ARMED FORCES AND THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM

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I

Not unreasonably, a recent analysis has insisted that our present world society may be considered dynamically pluralist only to the extent that "it aims at the peaceful realization of international political and social justice, excluding any sort of colonialism, neo-colonialism, or hegemony" (Schneider 1979 (45), pp. 24, 29). By such a definition, attention is being drawn to the fact that it simply would not do to label as "pluralist" an existing international environment where economic, political, and military threats, pressures, destabilizing acts, direct aggressions (interventions), and hegemonic control are acknowledged facts, the capacity for thermonuclear "overkill" a manifest reality, and ecocide (as much as genocide) a distinct possibility. Put in another way, the threat systems of mutual deterrence side by side with unilateral intervention, the social costs of uncontrolled growth, and the "economics" of Third World hunger in the presence of First World abundance have added up to a hierarchical, discretionary, substantially irrational world "order" that should give pluralists pause before crowning it with the laurels of their terminology (which they might be tempted to do, for instance, by stating the obvious - that a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors, including organizations, does indeed appear on the international stage).

Recognizing the dilemma, Johan Galtung has attempted to introduce a normative dimension by (1) listing prerequisites for a pluralist world society in the above-defined sense, and (2) linking the multi- to the single-society level. Thus, a high degree of horizontal and vertical mobility, an egalitarian minimal income, participatory democracy, and the renunciation of reigning over foreign societies in space, as well as - by responsible planning of resources - over future generations in time would have to correspond for the single and for world society (cf. Galtung 1970 (15), pp. 178, 186 ss., 215). Because these are structural requirements, Galtung has termed his concept "structural pluralism".

Galtung's considerations point to the interrelation between national and international social changes: If it appears extremely doubtful that states and societies characterized by varying degrees of monism (or - less candidly - limited pluralism) might constitute, between themselves, a pluralist world order, it also stands to rea-

son that any one society attempting to advance in the direction of "more" structural pluralism would be laboring under pronounced difficulties in a less than pluralist international environment. Moreover, by demanding a cessation of intervention into the affairs of other (smaller, weaker) societies, Galtung underscores the necessity of finally including the military institution into pluralist analysis - a point of particular importance for the reflections submitted below. And finally, when Galtung resorts to a normative approach, additionally coining the term "structural" pluralism, he more than merely hints at the familiar fact that semantic confusion over concepts like pluralism ia a likely occurrence: Considering the crucial role such concepts are wont to play in legitimizing and stabilizing existing power structures, lip service is being paid to them by the most diverse socio-political groups.

The first task, then, would consist in outlining more distinctly what, hereafter, will be meant when talking about that effort "to construct a theory of the place of the State in the great society" (Laski 1977 (29), Preface to the 1st ed. of 1925) that came to be called pluralism.

II

When the concept of pluralism was elaborated during the first two decades after 1900, it was conceived initially - although this is frequently and conveniently forgotten - as a critical political theory - a political philosophy attempting to "formulate the fundamental content of freedom and democracy" (cf. Gettell 1924 (16): 470; Magid 1941 (33): 65). Pluralist analysis strove to link political and socio-economic levels of organization and influence. Its results suggested that the present system of property, by virtue of the concentration of power it implied, made "the political personality of the average citizen ineffective for any serious purpose" (Laski 1921 (28): IX); and that the accompanying economic philosophy had much too often resulted in the virtual "crushing of individuals" (Follett 1918 (13): 170).

The conclusion, at the time, was that "no political democracy can be real that is not as well the reflection of an economic democracy... The present system of property does not in the least involve

the present technique of industrial direction" (Laski 1919 (27): 38; id. 1925 (29): 112). Initial pluralism, in a nutshell, used "socialism to shape a new interpretation for liberalism", criticizing a system that, "under cover of political democracy", left workers, in varying degrees, "to the mercy of the industrial autocrat" (Griffith 1933 (18): 78, 79).

Such was the essence of original pluralism. Over the subsequent decades, however,a definite lack of acknowledging and researching economic constraints has seemed to persist in pluralist, group-orientied thinking: If "pluralism's embrace of positive government first put it at an ideological pole opposite capitalism..., the two apparent antitheses ultimately disappeared... Capitalism and pluralism were not actually synthesized, however; in a sense, they absorbed each other" (Lowi 1979 (32): 35). For the process observed by Lowi, economic as well as political reasons may be discerned. Politically, when the rise of communism and fascism seemed to suggest "the similarities between the extreme Right and the extreme Left and the dangers of mass movements", a "modern" pluralism sprang up, continuing to be haunted by the twin specters of radicalism and totalitarianism (cf. Rogin 1967 (41): 78, 79). Economically, the "modern" version of the pluralist concept has been favored by the fact that the structure of capitalist economies has come to be dominated by oligopolies and monopolistic competition - by "group phenomena" (Latham 1952 (30): 5): No longer a special case, oligopoly is "the most frequent market form of modern economies" (Sylos-Labini 1969 (49): 14).

Oligopoly capitalism, however, has continued to work to the disadvantage of the average citizen - even if integrated into multifarious pluralist groups and associations - by means of five separate, if interconnected mechanisms (for most of the following, cf. already Eisfeld 1972 (10): esp. chs. XI, XVI, XVII):

(1) Pursuing tactics of integration and collusion, oligopolistic firms have advanced from "price takers" to "price makers". Their "administered" prices show a perverse flexibility over the business cycle, preparing the way for stagflation. As effective external (public) controls over these groups' pricing and investment-financing power, the anti-trust, monetary, and fiscal tools of interventionist governments have proved inadequate.

(2) With regard to sales, assets, and number of employees, large corporations have developed into social and public (rather than individual and private) institutions, comparable to whole nations. Although every such corporation is, in fact, a "body politic" with an "internal government" (cf. Dahl 1959 (9): 3), it is, however, neither subject to an effective internal (private) control, because the typical small stockholder, for all practical purposes, has become "disfranchised" (Gordon 1961 (19): 160).

(3) The privileges of oligopoly are reinforced by the privileges of quasi-monopoly (cf. Preiser 1971 (40): 136 ss.): Owning or controlling property advances elasticity in the conduct of life, while lack of property still forces relative rigidity upon the wage-earner.

(4) While trade unions have, at least within certain limits, increased the independence of wage-earning blue-collar workers, the compliance and docility of salaried white-collar employees (their "other-directedness", in Riesman's famous expression) has increased with the grouping of business firms into ever larger organizational units. White-collar strata, however, have been growing, in absolute numbers and in proportion, in the course, and due to the implied logic, of economic development.

(5) Finally, multinational corporations have come to decree "part and parcel of what happens in national economies, without" - again - "individual governments sufficiently controlling or checking their power" (Mielke 1973 (35): 367 ss.) - in foreign exchange policy by transferring short-term liquid assets; in fiscal policy by shifting profits via transfer-pricing; in wage policy by transferring production facilities and investment outlays between countries. For these transnational oligopolies, "the markets of the Third World (form) an important battleground", the outcome of the battle contributing to the decision on "oligopoly equilibrium in the developed (Western) world itself", while the difficulties they are able to create "may well inhibit Europe's ability to cope with its internal problems" (cf. Hymer/Rowthorn 1970 (20): 91) - a subtle hint at the already referred-to fact that any attempt to realize more participatory pluralist structures on a national level may be internationally undercut.

To the extent, then, that oligopolies and monopolistic competition

are group phenomena, and the policies of interventionist governments can be ascribed to organized group influences, "modern" pluralism may be considered as a theory adequate to interventionist oligopoly capitalism. Simultaneously, however, its inherent anti-hierarchical, anti-monist, participatory implications (conflicting with a mere group approach analytically centering on existing large-scale organizations) qualify pluralism to normatively transcend the participatory barriers structurally imbedded in the present socio-political system.

A "normative initiative" implying structural changes (cf., for the term, Falk 1982 (12a):6 ss.) and termed "socialist pluralism" will be considered below. Before proceeding to that, however, it will be necessary to explore first some of the limits of present-day pluralism inherent in the armaments race and the military institution proper, in order to be later able to include attempts at surmounting these barriers into discussing the normative challenge posed by pluralism.

III

Concerning the motives and behavior of economic, political, and military "oligopolistic giants", fundamental parallels have long been recognized (cf. Rothschild 1971 (42): 28/29). Researched in a more systematic way, they may well provide an analytical framework for a more comprehensive understanding of the existing limits to national and international pluralism.

For the more modest purposes of the present survey, however, it would seem sufficient to note that the tendency of pluralism "to function only in certain sectors, whereas others remain highly authoritarian" (Beyme 1980a (4): 97) does not apply, of course, merely to the economic base of society. Instead, a more far-reaching "system of limited pluralism" (ibid.: 95) has been diagnosed, for instance, by empirically analyzing the West German case - the sectors of the party and interest groups systems, of regional groupings, of public philosophy and ideology (the "legitimizing", as compared to the production and distributional spheres), of the mass media and the educational system (cf. Beyme 1979 (3): passim; id. 1980a (4): passim).

When the concept of sector pluralism was first formulated a decade

and a half ago, three sectors, because of their hierarchical, authoritarian structure, were immediately designed as "from a pluralist viewpoint, institutions apart": governmental bureaucracy in general; the foreign policy apparatus in particular; finally, the armed forces (cf. Narr 1969 (36): 59, 62, 67). Concerning the latter, Narr even at the time noted that "a not insignificant part of politics is determined by military considerations in the largest sense", emphasizing that it were "inconsistent" to leave the military domain - as at present - outside the scope of pluralism.

Some consequences of West Germany's rearmament may serve as a first instance to illustrate the importance military developments are apt to acquire for Western socio-political systems - and the research myopia that has resulted in a failure of political science to link just such developments to the problem of maintaining (not to speak of extending) already limited pluralist structures.

At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Germany was formally demilitarized. The Federal Republic of Germany, after 1949, existed without armed forces (not counting frontier protective troops) for six years - though not, of course, as an entirely sovereign state. A "military constitution" proper was inserted into the West German Basic Law only in 1956, after the latter had been amended two years earlier by assigning legislative competence in defense matters to the federal parliament. In 1955, West Germany joined the North Atlantic Alliance; during the same year, the first regiments were formed. Hardly two decades later, they had expanded into the largest conventional force in Europe, disposing of 12 army divisions and altogether 460,000 regular service-men. These, plus 180,000 civilian employees working in the armed forces administration - not including the 120,000 civilians employed by the allied troops stationed in West Germany -, by 1973 accounted for 12.5% of all government personnel (cf. Schmidt 1975 (44): 28).

West Germany's steady military spending is acting, in budgetary terms, as a constraint on welfare and social security expenditure, thus contributing to thwart - under conditions of mass unemployment - the established pluralist principle of offering a "new" (or even, hopefully, "fair") deal to those social groups whose living conditions are deteriorating. The build-up of an armament industry has resulted in entrepreneurial and labor pressure for the continuing production

of new (plus the additional export of existing) weapons systems, thereby undermining the support for and democratic legitimacy of defense cuts and contributions to more comprehensive disarmament efforts (which would most certainly have to be considered as advancing national and international pluralism). Finally, just to touch upon a third of several more relevant questions, available data suggest that universal military training propagates a "subculture" characterized by a "militarization of needs" - rigidities of perception and conduct tending to offset the development of less conventional standards that would coincide with pluralist norms.

As far as military spending is concerned, the West German government domestically is wont to refer to those expenditures designated by the federal budget for defense purposes, confronting them with social welfare spending and arguing that the latter has continued to receive "clear priority" (for details, cf. Bielfeldt 1977 (6): 58 ss.). When referred to in the context of the government's foreign policy obligations, however, the expenditures cited according to the accepted NATO definition are those "specifically (made) to meet the needs of the armed forces". Over the last decade, the latter figure has annually exceeded the former by 20 to 23% (cf. Krasemann 1985 (23): 64). More important, while (from 1980 to 1984) the federal budget, in current prices, rose by 14.4%, defense spending increased out of proportion (by 18.8%), with labor and social security spending falling behind (up 15.6%), and expenditures for children, families and health even decreasing by 9.7% (cf. id.: 70). In spite of decreasing public revenues and efforts to reduce the national debt, defense spending is still given highest priority, so that the continuing military build-up is at least indirectly financed out of non-defense cuts. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the "warfare-welfare tradeoff" (K. Peroff) has been even much more conspicious.

The West German government has actively encouraged first the build-up and then the concentration of an armament industry (for details on, for instance, the aviation industry, cf. Schlotter 1975 (43): 82 ss.; for figures on domestic armament expenditures during the 60s and 70s, cf. Schmidt 1975 (44): 36). Thus, firms on one hand have become increasingly dependent on armament contracts for their

existence; on the other hand, however, the defense industry's increasingly oligopolistic structure is permitting large corporations to contract out from under more restrictive governmental armament planning by first increasing their capacity and then campaigning for the production and purchase of additional weapons systems, arguing that otherwise their firms "would collapse" (cf. again, for West Germany, Schlotter 1975 (43): 35 ss.; for the U.K. and especially the U.S., where the strategy can be observed on a much larger scale, cf. Prins 1983 (39): 150 ss.).

Thus, not only does the goal of "reconversion", of economic readjustment to civil production (including the relevant post-World War II experience in demilitarized West Germany, but especially in the United States, where some systematic federal planning was done), remain excluded from corporate considerations (for a survey of the reconversion literature, cf. Albrecht 1979 (1): passim). Also, organized as well as unorganized labor is included into the pressure for self-perpetuation of the defense industry: In 1975/76, shop committees from West Germany's large defense contractors clamored for governmental licensing of "stop-gap orders from non-tension regions", because otherwise "colleagues who had carried out their duty to the state" would stand in peril of losing their jobs; by 1980, with unemployment mounting, the personnel of the Howaldt shipyard in Kiel struck for several hours (with their management's consent) to stress their demand for the production and delivery of two submarines (which had come under public criticism) to the Chilean dictatorship (cf. Mechtersheimer 1977 (34): 137; Rodejohann 1985 (40a):133).

The problem of the values and norms of large parts of the population, which these events touch upon, gains additional saliency if the inadequate realization of the "citizen in uniform"-concept by the military institution proper is included into the analysis. The concept, introduced in the '50s as a deliberate break with Germany's military past, was meant to work through "intra-unit guidance" centering on the draftees' civic education, but by degrees reduced to military "human relations" and anti-totalitarian indoctrination (cf. Bredow 1973 (8): 101 ss.; Bald et al. 1981 (2): 137 ss.). This failure has tended to reinforce, in draftees, psycho-social deficiencies acquired during their pre-military socialization - those rigidities that were already pointed out above -, or at least forced

upon them a segmentation of attitudes into "conventional" and "post-conventional" patterns required by specific roles (cf. Bald et al. 1981 (2): 151 ss.; Wakenhut 1979 (51): 626 ss.), but hardly conducive to the development of a profoundly pluralist political culture.

If much more empirical research appears necessary to further substantiate preliminary results like these, one of the problems involved is precisely that such research has not been promoted by a profound concern to systematically analyze these and other implications of the military sector as to their consequences for pluralist structures and norms in West Germany and elsewhere.

IV

Italy, the second "axis" country defeated during World War II, became a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. In NATO strategy, it enjoyed a limited role for two decades: Its army was to guard the "Gorizia corridor" against a Soviet invasion through Yugoslavia, and the country against "domestic subversion"; it was also assigned combat tasks in the Mediterranean. Between 1976 and 1979, the army was modernized, and the fleet as well as the air force were beefed up, accompanied by an attempt at a more profound integration of the armed forces into civil society (for details, cf. Tonello/Finkelstein 1984 (50): 2).

In 1979, Italy accepted the deployment of 112 cruise missiles at Comiso in Sicily (West Germany was the only NATO country to take 108 Pershing II in addition to 96 cruise missiles). Following the appointment of the Cossiga administration, the defense budget increased by 106% over the succeeding three years. Italy, now "the United States' outstanding ally" (Reagan), was inserted into the U.S. strategy of "power projection" to the Middle East and further to South West Asia; the Mediterranean (according to former defense minister Lelio Lagorio) graduated from NATO's "southern flank" - which is supposed to have shifted, unofficially, to the Gulf of Hormuz - to the alliance's "central front". At present, Sicily, with the bases of Comiso, Sigonella (6th U.S. fleet) and Birgo (AWACS), the new military airports at Pantelleria and Lampedusa, finally the training (and, possibly, cruise missile dispersion) sites under construction around Mistretta, Nicosia, and Gangi, is being militariz-

ed to the extent of being changed into a "veritable American aircraft /and missile/ carrier" (for the details and the quote, cf. Tonello/Finkelstein: ibid.).

The earlier remarks concerning West Germany reflected upon developments on a national level; the foregoing observations refer to effects derived from international interaction. The consequences of the internationalization of capital have been the subject of much scholarly and political debate - although even there contributions from the pluralist camp have been rare. In comparison, the internationalization of militarism seems to have gone largely undiscussed. To grasp realistically what is happening, the traditional notion of militarism needs to be replaced no less than the more recent concept of an isolated military-industrial complex. Instead, "civil" society itself has to be pictured as moving in the direction of a system in which the distinction between (formerly civilian) policy and (formerly military) strategy is being eroded by the common momentum of political-ideological-military-scientific-corporate business-(even organized labor) interaction to a point of continuous technological, manufacturing and political "warfare overachievement", in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms (for this attempt at a comprehensive formulation, cf. the suggestions by Prins 1983 (39): 136, 148 ss., and Senghaas 1972 (46): 11 ss.).

Such militarization is brought about "subtly, noiselessly, hardly contested anywhere" (Senghaas 1977 (47): 223). Like a disease, the ideologies and policies of ever new "compensating armaments" are spreading through the First and Second and from both to the Third World, where the armed forces are increasingly misused for counter-insurgency purposes - for "containing" social conflicts by the armed forces intervening "to jail, torture, or kill political prisoners, to enforce censorship and the banning of political parties, to deny other civil liberties and human rights" (Forsberg 1984 (14): 312).

Increasingly, too, U.S. "vital" interests and the military means to secure them have become globally defined, as indicated by conceptions like "power projection" (signifying the capability to intervene), "forward deployed presence" or "integrated battlefield" (the latter referring to development of the ability "to deliver

conventional and/or nuclear fires throughout the spectrum of a battle...in all U.S. Army units worldwide" /General Donn R. Starry, now in charge of the Rapid Deployment Force, quoted by Evangelista 1983 (12): 53, 57/. The USSR, as far as its resources are apt to permit, can be counted upon to follow this change in strategical emphasis. It should not be a matter of much conjecture that the socio-political structures, the values and norms promoted by an ever more "sophisticated" global militarization not only pose a medium- or even short-term threat to the survival of the human race, but an immediate challenge to pluralists everywhere.

V

To critical observers, the inherent limits of capitalist sector pluralism have suggested that "prospects to realize a more genuine pluralism, with more than merely formal equality of chances for every group, are much more pronounced under democratic socialism than even under the most democratic system with a capitalist economy" (Beyme 1980b (5): 40/41). When oligopoly capitalism was thus critically assessed, it had already become apparent that "actually existing" socialism had degenerated into monopoly socialism (cf. Kuron/Modzelewski 1969 (26): esp. 12 s.), and pluralist thought had reasserted its normative strength: Pluralism came to be recognized as "an inner requirement of socialism", because such a society "will entail neither the disappearance of differences nor the ceasing of strife and dissension". Present "rigid" pluralism might, under socialism, be transformed into a "dialogical" and "dialectical" pluralism. This, in turn, would require that "the judiciary, the economic administration, the system of education, science etc. must possess their autonomous organization and be able to express their 'partial views'" (Lombardo-Radice 1965 (31): 1,3). Such organizational autonomy should expressly include trade unions and should also extend "to those people and groups who do not support socialist options". The introduction of socio-economic pluralism would free existing rights from structural limitations "because of which they have dried up in capitalist society" (Ingrao 1964 (21): 70, 72, 75).

These positions directly influenced the Czechoslovak discussions before and in 1968 (cf. Klokocka 1966 (24): 74, 78; id. 1968 (25): 33). The necessity not only to "recognize the pluralist structure

of socialist society", but to institutionalize "guarantees for the confrontation of interests" (id. 1968: 35, 41), was accepted during the short-lived Czechoslovak experiment, causing the "reform communists" of that country to project workers' councils, political, producers' and consumers' associations as "multiple autonomous subjects" of the economic and political process (cf. Slama 1968 ([48]): 192, 195; Pelikán 1969 (38): 2o2 ss.).

Such conceptions, developed after the "discovery of pluralist socialism" (Slama, ibid.: 191 ss.), seek to diminish, as far as institutionally possible, rigidity, inequality and apathy inherent in capitalist and "actually existing" socialist societies. They center on the self-management of blue- and white-collar employees in firms, reinforced consumers' rights, indicative economic planning, and a more profound and continuous fusion of "everyday" social with periodical "political" activity through a network of organizational groupings.

But what sort of tasks would have to be assigned to the military? And what structural changes would have to be wrought inside the armed forces to prevent military - rigid, hierarchical - values "spilling over" into society, and military influence fusing with other interests into the tangled web of relationships substituted above for the less accurate concept of the military-industrial complex, as introduced by Dwight D. Eisenhower in his presidential farewell address?

For a short time, the Portuguese officers - the so-called Armed Forces Movement, or MFA - who overthrew the Caetano dictatorship in 1974, tried to provide an answer. These officers expressly advocated a "socialist pluralism". In their declaration of June 21, 1975, they affirmed that "socialist pluralism includes, both in theory and in practice, co-existence between various forms and concepts of the building of the socialist society...(and) recognition of the existence of various political parties, even though they do not necessarily defend socialist options... Thus the MFA repudiates the implantation of socialism by violent or dictatorial means." From the changes the MFA officers attempted to introduce into their own units, and from the consequences when they finally failed, something can be learnt.

VI

The Portuguese Armed Forces Movement owed its existence to the increasingly savage and hopeless colonial wars fought in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique for over a decade. Increasingly, soldiers felt frustrated with the manner they were being used against their own, their country's and other peoples' needs. Professional grievances served as a first rallying-point, followed by a rising discontent over what came to be perceived as deeper-lying political reasons for the professional malaise. "Decolonization - Democratization - Development" therefore became the MFA motto. It was explained in the MFA program by considering that the dictatorship had not succeeded in defining an overseas policy leading to peace; therefore, such a policy had to be elaborated by democratically elected representatives. Moreover, the drastic deficits and structural distortions of the Portuguese economy, accompanied by severe social inequalities and inherited from forty years of autocracy under the Salazar and Caetano regimes, were too extreme to have escaped the officers' attention; they explained the "development" part of the motto.

However, the "politicized" officers were also very much aware of the danger a mere "operational" attitude extolling traditional military discipline and professionalism over structural change - if it continued to prevail among the armed forces - would imply for their program. These apprehensions were strengthened by the abortive "general's coup" led by former President António de Spínola in March, 1975. Accordingly, the MFA intended to change both the hierarchical relations between the upper and lower armed forces echelons and the estranged relations between the military and civil society (for a comprehensive analysis, cf. Eisfeld 1984 (11): esp. parts III/IV).

Initially, the MFA was a mere officers' - mainly a captains' - movement. However, already in 1975 N.C.O.s -non-coms - had organized a first national meeting. When delegate assemblies of the army, navy and air force, as well as on a comprehensive armed forces level, were institutionalized by March, 1975, officers, non-coms and privates obtained representation to the ratio of 4 : 1 : 1.

If officers thus kept their numerical superiority, the move, for

military thinking, may still be considered revolutionary. A "new" soldier, politically informed and alert, came to be in demand. Calling for the replacement of simple orders from above by group participation in decision-making processes, a dynamic understanding of command and discipline was promoted. The intended "dynamization" of the armed forces aimed at nothing less than a "cultural revolution" of value changes enabling the troops to participate in the political mobilization of society and in the material development of the country. Termed the"Alliance People-MFA", that perspective was doubtlessly influenced by the "hearts and minds"-campaign, including civil development tasks, that had been part of the MFA's African experience during the colonial wars.

"Detachments of dynamization" were added to the staffs and units of the three services, always including non-coms and privates besides officers. They had already been preceded by "detachments of well-being" that sought to combine social services with democratic education. Apart from the delegate assemblies, the new detachments developed into the most important feature of the reorganized armed forces.

The attempted "democratization of the barracks" - the combination of politicization, participation and pluralism - suggests an important contribution to the theory and practice of socialist pluralism. If one considers the test of democracy not to consist in the exceptional case of war, but in the normalcy of peace, the task of advancing the troops' homogeneity and uniformity as a supposed prerequisite for fighting efficiency is replaced by the job of establishing the armed forces as part and parcel of civil society (cf. Greiffenhagen 1973 (17): 38/39).

This would require the above-mentioned dynamic perception of command and obedience, allowing for organized group processes and individual participation not merely on the technical - the "team" - level of handling increasingly complex weapons systems. Considering, moreover, that the political-military-academic-industrial "complex" already referred to does seem on the verge of exerting (again, in Eisenhower's words) a "total", i. e. "economic, political, even spiritual" influence (cit. after Prins 1983 (39): 134), pluralists should feel doubly encouraged to tackle the task of advancing a new military structure, whence alternative political "outputs" -

"inputs" to the public, the parties', parliamentary and governmental levels - might result from group discussion and participation. The West German "Darmstadt signal", a group of 150 officers and N.C.O.s that, having emerged during the missile deployment debate of 1983, continues to speak up publicly and in seminars for disarmament steps and alternatives to prevailing nuclear strategies, provides an example of such - as yet informal - participation.

At the same time, there is no reason why the armed forces' human and material resources should only be used for civil purposes domestically and abroad, after catastrophic events (floods, fires, famines, earthquakes) have occurred. Portugal's infra-structural deficiencies certainly determined the extent to which the MFA stressed the military role in national reconstruction. However, the basic principle again was that of a peaceful mission, using to advantage the technological capacities of a modern army and inserting the troops into every-day life.

VII

Civil-military integration and military democratization would be apt to promote the soldiers' qualifications, their knowledge, their capability to contribute to joint reflection and action. They would favor decentralization, the determination and practice of action in small groups; they would tend to work against a hierarchy that is proving, to the every-day experience of civil and military life in modern societies, neither humane nor effective. Moreover, research in military sociology has demonstrated the importance of small group-solidarity all the more under combat conditions.

The emergence of "participatory armed forces" might create essential prerequisites for gradually resorting to "transarmament" by eliminating, in stages, "the more provocative, aggressive, or escalatory aspects of armaments" and defining national defense "in the narrowest and strictest sense" (Forsberg 1984 (14): 287, 310). Such a process would, of course, have to imply institutional and attitudinal change occurring "in a gradual, interactive manner" (id.: 309) - which is one of the reasons why the problem of norms and values was touched upon before. Step-by-step, present retaliatory and especially nuclear deterrence policies would have to be

replaced by a "mixed" strategy combining conventional military, paramilitary (guerilla) and non-military, i. e. social, means (cf. Galtung 1984 (15): passim).

Such an "inoffensive defense" - which has also been called "defensive defense" or "defensive deterrence" - is based on the recognition that nuclear defense would equal nuclear aggression in literally annihilating a society's own population and own territory. Inoffensive defense is "as much a signal of political resistance as it is of military defense" (Kaldor 1983 (22): 14). It implies a fundamental alternative to the present East-West threat system. Its emphasis on small, mobile, highly autonomous units (using precion-guided weapons), combined with civil disobedience and non-violent action of a country's organizations and associations, clearly favors the sort of "participatory" armed forces advocated here.

Transarmament measures would combine domestic with foreign policy effects: In foreign policy by confidence-building measures and cooperation, domestically by strengthening participatory structures in civil and military institutions. According to Max Weber, the large corporation and the army have been the two institutions most relevant for disciplining the citizens of industrial societies. Pluralist theory has hardly commenced including the first into its systematic reasoning. It would do well to finally turn to the second - if only for the fact that the scientific community's "fundamental ethos, which puts a high value on curiosity, veracity and testing, and a very strong taboo on threat as an instrument of changing human images", is in an "almost grotesque contradiction" with the ethos of present national defense. Neglecting to recognise that contradiction, or even cooperating with defense organizations, today may be equivalent with contributing (willigly or unwillingly) to the destruction of the human race - something every scientist "should be utterly ashamed of" (Boulding 1984 (7): 107, 108).

VIII

The Portuguese effort, referred to above, started to run off the rails when the Armed Forces Movement attempted to act, simultaneously, as "motor of the revolutionary process". Ideological

cleavages between military factions were prone to appear to the extent that political parties (and foreign governments) now tried to impress their political projects upon the MFA. In the end, a revolt of left-wing units was suppressed by carefully pre-arranged mesaures equal to a "centrist coup" that expanded into a general purge and terminated the MFA.

As a consequence, professional - "operational" - officers came to the fore again. Delegate assemblies and detachments of dynamization were immediately abolished. During 1976, U.S. and West German military advisory groups were admitted into the country; extensive military aid followed. The armed forces were to be equipped with "sophisticated" weapons, to be tied to the "common defense" of the NATO territory, and to draw their "professional pride" from that "legitimate" task (Pell 1976 (37): 9).

When the Luso-American agreement over the Azores facilities was extended to 1991, the U.S. was allowed to use the Lajes air base not only for NATO purposes, but also for "Middle East contingencies". Portugal resigned herself to the role of intermediary for the projection of American power (the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force) to the Middle East and possibly further to South West Asia. Or, put in another way: After the development in the direction of socialist pluralism had been turned back, and along with the "re-professionalization" of her armed forces, Portugal became a "quiet pasture" for the global military planning of another power.

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SELF-MANAGEMENT AND PLURALISM

Sources, Results and Problems of "Pluralism of Self-Management Interests" in Yugoslavia

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SELF-MANAGEMENT AND PLURALISM

(Sources, Results and Problems of "Pluralism of Self-Management Interests" in Yugoslavia)

A considerable portion of political thought and political science holds the view that the essential aspect of Marxism is monism and that this is also the chief characteristic of socialist democracy which finds its inspiration in Marxism. This stance is not only advocated by adversaries of socialism but also by a number of its protagonists. The latter often maintain that the term "pluralism" is unacceptable, also because it puts too much emphasis on special and diverse interests, while it disregards what is common and unified.

We maintain-and we are not alone in this-that (1) this way of considering the link between Marxism (or Marxist-inspired socialism) and socialism is unacceptable. This is realized and admitted even by some of those authors who usually do not opt for socialism, but still reject the traditional equating of socialism with monism.

If it so happened, in the course of history, that socialism was equated with monism, this does not stem form Marxism (if we understand by this Marx` thought and autentic thought issuing from it), neither from the nature itself of socialism but is above all the consequence of historical conditions in which "early socialism" (2) appeared and evolved. We are referring in particular to the fact that socialism affimed itself as a system mainly in countries which carried out a social revolution by force, which were economically underdeveloped and were characterized by long-standing tradition of authoritarian rule and lack of experience in liberalism. These countries also experinced the armed pressure of counterrevolution and they had to concentrate, at the beginning of the post-revolutionary period, their economic and political resources (initial socialist accumulation), etc.

If the above explains the tendency of early socialism to lean towards the practice of state and party monism it does not of course in any way excuse the occurrences which surpassed the objectively conditioned forms of monism in various forms, which have been more or less critically and uncompromisingly evaluated by recent socialist theory and practice (breach of the rule of law, "the cult of the persionality", in "stalinism" etc.) In general, we may say that the first phase of monism has been

passed, but in contemporary socialist thought and political science there exist considerable discrepanicies not only in terms of the evaluation of the past but also in terms of what is the alternative for this initial monism (which has the characteristics of "administrative socialism","bureaucratic centralism, "etatism", etc.). We may state that there are at least two answers offered. Both of them admit that in socialism there necessarily exist the dialectics of contradictions and contradictions of interests (3). But in general terms, the difference between the two is that one of them also admits "pluralism" along with ackonowledging the legitimacy of the contradiction of interests; the other still contends that for a socialist society the unity of interests is of primer importance, while the differences in interests are of secundary importance. This is why "pluralism" has been and is repudiated and "monism" accepted as a term suitable to characterize the essence of a socialist democracy.

I. Reasons for an Explicit Option for "Pluralism"

1. In the Yugoslav political thought and political science-which, as it is known, opted in recent years for a specific brand of pluralism - this option did not occur without internal hesistations, opositions and doubts. Although the Yugoslav socialist revolution displayed some characteristics which later contributed to the option for a specific form of pluralism, some of the essential circumstances, in which socialist revolution took place and socialist transformation began, were in many ways similar to some general characteristics of the history of early socialism.

Socialist revolution developed in the form of a national liberation struggle against foreign occupants and their allies. In 1945 the country was extremely beckward, with the working class in considerable minority. As a political community, it existed before the war only for a short time without succeeding in affirming the forms of democratic governement which would have acknowledged all the legitimate interests (the national issue) etc. In the first few post-war years, a number of factors contributed to the concentration of economic and political resources. This was undoubtly the chief reason that Yugoslavia`s leading political forces decided to adopt a monistic system (although it never was some kind of pure monism since it included federalism, etc.) To this undoubtedly contributed the then dominant practice (model) of socialism, as it was shaped in the political experience accumulated up to that time, wich as we have already mentioned, particulary stressed monism as an essential charachteristies of socialism.

2. Nevertheless, in the 70`s socialist thought and political science in Yugoslavia positively opted for (for a specific) pluralism (5). On conceptual and theoretical works and political documents was founded a thesis which was also unusual for the then dominant political and scientific vocabulary in this country, i.e., that "pluralism" is one of the essential characteristics of socialism which is based on self-management. From that moment on, we refer in Yugoslav political life and practice to the "pluralism of self-management di interest" or to "self--management"pluralism" as a rew form of socialist democracy. It was not` we think, a question of superficially accepting the term "pluralism," but was a well thought-out concept based on the realization that"because of the multitude of interests in society arising from class, economic, political, social and other considerations in life, work and creativity of the people, it is clear that there can be neither democracy nor human freedom if man is not able to enjoy a free ecpression of his interests and his ideas, of his aspiration and creative views "(7).

Although the concept "pluralism" - we must of, course, be aware of it - at the abstract level, stresses primarily the diversity, multicplicity with-out stressing unity, in the form of "self-management pluralism," represents a political and scientific inovation, which, despite its limitations, problems in its implementation, cannot be denied to be of exeptional significance (8).

3. Such an explicit choice for self-management as "pluralism" was a logical out come of a series of social and historical, spiritual and political factors, which had an impact on the solution of the dilemma faced by every more advanced socialist society. We must nevertheless maintain that we still do not have a relatively comprehensive synthetic study on the origins of self-management as pluralism. On the other hand, the realization that the idea of pluralism of self-management interests has deep historical roots in our country as well as in the world is gaining ground in social sciences. Let us succinctly enumerate only a few main sources of this pluralistic concept. (9).

- The option for "self-management pluralism" is above all a logical consequence of the connection between the Yugoslav concept of socialism and self-management orientation: does not self-management, by definition, mean the negation of monistic management of society? Does it not presuppose a larger number of relatively automomous economic, social, cultural, subjects which express and must express their subjectivity in the political arena? Does this not mean as well the transcendence of every unilateral transmission system?
- The connection between the option for pluralism and history of the post-war-self-management in Yugoslavia draws our attention to broader theoretical sources which can provide support and actually support the idea of self-management and thereby also the idea of specific self-management pluralism. First of all, we must mention some essential aspects

of Marx(10) and Engels(11) theory ranging from their criticism of the "political state" and classical politcal representation to the idea of the "whithering away" of the state and particularly of the free association of producers. A considerable impact on the origins of self-management had Lenin's concept of the state and revolution, particularly his views on the soviets and interest motivation in the life of a post-revolutionary society (NEP, etc.) (12).

It was actually the concept of "council democra y" as it was developed by quite a number of socialist thinkers in the years between 1917 and 1925 (Rosa Luxemburg, Karl K rsch, Antonio Gramsci, Pannekoek, austro-marxists, etc.) (13) that contained essential ideas, which represent the origin of self-management pluralism. And the same holds true for some other sources (such as quild-socialism, etc.), but they also belong directly in to the history of pluralism.

- We must also not overlook the significance the history of Yugoslav political thought has had for the origin of the idea of self-management and also self-management pluralism. Here we have in mind such thinkers as Svetozar Marković, Ivan Cankar(14) etc.) from the standpoint of their views on the active role of workers in socialist society as well from the standpoint of their views on federalism as a natural form of binding together the Yugoslav nations.
- Factors which were significant for the origion of self-management pluralism stemmed also from socialist practice from the Paris Commune (15) and experiences of the October Revolution (16) to thef National Liberation (17) War in our country. We must refer to the elements if specific "revolutionary pluralism" (18) as one of the actual characteristics of socialist revolution in Yugoslavia, which must have exercised and actually did exercise a considerable influence-despite later fluctuations-on post-war development of Yugoslavia and on the final option for self-management pluralism.
- Finally, we must not forget the negative experience-domestic and world-wide-such as occurrences of bureaucratism, political alienation and other negative aspects of monism, also contributed to the concept of self-management pluralism. They were becoming increasingly less acceptable as post-revolutionary society developed economically and was being more and more socially articulated and demanded that new interests and new social subjects be expressed and accepted in the political system.

II. Self-management Pluralism as a Project, Institution and Practice

It is understandable that the identification of historical sources of socialist self-management pluralism represents only one important aspect of this phenomenon. If we wish to give an overall outline of this issue, at least three of its further aspects should be taken into account (each with many subdivisions). What we have in mind is that the self-management

pluralism is, first an ideological project; it is a set of institutions and, finally, a form of social and political practice. There have been many studies made on individual above-mentioned aspects and on all of them, although one could perhaps argue that there is still a lack of balanced, complex, empirically founded studies on this subject. In this paper which is macroscopic in its character, the three aspects can only be alluded to. Some practical results and problems of self-management pluralism will be treated in the next section of this contribution.

The history of self-management pluralism as a project in Yugoslavia overlaps with the development of self-management idea after the Warld War II in this country (19) (taking into account, of course, the older domestic and foreign sources which were mentioned above). It was developed by creative social thought and by social science. As a term and concept it was introduced after the conflict with Stalin and with the centralist statist conception of socialism by the end of the forties and at the beginning of the fifties. Its inception started with the idea of workers self-management which was soon expanded to all the important aspects of social life (2o). It began as a principle related to management at lower levels of society to reach, in a few years, the higher and upper level of the political system. It was formally limited, in the first years, only to what was later called "participation", and was consequently enlarged by new rights and competences, including the right to decide on expanded reproduction. If at the beginning it applied, in general terms, to the sphere of material interests it has become increasingly related to the issues of cultural creativity and freedom (moral interests) as well.

The structure of the self-management concept has become complex. It has been related - this should perhaps be mentioned in the first place - to a specific outlook on the idea of ownership in a post-revolutionary society: criticising the identification of social ownership, it launched the idea of "social ownership" as a form of property inherent to socialist self-management (21). Breaking with the monistic concept of state ownership - although not denying its legitimacy in specific historical conditions - was extremely important for the final explicit option for the specific brand of pluralism in a post-revolutionary society. It is this concept of ownership (with its many specific contradictions that must not be over-looked) upon which the relative autonomy of socialist economic enterprises has been built. This finally resulted in the institution of the "basic organisation of associated labour" as one of the basic elements of the socio-economic and sociopolitical system. The idea of autonomy of local government was another aspect of restructuring the original centralistic monistic state and of rebuilding a new structure of political system on the basis of local communities and communes as well (22). In addition, important changes have been introduced in the status of public services in the socioeconomic and political system. The sector of public services has been linked, by way of the principle of the "free exchange of labour", to the users of the services, while "self-management unions of interests"

were the institutional form through which the integration between production and public services was to be carried out (23). Although the state retained important regulatory and control functions in the service sector as well, its role was in this way nevertheless largely reduced and limited. By the socialization of the state ownership in the sphere of material production and by the deetatization of public services, introduction of the "self-management agreements" and "social comacts" as the fundamental method for reaching important decisions regarding common and general interests, it has been expected that the role of the state and the state apparatus was going to be gradually supplanted, by the role of the working class and working people. But some further ideas which are of crucial importance for understanding the multidimensional character of the concept of self-management pluralism in Yugoslavia should be added. Yugoslavia being a multinational state, it is extremely important how the interests of different nations and nationalities have been and are included in the self-management pluralism. In fact, the idea of national interests was one of hte generative factors and focal points of specific pluralism in Yugoslavia. There is no self-management pluralism without the pluralism of national interests as its constituent part (24). This realization has been one of the main reasons upon which the idea of a specific federalism in this country has been founded.

The system of self-management pluralism cannot exist as a loose coalition of particular interests. As any system, it should also consist of social and political mechanisms that would integrate its parts. The process of integration has been too weak, as it has been stated in social science and recent documents (26). Still, there are some basic elements in self-management pluralism which are intended to overcome particularism and localism and to aggregate the particular interests in larger common and general interests. Let us enumerate some of such crucial mechanisms, through which self-management pluralism, more or less successfully, attempts to reach a degree of unity without which no social and political system is viable. Four main integrative farces will be mentioned. The integration of particular interests is, first, based on the economic imperatives, which would connect the economic and social subjects viz. their interests on the basis of their economic motivations. The respect of objective laws of market economy, combined with adequate social planning, is expected to impose on the economic subjects rational behavior which would be in the long run helpful to economic and social development (27). It is generally estimated that arbitrary political decision concerning economic matters were in the past one of the main reasons for serious deficiencies in the economic policy (28). The delegate system (29), which was introduced to supplant the traditional representative principle, is a second vehicle of social and political integration. It links the interests of the primary interests communities to broader levels of sociopolitical system, from the basic organisation of associated labour and local communities and communes to the republic (province) and Federation. Articulated horizontally and vertically, the delegate system opens new avenues of voic-ing and integrating interests, although it has been less successful in their integration at broader levels of the political system. Third, sel-management pluralism is also integrated by the active role of conscious "subjective forces" of socialist society (3o). They englobe not only, as in their traditional meaning, the

sociopolitical organisations (League of Communists, Socialist Alliance etc.), but also science, culture, profesional role of public administration, etc. It is through these activities and organisations that the particularistic tendencies of self-management pluralism are to be overcome and general visions and interests be shaped. Finally, one should not disregard the role of voluntary association (31) as one of very important instruments of articulation and integration of interests in political system of self-management. It cannot be said that all the potentials of voluntary associations have been developed so far but they are more and more numerous and conscious of their role.

We should perhaps add that forces of social and political integration in self-management pluralism, as elswhere, a not a kind of pure advocates of common and general interests. They are also, as it has been proved in practice, affected by their own partucularistic interests (bureaucratism, professional corporatism, etc.) and by the pressures of other particular interests. This is not to deny the strategic role of crucial social forces and organisations in the process of aggregation of social and political interests but to point at the contradictory character of political process in the pluralism of self-managment interests as well.

Of course, only some dimensions of the ideological and institutional aspects of self-management pluralism have been mentioned (31a). From what has been said and also implied it follows that self-management pluralism is far from being an idyllic alternative to this or that form of socialist monism or multipartism.

It is not like an isolated garden in which a hundred flowers blossom in undisturbed traquillity. Social and political processes have rarely been implemented just as it was forseen. Ideas and institutions have to be tested by the hard facts of social and political realities. And they cannot be implemented overnight, particularly if they have an ambition te substantially change the relations of domination and emancipation (31b). Pluralism and this applies again to the self-management pluralism as well-is not only desirable, but also dangerous, as it has been recently aptly stated (31c).

We should be, I think, aware of this fact not to abandon the commitment to self-management pluralism, but to take it as an aspect of social and political reality which has its own rules of game. If it is understood as a new utopia, without considering the contemporary reality of the country and its international environment, the self-managment pluralism as a specific way of seeing and resolving the contradictions of our society could be jeopardized. If we are going to outline some problems and limits of self-management pluralism, this will be done primarily in the form of some examples without trying to be exhaustive. But before enumarating some of its problems and limits let us hint at some of its assets.

III. Some Results, Problems and Limits of Self-management Pluralism

1. The concept of self-management pluralism has clearly differentiated self-management and participation. Self-management, in its developed form, does not only mean participation in the implementation of decisions adopted from above, but is also the involvement in the shaping of policy, in all the phases of decision-making. It is therefore not limited to the consultative role of those concerned at the grass-roots level of economy (industrial democracy) but spreads, institutionally and according to its intention, from decision-making at the place of work and in local communities to other levels and other significant areas of social life. The propagation of self-management pluralism from "workers self-management" to "social self-management" confirms this process although practical implementation of self-management is still in many important cases at a level of participation (32). A clear-cut difference between self-management and participation is, though, of great importance because of long-term orientation in the development of self-management pluralism.

2. We can maintain that self-management pluralism means the beginning of transformational policy-making. Stemming from the criticism of the "political state", it criticizes the policy which limits itself, above all, to the sphere of state and party institutions and is based on formal dualism of the concrete human being and citizen, the civil society and the state (33). As much as it enlarges the area of self-management decision-making to the essential spheres of material production and public service, it just as much transforms the contents of the policy and propagates its scope. We could perhaps affirm that in that sense self-management pluralism is an integral part of present-day tendencies, which are encountered in all contemporary more developed societies, to transcend the narrow boundaries of the "old" (state and party) politics and to open new areas to the public: political life extends from the struggle for power to the decision-making in all public affairs, from "micro-level" (micro-politics) to decision-making at regional (mezzo-politics) and national levels (macro-politics), which is intended to create new links of foreign and domestic policy as well. In this way, the traditional relation between the state and the society begins to be transformed in a specific way, which is one of the fundamental problems of all contemporary, including socialist societies.

3. The concept of self-management pluralism is based on the realization that the development of a socialist society is characterised by the fact that with its growing complexity there actually appears an increasing number of interests stemming form the socialist society itself, i.e., they appear "within the people itself". Although it insists on the hegemonistic role

of interests of the working class, it does not interpret them as undifferentiated abstractions, but sees them in its internal articulation. This has two consequences: the interests of the working class themselves are articualted in various institutions (self-management, socio-political, state institutions) and furthermore the multi-layeredness and transcendental character of the interests of the working class are recognized, i.e., they are considered from the standpoint of their connection and overlapping with a number of other interests, which are characteristic of the concrete structure of a socialist society. Of key importance, in this context, is precisely the interconnection of interests of the working class with national interests. One of the positive impact of the concept of the interest of self-management pluralism., I think, is the strengthening of the policy of recognition of national independence and specific interests of Yugoslav nations and nationalities and, based on this, the building of a new form of self-management and cooperative federalism.

4. At a time when the issue of human freedom and human rights is in the forefront in contemporary political theory and practice, we must not overlook the significance of self-management pluralism in connection with these issue in terms of the actual situation and the program. Self-management pluralism preserves essential classical rights (of course not those linked with the monopoly of private property), and also introduces new rights by wich the contents and forms of existing rights have been expanded (34). These new rights are based on the right to self-management and on all rights derived from it. And this begins-through contradictory processes of development and retrogressions - to open new areas for the affirmation of man`s individual and collective social and political rights.

5. These new rights acquiring institutional frameworks and material basis, also expand the area for free creativity. Unbiased evaluation can-not argue the fact that one of the essential consequences of the concept of self-management pluralism in Yugoslavia is also a greater freedom in cultural creativity in the narrowest and the widest sense of the term. Not only that no artistic style has any formal advantage before others, but also the artistic and scientific production more and more deal with the so-called "taboo topics". Controversy is of course inevitable, and various misunderstandings and steps backwards occur as well. Nevertheless, open debate of the most sensitive problems bare witness to the new atmosphere, created by the pluralistic concept of socialist cultural policy (35).

6. The recognition of a plurality of interests in a socialist society represents the existence of political (socio-political) organizations as well. They act as factors of orientation and integration of the society. But at the same time this means a need to transform the traditional concept of the leading role of vanguard organization and to change the entire sistem of political and interest associations. Self-management pluralism means

criticism of the "political state" as well as criticism of political parties since it sees in both of them an obstacle to direct management by the people. Therefore it does not see any prospects neither in the renewal of monolithic monopartism, neither in the renewal of parliamentary multy-party system (36). The concept and pratical orientation of the democracy of self-management pluralism implies as well a new (relative) autonomy of political organizations and a new strengthening of associations of interest, which in the relationships of mutual responsibility, more intensive internal democratization and pronounced public activities are to perform supervision among themselves and supervision of state organs, while at the same time insuring room for expression, based on socialist self-management, of various ideas and formation of alternative policies. The leading role of vanguard organizations thus is not considered to be decreed, but must, in principle, continuously affirm itself in the struggle of opinions and obtain active consent of its members and citizens in public confrontations within the system of political organizations, associations of interest and state organs. An articulated system of political organizations, interest associations, self-management organs and state institutions is, one could add, also a potential basis for recruitment of a more rapid turnover of personnel, which carry out leading socio-political and self-management functions, as well as the groundwork for a possible democratization of the voting process, which, in accordance with the principles of self-management pluralism, requires new procedures (greater role of the entire system of self-management institutions in candidate nomination at all levels, number of candidates, etc.).

7. These and other practical effects and/or long-term orientations of self-management pluralism expand the possibilities for development of democracy in socialism (37). First, we may affirm that direct democracy is becoming stronger (it is even becoming dominant in some areas). The category of democracy continues to be differentiated: it is no longer only a political category, which refers only to the choice of the leaders and to their control (Schumpeter), but is articulated as a work and social category (workers democracy, democracy of suppliers and users). As a delegate democracy it reaches (although in practice not sufficiently) from the fundamental level (micro-democracy) to the middle level (mezzodemocracy) and to the national and state level (macro-democracy). As a democracy, which is "guided" (the role of the system of political organizations and voluntaery associations, etc.) presupposes the active role of those involved in the political process.
We are aware of the fact that in these points, which were shown as the results of self-management pluralism, there are strong normative and program elements. But socialist democracy of self-management pluralism openly admits the contradictions and problems, conflicts and even crises in the contemporary Yugoslav society. We can maintain that the self-management pluralism is actually burdened in its practical functionning by a number of dilemmas, contradictions, obstacles and limitations, which must necessarily render its normative ingredient relative. This limits its

visions by objective possibilities, subjective motivations and capabilities. This introduces in initial optimistic impatience of its protagonists a dose of doubt and sometimes even radical scepticism. In short, this brings us back to level of empirical verification, which we have taken into account in the identification of results. Now, we would like to turn, the perspective around and attempt to answer the following question: Which are the problems, contradictions and limits in the fulfilment of pluralism, based on socialist self-management? Let us enumerate only a few examples of limitations which seem the most serious.

1. The articulation of specific interests has not been accompanied by an equally intensive process of economic, social and political integration of interests. As a result, particularistic tendenceies in the society have been stronger than it would have been legitimite from a normative point of view and functional from a rational standpoint (38). That is one of the reasons that the role of state administrative apparatus and parastate aparatuses of self-management institutions have been recently growing (39), what was also a response to the lack of an adequa-te integration of interests on the proclaimed self-management basis.

2. The indicators of economic progress reached in Yugoslavia after the second World War in terms of number of employed, GNP, productivity of labour, average economic growth per year, development of social service sector etc. (for data see Strategies and foundations of the delopmental policy in Slovenian) (4o) are quite decent. Yet the economic policy and policy of social development have not been such as to reach a balanced development of all branches of economy and all sectors of social activity. Contradictions in the development of industry and agriculture and within different branches of industry are apparent. And although there has been a visible economic and social progress of the underdeveloped areas of the country one cannot deny that the differences among these and more developed parts of the country are still one of the main sources of problems and tensions which also overlap with the national issue. In addition one cannot omit the limits of self-management pluralism stemming from foreign debt and obligations to foreign creditors, to international financial institutions. All this is also connected with the insufficient role science has played in the decision-making process and also with the negative role of voluntarism in the social planning process. Of course, one cannot deny the unforseen and also partly unforseeable negative impact of the international economic crisis and monetary trends on the implemantation of adopted policies.

3. It goes without saying that the multiplicity of units of self-managment articulation of interests tended to promote the voicing of different interests and to overload the system with the demands which were not, as it became clear later, adequate for the objective possibilities of the country. This contradiction between subjective wants and objective possibilities,

which is a general contradiction of contemporary society, was not always met by efficient policies and measures, wich had been in-built in the system, to reduce the social pressure upon the decision-making centers and select adequate policy priorities.One should thus point to the fact that the state organs, being too much under the pressure of particularistic interests, sometimes failed implementing their legal competencies (41).

4. This brings us also to another contradiction in the realisation of the principles of self-management pluralism. We have in mind its implementation on micro-macro level. One can say that the grass-roots democracy, which has been developing for years, has not sufficiently penetrated the broader and global levels of the social and political system. The delegate system which was introduced to overcome the defficiencies of classical political representation, has been, in practice, moving too slowly, which applies especially to the role of work organisations viz. their delegates in the structure of the assembly system (42). There is still a visible asymmetry between the power of political factors and excutive organs comparing to that of workers delegates in the assemblies at higer viz. broader levels of political system (43). There is an urgent need to democratize the personnel policy and to introduce some changes in the electoral system as well thus ennancing the vertical (and not predominantly horizontal) circulation of personnel and shaping social and political responsibility (44) of all functionaries at all levels, and especially at the top levels of the political system.

5. In the near future one cannot exclude some changes in the political system (45). These have in fact been discussed and also partly adopted (e.g. regarding the duration of the term of mandates of some leading possitions: the tendency is to extend the terms of mandates from one year to two years with the possibility of one relection). And there have also been broader discussions on the functioniong of political system which aim to introduce some "rationalisations". Although there are public controversies in science and politics as to what changes of the political system are needed, it is expected that these changes would be located "within" the system and will not represent changes "of" the system; of course, it is understandable that the empirical meaning of what is "within" the system is likely to be, owing to different interests, controverisial. Nevertheless, the need to overcome "hypernormativisation" and "hyperinstitutionalization" of the system is generally acknowledged and "rationalizations" of the system are expected.

6. It is, one may say, undisputed that the federal structure of the political system is the only legitimate form of the constitution of Yugoslavia. Still, it cannot be overlooked that not enough efficient implementations of some common interests at the Federal level, new tendecies of the etatisation at the lower levels of the political system (the development of so called "polycentric etatism") (46), some unresolved problems in the relation between republic-autonomous socialist provinces, new phenomena of desintegrative particularistic nationalism have, in recent times, caused

new pressures to change some provisions of the constitutional system, especially those relating to the position of socialist republics in the Federation, viz. at autonomous province in the republic viz. Federation. If there is no doubt that further deetatisation, of the political system at all levels and more efficient policies of building common interests are needed, one can expect that any proposal to substantially revise the constitutional position of the Federation and their constituent units would be met (and has been met) with serious controversies (47).

7. One of the strategies to overcome the particularistic and localistic tendencies is to stregthen the role of the socio-political organizations. In this connection the role of the League of Communists as a most important factor of integration is widely discussed. It is felt that the League, in its constituent parts, in the past clang too much to the interests of particular nations / nationalities (so called "federalization of the Party"). This being interpreted as against the principle of democratic centralism, two questions remain open: What is the meaning of democratic centralism in a multinational country? What transformation is this principle to undergo in a system of self-management pluralism? One cannot deny contradictions in the role of a vanguard organisation in a system of self-management pluralism and self-management federalism. On the other hand self-management pluralism was the policy the League itself has been advocating for many years. These contradictions cannot be resolved at one point in time. It will be a long-range political process, with steps forward and back-word. The accumulated contradictions demand more unity of purpose and action which can be guaranteed by a uvanguard organization. On other hand, this organization can be effective in a complex or at least more complex socialist society, based on pluralism of self-management, only through an authentic political process; this means a process which would involve all the basic and intermediary initiatives, stemming from the articulated structure of society, its self-management institutions, system of sociopolitical organizations, interest associations and state organs. This also involves a new role of the individual, citizen, members of organizations and of associations and also a new style of work of social and political leadership.

Conclusion:

It is difficult to objectively evaluate the achievements and opened problems of self-management pluralism, such as it has been developing in Yugoslavia for decades and particularly in recent time. There is no doubt that it is burdened by deep contradictions (48). The economic crisis confronts the country with long-term obstacles, which require accelarated development of science, extremely rational management, decrease in personal and collective consumption, and a new strategy of development. The occurence of particularism resuscitates the actual need for a more efficent social integration but also instigates some tendencies towards uniformism. The dilemma "self-management or etatism" could be once more aggravated, with all its accompanying consequences. The legitimate role of the socialist state, which

should, indeed, in accordance with the constitutional norms, more efficiently carry out its functions, could be turned to an excessive state interventionism, which could limit self-management to mere participation. The legitimate defence of common interests without which no community can exist, could be sometimes mixed with the underestimation of legitimate particular interests.

Regardless of all these dilemmas and problems, which are connected to the excessive endebtedness of the country as well (49)(and with all the consequences which flow from it), we are certain that their long term solutions demands, along with some institutional changes, in particular the uncompromising fulfilment of self-management alternative, the alternative of pluralism of self-management interests.

Various forms of transformation of clasical represantative system, ranging from the appearance of neocorporatism to the introduction of new shapes of participation (5o), bares to the fact that self-management pluralism in its fundamental concept (by this we do not mean all its institutional forms) represents a long term approach to the socialization of economing-politics and to stimulate cultural creativity in our country. A more developed socialist society reject one-dimensional uniformism and must, sooner or later, opt for one or another form of implicit or explicit socialist pluralism. This tendency is in a way perhaps supported by the fact that in basic constitutional documents of a number of socialist countries the category of interests is more and more utilized and the legitimacy of interest contradictions in theory has been recognized. The time has passed when social and political initiative could have been monopolized by a center of power. This is true in spite of the fact that modern society-and also pluralism of self-management-calls for permanent coordination, integration and democratic centralization of interests, for more efficient building of common and general interests.

We believe that the power of the concept of self-management pluralism, notwithstanding all its problems and limits, stems from the fact, that it is responsive to the demands of modern mass society (51): to recognize an active role of an increasing number of social subjects, to give public status to many new subjects that were traditionally considered as "private" or were just an object of political or economic monopoly power centers. In this way new channels are opened for the mediation of interests between state and society and new possibilities are given for the active involvement in public policy-making.

Of course, the "normative optimism" concerning the self-management pluralism has passed. A new consciousness as to the dialectics of principles, intitutions and self-management reality has recently emerged. There is no guarantee that in the years to come self-management pluralism will not be faced new serions challenges from within and from international environment. There is no iron law of self-management pluralism as there is no iron law of oligarchy. But there is a deep need less dominantion and repression and more freedom and emancipation, in the world. This is why self-management

pluralism as an original tendency has, in my opinion and hope, a chance and a future.

To overcome, hence, the contratictions, difficulties and obstacles of self-management pluralism is not to return to the mecahnisms of centralism, but to further the socialist democratization of the political system in all its constituent parts. This also implies a new respect for the individual, his rights as a "subject of subjects", but at the same time it implies his new responsiveness to social and political obligations.

NOTES

1. In this sense the majority of Yugoslav political scientists advocating the conception of "self-management pluralism" (see below): see also: Stanislaw Ehrlich, Oblicza pluralizmow, Warszawa: PWN, 1980; Rainer Eisfeld, Sozialistischer Pluralismus in Europa. Ansätze und Scheitern am Beispiel Portugal. Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984; Against pluralism as a characteristic of a socialist democracy see, e.g., Asen Kožarov. Monizm i pljuralizm v ideologii i politike. Moscow: Progress, 1976.

2. On the concept of an "early socialism" see Aleksandar Grličkov, Razpotja socializma. Ljubljana: CZ, 1984

3. One may say that the recognition of the existence of contradictions of interests in a socialist society was an important factor which led towards the conception of self-management pluralism in Yugoslavia. See, e.g., The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists. Beograd: Ed.Jugoslavija, 1958, pp. 145-157. See also Rade Aleksić, Dijalektika socijalizma. Prilog marksističkoj teoriji o društvenim suprotnostima. Beograd: Vuk Karadžić, 1975. As for social science research, the difficulties and possibilities of using dialectical categories have been stressed by Zdravko Mlinar. Among his studies see, e.g., "Dialektika, empirizem in spekulacija v sociooloških in politoloških raziskavah", Anthropos, No. 3-4, 1977, pp. 225-238. See also the paper presented by me to the XIIth IPSA World Congress (Rio de Janeiro, August 9-14, 1982) with the title: "Contradictions as an Instrument of Analysis in Political Science". On recent discussions in the Soviet Union on this topic see, e.g. Marksizam u svetu, No 4-5, 1985, the contributions of P.Fedoseev, V.S. Semjonov, A.P.Butenko et.al., with an introductory study of Sava Živanov ("Sovjetska društvena teorija pred izazovom preispitivanja"). Concerning these discussions cf. also Giulietto Chiesa, "Conflitti nella società sovietica", Rinascita, No 51, 1984. Concerning contradictions, conflicts and pluralism in a society cf. also Jerzy J.Wiatr, Przyczynek do zagadnienia razwoja spolecznego w formaciji socjalistycznej, Warszawa: Kiw, 1979, especially Ch.VI: "Dialectics of Social Conflicts".
It should be mentioned that the topic of dialectical discourse has been one of the main problems discussed at the XII th World Congress of the IPSA, Rio de Janeiro, August 9th - 14th 1982. See: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Political Discourse: Past, Present, Future", in International Political Science Association XIIth World Congress in Rio de Janeiro "Society Beyond the State in 80's". Brasilia: The University of Brasilia Press, pp. 21-23.

4. Cf.Najdan Pašić, Pluralizam interesa i politički sistem. Beograd: Delta Press,1979, p.9.

5. The first official document, which spoke verbis expressis on behalf of pluralism of interests in socialist democracy in Yugoslavia was, as far as I know, Socialistična zveza delovnega ljudstva danes. Ljubljana: Republiška konferenca Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije, 1970. As for political science one can mention a book of Jovan Mirić. Interesne grupe i politička moć, Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1973.

6. The terms were introduced by Edvard Kardelj in his book, later translated in many foreign languages: Smeri razvoja soci-političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja. Ljubljana: Komunist, 1977 (second, revised edition 1978). The book was also translated into English. See: Edvard Kardelj. Democracy and Socialism. London: Summerfield Press, 1978.

7. Edvard Kardelj, Socialism and Democracy, p.121.

8. It seems that some authors would not agree with such a positive estimation of this terminological innovation. See, e.g., Gojko Stanič in the discussion on occasion of the publication of the quoted Kardelj's book. See his contribution in: Socializem in demokracija. Ljubljana; ČZP Komunist, 1978, p.97. It should be added that Gojko Stanič appreciated the basic ideas of the book but did not quite agree with the term "pluralism".

9. Cf. Predrag Vranicki. Zgodovina marksizma. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1983; Miloš Nikolić, Dimitar Mirčev. Participacija, samoupravljanje, demokracija. Zagreb: Cekade, 1985.

lo. Cf. Karl Marx's works: Kritik der Hegelschen Staatsrechts (1843); (Marx and Engels), Manifest der Komunistichen Partei (1848); Bürgerkrieg im Frankreich, etc.

11. See his Anti-Dühring and other works.

12. See his capital work, State and Revolution.

13. Cf. Predrag Vranicki, Samoupravljanje, 2 vols., Zagreb: Globus, 1982 (Selection and Introductory: "Ideje i praksa samoupravljanja u Europi na razmedju stoljeća", pp. IX-CIII).

14. Svetozar Marković. Sabrani spisi. Four volumes. Beograd: Kultura, 196o. Ivan Cankar, "Slovenci in Jugoslovani", a lecture in 1913, now published in Ivan Cankar, Zbrana dela, Vol. 25, Državna založba Slovenije, 1976, pp. 228-239.

15. Cf. Savin Jogan.Pariška komuna 1871 in sodobna jugoslovanska občina. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1984.

16. Cf. Predrag Vranicki, op.cit.,pp. XI-LI.

17. Cf. Edvard Kardelj, "The System of Socialist Self-management in Yugoslavia", in Socialist Self-management in Yugoslavia. 195o-198o. Documments. Selected and edited by Blagoje Bošković and David Dašić. Beograd: STP, 198o, p.14-15.

18. The term was used by Stanislav Ehrlich in his "The Rationality of Pluralism", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No 2. 1981. This pluralism was articulated in the National Front, e.g. in the Front of Liberation in Slovenia, which was founded and structured by different groups, led (cultural workers, left Christian socialists, left wing of "Sokol" etc) led by the Communist Party as the leading force. See: Zgodovina Slovencev. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1979. pp.744-754. See also Janko Prunk. Pot krščanskih socialistov v Osvobodilno fronto. Ljubljana: CZ,1977.

19. See Dušan Bilandžić. Zgodovina socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije. Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1980.

20. Cf. Edvard Kardelj. Protislovja družbene lastnine v sodobni socialistični praksi. Ljubljana: DZS, 1976.

21. Dušan Bilandžić, op.cit. See also: Edvard Kardelj: Samoupravljanje. In 5 volumes. Ljubljana: DZS, 1979.

22. Najdan Pašić. Istorijski put komune. Beograd: Rad, 1981.

23. Dimitrijević Momčilo, Samoupravne interesne zajednice. Beograd, 1975.

24. More about this problem in my book Interesi in politika. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1981.

25. Jovan Djordjević (chief editor), Društveno-politički sistem SFRJ, Beograd; Radnička štampa, 1979, p.50.

26. In the documents referred to in the note No. 27.

27. This is one of the ideas elaborated in the recent documents on economic stabilization in Yugoslavia by so called "Kraigher's Commission". See especially: Izhodišča dolgoročnega programa ekonomske stabilizacije, Ljubljana: DE, 1982; Strategija in temelji razvojne politike, Ljubljana: DE, 1983; Sklepni del dolgoročnega programa gospodarske stabilizacije. Ljubljana: DE, 1983.

28. Cf. Izhodišča dolgoročnega programa gospodarske stablizacije, op.cit.

29. More books on delegate system has been recently published in Yugoslavia than on any other aspect of self-management pluralism. Only some examples. Dušan Bilandžić et. al. Teorija i praksa delegatskog sistema. Zagreb: FPN, 1979; Delegatski sistem. Funkcionisanje i ostvarivanje. Analiza rezultata istraživanja za SR Srbiju bez pokrajina. Coordinated by Najdan Pašić, ed.by Radivoje Marinković. Beograd: IPS FPN, 1979; Delegatski sistem med normo in stvarnostjo. Rezultati raziskovanja v okviru projekta "Delovanje in uresničevanje delegatskega sistema v Sloveniji. Coordinated by Adolf Bibič and operatively by Drago Zajc, Ljubljana: Komunist, 1983.

30. Edvard Kardelj. Democracy and Socialism, op.cit., Ch. VII. Recently the significance of science in the social development has been more and more stressed, Cf., e.g., Temelji strategije tehnološkega razvoja. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1983.

31. A general outlook on this topic can be find in a book of Miodrag Zečević, Društvene organizacije i udruženja. Beograd: IPS FPN, 1976. For an empirical analysis see, e.g., Stane Kranjc, Interesna združenja občanov. Ljubljana: FSPN, 1973. In recent time the associations of writers and some professional associations have become, e.g., more outspoken.

31.a. Among recent literature, which elaborates basic aspects of this concept, see, e.g., Najdan Pašić. Interesi i politički proces. Beograd: Komunist, 1983; Jovan Mirić. Pluralizam interesa i samoupravna demokratija. Zagreb: Cekade, 1982; Vinka Tomić, Pluralizam interesa u delegatskom sistemu. Beograd: IPS FPN, 1984. Of course, the institutional aspects of the self-management pluralism can be found in any book on Yugoslav politi-system, e.g. Majda Strobl, Ivan Kristan, Ciril Ribičič, Ustavno pravo SFRJ, Ljubljana: PF - Univerzum, 1978.

31.b. On some new dimensions of the topic see, e.g., Christian Bay, Strategies of Political Emancipation, Notre Dame. London: Univ. Notre Dame Press, 1981.

31.c. Robert Dahl, "Polyarchy, Pluralism, and Scale", Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.7, No.4, 1984, p.235. In fact, Dahl speaks of "undesirable consequences" of pluralism along with its desirability.

32. This relates especially to the problem of expanded reproduction.

33. More about this problem see in Adolf Bibič, Zasebništvo in skupnost. Civilna družba in politična država pri Heglu in Marxu. Druga, dopolnjena izdaja. Ljubljana: DE, 1984.

34. On human rights and self-management, see, e.g. "Autogestion - Droits et libertes de l'homme", Questions actuelles du socialisme", No.12, 1984 (the issue is dedicated to this problem).

35. Cf. Boris Majer, "O nalogah ZK v kulturi in kulturni politiki", Komunist (Ljubljana), No. 25, 1985.

36. This was one of the central points of the conception of self-management pluralism as developed by Yugoslav politieal science and political thought. The question of political pluralism should be, in this conception, adequatly resolved through the mechanisms of Socialist Alliance etc and not through a multiparty system which is not suitable for the democratio development of the political system of self-management. Cf. Stjepan Pulišević, Političke stranke kao faktor suvremenog političkog sistema, Zagreb: Naprijed, 1971. An interesting recent book on political parties, with references to sociopolitical organisations in Yugoslavia (especially the League of Communists) is Vladimir Goati's, Savremene političke partije. Komparativna analiza. Beograd: IPD-Partizanska knjiga, 1984.

37. Cf.Dimitar Mirćev, Participacija, demokracija, samoupravljanje, op.cit. Of course, this is not to say that self-management democracy has ceased to be a political category and that political democracy would be a secondary question.

38. On the problems of integration and desintegration in contemporary Yugoslav society, see, e.g., Niko Toš et.al.(eds), Integracioni i dezintegracioni procesi u jugoslovenskom društvu. Ljubljana: Knjižnica FSPN, 1983.

39. This is connected also with "hiperinstitutionalization" of the political system. On the "new bureaucratism" and its causes see Vojan Rus, et al. in the discussion under the title: "O posebnostih našega sodobnega birokratizma", Anthropos, V.VI, 1983, pp.83-122.

4o. See note no 27, supra.

41. This is one of the evidences that the state in socialism, although it has to "wither away", is not only a factor of repression but also of emancipation. There have been vivid discussions on the relation of state and self-management in Yugoslavia in recent times. See, e.g., the contributions of Tomislav Jantol, Živojin Rakočević. Radovan Radonjić et.al. in Politička misao, Vol XVIII, No 1-2, 1981; and discussions on the same topic by Jovan Djordjević, Nikola Visković, Milan Podunavac, Vladimir Goati, Boštjan Markič et.al. in Marksistička misao, No. 6, 1984, pp. 3-6o.

42. Cf. Ciril Ribičič (ed.), Zamisel in delovanje zborov združenega dela. Ljubljana: DE, 1985.

43. Cf. Miha Ribarič, Delegatski sistem kot sredstvo integracije dela in politike. Maribor: Obzorja, 1979.

44. Some basic aspects and problems of the electoral system are elaborated by Boštjan Markič. Volilni proces in delegatsko odločanje v samoupravni družbi. Ljubljana: FSPN, 1985 (multigr.).

45. On the problem of social and political resposibility see, e.g., Bogdan Kavčič (ed.). Odgovornost v samoupravni družbi. Ljubljana: FSPN, 1982.

46. Cf. Najdan Pašić, Interesi in politični proces, op.cit., passim.

47. The problem of the funcioning of political system in general and the nature of federalism have been recently vividly discussed in this country. In a near future the concluding results and some concrete proposals concerning further improvements of the efficiency of the system and of some possible changes of the Constitution are expected. For the current discussions on the problem it is perhaps interesting to mention the reactions to Jovan Mirić's book (Sistem i kriza, Zagreb: Cekade, 1984), which is pretty critical to the existing structure of the political system (especially concerning the nature of the Federation, the positions of republics/provinces in the federation), arguing that the existing system inclines more to confederalism than to federalism (what is also the argument of some other lawyers and political scientists, cf. some recent declarations of Professor Jovan Djordjević). At a scientific conference, dedicated to the book of Professor Mirić, organized in Zagreb in December 1984, more than 3o political scientists and lawyers from all parts of Yugoslavia took part, with pro et contra positions. Materials from this conference are now available in the book Prijepori oko političkog sistema. Zagreb: CIPRA, 1985. The "confederation thesis" has been critised especcially by Ivan Kristan, but defended by some others. For a representative sample of positions to the question of contemporary federalism in Yugoslavia see, e.g., also Teorija in praksa, No. 12, 1984.

48. Cf. Zdravko Mlinar (ed.), Pojavi krize, Ljubljana: FSPN, 1983, Silvano Bolčić, Razvoj i kriza jugoslovenskog društva u socijološkoj perspektivi. Beograd: SIC, 1983.

49. Cf. Janez Stanovnik. Svet v dolgovih in Mednarodni monetarni sklad. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenija, 1983.

50. Among growing literature on neo-corporatism see, e.g., Claus von Offe. Družbena moč in politična oblast. Ljubljana: DE, 1985 (Selected and edited by Matjaž Maček). Concerning new shapes of self-management and participation see recent developments in Poland and new constituional status of the work collectives in the Soviet Union.

51. It should be perhaps mentioned here that in recent literature the concept of "mass society" has begun to be reconsidered in a positive sense. See, e.g., Umberto Cerroni, Teoria della società di massa. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1983.

PERONISM AND RADICALISMO: ARGENTINA'S TRANSITIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1955, the most visible feature of the Argentine political system has been a higher level of instability. Not only did military coups become more frequent, but the installation of each new regime was invariably followed by a repetition of the same cycle: the failure to develop an alternative political formula, signs of the emergence of political fragility, and the final collapse. More significantly, beneath the tumultuous surface of political events, the key mechanisms of the 1945-55 state were dismantled without being replaced by alternative arrangements. Those mechanisms had been based upon the partial institutionalization of Perón's own personal leadership. During those years, Perón had not only been the head of government, he had also played two other key roles by channeling the political representation of the popular masses through himself and by promoting the subordination of the armed forces to the political institutions.

Despite the ultimate failure to create alternative political mechanisms to replace those of the Peronist state, the course of post-1955 events was shaped by the unfolding of the successive projects. Following the 1955 coup, three different attempts were made to create an institutional system based on political parties. During the first eleven years, the goal was to restore the hegemony of the "democratic" political parties with the exclusion of Peronism. 1/. Although public liberties were somewhat expanded and constitutional guarantees were seldom suspended, the proscription of Peronism made a mockery of the claims of its "democratic" adversaries and ultimately resulted in growing political instability. The military developed a pattern of tutelary intervention whereby they repeatedly enforced the exclusionary measures, and exercised their power to selectively veto the policies and initiatives of the civilian governments. A distinct style of societal functioning was established during the 1955-1966 years; the most profound economic, cultural, and organizational processes were fairly autonomous from transformational initiatives "from above." Rather, the dominant social tendencies were the result of the interrelation of the pressure, resistance, and struggle of the different actors of civil society. As a consequence, the organized social actors, and most notably business and labor, perfected their ability to block government intervention from above. All this, finally, contributed to the constitution of a dual political system. In this system the non-Peronist parties and parliament operated on one side. Neither these parties nor parliament could, however, channel the interests and orientations of the fundamental social actors. On the other side, a system of extra-parliamentary negotiations and pressures operated by going around the political parties. In this system, agreements were made and obligations were contracted, and the various sectors accepted cuts in their original demands. Nevertheless, they let it known that their support for substantive agreements had been given reluctantly, and that they would not hesitate to break these agreements even at the risk of provoking a breakdown of the institutional framework.

The dual political system of the 1955-1966 period was characterized by the fact the parliamentary mechanisms and the party system helped to strengthen the opposition by proscribing Peronism and condemning it to work from outside the institutions. In turn, the participants in extra-parliamentary negotiations, notably business and the military, used their threats to destabilize the political

institutions of government as a weapon of last resort.

In comparison with the years of "semi-democracy," the two more recent attempts at implanting constitutional democracy --i.e. that of 1973 and the present one-- started within a quite different set of circumstances. 2/ Beginning in 1966 the military became convinced of the futility of trying to correct "negative" political practices without directly involving themselves in governmental affairs. From 1966, in fact, "surgical" analyses predominated which identified different illnesses --the crisis of authority (in society as well as in the state), labor unrest, lack of class discipline. All agreed that the "cure" would require very deep cuts. Argentine society was, then, subjected to brutal "treatments" in which the generalization and extension of state repression, often conducted in violation of legal norms, was one of the "remedies" most often applied, albeit not the only one. The political formulae devised by the military from 1966 on proposed to overcome the dualism which had prevailed in the political system hitherto. This would be done by channeling back into a non-democratic institutional framework those processes of negotiation which had developed outside the formal system in the previous period. The military governments proved ultimately unable either to corral politics into corporatism or to impose rigidly repressive social schemes: nevertheless, the consequences of the projects of 1966 and 1976 were that those interstices through which politics had filtered up to 1966 without great explosions were blocked. Therefore, political interactions gradually began to take place outside the institutions, and were conducted in an increasingly savage manner. The different actors rapidly put aside previously understood game rules, and adopted strategies in which progressively less attention was paid to the destructive consequences of their individual actions --both in relation to "the others" and to the collective whole.

One of the consequences of the intensifying of authoritarianism from the mid-1960s onwards was that both reversions to a party-controlled democratic government were made against the will of the military, rather than under its protective tutelage. Hence, the installation of civilian regimes in 1973 and 1983 were the culminations of open confrontations between the collapsing military regimes and the oppositions of the time. The confrontationist style of politics that prevailed during the transitions could have hardly been avoided. Although each one of the last presidents of both dictatorships, General Lanusse and Bignone respectively, had been explicity appointed to administer the liquidation of military rule, the armed forces made last-minute efforts to determine who their successors would be, or at least to impose restrictions upon them. Although the military failed to achieve those objectives, military intransigence acted as a catalyst for significant changes in the patterns of relationship between Peronists and Radicales. In 1970 the two largest parties signed a pact, La Hora del Pueblo, whereby they reversed the antagonism that had made them irreconcilable opponents since the mid-1940s. In the early 1980s, in turn, the overwhelming electoral supremacy which Peronism had enjoyed over the Radical party since its creation finally came to an end with the victory of Alfonsín at the polls in October 1983.3/

Actually, Peronism and the Unión Cívica Radical were respectively the central protagonists of each of the two transitions. Thus, I propose to analyze the characteristics of the two parties, paying special attention to the roles

they played in 1973, in the case of Peronism, and in 1983, in the case of the Radical party. This allows me to underscore the basic features and modes of action of the two parties

PERONISM

The hegemonic position achieved by Peronism during Perón's first presidency of 1946-1955 had been based on three elements: the close idenfification of the party with the state, the development of a mass-based union movement, and the successful generation of a new collective identity associated both with the value of social egalitarianism and with contesting the traditional oligarchy's cultural supremacy. 4/ The control of the state and Peron's dual role as leader of the masses and head of government had been essential mechanisms in the political formula of Peronism. Hence, the successful military coup of 1955 did more than simply remove Peronism from power; it also affected the very nature of Peronism itself. As a result of the change in regime, all three of the above-mentioned elements were profoundly redefined.

Before 1955 the subordination of the Peronist party to the state was manifest in several ways. In the first place, it meant that an autonomous party organization was missing: the party as such was little more than an appendage of state institutions, and especially of the agencies of the executive, both at the national and provincial levels. Perón and a couple of his close associates in the presidency decided on every important party issue, including the selection of candidates for elective office. A similar scheme was followed at the provincial level where every governor ran party affairs strictly enforcing the adherence to the principle of verticalismo. 5/ One of the most important consequences of verticalismo within Peronism was to render congress an irrelevant institution almost completely dependent upon the executive.

The subordination of the party to the state transformed the former into simply a means to help secure the legitimacy of public policies among the population. Therefore, the party served neither to articulate social demands, nor to mediate the conflicting interest and values of its members. Last but not least, statism gradually became the all-encompassing, albeit largely implicit, ideology of the Peronist party-in-power. In this sense statism was much more then just a correlate of economic interventionism: it was also associated with a political culture in which the state was conceived as the embodiment of the public good and political pluralism was deemed a divisive, and sometimes evil, phenomenon.

The fall from power created a vacuum within Peronism. The interruption of the contiguity between the state and the party structures did more than remove Peronism from the control of public resources. It also brought about the evaporation of the principle under which Peronism had been organized since the mid-1940s. The history of post-1955 Peronism was one of a succession of largely ineffective attempst to devise an alternative formula for the internal generation, distribution and legitimation of authority. The unfolding of each attempt, however, had effects that went beyond its respective period. Three different stages followed after Perón's overthrow: 1955-1970, 1970-1974, and 1974 to the present.

Proscription

The 1955-1970 period was defined by the electoral proscription of the Peronist party and by the exile of Peron.6/ During those fifteen years, the ban imposed on Peronist activities and symbols made it impossible for formal party structures to develop. Although Peron's leadership remained a powerful factor, the party's character was largely redefined. A series of vice-royal delegates and tactical commands were appointed by Perón to "conduct operations in the field," but they were by and large powerless not least because Perón often gave ambiguos signals by refusing to acknowledge responsibility for specific decisions, or by making parallel appointments. 7/ In practice, although dey-to-day affairs within the Peronist domain moved outside the control of the former president, he still retained the capacity to make the final decisions on electoral choices at the national level. 8/ He was also capable of fulminating against heretics and those who openly challenged his authority, this being in turn associated with the fact that he remained the custodian and reformulator of the movement's ideological legacy.

The second major change within post-1955 Peronism was the politicization of the union leaderships. The catalyst of the transformations was the military government of 1955-1958. In the three year period, the military failed in a double way . In the first place, it was unsuccessful in eradicating Peronism from the working class. Likewise, its attempt to implement a multiple union affiliation and representation system to replace that established by the Peronist law of the 1940's collapsed in its inception. However, the Peronist unionists who had controlled the unions until 1955 were, with few exceptions, effectively removed from the union scene and never regained their former influence. Moreover the military's frustrated project created the conditions for the emergence of a new breed of union leaders. They still identified themselves as Peronist but nevertheless achieved a significant degree of autonomy vis-a-vis Perón and other party figures. The main basis of their power was their control of the possibility of disrupting the production of goods and services through strikes and other work stoppages. Collective bargaining became effectively established in the late 1950s and thus added a powerful weapon to the arsenal of the union leaders. Moreover, unlike what had been the case until 1955, the new unionists were part of a system in which, as a result of Perón's removal from office, the state had lost its capability to legitimately impose its arbitration on the unions. Until that year, state power had been greatly expanded by the fact that labor leaders could be reminded of their obligation to follow the directives of the "first worker," who also happened to be the country's top political official.

The privileged bargaining weapon of union leaders became in addition a political resource within the Peronist camp. The other major resource, i.e. Peronist votes, had of course a severe limitation: its leverage was restricted to electoral periods and it could not be used in a positive fashion since the proscriptions barred Peronist from policy-making positions.

Finally, a third variable in the post-1955 equation of Peronism was the political cadres who, in varying decrees, enjoyed influence among the Peronist

electorate. The efforts of the politicos to gain space were hampered by several factors: the most severe being that they had to surmount a formidable subcultural obstacle, Peron's rejection of politics during his presidency. His view of politics as squabbling and often erosive factionalism had of course fitted the image that he projected of the wise and strong, but reconciling, father. But it had also made it impossible for any other Peronist leader to surge from the ranks and gain sustained political recognition. Since that legacy was compounded by the difficulty in building a stable electoral machine, an obvious raison d'etre for politicians, and by Peron's successful post-1955 manipulations of his subordinates, it was not surprising that not one Peronist politico achieved national stature during 1955-1970. At the regional and local levels, this was also true for the large electoral districts of urban, industrialized Argentina, i.e. the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba, and Mendoza and the Federal District, where no individuals or groups except for a few union leaders, developed autonomous bases of political power.

After 1955 the less developed provinces outside Argentine's industrial core provided a more propitious socio-political environment for the rise of a relatively autonomous leadership. To a greater or lesser extent, these provinces had smaller concentrations of industrial workers, and the resources controlled by the provincial state were a key economic variable. In part as a consequence of those factors, a clientelist pattern of a rather traditional variety gave several Peronist provincial politicians bargaining power as they acted promoting the participation of potential Peronist voters and as brokers between the national government and the provincial universes. 9/

In 1969 Peronism seemed to be at its nadir. For the preceeding three years, General Onganía had been firmly in control of a military regime which explicity aimed at the consolidation of a sine die dictatorship. Not only Peronist unionists had been subdued --by the government's combination of repression, cooptation and industrial expansion-- but Perón and the políticos had apparently lost their hitherto strongest bargaining chip; the de-stabilizing threat that votes posed to weak civilian governments. Besides, the Peronist movement was internally disorganized and its unity was crumbling, although this did not seem to matter very much in comparison with the external circumstances. However, in May of 1969 a series of student demonstrations in several provinces cities, and above all the mass riots in the country's second largest industrial center, Córdoba, doomed Onganía's regime. He managed to survive for yet another year, but finally he was unceremoniously fired by his military comrades, who, as early as the second half of 1970, also realized that their extrication from power was inevitable. The collapse of military authoritarianism confronted Peronism with two major challenges: (1) how to force the military to refrain from proscribing it yet once more, thus translating its presumable electoral supremacy into its return to power, and (2) how to transform the party into an effective electoral instrument capable also of providing the foundations for a stable government. This second question obviously required the resolution of the issue that had been pending since 1955, i.e. the definition of the party's structure of legitimate authority. 10/

During the next four years Peronism initially seemed to manage an adequate response to both challenges. On the one hand, Perón skillfully outmaneuvered the military who, in a quite paradoxical turn of events, ended up by pleading with Perón to occupy the presidency, instead of his former crony, Héctor Cámpora, who had been elected only because the armed forces initially vetoed Perón's candidacy. On the other hand, Perón succeeded union leaders and party back under his reign, not only disciplining rebellious union leaders and reunifying the dispersed flock of Peronist politicians, but also coopting factions from other parties as well. 11/ However, the final exit of the old leader from the stage of Argentine politics --his death in July 1974-- would reveal the tenuous nature of his late political achievements. Let's examine the "second coming" of Peronism and its subsequent collapse.

Return to power.

The success of Perón's tactics in the early 1970s was associated with his ability to orchestrate the aggregation of the heterogeneous opposition front that brought about the collapse of the military government. This was certainly a major accomplishment, given the fact that during the 1970-1972 years the opposition to the waning military regime grew in several different, and not necessarily compatible, directions including the emergence of a politically significant insurrectionary left-wing resorting to guerrilla tactics and calling for the overthrow of capitalism. The largest guerrilla group, the Montoneros, called itself Peronist, a claim that Perón was not going to challenge until 1974.

When the old general was triumphally reelected to the presidency in September 1973 he completed his operation by rescuing some of the old ingredients of the Peronist formula but also introducing some starting innovations. One of the changes was related to the development of a powerful unifying myth which underscored what the different sectors, both those with and without a Peronist ancestry, had in common: their opposition to the military regime. Perón and his movement were ideally suited to invoke a return to past glories: after having been proscribed and harassed for eighteen years, they were and successfully claimed to be, the quintessential opposition force. In turn, an idealized version of the sort of country Argentina had been before 1955 became, for lack of a better alternative, the only theme with an affirmative connotation. This, obviously had both advantages and disadvantages. The myth of the return to the Golden Age appealed to most organized groups and individual citizens, inasmuch as they identified the Golden Age with the specific gratifications that they were pursuing at the sectorial and individual levels --with the military government being the only obstacle apparently standing between each one and immediate satisfaction. At the same time, however, the emphasis on immediate gratification inevitably imposed a most formidable task on the coming (Peronist) regime: that of satisfying peremptory demands which often involved the pursuit of rather contradictory objectives. In any case, immediate gratification was inextricably associated with the early years of Peronism. The high growth years of 1945-1948 had provided economic space for the development of a non-zero-sum intersectorial game, and for a twenty-five percent increase in real wages.

A second front on which Perón also introduced unprecedented changes, albeit without altering the traditional style of Peronism altogether, was the crucial area of the relationships among the state, the party, other political actors, and himself. To begin with, Perón repeated his old line and pushed in the direction of reweaving the hierarchically-controlled organizational web that had been dismantled during the previous fifteen years. He also reasserted his monopoly on the movement's ideology; he was able to succeed in this enterprise before, rather than after, regaining the government. One of Peron's boldest moves was to welcome the emergence and expansion of the self-proclaimed Peronist guerrillas --to whom he affectionately referred as "his boys" (mis muchachos)-- using them to blackmail the military and to make the políticos and the unionists toe the line. This was particularly the case with the traditional labor leadership which was left with no say in the electoral campaign and selection of candidates, and was forced to remove the secretary general of the 62 Organizations, Rogelio Coria, from his top position. 12/

As a result of his shrewdness, Perón was thus able to regain control of the already legalized party. 13/ Once the Peronist occupied the government, however, the picture became more complicated. Perón, as in the old times, decided on every party matter, including the most strategic one of how the various areas of government would be distributed among the different factions. But, at the same time, the party became an almost empty carcass. The competing sectors --the most significant being the traditional union leadership, the emerging para-military right wing squads, the left-wing Montoneros guerrillas, and the políticos-- were subordinated to Perón within the party, but kept most of their resources outside of it. Perón nevertheless retained in part the power to mediate, but the eclipse of the party meant that no common institutional arena where the sectors could negociate and settle their conflicts was created during the first year of the Peronist government.

The arena where the old leader was much more innovative and ultimately achieved better results was in the relationship with other parties --i.e. those which had supported his overthrow in 1955-- and specially with the UCR. The key there was the historic reconciliation of the two parties, which, together with several minor forces, signed in 1970 a document known as La Hora del Pueblo. According to it, the two party presidents, Perón and the UCR's Ricardo Balbín, agreed that neither party would participate in a coming election if any of them was proscribed, and both of them would support the resulting constitutional regime, irrespectively of the winner. La Hora del Pueblo, in fact, became a major turning point in Argentina's political history: for the first time the two major political groupings agreed to sustain the democratic institutions without preconditions. It also indicated a shift in the practices of Peronism, whose emergence and twenty-five year history had been associated with the rejection of party politics. However, the new relationship between the two parties had a flaw: most of the internal factions of Peronism gave only lip service to support Perón's initiative. Despite their own ideological differences, the Montonero guerrillas, the union leadership and the fascistic palace clique which sorrounded Perón and his wife and vice-president, Isabel, coincided in their hostility toward the establishment of a party-dominated political system.

In part, the shortcomings in the nevertheless innovative attempt to develop a stable pattern of inter-party relationships were caused by one of the most resilient features of Perón's style: his reluctance to admit the growth of political linkages independent of his own mediating role. In the 1970s Perón dropped many of the more arbitrary and dictatorial traits that had prevailed during his first presidency. This probably reflected his greater experience and his recognition of the fact that Argentine political society had become more complex with diverse groups gaining in power and autonomy. But although Perón promoted the creation of a more complex formal political system incorporating most parties and social class organizations --including his adversaries of the past-- he did not relinquish a crucial role: that of linking the various parts of the emerging network. Thus, for example, the UCR was able to gain a significant amount of influence upon policy --making during the less than nine months of Perón's presidency. But this influence was more a consequence of Perón's receptiveness to the advice and criticisms of the Radical leader, Balbin, than of an increase in the weight of those institutions, like congress, where the Radicales and other opposition parties were represented. , Beyond that, the relationship between the Peronist and Radical parties as such only involved the weakest category of Peronist leaders, the políticos, while unionists and other factions shunned political bargaining with the opposition parties.

During Peronism's first year in government Perón also sought to bring class organizations into the institutional framework. 14/ He promoted the signing of the Social Pact, whereby the CGT and the major business associations agreed to a temporary freeze of wages and prices, and agreed to submit proposed increases to governmental arbitration. The pattern, however, was similar to the one which defined the relationships with the major opposition party, Perón's bargaining with, and cajoling the class associations brought about some temporary successes, but the government party as such did not provide any instrument for economic and political bargaining.

In sum the advances made in the direction of building up a system of political bargaining in the early 1970s increasingly depended upon the role played by Perón in linking the policy-making agencies of the state, the political opposition, and the class associations. The party itself lagged behind. The fact that several actors operating within the Peronist conglomeration had more power than in the pre-1955 days acted rather as a centrifugal force leading to a situation where the extermination of the adversaries within Peronism soon became the rule. Although the extremism of two of the most visible actors --i.e. the Montoneros and the right wing faction-- contributed to that outcome, the reluctance of Peronist leaders in general to make the concessions and accomodations required to sustain stable institutional procedures was another factor of equal importance.

Perón's disappearance: a void yet to be filled.

On July 1, 1974, Perón died and was formally replaced as head of state

and as party president by his wife. In turn, Isabel was deposed by the military less than two years later although formally she was the party president until early 1985. The political incompetence and personal inestability of Isabel certainly contributed to the steady deterioration of the political situation between 1974 and 1976, and thus to the success of a military coup which was not actively opposed by any sector of Argentine society. At a deeper level, however, Isabel and her political survival expressed the double failure of post-1974 Peronism: i.e. proving incapable both of providing the political foundations for a democratic regime and of reorganizing the party by designing procedures and creating symbols with which to fill the organizational vacuum resulting from the disappearence of the old leader.

During Isabel Peron's tenure, Peronism became a battlefield where the different factions waged a war of all against all in which even those who were able to defeat their adversaries scored what soon turned out to be pyrrhic victories. In that sense, the pace of events accelerated during 1975. The Peronist guerrillas went back to clandestine activities, resorting again to terrorist tactics, this time against a Peronist government. The Montoneros suffered a sound political defeat, losing whatever support they have enjoyed during the last year of the military dictatorship. However, the defeat of the Montoneros did not put an end to political violence: on the contrary, state terrorism kept increasing in scope and brutality with the liquidation of the guerrilla movements becoming a pretext to launch a campaign of extermination of leftist dissidents and middle and low-rank trade union activists who questioned the top Peronist leadership. 15/

Likewise, the Fascistic cliques led by Welfare Minister López Rega, who was the power behind the throne during Isabel's first year in office, attempted in mid-1975 to eliminate the only serious contender they had within Peronism, the union leadership. The operation, both economically and politically, was unprecedented in the history of Peronism. On the one hand, it attempted to contain the uncontrolled race between prices and wages by putting a limit on wage increases. On the other hand, it tried to involve the armed forces through the appointment of an officer on active service as Interior Minister and of a commander-in-chief of the army with Peronist credentials. According to this scheme, the military would have become the main support for a political regime which would have suppressed parliamentary institutions and would have subjected the unions to stern disciplinary measures. The union leadership successfully blocked Lopez Rega's bid for absolute power thus forcing Isabel to fire her minister and to abort the stabilization program. Nevertheless, the union bosses kept emphasizing short-term considerations and showing a lack of concern for institutional consolidation. During the last months of Isabel, only the unions' active support of an economic stabilization plan could have saved the Peronist government. Ultimately, the fragmentation of Peronism led to the decomposition of the government itself, which lost contact with social processes and became totally incapable of influencing events.

The only attempt to reverse the deterioration of the government was in fact made by the weakest link of Peronism, i.e. the politicians. The deterioration of the presidential figure and the transformation of the executive into a disequilibrating factor gave some space to congress, both of whose houses were controlled by the Peronist party. Congress made two bold moves: first it forced the resignation of the speaker of the chamber of deputies, a relative and close associate of López Rega, and later it put pressure on Isabel, who requested a leave of absence. Since there was no vicepresident, the president pro tem of the Senate, Italo Luder, became the temporary head of the executive, hoping that Isabel would finally submit her resignation. The latter initiative, however, was frustrated when Isabel chose to reoccupy the presidential seat, thus pushing the military conspiracy beyond the point of no return, culminating in the coup of March 1976.

The failure of Peronism in 1975 to find an institutional alternative to what was otherwise an unavoidable collapse provided a clue to what lay in the decade ahead. Neither the factions advocating the use of political violence nor the union bosses seemed capable of providing the leadership that was necessary to turn Peronism into a viable political party. But even the politicos, who desperately searched for a formula in order to save institutional stability by making it to the elections that were scheduled for late 1976, were impaired by their formal respect for verticalismo. Despite the fact that Luder and many of his colleagues were aware that the permanence of Isabel and the irresponsibility of labor leaders made disaster inevitable, they chose not to challenge a formal hierarchy which had already lost all the initiative.

In what was a striking contrast to the situation emerging after Perón's 1955 downfall, between the 1976 coup and the war with Britain in 1982, the Peronists remained largely inactive. Or to put it more acurately, the few and limited activities in which Peronists were engaged --like their 1979 endorsement of the OAS condemnation of the military government's human rights abuses-- had hardly any political impact. This was in part the result of the unparalleled, and effective, repression engaged in the military which made any opposition activity extremely difficult, and dangerous. Many left-wing Peronist, including thousands of union middle rank officials and cadres, teachers, and students activists, were among the diseppeared. The repression also reached many moderate Peronists who simply criticized the policies of the military; not surprinsingly, the possibility of being killed became a powerful deterrant to political activity. But it was not only repression that explained the paralysis of Peronism.

Unlike the 1955-1973 years, there was not a leader in exile with the charisma and manipulative powers of Perón, capable of becoming the focal point of the opposition. And, perhaps even more significantly, the image of Peronism among many of its followers was seriously damaged by its dismal performance in government, and by the contributions it had made to the generation of a context in which politics were reducted to the savage confrontation between armed bands, and the hunting of defenseless victims. Most sectors mobilized since 1969 were caught in a parabola of deactivation and political withdrawal because of fear of, and disappointment with Peronism.

Anyway, the fiasco in the South Atlantic war confirmed and accelerated what had already been glimpsed in 1981 and the early months of 1982: the military regime was not going to be able to survive the failure of the ambitious program of economic reform it had launched in 1976. In yet another turn of the wheel, the fouth military president since the coup, General Bignone, announced that presidential elections were going to be held in 1983 preceded by the reorganization of the political parties. Unlike the transition to a democratic regime of the 1970s, this time the military recognition of its failure was not preceeded by any form of social mobilization or political insurgency, thus giving political parties the uncontested supremacy in the process of transition. The first months of 1983 seemed to suggest that the Peronist party had successfully erased the memories of the previous ten years: over 5 million people registered in order to participate in primary elections of the authorities and candidates of parties, with approximately sixty percent choosing to register as Peronist. 16/ However, this was the prelude to the first electoral defeat in the history of Peronism.

In the first place, although verticalismo was not formally challenged and all the major sectors and figures kept invoked Isabel Perón as president of the party, nobody but a tiny minority really counted her as a factor in the internal power equation. This minority, i.e. the so-called ultraverticalistas (a selection of name which obviously suggested that the verticalistas were not quite so) gained control only in two relatively small provinces, Jujuy and Corrientes, and achieved no significant representation in other districts. The unsuccessful bid of the ultraverticalistas was not the only failure to build a current capable of imposing its hegemony within the party. A more serious attempt developed around the creation of an internal movement named MUSO which was promoted by one of the presidential precandidates, Antonio Cafiero. The purpose of MUSO was to forge an alliance between the labor leaders of the 62 Organizations and the provincial caudillos of non-Pampean region on the basis of a programmatic coincidence. In turn, the program of MUSO proposed a slightly modified version of the middle-of-the-road economic platform upheld by Perón in 1973-1974 --with its emphasis on the Social Pact between the unions and the entrepreneurial associations-- and the renewal of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the Radical party.

MUSO never got off the ground. Actually, Cafiero was largely responsible for the outcome: he made several mistakes and proved hesitant in his negotiations to secure the support of the major brokers. But MUSO's collapse also reflected the reluctance of both the union leaders who controlled the 62 Organizations and the provincial caudillos to commit themselves to a programmatic agreement requiring definitions of substantive issues, 17/ before the race for the candidacy had been defined.

In the context of the debacle of the attempts of ultraverticalismo and MUSO to attain national predominance, a series of changes took place. Perhaps the most significant was the acceptance of all factions of the legitimacy of the principle of "one man, one vote" for the selection of authorities and candidates. This was a reversal of the practices of the past: Perón had always been the grand-elector. Furthermore, it practically denied the right of Isabel, or of whoever

happened to occupy the presidency of the party, to impose a hierarchical structure from the top. However, the one man, one vote rule was undercut by the use of a two-tier electoral system whereby regular party members elected slates of delegates who, in turn, then elected authorities and candidates. In all districts different slates of delegates competed, with most of them not being committed to any specific national slate. The use of the two-tier system had one important consequence: many district bosses became "favorite son" candidates, and since there was limited coordination among the different districts, the provinces with the largest delegations --Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba and the Federal District-- acquired an enormous weight.

The democratizing impact of the Peronist reorganization was further limited by the fact that in two of the largest districts, Buenos Aires and the Federal Capital, the winning factions resorted to strongmen tactics whereby they were able to deny representation within the party organs and the candidate lists to opposing factions which had received significant support among the membership.

And precisely Buenos Aires and the Federal Capital were the main operational basis of the two sectors which, in a sort of loose and not always easy coalition, made the most gains in the process of reorganization: the old union leadership of the 62 Organizations, and a comparatively new political machine built by a hitherto secondary figure, Herminio Iglesias. 18/ Iglesias was a new type of Peronist politician. Although he had been a minor union official in the 1960s, the basis of his power was unrelated to traditional Peronist labor politics. He purposely resorted to a brusque style, using offensive terms in his speeches and emphasizing his lower class origins; Iglesias, a sort of conservative populist, developed strong ties to sectors of the Catholic Church and the army. He was particularly successful in building an extensive network of unidades básicas (local party offices) in the Gran Buenos Aires and in the other major provincial cities, with the mass of his followers coming from the declassé marginal poor. 19/

Iglesias and the 62 Organizations controlled the national congress of the party overshadowing the presidential candidate, Italo Luder, who managed to get selected by negotiating an alliance with several provincial caudillos and reaching a deal with Iglesias and Miguel. Luder, anyway, failed to mellow the tone given to the Peronist campaign by the party leadership; this had a disastrous effect upon its electoral changes. There was widespread violence against the internal oppositions and a frequent use of insults in public rallies and television speeches with the main target being the Radical party candidate, Alfonsín who was accused of anything from abetting communist terrorism to being the US candidate and a traitor to the fatherland. All this became a powerful reminder of the 1973-1976 years when internecine violence and the reluctance of the union leadership to bind itself to some sort of interest concertation had paved the way for the coup and the subsequent military regime. The Peronists got barely forty percent of the national vote --a substancial drop from previous results-- and lost all but one of the more populated districts of industrialized Argentina with large working class contingents.

The political thaw which began in 1982, and the unfolding of the electoral campaign turned the dormant crisis Peronism had been suffering since 1974 into an

overt one. The unprecedented electoral defeat of October 1983 accelerated the pace. Internal confrontation multiplied and factionalism became rampant; this process culminated in December 1984 in a national congress in which the party structure split into two sectors with each sector holding separate congresses in early 1985. Furthermore, the party suffered yet another electoral setback when it promoted the electoral abstention in the national plebiscite on the peace treaty that the Argentine government had tentatively signed with Chile to put an end to the territorial dispute in the Beagle Channel. 20/ Within this context of violence, fragmentation, and erosive authoritarianism, during 1984 two trends suggested that a complete breakdown of Peronism was not necessarily inevitable.

The pattern of break-up of the Peronist vote by district in the general elections of 1983 had a most important, and paradoxical, consequence. The sectors from the largest electoral districts associated with the 62 Organizations and Buenos Aires strongman Iglesias who controlled the party structure, achieved very limited institutional leverage. Peronism was defeated in all the major districts of the industrial core of the country, except Santa Fe, gaining just two senate seats and one governorship in that region. Conversely, the clientelistic caudillos and cliques from the less populated, and non-industrial, provinces gained a significant representation in the Senate and the lion's share of provincial governoships. Fourteen of the twenty-one Peronist senators --the largest bloc in the 46-member upper house-- came from the eight northermost provinces which were all won by this party. Furthermore, the senate became the key institution for the balance of power, given the fact that the Radicales won a comfortable majority in the chamber of deputies while they only had eighteen seats in the senate. 21/ Although Peronist senators and governors --as well as the provincial leaderships they represented-- were not able to develop concerted actions during 1984, a substantial majority came to oppose the party's leadership, and late in that year seemed to be moving in the direction of translating their institutional leverage into gaining more power in the party organization. Their contribution to the eventual reversal of the erosion of Peronism could be decisive in the near future.

The other space in which there was a major turning point during 1984 was the labor front. For the first time since 1956, the 62 Organizations lost control of the Peronist union movement. After a bill submitted by the executive was defeated in the senate in early 1984, a compromise was reached and a new law was approved, changing the procedures for the election of union authorities. The new law guaranteed governmental impartiality and prevented gross manipulation and coercion by labor bosses. During the last quarter of 1984, relatively fair and open union elections were held and a surprinsingly pluralist pattern emerged both in general and within the Peronist camp. In the latter case the 62 Organizations mixed victories and defeats at the national level, with two other tendencies, the "25" and Gestión y Trabajo, making spectacular advances. In terms of the history of the Peronist labor movement, the "25" and Gestión y Trabajo were heirs to two opposed, and always minority, traditions: the Combativos (hard-liners) and the Parcipacionistas (soft-liners), but in 1984 the temporarily joined forces in

successfully promoting a democratization of the Peronist labor movement which was able to loosen the tight hold that the 62 Organizations had had on union participation within the party organizations.

The second year of democracy in Argentina, 1985, thus opened with a Peronist party in turmoil. Two major issues were in the process of being settled—the control of the party organization and the distribution of power within the General Confederation of Labor; the future of the party, and its very existence, depended on the outcomes.

THE RADICALES

When Perón was deposed in 1955, the UCR seemed to be strategically located within the Argentine political system to achieve political supremacy. The military, who saw themselves as the benign rebuilders of a democracy which had been distorted and corrupted by the "totalitarian dictator," clearly intended to give power back without delay to a constitutional government controlled by the "democratic" parties. And, with the exclusion of the Peronist, the UCR was the only national party left; the other parties, which had also conspired with the military and had answered its convocation, had very limited electoral appeal and no national organization. 22/ The Radicales did not live up to expectations, however. The party split immediately in two, and later in three, and in the following fifteen years failed both in government and as opposition. Although each of the two original branches, the UCRI and the UCRP, were in government --the former between 1958 and 1962 and the latter between 1963 and 1966-- they were never able to overcome the stigma that their victories were made possible by the proscription of the party which remained throughout as the strongest electoral force. Moreover, each of the respective regimes was overthrown by the military without their being capable of any resistance. In 1970, when La Hora del Pueblo was signed between Perón and the Radical leader Balbín in the aftermath of the military government, the Radicales had had little impact as an opposition and were portrayed, with disastrous electoral consequences, as being in fact preferred by the military as their successors.

The dismal performance of the Radicales during the 1955-1970 years was not entirely their fault. It was also an almost inescapable consequence of the operation of a dual political system as described above. In fact, between 1955 and 1966, the two Radical parties developed diametrically opposed visions of, and strategies toward, Peronism, thus making it possible for the "impossible political game" portrayed by O'Donnell, to sustain itself over a decade. 23/ That is, the UCRI and the UCRP combined their stands on economic and political strategies in such a way that they increased the changes for Peronism to penetrate, and to disrupt, the political scene but neither of the two Radical parties dared to challenge the proscriptions imposed by the armed forces, an initiative which would have created the conditions for a truly democratic system to emerge. What was the essence of the positions they sustained vis-a-vis Peronism? From as early as 1956, significant sectors of the UCRP had advanced reformist and

nationalistic economic policies very similar to those applied by the Peronist regime during the last 1940s. However, at the same time, the UCRP supported the electoral proscription of Peronism --at least until the early 1960s-- and favored a system of union affiliation which would have atomized the working class organizations. The formula of the UCRI was almost opposite to that of their old comrades-in-arms. Beginning in 1958, when the party leader Frondizi assumed the presidency, they advocated the expansion of industries producing consumer durables and capital goods, as well as the modernization and gradual privatization of the energy, transport, and communication sectors. The program also reserved a strategic role for foreign capital and initially imposed a drastic reduction in real wages. 24/ The UCRI, however, never abandoned the "integrationist" goals which they had pursued since 1956. That is, they tried to reinforce Peronist predominance in the labor movement while also inducing union leaders to act "responsibly," which meant: a) controlling the "excessive" wage demands of the rank-and-file, and b) distancing themselves from Perón.

With the Peronists excluded, the two Radical parties exhausted the gamut of significant electoral forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The conservative forces which had supported the anti-Peronist coup of 1955 lacked a party of their own with a real chance of winning a presidential election, or even obtaining significant parliamentary representation. After 1955, consequently, the conservative social forces faced the fact that the defeat of Peronism would not by itself resolve their political problems. Thus, they were recurrently forced to choose between two "lesser evils" --i.e. UCRI's developmentalism which was, however, too "soft" on Peronism, and UCRP's harder line on Peronism which, however, supported economic policies the conservatives abhorred --and to modify their assessment repeatedly. The alternating directions of the conservative swing consistently distorted the political game, corroding the fundamental pillars of the party system, and especially undermining the strength of the two Radical parties, not least because they became bitter political antagonists who did not hesitate to conspire against the institutional order. 25/ Finally, the conservatives became increasingly aware that their long-terms goals --the erradication of Peronism, and the rectification of the statist and pro-industrialist economic orientation-- were not served by their continual swings. Towards the mid- 1960s, this progressive dawning of awareness was a decisive factor in inducing the conservatives to opt for an openly anti-democratic strategy. They broke with the non-Peronist party establishment, particularly with both the UCRP and UCRI, and sought to bring about the installation of a sine die military dictatorship. At that point, some of the confusion of the previous period was eliminated, but the Radicales were experiencing the most acute crisis of their contemporary history: Argentina was entering into what seemed to be the beginning of a military millenium and their 10-year division was becoming a three-way split; the UCRI broke into two factions which would compete for the name of the party for several years. One line stricly followed the developmentalist and integrationist prescriptions of Frondizi; the other adopted a more progressive course under the leadership of Oscar Alende, a former governor of Buenos Aires.

The early 1970s: the resolution of the struggle over the Radical legacy.

The first five years of the military regime inaugurated in 1966 was a time of reckoning for the Radical parties. Only the UCRP chose to follow a consistent opposition line --in fact, the UCRP's government was the one deposed by Onganía-- trying, at the same time, to preserve and expand the territorially-extended party organization which the UCRP had largely inherited from the pre-1955 united UCR. Another important development within the UCRP was the emergence during 1968 and 1969 of an internal dissident group, challenging the established leadership of Ricardo Balbín: Renovation and Change (RyC). RyC demanded that the party follow a more militant line against the military dictatorship by attempting to mobilize the popular sectors, even those which had traditionally been a part of the constituency of Peronism. RyC also sought, fairly successfully, to recreate the party's youth movement whose predecessor had been largely absorbed by UCRI at the time of the division. However, breaking with traditional Radical patterns of intransigence, RyC's leader Raúl Alfonsín did not seek to found a new party, but stayed within the UCRP as head of a minority faction. 26/

Meanwhile, UCRI's two branches, Frondizi's and Alendes's, tried unsuccessfully to influence the policies of the military regime from within. Frondizi and his close associate Frigerio attempted to capture the economic ministry and broke with Onganía only when he shunned them. Alende, in turn, gave support to the second military president, General Levingston, trying to induce him to follow a nationalistic line and to resort to popular mobilization as his political basis. He also failed: Levingston was indeed a nationalist, but a rabid right-winger too who in seeking to found a corporatist regime for which he lacked support among his colleagues, was rapidly overthrown. 27/

The replacement of Levingston by General Lanusse did not only put an end to Alende's attempt to become l'éminence grise of the Argentine version of a military regime like Velasco's Perú, it also signaled the military recognition that their projects of 1966 were doomed. The opening of the electoral season again put at the top of the political agenda the question of Peronism and what would be the response of the Radical parties if the armed forces were to insist on their proscription of Peronism. In one sense the three parties struck a unanimous chord: the experience of the 1955-1966 years had convinced them that no stable political regime based on the respect of popular sovereignty could be built in Argentina without the full participation of the Peronist party. From that point their paths diverged. Balbín, the UCPP's president began to unfold a long-term strategy whose first step was for his party to become the sole heir to the old UCR. Balbin's tactics were favored by the fact that most of the party's structure had stayed with the UCRP, and by the 1963 split suffered by UCRI, which left both of its factions without a national organization. He also counted on the circumstance that a former high ranking member of the party, Arturo Mor Roig, became the Interior Minister during the last throes of the military regime and was put in charge of implementing its phasing out. It was not altogether accidental, then, that the courts settle the dispute between the feuding Radicales in favor of the UCRP, which again became the

UCR after fifteen years of division. The former branches of UCRI were forced to change their names, with Frondizi's adopting the one of Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo (MID), and Alendes's that of Intransigent Party (PI). But beyond the conjuncture of 1971, Balbín's success in recapturing the UCR was related to the second, and more foresighted, part of his strategy as it was first delineated in La Hora del Pueblo. The UCRP envisioned in the early 1970's the formation of a party system of which Peronism was indeed an irrepleceable ingredient, and perhaps the dominant one in the short term. But this system, if it were to come about, required at least another party, which had to be resigned to losing the upcoming elections at the hands of Peronism without withdrawing its support to, and its participation as a loyal opposition in, the process of consolidating democratic institutions.

It was in this sense that the UCRP's claim to inherit the tradition of the other historical mass party in Argentina, was more solidly grounded than those of its adversaries. Neither Frondizi nor Alende and their respective followers, were betting on the emergence of a stable two party system. In fact despite their considerable ideological differences, both of them, and subsequently their two new parties MID and PI, were pursuing, although with different diagnoses, and accordingly different tactics, the same objective: to become the heirs of Peronism. One of them, Frondizi, sought to bring about the metamorphosis of Peronism, whereby it would become a multiclass national movement to which his party would add indispensable ingredients: entrepreneurial support, technocratic cadres, and a developmentalist ideology. Alende, in turn, perceived Peronism as a popular movement with a bourgeois ideology which was temporarily glued together by the charismatic personality of Perón. Consequently, Peronism would break down after Perón's death, with the PI becoming first, the next logical stage for its working class and anti-imperialist components, and then the instrument for their more thorough organization. The electoral strategies implemented by MID and PI followed from their respective diagnoses. MID joined the party front led by the Peronists, FREJULI, while PI became the leading force of a left wing front, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria (APR) which also included the Communist party, and a left wing faction of the Christian Democrats. Alende became APR's presidential candidate.

Once the dispute around the name of the party was settled, the UCR's internal front was reopened. Alfonsín'RyC decided to seek the presidential candidacy thus triggering a realignment of the different sectores. Most of MIR, i.e. Balbín's Buenos Aires party machine from which Alfonsín also came, remained faithful to the old leader with the exception of half a dozen of local bosses. Likewise, Balbín was able to renew the alliances with most provincial caudillos and leaderships, and with the rather corrupt machine of the Federal District. There was an exception, though: Alfonsín negotiated a deal with the Radical leadership of Córdoba, which was quite an important district in internal party politics because it had a high number of registered party members and a history of local victories over the Peronist party. In the internal direct elections, Alfonsín made rather an impressive showing although he was beaten by Balbín. Despite the fact that the RyC organization was quite poor in most districts outside the large industrialized areas of the country, Alfonsín received over 40% of the votes cast and RyC

secured the minority representation in the party organization. 28/

The UCR and the second coming of Peronism.

The presidential elections of March 1973 proved disastrous for the UCR. It received just 21% of the votes, not much more than the party which came in third, a hastly put together confederation of conservative forces, the Federalist Alliance, which received 15%. There were several reasons for the Radical failure. The party had not overcome the image of ineptitude and lack of dynamism that it had carried since the 1960s. At the same time, and despite its unaltered opposition to the military governments of the 1966-1973 period, the UCR was perceived as being the party favored by the military president General Lanusse in the upcoming elections. Lanusse was desperately trying to avoid a victory of Peronism without proscribing it, and the UCR was seemingly in the position of becoming the rallying point for an eventual anti-Peronist coalition 29/. Last but not least, Balbín was a lackluster candidate. All his cunning had proven valuable in building a machine within the party, but outside of it he was perceived as a loser and the epitome of all the vices of politiquería (politicking) 30/

Actually, Balbín's style pervaded the UCR campaign; the emphasis was put on small comité (local office) meetings of the party's faithful, and there was very little television advertising, while the Peronists ran a sophisticated campaign in the media. UCR's closing rally in the Federal District --which had a tradition of high Radical vote-- attracted less than 30,000 while the Peronists were holding meetings with crowds of hundreds of thousands all over the country.

However, in fairness to Balbín, the tone of the Radical campaign was not simply the result of his personal imprint. Two other factors intervened. The first was beyond the control of the UCR: Perón absolutely outmaneuvered the military and the other parties. The second factor was related to the UCR's strategic shift whereby the party reversed its traditional anti-Peronist position. The essence of anti-Peronism had been to adamantly oppose Peronist participation in national elections, and, therefore, to reject the possibility of becoming the opposition party in the context of a Peronist administration. The co-signing of La Hora del Pueblo by the UCR made explicit its acceptance of an eventual Peronist electoral victory and its commitment to the stability of the constitutional regime, independently of the winner. A logical corollary to the holding of free elections in Argentina in the early 1970s --with a Peronist party which had obviously suffered little erosion, if any, in its support and with Perón himself going through a renaissance-- was the return to power of the party which had suffered eighteen years of proscription. However, that was not a foregone conclusion. Governmental surveys suggested that only 35% of the voters supported FREJULI and with a two-round election it seemed entirely feasible to defeat the Peronist candidate in a decisive second round. In that context, in which the underestimation of Peronist strength was not obvious to most of the protagonists, the historical antecedents of the UCR could have thrown doubts on the sincerity of the reversal of its position on Peronism. The UCPP had supported a hard line against Peronism

in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and its administration had implemented a labor law which sought to undermined the power of the Peronist labor movement in the mid 1960s. Against that background, Balbín's 1970 historical reconciliation with Perón could have still been interpreted as a hypocritical move designed to legitimate a Peronist defeat through shrewd engineer of the electoral laws, and the last-minute formation of a "Stop Perón" coalition. Possibly in order to dispel any suspicion that this was indeed the case, Balbín chose not to address Peronism or Perón as UCR's electoral adversaries. That left the party in the self-defeating position of not presenting itself as an alternative either to the military regime (since Peronism had already the opposition place) or to the other major electoral option, i.e. Peronism.

Beyond the electoral conjuncture the course taken by the UCR in 1973 prefigured a trend which would subsequently ruin the chances that the party might have had of reversing its minority status, and thus capturing the government at some point in the future. Balbín was aware that the formation of a party system in Argentina was indeed a prerequisite for the consolidation of democratic institutions, and that it required both a viable government party, and a loyal opposition which would abstain from trying to destabilize the political system. Besides, in the context of the 1973 transition, it also became evident that the demarcation line between what could have been deemed as reasonable opposition tactics vis-a-vis the recently elected Peronist government and destabilizing practices was not precisely drawn. As a consequence of these perceptions and choices, until Peron's death in June 1974, Balbín followed an extremely careful approach whereby public criticism of governmental policies was avoided, and suggestions for changes were privately made directly to the president. Perón, in fact, proved to be an increasingly receptive interlocutor for Balbín, and several of the Radical's suggestions were implemented. 31/ But the Radical tactics had one major drawback. The influence that the UCR had on public policies was completely dependent on the special relationship that Balbín developed with Perón; in fact, most sectors of the Peronist party, and particularly the most extremist elements like the Montoneros and López Rega's clique, resented Perón's closeness to Balbín. The preservation of the special relationship required that the UCR abstain from practices which any opposition party could have legitimately undertaken, like serious congressional discussion and public questioning of governmental decisions. It also limited the UCR's opportunities to appeal for the support of those social sectors --like the working class and the poor, whom Perón considered to be naturally and exclusively under his tutelage. Hence, the likelihood that the huge margin separating the two parties could have been significantly reduced, in the case of serious governmental mismanagement or even collapse, for instance, was almost nil. The correlation of forces between Peronism and the UCR was frozen at the level which made it practically impossible for a normal swing in the respective supports of the two parties to bring about an institutional change in government.

In summary, the UCR moved from one extreme to the other: from being a disloyal opponent of Peronism to occupying the role of a permanent and subordinate opposition. The death of Perón, which was followed by a series of unsuccessful attempts by Balbín to turn into a sort of grandfatherly tutor of Isabel, showed that the role to which the UCR had condemned itself was not only detrimental to its chances of achieving power; it also prevented the party from developing the means

for pressuring Isabel and her entourage, thus losing all possibility of having an impact on a fast deteriorating government. But, worst of all, the disintegration of the government also pulled down its opposition, which could do nothing to became a credible institutional alternative capable of preventing the breakdown of democracy.

After Perón's death and the falling of even minimal norms of political coexistence, it became evident that a new formula had to be found in order to fill the power void and to overcome the system crisis opened in 1974. When the Peronist politicians failed to displace Isabel, it also became apparent that the UCR could not provide an alternative. Balbín and his associates squarely rejected the possibility of mobilizing popular support around the opposition's stands, and their restrained public warnings and off-the-record criticisms had no impact. In the end, the UCR could do nothing but helplessly witness the coup of 1976 which promised yet another military millenium and put a ban on the activities of all political parties.

The rise of Alfonsín.

The freeze imposed on political activities by the regime of General Videla (1976-1981) was completely effective. The public domain remained closed during those five years; systematic state terrorism, a total breakdown of the rule of law, and press censorship erected a solid fence around parties, unions, and other voluntary associations that isolayed them from an already privatized citizenry. While the Peronist party remained in a state of paralysis, there were however some developments within the UCR. Alfonsín, and his RyC fellow leaders, who had steadily lost ground to Balbín during the Peronist interlude, were able to start the task of building a national structure again. This was not only associated with the undertakings of Alfonsín himself, who relentlessly expanded the network of local caudillos and neighborhood punteros, but also to the active life maintained by the RyC youth movement that had emerged in the late 1960s. 32/ The first generation of the leadership of RyC's youth, who were now in their late twenties and early thirties, had already become full members of the party and proved especially effective in maintaining and expanding RyC in districts where the UCR had been traditionally weak, like the working class and poor suburbs of Buenos Aires (which were part of the province of Buenos Aires) and Santa Fe.

Neither the UCR nor the Peronist movement, however, had any significant impact on the political processes leading to the collapse of the military regime; nor for that matter did other opposition forces. The breakdown of military domination was triggered by the failure of the government's economic policies. After Videla stepped down, there was a crescendo of innovations introduced by successive military presidents in orden to avoid disaster, which only succeeded in making it come faster. During 1981, Videla's successor, General Viola, tried to implement a more pragmatic economic program and to engineer a political liberatization controlled from above. Both as a result of the fragmentation of the internal military front and of Viola's indecisiveness, his projects never got off the ground, and he was deposed at the end of the year. However, it was during

Viola's term that political parties reoccupied the public space, but still without being able to generate any momentum. Anyway, the politicians correctly sensed that Viola did not have any power to implement the announced liberalization. All this coincided with the formation of the Multipartidaria, in which Peronist and Radicales joined with the PI, MID, and the recently reunited Christian Democrats in creating a mechanism in order to present a common front in what was perceived as the inevitahle negotiation of the transition with the armed forces. The formation of the Multipartidaria was, in fact, the last political act of Balbín, who died immediately afterwards.

The Multipartidaria, however, was not going to be the other protagonist of the transition, to a large extent because there was in fact no transition, but a sudden collapse. The new military president, General Galtieri, inaugurated 1982 with an attempt to recover the impetus lost by the military. First, he tried to return to an even stricter version of the neoconservative orthodoxy. After the new economic plan lost its momentum in just three months, Galtieri launched the South Atlantic venture, and the defeat at the hands of the British did not only signal the hasty replacement of Galtieri, but to all intents and purposes the end of the military regime. The armed forces dragged on for yet another long year, basically trying to secure from the political parties an agreement not to punish them for the human rights violations they had committed. Their failure to extract such a promise was in principle an indicator of how low the influence of the military had sunk in the aftermath of its double failure --in government and in war. This set the stage for an electoral campaign in 1983 which differed entirely from the one of ten years earlier.

In 1973, the military, in its attempt to retain influence in determining who would succeed it, set the terms under which the election was held. After not allowing Perón to run, the armed forces attempted to legitimize a military-backed candidate with enough leverage to become a factor in the second round, and to engineer a Peronist defeat. 33/ They failed in achieving their goals, but in the process they became one of the terms of a confrontation in which the Peronist successfully monopolized the space of the opposition, and won. As I have argued above, the 1973 electoral patterns left the UCR in a floating vacuum which was detrimental to its chances. In 1983, with the same two major parties occupying the stage, Alfonsín was confronted with a double challenge: how to capture the candidacy within his own party, altering the minority status of RyC, and how to defeat the Peronist who, despite their problems, were still the majority party, having won the previous two elections within a better than 2-to-1 margin, and having outdistanced the UCR precisely by that margin in the more recent 1983 registration process. Against this background, Alfonsín made a bold, and rather innovative move, by defining the campaign in terms of the opposition between democracy and authoritarianism, making the claim that the UCR was the party best suited to built a democratic system in Argentina. Hence, unlike 1973, the reference was to the future --i.e the need to, and the capability to construct democracy-- rather than to the past --i.e. the return to a Golden Age which had been negated as a result of the eighteen-year proscription of Peronism. Alfonsín thus managed to simultaneously alter the electoral equation vis-a-vis Peronism, and within his own party. Setting the election in terms of the future appealed to an electorate

which was emerging from, and eager to leave behind, a long decade of political violence and state terrorism. And while the recourse to state terrorism had largely been the work of the military, Peronism could not escape being blamed for the contribution it had made to political violence from both ends of its ideological spectrum in the 1970s. Furthermore, Alfonsín made an explicit, and credible, connection between Peronism and the military when eight months before the election. he denounced the so-called Pacto militar-sindical, i.e. a pact between the top leadership of the armed forces and the Peronist labor bosses, whereby the former would support a future Peronist regime in exchange for the human rights violations they had committed being condoned.

At the same time, the claim that the UCR was better equiped that the Peronist party to launch a process of consolidation of the democratic institutions contradicted one of the implicit, abeit fundamental, ingredients of the formula that Balbín had put together with Perón in the 1970 La Hora del Pueblo, i.e. that the UCR was indeed essential for the making of democracy in Argentina, but that it would have to dutifully accept its minority status. In making the credible claim that he was the only Radical leader who could effectively bring about an electoral victory for the party, Alfonsín turned the tables within the UCR, and transformed what seemed to be a close race against Fernando de la Rúa, into a lop-sided victory. 34/

Once the Radical election was settled, Alfonsín monopolized the political initiative, never to relinquish it until the election. RyC resorted to mobilization tactics which had not been used by the UCR since the times of Yrigoyen, and was also able to penetrate the working class and the urban poor to an extent unparalleled since the emergence of Peronism. With the election of December, 1983 the UCR not only reversed a history of defeat at the hands of Peronism, it also became a multi-class party.

Recent changes within the Radical party.

When the Peronist party assumed office in 1973, the internal struggle for state power and for control of the union movement soon turned Peronism into a quagmire. By contrast the first year of the Radical government, the renewal of internal competition --temporarily halted during the electoral campaign-- was characterized by negotiation and compromise. The state apparatus and the party structure were the two arenas where the different factions sought to increase their relative power, but it was in the party where the competition was keener. At the governmental level, Alfonsín selected members of the different party factions for the top positions, with all sectors accepting the legitimacy of the presidential prerogative. RyC leaders were appointed to approximately two thirds of the positions in the ministries, state banks and public enterprises, a circumstance which reflected its relative strength within the party. However, Alfonsín appointed one of his more adamant adversaries within the party, Antonio Tróccoli, to the key Interior Ministry, while the Foreign Ministry and the Planning Secretariat were filled with two of the president's closest associates, who were nevertheless recent comers to the party. In fact, it was only in the Labor Ministry

that two sectors of RyC openly competed for office, after the initial appointee, an independent labor leader who led the government into its only political defeat during 1984, resigned. 35/

Actually, the continuing feud over control of the Ministry of Labor was symbolic, and also one more of the effects of a rift within the ranks of the leadership of RyC, which started in 1983 and became more open once Alfonsín took office. One of the currents, which called itself "los históricos," among whom the successor of Mucci in the Labor Ministry, Juan Manuel Casella, was prominent, argued that it was advisable to follow a moderate course, thus consolidating the unprecedented gains of the UCR at the polls.36/ Consequently, los históricos mellowed the strong rhetoric used by RyC during the campaign, and promoted a rapprochement with the Peronist union leader in order to gain their acquiescence to the austerity measures that the government implemented, beginning in the second semester of 1984. During that year too, los históricos developed very close ties with some of the former opponents of Alfonsín in Línea Nacional, and especially with the sectors associated with Interior Minister Tróccoli and the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Juan Carlos Pugliese. Línea Nacional, in fact disintegrated after Alfonsín's victory, and many of its regional caudillos and local punteros entered in various alliances with the internal sectors of RyC.

The other current in RyC was the Junta Coordinadora, or just Coordinadora (Coordinating Caucus), which became the heir to the Radical youth movement founded in the 1960s. The emergence of the youth had enabled the party to secure a foothold in the student movement. During the late 1970s the Radical youth gained strength within the large student population of Argentina, ultimately overtaking those sectors which had enjoyed supremacy earlier, i.e. the Peronist in the early 1970s, and the Communists and other leftist groups in the 1960s. The Coordinadora criticized its opponents for compromising too much with the Peronists, and for their abandonment of the mobilization tactics that had enabled the Radical party to increase its appeal with the popular masses. Accordingly, the Coordinadora raised the motto of the "Third Historical Movement" as the connecting link between, on the one hand, the renewed popular appeal of the Radical party and, on the other, the memories of the previous two political movements which had enjoyed widespread mass support: Yrigoyen's wing of the UCR in the 1910s and 1920s, and Peronism. The theme of the "Third Historical Movement" had in the eyes of the Coordinadora leaders a double adventage: it highlighted the claim of RyC to express continuity with Yrigoyenismo, which represented the popular side of the UCR, and it also recognized the weight of the Peronism traditions while hinting at their exhaustion. However, the title of "movement" has an antiparty resonance which was not absent in the two first "historical movements," both Yrigoyen and Perón had tended to distrust politicians, and to identify party politics with divisiveness, factionalism, and selfishness. This implic ambiguity was not addressed by the Coordinadora.

During 1984 the disputes between the históricos and the Coordinadora centered around the renovation of party authorities, According to the UCR charter, all officials in the executive branch had to resign from their party positions. This meant that Alfonsín and vicepresident Martínez, as well as most of the

members of the UCR national Committee and of many provincial committees, had to be replaced in the party hierarchy. Since the históricos controlled a majority of the positions in the party structure, the Coordinadora pressed for the rule to be applied in order to force a renovation of the authorities. Alfonsín, nevertheless, chose to freeze the conflict by getting a 1984 party convention to approve a temporary suspension of the rule. He was obviously aware that nobody was going to be able to openly challenge his decision since it would have been tantamount to demanding Alfonsín's resignation from the party presidency. Alfonsín was explicitly concerned with the possibility that internal competition could weaken the party and thus reduce its chances of becoming the motor of the hitherto unsurmountable task of consolidating democratic institutions. However, the risks associated with his strategy were not insignificant. First, elected officials were really dedicating most of their time to the running of government, and this meant that the management of party affairs could fall in the hands of a de facto, and thereby not entirely legitimate, leadership. Secondly, the double role of Alfonsín as head of both the government and the party could not but raise the specter of Peronism, where the extreme personalization of authority had indeed contributed to that party's difficulty both in supporting mechanisms for the institutionalization of conflicts, and in accepting internal pluralism.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1980s.

The last twenty years of Argentina political history have witnessed the gradual articulation of a comprehensive authoritarian model, as well as the steady deterioration of the patterns of self-restrained interaction among the various social and political actors. However, despite the worsening political situation, two steps forward were taken in the direction of creating a party system: the healing of the Peronist-antiperonist fracture, and the reversal of the long-term pattern of destabilizing imbalance between the country's leading parties.

The 1983 election opened a new period, in which the possibility of the construction of a party system was renewed. One of the central dilemmas of the current stage is if the style of negotiation and cooperation inaugurated by Balbín and Perón in the early 1970s would survive the intensification of the inter-party competition initiated during the last electoral campaign. This intensification seemed unavoidable in the light of the reversion of the traditional image of the UCR as a party without initiative. However, even if the two parties manage to reestablish the patterns of coexistence, thus consolidating the common terrain that prevailed during a decade, they still have to overcome another serious shortcoming. Argentine parties have been quite unsuccessful in aggregating the interests of the different social sectors. This, in part, was the result of the reluctance of the associations representing class interests, i.e. those of industrialists, workers, large landowners and farmers, to agree on at least some common objectives. But it also reflected the failure of political parties both to act as arenas for compromise among social groups, and to assume the costs of promoting unpopular economic policies designed to tackle the dilemmas of contemporary Argentine society. This weakness of political parties has become apparent again during the first year of Alfonsin's government. The two large parties have not been able to put forward proposals which politically take into

account the brand new type of economic crisis affecting the country.

In the first place, both Radicales and Peronists have shrunk from confronting Argentine citizens with the fact that during the coming years there can be only a sharing of losses. This would have required them to question their common myth of a powerful Argentina as a country with endless resources. More specifically, the governing party has not assumed the responsability of allocating differential costs and benefits through its economic policies. The attempt to postpone harsh decisions could end up hurting the less privileged strata of the population more than if some negotiated agreement among business, labor, and landed interests had been strenuously pursued. The Peronists, in turn, often relapsed into pure obstructionism, choosing not to acknowledge the inevitable negative impact that a program of economic adjustment would cause. They opted to indict publicly the government for"giving in" to the demands of the International Monetary Fund and the creditor banks. In choosing this course, they shunned the responsibility of admitting that any alternative implies sacrificies for all social sectors.

In this context of ineptitude of the two largest parties, the eventual gains of the minor parties of the right and the left in the congressional elections of November 1985 might mean more than just the electoral reemergence of those portions of the citizenry which sustantively adhered to their tenets. This circumstance might also reveal a dangerous tendency of the major parties to lose sight of the real issues, with the consequence that the predominance of extremist views, with their captivating simplicity, might again contribute to hide the need to pursue negotiation and compromise as the only means to settle conflicts of interest.

END NOTES

[1] Naturally, this was done in the name of democracy. Peronism, and Communism after 1959, were equated with "anti-democracy." Consequently, the actions taken against Peronists, Communists, and those politicians and officials who supported or tolerated them, were justified with the argument that such actions were necessary to protect democracy.

[2] In Autoritarismo y Democracia, I have characterized the regimes of the 1955-1966 period as "semi-democratic." (Cfr. 1983, pp. 13-35)

[3] In every open national election held since 1946 the Peronists had increased their majority vis-a-vis the Unión Cívica Radical. In the two 1973 presidential elections, the Peronist margin of victory went from 50 to 22% in March to 60 to 25% in September.

[4] It should not be forgotten, however, that Argentina's "traditional" oligarchy was a relatively young social class based on the extensive capitalist agriculture of the Pampas, rather than a hacendado class exploiting peasant producers.

[5] One of the basic tenets of the Peronist creed in the 1940s was that in all organizations, including the party, authority had to be concentrated at the top, while party leaders were not held accountable for their actions vis-a-vis the rank and file.

[6] There were partial exceptions to the proscriptive regulations. The party was often allowed to present candidates for congressional elections and to run for office at the provincial and local levels. However, Perón himself was forced to remain in exile throughout the whole period. Besides, the tickets standing for Peronism were not allowed to call themselves Peronist, or Justicialista (Justicialismo has been the other designation recurrently used since the 1940s)

[7] The use of the word "delegado personal" was an indication of Perón's intention to suggest that supreme authority ultimately rested in himself. The "order from Madrid," where the old leader spent most of his years in exile, remainded a powerful last-minute resort which he never surrendered entirely. Besides, since orders usually came in cassettes, their full authenticity was often in doubt, and therefore complete certainty was never achieved. Perón became a skillful manipulator of the different levels at which his orders could be read.

[8] The range of choices varied from abstention to the support of "neo-Peronist" tickets and candidates from third parties. "Neo-Peronism," in turn, ranged from largely autonomous provincial parties to interchangeable labels which were little more than façades for the candidacies selected by Perón.

[9] The two most prominent políticos of this kind, and the only ones who became the undisputed bosses of their provinces, were Bittel from Chaco and Sapag from Neuquén. Both led splinters of Peronism in the early 1960s and their popular appeal was recognized even by military governments, which appointed them governors. Beginning in the 1970s, however, each of them followed different courses. Bittel returned to the Peronist party and became an important national figure in the late 1970s; Sapag led the consolidation of the only successful breakaway from Peronism, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino. Since 1983, the Movimiento has run one of the three provincial administration not controlled by either of the two major parties. In most other provinces clientelistically-oriented Peronist politicians also emerged. However, their fortunes were much more erratic, and they could not overcome factional disputes. None was as successful as Bittel or Sapag.

[10] This was clearly realized by Perón who was soon announcing that nobody but "the organization" would inherit his power.

[11] The winning coalition in 1973, the Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional --FREJULI-- included former sectors of the Radical, Conservative, Christian Democratic and Socialist parties.

[12] Beginning in the late 1950s, and after a short period of joint action with some minority groups like the Communists and independent labor leaders, the 62 Organizations became the most important part of the Peronist labor movement. They coordinated the actions of the different unions, compensating to some extent for the vulnerability of the CGT (General Confederation of Labor) to governmental control and repression. In fact, the CGT was under the administration of the unions themselves for less than half of the 1955-1973 years.

[13] The last military president, General Lanusse, and his Interior Minister, who was a former Radical politician, legalized all parties in March 1971.

[14] Beginning May 25, 1983, Héctor Cámpora occupied the presidency for less than fifty days. Then, Perón, who apparently did not intend to become the head of the government but resented Cámpora's leading toward the left, forced his resignation as well as that of the vice-president Solano Lima, in a palace coup which opened the way to new elections and Perón's assumption of the presidency in October 1973. Perón died on July 1, 1974 to be replaced by the vice-president, his wife Isabel.

[15] Besides the Montoneros, there was a Trotskyte guerrilla faction, the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) which was all but exterminated by the army during 1975. ERP bands had some strength in the mountainous countryside of the province of Tucumán but were not significant elsewhere.

[16] The 1983 electorate was slightly above the 18 million figure.

[17] In addition to the ultraverticalismo and MUSO, there was a third internal current which gave emphasis to ideological definitions, Intransigencia

y Movilización (IyM). If the ultraverticalistas represented the right-wing within the always fluid ideological spectrum of Peronism --with their emphasis on anti-communism and traditional values-- IyM was the left-wing. It advocated the return to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Peronism of the early 1970s and the use of popular mobilization as the instrument for changing Argentina political society. IyM only gained control of Catamarca, one of the most traditional and less populated Argentine provinces, and was subjected to a sort of political quarantine by the other factions until mid 1984.

[18] The 62 Organizations had been created by the most powerful post-1955 union leader, Augusto Vandor. Vandor, who was for more than a decade the secretary general of the UOM (Metallurgical Workers' Union), was assassinated by the Peronista guerrillas in 1969. His successor at the helm of UOM, Lorenzo Miguel, also became the head of the the 62 Organizations, a position he retained even when he was jailed by the military during the late 1970s.

[19] Gran Buenos Aires has a population of over nine million, with a third living within the Federal District. All other cities and towns of the larger metropolitan area are located within the jurisdiction of the province of Buenos Aires.

[20] Although voting in the plebiscite was not obligatory, and several extremist right and left wing groups in addition to Peronism supported abstention, over seventy percent of the electorate voted; with four of each five votes for yes. Participation in obligatory national elections has been usually around the 80% level.

[21] According to the constitution, the senate has to approve the executive's appointments in the judiciary and promotions in the armed forces. National deputies are elected according to proportional representation within each province.

[22] The remnants of the Conservative party had all but desapeared from Buenos Aires and the other large provinces, and it could compete for power in just two districts, Mendoza and Corrientes. The Socialists, who had never been strong outside Buenos Aires, had lost whatever support they had among the working class. In fact, the potential constituencies of both Conservatives and Socialists had been siphoned out by the populist Peronism. The Communist party, in turn, emerged from the Peronist decade with a relatively intact apparatus but it could not attract more than 3 or 4% of the voters. Other parties, like the recently created Christian Democrats and the Demócrata Progresista, were even smaller.

[23] Cfr. O'Donnell, 1973, Ch.4.

[24] Net foreign investments in the 1959-1961 years were the highest of the 1930-1982 period. Real wages dropped over 20% during 1959.

[25] The UCRP did not oppose the military overthrow of Frondizi in 1962 and it merely advised him to resign when he requested support to withstand the pressures of the armed forces. Fondizi dutifully reciprocated in 1966 by actively supporting General Onganía's takeover, terminating the civilian regime of UCRP's Illia.

[26] In the 1960s in fact, Alfonsín was widely considered to be the leader being groomed by Balbín to succeed him in the presidency of the party. It would later become obvious that Balbín's ultimate decision to sack Alfonsín as his successor was not related to personal clashes but to their substantive disagreement over the party's strategy. Both leaders came from the province of Buenos Aires, which had been the dominant district since the creation of UCRP. The faction from which they came, MIR, had never attempted to develop a national organization; it rather established its predominance on the basis of coalitions with local and provincial caudillos.

[27] Cfr. O'Donnell, forthcoming University of California Press.

[28] Unlike the case of the Peronist party, the UCRP and afterwards the reunited UCR have chosen their presidential formulas through internal primaries. Minorities were also given representation in the party's leadership provided they gained at least a quarter of the votes in a given districts.

[29] Lanusse tried to block the victory of Peronism by altering the law and establishing a two-round presidential election in cases where no candidate achieved the absolute majority. He hoped that anti-Peronist parties would opt for a common candidacy in the second round. However, FREJULI's ticket headed by Campora a received over 49% of the vote in the first round and Lanusse decreed the suspension of the second round requirement. The UCP also announced that it would not present a candidate for the ballotage.

[30] Balbín had been twice defeated as a presidential candidate, in 1952 and 1958. When he decided not to run in 1963, the UCRP won the election.

[31] Key advisers of Perón and Balbín have recently revealed that, at the time of his death, Perón was considering engineering the succession in order to have Balbin designated as his successor by congress. This was not only paradoxical given the history of confrontation between the two leaders; it also indicated the lack of confidence that the president had in his constitutional successor, Isabel Perón, and in his party.

[32] Punteros are the neighborhood leaders who run local offices and organize the mobilization of party members for registration and internal elections. Their constituencies ran from a few hundreds to several thousands.

[33] However, even the minimalist strategy was hardly played. The natural candidate of the military was the regime's Social Welfare minister, Francisco Manrique, who had gained some popularity devising and running an institution for

the distribution of spoils. Manrique ran as the candidate of the Federalist Alliance, but president Lanusse decided to sponsor the candidacy of an entirely unknown Air Force general, Ezequiel Martínez. Manrique made a respectable showing, he received almost 15% of the votes; Martínez only got a meeger 2%.

[34] The Radical party's internal election had one more presidential precandidate in addition to Alfonsín and de la Rúa: Luis León. León and his grouping, MAY, did not have any chance, although they won in two small districts, including León's own, Chaco. De la Rúa emerged as the precandidate of Línea Nacional (LN) which became the formal expression of all the provincial groupings that had provided the basis for Balbín's supremacy until his death. LN, which controlled the national organization of the party and most of the provincial offices, was hampered by a serious confrontation within the province of Buenos Aires and by the lack of candidates with comparable appeal to Alfonsín's. It experienced a prolonged attrition when three leaders sought the candidacy, with de la Rúa, a young former senator from the most conservative sectors of the party, being backed by one of the Buenos Aires strongmen and a former adversary of Balbín, García Puente. The two other precandidates, Antonio Tróccoli and Juan Carlos Pugliese, had been close associates of Balbín and finally withdrew from the race, not before the latter made an attempt to convince Alfonsín to become the unity candidate in exchange for selecting de la Rúa as his running mate. Alfonsín chose not to break his alliance with the Córdoba leadership, which had selected Víctor Martínez as the vicepresidential candidate, and internal elections were held. RyC scored landslide victories in all the large districts --Santa Fe, Córdoba, the province of Buenos Aires, and the Federal District-- and also defeated LN in most of the others.

[35] The Labor Minister Mucci failed to get congress to approve his proposal for a new law regulating union elections. The government's bill was defeated in the Senate when the Peronist bloc managed to obtain the support of two keys senators from the MPN.

[36] Los Históricos claimed that they represented the historical traditions of RyC; in many districts they kept the original name for themselves.

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Political parties and others social actors. The chilean case.

(Spanish version)

Manuel Antonio Garretón M.

Abstract

La relación entre los partidos políticos y el conjunto de actores sociales en Chile se caracterizó por la solidez de las fuerzas políticas y por una cierta dependencia y debilidad de las organizaciones sociales, que adquirían presencia sólo en la medida que se vinculaban a la estructura político partidaria. Esto durante todo el período del "Estado de compromiso" y, pese a algunos desbordes, hasta 1973. Durante el régimen militar se desarticula esta relación y surgen espacios sustitutivos para la constitución de actores sociales. El paper describe la forma de articulación previa, los cambios ocurridos durante el régimen militar y las proyecciones de tales transformaciones en la relación partido-actores sociales para un proceso de transición a la democracia y para la consolidación de ésta.

Parte del material utilizado en este trabajo ha sido tomado de mis planteamientos en el volumen colectivo "Partidos y Democracia" editado por FLACSO, 1985.
En la elaboración de material bibliográfico y en la recolección de información a través de entrevistas selectivas se contó con la valiosísima colaboración de Paulo Hidalgo.

El presente trabajo intenta un análisis de las relaciones entre partidos políticos y el conjunto de la sociedad bajo el régimen militar chileno. Mas que una descripción detallada de lo que ha ocurrido en este período en tal materia, para lo que no existen investigaciones sistemáticas al respecto[1/], nos interesa evaluar en términos generales qué variaciones se han producido bajo la dictadura en lo que podríamos llamar el patrón vigente de las relaciones entre partidos y sociedad hasta el derrumbe del régimen democrático en 1973.

En la primera parte recordaremos los rasgos básicos, a nuestro juicio, del sistema partidario y de sus relaciones con los otros actores sociales hasta 1973[2/]. Enseguida nos referiremos al proyecto de la dictadura chilena respecto del sistema partidario. En la tercera parte examinaremos algunos antecedentes respecto de la evolución de los partidos en las diversas fases del régimen y de las relaciones entre los partidos y otros sectores y actores de la sociedad. En la última parte intentaremos algunas conclusiones que permitan ubicar los puntos anteriores en la perspectiva de la transición y consolidación democráticas[3/].

I. EL ESQUEMA PARTIDOS-SOCIEDAD HASTA 1973

El sistema partidario que se desarrolló hasta 1973 debe ser puesto en el contexto de un régimen político democrático, restringido hasta 1958 y de participación masiva desde entonces, y de un proceso de creciente incorporación de diversos sectores sociales a la vida económica, social, cultural y política, que se hace en forma segmentada, gradual, conflictiva y sujeto a la capacidad de organización y presión sobre el Estado. Este último se transforma en el referente casi único de la acción colectiva. En este contexto, el sistema de partidos en Chile se convierte en el instrumento principal de acceso al Estado y en el canal obligado para que una categoría o sector se constituya en actor nacional. Las organizaciones sociales son normalmente una articulación de liderazgo político y representación de una base social. El movimiento estudiantil, el movimiento sindical, el movimiento campesino o poblacional en los 60, no pueden entenderse sin esta particular imbricación entre partido y grupo social[4/]. De aquí se derivan algunos rasgos que caracterizan al sistema de partidos en Chile y que poseen aristas positivas y negativas.

En primer lugar, la estabilidad del sistema de partidos es un elemento claramente positivo en la medida que ofrece a los nuevos sectores que se incorporan a la vida social y política, referentes claros en lo ideológico, pautas de acción relativamente formalizadas, liderazgos y estructuras perdurables. Asimismo, se permite un sistema continuo de reproducción de la clase política y las relaciones interpartidarias poseen un código consensual.

La estabilidad del sistema de partidos, con pocos quiebres hasta 1973, se explica en parte por otro rasgo, cual es el carácter nacional del espectro partidario en el sentido de proyección territorial sin la existencia de "partidos regionales" y también en términos de su inclusividad. En otras palabras, el espectro partidario abarca toda la gama ideológica (derecha, centro, izquierda) y a veces con más de una opción organizacional en cada tramo del espectro. Como este sistema logra constituírse como tal antes del proceso de incorporación masiva de la población a la vida política, cuando ésta se produce encuentra ya canales constituídos para su expresión y representación.

Un sistema de partidos estable y completo ideológicamente, que se constituye en el elemento principal de acceso al Estado y la vida pública, posee también el importante valor de ser representativo de los diversos sectores culturales y sociales del país. En ese sentido es un sistema capaz de realizar consensos y concertaciones que cuentan con respaldo social, lo que le da al sistema político en su conjunto una gran capacidad de regular los conflictos y de reproducirse. En parte la estabilidad de la democracia política se debe en Chile a estos rasgos del sistema de partidos.

Estable, diversificado ideológicamente y políticamente inclusivo, representativo de la sociedad expresando y canalizando sus conflictos y consensos, este sistema partidario tenía también algunos rasgos críticos.

Por un lado, y ello es un rasgo de la sociedad chilena en su conjunto, no existían otros canales institucionales y organizacionales, excepto en el mundo de la derecha, suficientemente autónomos del sistema partidario y que expresaran intereses corporativos, demandas sociales, ideas o aspiraciones colectivas y sectoriales.

La sociedad civil era así débil en relación a la sociedad política, las organizaciones sociales frágiles en la base social. Habría, entonces, una relativa partidización de la sociedad, una gran debilidad de otras expresiones organizativas a nivel local o nacional y una cierta dependencia del recurso partidario. Este fenómeno se expresa en la relación de adhesión-rechazo por parte de vastos sectores hacia el sistema de partidos. Se le reconocía a éste su validez y representatividad, puesto que se participaba en la competencia electoral y se buscaba cierta protección clientelística, pero se criticaba y denunciaba el "sectarismo" y la "politiquería": había, así, un cierto atractivo del "independentismo", pero enormes dificultades para darle un espacio en la política.

Por otro lado, la solidez y extensión de una clase política, que asegura la capacidad de concertación y representación, tiene como contraparte su tendencia a la autonomización. Ello se expresaba en dos rasgos del sistema de partidos. Uno de ellos era la constitución por parte de los partidos de verdaderas subculturas diferenciadas unas de otras, donde el tipo de adhesión o militancia era casi religiosa, con códigos internalizados que abarcaban toda la

vida del militante, donde el partido es todo para el individuo y donde la "razón de Estado" es la "razón de partido". Siendo la militancia una especie de modo de vida, la política pierde su carácter secular y hay una tendencia a la instrumentalización del resto de las esferas de la vida social. Este rasgo, positivo desde el punto de vista de la homogeneización de la extrema diversidad social, se constituye en un elemento obstaculizante de las relaciones interpartidarias (relaciones entre cosmos diferentes) y del partido con el resto de la sociedad, porque el militante y el partido en su conjunto tienden a identificar a la sociedad con sus propios valores, intereses y dinámicas. El otro rasgo, en parte relacionado al interior, era el inmenso peso ideológico-doctrinario de los partidos, donde la unidad partidaria se encuentra no en una determinada visión programática sino en concepciones y proyectos globales sobre el ser humano y la sociedad. Se trata así de especies de Iglesias en que los militantes se definen por una determinada fe. Este rasgo se expresa en la tendencia a definir proyectos completos de tipo excluyente, lo que fortalece una visión mesiánica del partido, con una escasa comprensión de los medios concretos para realizarlo. Los ejemplos de la "revolución en libertad" y la "vía chilena al socialismo" ilustran sobre la envergadura de unos objetivos postulados ideológicamente y de unos medios o instrumentos demasiado pobres para tan altos fines. Asimismo, la definición de los procesos históricos a los que había que responder se hacía a partir de grandes elaboraciones ideológicas, perdiendo de vista muchas veces sus significados reales.

Todo lo anterior es de algún modo la contraparte negativa de ese rasgo de estabilidad que habpiamos mencionado. Porque la estabilidad significa también cierta rigidez y dificultad de adaptarse a nuevas circunstancias.

Esta rigidez se expresó también en un tercer rasgo crítico, cual es la dificultad de establecer alianzas estables y, por lo tanto, dado el componente altamente ideológico de los partidos, la tendencia a la polarización del sistema partidario. Así, cada partido enfatizaba los elementos conflictivos e intransables de su proyecto y cada proyecto aparecía como totalmente excluyente de otros y por lo tanto sólo realizable por el propio partido. Hay en este ideologismo y tendencia a la polarización dos aspectos. Uno se refiere al aspecto institucional, donde si bien el sistema obligaba al gradualismo y la negociación, no se proveían mecanismos que facilitaran los acuerdos y alianzas para formar mayorías relativamente estables[5/]. El otro aspecto tiene relación con este fenómeno del partido como una subcultura, como portador mesiánico de un proyecto global de sociedad, donde a veces más importa la diferenciación de su identidad que la cooperación en programas y políticas comunes.

Finalmente, señalemos que otra deficiencia del sistema de partidos era la ausencia de una institucionalización legal del mismo, que le diera a los partidos un determinado status y fijara normas generales respecto de sus atribuciones y responsabilidades públicas y algunos principios básicos que aseguraran su democracia interna. Al carecer de este rango institucional, los partidos aparecen como algo

propio de iniciados, pierden transparencia ante los ciudadanos y no hay forma de garantizar los derechos de los militantes y la democracia interna, corriéndose los tradicionales riesgos del caudillismo, el fraccionalismo, el asambleísmo, o el burocratismo y la oligarquización, fenómenos todos estos que afectaron de distinta forma a los diferentes partidos chilenos.

La crisis de 1973 aparece como una exacerbación de los rasgos negativos del sistema de partidos ya señalados, aunque no pueda atribuírse a este sistema la causa del colapso democrático[6/]. Por un lado, en todos los puntos del espectro partidario se produjo una relativa incapacidad de canalizar la irrupción en la escena política de sectores sociales antes marginados o confinados a su dimensión puramente corporativa. Así, por ejmplo, en la derecha, los gremios empresariales desbordaron la derecha política tradicional, en el centro fueron los gremios profesionales los que desbordaron la conducción política de la Democracia Cristiana y en la izquierda ciertos núcleos laborales y poblacionales sobrepasaron la conducción tradicional de sus partidos[7/]. Sin embargo, sería falso ver este desborde e incapacidad de conducción como un puro efecto de un movimiento de masas sobre unos partidos inocentes que sólo buscaban canalizarlas. La paradoja estriba en que desde los partidos mismos se alimentó este desborde o, dicho de otro modo, ningún partido apostó al sistema por encima de sus posiciones, sino que sacrificó aquél por el triunfo de éstas, identificando este triunfo con la mantención del sistema político mismo. Es más, en algunos casos se apostó explícitamente a la ruptura del sistema político como fue el caso del conjunto de la derecha,

o se consideró indiferente su mantención como en el caso de la extrema izquierda, o se fue absolutamente ciego en la incapacidad de defenderlo apoyando tácitamente su destrucción como en el caso de la Democracia Cristiana. Se reforzó, así, uno de los rasgos negativos del sistema de partidos cual era su tendencia a la polarización. En la derecha, surgió un sector claro y decididamente anti sistema como fue Patria y Libertad, y en la derecha tradicional misma se fortalecieron las posiciones antidemocráticas jugando todo al derrocamiento de Allende y a la deslegitimación de todos los mecanismos arbitrales de la sociedad política, incluido el sistema electoral. Una de las expresiones de este abandono del sistema democrático fue la autodisolución de la derecha (el Partido Nacional) después del golpe militar de septiembre 1983. El centro político, por su parte, puso por encima de todo la preservación de sus intereses organizacionales de largo plazo buscando neutralizar el proyecto de la Unidad Popular y convertirse en "la" alternativa, sin reparar en el carácter popular del gobierno y en la naturaleza de una oposición frontal que buscaba el derrocamiento y a la cual tuvo finalmente que sumarse. Respecto de la izquierda, ella buscó cumplir su proyecto socialista sin realizar las alianzas políticas que le dieran la mayoría necesaria para cumplir ese proyecto dentro de los marcos democráticos. Al interior de la izquierda, las diferencias internas respecto de su proyecto político fueron remediadas con la exacerbación del principio de la "razón de partido": lo que se llamó el "cuoteo".

Así, la tendencia a la tripolarización que había cristalizado en la década del 60 alcanzó niveles extremos en

el período 70-73: una derecha que se propone terminar con el régimen democrático, un centro que pierde su capacidad de realizar alianzas que flexibilicen el espectro político y que se presenta como alternativa excluyente (a diferencia del centro ocupado por el Partido Radical en las décadas anteriores), y una izquierda que cuestiona los principios de negociación y gradualismo pues pone como objetivo único el cumplimiento integral de su programa sin alianzas que lo viabilicen. En suma, la política como confrontación total, donde la arena legitimada de solución de conflictos pierde su capacidad de regularlos porque los actores políticos no concentran sus esfuerzos en preservarla sino en sus propias metas.

Vale la pena indicar aquí el vacío institucional que favoreció esta polarización y desborde de los conflictos al no proveer mecanismos que forzaran a realizar acuerdos mayoritarios (segunda vuelta electoral, por ejemplo), que permitieran expresarse las mayorías en los momentos claves (compatibilización de elecciones presidenciales con las parlamentarias, por ejemplo) o que resolvieran los conflictos interpartidarios (declaración de incompetencia del Tribunal Constitucional que deja sin resolver el principal conflicto institucional del período como fue el proyecto sobre el "Area de Propiedad Social", por ejemplo).

Finalmente, en este período se hace presente también el fenómeno de partidización polarizante del conjunto de la sociedad, al no haber ninguna institución (excepto quizás la Iglesia) que mantenga una cierta neutralidad frente al conflicto político.

II. MODELO POLITICO MILITAR Y PARTIDOS

El "modelo político" desarrollado por la dictadura de Pinochet ha variado en el tiempo y pueden distinguirse, entonces, diversos momentos del mismo en relación al problema de los partidos[8/].

En una primera fase, luego del golpe militar de Septiembre de 1973, este modelo se caracteriza por dos rasgos principales. Por un lado, la eliminación del sistema democrático precedente, con lo que ello implica de supresión de sus instituciones y de persecución de sus organizaciones y sus miembros a través de todos los métodos represivos como asesinatos, detenciones, desapariciones, relegaciones, exilio, ejecuciones sumarias, etc. El aparato represivo y de control militar ocupa el hueco del sistema político anterior. Por otro lado, la creciente personalización del liderazgo político y militar en Pinochet, subordinando a la Junta de Gobierno a un papel secundario, y subordinando también las diversas ramas de las FF.AA. al Ejército.

Hay un segundo momento en que se busca fundar un nuevo modelo político para el país, que se adecúe a la visión global de sociedad del núcleo dirigente en el Estado (Pinochet, equipo económico de Chicago y "gremialistas") y a las transformaciones en la sociedad impulsadas por este núcleo. Se trata de institucionalizar un <u>régimen militar</u> con gobierno personalizado por largo plazo y proponer para el futuro un <u>régimen autoritario</u> de arena política restringida, exclusión de sectores proclives al cambio y poder tutelar de las

FF.AA. Este momento tiene su culminación en la imposición de una Constitución en 1980 a través de un plebiscito manejado por el Gobierno. Esta Constitución, en su articulado transitorio, consagra un régimen militar de larga duración y, en su articulado definitivo, consagra el sistema autoritario mencionado que a veces se le llama oficialmente "democracia protegida"[9/].

La institucionalidad política transitoria hasta 1989 no es sino la reproducción del sistema dictatorial implantado en 1973. En ella desaparecen virtualmente los derechos ciudadanos y sus garantías. Para el futuro, se busca una relación Estado-sociedad en la que prima el carácter autoritario y vertical (primacía del Ejecutivo, intangibilidad de algunas instituciones públicas, debilitamiento del Legislativo, papel de las FF.AA.), la exclusión política (proscripción de las ideas de cambio social), la atomización de la organización social (incompatibilidades entre la organización social y la acción política), y la rigidez del marco constitucional mismo (casi imposibilidad de reforma a la Constitución).

En relación a los partidos políticos, esta institucionalidad los consagra a nivel constitucional y de "ley orgánica". Ya hemos señalado que en el período democrático hubo aquí una carencia importante. Elevar la existencia de los partidos a nivel constitucional, fijar normas generales de funcionamiento y principios que deban regir sus estatutos, así como consagrar el principio de la democracia interna, son todos elementos necesarios de cuya ausencia adoleció la institucionalidad democrática. Pero todos estos elementos y prin-

cipios se desvirtúan en la institucionalidad propuesta en la Constitución del 80, aún sin que se promulgue la ley orgánica que allí se plantea, por cuanto, en primer lugar, se consagra el principio de exclusión de partidos que profesen ciertas ideas definidas muy vagamente (art. 8); en segundo lugar, se pretende enfrentar el fenómeno de partidización de la sociedad a que hemos aludido, con la total segmentación de las esferas de acción colectiva (gremial, sindical, cuerpos intermedios) y de la acción política, haciendo caso omiso de una relación histórica y cultural e imponiendo artificialmente normas que impidan una combinación más fluida (artículo 19 Nºs 15 y 19; art. 23). Los partidos aparecen entonces, y pese a su consagración institucional, disminuídos en su capacidad de articular política y sociedad, lo que a su vez se refuerza cuando se examinan los anteproyectos de la ley orgánica en que se plantean trabas a su constitución y se les limita fuertemente su posibilidad de acción y representación.

En los dos "momentos" señalados del modelo político hay elementos comunes: mantención de un alto nivel represivo a organizaciones y personas, intento de desarticular el sistema partidario existente hasta 1973 y, en términos más generales, eliminar los mecanismos de representación y de la política como mediación entre la sociedad y el Estado. La utopía es una sociedad en que la política ha sido eliminada por irrelevante y reemplazada por una sociedad atomizada que resuelve los problemas de los individuos a través de los mecanismos del mercado, y en que el Estado, reducido pero fuerte y autoritario, es el guardián del orden establecido

y no el referente de la acción colectiva. Es decir, se trata de un modelo político que sustituya al que existió en Chile hasta 1973 y que hemos descrito en la primera parte. Pero ello supone un largo período de régimen militar que cree las condiciones de viabilidad de tal modelo.

En 1983 este proyecto político acusa el impacto del derrumbe del modelo económico que le servía de base material y queda convertido en un puro proyecto de sobrevivencia del régimen militar en los términos establecidos en la Constitución del 80. Este impacto, expresado en el movimiento masivo de descontento a través de las Protestas Nacionales, forzó al Gobierno a crear un espacio político público informal donde irrumpió la oposición política a través de grandes bloques. Este espacio, que se conoció con el nombre de "apertura", se cerró en Noviembre de 1984, volviendo al mismo esquema previo a 1983[10/].

Así, la utopía de construir una nueva forma estable de articulación entre Estado y sociedad civil, que fundara también un nuevo sistema de partidos de espectro limitado, parece fracasada. Como veremos, el gobierno militar logró desarticular el modelo político precedente y en parte el sistema de partidos, pero no lo reemplazó por ninguno nuevo y mantuvo siempre vigente una relación represiva del Estado hacia la sociedad. Con ello no resolvió ningún problema: no logró crear un sistema consensual de canalización de demandas y de participación social; provocó una enorme crisis de representación y de legitimidad en la sociedad sin mecanismos de resolución; exacerbó algunas tendencias negativas del

sistema anterior al impedir que se expresaran liderazgos y estilos renovados. Hubo así un fracaso no sólo del proyecto del régimen, sino también de su intento por eliminar de raíz el sistema antiguo. Este persiste larvadamente a través de un sistema partidario relativamente desarticulado, pero vigente y no sustituído, lo que será examinado a continuación.

III. PARTIDOS POLITICOS Y SOCIEDAD BAJO LA DICTADURA MILITAR

Si recordamos una periodización gruesa del régimen militar hecha en otras ocasiones[11] en el predominio de su fase reactiva (1973-76/77), las características principales del sistema partidario fueron las siguientes: a) Eliminación del sistema político e ilegalización de los partidos con represión muy violenta a los partidos de izquierda y su paso a la clandestinidad. b) Autodisolución de la derecha política (Partido Nacional) y plena identificación de su elite dirigente con el nuevo régimen. c) Proceso de distanciamiento progresivo de la Democracia Cristiana respecto de un régimen cuyo advenimiento aprobó, con importantes excepciones, tácita o explícitamente. d) Las actividades partidarias quedan reducidas a tareas de sobrevivencia y rearticulación mínima de los aparatos organizacionales siendo predominante su atomización y silenciamiento. e) Surgimiento de un espacio sustitutivo de la política provisto por la Iglesia, vinculado inicialmente a la defensa de derechos humanos básicos pero que progresivamente adquiere un rol único y crucial en la reconstitución de organizaciones sociales y como instancia de encuentro de la dirigencia política. Este hecho quizás sea el más significativo dándole a la Iglesia el carácter de actor único frente al actor estatal-militar. f) Acción insurreccional minoritaria y de escasa significación del MIR con progresivo desmantelamiento de sus estructuras.

En la fase siguiente que hemos denominado "transformadora" o "fundacional" desde la perspectiva del régimen, los

rasgos principales del sistema partidario y sus relaciones con la sociedad parecieran ser: a) Consolidación de la Democracia Cristiana como partido de oposición, con predominio de su tendencia alternativista a subordinar a los otros partidos a su liderazgo, y surgimiento en la oposición partidaria de los temas de los "frentes amplios", "oposición unida" que se enfrentan a resistencias tanto de la DC como del Partido Socialista. La tendencia a la fragmentación de éste se agudiza en una división principal en 1979, lo que, a su vez, activa procesos de renovación y autocrítica tanto en sectores "históricos" del Partido como en grupos partidarios menores escindidos de la DC y que se definen por un "socialismo renovado". b) Surgimiento de espacios tanto en los medios intelectuales como en sectores laborales, estudiantiles, poblacionales, donde se dan actividades de disidencia y oposición y en que los partidos actúan a través de militantes que adquieren creciente autonomía respecto de sus organizaciones[12/]. c) Creación de organizaciones sociales de tipo cupular donde la dependencia partidaria es mucho mayor y donde las concertaciones adquieren carácter netamente político reproduciendo los conflictos de ese nivel. d) Ampliación del espacio de la Iglesia más allá del tema específico de los "derechos humanos" estableciendo conexiones directas con las organizaciones sociales, las que al no pasar en este caso por el canal partidario aumentan su autonomía.

A partir del plebiscito de 1980 que marcó de algún modo la culminación de la fase anterior[13/], se producen cuatro fenómenos significativos: a) La variación en la línea del PC que enfatiza los aspectos insurreccionales en su estrategia y orienta su acción especialmente al campo pobla-

cional; b) La redefinición del liderazgo partidario en la DC más proclive a un entendimiento con la izquierda aunque con exclusión de acuerdo global con el PC; c) El reforzamiento de las tendencias renovadoras en el campo del socialismo teniendo como contraparte los impulsos de reunificación de los sectores orgánicamente más históricos del PS; d) La presencia de espacios, organizaciones, instancias y actividades de oposición marcadas en general por un doble movimiento de partidización en la cúpula y autonomización en los niveles de base e intermedios.

En 1982 el derrumbe del modelo económico en que el régimen militar basaba todo su proyecto político empujó a éste a una fase de crisis sucesivas, si bien no capaces de engendrar una crisis terminal. Desde nuestra perspectiva los fenómenos principales de esta fase han sido: a) La irrupción masiva de un movimiento de protesta en que se expresaba el descontento popular y de clases medias[14/]. La Primera Protesta de Mayo de 1983 tuvo su origen en las grandes organizaciones sindicales mucho más que en el liderazgo político partidario. Sin embargo, el efecto de estas primeras protestas fue que el régimen inició un proceso de "apertura política", errática, informal, reversible y acompañada de altos niveles represivos, destinado a recomponer su bloque de apoyo y a encapsular y canalizar a la oposición. Esta emergió al espacio público a través de la constitución de grandes bloques[15/], lo que llevó a un relativo distanciamiento de los núcleos partidarios militantes respecto de las bases sociales de las primeras protestas, las que se fueron reduciendo a sectores pobladores jóvenes.

Estos constituyen el sector social más activado, pero al mismo tiempo el de mayores dificultades para canalizar y representar. La ausencia de una estrategia de término del régimen por parte de la oposición llevó a mantener en los hechos una actividad de desestabilización sin los necesarios respaldos de fuerza política y sin fórmulas de transición a negociar con un poder militar que, por otro lado, se negaba a cualquier paso en este sentido. Este bloqueo llevó al cierre de la "apertura" a fines de 1984 y a la declaración del Estado de Sitio; b) El espectro partidario sufrió algunas variaciones, más allá de los bloques a que hemos hecho mención. Por un lado, tiende a bifucarse la derecha política en dos sectores, uno proclive al régimen y otro tomando distancias de él, pero sin que exista aún una cristalización orgánica definitiva. En el centro, la DC aunque más inclinada a posiciones de centro izquierda mantiene su renuencia a acuerdos con el PC. En la izquierda el campo socialista se mantiene fragmentado con sectores renovados que no logran darse expresión orgánica y sectores más clásicos que no logran autonomizarse claramente respecto del PC. Este mantiene una dualización entre sectores más tradicionales y gradualistas, ligados a los medios sindicales, y sectores radicalizados, que hoy tienden a predominar, con posiciones más insurreccionales y militaristas y con un campo de acción principalmente en la juventud pobladora; c) Los procesos de activación partidaria han mostrado la perdurabilidad de los partidos y su capacidad de convertirse en actores e interlocutores ahí donde se genera espacio público. En casi todas las organizaciones sociales (gremiales, estudiantiles, sindicales) como en casi todas las grandes con-

certaciones primar los liderazgos y posiciones partidarias. Sin embargo, ello va aparejado aunque en grados diferentes, de dos fenómenos que relativizan esta infuencia partidaria y plantean interrogantes para las relaciones partido-actores sociales en el futuro. En primer lugar, esta influencia se da casi exclusivamente en el nivel cupular y en los medios más politizados, pero al precio de una cierta no sólo indiferencia sino incluso rechazo en niveles intermedios y de base donde la crítica a los partidos adquiere a veces caracteres virulentos. El problema planteado es si los partidos son capaces de ir más allá en su convocatoria de los círculos en los que ya están implantados. En segundo lugar, se produce un cambio difícil de precisar en el modo cómo se ejerce esa influencia y liderazgo partidario en las organizaciones sociales, por cuanto el tipo de militancia aparece con lealtades más firmes hacia las organizaciones y menos dispuesta a la "orden de partido".(Ello es especialmente visible en grandes sectores del movimiento estudiantil), por lo que el problema de la autonomía de las organizaciones tiende a ser puesto como el problema crucial. La política de estas organizaciones la hacen más las personas militantes que sus mismos partidos y en muchas de ellas la mera legitimidad partidaria ha sido erosionada a favor de una legitimidad que se conquista en la organización. Sin embargo, es evidente que en los momentos de mayor "apertura política" aumentan las tendencias a la partidización.

IV. PARTIDOS Y SOCIEDAD EN LA TRANSICION Y CONSOLIDACION DEMOCRATICAS

1. Qué rasgos del sistema partidario en su relación con la sociedad que lo caracterizaron en el pasado subsisten hoy?

En primer lugar debe insistirse que en Chile el sistema partidista no fue reemplazado por otro. No hubo un proceso de refundación o creación de un sistema de partidos bajo el régimen militar como fue en el caso de Brasil. Aquí permaneció el mismo sistema partidista con los rasgos ya señalados: fragmentación en dos puntos del espectro (derecha e izquierda socialista), desarticulación de los vínculos entre partidos y sociedad civil debido, entre otras cosas, a las exigencias de la clandestinidad, pérdida del papel de mediación y de canalización de demandas sociales, crisis de representatividad.

La superación de los rasgos críticos indicados en la primera parte de este trabajo es extremadamente difícil en un contexto represivo, sin espacio público, sin contactos institucionalizados con el resto de la sociedad. Se trata de un sistema partidista al margen de la institucionalidad, que acusa vacíos en algunos puntos del espectro y carente de los mecanismos más elementales de representación. En tales condiciones es evidente que la renovavión en la clase política se hace sumamente difícil, y los nuevos liderazgos posibles no cuentan con las instancias para manifestarse. Asimismo, el modo cómo fue realizada la "apertura" impidió que cristalizaran los procesos de renovación que se habían dado en el interior de los partidos.

Sin embargo, los elementos de reconstitución y renovación del sistema partidista están latentes, en la medida que no se logró eliminarlo ni sustituírlo del todo. Algunos defectos pueden haberse profundizado por razones externas a los partidos y otros están en proceso de superación.

Así, respecto de la tendencia a la partidización de la sociedad a la que nos hemos referido, la situación de dictadura y la misma reflexión autocrítica de los partidos ha llevado a que se desarrolle una mayor autonomía de las organizaciones sociales, aun cuando persiste el modelo de imbricación entre organización política y organización social. Hay una positiva mayor tensión entre ambas. Pero, y las situaciones de movilización así lo muestran, aún subsiste una desvinculación entre la militancia orgánica de los partidos y el resto de la gente, con lo que muchas veces el juicio que se hace sobre el estado de conciencia y movilización de la sociedad en general es una simple proyección de lo que ocurre en la clase política. Aún no se logra en ésta una conciencia generalizada del partido como promotor de organizaciones sociales que luego adquieren plena autonomía. La tendencia a imponer la lógica partidaria o política al conjunto de la sociedad no ha sido totalmente superada. En la elección de los liderazgos sociales y en las concertaciones se tiende aún a privilegiar las pertenencias y posiciones partidarias. De ello sin embargo no puede culparse sólo a los partidos sino también al contexto dictatorial que elimina instancias en las que pueden florecer nuevos liderazgos más autónomos del sistema partidario. En todo caso, en el interior de los partidos mismos hay mayor valoración de esta autonomía de la organización social.

En cuanto al maximalismo ideológico, es cierto que se ha producido una evolución hacia partidos más programáticos y, en algunos sectores, se ha ido perdiendo el carácter religioso de la militancia. Pero aún subsiste una gran dificultad para secularizar la política. La definición de los procesos políticos sigue siendo ideologizada y las grandes metas o proyectos no van acompañados de una definición e implementación adecuada de los medios. Es preciso señalar, sin embargo, en los sectores tradicionalmente más proclives al ideologismo una tendencia a un mayor realismo y a formulaciones menos codificadas en un lenguaje ideologizado y abierto sólo "a los inidiados". Paradojalmente, sectores más pragmáticos en el sistema político anterior son ahora los más ideologizados.

En cuanto a la tendencia polarizante del sistema partidista, se mantiene aún la incógnita en dos puntos del espectro lo que retarda la reconstitución del sistema: la derecha y la izquierda socialista. Existe una cierta derecha que se define como soporte o sucesora del régimen militar, lo que lleva a pensar en la persistencia de un sector autoritario, con indudables efectos polarizantes. El centro político, expresado en la Democracia Cristiana, parece haber suavizado su natural alternativismo como lo prueba su voluntad de establecer alianzas, lo que se ilustra con la creación de la Alianza Democrática en 1983. Sin embargo, el modo de elaboración de su "Proyecto Alternativo", la creación de una Central Sindical de corte ideológico y, sobre todo, su renuencia a un entendimiento con el Partido Comunista y a aceptar a éste como interlocutor importante en el proceso de democratización, ilustran la persistencia de rasgos

polarizantes. Respecto de la izquierda, se mantiene el retardo en la constitución orgánica de la izquierda socialista como un gran partido que supere la fragmentación existente, debido a la persistencia de estilos que buscan antes que nada perpetuar la identidad de grupos. Esta ausencia es también un elemento reproductor de la polarización. Por otro lado, el entendimiento de ciertos socialistas con el centro muestra una tendencia en el campo socialista a la superación del rígido esquema tripolar existente hasta 1973 y la voluntad de flexibilizar el esquema de relaciones interpartidarias, aun a costa de viejas alianzas. Por su parte, el tradicionalismo de cierta izquierda expresada por el Partido Comunista, que busca reconstituir el esquema de"tres tercios"y el cambio en la línea clásica del PC hacia rasgos más insurreccionales, son otros elementos que dificultan la superación del rasgo polarizante del sistema partidista.

2. Si analizamos ahora la probelmática del sistema de partidos desde la perspectiva de una transición democrática, recordemos que la experiencia de las dictaduras militares de los últimos tiempos muestra que la lógica política y su progresiva presencia en el espacio público, constituyen la principal erosión del régimen autoritario y la principal amenaza para la sobrevivencia de éstos. Por el contrario, la lógica militar y el cierre de espacios políticos es el mejor escenario para la mantención de una dictadura o régimen militar. Pero crear espacios políticos exige el desarrollo de actores capaces de moverse en él, concertarse, expresar demandas sociales y resistir en conjunto a la pauta autoritaria. Reconstituir un sistema de aprtidos es así una

necesidad para el término del régimen militar y un proceso de transición en que haya interlocutores que puedan resolver la profunda crisis de representación que afecta a la sociedad chilena y asegurar la alternativa post-autoritaria.

Vale la pena insistir que esta reconstitución del sistema partidario existe de algún modo y que el problema principal es la falta de un espacio público en que ello se exprese y de un sistema político donde su acción sea efectiva. Para que una reconstitución del sistema partidario sea real, debe cumplir con el requisito de ser completa, es decir sin ausencia o exclusión de ningún sector ideológico político. Ello dice relación tanto con la necesidad de contar en ese sistema con los partidos marxistas leninistas, entre ellos el Partidos Comunista, como la necesidad que se completen expresiones orgánicas en dos puntos del espectro. Uno es la derecha política que aparece aún fragmentada orgánicamente y vacilante ideológicamente en una adhesión democrática irrestricta. El otro es la ausencia de una izquierda socialista unificada, la que aparece también fragmentada orgánicamente.

Pero la sola reconstitución de un sistema partidario, cualquiera sea su grado de precariedad, y su presencia en el espacio público no bastan para desencadenar y asegurar un proceso de transición democrática. La experiencia de la "apertura política" entre los años 83 y 84 muestra hasta qué punto la existencia de partidos y agrupaciones más amplias fue incapaz de provocar una seria crisis de desestabilización del régimen.

Hay aquí dos aspectos que nos parecen ligados. Por un lado, como hemos dicho, la oposición en su conjunto irrumpió en el espacio público sin una propuesta de transición concreta con la que enfrentarse a un régimen debilitado, con la cual negociar y en torno a la que debía convocarse y concertarse una fuerte movilización social que carecía de metas específicas. Es probable que la percepción de inminencia de término del régimen así como la existencia de espectativas y diseños diferentes y hasta contradictorios respecto de ese término y su alternativa futura (algunos de los cuales se acercaban más al diseño clásico de revoluciones sociales que al de meras transiciones entre dos regímenes sin vacío institucional), hayan impedido la proposición de una fórmula unitaria y consensual de transición. Es también probables que el problema tan mentado de la "unidad" de la oposición deba ser redefinido en estos términos. Dado el peso ideológico de las organizaciones partidarias y el mutuo sectarismo (en especial el de la DC hacia el PC) parece difícil en el caso chileno pensar en una "Multipartidaria" que no sea referida exclusivamente a la lucha por espacio público y libertades mínimas y a la propuesta de una fórmula única de transición. Esta última debe tener como requisito el que sea "negociable" y que genere una arena de resolución del conflicto de legitimidad entre régimen y oposición. Esta arena o institución mediadora ha sido un elemento clave de todas las transiciones ocurridas en el último tiempo.

El segundo aspecto en la reconstitución de un sistema partidario en una perspectiva de transición dice relación con la necesidad de restablecer los lazos entre el sistema partidario y los diversos sectores sociales que éstos pueden

representar, superando la situación de una sociedad atomizada donde no se sabe a ciencia cierta quién representa a quién. La crisis de representación tiene que ver no sólo con la distancia entre una clase política amplia y masas dispersas, sino también con las transformaciones estructurales de la sociedad ocurridas estos años y que han ido en el sentido de aumento de la "inorganicidad" de la sociedad[16/]. Quizás donde mejor se muestra esta distancia pero también la ausencia de soluciones de reemplazo es en los procesos de movilización social (protestas, paros, etc.) que, carentes de metas específicas e intermedias y de canales de participación que no sean la mera agitación, terminan reducidos a una base militante crecientemente radicalizada y separada de lo que a veces despectivamente se llama la "base social".

3. La consolidación de un régimen democrático en el futuro en lo que al sistema de partidos se refiere deberá abarcar tanto aspectos institucionales como transformaciones en la cultura política, lo que es muy difícil en el corto plazo.

Hay que pensar que el desafío que se le abre a la sociedad chilena, al término del régimen militar, es semejante al que enfrentó en los años 30 después de la erosión del sistema oligárquico y de la crisis económica mundial que tanto afectó a Chile. En efecto, se trata de reconstruir un sistema democrático a la vez que definir colectivamente un nuevo modelo de desarrollo interno y de inserción internacional. Ello en condiciones de partida extremadamente desventajosas, tanto en cuanto a las condiciones materiales como en cuanto al grado de fragmentación social y desarticu-

lación política. Pero para enfrentar este desafío, a diferencia de los años 30, no se partirá de una democracia restringida en su participación a un tercio de la población, con exclusiones estructurales de vastos sectores sociales, que lo hacía más "manejable". Partimos ahora de una situación en que la presencia activa de masas en la política ya se produjo en los 60 y que hay que contar con ella necesariamente.

En este contexto, entre los rasgos básicos que debiera tener una consolidación democrática hay que considerar el aspecto inclusivo del sistema político, lo que a su vez tiene dos planos. Por un lado, el de la presencia en el sistema político de toda la diversidad cultural e ideológica del país, lo que implica un espectro partidario completo, sin ningún tipo de exclusión doctrinaria o ideológica. Por otro lado, se trata de responder a la demanda por participación contenida durante tantos años.

A este respecto parece estrictamente necesario la diversificación de canales de participación efectiva, donde los elementos de democracia al nivel del poder local o sectorial son indispensables. Así, no puede pensarse en que toda la participación social o política se haga a través de un canal partidario único. Aumentar y diversificar los canales o instancias de participación es no sólo una exigencia democrática propiamente tal, sino que tiene un efecto importante en la cultura política, en el fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil y en la superación de la unidimensionalidad de la política. Con ello aludimos a que, en el sistema anterior, toda acción colectiva y sus correspondien-

tes conflictos en diversos ámbitos de la sociedad eran expresión del conflicto político partidario gloabl de la sociedad. Es perfectamente posible, y parece altamente positivo, que a nivel territorial (comunas, por ejemplo) o funcional (Universidades, sindicatos, por ejemplo), las coaliciones o mayorías que se formen no respondan siempre a una directa expresión de los partidos políticos y sus alianzas, sino que respondan a condiciones y necesidades propias de cada ámbito. Pero ello supone que haya en estos ámbitos transferencia de poder estatal, es decir, poder real de decisiones relevantes. La jultidimensionalidad y diversidad de la participación masiva no se logra automáticamente por disposiciones mecánicas que desliguen la acción partidaria de la acción colectiva en los ámbitos territoriales o funcionales, como trata de imponerlo la Constitución de 1980, sino que supone una voluntad política de los partidos para fortalecer siempre los aspectos autónomos de la sociedad civil. Ello apunta a un cambio necesario en la cultura política de las elites partidarias. Por un tiempo largo quizás la promoción de organizaciones sociales será tarea, no exclusiva, de la clase política, la que deberá ser capaz de aceptar luego la independización y autonomía de esas organizaciones. Eliminar la tendencia al "copamiento" o "control" de las organizaciones sociales es un requisito para obtener una extensión e intensificación de la participación social.

La inclusividad del sistema político y la extensión y diversificación de los canales de participación política, deberá ir acompañada de una democratización interna de las organizaciones sociales y políticas. En efecto, hay una

tendencia natural a la reproducción de dirigentes y al conformismo y apatía de la gran masa de participantes. El fraccionalismo, el caudillismo, las oligarquías y también el asambleísmo son los sustitutos de la democracia interna de las organizaciones. Aquí es posible instalar diversos mecanismos para favorecerla, como son, por ejmplo, las elecciones primarias en el caso de los partidos, la publicidad de sus actividades, la rotatividad periódica de los dirigentes evitando la permanente reelección, la obligatoriedad de sistemas de información, las cuotas obligatorias mínimas de representación femenina para asegurar una tendencia a la igualdad de participación entre mujeres y hombres en todos los planos de la esfera pública, mecanismos de consulta a los miembros y clientelas de las organizaciones, etc.

A nivel de mecanismos institucionales, es importante también considerar aquéllos que favorecen la conformación de mayorías y obligan a la concertación y el acuerdo (por ejemplo, la segunda vuelta electoral). Pero esto supone también un cambio en una cultura política que enfatizaba la identidad ideológica y la globalidad excluyente, y por lo tanto los valores principalmente conflictivos, por una en que se favorezcan los aspectos programáticos y los valores cooperativos. El fortalecimiento de una conciencia nacional (en ningún caso nacionalista) que permita el compromiso con el sistema político, por encima de las diversidades necesarias y sin negar la voluntad de cambio social, aparece también como un requisito.

Tampoco puede olvidarse que la posibilidad de una democracia estable está ligada a la capacidad que tenga este

régimen político de canalizar las demandas por cambio social, que muy probablemente tenderán a radicalizarse luego de la crisis nacional generalizada que enfrentamos como herencia del régimen militar. Tanto esta realidad, como los antecedentes históricos del sistema político chileno en la mayor parte de este siglo, como la tendencia ideologizante de la clase política chilena, hacen poco viable en el mediano plazo una "democracia conservadora" y plantean más bien la necesidad de lo que podría denominarse una democracia de carácter progresista. En efecto, si el sistema institucional no aparece ante los actores sociopolíticos como capaz de expresar y canalizar adecuadamente las demandas de transformación y cambios sociales, perderá legitimidad y será desbordado por aquéllos o presionado hasta límites de inestabilidad. Lo que estamos afirmando es que la democracia política exige en Chile un proceso progresivo de democratización económica y social.

Hay aquí un aspecto institucional, cual es evitar la rigidez de los mecanismos que permiten transformaciones en las diversas esferas de la sociedad, manteniendo sí la intangibilidad de las normas fundamentales que rigen el sistema cuales son el régimen político democrático y el respeto a los derechos humanos. El entrabamiento institucional de los procesos de cambio ha sido siempre en Chile un elemento desestabilizador. Pero también hay un aspecto más allá del nivel institucional y que se refiere al soporte político que una democracia que favorece el cambio social debe tener. Las fuerzas desinstitucionalizadoras que desata en su contra un proceso de cambio social son tan grandes, que sólo puede

responderse a ellas en un régimen democrático con una mayoría político social importante. En otras ocasiones se ha señalado que las bases sociales de esa mayoría potencial son las clases medias y los sectores populares y que sus expresiones políticas son el centro y la izquierda en su conjunto[17]. Dicho de otro modo, la estabilidad de una futura democracia en Chile dependerá de su capacidad de impulsar y encauzar el cambio social y la transformación estructural y esto dependerá de la posibilidad de un acuerdo histórico de largo aliento entre el centro y la izquierda. Es lo que hemos llamado bloque democrático-transformador, que no debe entenderse como una alianza de gobierno, sino que en su interior pueden darse diversas coaliciones gobernantes según las circunstancias históricas. Se trata aquí nuevamente de un cambio en la cultura política que permita comprender a los actores de centro y de izquierda que no pueden realizar proyectos de cambio aislados, como ocurrió en la década del 60 y comienzos de los 70, sin grave riesgo para la estabilidad democrática.

Lo anterior lleva también a pensar en un cambio necesario en el espectro político partidario para romper la rigidez y polarización que lo caracterizó hasta el 73. En la década del 60 y hasta la fecha indicada asistimos a un esquema tripolar (derecha con tendencia autoritaria, centro excluyente e incapaz de alianzas e izquierda con dos partidos principales pero unificada en la matriz marxista leninista) que impidió, en un marco muy ideologizado, la necesaria flexibilidad de alianzas y donde la tendencia de cambio social fue asumida unilateralmente por el centro o la izquierda sin alcanzar la mayoría sociopolítica de respaldo que se

requería. Un requisito de una futura democracia es la superación de este esquema y su reemplazo por un esquema de cuatro polos: una derecha política que adhiera sin ambigüedades a la democracia como régimen y que exprese socialmente a las clases empresariales y las que giran en torno a ellas; un centro político, que rompe su "alternativismo" y es capaz de alianzas principalmente a la izquierda y donde se vean reflejados grandes sectores de capas medias, lo que dadas las vertientes cristianas y laicas pudiera resultar en más de un partido de centro; una izquierda socialista que exprese la renovación de este pensamiento en los últimos diez años y que supere su actual fragmentación y una izquierda de corte clásico marxista leninista que expresa una tradición bastante enraizada en ciertos núcleos obreros. (Podría así hablarse de dos izquierdas: socialista y comunista, cuya unidad dejaría de ser el eje de su acción y se convertiría sólo en uno de los problemas a resolver en cada coyuntura). Así, los cuatro polos constituyen el espectro democrático, y el centro y las dos izquierdas constituyen el triángulo democrático transformador al que hemos aludido y que combina adhesión a la democracia política con vocación de cambio social, con alianzas variables en su interior.

La configuración de un esquema como éste favorecería adecuadamente la combinación de estabilidad y pluralismo al superar el esquema tripolar de los 60. En torno a estos cuatro ejes, pueden girar partidos menores, pero la tendencia debiera ser a su absorción. La consolidación de este sistema partidario puede ser favorecida por leyes electorales. Pero, además, la posibilidad de evitar permanentes divisiones partidarias está vinculada a la existencia de

normas que garanticen una democracia interna que exprese la diversidad sociocultural en el interior de cada partido.

En síntesis, sistema político inclusivo y con canales diversificados de participación social, democratización de las organizaciones sociales y políticas y autonomía de las primeras respecto de las segundas, impulso y canalización de las tendencias democráticas de transformación social, espectro político flexible donde puean contribuir mayorías sólidas y donde pueda constituirse un bloque de centro e izquierda que asegure el carácter progresista de la democracia, parecen los rasgos básicos de la consolidación de una futura democracia en Chile.

NOTAS

1/ Una contribución importante al tema de las relaciones entre lo político y lo social en Chile, son los trabajos de Rodrigo Baño "Lo social y lo político: consideraciones acerca del movimiento popular urbano" (FLACSO Santiago, Documento de Trabajo 208, Junio 1984), "El movimiento popular urbano en la perspectiva de las tendencias políticas" (FLACSO Santiago, Documento de Trabajo, Noviembre 1983) y "Movimiento popular y política de partido en la coyuntura crítica del régimen (1983-1984)"(FLACSO, Santiago, Documento de Trabajo N° 236, Marzo 1985). Sobre el tema específico de los partidos, ver A. y S. Valenzuela "Partidos de oposición bajo el régimen militar chileno" (En "Chile 1973-198?" FLACSO-Chile-Revista Mexicana de Sociología 1983); A. Valenzuela "The chilean party system: origins,characteristics and future prospects" (Wilson Center, Washington DC, mimeo 1984); C. Huneeus, "Los partidos políticos y la transición a la democracia en Chile hoy" (Centro de Estudios Públicos, Documento de Trabajo N° 18, 1984); T.Moulian, "Mecánicas de transición y partidos" (mimeo, Santiago 1984) y M.A.Garretón "Dictaduras y democratización" capítulo 4 (FLACSO, Chile 1984). Los trabajos sobre la relación de los partidos con otros sectores sociales serán citados más adelante. A ellos deben agregarse las entrevistas realizadas con investigadores de estos temas a los que agradezco las informaciones entregadas. Ellos son: Vicente Espinoza, José Joaquín Brunner, Eduardo Valenzuela, Guillermo Campero, Gonzalo de la Maza y Mario Garcés.

2/ Un desarrollo de estas ideas se encuentra en el capítulo 1 de mi libro "El Proceso Político Chileno" (FLACSO, Santiago, 1984).

3/ Ver "Dictaduras y democratización, capítulo 4.

4/ Ver sobre estos temas, entre otros, G.Campero y J.A. Valenzuela "El movimiento sindical chileno en el capitalismo autoritario" (ILET, 1981); V.Espinoza "Movimiento popular urbano y procesos de institucionalización política" (Proposiciones, Santiago Tomo XI Año V, Septiembre 1984); S.Gómez "Instituciones y procesos agrarios en Chile" (capítulo 1, FLACSO, Santiago 1982); M.A.Garretón "Universidad y política en los procesos de transformación y reversión en Chile" (en G.Rama, compilador "Universidad, clases sociales y poder", Ateneo, Caracas, 1982).

5/ Sobre esta tensión entre la tendencia a la transacción y compromiso y el proceso de polarización, especialmente en la década del 60, ver A.Valenzuela "The Chilean party aystem...op.cit." y M.A.Garretón, "El Proceso Político Chileno", op.cit.

6/ Una descripción del período 1970-1973, M.A.Garretón y T.Moulian "La Unidad Popular y el conflicto político en Chile" (Editorial Minga 1983).

7/ Ver G.Campero "Los Gremios empresariales en el período 1970-1973" (ILET, Santiago 1984).

8/ Sobre las fases del régimen militar, "El Proceso Político chileno", op.cit.

9/ Un muy buen estudio de la Constitución de 1980 en G. Arriagada "¿La Constitución conduce a la democracia?" (Revista Hoy, N° 358, 1984).

10/ Sobre la crisis del régimen militar y la "apertura" de 1983, "Dictaduras y democratización", op.cit. "Chile: la transición bloqueada" (Revista Mensaje Enero-Febrero 1985).

11/ Ver nota 8.

12/ Ver sobre estos temas: A.Flisfisch, "Algunas hipótesis sobre la relación entre intelectuales y partidos políticos en Chile" (FLACSO, Documento de Trabajo 234, 1985, Santiago); M..A. Garretón "Las Ciencias Sociales en Chile: situación, problemas y perspectivas" (Academia Humanismo Cristiano, Santiago, 1983); G.Campero y J.A. Valenzuela, "El movimiento sindical..."op.cit.; V. Espinoza, "Los pobladores en la política" (SUR, Santiago, Documento de Trabajo N° 27, 1985); E.Valenzuela "Movimiento estudiantil: continuidad o ruptura" (Santiago, mimeo, 1985); E. Valenzuela, "La rebelión de los jóvenes" (SUR, Santiago, 1985) y los trabajos de R. Baño citados al inicio.

13/ Sobre el significado del plebiscito, ver "El Proceso político chileno..."op.cit.

14/ En relación a las Protestas Nacionales, ver, entre otros, ECO, "Protestas y protagonismo popular" (Cuaderno N°4, 1983); A.Rodríguez "Por una ciudad democrática" (SUR, Santiago, 1983).

15/ Los bloques son la Alianza Democrática (dos partidos de derecha, Democracia Cristiana, partidos de corte social demócrata y uno de los Partidos Socialista); el Bloque Socialista (el Partido Socialista mencionado, el Mapu, MOC, Izquierda Cristiana e independientes socialistas); el MDP (Partido Comunista, otro Partido Socialista, MIR y otros grupos menores). En la Derecha se constituyó el ADENA que agrupa a las diversas fracciones de derecha con excepción del Partido Nacional y la UDI.

16/ E.Tironi "Clases sociales y acuerdo democrático" (CED, Santiago, Documento de Trabajo N° 14, 1984).

17/ Sobre estos puntos, "Dictaduras y Democratización", op.cit.

XIII^{e} CONGRES MONDIAL DE L'ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE

Sous-thème III: POLITIQUES ET ACTIONS PUBLIQUES - ETUDES COMPARATIVES

Section III.4. La législation étendue et son domaine

Responsables: Peter GERLICH, Vienne, Autriche
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L'EXTENSION DE LA LEGISLATION ET LE DROIT AUTOGESTIONNAIRE EN YOUGOSLAVIE

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L'EXTENSION DE LA LEGISLATION ET LE DROIT AUTOGESTIONNAIRE EN YOUGOSLAVIE

1.L'extension de la législation - phénomène contemporain universel.

L'extension de la législation est un phénomène qu'on rencontre dans le monde actuel dans tous les pays sans égard aux différences de leurs systèmes sociaux.Il se manifeste en général de deux façons.Primo,dans la régulation des rapports sociaux des domaines qui n'ont été pas encore l'objet d'une régulation législative.Secundo,dans la régulation plus étendue et plus détaillée de rapports sociaux déjà réglés par différentes lois.

Les raisons de l'extension de la législation sont nombreuses et variées.Il y a parmi elles des raisons spécifiques pour certains pays.Parmi les raisons d'ordre général la première place occupent le progrès technique et technologique,les conditions de vie toujours plus complexes et les rapports sociaux toujours plus développés.Les changements sociaux radicaux (économiques et politiques),et surtout les changements de caractère révolutionnaire, contribuent aussi à l'augmentation de la fonction législative de l'Etat.La raison essentielle en devrait,pourtant,être rechercher dans l'accroissement progressif de la puissance de l'Etat et dans l'élargissement constant de ses fonctions,notamment de ses fonction économiques.Par le renforcement de la position sociale de la classe ouvrière et des autres couches laborieuses et de leur rôle dans la vie politique,nombre de questions d'une importance pour les travailleurs deviennent aussi l'objet de la législation.

La législation est la fonction la plus importante de l'Etat moderne. C'est un moyen puissant par lequel l'Etat règle les rapports sociaux et s'efforce à résoudre les conflits sociaux conditionnés par les contradictions des intérêts entre les individus ou entre différents groupes sociaux plus restreints ou plus étendus et,finalement,entre les classes sociales existantes. Cependant,la loi n'est pas tout-puissante.La puissance d'une loi dépend de la force organisée d'Etat qui est derrière elle et de son aptitude,dès que cela s'avère nécessaire,d'assurer l'application de la loi même par contrainte.

Le problème de la justification de l'élargissement des dimensions de la fonction législative de l'Etat est étroitement lié aux attitudes idéologiques envers la loi et envers son rôle et son importance pour la vie et le développement d'une communauté sociale.De même que les autres grandes questions thèoriques,cette question est aussi l'objet de deux différentes conceptions cotradictoires.Selon la première les lois assurent la réalisation des libertés et des droits de l'homme et du citoyen,résolvent les conflits sociaux,règlent les rapports sociaux et assurent une vie et un développement stable dans une communauté sociale donnée.Cette conception mène vers la conclusion que par l'extension de la fonction législative de l'Etat on cré également des conditions pour que l'homme jouisse de plus de libertés.Selon la deuxième conception, étant donné que les lois imposent des obligations et créent des bases pour appliquer une contrainte sur l'homme,en réalité elles limitent la liberté. Elles sont l'expression de l'arbitraire de l'Etat,du volontarisme de législateur.C'est sur cette conception que reppose la pensée de Saint-Just,l'un des plus radicaux panseurs politiques du mouvement révolutionnaire français de la fin du XVIII^{e} siècle,selon laquelle autant un pays ait plus de lois,autant il a moins de liberté.

Les deux conceptions reposent sur certaines expériences provenant de la politique législative dans différents pays,dans des périodes et conditions sociales bien concrètes.La priorité absolue d'une entre elles pourrait présenter un danger niant les intentions positives dont elle a été inspirée initialement.Cependant,l'expérience historique signale le besoin d'une majeure vigilance envers l'éventuel abus du pouvoir législatif,surtout quand il se trouve dans les mains des forces qui ne jouissent pas d'un soutien démocratique.

2.<u>L'extension des domaines de la législation dans la période de l'étatisme révolutionnaire socialiste en Yougoslavie (1945-1950)</u>.

Les changements révolutionnaires réalisés au cours de la guerre de libération nationale contre les occupants fascistes ont conduit à la supprésion de l'ancien régime législatif.Ces changements ont provoqué une activité législative intense et vaste au cours des premières années suivant la fin de la guerre.A cette époque-là on a procédé non pas seulement à la modification et au remplacement de la plus grande partie d'anciennes lois,mais la législation a englobé nombre de nouveaux domaines de la vie sociale et des rapports sociaux.Ainsi,par exemple,l'objet de la réglementation législative ont été devenus:la nationalisation des entreprises privées,la réforme agraire,l'expropriation et la confiscation;l'organisation des entreprises d'Etat et leur fonctionnement;les coopératives agricoles et les autres formes des coopéra-

tives;le rachat des produits agricoles et la circulation des produits industriels et agricoles;la planification du développement économique et social;les rapports de travail et les nouveaux droits économiques des travailleurs;la sécurité sociale des travailleurs et beaucoup d'autres matières.

Dans cette période les rapports sociaux ont été partiellement réglés par les lois d'assemblées (lois parlementaires),et le plus souvent - par décrets-lois promulguées par le Couvernement.Les décrets-lois réglaient le fonctionnements des activités économiques et les mesures concernant l'exercice des plans économiques.

L'Etat était l'unique propriétaire des moyens de production et ses fonctions ont augmentées sensiblement dans tous les domaines de la vie sociale et notamment dans l'économie.Néanmoins,la période de l'étatisme en Yougoslavie n'a pas duré trop longtemps.Très vite,on a découvert les dangers qu'il cachait en soi et qui menaçaient le développement ultérieur du socialisme,en particulier les dangers de l'accroissement de la bureaucratie et de sa consolidation comme une couche dirigeante séparée en dessus de la classe ouvrière et de toute la société.

Par la remise des entreprises économiques d'Etat à la gestion directe des travailleurs et par l'introduction de l'autogestion ouvrière dans l'économie en 1950,et quelques années plus tard, dans d'autres domaines des activité sociale,a commencé le processus de la socialisation graduelle des fonctions de l'Etat (le processus de désétatisation) et d'édification de la société socialiste sur les bases autogestionnaires.

3.L'extension ultérieure de la législation dans la période du développement du système socialiste autogestionnaire.

Dans le processus de l'édification de l'autogestion socialiste on a supprimé les compétences de l'Etat dans le domaine de la gestion directe de l'économie et dans les autres activités sociales et elles ont été,petit à petit et en dimensions toujours plus étendues,transmises dans le domaine de l'activité directe des travailleurs et de leurs organisations et communautés autogestionnaire.Ce processus n'est pas encore achevé et vu de l'aspect de ses objectifs finals il est toujours dans sa phase initiale.

Par l'introduction des premières formes autogestionnaires en 1950 et jusqu'aujourd'hui,la législation existante est soumise à une révision permanente et les nouvelles lois réglent les rapports sociaux en accord avec le niveau atteint de l'autogestion.Une révision importante de la législation a été faite après la promulgation de la Loi constitutionnelle en 1953 et,en particulier,après la promulgation des constitutions en 1963 et 1974.C'est

pour cette raison qu'en Yougoslavie sont très rares les lois plus anciennes de dix ans. D'une manière globale, la fonction législative n'a pas diminué dans cette période. Au contraire, dans certains domaines elle continue en s'élargissant.

Le nouveau système des rapports sociaux socialistes et autogestionnaires, défini par la Constitution de la SFRY et les constitutions des Républiques socialistes et des Provinces autonomes de 1974 suscita le besoin d'une nouvelle réglementation législative de nombre de questions sociales ayant pour conséquence un nouvel élargissement des domaines de la législation. Ici, avant tout, il faut souligner la nouvelle réglementation législative des rapports dans le travail associé, codifié par la Loi fédérale sur le travail associé de 1976 qui, selon l'importance des questions qu'elle règle, occupe la place immédiatement après la Constitution. De plus, les rapports dans les domaines de la propriété sociale et du travail associé sont réglés par beaucoup d'autres lois concernant: les droits et les obligations des organisations de travail associé et des autres organisations et communautés autogestionnaires et des communautés socio-politiques à l'égard des moyens de propriété sociale; la reproduction élargie et le travail passé; l'amortissement et la révalorisation des moyens de propriété sociale; l'établissement et la distribution du revenu total et du revenu net; l'assainissement et la liquidation d'une organisation de travail associé; l'association obligatoire du travail et des moyens des organisations de travail associé s'occupant du commerce avec des organisations productrices de travail associé; l'association des organisations de travail associé dans des sociétés générales et des chambres d'économie; l'association obligatoire des organisations de travail associé dans des communautés lorsqu'elle est éxigée par l'unité technologique des systèmes dans différents secteurs et lorsqu'elle est dans l'intérêt de tout le pays (par exemple: chemins de fer, électro-énergie, poste, télégraphe, téléphone, etc.); le système de la planification sociale; le système du contrôle social des prix; le régime des changes, les rapports de crédit et autres relations économiques avec l'étranger; les échanges des marchandises et des services avec l'étranger; les activités économiques à l'étranger; les mesures de protection contre les monopoles et la concurrence déloyale.

La nouvelle organisation autogestionnaire exigeait une réglementation législative de la position et du fonctionnement de nombre de nouvels organes et organisations, tels: tribunaux de travail associé, avocat social de l'autogestion, communautés autogestionnaires d'intérêts, conseils dans les communautés socio-politiques, etc.

L'objet de la nouvelle et assez large législation est aussi le nouveau mode de financement des besoins de la Fédération.Chaque année par une loi fédérale,adoptée sur la base du consentement des assemblées des Républiques et des assemblées des Provinces autonomes,on définit le volume total des dépenses dans le budjet de la Fédération.La Fédération est aussi limitée dans le domaine de la création des fonds et de la prise d'autres obligations excédant les dépenses totales prévues par le budjet.C'est pourquoi les dernières dix années on a adopté un grand nombre de lois fédérales (à peu près 50) permettant à la Fédération de s'endetter auprès de la Banque Nationale de Yougoslavie pour pouvoir assurer le financement de différents besoins dont les moyens ne sont pas prévus dans le budjet;on lui admet les moyens pour versements de la RSFY dans différents fonds internationaux ou dans les organisations internationales financières ou autres;la Fédération est autorisée à donner des supergaranties sur les obligations des banques du pays - garants des crédits obtenus de différentes organisations financières étrangères ou internationales;on lui assure des moyens pour financer les programmes d'investissements;elle est autorisée de transformer les crédits à court terme de la Banque Nationale de Yougoslavie pour financer différents besoins en crédits à long terme à rembourser par la Fédération;elle est autorisée d'entreprendre d'autres obligations financières ou de crédit.

Un domaine spécifique de la législation yougoslave représente le financement du progrès accéléré des Républiques et des Provinces autonomes insuffisamment développées.La loi fédérale valable pour toute période quinquennale du plan social de la Yougoslavie désigne les Républiques et les Provinces autonomes considérées insuffisamment développées.Les lois fédérales déterminent les sources permanentes d'alimentation du Fonds de la Fédération pour le financement du progrès accéléré des Républiques et des Provinces autonomes insuffisamment développées,les conditions d'allocation des crédits prélevés sur ces ressources et le mode de gestion de Fonds.La loi spéciale préscrit aussi la répartition globale des moyens de ce Fonds pour la période du futur plan quinquennal et réglemente les questions liées au remboursement des tranches des crédits reçus des sources de ce Fonds.

Les besoins de moyens supplémentaires étrangers affectés à l'accélération du développement économique du pays ont également influencé un certain élargissement des domaines de la réglementation législative.Ainsi,des lois fédérales ont réglé les questions,telles:les investissements de moyens de personnes étrangeres dans les organisations de travail associé du pays;la cession des droits sur l'édification des constructions d'investissement aux

entrepreneurs étrangers;coopération dans la production et collaboration technique à long terme entre les organisations de travail associé et les personnes étrangères.

La raison pour un certain élargissement de la législation ces dernières années est aussi la situation actuelle de l'économie du pays.Pour prévenir et éliminer les perturbations dans l'économie,on adoptait des lois limitant temporairement les droits des organisations de travail associé,des autres organisations et communautés autogestionnaires,ainsi que des communautés socio-politiques de disposer d'une partie des moyens sociaux.Ces lois étaient adoptées le plus souvent avec une validité d'un an et après l'écoulement de leur validité,elles ont été réadoptées avec le même contenu ou un contenu similaire.Ainsi,en 1984 on a adopté des lois portant sur l'interdiction temporaire de disposer d'une partie des moyens sociaux pour:financer la construction de nouvelles centrales thermiques,installations de chauffage,de production d'énergie et des chaudronneries aux combustibles liquides;l'achat du combustible Diesel et de l'essence;le paiement des revenus personnels; l'interdiction temporaire aux communautés socio-politiques et aux communautés autogestionnaires d'intérêts de disposer d'une partie des moyens sociaux pour le financement de certaines formes de consommation.

Les tendances vers un élargissement de la législation peuvent s'apercevoir aussi dans le domaine du régime des changes et des rapports de crédit avec l'étranger.La depressiation du dinar ces dernières années fut une des raisons pour adopter certaines lois réglant les questions du calcul et de la couverture des différences de cours advenues chez les banques sur les comptes des devises et les épargnes en devises des citoyens,ainsi que en vertu des affaires bancaires de devises sur les comptes courants.L'endettement du pays à l'étranger et le remboursement des crédits sont une nouvelle matière soumise à l'intervention législative.Afin de régler les problèmes de ce domaine,on a adopté quelques lois stipulant les questions des crédits commerciaux étrangers et les paiements en monnaies convertibles ou répartissant les droits à l'endettement à l'étranger des organisations de travail associé en vertu d'un crédit que la Yougoslavie a obtenu à l'étranger,etc.

4.<u>Le droit autogestionnaire - phases et formes de son développement</u>.
Une partie intégrante du processus de la socialisation des fonctions de l'Etat (de la désétatisation) est aussi la socialisation du droit,précisément,la socialisation d'une partie de la fonction régulatrice de l'Etat.Les rapports socialistes autogestionnaires en cours d'édification représentent en même

temps une base pour l'apparition d'une nouvelle forme de droit,appelé droit autogestionnaire.Son développement a passé trois phases.

Au début (1950-1963) la réglementation autogestionnaire a été assez limitée.Pour adopter un acte autogestionnaire général une autorisation explicite donnée par la loi a été indispensable.Le volume en a été défini également par la loi.La validité de l'acte autogestionnaire général a été soumise le plus souvent au consentement préalable ou à l'approbation supplémentaire d'un organe compétent de l'Etat.

Plus tard (1963-1974) les questions ayant pu être réglées par des actes autogestionnaires généraux ont été élargies et on a quitté le régime général exigeant un consentement préalable ou une approbation supplémentaire de l'organe compétent de l'Etat.L'approbation a été retenue en tant qu'une exception et ceci seulement pour les actes généraux des organisations autogestionnaires s'occupant des activités d'un intérêt social particulier. Dans cette phase l'autorisation par la loi représentait encore la seule base de la réglementation autogestionnaire.

Dans la phase actuelle,après l'adoption de la Constitution de 1974, de larges possibilités pour la promotion du droit autogestionnaire sont assurées.La réglementation autogestionnaire des rapports dans les organisations de travail associé,ainsi que dans les autres organisations et communautés autogestionnaires est définie comme un droit constitutionnel des travailleurs et des citoyens de ces organisations et communautés,qu'ils réalisent d'une manière directe ou par l'intermédiaire de leurs délégués dans les organes de gestion.La base principale pour la réglementation autogestionnaire n'est plus la loi;maintenant c'est la constitution elle-même. Ensuite,les actes autogestionnaires généraux ne règlent pas seulement les rapports dans les microorganismes de la communauté sociale,voire dans les organisations de base de travail associé ou dans les autres organisations et communautés autogestionnaires de base.Ils ne sont pas actes de caractère exclusivement interne.Ils règlent également les questions d'intérêt commun pour les travailleurs et les citoyens des plusieurs organisations et communautés autogestionnaires,de même que les rapports d'un intérêt social plus large.Finalement,les sujets de la réglementation autogestionnaire sont complètement libres.Le régime d'une approbation supplémentaire des actes autogestionnaires généraux par un organe de la communauté socio-politique n'est prévu que comme exception rare.Les actes autogestionnaires généraux doivent être conformes à la Constitution et ne peuvent pas être en opposition avec les lois.Le contrôle de leurs constitutionnalité et légalité,

de même que le contrôle des lois,des autres prescriptions et actes généraux relèvent de la compétences des cours constitutionnelles.

Les formes du droit autogestionnaire dans différentes phases de son développement ont été également soumises à des changements.A l'heure actuelle existent plusieurs types d'actes autogestionnaires généraux.Leur liste n'est pas fixée.

Les accords sociaux sont le plus important acte autogestionnaire général.C'est par ces actes que les organisations de travail associé,les chambres d'économie et les autres associations générales,les communautés autogestionnaires d'intérêts,les organes des communautés socio-politiques, les syndicats et les autres organisations socio-politiques et les organisations sociales assurent et coordonnent la réglementation autogestionnaire des rapports socio-économiques et des autres rapports d'intérêt social plus large pour les participants à l'accord ou d'intérêt social général.Plus concrètement,ce sont des rapports déterminés dans le domaine de la planification,des prix,de la distribution du revenu et de la répartition des moyens destinés aux revenus personnels et à la consommation commune des travailleurs des échanges internationaux,de la politique de l'emploi dans le pays et à l'étranger,ainsi que de la protection et de la promotion de l'environnement. Les accords sociaux peuvent être conclus dans le cadre de toutes les communautés socio-politiques (communes,provinces autonomes,républiques,Fédération).*

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* Parmi nombre d'accords sociaux conclus au niveau de la Fédération, on pourrait citer à titre d'exemple les suivants:Accord social sur les activités communes dans le domaine de l'environnement et de l'aménagement spatial (1974),Accord social sur les conditions de formation et sur les critères de détermination des prix du transport dans le trafic ferroviaire des marchandises et sur les rapports des Chemins de fer et des bénéficiaires de leurs services (1974),Accord social sur la coordination des droits et des obligations des ouvriers embauchés chez les travailleurs qui par leur travail personnel exercent indépendamment une activité professionnelle avec les moyens de travail dans la propriété des citoyens et chez les personnes juridiques civiles et personnes physiques (1976),Accord social sur la politique des cadres dans la Fédération (1976),voire sur la réalisation de la politique des cadres dans les organes et les organisations de la Fédération et dans les organes des organisations socio-politiques dans la Fédération

Les conventions autogestionnaires sont une seconde forme d'acte autogestionnaire général.Elles règlent et coordonnent les rapports socio-économiques et autres rapports et intérêts autogestionnaires dans la reproduction sociale et dans les autres formes de réalisation de la position socio-économique des travailleurs.Les ouvriers dans les organisations de base et dans les autres organisations de travail associé et aussi les travailleurs et les citoyens dans les communautés locales,les communautés autogestionnaires d'intérêts et autres organisations et communautés autogestionnaures,dans le cadre de leurs droits autogestionnaires,par ces actes harmonisent leurs intérêts dans la division sociale du travail et dans la reproduction sociale; associent leur travail et les moyens et règlent leurs rapports mutuels concernant l'association du travail et des moyens;forment des organisations de travail associé,banques,communautés professionnelles et autres;déterminent les bases et les critères de la distribution du revenu et de la répartition des revenus personnels;fixent leurs droits,obligations et responsabilités réciproques et prescrivent les mesures pour leur réalisation et règlent d'autres rapports d'intérêt commun.Les conventions autogestionnaires règlent d'une manière générale les rapports mutuels dans le cadre d'une organisation. Ainsi,par exemple,les travailleurs dans une organisation de base de travail associé,par la convention autogestionnaire associent leur travail et règlent leurs rapports mutuels y relatifs.Mais,une convention autogestionnaire règle aussi les intérêts mutuels plus larges.Ainsi,par exemple,les ouvriers de différentes organisations de travail associé,voire les travailleurs et les citoyens de différentes organisations et communautés autogestionnaires règlent leurs rapports mutuels et harmonisent leurs intérêts.

(1981),Accord social sur le transit des marchandises (1978),Accord social sur les actions communes dans l'exercice de la politique du développement de la petite économie (les activités tertiaires) en RSFY (1980),Accord social sur l'organisation de l'éducation et de l'enseignement des citoyens de la RSFY se trouvant en travail et séjour temporaires à l'étranger (1980),Accord social sur les actions collectives des communes et des villes pour empêcher la pollution des eaux du bassin de la rivière Sava (1980),Accord social sur la réalisation de la politique du développement du complexe agro-industriel déterminée par le Plan social de Yougoslavie de 1981 à 1985 (1982),Accord social sur les bases de la stratégie du développement technologique de la RSFY (1984).

Enfin,ils existent des actes autogestionnaires généraux réglant les rapports exclusivement dans le cadre d'une organisation de travail associé ou d'une autre organisation ou communauté autogestionnaire.Ce sont:les statuts,les règlements,les décisions et autres.

5.Délimitation des domaines de la législation et du droit autogestionnaire.

La Constitution de la RSF de Yougoslavie de 1974 contient deux principes sur lesquels repose la délimitation du domaine de la législation du celui du droit autogestionnaire.Selon le premier,le statut autogestionnaire et les droits du travailleur dans les organisation de base et dans les autres organisations de travail associé,dans les communautés locales,les communautés autogestionnaires d'intérêts et les autres organisations et communautés autogestionnaires,le statut autogestionnaire des travailleurs dans la commune,la libre association autogestionnaire,l'activité et la créativité des travailleurs,l'égalité en droits des nations et des nationalités,ainsi que les libertés,les droits et les devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen,déterminés par la constitution,sont la base,la limite et l'orientation de la réalisation des droits et devoirs des communautés socio-politiques dans l'exercice des fonctions du pouvoir (Constitution de la RSFY,Principes fonamentaux,partie IV, alinéa 8).Selon le deuxième principe,les libertés et droits sont exercés et les droits remplis en vertu de la Constitution.Seule la loi puisse prescrire le mode d'exercice des différentes droits et libertés,mais uniquement lorsque la Constitution en dispose ainsi ou lorsque cela est indispensable à leur exercice (Constitution de la RSFY,article 203,alinéa 3).

Ces principes constitutionnels représentent un cadre général pour le législateur.La loi,donc,ne peut tout régler.La loi ne peut pas dépasser les limites du domaine autogestionnaire où les travailleurs et les citoyens, directement ou par leurs délégués,dans les organisations et communautés autogestionnaires règlent seuls leurs rapports mutuels.Une telle loi serait inconstitutionnelle.

Pourtant,dans l'application de ces principes existent nombre de problèmes complexes.Ce n'est pas rare de voire les dilèmes se manifester pour ce qui est du domaine de la réglementation législative de certains rapports. En raison des limites pas tout-à-fait claires entre les deux domaines,on est témoin des phénomènes de régler par la loi les rapports appartenant à la réglementation autogestionnaire et,vice-versa,de régler par les actes autogestionnaires les rapports dont la réglementation par la loi serait plus

efficace.Certaines analyses révèlent que la réglementation législative est encore trop dimensionnée et que le droit autogestionnaire,en mesure non justifiée,dépend de la législation.Par la réglementation complète d'un domaine donné la loi limite l'espace de la réglementation autogestionnaire.Pour cette raison,on indique le besoin d'une autolimitation du législateur duquel on exige de laisser une place large autant que possible à la réglementation autogestionnaire.Les lois doivent stimuler l'autogestion et le droit autogestionnaire et non pas les limiter ou restreindre.Les opinions que le développement du droit autogestionnaire exige une délimitation plus précise de son domaine du celui de la législation sont de plus en plus poussées.

Les domaines de la législation et du droit autogestionnaire ne sont pas tout-à-fait séparés et indépendants l'un de l'autre.Ils sont mutuellement liés et conditionnés l'un avec l'autre.La réglementation législative et le droit autogestionnaire sont des sous-systèmes de l'unique ordre politique et juridique de la société socialiste autogestionnaire.Mais,en même temps,ils sont en certaine contradiction avec une tendence poussée en faveur de la réglementation autogestionnaire des rapports sociaux toujours plus importants.

6.Les réflexions finales sur le rapport entre la législation et le droit autogestionnaire.

Dans le développement du système socialiste en Yougoslavie vers une socialisation graduelle des fonctions de l'Etat on a réalisé d'importantes transformations sociales.Quoi que la fonction législative de l'Etat ne soit pas encore essentiellement diminuée (dans certains domaines elle est même élargie), des tendances envers sa limitation s'étaient manifestées et se manifestent de plus en plus.L'expression de ces tendances est le développement du droit autogestionnaire et l'élargissement progressif de ses domaines.

Par le droit autogestionnaire les hommes libres et égaux en droits, de plus en plus seuls,et non pas l'appareil aliéné de l'Etat,entreprennent à organiser leur vie et leur travail,à régler leurs rapports mutuels et à assurer le fonctionnement du mécanisme de la société.Dans ce processus,la loi elle-même, comme acte typique assurant la contrainte de l'Etat,subit de transformations essentielles,la fonction législative devient de plus en plus socialisée et les rapports que l'Etat règle actuellement vont devenir peu à peu l'objet de la réglementation autogestionnaire.Tout en retenant la qualité d'un acte du pouvoir d'Etat dans les domaines et en dimensions nécessaires,dans la période actuelle la loi devient de plus en plus aussi un moyen de réglementation des nouveaux rapports sociaux autogestionnaires et d'organisation autogestionnaire de la société,un moyen de prise de décisions sur les questions de la société par les

travailleurs et les citoyens.

Le droit autogestionnaire est dirigé contre l'idolâtrie de l'Etat et sa toute-puissance et notamment contre l'idéalisation de la fonction régulatrice de l'Etat.La loi n'est pas l'expression de la volonté générale,elle n'est pas toujours l'acte de la raison et de la justice.En tant qu'une forme fondamentale de réalisation de la fonction régulatrice de l'Etat et un des instruments les plus importants de son pouvoir,la loi règle les conflits des intérêts sociaux en dernière ligne en faveur des groupes dirigeants et elle est au fond un moyen à imposer leurs intérêts par la force,voire par le menace de contrainte de l'Etat.La loi protège la liberté contre la violence,mais très souvent elle-même exerce une violence sur la liberté.Pénétrant profondément dans la sphère des libertés individuelles,la loi les limite souvent.

D'autre part,la thèorie de l'autogestion socialiste yougoslave n'accepte pas la conception de "liberté sans lois".Le socialisme en général, donc,le socialisme autogestionnaire yougoslave n'est pas une société sans conflits.Il s'y manifestent certaines contradictions sociales et conflits d'intérêts,dont le plus grave est le conflit entre les intérêts de la classe ouvrière et ceux de la bureaucratie politique qui dirige à son nom.Les contradictions sociales et les conflits des intérêts qui existent encore dans le socialisme ou se développent sur son terrain,demandent à être résolus par l'autorité de l'Etat et conditionnent l'imminence d'une réglementation de l'Etat et d'une intervention de la loi.Tout cela a un certain reflet sur le degré et le volume du développement du droit autogestionnaire.Le socialisme autogestionnaire cherche les voies envers un ordre rationnel dans lequel les fonctions de l'Etat seraient limitées à des domaines où elles sont toujours nécessaires et où l'Etat n'aurait plus le monopole sur la réglementation des rapports sociaux.

Le développement du droit autogestionnaire limite peu à peu le monopole de l'Etat sur la réglementation des rapports sociaux.La pluralité des sujets de la réglementation,des centres de prise de décisions et de la création des règles,des "législateurs",est une des caractéristiques essentielles de l'ordre juridique autogestionnaire.L'identité des sujets qui règlent les rapports en question et qui sont tenu à se conformer aux normes prescrites est sa deuxième caractéristique essentielle.

La réglementation autogestionnaire des rapports sociaux représente au fond un mode de libre auto-obligation mutuelle des travailleurs et des citoyens réposant sur les bases de leurs interdépendence,responsabilité et

solidarité.Le droit autogestionnaire représente un nouveau mode démocratique de résoudre les contradictions des intérêts et de les harmoniser et synthétiser en intérêts communs et généraux.Dans le conflit entre l'homme et la contrainte de l'Etat,l'autogestion et le droit autogestionnaire offrent des solutions en faveur de l'homme et ses libres activités.Ils représentent aussi une impulsion pour rechercher les nouvelles voies vers des modes plus démocratiques et plus humains de la vie des hommes et de l'organisation de la société.