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Congreso de los Diputados

V LEGISLATURA

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SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

PERMITAME MANIFESTARLE MI ENHORABUENA MAS CORDIAL POR SU ELECCION COMO PRESIDENTE DE ESTA ASAMBLEA Y DESEARLE LOS MAYORES ÉXITOS EN EL DESEMPEÑO DE SUS FUNCIONES. LOS MIEMBROS DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL RECONOCEN ASI EN SU PAIS, COTE D'IVOIRE, LA DECISIVA CONTRIBUCION DE AFRICA A LAS LABORES DE LA ORGANIZACION. CONFIO EN QUE LA ASAMBLEA CONTINUE EN LA LINEA DE CONSENSO PUESTA DE MANIFIESTO EN EL ANTERIOR PERIODO DE SESIONES, BAJO LA PRESIDENCIA DEL EMBAJADOR INSANALLY, A CUYA LABOR RINDO TRIBUTO.

QUIERO ADEMAS, REITERAR AL DR. BOUTROS-GHALI, QUIEN EN ABRIL DE ESTE AÑO NOS HONRO CON SU VISITA OFICIAL A MI PAIS, LA PLENA COLABORACION DE LAS AUTORIDADES ESPAÑOLAS PARA ASISTIRLE EN LA DURA TAREA DE HACER FRENTE A LOS DESAFIOS CADA VEZ MAS COMPLEJOS QUE SE PRESENTAN A LA ORGANIZACION.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

EL MINISTRO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES DE LA REPUBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA, EN SU INTERVENCION EN NOMBRE DE LA UNION EUROPEA, EXPUSO NUESTROS PUNTOS DE VISTA COMUNES EN ESTE DEBATE GENERAL. ESTOS PUNTOS DE VISTA REFLEJAN LOS AVANCES EN LA CONSTRUCCION DE UNA POLITICA EXTERIOR Y DE SEGURIDAD COMUN QUE ES UNO DE LOS OBJETIVOS PRIORITARIOS DE LA UNION. DESEARIA AHORA, EN NOMBRE DE MI DELEGACION, PROFUNDIZAR EN ALGUNAS CUESTIONES.

LOS CAMBIOS FUNDAMENTALES EN EL SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL, DE LOS QUE HEMOS SIDO TESTIGOS EN LOS ULTIMOS AÑOS, HAN CONFERIDO A LAS NACIONES UNIDAS LA GRAN OPORTUNIDAD DE CONVERTIRSE DEFINITIVAMENTE EN EL CENTRO DE ARMONIZACION UNIVERSAL DE LOS ESFUERZOS DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL PARA ALCANZAR LOS PROPOSITOS COMUNES PLASMADOS EN LA CARTA; PERO TAMBIÉN HAN SOMETIDO A LA ORGANIZACION A UNA DE LAS MAYORES PRUEBAS DE SU HISTORIA. ALGUNOS HAN LLEGADO A CUESTIONAR SI LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CUENTAN CON POSIBILIDADES REALES DE CONTRIBUIR EFICAZMENTE A LA SOLUCION DE LOS NUMEROSOS CONFLICTOS QUE HAN SURGIDO O SE HAN REAVIVADO EN LOS ULTIMOS AÑOS.

TRAS EL PRIMER ALDABONAZO DADO POR CRISIS COMO LAS DE LA ANTIGUA YUGOSLAVIA, SOMALIA Y ANGOLA, HEMOS PRESENCIADO SITUACIONES TERRIBLES COMO LA DE RUANDA, DONDE LOS MEDIOS DE LA ORGANIZACION SE HAN MOSTRADO DESGRACIADAMENTE INSUFICIENTES PARA PONER FIN AL SUFRIMIENTO DE MILLONES DE SERES HUMANOS.

SIMULTANEAMENTE, LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, CON SUS RECURSOS DESPLEGADOS AL MAXIMO, SUFREN UNA CRISIS FINANCIERA, FRENTE A LA QUE POCO PUEDEN HACER SIN LA COLABORACION DECIDIDA DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS. ESTA COLABORACION HA DE MANIFESTARSE, EN PRIMER LUGAR, EN LA ATENCION PUNTUAL A LAS OBLIGACIONES FINANCIERAS ESTABLECIDAS EN LA CARTA. SOLO ASI PODRA LA ORGANIZACION CONTAR CON LOS MEDIOS NECESARIOS PARA CUMPLIR SUS OBJETIVOS. ADEMAS, ESTOS MEDIOS HAN DE SER UTILIZADOS DE LA FORMA MAS EFECTIVA POSIBLE.

MAS ALLA DE LOS ESFUERZOS DE RENOVACION REALIZADOS O EN CURSO, HEMOS DE PLANTEARNOS SERIAMENTE UN PROCESO DE REFLEXION, AL MAS ALTO NIVEL, CON EL OBJETIVO DE DECIDIR SI ESTAMOS DISPUESTOS A DOTAR A LA ORGANIZACION DEL CONJUNTO DE INSTRUMENTOS JURIDICOS, MATERIALES Y FINANCIEROS QUE NECESITA PARA ENFRENTARSE CON ÉXITO A LAS EXIGENCIAS CRECIENTES QUE LE PLANTEA LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL. LA CREDIBILIDAD DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS ESTA EN JUEGO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA REFORMA DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD ES UNA CUESTION SUMAMENTE IMPORTANTE Y COMPLEJA, QUE HA DE SER LLEVADA A CABO DE FORMA MEDITADA, MEDIANTE UN PROCESO DE DIALOGO QUE CONDUZCA A UN ENTENDIMIENTO DEL CONJUNTO DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS.

ESPAÑA, QUE DURANTE ESTOS DOS ULTIMOS AÑOS HA OCUPADO UN PUESTO DE MIEMBRO NO PERMANENTE DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, REITERA SU POSICION FAVORABLE A REVISAR, SIN PRECIPITACION, SU COMPOSICION Y FUNCIONAMIENTO, INSPIRANDOSE EN LOS CRITERIOS DE REPRESENTATIVIDAD, EFICACIA Y TRANSPARENCIA Y CON EL OBJETIVO ULTIMO DE REFORZAR LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS ACTUACIONES DEL CONSEJO.

ESPAÑA, QUE HA TOMADO Y SEGUIRA TOMANDO PARTE ACTIVA EN LAS REUNIONES DEL GRUPO DE TRABAJO AD HOC DE ESTA ASAMBLEA, ES PARTIDARIA DE UN AUMENTO MODERADO DEL NUMERO DE MIEMBROS DEL CONSEJO. ELLO PERMITIRIA LA PRESENCIA MAS FRECUENTE EN EL CONSEJO DE ESTADOS CON PESO E INFLUENCIA EN LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y CON CAPACIDAD Y VOLUNTAD DE CONTRIBUIR DE FORMA SIGNIFICATIVA AL MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ Y LA SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONALES Y A LOS DEMAS PROPOSITOS DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. ESTA AMPLIACION DEL CONSEJO FACILITARIA TAMBIEN UNA DISTRIBUCION GEOGRAFICA EQUITATIVA DE LAS DISTINTAS REGIONES DEL MUNDO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

ACONTECIMIENTOS SOBRECOGEDORES, COMO LOS DE RUANDA, PONEN DE RELIEVE LA NECESIDAD DE PROSEGUIR EL REFUERZO DE LOS MECANISMOS DE ACTUACION IMPRESCINDIBLES PARA EJECUTAR LOS MANDATOS CADA VEZ MAS AMPLIOS Y COMPLEJOS OTORGADOS POR EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD A LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ.

EN PRIMER LUGAR, HAY QUE CONTINUAR EL PERFECCIONAMIENTO DE LOS DISPOSITIVOS DE DIRECCION Y CONTROL AQUI MISMO, EN NUEVA YORK. LA SECRETARIA HA REALIZADO YA UN IMPORTANTE ESFUERZO PARA FORTALECER EL DEPARTAMENTO DE OPERACIONES DE MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ, CON LA SALA DE SITUACION, LA AMPLIACION DE LA OFICINA DEL ASESOR MILITAR Y EL IMPULSO DADO A LA CÉLULA DE PLANEAMIENTO.

EN SEGUNDO LUGAR, Y A FIN DE AGILIZAR LA PUESTA EN MARCHA EFECTIVA DE LAS OPERACIONES, CONVIENE QUE ENTREN EN FUNCIONAMIENTO LAS DISPOSICIONES SOBRE CAPACIDAD DE RESERVA PARA EL MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ (STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS). ESPAÑA ESTA DISPUESTA A PARTICIPAR EN ESTE MECANISMO, QUE HABRIA DE SER AMPLIADO A LOS COMPONENTES POLICIALES DE LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ Y AL MATERIAL DE TRANSPORTE Y LOGISTICA EN GENERAL.

EN TERCER LUGAR, ES IMPORTANTE AFRONTAR LAS CUESTIONES RELACIONADAS CON LA SEGURIDAD DEL PERSONAL DE LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ. LAS FUERZAS DE LAS NN.UU. Y EL PERSONAL AL SERVICIO DE LA ASISTENCIA HUMANITARIA, HAN SUFRIDO NUMEROSAS BAJAS, ENTRE ELLAS LAS DE ESPAÑOLES QUE HAN ENTREGADO SUS VIDAS AL SERVICIO DE LA PAZ.

LA CREACION DE UN COMITÉ ESPECIAL SOBRE LA SEGURIDAD DEL PERSONAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, EN PARTICULAR EN LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ, HA SIDO UN PASO EN LA BUENA DIRECCION Y ESPERAMOS QUE EL PROYECTO DE CONVENCION INTERNACIONAL SOBRE LA MATERIA PUEDA SER LLEVADO A BUEN TÉRMINO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

A PESAR DE LOS REITERADOS INTENTOS DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL Y DE MUCHAS DE LAS FUERZAS POLITICAS DE LA ZONA, LA PAZ AUN NO HA LLEGADO A LOS BALCANES.

ES VERDAD QUE SE HAN PRODUCIDO ACONTECIMIENTOS QUE PERMITEN ALBERGAR ESPERANZAS. HEMOS SIDO TESTIGOS DE UNA NUEVA COHESION INTERNACIONAL QUE DEBEMOS A TODA COSTA PRESERVAR. SE HA PRODUCIDO UN ACERCAMIENTO ENTRE LAS COMUNIDADES CROATA Y MUSULMANA, QUE HA CULMINADO EN LOS ACUERDOS SOBRE LA FEDERACION. ME COMPLACE RESALTAR LA IMPORTANTE TAREA QUE LA UNION EUROPEA ESTA REALIZANDO EN LA CIUDAD DE MOSTAR PARA CONTRIBUIR A ESTE PROCESO. ESPAÑA PARTICIPA ACTIVAMENTE EN ÉLLA, PUES ES EN ESA ZONA DONDE LA AGRUPACION ESPAÑOLA DE UNPROFOR DESARROLLA SUS ACTIVIDADES.

DAMOS LA BIENVENIDA A LA PUESTA EN MARCHA DEL TRIBUNAL INTERNACIONAL PARA EL ENJUICIAMENTO DE LAS GRAVES VIOLACIONES DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO COMETIDAS EN EL TERRITORIO DE LA EX-YUGOSLAVIA.

CONFIAMOS EN QUE LA EXPERIENCIA DE ESTE TRIBUNAL AD-HOC SIRVA DE ALICIENTE PARA QUE EL PROYECTO DE ESTATUTO PARA UN TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNACIONAL DE CARACTER PERMANENTE Y CON JURISDICCION UNIVERSAL, ELABORADO RECIENTEMENTE POR LA COMISION DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, SEA CONSIDERADO POR LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL CON LA MEJOR PREDISPOSICION Y ESA VIEJA IDEA SE CONVIERTA EN REALIDAD EN EL PLAZO MAS BREVE POSIBLE.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

ESPAÑA ALIENTA EL PROCESO DE TRANSICION POLITICA Y ECONOMICA EN QUE SE HALLAN INMERSOS LOS PAISES DE LA EUROPA CENTRAL Y DEL ESTE. SU FUTURA ADHESION A LA UNION EUROPEA Y SU INTEGRACION PROGRESIVA EN LOS MECANISMOS DE SEGURIDAD DEL CONTINENTE CONTRIBUIRAN A LA ESTABILIDAD EUROPEA.

TAMBIEN ASISTIMOS A IMPORTANTES CAMBIOS HACIA LA DEMOCRACIA Y LA ECONOMIA DE MERCADO EN LA FEDERACION RUSA Y EN LOS OTROS PAISES SURGIDOS DE LA DISOLUCION DE LA UNION SOVIETICA. ESPAÑA APOYA ESOS PROCESOS, CUYO EXITO CONTRIBUIRA NO SOLO AL REFORZAMIENTO DE LA SEGURIDAD EN EUROPA SINO TAMBIEN A LA PAZ MUNDIAL.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA COMUNIDAD IBEROAMERICANA DE NACIONES SE HA DOTADO DE UN FORO POLITICO DE INDUDABLE VALOR, QUE ESTE AÑO, EN CARTAGENA DE INDIAS HA VUELTO A CONSTATAR CON SATISFACCION LOS AVANCES EN LA SENDA DE LA DEMOCRACIA Y DE LA MODERNIZACION ECONOMICA.

ALLA DONDE TODAVIA HAY CONFLICTOS ARMADOS INTERNOS, COMO ES EL CASO DE GUATEMALA, ASISTIMOS A UN PROCESO DE NEGOCIACION, AUSPICIADO Y PROMOVIDO POR LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, CON EL CONCURSO DEL "GRUPO DE PAISES AMIGOS". EN EL ESTAN COMPROMETIDOS TANTO EL GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA COMO LA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA, CON EL OBJETIVO ULTIMO DE LOGRAR LA RECONCILIACION NACIONAL Y EL PLENO RESPETO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LAS LIBERTADES FUNDAMENTALES.

LA DELICADA SITUACION DE CUBA EXIGE UN ESFUERZO ADICIONAL DE DIALOGO Y COOPERACION QUE PERMITA INTEGRAR DEFINITIVAMENTE AL GOBIERNO Y PUEBLO CUBANOS EN LA ACTUAL CORRIENTE DEMOCRATICA QUE IMPERA EN EL CONTINENTE. EL DIALOGO ES ESENCIAL. SE DEBEN FOMENTAR SOLUCIONES IMAGINATIVAS ENTRE CUBANOS - SIN EXCLUSIONES - QUE ABRAN NUEVOS ESPACIOS DEMOCRATICOS QUE CONDUZCAN A UNA TRANSICION PACIFICA, RESPETANDO LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, LA SOBERANIA NACIONAL Y LAS LIBERTADES FUNDAMENTALES. EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL QUE CONTINUA SIENDO CONTRARIO AL EMBARGO IMPUESTO, VE CON SATISFACCION LAS CONVERSACIONES QUE PUEDEN ABORDAR LOS TEMAS PENDIENTES ENTRE WASHINGTON Y LA HABANA.

EL GOBIERNO ESPANOL SIGUE CON ATENCION EL DESARROLLO DE LA SITUACION EN HAITI CON VISTAS A LA PLENA APLICACION DE LAS RESOLUCIONES 917 Y 940 DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, LO QUE SUPONDRA EL RETORNO DEL PRESIDENTE LEGITIMAMENTE ELEGIDO POR EL PUEBLO HAITIANO. LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL DEBERA CONCENTRAR SUS ESFUERZOS EN LA RECONSTRUCCION DEL PAIS, PARA QUE LA DEMOCRACIA PUEDA ASENTARSE SOBRE BASES SOLIDAS QUE GARANTICEN LA LEGALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL Y EL RESPETO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

ESPAÑA CONCEDE ATENCION PRIORITARIA AL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE UN NUEVO PROCESO DE DIALOGO Y COOPERACION INSTITUCIONALIZADOS EN EL MEDITERRANEO, QUE PERMITA HACER FRENTE A LAS DISPARIDADES ECONOMICAS, DEMOGRAFICAS Y CULTURALES EXISTENTES EN LA REGION E INSTAURAR LA PAZ Y EL BIENESTAR EN EL ENTORNO MEDITERRANEO.

MI PAIS MANTIENE ESPECIALES LAZOS DE AMISTAD Y COOPERACION CON LOS PAISES DEL MAGREB Y TRATA DE CONTRIBUIR DE FORMA PRACTICA A LA SUPERACION DE LOS PROBLEMAS EXISTENTES EN ESTE AREA DE INTERES PRIORITARIO PARA ESPAÑA.

EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL ESTIMA QUE LA SOLUCION DEL PROBLEMA DEL SAHARA OCCIDENTAL PASA POR LA CELEBRACION DE UN REFERÉNDUM DE AUTODETERMINACION CON TODAS LAS GARANTIAS INTERNACIONALES. MI GOBIERNO REITERA SU APOYO AL SECRETARIO GENERAL Y A SU REPRESENTANTE ESPECIAL PARA QUE PUEDA AVANZAR EL PLAN DE ARREGLO ACEPTADO POR LAS PARTES Y PARA QUE, DE ACUERDO CON LAS RESOLUCIONES DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, SE CREEN LAS CONDICIONES NECESARIAS QUE PERMITAN LA PROXIMA REALIZACION DE DICHO REFERÉNDUM.

EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL HA EXPRESADO EN NUMEROSAS OCASIONES SU PROFUNDA SATISFACCION POR LOS PROGRESOS DEL PROCESO DE PAZ EN ORIENTE MEDIO, INICIADO EN LA CONFERENCIA DE MADRID. 1994 HA SIDO, GRACIAS A LA VALENTIA DE LAS PARTES IMPLICADAS, UN AÑO DE IMPORTANTES LOGROS EN EL CAMINO DE LA PAZ Y EL ENTENDIMIENTO. ESPAÑA HA APOYADO SIEMPRE LA NECESIDAD DE UNA PAZ GLOBAL Y DURADERA, DE ACUERDO CON LAS RESOLUCIONES 242 Y 338 DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD. MI PAIS ALIENTA A LAS PARTES Y A TODOS LOS ESTADOS DE LA REGION A QUE, DESDE UN CLARO Y UNANIME RECHAZO A LA VIOLENCIA Y AL USO DE LA FUERZA, CONJUGUEN TODOS LOS ESFUERZOS NECESARIOS PARA LOGRAR LOS FINES DESEADOS DE PAZ Y DESARROLLO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

A LO LARGO DEL AÑO EN CURSO HEMOS SIDO TESTIGOS DE ACONTECIMIENTOS DE GRAN TRASCENDENCIA EN EL AFRICA SUBSAHARIANA: UNOS HAN TENIDO UN MARCADO CARIZ ESPERANZADOR Y OTROS, COMO LA TRAGEDIA DE RUANDA Y LAS DIFICULTADES EN EL PROCESO DE PAZ EN SOMALIA, HAN PUESTO DE MANIFIESTO LA FRAGILIDAD DE LAS ESTRUCTURAS DEL CONTINENTE.

RUANDA NOS HA SOBRECOGIDO. HEMOS ASISTIDO A LOS HORRORES DE LA GUERRA CIVIL CON UN SENTIMIENTO DE AMARGURA E INCLUSO DE IMPOTENCIA. A PESAR DEL ESFUERZO LLEVADO A CABO POR LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL, EN EL QUE MI PAIS PARTICIPA ACTIVAMENTE, TODAVIA NO SE HA ENCONTRADO UNA SALIDA A LA CRISIS Y AL PROBLEMA QUE PLANTEAN LOS MILLONES DE DESPLAZADOS Y REFUGIADOS, QUE TIENE ADEMAS SERIAS REPERCUSIONES SOBRE LA ESTABILIDAD DE LOS PAISES VECINOS.

LOS RESPONSABLES DE LAS GRAVES ATROCIDADES, INCLUIDO EL GENOCIDIO, COMETIDAS EN RUANDA DEBEN RESPONDER INDIVIDUALMENTE ANTE LA JUSTICIA. POR ELLO, ESPAÑA APOYA LAS TAREAS DE LA COMISION DE EXPERTOS CREADA EN VIRTUD DE LA RESOLUCION 935 DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, QUE IMPULSAMOS Y COPATROCINAMOS, ASI COMO LAS DEL ALTO COMISIONADO PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LAS DEL RELATOR ESPECIAL PARA RUANDA.

LA EXTREMA GRAVEDAD DE ESTOS SUCESOS HACE URGENTE DAR UNA RESPUESTA JURIDICA MEDIANTE EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE UNA JURISDICCION AD HOC PARA RUANDA, SOBRE LA BASE DEL MODELO QUE NOS OFRECE EL TRIBUNAL YA CREADO PARA LA EX-YUGOSLAVIA.

SUDAFRICA HA SIDO LA OTRA CARA DE LA MONEDA. NOS FELICITAMOS POR SU REGRESO A LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL COMO MIEMBRO DE PLENO DERECHO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, UNA VEZ ABOLIDO EL SISTEMA DEL APARTHEID Y CONSTITUIDO UN GOBIERNO DEMOCRATICO Y NO RACIAL.

TAMBIÉN EN EL AFRICA AUSTRAL SEGUIMOS CON SUMO INTERÉS, POR SU IMPORTANCIA, LOS PROCESOS DE PAZ EN ANGOLA Y MOZAMBIQUE. DESEAMOS QUE EL GOBIERNO ANGOLEÑO Y UNITA LLEGUEN A UN ACUERDO DE PAZ DURADERO QUE PONGA TÉRMINO A DÉCADAS DE SUFRIMIENTO. EN MOZAMBIQUE, ESPERAMOS QUE LA RECONCILIACION NACIONAL SE CONSOLIDE CON LAS PROXIMAS ELECCIONES. ESPAÑA CONTRIBUIRA A SU CELEBRACION PACIFICA Y DEMOCRATICA CON EL ENVIO DE OBSERVADORES.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA DESCOLONIZACION DE GIBRALTAR ES UN OBJETIVO PRIORITARIO PARA EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL. ESTA ASAMBLEA GENERAL ESTABLECIO LA DOCTRINA SEGUN LA CUAL, LA DESCOLONIZACION DE GIBRALTAR NO ES UN CASO DE AUTODETERMINACION SINO DE RESTABLECIMIENTO DE LA INTEGRIDAD TERRITORIAL DE ESPAÑA. QUIERO REITERAR LA FIRME DECISION DEL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL DE CONTINUAR EL PROCESO NEGOCIADOR CON EL GOBIERNO DEL REINO UNIDO, CON ANIMO CONSTRUCTIVO Y SOBRE LAS BASES ESTABLECIDAS POR LA DECLARACION DE BRUSELAS DE 27 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1984, TENIENDO DEBIDAMENTE EN CUENTA LOS LEGITIMOS INTERESES DE LA POBLACION. EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL EXPRESA SU FIRME ESPERANZA DE QUE ESTAS NEGOCIACIONES PONGAN FIN A ESTE ANACRONISMO COLONIAL.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

EL DESARME Y EL CONTROL DE ARMAMENTOS SON ELEMENTOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA PRESERVACION DE LA PAZ Y LA SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONALES. EN CONSECUENCIA, EN EL ULTIMO AÑO ESPAÑA HA ADOPTADO UNA MORATORIA UNILATERAL SOBRE LA EXPORTACION DE MINAS ANTIPERSONAL, HA RATIFICADO LA CONVENCION SOBRE PROHIBICION O RESTRICCION DE CIERTAS ARMAS CONVENCIONALES Y HA SIDO UNO DE LOS PRIMEROS ESTADOS EN DEPOSITAR EL INSTRUMENTO DE RATIFICACION DEL TRATADO SOBRE LA PROHIBICION DE ARMAS QUIMICAS. DEFENDEMOS ASIMISMO UNA PRORROGA INDEFINIDA E INCONDICIONAL DEL TRATADO DE NO PROLIFERACION NUCLEAR Y LA PRONTA CONCLUSION DE UN TRATADO DE PROHIBICION DE ENSAYOS NUCLEARES.

ESPAÑA ESPERA, ASIMISMO, QUE SE LLEGUE EN BREVE PLAZO A UNA DECISION DEFINITIVA SOBRE LA AMPLIACION DE LA CONFERENCIA DE DESARME, QUE PERMITA LA PARTICIPACION PLENA DE PAISES QUE, COMO EL MIO, HAN DEMOSTRADO A LO LARGO DE MUCHOS AÑOS SU COMPROMISO CON LAS TAREAS DE LA CONFERENCIA.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA ESTRECHA VINCULACION ENTRE PAZ Y DESARROLLO APARECE ESPECIALMENTE REFLEJADA EN EL INFORME SOBRE UN "PROGRAMA PARA EL DESARROLLO" QUE NOS PRESENTO EN MAYO EL SECRETARIO GENERAL.

QUIERO EXPRESAR MI SATISFACCION POR SU PUBLICACION Y COMPARTIMOS SU ENFOQUE QUE PARTE DEL PRINCIPIO DE QUE EL DESARROLLO ES UN DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL Y LA BASE MAS SEGURA PARA LA PAZ. NOS PARECE ACERTADO DELIMITAR LAS CINCO DIMENSIONES PRINCIPALES DEL DESARROLLO QUE SE DESTACAN EN EL PROGRAMA: LA PAZ COMO BASE FUNDAMENTAL, LA ECONOMIA COMO MOTOR DEL PROGRESO, EL MEDIO AMBIENTE COMO BASE DE LA SOSTENIBILIDAD, LA JUSTICIA COMO PILAR DE LA SOCIEDAD Y LA DEMOCRACIA COMO GARANTIA DE BUEN GOBIERNO.

DEBEMOS AHORA DETERMINAR QUÉ ACCIONES SON NECESARIAS PARA PONER EN PRACTICA EL PROGRAMA Y ELABORAR RECOMENDACIONES CONCRETAS, PARTIENDO DE QUE EL DESARROLLO NO PUEDE SER REDUCIDO A UNA SIMPLE DIMENSION ECONOMICA, SINO QUE TIENE QUE SER TAMBIÉN CONSIDERADO EN SUS VERTIENTES POLITICA, CULTURAL, AMBIENTAL, SOCIAL Y HUMANITARIA. SOLO CON ESTE ENFOQUE GLOBAL PODREMOS AFRONTAR LAS PROFUNDAS DESIGUALDADES Y LOS SERIOS PROBLEMAS DE LOS PAISES EN DESARROLLO.

ADEMAS, LOS RECURSOS FINANCIEROS DESTINADOS A ESTOS FINES HAN DE SER UTILIZADOS MAS RACIONAL Y EFICAZMENTE. PARA ELLO, HAY QUE PROSEGUIR LA REESTRUCTURACION DE LOS SECTORES ECONOMICO Y SOCIAL DE LA ORGANIZACION Y DEL SISTEMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, EN PARTICULAR REFORZANDO AUN MAS EL PAPEL COORDINADOR QUE CORRESPONDE AL ECOSOC.

LAS ACCIONES EN PRO DEL DESARROLLO HAN DE TENER SIEMPRE EN CUENTA LA PROTECCION DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE. ESPAÑA FORMARA PARTE, A PARTIR DEL PROXIMO AÑO, DE LA COMISION DE DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE, QUE EN SU ULTIMA SESION ABORDO, POR VEZ PRIMERA, LA PUESTA EN PRACTICA DEL "PROGRAMA 21" Y OTROS ACUERDOS ALCANZADOS EN LA CUMBRE DE RIO.

LAS GRANDES CONFERENCIAS CONVOCADAS POR LAS NACIONES UNIDAS DESEMPEÑAN UN PAPEL DESTACADO EN LA BUSQUEDA DE UN CONSENSO MUNDIAL SOBRE EL DESARROLLO: EL PROGRAMA DE ACCION ADOPTADO EN EL CAIRO POR LA CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL SOBRE POBLACION Y DESARROLLO, INAUGURA UNA NUEVA POLITICA DEMOGRAFICA Y HACE DE LA MUJER EL EJE DE TODA POLITICA POBLACIONAL. ESTE PAPEL FUNDAMENTAL DE LA MUJER EN EL DESARROLLO, SERA TAMBIÉN PUESTO DE RELIEVE EN LA CONFERENCIA MUNDIAL SOBRE LA MUJER, QUE TENDRA LUGAR EN PEKIN EN SEPTIEMBRE DE 1995.

LA CUMBRE MUNDIAL PARA EL DESARROLLO SOCIAL, QUE SE REUNIRA EN COPENHAGUE EN MARZO DE 1995 DEBE, ASIMISMO, PROPICIAR EL INICIO DE UNA NUEVA ORIENTACION EN LA FORMA DE AFRONTAR LOS PROBLEMAS SOCIALES EN EL MUNDO, PARTIENDO DEL PRINCIPIO DE QUE LA PERSONA HA DE SER EL CENTRO Y OBJETIVO DEL DESARROLLO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

NADIE PUEDE DUDAR DE LA IMPORTANCIA QUE REVISTE LA PROTECCION, PROMOCION Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, COMO TAREA FUNDAMENTAL DE LOS ESTADOS Y DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. LA INTOLERANCIA, LAS DESIGUALDADES DE TODO TIPO Y LAS VIOLACIONES DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES SIGUEN PONIENDO EN PELIGRO LA VIDA, LA LIBERTAD Y LA SEGURIDAD DE MILLONES DE SERES HUMANOS.

PARA CONSEGUIR ERRADICAR ESOS MALES ES NECESARIO QUE, ASUMIENDO LOS COMPROMISOS CONTRAIDOS EN LA CONFERENCIA DE VIENA, REDOBLEMOS NUESTROS ESFUERZOS Y PONGAMOS EN PRACTICA PRINCIPIOS QUE NO POR SER UNIVERSALMENTE RECONOCIDOS SON UNIVERSALMENTE APLICADOS.

EL ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, ORGANO CREADO POR ESTA ASAMBLEA EL AÑO PASADO Y CUYO PRIMER TITULAR ES EL EMBAJADOR AYALA LASSO, HA DE PODER DESEMPEÑAR ADECUADAMENTE SUS FUNCIONES. PARA ELLO ES ESENCIAL QUE CUENTE CON UNA ADECUADA DOTACION PRESUPUESTARIA Y DE PERSONAL, QUE HA DE SER FACILITADA TAMBIÉN AL CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, ASI COMO SON LA COLABORACION Y EL APOYO DE TODOS LOS ESTADOS.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

EN 1995 SE CELEBRARA EL QUINCUAGÉSIMO ANIVERSARIO DE LA FUNDACION DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. SERA UNA OPORTUNIDAD PARA HACERNOS REFLEXIONAR TANTO SOBRE LOS LOGROS DE LA ORGANIZACION, QUE NO HAN SIDO POCOS, COMO SOBRE LOS RETOS A LOS QUE ÉSTA SE ENFRENTA. VIVIMOS EN UNA SOCIEDAD INTERNACIONAL CADA VEZ MAS COMPLEJA Y DINAMICA, DONDE YA NO ES POSIBLE SEPARAR TOTALMENTE LO NACIONAL DE LO INTERNACIONAL, NI DIVIDIR LAS TAREAS DE LA ORGANIZACION EN COMPARTIMENTOS ESTANCOS. EL DESARROLLO PLENO DE LA HUMANIDAD SOLO PODRA SER ALCANZADO ATENDIENDO A SUS MULTIPLES FACETAS, COMPLEMENTARIAS E INTERDEPENDIENTES. EL CAMINO HACIA UN MUNDO MEJOR, EN EL QUE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CONTINUAN DESEMPEÑANDO UN PAPEL FUNDAMENTAL, HA DE SER RECORRIDO POR TODOS LOS PUEBLOS DEL MUNDO, TAL COMO REZA EL LEMA DE LAS CELEBRACIONES DEL CINCUENTENARIO, Y COMO ES FIRME CONVICCION DEL GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA Y DE LOS ESPAÑOLES.

MUCHAS GRACIAS, SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.

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PRACTICAL INTERNATIONALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Richard N. Gardner

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PRACTICAL INTERNATIONALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Richard N. Gardner

The United States is seeking to redefine its world role in a dramatically new post–Cold War era. Three different philosophies are competing for public attention. One is a New Isolationism—a call to "come home America" to focus on neglected domestic problems. A second is a New Nationalism—an appeal for the unilateral exercise of American power now that there is no Soviet Union to stand in our way. A third approach —one that can best be described as Practical Internationalism—is the one that animates this essay.

The New Isolationism is based on a double fallacy—that the United States cannot simultaneously afford both domestic revitalization and world leadership and that we can safely take a holiday from involvement in events beyond our shores. But the truth is that our six-trillion-dollar economy can afford both if, in the light of new priorities, we make wise decisions to adjust our defense budget and non-means-tested entitlement spending. And wise leadership can also help the American people toward

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understanding that certain expenditures of their tax dollars overseas may be the most cost-effective way of investing in their welfare at home.

To be sure, there is a powerful sense in which "foreign policy begins at home." The United States cannot be a world leader with a stagnant economy and a disintegrating social structure. But it is equally true that in an increasing number of areas "domestic policy begins abroad." Measures to prevent aggression and bring stability to the Middle East and the Gulf help assure access to oil supplies that are essential to our economy. Trade negotiations to open foreign markets to our exports can be critical to preserve American jobs and profits. Without international measures to curb proliferation the American people may face hostile nations pointing missiles armed with nuclear or chemical warheads in our direction. We need to help India and China phase out their use of chlorofluorocarbons if a cancer-inducing hole in the ozone layer over North America is to be contained. And unless we do more to help alleviate poverty and accelerate family planning south of our borders we will face a human tidal wave of unwanted immigration.

The New Nationalism is also based on a fallacy—that the American people are prepared to have their country play the role of world policeman. Every time that question is posed to Americans in public opinion polls the answer is overwhelmingly negative. U.S. global unilateralism is also unacceptable to the people of other countries. The economics and the politics of the post–Cold War era are both pushing in the direction of cost sharing and decision sharing when it comes to questions of international security. Moreover, there is an increasing number of situations—several examples of which are noted above—where the United States cannot protect its interests without cooperation from other countries.

Practical Internationalism reflects these new realities and calls for the maximum use of international institutions in the pursuit of American national interests. This is not the same as Utopian Universalism. As the world "practical" is designed to indicate, we will need to make use of a variety of bilateral, regional and global institutions with a constant view to their ability to serve U.S. interests. We will continue to need NATO, for example, as our insurance policy against military threats that might emerge in the former Soviet Union. We should strengthen both the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS) as instruments for regional conflict resolution. And we should preserve the option of acting alone militarily when there is no other means of defending our interests.

We will also need to make increasing use of the United Nations. During the darkest days of the Cold War, scholars concerned with the UN used to complain bitterly that the world organization had "become necessary before it had become possible." With the Cold War behind us, the UN

is proving to be both necessary *and* possible in its primary role—dealing with threats to peace and security. The United States and its principal partners recognized that a new era was opening for the UN when they made the following statement at the G-7 London Summit last July:

> We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfill completely the promise and vision of its founders. A revitalized United Nations will have a central role in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the UN stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression. We will make preventive diplomacy a top priority to help avert future conflicts by making clear to potential aggressors the consequences of their actions. The UN's role in peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared to do this strongly.

The Security Council of the UN held the first meeting in its history at the Head of State and Head of Government level on January 31, 1992. After reaffirming their commitment to the collective security system of the Charter, the fifteen Council members invited the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to prepare a report for UN members by July 1, 1992 on "ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping."

In the last two years the UN Security Council has played a role of unprecedented importance in world politics. It not only authorized the use of force to terminate Iraq's aggression against Kuwait; it then took measures to destroy Iraq's weapons capabilities, to maintain embargoes on arms sales to Iraq and on the purchase of Iraqi oil, to assure compensation to victims of Iraq's aggression, and to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq and protect them against mass repression.

All together, the UN has launched as many peacekeeping operations (thirteen) in the last four years as it did in its first forty-three, and the scope of those operations has broadened from mere border patrolling and truce supervision to organizing and monitoring free elections, disarming hostile forces, assuring the protection of human rights, resettling refugees, and even providing for a country's interim administration. The newly authorized and ongoing operations include UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia); UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in Croatia); MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara); ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador); UNAVEM II (UN Angola Verification Mission) and UNIKOM (UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission).

These are in addition to the peacekeeping operations launched in earlier periods of the UN's history but which still continue: UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon); UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force

on the Golan Heights); UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus); UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan); and UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization in Israel and the occupied territories). In 1992 and 1993 the combined cost of these new and old peacekeeping operations will be well over $2 billion a year—double the UN's regular budget.

Quite apart from peacekeeping operations, the UN Secretary-General through his special representatives has recently been engaged as a fact finder or mediator in such far-flung places as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. All indications are that the demands for his services as peacemaker are likely to escalate in the months ahead.

In the light of these circumstances, and particularly in view of the report of the Secretary-General issued in response to the Security Council Summit, the United States needs to consider where the UN fits into its security policies for the 1990s and, more specifically, just what kind of evolution in UN activities and structures would serve our national interests.

The proposals that follow are designed to provide a UN agenda for the next Administration—an agenda that would hopefully merit bipartisan support no matter who should occupy the White House.

Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking

Under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General can bring to the attention of the Security Council "any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of peace and security." Under Article 98, the Secretary-General can be asked to perform "other functions" by the Security Council and other UN organs. At the Security Council Summit of January 31, there was widespread support for enhancing the preventive diplomacy and peacemaking role of the Secretary-General. One way of doing this would be to improve the flow of reliable information to him on incipient conflict situations in different regions of the world, together with expert analysis of that information with options for constructive UN action.

As a result of the restructuring of the Secretariat by the new Secretary-General, the UN now has in place an outstanding team to support an enhanced role for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. Boutros-Ghali has appointed two new Under Secretaries-General for Political Affairs, Vladimir Petrovsky and James Jonah, and under them three new Assistant Secretaries-General—Giandomenico Picco, Kofi Annan and Sotirios Mousouris. Marrack Goulding is the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping. These senior staff members should be given "watching briefs" on different regions of the world and be available for special missions on behalf of the Secretary-General to defuse incipient conflicts. They could

supervise small "regional bureaus" at UN headquarters, capable of the kind of political analysis performed in national Foreign Ministries. This group of permanent UN civil servants could be supplemented in emergency situations by high-level personalities from UN member nations on temporary assignments. The use of Cyrus Vance in the Yugoslav crisis is a model on which to build.

In addition, the fifteen members of the Security Council should be asked to supply information regularly to the Secretary-General's office that could help him perform his preventive diplomacy and peacemaking functions. This information could come from reconnaissance satellites as well as from other sources employed by national intelligence agencies and diplomatic establishments. The supply of this kind of information from Permanent Members of the Council has recently proved most valuable in enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Special Commission to find and dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This new practice of information sharing should now be broadened and regularized in the larger context of the Secretary-General's "peace watch" functions.

Another measure to be considered is the building up of UN field offices for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking functions. The Secretary-General has no worldwide diplomatic corps—and the UN members would not at this stage authorize one. But political offices of the Secretary-General were quietly established during recent years in Baghdad, Teheran, Islamabad, and Kabul. Building on this precedent, political offices could be opened in other places as the need arises. The heads of the UN's five Regional Commissions, the UNDP's Resident Coordinators, and the UN Information Officers in selected countries could also be utilized for information gathering and preventive diplomacy.

The Secretary-General could make greater use of his Article 99 authority to alert the Security Council to information developed through such an improved worldwide intelligence network. The Council could hold regular closed meetings to examine problems identified in the Secretary-General's "peace watch." And additional Security Council Summits could be convened, affording Heads of State and Heads of Government the opportunity to evaluate the UN's role in collective security and recommend improvements.

Peacekeeping

Recent experience has revealed a number of deficiencies that need to be corrected if the UN is to respond effectively to the heavy peacekeeping responsibilities it is being called upon to discharge in the 1990s. As the operations in Yugoslavia and Cambodia indicate, peacekeeping forces will

increasingly be needed to deal with conflicts *within* as well as *between* states, and will require skills that go well beyond troop supervision and border patrol. Three things need to be done to make the UN's peacekeeping operations more effective.

First, units of national armed forces earmarked for UN service should be prepared in advance for the complex tasks that now characterize peacekeeping operations. They should undergo common training programs and, where possible, participate in joint exercises. The military assistance programs of the United States and other donor countries could finance some of the cost.

Second, equipment needed in those operations—jeeps, trucks, radios and other communications gear—should be stockpiled in key locations for emergency use. The UN estimates that some fifty members are now able and willing to supply a battalion (600–700 men) for a UN peacekeeping operation, but adds that in the case of many Third World countries the needed equipment is lacking.

Finally, we need to address the serious financial problems that have recently delayed the deployment of peacekeeping forces. The United States now owes the UN over $400 million in back dues for peacekeeping and the regular budget. The Russian Federation and other members also owe large amounts. These arrearages jeopardize the UN's capacity to respond to peacekeeping emergencies and should be paid promptly. In addition, the UN needs a Peacekeeping Emergency Fund of $50–100 million to cover the start-up costs of new operations, otherwise the arrival of peacekeepers will continue to be delayed until new financing is made available in each situation. To be sure, the costs of UN peacekeeping are now substantial, but it is worth recalling that the cost of Desert Storm was $1.5 billion *per day*.

Peace Enforcement: A UN Rapid Deployment Force?

A central question to be considered by the next Administration is whether the UN's system for deterring and defeating aggression should rely exclusively on ad hoc coalitions assembled and led by the United States, or whether an institutionalized system should now be created as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter. That Article provides that "all UN members undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Although Article 43 declares that these agreements "shall be negotiated as soon as possible," efforts to negotiate them were abandoned in the early postwar years due to the Cold War.

Article 47 of the Charter provides for a Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members of the Security Council or their representatives, to "advise and assist" the Council on all questions relating to "military requirements" and the "employment and command of forces placed at its disposal." The Military Staff Committee is to be responsible under the Security Council for the "strategic direction" of the armed forces placed at its disposal. Questions relating to the command of these forces are to be "worked out subsequently."

How might these Charter provisions now be implemented in a way that would serve the common interest in deterring or defeating threats to the peace and acts of aggression? Certainly not by asking UN members to assign units of their armed forces to a huge UN standing army. For both political and budgetary reasons, such an ambitious plan would have scant support.

A more modest proposal could now be the subject of discussions among members of the Security Council and other interested UN members. The five Permanent Members of the Council could enter into Article 43 agreements, designating units of brigade strength (2,000 men) for a standby UN Rapid Deployment Force (UN-RDF) to deal with threats to the peace and acts of aggression. Thirty other UN members could commit smaller units of battalion strength (600–700 men) pursuant to such agreements. This would provide a force of up to 30,000 men that would be prepared in advance of a crisis with common training, standardized or interoperable equipment, and joint exercises under a UN commander. When a crisis occurred, those national contingents most suited for the purpose would be called up—which in most cases would be far less in number than the total potential force of 30,000.

The five Permanent Members, like other UN members, would assign units of their ground forces under Article 43 agreements (for example, the Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division could be the U.S. contribution). The Permanent Members could also be asked to pledge air and naval units and/or airlift and sealift capability. In some conflict situations, for political reasons it would be preferable to keep the Permanent Members, or at least the U.S. and the Russian Federation, in a backup military role, with ground forces of other UN members on the front lines.

A UN-RDF of this kind would be available not just to carry out peacekeeping operations but to engage in peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter. It would be equipped to perform a variety of functions: (1) to be stationed preemptively on the border of any UN member that was threatened by aggression; (2) to defeat aggression if it occurred; (3) to put an end to mass repression against civilian populations (for example, the Kurds in northern Iraq) that constituted a threat to international peace and

security; (4) to open and defend "humanitarian relief corridors" in domestic conflicts; and possibly (5) to combat acts of terrorism.

The UN Rapid Deployment Force could only be deployed by the Security Council and therefore could only operate where there were nine affirmative votes of the fifteen Security Council members and where no veto was cast by a Permanent Member. Such a force would not be powerful enough to deal with all kinds of aggression; action by U.S.-led coalitions would sometimes be necessary as authorized by the Council in Desert Storm. Moreover, UN members would continue to have the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Nevertheless, a UN-RDF would constitute a meaningful political as well as military deterrent in many situations, particularly where it could be deployed preemptively on the border of a threatened country. It is unlikely that Saddam Hussein would have attacked Kuwait if a UN force composed of units of a dozen members, including the Permanent Members, had faced him on the other side of the border.

The feasibility of creating a UN-RDF will depend, first and foremost, on the attitude of the Security Council's Permanent Members. Judging from their statements at the Security Council Summit, France and Russia seem to favor the idea. The United States and the United Kingdom have been skeptical. The position of China is unknown, but Beijing would be unlikely to block creation of a UN-RDF if the other four Permanent Members favored it.

A more difficult question is presented when it comes to participation in a UN-RDF by countries that are not Permanent Members. They do not have the veto privilege, are not members of the Military Staff Committee, and may not even be members of the Security Council when a call is made on units they would be asked to pledge under Article 43 agreements. But Article 44 of the Charter provides that when the Council has decided to use armed force it shall invite UN members not on the Council to participate in its decisions concerning the employment of units of that member's armed forces. Article 47 further provides that UN members other than the Permanent Members can be invited to participate in the work of the Military Staff Committee when this is required for the "efficient discharge" of the Committee's responsibilities. These Charter provisions could be interpreted liberally to provide a seat at the decision-making table for non-Permanent Members contributing to a UN-RDF. In addition, such members could be permitted to insert an "opting-out" provision in their Article 43 agreements, to the effect that in exceptional cases involving important national interests they could decline to make their armed forces available for a particular operation.

It is often forgotten that the negotiation of Article 43 agreements is not merely an option available to UN members: it is a legal obligation of

membership in the world organization. If it were activated, Article 43 could provide a way of securing contributions from two key countries that resisted making human (as opposed to financial) contributions to the Gulf War for domestic political and constitutional reasons—Japan and Germany. With the creation of a UN-RDF, the governments of these two countries could argue that their Constitutions should be interpreted to permit fulfillment of Article 43 obligations and, failing such an interpretation, that their Constitutions should be amended accordingly. The Japanese Socialists and German Social Democrats would not be able to claim any longer that sending armed forces abroad would be caving in to U.S. demands or encouraging the revival of militarism.

A basic advantage of the Article 43 approach is that it would provide a degree of legitimacy for UN peace enforcement actions that is not available when they result from coalitions dominated by one country. In the Gulf War the military operation became identified with the United States rather than the United Nations, and Saddam Hussein was able to argue that his enemy was the United States and not the world community as a whole. In addition to the problem of appearances, there was the practical consequence in the Gulf War that once the Security Council had authorized the employment of armed force under Resolution 678, it had no control over how that force was employed. Indeed, because of its veto power the U.S. was in a position to block any effort by the Council to force the termination of hostilities or force the U.S. to alter the way it was carrying out the Council's broad mandate. Many UN members—and not only those who claimed the U.S. had "hijacked" the Security Council—are determined to prevent a repetition of the Gulf experience and assure that future peace enforcement operations are run by a UN commander kept under strict UN control. Their presence in the future as non-Permanent members of the Council may mean that the Gulf experience is a nonrepeatable proposition—or is repeatable only in exceptional circumstances.

Another argument for the Article 43 approach is that it is more likely than the use of ad hoc coalitions led by the U.S. to provide the genuine collective security system protecting all UN members that is implied in President Bush's "new world order." There will be many threats to the peace or acts of aggression where neither the United States nor any Permanent Member of the Security Council will wish to take the heavy military and political burdens assumed by the U.S. in the Gulf War. Yet President Bush has presented his "new world order" as one in which aggression will be defeated and international law upheld on behalf of *all* nations, not just the United States. In doing so he articulated the same Wilsonian vision set forth by other American Presidents. Franklin D. Roosevelt, announcing U.S. war aims in his famous Four Freedoms speech, called for a postwar order that would assure "freedom from fear—

everywhere in the world." John F. Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, called for "a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved." Similar language can be found in statements of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon and Reagan.

If statements like these by American Presidents are more than meaningless rhetorical flourishes, it must be because we consider that the construction of a global security system that protects all nations is something that serves the interests of the United States. But why should we care if Rwanda attacks Burundi and no immediate vital interest of the U.S. or an ally is evidently at risk? It must be because (1) we feel a moral concern for the rights of the Burundians, (2) we believe that aggression unpunished there would encourage aggression elsewhere, and (3) the United States will not be politically successful in mobilizing coalitions to defeat aggressions that threaten our vital interests if we show indifference to aggressions that threaten the vital interests of others.

There are thus compelling arguments for the proposition that activating Article 43 would now serve the national interests of the United States. But there are also arguments that will be advanced against the proposal. The first is that a UN-RDF resulting from activation of Article 43 could be used against the United States. Had such a system existed during the last decade, the Sandinistas could have appealed for protection by the UN-RDF against contra incursions in Nicaragua. General Noriega might have done the same in advance of the U.S. invasion of Panama. The short answer to this objection is that the U.S. could have blocked such deployments of the UN-RDF by its veto. Nevertheless, for the U.S. to use its veto repeatedly in situations where a UN-RDF was being called upon to protect other countries against U.S. violations of their sovereignty would be politically costly and could lead to the collapse of the whole UN-RDF system. Perhaps the best answer to this objection is to say that, yes, the constitution of a UN-RDF could make it more difficult for the U.S. and others to use force in violation of international law, and that this would be one of its benefits. After all, a UN-RDF could also have been used to protect Salvador against Nicaraguan support of the Salvadoran insurgents. On balance, a UN-RDF would inhibit aggression from all quarters; the United States should be able to live with that.

A second argument against a UN-RDF is that it would be unable to function in situations where it was blocked by a veto or faced with the *fait accompli* of a heavily armed aggression, and yet the fact of its existence might rule out a military response by the U.S. and its allies outside the UN. But there is no reason why this should be so. The U.S. and other UN members could, in setting up the UN-RDF, make clear that they reserve their rights of individual and collective self-defense in accordance

with Article 51. And the President would need to emphasize to Congress and the American people that a UN-RDF would not be intended to provide the answer to all threats to U.S. security.

Perhaps the most substantial objection to a UN-RDF regards its military feasibility. It is true that the UN has demonstrated the workability of multinational peacekeeping forces composed of contingents from many nations, but these contingents were used for observation, border patrols, buffer zones and the maintenance of order, not war making. Can a successful military campaign be conducted by a coalition of a dozen different national contingents, each under a national commander but subject to an overall UN commander? How would the vital functions of intelligence, communications and logistics be handled? Could any amount of preparatory training and joint exercises overcome the difficulties of diverse cultures, military doctrines and national interests? Would the Pentagon ever consent to U.S. forces being placed under the overall command of a non-American? Are there military figures of politically appropriate nationality available whom the Permanent Members of the Security Council would trust to conduct a military campaign effectively? If these questions cannot be answered authoritatively at this time, surely they should be the subject of study by qualified military and political leaders from interested UN members, under the auspices of either the UN, national governments, or private institutions.

The UN and Regional Organizations

The demands on the UN are now so great as to place a severe strain on its resources of people and money. Hence Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and many UN members are looking with interest on ways of involving regional organizations outside the UN as "force multipliers."

Certainly more could be done to employ the resources of the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, the European Community, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to assist the UN in its preventive diplomacy and peacemaking functions. The EC has been engaged in an effort, with limited success thus far, to resolve the crisis in what used to be Yugoslavia.

But none of the regional organizations mentioned above has military forces at its disposal. If the UN wishes to make use in Europe of the military forces of another international organization, it will have to look to NATO. This would have been unthinkable a few years ago, but today the Republics of the former Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe that have been liberated from Soviet rule are associated with NATO in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Some of them are even

seeking NATO membership. There is no overriding political reason why the Security Council should not make use of NATO-assigned forces for peacekeeping—or even peace enforcement operations by a UN-RDF. Indeed, Article 43 of the Charter specifically envisages that agreements to supply forces to the Council can be made by "groups of members," and Article 53 provides that the Council can utilize regional agencies for "enforcement action under its authority."

Making NATO-assigned forces executing agents for carefully selected UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations both inside Europe and beyond is an option that should now be seriously explored. The same option could be explored with the Western European Union or the European Community if and when those organizations develop significant military capabilities. The NATO option has the practical advantage that the forces are readily available, have already engaged in joint military operations, and can be paid for out of the military budgets of NATO members. But since NATO-assigned forces are trained for war making and not peacekeeping, a special training program should be undertaken to prepare them for the special requirements of UN operations in places like Cyprus and Yugoslavia.

The UN and Non-Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles to deliver them is now the number one national security threat to the United States. India, Pakistan, Israel and perhaps South Africa have joined the nuclear weapons club along with the Permanent Members of the Security Council. North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya and perhaps Algeria are actively seeking nuclear weapons. Iraq's nuclear ambitions were temporarily frustrated by Desert Storm and UN inspections, but continued vigilance will be required to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its nuclear capacity. The nuclear policies of the successor states of the former Soviet Union will also require close attention.

Beyond the nuclear problem, there is the frightening prospect that, in the absence of preventive action, some thirty countries could have chemical weapons and some ten countries biological weapons by the year 2000. More than two dozen countries could have ballistic missiles by that date, some of them with great accuracy and ranges of a thousand miles or more.

Much more can be done by the United States to deal with this challenge through tighter export controls and wise diplomacy. But multilateral action will be indispensable if our policies are to be effective. For chemical weapons, the speedy conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Treaty now being negotiated in Geneva under UN auspices is an obvious necessity.

For missiles, new efforts will be needed to tighten the restrictions in the Missile Technology Control Regime and to secure the cooperation of nonparticipating countries such as China.

The discovery of Iraq's near acquisition of nuclear weapons despite its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has shocked the international community into new preventive measures in the nuclear weapons area. The twenty-seven-nation Nuclear Suppliers Club recently concluded a long-overdue agreement covering the export of "dual use" items—materials and machinery that can be used either for peaceful purposes or for the making of atom bombs. This begins to close a major loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but the new accord is still only voluntary and lacks any enforcement mechanism. How to remedy these deficiencies should be high on the future non-proliferation agenda.

Another urgent priority is the strengthening of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Iraqi experience showed how an NPT signatory can frustrate IAEA safeguards by clandestine activities in undeclared sites. The IAEA's Board of Governors has recently reaffirmed the Agency's right under its safeguards agreements to carry out short-notice inspections at undeclared sites where it has reason to suspect that a country is engaging in prohibited activities. But to make this right meaningful, IAEA members will need to organize a "proliferation watch," making information regularly available to the Agency on nuclear exports and on suspect activities that come to their attention from satellite photography and other intelligence sources.

In addition, it would be helpful if the Security Council could adopt a resolution stating that attempts by an NPT party to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its NPT commitments would be regarded as a threat to the peace, and that sanctions would be employed to enforce IAEA measures to put an end to such activities. The Security Council could also call upon UN members to refrain from supplying any nuclear materials to a non-NPT country unless that country has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities.

Finally, we might explore ways to reaffirm the security guarantees given to non-nuclear weapons countries under Security Council Resolution 255. In that resolution, adopted at the time the NPT was opened for signature in 1968, the U.S., the USSR and the U.K. each declared its intention to seek Security Council action to assist any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT that was "a victim of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used." Now that both France and China have finally become NPT parties, it might be useful to reaffirm and toughen resolution 255, with the addition of comparable declarations of intention by those countries.

In short, the new priority on non-proliferation has brought with it a new imperative of multilateral action. There is a clear need to reinforce

the IAEA safeguards regime and to employ the political and legal powers of the Security Council in support of the Agency and of other non-proliferation efforts.

Reconstituting the Security Council: Is It Time to Open Pandora's Box?

As the Security Council plays an increasingly central role in world politics, demands for changes in its composition and methods of decision-making are becoming more insistent. The more active the Council becomes, the more the 160-plus UN members not on it complain about decisions made in their names but without their participation. As the UN approaches its fiftieth anniversary, it becomes difficult to justify permanent seats on the Council for the United Kingdom and France, but not for Japan and Germany. And large countries in the developing world that have enormous influence over events in their regions feel aggrieved that they have no comparable input into UN security policy.

"If it ain't broke, don't fix it," has been the response thus far of the five Permanent Members to demands for Security Council reform. The UK and France fear the loss of their Council seats; all five Permanent Members fear the loss of the veto. But that same veto protects the Permanent Members from any change in the Charter they do not like, and indefinite refusal to consider any change in the Council's composition could undercut the Council's effectiveness. UN members could one day refuse to implement Security Council-approved economic sanctions or decline to supply troops for peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations if they feel the Council has lost legitimacy.

There is a growing feeling among UN members that the Council cannot remain as it is to the year 2000, and that an appropriate occasion to make changes would be the UN's fiftieth anniversary in 1995. Since the national interests of the United States and its allies are deeply involved in this question, it would seem only reasonable that they should begin serious discussions of it among themselves in official or unofficial forums.

One obvious purpose of reconstituting the Security Council through Charter amendment would be to provide permanent seats to Germany and Japan, provided of course that these countries are prepared to permit the use of their armed forces in Council-authorized operations which they approve. Another would be to provide permanent seats to India, Nigeria and Brazil. Alternatively, additional seats could be made available to Asia, Africa and Latin America, to enable those countries to take their places on the Council with greater regularity. Any additional permanent seats on the Council should, if possible, be without veto, in order to preserve the ability of the Council to operate effectively.

If the size of the Council could be held at twenty to twenty-three—and if the veto privilege could be retained—enlargement of the Council could be achieved in a manner acceptable to the United States and the other Permanent Members. The result would be a stronger United Nations, more capable of responding to the challenges of the post–Cold War world. Whether such an outcome is achievable is uncertain. But sooner or later, and very probably sooner, we should try to find out.

Conclusion

This essay has sought to demonstrate ways in which a more effective United Nations could serve U.S. national security interests as well as the interests of other members of the world community. But is such an ambitious UN agenda compatible with the realities of U.S. domestic politics?

One reason for optimism is the bipartisan political consensus that seems to be emerging, which embraces Practical Internationalism as our post–Cold War foreign policy philosophy, in contrast to a New Isolationism or a New Nationalism. President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker and Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton have all been calling for a policy of constructive U.S. "engagement" on world problems, with multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, playing a central role. Thus the leadership of both political parties seems agreed on the broad strategic outlines of a foreign policy that emphasizes maximum feasible multilateralism, even though they may disagree on tactics and details.

But we still have a long way to go to close the gap between rhetoric and reality, between the ends of a new foreign policy and the means that are necessary to implement it. The perception of the American public continues to be that we should spend less on "foreign affairs" and devote more of our resources to neglected domestic problems.

The harsh truth which no political leader has been willing to acknowledge is that the national interest will require a good deal more spending on both. Our international affairs budget for fiscal year 1993 totals $22 billion, including $1.4 billion for international organizations and $11.5 billion for economic, humanitarian and development assistance. To meet the challenges of collective security in the 1990s—which include not only the military threats discussed in this essay but nonmilitary economic and environmental threats—we will probably require an international affairs budget closer to $30 billion by the mid-1990s. The test of our seriousness about Practical Internationalism will lie in our willingness to pay for it. To meet that test will require a level of bipartisan statesmanship in both the Executive Branch and the Congress that has not been notable in recent years.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

PERMITAME MANIFESTARLE MI ENHORABUENA MAS CORDIAL POR SU ELECCION COMO PRESIDENTE DE ESTA ASAMBLEA Y DESEARLE LOS MAYORES ÉXITOS EN EL DESEMPEÑO DE SUS FUNCIONES. LOS MIEMBROS DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL RECONOCEN ASI EN SU PAIS, COTE D'IVOIRE, LA DECISIVA CONTRIBUCION DE AFRICA A LAS LABORES DE LA ORGANIZACION. CONFIO EN QUE LA ASAMBLEA CONTINUE EN LA LINEA DE CONSENSO PUESTA DE MANIFIESTO EN EL ANTERIOR PERIODO DE SESIONES, BAJO LA PRESIDENCIA DEL EMBAJADOR INSANALLY, A CUYA LABOR RINDO TRIBUTO.

QUIERO ADEMAS, REITERAR AL DR. BOUTROS-GHALI, QUIEN EN ABRIL DE ESTE AÑO NOS HONRO CON SU VISITA OFICIAL A MI PAIS, LA PLENA COLABORACION DE LAS AUTORIDADES ESPAÑOLAS PARA ASISTIRLE EN LA DURA TAREA DE HACER FRENTE A LOS DESAFIOS CADA VEZ MAS COMPLEJOS QUE SE PRESENTAN A LA ORGANIZACION.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

EL MINISTRO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES DE LA REPUBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA, EN SU INTERVENCION EN NOMBRE DE LA UNION EUROPEA, EXPUSO NUESTROS PUNTOS DE VISTA COMUNES EN ESTE DEBATE GENERAL. ESTOS PUNTOS DE VISTA REFLEJAN LOS AVANCES EN LA CONSTRUCCION DE UNA POLITICA EXTERIOR Y DE SEGURIDAD COMUN QUE ES UNO DE LOS OBJETIVOS PRIORITARIOS DE LA UNION. DESEARIA AHORA, EN NOMBRE DE MI DELEGACION, PROFUNDIZAR EN ALGUNAS CUESTIONES.

LOS CAMBIOS FUNDAMENTALES EN EL SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL, DE LOS QUE HEMOS SIDO TESTIGOS EN LOS ULTIMOS AÑOS, HAN CONFERIDO A LAS NACIONES UNIDAS LA GRAN OPORTUNIDAD DE CONVERTIRSE DEFINITIVAMENTE EN EL CENTRO DE ARMONIZACION UNIVERSAL DE LOS ESFUERZOS DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL PARA ALCANZAR LOS PROPOSITOS COMUNES PLASMADOS EN LA CARTA; PERO TAMBIÉN HAN SOMETIDO A LA ORGANIZACION A UNA DE LAS MAYORES PRUEBAS DE SU HISTORIA. ALGUNOS HAN LLEGADO A CUESTIONAR SI LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CUENTAN CON POSIBILIDADES REALES DE CONTRIBUIR EFICAZMENTE A LA SOLUCION DE LOS NUMEROSOS CONFLICTOS QUE HAN SURGIDO O SE HAN REAVIVADO EN LOS ULTIMOS AÑOS.

TRAS EL PRIMER ALDABONAZO DADO POR CRISIS COMO LAS DE LA ANTIGUA YUGOSLAVIA, SOMALIA Y ANGOLA, HEMOS PRESENCIADO SITUACIONES TERRIBLES COMO LA DE RUANDA, DONDE LOS MEDIOS DE LA ORGANIZACION SE HAN MOSTRADO DESGRACIADAMENTE INSUFICIENTES PARA PONER FIN AL SUFRIMIENTO DE MILLONES DE SERES HUMANOS.

SIMULTANEAMENTE, LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, CON SUS RECURSOS DESPLEGADOS AL MAXIMO, SUFREN UNA CRISIS FINANCIERA, FRENTE A LA QUE POCO PUEDEN HACER SIN LA COLABORACION DECIDIDA DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS. ESTA COLABORACION HA DE MANIFESTARSE, EN PRIMER LUGAR, EN LA ATENCION PUNTUAL A LAS OBLIGACIONES FINANCIERAS ESTABLECIDAS EN LA CARTA. SOLO ASI PODRA LA ORGANIZACION CONTAR CON LOS MEDIOS NECESARIOS PARA CUMPLIR SUS OBJETIVOS. ADEMAS, ESTOS MEDIOS HAN DE SER UTILIZADOS DE LA FORMA MAS EFECTIVA POSIBLE.

MAS ALLA DE LOS ESFUERZOS DE RENOVACION REALIZADOS O EN CURSO, HEMOS DE PLANTEARNOS SERIAMENTE UN PROCESO DE REFLEXION, AL MAS ALTO NIVEL, CON EL OBJETIVO DE DECIDIR SI ESTAMOS DISPUESTOS A DOTAR A LA ORGANIZACION DEL CONJUNTO DE INSTRUMENTOS JURIDICOS, MATERIALES Y FINANCIEROS QUE NECESITA PARA ENFRENTARSE CON ÉXITO A LAS EXIGENCIAS CRECIENTES QUE LE PLANTEA LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL. LA CREDIBILIDAD DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS ESTA EN JUEGO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA REFORMA DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD ES UNA CUESTION SUMAMENTE IMPORTANTE Y COMPLEJA, QUE HA DE SER LLEVADA A CABO DE FORMA MEDITADA, MEDIANTE UN PROCESO DE DIALOGO QUE CONDUZCA A UN ENTENDIMIENTO DEL CONJUNTO DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS.

ESPAÑA, QUE DURANTE ESTOS DOS ULTIMOS AÑOS HA OCUPADO UN PUESTO DE MIEMBRO NO PERMANENTE DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, REITERA SU POSICION FAVORABLE A REVISAR, SIN PRECIPITACION, SU COMPOSICION Y FUNCIONAMIENTO, INSPIRANDOSE EN LOS CRITERIOS DE REPRESENTATIVIDAD, EFICACIA Y TRANSPARENCIA Y CON EL OBJETIVO ULTIMO DE REFORZAR LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS ACTUACIONES DEL CONSEJO.

ESPAÑA, QUE HA TOMADO Y SEGUIRA TOMANDO PARTE ACTIVA EN LAS REUNIONES DEL GRUPO DE TRABAJO AD HOC DE ESTA ASAMBLEA, ES PARTIDARIA DE UN AUMENTO MODERADO DEL NUMERO DE MIEMBROS DEL CONSEJO. ELLO PERMITIRIA LA PRESENCIA MAS FRECUENTE EN EL CONSEJO DE ESTADOS CON PESO E INFLUENCIA EN LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y CON CAPACIDAD Y VOLUNTAD DE CONTRIBUIR DE FORMA SIGNIFICATIVA AL MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ Y LA SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONALES Y A LOS DEMAS PROPOSITOS DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. ESTA AMPLIACION DEL CONSEJO FACILITARIA TAMBIEN UNA DISTRIBUCION GEOGRAFICA EQUITATIVA DE LAS DISTINTAS REGIONES DEL MUNDO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

ACONTECIMIENTOS SOBRECOGEDORES, COMO LOS DE RUANDA, PONEN DE RELIEVE LA NECESIDAD DE PROSEGUIR EL REFUERZO DE LOS MECANISMOS DE ACTUACION IMPRESCINDIBLES PARA EJECUTAR LOS MANDATOS CADA VEZ MAS AMPLIOS Y COMPLEJOS OTORGADOS POR EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD A LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ.

EN PRIMER LUGAR, HAY QUE CONTINUAR EL PERFECCIONAMIENTO DE LOS DISPOSITIVOS DE DIRECCION Y CONTROL AQUI MISMO, EN NUEVA YORK. LA SECRETARIA HA REALIZADO YA UN IMPORTANTE ESFUERZO PARA FORTALECER EL DEPARTAMENTO DE OPERACIONES DE MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ, CON LA SALA DE SITUACION, LA AMPLIACION DE LA OFICINA DEL ASESOR MILITAR Y EL IMPULSO DADO A LA CÉLULA DE PLANEAMIENTO.

EN SEGUNDO LUGAR, Y A FIN DE AGILIZAR LA PUESTA EN MARCHA EFECTIVA DE LAS OPERACIONES, CONVIENE QUE ENTREN EN FUNCIONAMIENTO LAS DISPOSICIONES SOBRE CAPACIDAD DE RESERVA PARA EL MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ (STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS). ESPAÑA ESTA DISPUESTA A PARTICIPAR EN ESTE MECANISMO, QUE HABRIA DE SER AMPLIADO A LOS COMPONENTES POLICIALES DE LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ Y AL MATERIAL DE TRANSPORTE Y LOGISTICA EN GENERAL.

EN TERCER LUGAR, ES IMPORTANTE AFRONTAR LAS CUESTIONES RELACIONADAS CON LA SEGURIDAD DEL PERSONAL DE LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ. LAS FUERZAS DE LAS NN.UU. Y EL PERSONAL AL SERVICIO DE LA ASISTENCIA HUMANITARIA, HAN SUFRIDO NUMEROSAS BAJAS, ENTRE ELLAS LAS DE ESPAÑOLES QUE HAN ENTREGADO SUS VIDAS AL SERVICIO DE LA PAZ.

LA CREACION DE UN COMITÉ ESPECIAL SOBRE LA SEGURIDAD DEL PERSONAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, EN PARTICULAR EN LAS OPERACIONES DE PAZ, HA SIDO UN PASO EN LA BUENA DIRECCION Y ESPERAMOS QUE EL PROYECTO DE CONVENCION INTERNACIONAL SOBRE LA MATERIA PUEDA SER LLEVADO A BUEN TÉRMINO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

A PESAR DE LOS REITERADOS INTENTOS DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL Y DE MUCHAS DE LAS FUERZAS POLITICAS DE LA ZONA, LA PAZ AUN NO HA LLEGADO A LOS BALCANES.

ES VERDAD QUE SE HAN PRODUCIDO ACONTECIMIENTOS QUE PERMITEN ALBERGAR ESPERANZAS. HEMOS SIDO TESTIGOS DE UNA NUEVA COHESION INTERNACIONAL QUE DEBEMOS A TODA COSTA PRESERVAR. SE HA PRODUCIDO UN ACERCAMIENTO ENTRE LAS COMUNIDADES CROATA Y MUSULMANA, QUE HA CULMINADO EN LOS ACUERDOS SOBRE LA FEDERACION. ME COMPLACE RESALTAR LA IMPORTANTE TAREA QUE LA UNION EUROPEA ESTA REALIZANDO EN LA CIUDAD DE MOSTAR PARA CONTRIBUIR A ESTE PROCESO. ESPAÑA PARTICIPA ACTIVAMENTE EN ELLA, PUES ES EN ESA ZONA DONDE LA AGRUPACION ESPAÑOLA DE UNPROFOR DESARROLLA SUS ACTIVIDADES.

DAMOS LA BIENVENIDA A LA PUESTA EN MARCHA DEL TRIBUNAL INTERNACIONAL PARA EL ENJUICIAMENTO DE LAS GRAVES VIOLACIONES DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO COMETIDAS EN EL TERRITORIO DE LA EX-YUGOSLAVIA.

CONFIAMOS EN QUE LA EXPERIENCIA DE ESTE TRIBUNAL AD-HOC SIRVA DE ALICIENTE PARA QUE EL PROYECTO DE ESTATUTO PARA UN TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNACIONAL DE CARACTER PERMANENTE Y CON JURISDICCION UNIVERSAL, ELABORADO RECIENTEMENTE POR LA COMISION DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, SEA CONSIDERADO POR LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL CON LA MEJOR PREDISPOSICION Y ESA VIEJA IDEA SE CONVIERTA EN REALIDAD EN EL PLAZO MAS BREVE POSIBLE.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

ESPAÑA ALIENTA EL PROCESO DE TRANSICION POLITICA Y ECONOMICA EN QUE SE HALLAN INMERSOS LOS PAISES DE LA EUROPA CENTRAL Y DEL ESTE. SU FUTURA ADHESION A LA UNION EUROPEA Y SU INTEGRACION PROGRESIVA EN LOS MECANISMOS DE SEGURIDAD DEL CONTINENTE CONTRIBUIRAN A LA ESTABILIDAD EUROPEA.

TAMBIEN ASISTIMOS A IMPORTANTES CAMBIOS HACIA LA DEMOCRACIA Y LA ECONOMIA DE MERCADO EN LA FEDERACION RUSA Y EN LOS OTROS PAISES SURGIDOS DE LA DISOLUCION DE LA UNION SOVIETICA. ESPAÑA APOYA ESOS PROCESOS, CUYO EXITO CONTRIBUIRA NO SOLO AL REFORZAMIENTO DE LA SEGURIDAD EN EUROPA SINO TAMBIEN A LA PAZ MUNDIAL.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA COMUNIDAD IBEROAMERICANA DE NACIONES SE HA DOTADO DE UN FORO POLITICO DE INDUDABLE VALOR, QUE ESTE AÑO, EN CARTAGENA DE INDIAS HA VUELTO A CONSTATAR CON SATISFACCION LOS AVANCES EN LA SENDA DE LA DEMOCRACIA Y DE LA MODERNIZACION ECONOMICA.

ALLA DONDE TODAVIA HAY CONFLICTOS ARMADOS INTERNOS, COMO ES EL CASO DE GUATEMALA, ASISTIMOS A UN PROCESO DE NEGOCIACION, AUSPICIADO Y PROMOVIDO POR LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, CON EL CONCURSO DEL "GRUPO DE PAISES AMIGOS". EN EL ESTAN COMPROMETIDOS TANTO EL GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA COMO LA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA, CON EL OBJETIVO ULTIMO DE LOGRAR LA RECONCILIACION NACIONAL Y EL PLENO RESPETO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LAS LIBERTADES FUNDAMENTALES.

LA DELICADA SITUACION DE CUBA EXIGE UN ESFUERZO ADICIONAL DE DIALOGO Y COOPERACION QUE PERMITA INTEGRAR DEFINITIVAMENTE AL GOBIERNO Y PUEBLO CUBANOS EN LA ACTUAL CORRIENTE DEMOCRATICA QUE IMPERA EN EL CONTINENTE. EL DIALOGO ES ESENCIAL. SE DEBEN FOMENTAR SOLUCIONES IMAGINATIVAS ENTRE CUBANOS - SIN EXCLUSIONES - QUE ABRAN NUEVOS ESPACIOS DEMOCRATICOS QUE CONDUZCAN A UNA TRANSICION PACIFICA, RESPETANDO LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, LA SOBERANIA NACIONAL Y LAS LIBERTADES FUNDAMENTALES. EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL QUE CONTINUA SIENDO CONTRARIO AL EMBARGO IMPUESTO, VE CON SATISFACCION LAS CONVERSACIONES QUE PUEDEN ABORDAR LOS TEMAS PENDIENTES ENTRE WASHINGTON Y LA HABANA.

EL GOBIERNO ESPANOL SIGUE CON ATENCION EL DESARROLLO DE LA SITUACION EN HAITI CON VISTAS A LA PLENA APLICACION DE LAS RESOLUCIONES 917 Y 940 DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, LO QUE SUPONDRA EL RETORNO DEL PRESIDENTE LEGITIMAMENTE ELEGIDO POR EL PUEBLO HAITIANO. LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL DEBERA CONCENTRAR SUS ESFUERZOS EN LA RECONSTRUCCION DEL PAIS, PARA QUE LA DEMOCRACIA PUEDA ASENTARSE SOBRE BASES SOLIDAS QUE GARANTICEN LA LEGALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL Y EL RESPETO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

ESPAÑA CONCEDE ATENCION PRIORITARIA AL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE UN NUEVO PROCESO DE DIALOGO Y COOPERACION INSTITUCIONALIZADOS EN EL MEDITERRANEO, QUE PERMITA HACER FRENTE A LAS DISPARIDADES ECONOMICAS, DEMOGRAFICAS Y CULTURALES EXISTENTES EN LA REGION E INSTAURAR LA PAZ Y EL BIENESTAR EN EL ENTORNO MEDITERRANEO.

MI PAIS MANTIENE ESPECIALES LAZOS DE AMISTAD Y COOPERACION CON LOS PAISES DEL MAGREB Y TRATA DE CONTRIBUIR DE FORMA PRACTICA A LA SUPERACION DE LOS PROBLEMAS EXISTENTES EN ESTE AREA DE INTERES PRIORITARIO PARA ESPAÑA.

EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL ESTIMA QUE LA SOLUCION DEL PROBLEMA DEL SAHARA OCCIDENTAL PASA POR LA CELEBRACION DE UN REFERÉNDUM DE AUTODETERMINACION CON TODAS LAS GARANTIAS INTERNACIONALES. MI GOBIERNO REITERA SU APOYO AL SECRETARIO GENERAL Y A SU REPRESENTANTE ESPECIAL PARA QUE PUEDA AVANZAR EL PLAN DE ARREGLO ACEPTADO POR LAS PARTES Y PARA QUE, DE ACUERDO CON LAS RESOLUCIONES DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, SE CREEN LAS CONDICIONES NECESARIAS QUE PERMITAN LA PROXIMA REALIZACION DE DICHO REFERÉNDUM.

EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL HA EXPRESADO EN NUMEROSAS OCASIONES SU PROFUNDA SATISFACCION POR LOS PROGRESOS DEL PROCESO DE PAZ EN ORIENTE MEDIO, INICIADO EN LA CONFERENCIA DE MADRID. 1994 HA SIDO, GRACIAS A LA VALENTIA DE LAS PARTES IMPLICADAS, UN AÑO DE IMPORTANTES LOGROS EN EL CAMINO DE LA PAZ Y EL ENTENDIMIENTO. ESPAÑA HA APOYADO SIEMPRE LA NECESIDAD DE UNA PAZ GLOBAL Y DURADERA, DE ACUERDO CON LAS RESOLUCIONES 242 Y 338 DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD. MI PAIS ALIENTA A LAS PARTES Y A TODOS LOS ESTADOS DE LA REGION A QUE, DESDE UN CLARO Y UNANIME RECHAZO A LA VIOLENCIA Y AL USO DE LA FUERZA, CONJUGUEN TODOS LOS ESFUERZOS NECESARIOS PARA LOGRAR LOS FINES DESEADOS DE PAZ Y DESARROLLO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

A LO LARGO DEL AÑO EN CURSO HEMOS SIDO TESTIGOS DE ACONTECIMIENTOS DE GRAN TRASCENDENCIA EN EL AFRICA SUBSAHARIANA: UNOS HAN TENIDO UN MARCADO CARIZ ESPERANZADOR Y OTROS, COMO LA TRAGEDIA DE RUANDA Y LAS DIFICULTADES EN EL PROCESO DE PAZ EN SOMALIA, HAN PUESTO DE MANIFIESTO LA FRAGILIDAD DE LAS ESTRUCTURAS DEL CONTINENTE.

RUANDA NOS HA SOBRECOGIDO. HEMOS ASISTIDO A LOS HORRORES DE LA GUERRA CIVIL CON UN SENTIMIENTO DE AMARGURA E INCLUSO DE IMPOTENCIA. A PESAR DEL ESFUERZO LLEVADO A CABO POR LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL, EN EL QUE MI PAIS PARTICIPA ACTIVAMENTE, TODAVIA NO SE HA ENCONTRADO UNA SALIDA A LA CRISIS Y AL PROBLEMA QUE PLANTEAN LOS MILLONES DE DESPLAZADOS Y REFUGIADOS, QUE TIENE ADEMAS SERIAS REPERCUSIONES SOBRE LA ESTABILIDAD DE LOS PAISES VECINOS.

LOS RESPONSABLES DE LAS GRAVES ATROCIDADES, INCLUIDO EL GENOCIDIO, COMETIDAS EN RUANDA DEBEN RESPONDER INDIVIDUALMENTE ANTE LA JUSTICIA. POR ELLO, ESPAÑA APOYA LAS TAREAS DE LA COMISION DE EXPERTOS CREADA EN VIRTUD DE LA RESOLUCION 935 DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD, QUE IMPULSAMOS Y COPATROCINAMOS, ASI COMO LAS DEL ALTO COMISIONADO PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LAS DEL RELATOR ESPECIAL PARA RUANDA.

LA EXTREMA GRAVEDAD DE ESTOS SUCESOS HACE URGENTE DAR UNA RESPUESTA JURIDICA MEDIANTE EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE UNA JURISDICCION AD HOC PARA RUANDA, SOBRE LA BASE DEL MODELO QUE NOS OFRECE EL TRIBUNAL YA CREADO PARA LA EX-YUGOSLAVIA.

SUDAFRICA HA SIDO LA OTRA CARA DE LA MONEDA. NOS FELICITAMOS POR SU REGRESO A LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL COMO MIEMBRO DE PLENO DERECHO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, UNA VEZ ABOLIDO EL SISTEMA DEL APARTHEID Y CONSTITUIDO UN GOBIERNO DEMOCRATICO Y NO RACIAL.

TAMBIÉN EN EL AFRICA AUSTRAL SEGUIMOS CON SUMO INTERÉS, POR SU IMPORTANCIA, LOS PROCESOS DE PAZ EN ANGOLA Y MOZAMBIQUE. DESEAMOS QUE EL GOBIERNO ANGOLEÑO Y UNITA LLEGUEN A UN ACUERDO DE PAZ DURADERO QUE PONGA TÉRMINO A DÉCADAS DE SUFRIMIENTO. EN MOZAMBIQUE, ESPERAMOS QUE LA RECONCILIACION NACIONAL SE CONSOLIDE CON LAS PROXIMAS ELECCIONES. ESPAÑA CONTRIBUIRA A SU CELEBRACION PACIFICA Y DEMOCRATICA CON EL ENVIO DE OBSERVADORES.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA DESCOLONIZACION DE GIBRALTAR ES UN OBJETIVO PRIORITARIO PARA EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL. ESTA ASAMBLEA GENERAL ESTABLECIO LA DOCTRINA SEGUN LA CUAL, LA DESCOLONIZACION DE GIBRALTAR NO ES UN CASO DE AUTODETERMINACION SINO DE RESTABLECIMIENTO DE LA INTEGRIDAD TERRITORIAL DE ESPAÑA. QUIERO REITERAR LA FIRME DECISION DEL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL DE CONTINUAR EL PROCESO NEGOCIADOR CON EL GOBIERNO DEL REINO UNIDO, CON ANIMO CONSTRUCTIVO Y SOBRE LAS BASES ESTABLECIDAS POR LA DECLARACION DE BRUSELAS DE 27 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1984, TENIENDO DEBIDAMENTE EN CUENTA LOS LEGITIMOS INTERESES DE LA POBLACION. EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL EXPRESA SU FIRME ESPERANZA DE QUE ESTAS NEGOCIACIONES PONGAN FIN A ESTE ANACRONISMO COLONIAL.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

EL DESARME Y EL CONTROL DE ARMAMENTOS SON ELEMENTOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA PRESERVACION DE LA PAZ Y LA SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONALES. EN CONSECUENCIA, EN EL ULTIMO AÑO ESPAÑA HA ADOPTADO UNA MORATORIA UNILATERAL SOBRE LA EXPORTACION DE MINAS ANTIPERSONAL, HA RATIFICADO LA CONVENCION SOBRE PROHIBICION O RESTRICCION DE CIERTAS ARMAS CONVENCIONALES Y HA SIDO UNO DE LOS PRIMEROS ESTADOS EN DEPOSITAR EL INSTRUMENTO DE RATIFICACION DEL TRATADO SOBRE LA PROHIBICION DE ARMAS QUIMICAS. DEFENDEMOS ASIMISMO UNA PRORROGA INDEFINIDA E INCONDICIONAL DEL TRATADO DE NO PROLIFERACION NUCLEAR Y LA PRONTA CONCLUSION DE UN TRATADO DE PROHIBICION DE ENSAYOS NUCLEARES.

ESPAÑA ESPERA, ASIMISMO, QUE SE LLEGUE EN BREVE PLAZO A UNA DECISION DEFINITIVA SOBRE LA AMPLIACION DE LA CONFERENCIA DE DESARME, QUE PERMITA LA PARTICIPACION PLENA DE PAISES QUE, COMO EL MIO, HAN DEMOSTRADO A LO LARGO DE MUCHOS AÑOS SU COMPROMISO CON LAS TAREAS DE LA CONFERENCIA.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

LA ESTRECHA VINCULACION ENTRE PAZ Y DESARROLLO APARECE ESPECIALMENTE REFLEJADA EN EL INFORME SOBRE UN "PROGRAMA PARA EL DESARROLLO" QUE NOS PRESENTO EN MAYO EL SECRETARIO GENERAL.

QUIERO EXPRESAR MI SATISFACCION POR SU PUBLICACION Y COMPARTIMOS SU ENFOQUE QUE PARTE DEL PRINCIPIO DE QUE EL DESARROLLO ES UN DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL Y LA BASE MAS SEGURA PARA LA PAZ. NOS PARECE ACERTADO DELIMITAR LAS CINCO DIMENSIONES PRINCIPALES DEL DESARROLLO QUE SE DESTACAN EN EL PROGRAMA: LA PAZ COMO BASE FUNDAMENTAL, LA ECONOMIA COMO MOTOR DEL PROGRESO, EL MEDIO AMBIENTE COMO BASE DE LA SOSTENIBILIDAD, LA JUSTICIA COMO PILAR DE LA SOCIEDAD Y LA DEMOCRACIA COMO GARANTIA DE BUEN GOBIERNO.

DEBEMOS AHORA DETERMINAR QUÉ ACCIONES SON NECESARIAS PARA PONER EN PRACTICA EL PROGRAMA Y ELABORAR RECOMENDACIONES CONCRETAS, PARTIENDO DE QUE EL DESARROLLO NO PUEDE SER REDUCIDO A UNA SIMPLE DIMENSION ECONOMICA, SINO QUE TIENE QUE SER TAMBIÉN CONSIDERADO EN SUS VERTIENTES POLITICA, CULTURAL, AMBIENTAL, SOCIAL Y HUMANITARIA. SOLO CON ESTE ENFOQUE GLOBAL PODREMOS AFRONTAR LAS PROFUNDAS DESIGUALDADES Y LOS SERIOS PROBLEMAS DE LOS PAISES EN DESARROLLO.

ADEMAS, LOS RECURSOS FINANCIEROS DESTINADOS A ESTOS FINES HAN DE SER UTILIZADOS MAS RACIONAL Y EFICAZMENTE. PARA ELLO, HAY QUE PROSEGUIR LA REESTRUCTURACION DE LOS SECTORES ECONOMICO Y SOCIAL DE LA ORGANIZACION Y DEL SISTEMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, EN PARTICULAR REFORZANDO AUN MAS EL PAPEL COORDINADOR QUE CORRESPONDE AL ECOSOC.

LAS ACCIONES EN PRO DEL DESARROLLO HAN DE TENER SIEMPRE EN CUENTA LA PROTECCION DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE. ESPAÑA FORMARA PARTE, A PARTIR DEL PROXIMO AÑO, DE LA COMISION DE DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE, QUE EN SU ULTIMA SESION ABORDO, POR VEZ PRIMERA, LA PUESTA EN PRACTICA DEL "PROGRAMA 21" Y OTROS ACUERDOS ALCANZADOS EN LA CUMBRE DE RIO.

LAS GRANDES CONFERENCIAS CONVOCADAS POR LAS NACIONES UNIDAS DESEMPEÑAN UN PAPEL DESTACADO EN LA BUSQUEDA DE UN CONSENSO MUNDIAL SOBRE EL DESARROLLO: EL PROGRAMA DE ACCION ADOPTADO EN EL CAIRO POR LA CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL SOBRE POBLACION Y DESARROLLO, INAUGURA UNA NUEVA POLITICA DEMOGRAFICA Y HACE DE LA MUJER EL EJE DE TODA POLITICA POBLACIONAL. ESTE PAPEL FUNDAMENTAL DE LA MUJER EN EL DESARROLLO, SERA TAMBIÉN PUESTO DE RELIEVE EN LA CONFERENCIA MUNDIAL SOBRE LA MUJER, QUE TENDRA LUGAR EN PEKIN EN SEPTIEMBRE DE 1995.

LA CUMBRE MUNDIAL PARA EL DESARROLLO SOCIAL, QUE SE REUNIRA EN COPENHAGUE EN MARZO DE 1995 DEBE, ASIMISMO, PROPICIAR EL INICIO DE UNA NUEVA ORIENTACION EN LA FORMA DE AFRONTAR LOS PROBLEMAS SOCIALES EN EL MUNDO, PARTIENDO DEL PRINCIPIO DE QUE LA PERSONA HA DE SER EL CENTRO Y OBJETIVO DEL DESARROLLO.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

NADIE PUEDE DUDAR DE LA IMPORTANCIA QUE REVISTE LA PROTECCION, PROMOCION Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, COMO TAREA FUNDAMENTAL DE LOS ESTADOS Y DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. LA INTOLERANCIA, LAS DESIGUALDADES DE TODO TIPO Y LAS VIOLACIONES DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES SIGUEN PONIENDO EN PELIGRO LA VIDA, LA LIBERTAD Y LA SEGURIDAD DE MILLONES DE SERES HUMANOS.

PARA CONSEGUIR ERRADICAR ESOS MALES ES NECESARIO QUE, ASUMIENDO LOS COMPROMISOS CONTRAIDOS EN LA CONFERENCIA DE VIENA, REDOBLEMOS NUESTROS ESFUERZOS Y PONGAMOS EN PRACTICA PRINCIPIOS QUE NO POR SER UNIVERSALMENTE RECONOCIDOS SON UNIVERSALMENTE APLICADOS.

EL ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, ORGANO CREADO POR ESTA ASAMBLEA EL AÑO PASADO Y CUYO PRIMER TITULAR ES EL EMBAJADOR AYALA LASSO, HA DE PODER DESEMPEÑAR ADECUADAMENTE SUS FUNCIONES. PARA ELLO ES ESENCIAL QUE CUENTE CON UNA ADECUADA DOTACION PRESUPUESTARIA Y DE PERSONAL, QUE HA DE SER FACILITADA TAMBIÉN AL CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, ASI COMO SON LA COLABORACION Y EL APOYO DE TODOS LOS ESTADOS.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

EN 1995 SE CELEBRARA EL QUINCUAGÉSIMO ANIVERSARIO DE LA FUNDACION DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. SERA UNA OPORTUNIDAD PARA HACERNOS REFLEXIONAR TANTO SOBRE LOS LOGROS DE LA ORGANIZACION, QUE NO HAN SIDO POCOS, COMO SOBRE LOS RETOS A LOS QUE ÉSTA SE ENFRENTA. VIVIMOS EN UNA SOCIEDAD INTERNACIONAL CADA VEZ MAS COMPLEJA Y DINAMICA, DONDE YA NO ES POSIBLE SEPARAR TOTALMENTE LO NACIONAL DE LO INTERNACIONAL, NI DIVIDIR LAS TAREAS DE LA ORGANIZACION EN COMPARTIMENTOS ESTANCOS. EL DESARROLLO PLENO DE LA HUMANIDAD SOLO PODRA SER ALCANZADO ATENDIENDO A SUS MULTIPLES FACETAS, COMPLEMENTARIAS E INTERDEPENDIENTES. EL CAMINO HACIA UN MUNDO MEJOR, EN EL QUE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CONTINUAN DESEMPEÑANDO UN PAPEL FUNDAMENTAL, HA DE SER RECORRIDO POR TODOS LOS PUEBLOS DEL MUNDO, TAL COMO REZA EL LEMA DE LAS CELEBRACIONES DEL CINCUENTENARIO, Y COMO ES FIRME CONVICCION DEL GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA Y DE LOS ESPAÑOLES.

MUCHAS GRACIAS, SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.

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FOR YOUR INFORMATION

UNITED NATIONS REFORMS

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U.S. STATEMENT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM MEASURES
(U.S. Calls for "Better Focused" U.N. System)

Washington -- Calling for "a better focused" and "more cost-effective" U.N. system, the United States believes the United Nations "should devote its efforts to the original purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, as they have been refined over the U.N.'s first 50 years."

The United States outlined a comprehensive proposal on needed U.N. reform measures in a statement to the Open Ended High-Level Working Group (HLWG) on the Strengthening of the United Nations which was created by the U.N. General Assembly on September 14, 1995. The statement was made public February 27.

The United States recommends that the United Nations focus on four core functions: maintaining peace and security; ensuring a rapid and effective response to humanitarian emergencies; establishing and monitoring the observance of international legal and technical norms; and promoting sustainable development.

The U.S. presentation to the working group outlined needed reform measures in a wide range of areas including the agenda for the U.N. General Assembly, functions of the U.N. Secretariat, and personnel procedures.

It called for a restructuring of the U.N. system that would be characterized by "fully interlinked information and reporting systems" and "a drastically pruned organizational structure."

Following are some key issues addressed in the U.S. assessment:

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS -- "A coherent, sustainable development agenda for the 21st century cannot be pursued adequately at the international level without the adoption of serious and pragmatic proposals for U.N. institutional reform."

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL -- "ECOSOC should focus on policy rather than operations and should also undergo further reform to strengthen its capacity to provide direction and guidance within its mandate, as proposed by the secretary general's report on an Agenda for Development."

U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT -- "UNCTAD needs to focus its activities on a small number of priority activities that provide practical assistance to developing countries in their integration into the global economic system, thereby contributing to their sustainable development."

REGIONAL COMMISSIONS -- The five regional economic and social commissions in the U.N. system have had "a limited impact, in part because they lack unique, compelling missions." The commissions "should focus on activities derived from their comparative advantages as unique sources of services or assistance to countries in their regions, leaving economic studies and the like to other bodies."

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS -- "The U.N.'s operational activities in support of development would benefit greatly from a more integrated, efficient and effective structure for coordination at U.N. headquarters level in New York, and encouragement of strengthened collaboration among U.N. field-level efforts under the resident U.N. coordinator in each recipient country."

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- "The key to improved humanitarian response should be based on an assessment of agencies' effectiveness and efficiency, and the seamlessness of functions among them: Are the agencies performing effectively? Do we get value for money from the current structure? Are there significant overlaps or gaps of functions? Change should not be forced for the sake of mere organizational theory; in humanitarian terms, errors in theory can result in increased suffering and death."

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES -- "Member states should take a harder look at the priorities of each organization and prune back those functions that have become obsolete in order to make room for emerging new priorities."

Following is the text of the U.S. statement:

(Begin text)

U.S. VIEWS ON REFORM MEASURES NECESSARY FOR STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

A Presentation to the Open-Ended High-Level Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System
February 1996

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STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

To act effectively in the 21st century, a better focused, leaner, more efficient and cost-effective UN system is needed. A re-engineered UN should devote its efforts to the original purposes set forth in the UN Charter, as they have been refined over the UN's first fifty years. The UN's mission would thus consist of these main functions:

-- maintaining peace and security by Charter-authorized military actions to restore peace, peacekeeping operations to maintain peace, projecting the rule of international law, and assuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

-- preparing for, mobilizing and coordinating humanitarian relief to meet emergencies caused by natural disasters or man-made catastrophes;

-- establishing norms, and supporting their implementation, especially in the areas of human rights, workers' rights, health and environment; similarly, defining and monitoring technical standards used in areas like civil aviation, postal services, telecommunications, and intellectual property;

-- supporting international development by promoting environmentally sound, socially equitable, economically viable growth through results-oriented expert advice and technical cooperation.

To perform its role properly, the UN must evolve from a fragmented configuration of competing structures into a fully integrated, interactive system. The new structure should be characterized by:

-- fully interlinked information and reporting systems;

-- centralized policy planning and coordination, to an appropriate degree of detail, to forestall overlap and duplication and to foster a clear division of labor;

-- decentralized action by operationally autonomous entities acting in full collaboration with other relevant bodies both inside and outside the UN system;

-- a drastically pruned organizational structure achieved by:

-- eliminating marginal programs and agencies;

-- consolidating similar activities and programs;

-- focusing efforts on the highest priorities as determined by revised and updated mandates.

Working Group on Strengthening the UN

On September 14, 1995, near the end of its 49th session, the General Assembly established an Open-Ended High-Level Working Group (HLWG) on the Strengthening of the UN System. In our view, the work of this group should cover the need for reform in five areas: the General Assembly, the Secretariat, economic and social affairs (ECOSOC, UNCTAD, the regional and functional commissions, and associated bodies), related funds and programs (including UNDP, humanitarian assistance programs, and human rights activities), and the specialized agencies. Discussion on the first two areas commenced in the first few months of 1996; the other areas should be considered subsequently in the light of progress on institutional issues in the current General Assembly's consideration of the follow-up to Resolution 48/162 and in the Working Group on an Agenda for Development.

The HLWG should aim to complete a set of specific proposals, or "blueprint," for UN reform by the time the 50th session of the General Assembly completes its work early in the fall of 1996. This is an ambitious but achievable timeframe which all member states should help to realize. Actual implementation of reform measures should commence with the adoption of the HLWG "blueprint" at the 51st session of the General Assembly.

Outlining a Blueprint for Reform

A clear and comprehensive outline of the main elements of the "blueprint" would be helpful to guide the HLWG's work. In what follows, the views of the United States are set forth on five areas for the HLWG's attention. For each of these areas, current problems and issues are spelled out, measures for correction and improvement are identified, and comments provided on implementing needed reforms, including where appropriate a schedule for steps to take in carrying them out.

The United States presents these views for the consideration of others. We are prepared to work cooperatively with the other members of the HLWG on these ideas as well as on proposals which others will be making. We may also have additional proposals to present as the discussions continue.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly's potential as a great world forum for deliberations on issues of global concern has never been realized.

The tiresome and time-consuming reiteration of agenda items already thoroughly considered previously or by other bodies has overloaded the Assembly's capacity and forestalled thematic debate on pressing or emerging issues. Means should be found to shorten the agenda by half and schedule the use of the time freed up for thematic discussions at appropriate levels.

The General Assembly should be the forum for addressing major issues of the sort that have been the subject of proposals for separate international conferences. This would re-energize the

General Assembly and make it relevant. It would also be more efficient than holding more international conferences. NGO involvement would need to be arranged, preparatory work would have to be organized, and an appropriate outcome would be expected from the deliberations.

There is also a need to streamline the list of General Assembly subsidiary, ad hoc and other bodies, eliminating those which are no longer needed, and merging those whose subject areas overlap. Examples would include the Committee on Program Coordination, whose program function should be transferred to ECOSOC and budget and related responsibilities to the Fifth Committee, the Special Committee on Decolonization whose work should be absorbed by the Fourth Committee, and the Palestinian Committees that have been outmoded by the peace process and should be terminated. No new bodies should be created without a finding of necessity.

Plenary

Annual debates should be scheduled, on a provisional multi-year basis, on major emerging issues of global concern. A greatly shortened annual agenda and the consequent reduction in time needed for main committee sessions should free up the time needed to properly conduct such debates. Matters that are now taken up in special or resumed sessions could be addressed in the principal General Assembly plenary sessions each year, such as the implementation of Agenda 21 and the follow-up to UNCED to be considered in 1997.

For 1996, UN reform and funding, tentatively suggested as the focus of a special session, could constitute the main thematic debate for the 51st session. In effect, this would be a logical follow-on to the de facto thematic debate in the 50th session on the UN's status and future in the light of its 50th anniversary. Already scheduled for plenary debate in 1996 are the mid-term review of the New Agenda for the Development of Africa and the social and economic impact of globalization and interdependence -- two closely related subjects that could perhaps be subsumed in a more inclusive debate on the new paradigm or new patterns for development. This debate could also encompass the integrated implementation of the outcomes of recent major UN conferences, under the rubric of sustainable development.

The voting and debating procedures of the General Assembly need to be improved so that the proceedings can be speeded up.

Second Committee

To pare down its agenda and make its sessions more focused, the Second Committee should further rationalize and streamline its work. More subjects should be shifted to a biennial or triennial schedule, resolutions on similar or closely related subjects should be combined into comprehensive omnibus resolutions, and matters already thoroughly debated in ECOSOC or elsewhere should not be re-opened for discussion. At the same time, some issues now taken up in the plenary of the General Assembly could usefully return to the Second Committee as the primary forum for discussion and recommended action.

-- Combining Resolutions

Separate annual resolutions on the program of action for least developed countries, debt, commodities, African development, African industrial development, science and technology in Africa, net transfer of resources and other closely related issues such as the partnership dialogue could be consolidated into a single resolution on the concerns of the least developed countries. A similar approach could be pursued with regard to the multiple resolutions that deal generically with trade and environmental issues. Moreover, because the concerns addressed by these resolutions vary little from year to year, the omnibus resolution addressing them could be taken up biennially or even triennially. Where new developments warrant, changing conditions or emerging issues could be taken up in any year that they occur.

-- Eliminating Resolutions

Follow-up resolutions should not be proposed or considered where previous follow-up work has already been done on the same or similar subjects. In the same vein, resolutions should be avoided that second-guess the outcomes or decisions of other bodies, like UNCTAD, that have already thoroughly considered an issue -- or specifically decided not to consider it.

Third Committee

The Third Committee was reorganized about five years ago. Meetings were restructured to decrease the opportunities for lengthy floor statements, and this appears to be working well. Although there are fewer agenda items, however, the number of sub-items remains unnecessarily large. Certain social issues could be considered in the context of omnibus resolutions of the Second Committee, instead of being taken up separately in the Third Committee. Attention to poverty eradication, for example, could probably be incorporated into the recommended omnibus resolution in Second Committee on the concerns of the least developed countries.

Fifth Committee

The procedures of the Fifth Committee and the closely related Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) should be altered to enhance accountability and efficient financial management. To increase its transparency, ACABQ meetings should generally be open to all UN member states, except for necessary executive sessions and informal exchanges with Secretariat officials. Similarly, all data generated by or for the ACABQ should be made available to UN members. Technical support for the ACABQ should be strengthened. The ACABQ's 16 members should be elected as experts, but they should be accountable to their governments.

The work of the Fifth Committee has become too complex and substantial to be handled by the full committee alone. The JIU has proposed the establishment of subcommittees, representative of the membership, focusing on peacekeeping management, strategic planning and oversight. The work of the committee

would be improved by the creation of such smaller subcommittees with focused missions.

SECRETARIAT

Measures to rationalize the structure of the UN Secretariat and improve its functioning must be intensified. Repeated efforts to reform the UN have always ended without fully accomplishing their aims. Current efforts at reform, in contrast, must be redoubled. The credibility of the institution and the prospects for continued public and financial support depend upon early, visible and continuing signs of improvement in four areas: restructuring, oversight, personnel, and system coordination.

Restructuring

Lines of authority should be consolidated throughout the Secretariat, and departments should be merged, to make the Secretariat a more effective mechanism for management of UN activities. This should be accompanied by real reductions in positions for personnel, including senior-level positions. After some reductions and consolidations in the Secretariat a few years ago, the proliferation of offices and positions has resumed to some extent; this should be reversed. The number and functions of Under-Secretaries General and the creation of the post of Deputy Secretary General should be closely examined. A Deputy Secretary General would serve as acting Secretary General in the absence of the Secretary General. Routine responsibilities would include administering the whole organization on a day-to-day basis, handling all management responsibilities and freeing the Secretary General to devote full time and attention to diplomatic and political issues. The Deputy would be nominated by the Secretary General, ratified by the General Assembly and serve at the pleasure of the Secretary General.

The Secretariat should be organized into a smaller number of departments, perhaps four or five, each headed by an Under Secretary General, dealing with: political security and peace, international economic cooperation and sustainable development, humanitarian affairs, and administration and management. The number of Under Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General positions should be reduced significantly. The Trusteeship Council, now dormant, should be formally abolished.

-- Consolidations

An early candidate for re-structuring has already received a great deal of attention. The Department of Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS) is largely redundant in its functions and responsibilities. It should be phased out as soon as possible, consistent with administrative efficiency, and its functions -- but not necessarily its personnel positions -- transferred for the most part to the semi-autonomous Office of Project Services (OPS) and other appropriate elements of the UN system. Personnel positions in DDSMS should be eliminated as they are vacated by attrition and reassignment.

The Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis (DESIPA) has statistical compilation and analysis as its most important function. DESIPA maintains an excellent statistical capability. But its activities in national income accounting and its work on social statistics could more efficiently and effectively by carried out if consolidated or better integrated with similar efforts of UNCTAD and the appropriate specialized agencies such as WHO, FAO, ILO, the World Bank, and the IMF.

The Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD) has established an innovative record in stimulating and relying upon the work of other elements of the UN system, rather than creating its own capabilities across the full range of its responsibilities. In connection with certain consolidations of ECOSOC subsidiaries (discussed in the section on economic and social reform, below), however, many of its functions could be transferred to Geneva and administratively supported by the UNCTAD secretariat. This is particularly true in connection with the recommended transfer of the Commission on Sustainable Development to Geneva.

The functions remaining at UN headquarters after restructuring DDSMS, DESIPA and DPCSD should be collected under a single Under Secretary General.

-- Terminations: Sunset Policy

It should become the standing practice throughout the UN system for programs to end after a specified period of time unless they have conclusively demonstrated their continuing relevance and value according to established criteria. The Secretary General's existing authority to require program managers to conduct evaluations should be exercised to initiate this process.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) should be tasked with developing a standardized evaluation methodology, including specified criteria for relevance and effectiveness, in accordance with strategic management principals with an emphasis on outputs. The use of this methodology should be required as a routine responsibility of program managers throughout the UN. The OIOS should monitor compliance with the evaluation process as part of its inspection function.

The information generated by the evaluation process should be used to establish priorities among those programs administered or supported by the UN Secretariat, terminating those programs and activities that have fallen to a lower priority or have lost their relevance to changing circumstances. Review of program evaluations should be part of the functions performed at present by the Committee on Program Coordination and in future by a reformed ECOSOC (see following section on economic and social reform). Finally, evaluations should be tied to the UN's budgetary process, thus assuring compliance with the "sunset" policy and providing a base of information to help establish funding requirements.

Oversight

The UN's inspector-general function, embodied in the new Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), should be thoroughly

integrated throughout the UN system, to create or reinforce transparency and accountability in all UN activities. Steps are needed to ensure the effective application of the OIOS's scope of authority to the UN's funds and programs. The specialized agencies (discussed in a separate section, below) should establish effective internal oversight functions or make use of the OIOS (or possibly the Joint Inspection Unit) to provide such services.

The relationship between the OIOS and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) should be strengthened. Effective operational collaboration between these two oversight bodies should be established and maintained. Restructuring of the JIU should be carried out, if required, to improve its operation and enhance its effectiveness as a joint oversight body with OIOS; the size of the JIU secretariat could probably be reduced. Regular meetings among the OIOS, JIU, ACABQ and the Panel of External Auditors should be held at least twice a year to develop coordinated working relationships among these external and internal oversight bodies.

Personnel

UN member states should express and regularly reiterate their strong support for ongoing UN efforts to inculcate a management culture of accountability and responsibility among UN personnel. Performance appraisals, new procedures for grievances and internal justice, and financial disclosure requirements are the main elements of improved UN personnel management.

A new employee performance appraisal system was inaugurated last spring, and UN managers are being trained in the development of work requirements and performance evaluations. Every effort should be made to ensure the effective implementation and continuation of the new system.

The employee grievance system is being revised. At the same time, action should be taken to reform the internal justice system In addition, means should be developed to impose appropriate civil sanctions for fraud and cases of egregious misconduct.

Financial disclosure requirements should be implemented for senior officials (D-1 and above) and those engaged in contracting or procurement functions. At the same time, the UN employee code of conduct should be revised and applied to all UN officials, not just Secretariat staff.

Improved personnel management practices should accompany these reformed regulations and procedures. Professional training programs inaugurated last year should continue and expand, especially in the area of procurement operations, including logistics and transportation. A serious effort should be launched to reduce extraneous staff, especially non-performing staff, through buy-outs and other mechanisms.

System Coordination

The Secretary General and his Deputy should make more effective use of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC). It should be turned into the functional equivalent of a "cabinet" for the UN system, along the lines of paragraph 61 of A/49/665. It should meet regularly under the Secretary General at the head-of-agency level to review and advise on coordination matters. It should also report regularly to the ECOSOC (see below). Finally, it should make greater use of small task forces at the executive head and operational program manager levels to address critical emerging issues and develop joint programs for them.

For informational purposes only, the ACC should prepare a combined presentation of the regular UN and specialized agency budgets. This consolidated description of financial plans and projections in the UN system would help in identifying areas of overlap and duplication, and facilitate the ACC's and member states' efforts to bring about greater coordination and system-wide collaboration.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

A coherent, sustainable development agenda for the 21st century cannot be pursued adequately at the international level without the adoption of serious and pragmatic proposals for UN institutional reform. The UN system's ability to support environmentally sound, socially equitable, and economically viable growth is undermined by overlapping institutional mandates, inadequate coordination and priority-setting and excessive administrative overhead. Member states should commit themselves to reforming the UN to reflect global budget realities, to make it more efficient and cost-effective in its operations, and to improve its management structures and practices.

On the economic and social side, member states should agree upon a set of principles and related proposals to bring about better coordination and prioritization of UN activities, functional consolidation of related programs or agencies, and the re-assessment of agency or program mandates with subsequent organizational re-arrangements. The results of these efforts should be keyed to re-engineering the UN system in a way which will clearly benefit all participants and enhance its contributions to economic and social development. Such fundamental reform will enable stronger and more productive cooperation between the UN and the international financial institutions and facilitate a greater role for the private sector.

ECOSOC

Better coordination and adjusted priorities among the agencies, programs and activities of the UN system would go a long way to eliminate wasteful duplication and overlapping activity, identify and fill gaps in UN efforts to meet the needs for which it was created, reprogram resources from areas of lower to areas of higher priority, and leverage the effectiveness of UN undertakings through collaboration and mutual reinforcement of effort.

The key to achieving these goals lies in enhancing the power and effectiveness of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in setting policy for and coordinating the UN's efforts in the

economic and social areas, as envisioned in Chapters IX and X of the UN Charter. ECOSOC should focus on policy rather than operations, and should also undergo further reform to strengthen its capacity to provide direction and guidance within its mandate, as proposed in the Secretary General's report on an Agenda for Development (UN General Assembly document A/49/665 of November 11, 1994). An expanded bureau or executive committee of ECOSOC should be created to meet between Council sessions in order to improve the continuity and effectiveness of ECOSOC's attention to and guidance of UN economic and social affairs. ECOSOC's nascent role as the unified governing body for UN development programs should be strengthened.

Coherent implementation of recommendations emanating from recent major UN conferences should be pursued under ECOSOC's auspices. Compiling these recommendations, estimating their costs, ordering them according to their importance, and proposing at least notional schedules for putting them into effect should proceed promptly. The Earth Summit's Agenda 21 might provide a common framework, amplified particularly by the programs of action produced by the Vienna human rights conference, the Cairo population conference, the Social Summit in Copenhagen, and the women's conference in Beijing.

No additional major UN conferences should be planned until the results of the most recent series, ending with the World Food Security Summit in Rome and HABITAT-II in Istanbul in 1996, are fully absorbed and applied.

The principal reform measures for enhancing the coordination and policy-making functions of ECOSOC are outlined below.

-- Executive Committee

An expanded Bureau or Executive Committee of ECOSOC should be set up to handle routine business on a regular or even continuous basis. Membership should be set at 15 UN member states. Selecting them would be a delicate task. The world's leading economies should be included, adequate geographic representation should be assured, and some rotation of membership should be provided for -- at least by including the current five-nation Bureau of ECOSOC.

The President of ECOSOC would chair the Committee. Overall guidance for the Committee's work would be provided by the main annual meeting of ECOSOC.

-- Policy Role

ECOSOC's role in setting policy for the operational development programs, as outlined in paragraphs 44-46 of the Secretary General's report on an Agenda for Development (A/49/665), should be enhanced. In part, this could be brought about by broadening the annual discussion of policy for operational development programs to include the status of collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral donors, especially the Bretton Woods institutions. The dialogue should be build around the concept of a "spectrum of support" (see section below on development funds and programs) for country-driven processes that formulate and carry out national sustainable development strategies.

-- Coordination: UN "Cabinet"

As mentioned above, the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) should be turned into the functional equivalent of a "cabinet" for the UN system, meet regularly under the Secretary General at the head-of-agency level, and report regularly to the ECOSOC. Small task forces should be formed at the executive head and operational program manager levels to address critical emerging issues and develop joint programs for them.

-- Coordination: Development Assistance

A de facto development assistance coordination committee should be set up, consisting of all senior officials in the economic and social sectors meeting under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, as organized by the UNDP Administrator, to improve coordination and performance, as outlined in paragraphs 86-88 of A/49/665. The de facto committee should meet periodically and report, orally or in writing, to ECOSOC. ECOSOC should review the de facto committee reports and make appropriate recommendations for action by ECOSOC or the General Assembly.

-- Meetings

ECOSOC's annual meeting should be shortened and held only in New York in the interest of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The annual session should concentrate on policy formulation and coordination. Special plenary meetings of ECOSOC can be called as deemed necessary.

-- Subsidiary Bodies

The number of ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies should be reduced significantly by consolidations and terminations, and the functions of the remaining bodies adjusted. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) should be the main body for providing a process for reviewing implementation of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) and for addressing UN support for the integrated pursuit of sustainable development policies and programs within the UN system. In that context, it should absorb the functions of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, the Committee on Natural Resources and the Energy Committee.

The CSD should take the lead in reviewing and overseeing the integrated implementation of the results of recent UN conferences on sustainable development and related issues. To facilitate interaction with the specialized agencies that are responsible for implementation of much of UNCED's Agenda 21 and many of the recommendations of other UN conferences, the CSD should be moved to Geneva after it completes its current multi-year work program in 1997.

The Commission on Social Development and the Commission on Population and Development should keep the CSD apprised of their work to permit their results to be integrated into the UN's system-wide efforts to promote sustainable development.

The Crime Commission and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs should fully concert and mutually reinforce their efforts, including holding joint meetings on matters of mutual interest.

UNCTAD

Because UNCTAD has attempted to tackle the entire range of issues that influence trade and development, its ability to play a meaningful and effective role in international economic policy has been extremely limited. The recent report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services identified a number of management problems and made specific recommendations for improving efficiency. UNCTAD needs to focus its activities on a small number of priority activities that provide practical assistance to developing countries in their integration into the global economic system, thereby contributing to their sustainable development. The main concern should be to make UNCTAD complementary to, and not competitive with, the new World Trade Organization (WTO). Priorities should be identified, and programs or activities that have become less relevant to changed circumstances should be scaled back or eliminated in the interests of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

In the short term, the UNCTAD IX Conference to be held from April 27-May 11 in South Africa will be the main vehicle for refocussing and streamlining UNCTAD. Member States agreed in the December 11-15 Trade and Development Board (TDB) session that UNCTAD's intergovernmental structure needs to be overhauled so that it is simpler, more transparent and coherent, reflective of clear priorities, and that its budget, program of work, and technical cooperation activities are effectively supervised by the member states.

The TDB will meet in February and March to begin consideration of UNCTAD's future work program. During these meetings and into UNCTAD IX, all elements of the current work program should be closely examined for their continued relevance and, in many cases, scaled back. UNCTAD Secretary General Ricupero's report to the ninth session provides a good basis for negotiating these adjustments. Some areas where UNCTAD has done valuable work include trade and environment, risk management, and trade efficiency. However, many elements of the current work program have not made unique, cost-effective, and valuable contributions to the international system and therefore should be eliminated (and the Secretariat correspondingly reduced). These elements include poverty alleviation, economic cooperation among developing countries, global interdependence, enlarged economic spaces, and export capacity.

REGIONAL COMMISSIONS

The five regional economic and social commissions in the UN system -- ECE (Europe), ESCAP (Asia and Pacific), ECLAC (Latin America and Caribbean), ECA (Africa), and ESCWA (Near East) -- have had a limited impact, in part because they lack unique, compelling missions. Much of their work duplicates that of other international organizations. Many of the commissions do not carry out their activities in the most cost-effective manner possible. The regional commissions should focus on activities derived from their comparative advantages as unique sources of services or assistance to countries in their regions, leaving economic studies and the like to other bodies.

There is strong interest within each region in its corresponding commission. Each region should translate that interest into strong support for regional commission reform and restructuring to ensure its relevance and effectiveness in an era of limited resources. The commissions should focus their efforts on programs that provide practical benefits to their members, especially those from developing countries. The number of intergovernmental meetings and publications they generate should be reduced to the minimum needed for coordination. Activities that are not unique or offer no value-added to the regional concerns of their members should be cut back or eliminated, and superfluous staff should be removed.

Reform efforts have been initiated in many of the commissions. The meetings scheduled for April/May 1996 in all the commissions (except ESCWA) should result in a strengthening of the reform process; ESCWA should find an appropriate mechanism to develop and implement reforms. The Fifth Committee recently discussed the resources for and roles of these commissions, and further guidance should be provided by the HLWG. Some areas to consider for reforms in the regional commissions are discussed below.

ECE

Following a priority-setting exercise a few years ago, the ECE has identified environment, transport, statistics, trade facilitation and economic analysis as the foci of its activities. A major area of the ECE's work is the development of regional standards on motor vehicles, perishable agricultural produce, and other products. Despite the decision to concentrate its efforts in five main areas, the ECE has been called upon to undertake an increasing number of activities in recent years, straining its resources.

Improvements in the ECE's efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as well as budgetary savings, clearly could be found through further prioritization and by declining to take on tasks in non-priority areas. Many of its activities, especially in standard-setting, are effectively global in nature or are also carried out by more centralized organizations in the UN system. These activities could be spun off or transferred to organizations that have more central roles in the UN or broader international system. We

believe there is room for rationalization and prioritization within each element of the ECE work program.

ESCAP

ESCAP lacks a clear sense of direction. As a result, it is overstaffed and inadequately managed. It holds over 200 meetings a year and produces voluminous documentation. Although the organization employs over 500 people, with some funded from extrabudgetary sources, much of its substantive work is performed by outside consultants. Sizable concentration of effort is in order, with consequent reductions of staff and programmatic activity that offers little of value to the regional membership. The work program should be cut back to focus on a limited number of discrete, unique, high-priority, regionally-oriented activities.

ECLAC

ECLAC serves primarily as an information source, with much of its program activity devoted to "advisory services" and the coordination of ad hoc experts' meetings. Some programs duplicate work done by other UN agencies, the Organization of American States, and the multilateral development banks. Nevertheless, almost half of ECLAC's budget and over half of its staff are devoted to "program support," including hosting conferences. Duplicative activities should be ended and other program elements rationalized to enhance cost effectiveness including through reducing expenses for travel and consultants.

ECA

ECA suffers from weak and fractured program oversight, poorly trained mid- and lower-level staff, excessive reliance on outside consultants, the absence of a comprehensive African development strategy, and weak financial management. As a result, ECA has contributed little to economic growth and development in Africa. On the other hand, a newly appointed executive secretary appears determined to bring about reform of the organization. Certain programs in specific areas deserve strong encouragement and support, particularly in Development Administration and Management, Infrastructural and Structural Transformation, and Women in Development. Substantial streamlining should be applied to virtually all program areas.

ESCWA

ESCWA is in disarray, aggravated by its move in 1990 from Baghdad to Amman. A note by the UN Secretary General, document A/49/891 of April 19, 1995, indicated that the commission has a number of problems. A comprehensive strategy is needed to tie its work program together. Its programs should be more mutually supportive. More systematic methods should be developed and applied to set priorities. Better ways should be found to gauge the relevance of inputs to its programs. Outputs vary widely in quality. The use of resources should be better accounted for. Major organizational and programmatic improvements are clearly needed to enhance the commission's overall performance.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The UN's operational activities in support of development would benefit greatly from a more integrated, efficient and effective structure for coordination at UN headquarters level in New York, and encouragement of strengthened collaboration among UN field-level efforts under the resident UN coordinator in each recipient country. This could be facilitated and reinforced through frequent meetings of all senior UN officials in the economic and social sectors, chaired by the Secretary General and organized by the UNDP Administrator, as described above (see paragraph on development assistance coordination in section on economic and social affairs).

Reinforcing UNDP's Leading Role

Activities and functions throughout the UN system devoted to providing technical cooperation for sustainable development should be consolidated into fewer agencies and programs. The list of UN entities engaged in development work is long. It includes the UN Development Program (UNDP), the Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), certain development-related functions assumed by the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the technical assistance programs of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), some of the work of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the five regional commissions, and various programs based in the UN Secretariat, primarily in the Department of Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS).

The UN Development Program clearly has the most comprehensive range of responsibilities for operational development assistance, and should form the core of functional consolidation, whether as "primus inter pares" among UN programs and agencies or as the principal element in a formally unified development organization. The institutional structure of UN development assistance will probably go through a protracted phase of evolution or re-engineering. The purpose of this process should be clearly defined, however -- to establish UNDP, and progressively modify its organization, as an umbrella structure for UN development funds and programs. It should provide a base for coordination and ultimately management of all UN development-related efforts, while preserving the identity of activities like UNICEF which have established themselves as valuable programs that draw public and financial support.

An enhanced UNDP could absorb many generally smaller, currently independent activities along the following lines:

-- UNIFEM

The UN Development Fund for Women represents an ambitious attempt to redress gender disparities throughout the world. However, it has suffered from underfunding and mismanagement. In addition, it is not advisable to have the concerns of women appear to be restricted to one UN entity, but rather they should be fully integrated into all development efforts. Accordingly, UNIFEM should not be an independent bureaucracy, but should be incorporated into UNDP and charged with promoting gender equality as part of all UN development efforts.

-- UNFPA

Efforts to stabilize rapid population growth cannot be effective acting in isolation from broader development concerns; gender equality, female education and health services will all form part of effective population programs, as the UN Conference on Population and Development made clear. Although UNFPA should remain a separate fund to preserve the visibility and importance of UN-based, multilateral family planning and demographic programs, efforts to integrate appropriate population, female education and women's health issues into UNDP's sustainable development technical cooperation activities should be enhanced. Similarly, administrative support services associated with this integrated programming approach should be consolidated where cost-effective. The current UNDP/UNFPA joint governance structure is a viable mechanism to ensure greater program and administrative integration, and could serve as a model for other integration efforts.

-- UNEP

Environmental concerns should be an integral part of all UN development efforts from the outset, and the UN Environment Program's development-related activities should be incorporated into UNDP to help ensure this. The recently signed "Framework Agreement for Cooperation in Capacity-Building" should initiate a gradual process of merging these UNEP activities into UNDP, so that environment becomes part and parcel of all economic development efforts, as envisaged by the UN Conference on Environment and Development.

-- UNCHS/HABITAT

The role of sharing innovative shelter strategies should be handled as one of the functions of UNDP, and UNCHS should be abolished.

-- IFAD and FAO

The resources for rural poverty lending provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development should be more closely integrated with the sector lending provided by the World Bank/IDA and with UNDP technical assistance. IFAD's targeted rural proverty lending should not be pursued independent of overall national sustainable development strategies. Although the level of future financial support from OECD countries is unclear, IFAD has sufficient internally generated resources to cover new lending and administrative costs for a minimum of two years. Over the longer term, ideally IFAD should be absorbed by either the World Bank Group or by UNDP.

In like manner, most FAO development efforts should be subsumed into UNDP. At country levels, it generally makes no sense to have separate FAO and UNDP offices, and the logic of consolidation runs all the way up the administrative hierarchy to the headquarters level.

-- UNIDO

Useful functions of the UN Industrial Development Organization should be incorporated into UNDP, as industrial development cannot be effectively pursued except as part of an overall national development strategy.

-- Other Specialized Agencies

The development-related activities of all other UN specialized agencies should be merged into a UN system-wide effort under UNDP's auspices. All trust fund resources should be programmed as part of the UN country program conducted under the direction of the UN Representative, who serves in turn under UNDP's overall management.

-- Regional Commissions

There is a widely recognized need for the UN to rationalize the structure of its regional programs and activities, including the regional commissions, as discussed at length in a preceding section. Most of the UN's regional efforts are development-related. It would be to the overall benefit of the UN system to integrate regional and development functions in a formal way. UNDP should decentralize its regional bureaus, and the UNDP's semi-autonomous regional directors should simultaneously serve as heads of the corresponding regional commissions.

Upgrading the UNDP Administrator

The head of UNDP should also serve as overall operational development activities coordinator for the UN, and as overall coordinator of the UN response to major UN conferences. These functions should be formally assigned as permanent responsibilities of the position.

Collaborative Support for Sustainable Development

A unifying theme in bringing about practical collaboration among the diverse institutions engaged in supporting development can be found in the national sustainable development planning process first recommended in the Earth Summit's Agenda 21. Major donors, organizations and programs -- bilateral as well as multilateral -- could work together by cooperating in support of well defined national strategies that arise from sound, responsible, democratic processes at country levels. Such an approach could be the basis for a "spectrum of

support" by development assistance organizations, within as well as outside the UN.

Building on the country strategy note (CSN) process, UNDP, other relevant UN agencies and other appropriate donors could contribute to building the indigenous national capacity necessary for initiating and maintaining national development planning processes -- and systematically evaluating the results of their efforts in each country. Incorporating the results into its country assistance strategy (CAS) process, the World Bank and other multilateral development banks could preferentially select activities for financing that fall within these comprehensive national schemes.

Bilateral donors in turn should cooperate in helping to support the realization of the national priorities identified and defined in these national processes. Ultimately, foreign direct investment and commercial lending should respond to the opportunities offered by these coherent, viable economic development strategies. There may be a role for UNDP to act as a contractor in managing implementation of certain parts of a national development strategy, as it has done for privatization programs in Argentina and Eastern Europe, with payment as appropriate for such services.

As a first step in promoting this process, the Commission on Sustainable Development has begun to review and discuss the national sustainable development strategies of selected countries, on a voluntary basis. This pattern should continue and deepen, expanding to include all relevant aspects of sustainable development, including the recommendations of all the recent development-related conferences. As the CSD completes its currently established multi-year work program, this review process could become one of its primary functions after 1997.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Over the past five years there has been a tremendous increase in the kind of civil strife that sparks strong demand for humanitarian relief from the international system. In response, funds have been made available to UN agencies for emergency assistance in ever growing amounts. Examination of the current humanitarian relief system has revealed gaps, inefficiencies, and coordination problems. The main operational humanitarian programs, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP), have responded effectively to the increase in emergency activity by improving their response capabilities and applying their mandates in the broadest possible way in accordance with the international community's wishes.

In 1995, ECOSOC called for an analysis of the emergency response capacity of the UN system to be accomplished over the next two years. This analysis will identify existing capabilities, and develop options, proposals and recommendations to clarify the division of labor among UN relief-related activities of UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, WFP, and UNHCR. The key to improved humanitarian response should be based on an assessment of agencies' effectiveness and efficiency, and the seamlessness of functions among them: Are the agencies performing effectively? Do we get value for money from the current structure? Are there significant overlaps or gaps in functions? Change should not be forced for the sake of mere organizational theory; in humanitarian terms, errors in theory can result in increased suffering and death.

DHA

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs should concentrate its efforts at developing blueprints and, through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), obtain endorsement by humanitarian agencies for coordinated operations. DHA has proposed to establish a Military-Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) in Geneva to coordinate planning for the use of military and civil defense assets in complex emergencies. It could also serve as an interagency planning and evaluation cell, functioning both before and after an actual emergency. Once such plans have been established, individual humanitarian agencies would carry out their field operations directly with each other, and with other UN entities, such as peacekeeping and political affairs. DHA would continue to coordinate and liaise with DPKO and DPA at UN Headquarters.

Another aspect of DHA coordination is the issuance of consolidated appeals and management of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) resources lent to the core UN emergency response agencies. DHA would also continue to lead interagency assessment teams during the initial phase of an emergency, and in advance of the issuance of subsequent appeals in the case of a protracted emergency.

UNHCR

Currently, UNHCR is automatically involved in any emergency where a refugee flow has occurred across international borders. UNHCR has the endorsement of the international community to involve itself inside a country of origin in three circumstances: (a) where UNHCR action could prevent a refugee flow, (b) where repatriation of refugees requires action in the receiving communities, and (c) other cases where the UNSYG (or other "principal competent organ") requests UNHCR to become involved, such as in the former Yugoslavia, in Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and in Chechnya. The UN should continue to apply the above criteria to justify UNHCR activity inside countries of origin to include cases involving internally displaced persons (IDPs) on a case-by-case basis.

WFP

The World Food Program should retain its primary role in food relief for all humanitarian emergencies and transition programs from relief to development. Its residual interest and role in agricultural development should be eliminated. FAO's current role in the provision of and funding for seeds and tools for emergencies, or in the transition out of relief programs, should be transferred to WFP, which should assume the principal operational role for such programs, drawing on the technical advice of FAO, as appropriate and cost-efficient. The MOU that WFP has negotiated with UNHCR should serve as a model for

situations in which UNHCR is not involved (see above), where WFP should develop MOU's with other operational humanitarian agencies.

UNICEF

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) has a role in the initial stages of a new humanitarian emergency in areas where it has a unique capability, and should have a stand-by capacity to implement certain programs such as emergency measles immunizations and the care of unaccompanied minors. Such emergency responsibilities should be set out in MOUs. Beyond those targetted areas, UNICEF should be called upon to support the UN system's response when it has a substantial and pre-existing infrastructure or expertise in an affected country or sector. UNICEF should concentrate its activities on the transition from relief to development, especially in repatriation or reintegration efforts (of refugees or internally displaced persons).

OTHER AGENCIES

Problems and inefficiencies can arise from the unpredictable entry of some UN agencies into the area of emergency relief. WHO's efforts to supply emergency health services and Habitat's attempted involvement in refugee housing are recent examples. Specialized or technical agencies capable of doing so should be encouraged to provide technical advice or technical assistance to the relief agency responsible for meeting a particular sector of need, but should not strive to become operational in emergency response themselves.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Internal crises are often caused by conflict involving the host government, which complicates the determination of the appropriateness of international intervention. Internal conflict invokes the participation of the Red Cross movement, under the terms of the Geneva Conventions (e.g. Sudan, Somalia, and Angola). The Secretary General should appoint a lead operational agency in IDP circumstances in which the UN determines that humanitarian assistance is appropriate, ensuring that an appropriate agency or entity has responsibility for each sector of need in specific emergencies. Such responsibilities will best be set forth in memoranda of understanding. The program in the former Yugoslavia (1992-present) follows this model.

Coordination

Enhanced interoperability in emergency response, especially in terms of transport and logistics, should lead to major new efficiencies in the short term. Over the long term, sharing or borrowing of skills and assets should lead to such good coordination that agency activities may be seen as joint operations.

UN organizations involved with humanitarian relief should enhance their abilities to perform joint operations, improve interagency communication, and specify their respective responsibilities and commitments through memoranda of understanding (MOUs).

Joint planning and evaluation of operations should be conducted through the newly established DHA Military-Civil Defense Unit (MCDU). In addition, DHA, UNHCR and WFP should take maximum advantage of recent studies and recommendations for the establishment of common information systems and interoperable communications networks.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Establishment of the position of High Commissioner for Human Rights was one of the major results of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. Creation of this post was an important step toward reform of the UN's human rights mechanisms; it should lead eventually to more effective use of human and financial resources both within the Human Rights Center and throughout the UN system.

The Center has responsibility for support of a broad and complex network of special rapporteurs, independent experts, and working groups. In addition to implementing mandates of the Human Rights Commission and providing necessary documentation for Commission meetings, the Center also manages several voluntary funds, and supports a series of treaty bodies which monitor international implementation of treaty obligations by States Parties.

More recently, the Center has become active in providing field support in Rwanda through establishment of an extensive network of human rights monitors. A by-product of this new responsibility has been greater coordination of efforts with field support programs of the UN, such as UNDP and the UN Volunteers.

Management Reform

The UN has identified certain organizational weaknesses at the Human Rights Center, stressing the importance of focusing on priorities and the need for strengthening the administrative capabilities and training programs of the Center. An outside management study has developed specific recommendations for more effective staffing and structure of the Center. Recently, the Director of the Center was named as the deputy to the Human Rights Commissioner, rationalizing and clarifying lines of authority between the Commissioner and the Center. The Commissioner should be supported and encouraged in his efforts to elaborate a clear and comprehensive vision of his role and functions based on the management study's recommendations.

Coordination

Funding for the office of Commissioner and the operational Center should be maintained and strengthened as steps continue to put in place a more efficient organizational structure. Over the longer term, as the capabilities of the Commissioner's office grow, recommendations should be developed for system-wide coordination of all UN human rights mechanisms by this office.

THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

A comprehensive approach to UN reform must include the specialized agencies which, taken together, now lay claim to more member state resources than the UN Secretariat itself (see footnote). Reform of these agencies is therefore an appropriate subject for discussion in the HLWG, although ultimate decision-making authority rests with the respective governing bodies. UN system-wide coordination through the ACC should reinforce each agency's reform efforts, e.g., in eliminating duplications.

While each agency has its own unique requirements, there are several broad reform principles that may usefully be applied, to a greater or lesser degree, to all of them:

-- Member states should take a harder look at the priorities of each organization, and prune back those functions that have become obsolete in order to make room for emerging new priorities.

-- Even after unneeded programs have been eliminated, there is room for further economies in how business is conducted: e.g. fewer and shorter meetings, fewer and shorter publications, and cutbacks in travel expenses.

-- In virtually all agencies there is scope for cutting back on overhead expenses, notably by streamlining headquarters staff.

-- More should be done to eliminate duplication in the mandates and activities of the specialized agencies.

-- Each agency should have an internal oversight mechanism with independent reporting authority, aimed at improved effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.

-- The budget-setting process should incorporate a more realistic appreciation of major-donor resource constraints. Budget transparency should be improved to allow member states to make informed decisions.

-- Agencies should investigate innovative fund-raising techniques, for example through the sale of certain services, to relieve some of the pressure on member state budgets.

Detailed below are a number of illustrative proposals for reform in WHO, FAO, and ILO:

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

WHO must become leaner and better focused on the identified priorities for which it can have a clear impact on improving the state of the world's health. WHO's well-known expertise in setting international standards (normative functions) and in helping countries fight communicable diseases must be supported and reinforced. While some reform steps continue to be taken, often due to pressure from western countries primarily, the impetus for lasting change must come from stronger leadership and management within the organization.

-- A Deputy Director General with day-to-day management responsibilities should be appointed. There should be an improved process for filling the top seven electoral offices (Director General and six Regional Directors), opening it up for member state input, so that member states have more oversight on the management of the organization.

-- A more transparent budget presentation format should be created to improve member state oversight and enhance priority-setting.

-- One of WHO's six regional offices should be eliminated, with its functions absorbed by its nearest regional counterpart.

-- Support should be reduced for the Americas region, recognizing that this region already benefits from a separate organization with a similar mandate (PAHO). The fellowship program should be cut in half to reduce unnecessary expenditures.

-- Meetings of the World Health Assembly should be biennialized in the interest of cost-effectiveness.

-- An enhanced internal oversight function should be put in place to improve organizational efficiency.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO)

FAO's greatest strengths lie in data collection and dissemination in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. Other important activities include the global early warning system and trade standardization (Codex Alimentarius and the International Plant Protection Convention-IPPC). Significant steps have been taken on reform, but there is room for further progress in reducing overhead, sharpening priorities, and cutting costs for meetings and publications.

-- FAO should make a greater effort to cooperate with, inter alia, the other Rome-based agencies, UNDP, and NGOs to implement sustainable food security strategies in low-income food deficit countries, and to reduce overlap.

-- In collaboration with other international organizations (inter alia), the FAO should develop broadly accepted yardsticks to help measure progress in key areas and identify and eliminate low-priority, unsustainable projects.

-- FAO should continue to reduce its bureaucratic overhead, transferring resources to higher priority needs while deemphasizing its involvement in programs of lower priority, or where FAO does not have a comparative advantage.

-- Personnel requirements should be assessed aggressively so that only those positions essential for important program activities are filled.

-- All official FAO staff travel should be downgraded from business to economy class to reduce unnecessary travel costs. The FAO practice of providing planefare to selected FAO meetings for one representative from each member country should also be reconsidered.

-- Vacant professional posts should be selectively downgraded and middle management positions should be reduced. Excessive General Service support staff should be cut.

-- The centralized Administration and Finance Department should be reduced by consolidating administrative functions in technical departments.

-- FAO country offices should be dismantled, especially in areas where countries are already served by a regional or subregional office.

-- FAO's Latin American field offices should be consolidated with those of IICA (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture).

-- An enhanced internal oversight function should be put in place to improve organizational efficiency.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO)

In recent years, the ILO has adopted several important reforms: shortened Governing Body meetings and conferences, consolidation of committees, restructuring of its sectoral program, decentralization of constituent services, and review and renewal of its core mandate. These measures provide a solid foundation on which to build. Reforms needed now include restructuring of the Geneva headquarters, reduction of overhead, and creation of improved methods and procedures by which the Governing Body can prioritize programs.

-- Publications and documentation costs should be reduced by 20 per cent through a strategic examination of all publications, Governing Body/Conference documentation, translation, and distribution.

-- Possibilities for outsourcing of printing and distribution should be explored.

-- Subsidies to related institutions including the International Social Security Association, the Turin Centre, and the International Institute for Labor Studies should be reduced or eliminated.

-- The Governing Body should be engaged in early and detailed program planning for the next budget cycle.

-- There should be a mechanism for more equitable sharing of exposure to exchange rate losses between member states and the organization.

-- The Director-General's assessment of ILO's comparative advantage should be sought to help the Governing Body set medium- and long-term priorities.

-- Meeting expenses should be reduced by: cutting back on technical and sectoral meetings; seeking outside support for the Maritime Session of the International Labor Conference, or consolidating its work with that of the general Conference; biennializing the International Labor Conference; and using the Turin Centre residential facilities for sectoral and technical meetings to reduce costs.

-- All regional offices and multi-disciplinary teams should be reviewed with the aim of eliminating overlap and ensuring that necessary administrative work is centralized. Offices in areas of lowest priority should also be eliminated.

-- Governments, workers, and employers should be engaged in a more effective dialogue aimed at eliminating programs that all agree are of lower priority.

-- Senior management positions should be defined with meaningful responsibilities and line authority to carry them out.

-- Improved Governing Body oversight procedures should be put in place to ensure better compliance with audit inspection recommendations.

Footnote

The U.S. budget requirement for assessed payments to the UN in FY 1996 is some $311 million, in contrast to $393 million for the affiliated agencies of which the U.S. is a member (WHO, FAO, ILO, IAEA, ICAO, IMO, ITU, UNIDO, UPU, WIPO, and WMO).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TO STRENGTHEN UNITED NATIONS
(9/14/95 Resolution Seeks to Strengthen, Revitalize U.N.)

United Nations -- The U.N. General Assembly has authorized a comprehensive initiative aimed at strengthening the role and effectiveness of the United Nations system "in order to realize the full potential of the organization" in accordance with the purposes of the U.N. Charter.

In a resolution adopted September 14, 1995, the General Assembly spelled out the mandate for the High-Level Working Group on Strengthening the U.N. System, which is tasked with conducting a thorough review of studies and reports of relevant U.N. bodies and submissions of member states and other entities on subjects related to the revitalization and reform of the U.N. system.

Following is the text of the resolution:

(begin text)

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (without reference to a Main Committee (A/49/L.68))

49/252. Strengthening of the United Nations system

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations is an occasion for reexamination and strengthening of the United Nations system, as the United Nations prepares for the challenges of the twenty-first century,

Determined to strengthen the role, capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations system and thus improve its performance in order to realize the full potential of the Organization, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and to respond more effectively to the needs and aspirations of the Member States,

Conscious of the importance of a viable financial basis and adequate and predictable resources for the effective functioning of the United Nations system,

Encouraged by the ongoing efforts to improve the administration, management and performance of the United Nations system,

Noting that important work is already proceeding in the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Development, the High-level Open-ended Working Group on the Financial Situation of the United Nations, the High-level Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, the Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Peace and the Consultations on Prospective New Modalities for Financing Operational Activities for Development, all of which report to the General Assembly,

Noting also that the Secretary-General and a number of United Nations bodies, as well as independent commissions, institutions, scholars and other experts, have studied the United Nations system and recommended a variety of measures designed to revitalize, strengthen and reform the United Nations system,

1. Decides to establish an open-ended high-level working group of the General Assembly, under the chairmanship of the President of the General Assembly and with two vice-chairmen to be elected by the working group, and that the group may establish, as necessary, sub-groups open to the participation of all Member States;

2. Decides also that the working group will undertake a thorough review of the studies and reports of the relevant United Nations bodies and submissions of Member States and observers, as well as studies and reports of submissions of Member States and observers, as well as studies and reports of independent commissions, non-governmental organizations, institutions, scholars and other experts, on subjects relating to the revitalization, strengthening and reform of the United Nations system, to be selected by the working group with the assistance of the Secretariat, and, without in any way duplicating or impeding the work of the other working groups referred to above, specify by consensus those ideas and proposals drawn therefrom that it concludes are appropriate for the purpose of revitalization, strengthening and reform of the United Nations system in fulfillment of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

3. Requests the bureau of the working group to maintain regular contacts with the bureaus of the working groups mentioned above;

4. Requests the working group to commence its substantive work during the fiftieth session of the General Assembly and submit a report on its work before the end of the session;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, within existing resources, to be supplemented by a trust fund to which voluntary contributions could be solicited, full assistance to the working group, including the facilities and support services necessary for it to conduct its work;

6. Decides to include the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled "Strengthening of the United Nations system."

107th plenary meeting/14 September 1995

(End text)

STATE DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM ("Changes for the Better" Goal of U.N. Reform)

FOCUS ON THE U.N.
U.N. CHANGES FOR THE BETTER

"The U.N. must be able to show that the money it receives supports saving and enriching people's lives, not unneeded overhead. Reform requires breaking up bureaucratic fiefdoms, eliminating obsolete agencies, and doing more with less. The U.N. must reform to remain relevant and to play a still stronger role in the march of freedom, peace, and prosperity."

President Clinton
October 22, 1995

Commitment to U.N. Renewal

Management and structural reforms are needed within the U.N. system to restore the 50-year-old institution's value as a force for international peace and prosperity. The Clinton Administration has taken the initiative in reshaping the U.N. system to make it more efficient, more focused on key priorities, and more accountable to its members. Recognizing the valuable contributions that U.N. organizations and programs have made since World War II in many areas --such as disaster relief, refugee assistance, and disease control -- the Administration places a high priority on strengthening the U.N.'s ability to address the challenges of the 21st century. At the same time, the Clinton Administration is committed to ensuring that the minor portion of the federal budget -- less than one-quarter of one percent -- that goes to the U.N. system is well spent.

Recent Progress

Over the past year progress has been made on oversight and management reforms that will make a substantial contribution to the U.N.'s ability to deliver value for money. The establishment of an Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in the U.N. Secretariat in late 1994 was an important step taken with strong U.S. backing. In its first year, the OIOS recovered $4 million in overpayments and unjustified expenses for the U.N.'s coffers.

An American, formerly the CEO of a major international accounting firm, became U.N. Under Secretary General for Administration and Management in 1994. Focused on establishing standards for management accountability and overhauling personnel, procurement, and planning systems, he is creating a modern management structure for the U.N. The initial management reforms adopted over the past year are expected to reduce costs by $35 million in 1996 and 1997.

The oversight and management reforms cited above will translate into significant savings within the U.N. Secretariat and the programs and projects it manages. But the U.N. system encompasses a highly varied group of affiliated organizations and programs; many are autonomous intergovernmental agencies. Some of these are in need of reform, but are not subject to the control of the U.N. Secretariat or the General Assembly. Where needed, the U.S. is pursuing reforms within such organizations and pushing for the establishment of independent inspection offices.

Considerable progress has been made toward greater efficiency and effectiveness within some relatively independent components of the U.N. For instance, the U.N. Development Program over the past two years has cut its administrative budget by 10 percent, reduced headquarters staff by 25 percent, reduced the number of top executive positions by 15 percent, and tightened its focus on poverty eradication.

Holding the Line

The U.S. has been using its influence throughout the U.N. system to contain the size of bureaucracies. Some parts of the U.N. system are staffed beyond reasonable needs; the U.S. is looking for a 10-15 percent reduction in overall staff over the medium term. In almost every U.N. organization, including the Secretariat, the U.S. opposes annual budget increases. For the 1996-97 biennium, the U.N. General Assembly approved a budget that was below the level expended during 1994-95.

The U.S. also opposes the further scheduling of major U.N. conferences. Beyond large-scale meetings already scheduled for 1996 -- the World Food Security Summit in Rome and Habitat II in Istanbul -- U.N. member states need to focus on implementing the worthwhile goals comprehensively defined by recent conferences instead of planning new gatherings.

Revisiting Economic and Social Functions

As a result of U.S. initiative, the world's leading industrial nations agreed at the Halifax Summit in June, 1995, to work together toward reform of the U.N.'s economic and social activities. Common goals include establishment of a stronger policy-setting role for the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council, reevaluation of the mandates of U.N. entities to ensure that they make sense, and a consolidation of the numerous overlapping agencies and programs in the areas of humanitarian relief, development assistance, and statistical reporting. The adoption of such an agenda will require broad-based support within the General Assembly. Toward this end, the U.S., through participation in a high level U.N. working group on reform, is helping to craft an economic and social reform program to submit to the General Assembly in 1996.

Peacekeeping Improvements

The U.S. is helping improve the U.N.'s ability to manage and support international peacekeeping operations. Every U.S.

administration of the past fifty years has recognized that U.N. and other multilateral peacekeeping operations at times offer the best way to prevent, resolve, or contain conflicts that could otherwise be more costly or deadly. And though most of the 35 U.N. peacekeeping operations undertaken since 1945 have helped contain regional conflicts, promoted democracy, and bolstered human rights, a few have fallen short and thereby drawn attention to areas for improvement.

"For all their limitations, U.N. peace operations have proven their ability, in the right circumstances, to separate adversaries, maintain ceasefires, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced persons to return home, demobilize combatants, and create conditions under which political reconciliation may occur and free elections may be held."

Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright
June 15 , 1995

A Presidential directive (PDD 25) in mid-1994 established a tighter framework for making decisions on whether the U.S. should participate in peacekeeping operations, and laid out goals for improved management of the operations that go forward. In line with those goals, the U.N. has finalized plans to modernize its Department of Peacekeeping Operations information management system. Efforts are also underway to strengthen the U.N.'s logistical support of peacekeeping operations, and to enable the U.N. to respond quickly to crises that demand a speedy international response. Such initiatives will result in substantial savings, more rational use of U.N. resources, and more effective peacekeeping operations.

Security Council Expansion

The U.S. holds that the U.N. Security Council, the body which oversees political and security issues, should continue to reflect the intent of the U.N. Charter as well as current economic and political realities. The U.S. is willing to consider changes to the Council that preserve its effectiveness, strengthen its capacity, and enhance its representative character. The U.S. supports Japan and Germany for permanent membership on the Security Council (current permanent members are the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China). The U.S. sees further scope for a modest expansion of the Security Council to enable fair representation of all the world's regions. Underlying the U.S. position on Security Council expansion is a firm requirement that any changes should not reduce the Council's effectiveness, and that the prerogatives of the current permanent members should be maintained.

An Indispensable Endeavor

Among its many accomplishments, the U.N. has helped heal nations torn by brutal civil wars, such as Cambodia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. It has promoted democracy, monitoring elections in nearly 50 countries. It has saved tens of millions of lives, by eradicating diseases like smallpox and by immunizing most of the world's children. It has helped establish and maintain standards for international aviation and shipping, telecommunications, postal systems, and food safety -- things we all rely on but generally take for granted. And it has helped the U.S. garner international support for several critical U.S. foreign policy concerns, as in the Korean and Gulf wars and in the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But just as successful national governments and corporations are tightening their belts and looking for ways to do their jobs better, so too must the U.N. Key to enabling 185 member nations to better address complex global challenges, U.N. revitalization is gaining considerable momentum with strong support from the U.S.

(End text)

ALBRIGHT LETTER ON STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS
(U.N. Must Improve Way of "Doing Business," U.S. Says)

United Nations -- The United Nations "must improve its way of doing business" in order to be "effective and relevant in the 21 century," says U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright.

The U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations outlined U.S. proposals to reform and revitalize the organization in a February 21 letter to the chairman of the High-Level Working Group on Strengthening the U.N. System (HLWG).

Albright said the United Nations "tries to do too much and, as a result, does too little well" and therefore should focus its efforts and resources on four "core" functions:

-- maintaining peace and security;
-- ensuring a rapid and effective response to humanitarian emergencies;
-- establishing and monitoring the observance of international legal and technical norms; and
-- promoting sustainable development.

The U.S. proposal calls for a restructuring of the United Nations and includes recommended changes in such areas as the budget, the General Assembly's agenda, sustainable development, humanitarian affairs, and specialized agencies.

The mandate for the High-Level Working Group on Strengthening the U.N. System was established in a U.N. General Assembly resolution adopted September 14, 1995.

Following is the text of Albright's letter:
(Begin text)

Dear Professor Freitas do Amaral:

I am pleased to convey to you the attached compendium of proposals submitted by my government for consideration by the High-Level Working Group on Strengthening the U.N. System (HLWG). These proposals are submitted for purposes of discussion and I am sending a copy to each mission. We expect to put forward additional ideas, and we will consider carefully the thoughts and proposals of others.

My government attaches great importance to the work of the HLWG. Of the various U.N. bodies now studying reform, it has the broadest mandate. Its purpose is nothing less than developing a blueprint for the U.N. of the 21st century. We believe the HLWG can -- and should -- recommend changes in the structure and operation of the General Assembly, the Secretariat and agencies and programs throughout the U.N. system. And we think that can be done without encroaching upon the mandates of other reform groups.

To reform the U.N. system, we first need to be clear about what we expect of it. The U.N. is one of the many instruments available for countries seeking to act cooperatively. But, because of its near universal membership, it has unique legitimacy. This is an enormous asset where real agreement is possible. But the need to build a consensus before taking action also hinders the U.N. In substantive areas, this creates the risk that actions will come late or that standards will be watered down. In the administrative realm, it has diffused purpose and spawned tolerance for ineffectual effort. Unfortunately, we have allowed habits to develop that have turned the organization inward upon itself; habits which divide bureaucratic turf again and again, substituting the appearance of action for its substance.

Some view the U.N.'s inefficiency as inevitable and consider it an acceptable price to pay for the breadth of the U.N.'s membership. My government rejects that view. Wasteful practices are neither inevitable nor tolerable. Given the nature of the U.N.'s work, they literally take food from the mouths of the hungry and the means of survival from those in desperate need. These excesses, unless curbed, will destroy the U.N.'s credibility, and they are already undermining its base of financial support.

To be effective and relevant in the 21st century, the U.N. must improve its way of doing business. Among the changes my government proposes to that end are the following:

1) **Core Purposes**. Currently, the U.N. tries to do too much and, as a result, does too little well. It should focus its efforts and resources on four core functions:

-- maintaining peace and security;

-- ensuring a rapid and effective response to humanitarian emergencies;

-- establishing and monitoring the observance of international legal and technical norms; and

-- promoting sustainable development.

2) **Restructuring**. The U.N. Secretariat should be reorganized to improve accountability and reflect the U.N.'s limited core functions. A Deputy Secretary General should be appointed with responsibility for administering the U.N. on a day-to-day basis and to act for the SG (Secretary General) in his or her absence. The number of departments should be reduced to four or five. The overall number of Under Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General positions should be reduced significantly.

3) **Budget Discipline**. The "no growth" budget adopted by the General Assembly for the 1996-1997 biennium provides a legislative mandate for fiscal discipline, selective down-sizing and reform. To achieve these goals, the U.N. should reduce overall staff by at least 10 percent; cut the ratio of support staff to professional staff; adopt a zero-based approach to budgeting;

evaluate all programs in terms of outcomes; make greater use of out-sourcing and implement measures to reduce paperwork. Also a "sunset" policy should be adopted which would terminate programs of unproven value after a specified period of time.

4) **A More Relevant General Assembly**. The General Assembly should assume the role now played by expensive global conferences, and become the venue for sustained thematic discussion, on a scheduled basis, of important and timely issues. At the same time, the traditional agenda of the Assembly should be shortened dramatically, recurring issues should be considered less frequently, time limits should be imposed on speakers, and the committee and subsidiary bodies structure should be reformed to eliminate overlap and duplication.

5) **Greater Accountability**. To improve accountability, the U.N.'s nascent inspector-general function should be integrated throughout the U.N. system; the promotion and retention of personnel should be based solely on merit; financial disclosure requirements should be implemented for senior officials and those engaged in contracting or procurement functions; and the U.N. employee code of conduct should be revised and applied to all U.N. officials, not just Secretariat staff.

6) **System Coordination**. In order to ensure the most effective use of U.N. resources, the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), comprised of agency heads within the U.N. system, should be turned into the U.N. equivalent of a "cabinet". This body should meet regularly and should prepare, for informational purposes, a combined presentation of the regular U.N. and specialized agency budgets.

7) **Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)**. ECOSOC should assume its intended role, under the U.N. charter, as the central policymaking body for matters within its areas of responsibility. To this end, an ECOSOC executive committee should be created to improve policymaking and allow the regular transaction of business. Guidance for the Committee's work would be provided by the main annual meeting of ECOSOC. In addition, ECOSOC's annual meeting should be shortened and moved to New York, and the number of ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies should be reduced significantly.

8) **U.N. Conference on Trade and Development**. Drawing on the recent OIOS report, UNCTAD should be reformed and downsized to emphasize high priority activities, eliminate waste, and minimize overlap especially with the new World Trade Organization.

9) **Regional Economic Commissions**. Much of the work of the U.N.'s regional economic and social commissions duplicates that of other international organizations. These bodies should focus on activities where they have comparative advantage by virtue of geographical proximity. This would make it possible, without weakening important programs, to reduce spending substantially through the elimination of unnecessary, ineffective or overlapping activities.

10) **Sustainable Development**. The many activities throughout the U.N. system that provide technical cooperation for sustainable development should be consolidated, with the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) as the core. In addition, a very high priority should be given to improving collaboration among recipient countries, U.N. development programs, the Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral and regional donors, and nongovernmental organizations in assisting in the development and implementation of national sustainable development strategies.

11) **Humanitarian Affairs**. U.N. organizations involved with humanitarian relief should improve their abilities to perform joint operations through the establishment of common information systems and interoperable communications networks.

12) **The Specialized Agencies**. A comprehensive approach to U.N. reform must include the specialized agencies which now lay claim to more member state resources than the U.N. Secretariat itself. Reform strategies should be tailored to each. In every case, however, the fundamentals of sound management are applicable. These include realistic budgeting, effective oversight, the elimination of waste, and a willingness to end less important activities in order to meet emerging needs.

The United States is committed to the reform and revitalization of the United Nations. By setting a high standard for U.N. management, and by restructuring the organization to meet changing needs, we can ensure the continued relevance, productivity and improved performance of the U.N. as it begins its second fifty years. That is a goal towards which all nations must work and from which all nations will benefit.

Sincerely,

Madeleine K. Albright

(End text)

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE

April 7, 1995

Excmo. Sr. D. Jordi Sole Tura
Presidente
Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores
Congreso de los Diputados
Carrera de San Jerónimo, s/n
28071 Madrid

Dear Sr. Sole:

As you may know, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has been conducting opinion polls to measure public and leadership attitudes in the United States toward foreign policy issues every four years since 1976. It is one of America's most prestigious and most influential public opinion polls.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of the 1995 poll (the sixth in the series) which was just released by the Council a few weeks ago. You may have seen one or more of the several press reports about it. It is the first poll conducted by the Council since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The poll demonstrates, once again, that Americans are committed to and supportive of the global role of the United States. In the leadership category, the commitment is especially high.

I think you'll find the data here especially interesting, particularly for what it reveals about the engagement of Americans in international issues and the changes that have taken place over the period that the polls have been conducted.

I hope you will have opportunity to share this report with your colleagues.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Brian Carlson

Brian E. Carlson
Counselor for Public Affairs

TRASLADO DE LOS SEÑORES DIPUTADOS AL AEROPUERTO

Jueves, 8 de septiembre

Excmo. Sr. D. Jordi Solé-Tura
15:30 hrs: salida del hotel para Aeropuerto de Newark
(Vuelo AF destino París, 18:00 hrs)

* * *

Excmos. Sres. Estrella, Yáñez-Barnuevo, Vázquez, Molins y Anasagasti.
Sra. Da. Carmen Dominguez
16:00 hrs: salida del hotel para el Aeropuerto JFK
(Vuelo IB destino Madrid, 18:30 hrs)

OFICINA DE INFORMACION DIPLOMATICA **EL PAIS** 22 JUN. 1995

LA ONU CUMPLE 50 AÑOS. En 1945, las potencias aliadas que acababan de ganar la guerra contra Hitler vieron la necesidad de crear una nueva organización que, aun manteniendo el espíritu de la Sociedad de Naciones, evitase los errores cometidos por ésta en vísperas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El 26 de junio, 50 Estados firmaban en San Francisco la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. Cincuenta años después, es cierto que no ha habido una nueva guerra mundial, pero la incapacidad de la organización intergubernamental para evitar conflictos como el que desangra la antigua Yugoslavia ha hecho que el papel de la ONU parezca hoy cuestionado. En estas páginas se debaten los logros y limitaciones de dicha organización.

¿Hay algo que celebrar?

RICHARD N. GARDNER

Cuando los padres fundadores de la ONU se reunieron en San Francisco hace 50 años, un empresario norteamericano llamado Beardsley Ruml realizó una notable profecía. Esto es lo que dijo:

"Cuando pasen cinco años, pensarán que las Naciones Unidas es la mayor visión jamás realizada por el hombre. Cuando pasen 10 años hallarán dudas en el interior de ustedes y en todo el mundo. Cuando pasen 50 años creerán que las Naciones Unidas no pueden tener éxito. Tendrán la certeza de que no tiene ninguna probabilidad de sobrevivir y triunfar. Sólo cuando Naciones Unidas tenga 100 años sabremos que es la única alternativa a la destrucción del mundo".

Las continuadas frustraciones experimentadas por las Naciones Unidas en Bosnia, junto con el ataque a esta organización mundial por parte del nuevo liderazgo republicano en el Congreso de Estados Unidos, dan especial relevancia a la predicción de Ruml. Las celebraciones del cincuentenario de la ONU que ahora comienzan no parecen ser especialmente felices.

Pero no deberíamos permitir que esta crisis de los 50 de la ONU empañe su historial de sólidos logros. Tampoco nos debe quitar toda esperanza de un futuro mejor para la organización mundial.

La Carta de las Naciones Unidas firmada en San Francisco —estos días hará 50 años— representó un decisivo salto adelante en la evolución de la civilización humana. Comprometió a las naciones, por primera vez en la historia, con la acción colectiva en los terrenos de la paz y la seguridad, el desarrollo económico y social y los derechos humanos.

Eso es algo por lo que estamos en deuda con muchas naciones y muchos individuos, pero no es exagerado decir que la fuerza principal que estuvo detrás del diseño del sistema de la ONU fue un presidente estadounidense, de cuya muerte recordamos el cincuentenario en este año de aniversarios: Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Sin la dedicación de Roosevelt y los valiosos hombres y mujeres de su Administración al internacionalismo constructivo y a un mundo mejor para después de la guerra no habría habido ONU, ni instituciones de Bretton Woods, ni GATT, ni OMS, ni FAO, ni Unesco, ni ninguna de las otras instituciones permanentes para la resolución de problemas a través de la cooperación.

¿Qué es lo que han logrado concretamente estas instituciones de la ONU? En mi opinión, tres cosas fundamentales.

En primer lugar, las instituciones de la ONU han proporcionado un instrumento indispensable para el mantenimiento de la paz: para la prevención, resolución y contención de conflictos entre naciones y dentro de una misma nación. Namibia, Camboya, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador y Haití son ejemplos recientes.

Pero nuestra actual experiencia en Bosnia debería recordarnos una limitación práctica de la ONU: sencillamente, la organización no es capaz de *imponer* la paz frente a adversarios bien armados. En el futuro previsible, la tarea de disuadir y derrotar la agresión deberá ser responsabilidad de miembros individuales de la ONU que actúen bajo la autoridad de la ONU, como en la Operación Tormenta del Desierto, o que ejerzan su derecho a la defensa propia, individual o colectiva, tal como lo confirma el artículo 51 de la Carta.

En segundo lugar, las instituciones de la ONU han proporcionado mecanismos esenciales para la liberalización del comercio internacional, la supervisión de la política financiera de las naciones y la aportación de asistencia técnica y financiera para apoyar el desarrollo económico y la transformación de las economías comunistas en economías de mercado.

Ahora, nuestra tarea es adaptar esas instituciones a nuevas realidades como el mercado mundial de capitales o la presencia en el mercado mundial de 3.000 millones de personas más, entre ellas los habitantes de China y de las Repúblicas de la ex Unión Soviética. También debemos intensificar la labor de la ONU en terrenos no previstos cuando se firmó la Carta en San Francisco: la planificación de la población y la defensa del medio ambiente mundial.

En tercer lugar, las Naciones Unidas nos ha dado una nueva legislación internacional y nuevos mecanismos internacionales para sostener un concepto que, hace 50 años, era totalmente revolucionario: los derechos humanos. La forma en que un Gobierno trata a sus ciudadanos ya no es exclusivamente asunto suyo. Es una preocupación legítima de la comunidad mundial, una preocupación expresada a través de mecanismos como la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU y el reciente creado Alto Comisariado de la ONU para Derechos Humanos. Debemos esforzarnos más para consolidar estos mecanismos.

Para que la gente de todo el mundo confíe en la ONU y su sistema de organismos internacionales hay que hacer mucho más por mejorar su eficiencia y su relación coste-eficacia. Los miembros de la ONU deberían dedicarse con mucha más seriedad que hasta ahora a mejorar la calidad del personal de la ONU y a eliminar programas de la ONU de baja prioridad o que se solapen con otros.

OFICINA DE INFORMACION DIPLOMATICA

EL PAIS

22 JUN. 1995

Lo que es más importante, para hacer realidad la profecía de Beardsley Ruml sobre la ONU a los 100 años, necesitaremos una perspectiva mundial más amplia y una nueva definición del interés nacional por parte de los miembros de la ONU y los ciudadanos que la componen. Nadie ha definido mejor esta visión más amplia que sir Shridath Ramphal, ex secretario general de la Commonwealth, en su declaración en la Cumbre de la Tierra en Río:

"Cada uno de nosotros —hombres, mujeres y niños, ricos y pobres, de cualquier credo, raza o religión— debemos empezar a asumir nuestra doble ciudadanía. Todos debemos pertenecer —y tener una sensación de pertenencia— a dos países: el nuestro y el planeta".

Éste es el requisito esencial, en mi opinión, para que la ONU logre hacer realidad las esperanzas que se pusieron en ella hace 50 años en San Francisco.

Richard N. Gardner es embajador de Estados Unidos en España y autor de *La diplomacia del dólar y la esterlina.*

Global Issues in Transition

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A WORD FROM THE EDITOR

As complex as the Cold War seemed, the tasks of foreign and security policy in that era seem simple compared to the diverse and challenging tasks facing the world in the late 20th century. As Eliot A. Cohen, of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University demonstrates in the lead essay in this issue, the United States faces a new set of potential military missions of such scope and diversity as to bedevil any rational planner. And to complicate matters further, these diverse missions — from concrete defense against high-tech attacks and insurance that others will not risk nuclear attack, to coalition-maintenance and the upholding of world order — must be performed in an era of budget stringency. Michael MccGwire of the Brookings Institution probes the issues of nuclear arms, arguing that only the elimination of nuclear arms by all current nuclear powers offers a chance of avoiding proliferation to other states in the years ahead.

U.S. Undersecretary of State Richard Holbrooke highlights the importance of Europe to the United States and Washington's efforts to adjust and expand proven "Western" institutions to create a security architecture capable of encompassing eastern and central Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union toward solution of the "local conflicts, internal political and economic instability" and revived "historical grievances" that "have now replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe." Hannes Adomeit of the Fletcher School, Tufts University, carefully traces ebb and flow of two paradigms of Russian self-perceptions — the "Imperial and Ideological" and the "New Thinking" — and their impact on security issues. And Karl-Heinz Kamp of the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung cautions against precipitate expansion of NATO, which, he cautions, could destroy the institution's usefulness.

Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise Institute and Eugene Rostow, Professor Emeritus of Yale University, debate the possibilities of U.S. intervention in the Bosnian crisis, with Glynn saying it is too late and Rostow arguing the case for upholding Bosnia's integrity in the face of aggression.

In the final contribution, on the diffusion of Western media technology and content in China, Joseph Man Chan of the Chinese University of Hong Kong highlights Beijing's dilemmas in attempting to modernize the economy without carrying out accompanying political reforms.

— The Editor.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES IN GIT, JUNE 1995

WHAT TO DO ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE
By Eliot A. Cohen

SUMMARY: In the post-Cold War setting, the American military faces a new set of missions — from concrete defense against high-tech attacks and insurance that others will not risk nuclear attack, to coalition-maintenance and the upholding of world order. The author traces the real challenges that American civilian leaders face in attempting to guide and shape the military for its future missions. (Length: 10,100 words.)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: ELIMINATE OR MARGINALIZE?
By Michael MccGwire

SUMMARY: The author argues that efforts to keep countries that currently do not possess nuclear weapons from developing them are doomed to failure, unless the existing nuclear powers support a policy that over time would eliminate atomic weapons completely. He maintains that this is a policy which all nations will find feasible, practical and in their interest. (Length: 3,700 words.)

AMERICA: A EUROPEAN POWER
By Richard Holbrooke

SUMMARY: In the post-Cold War world, the United States "has become a European power in a sense that goes beyond traditional assertions of America's `commitment' to Europe," argues this prominent American official. Washington has a vital and active interest in the adjustment and expansion of proven "Western" institutions to create a security architecture capable of encompassing eastern and central Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union toward solution of the "local conflicts, internal political and economic instability" and revived "historical grievances" that "have now replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe." (Length: 4,800 words.)

RUSSIA AS A GREAT POWER IN WORLD AFFAIRS: IMAGES AND REALITY
By Hannes Adomeit

SUMMARY: Russian officials are heard increasingly often to proclaim the country's status as a "great power". This article examines how the country's perceptions of its role in world affairs have evolved since the declining years of the Soviet Union. The author identifies two dominant paradigms, the "Ideological and Imperial" and the "New Thinking", and discusses the reasons for the ebb and flow of the latter in the years since Russia's establishment as a sovereign state after the collapse of the USSR. (Length: 17,200 words.)

THE FOLLY OF RAPID NATO EXPANSION
By Karl-Heinz Kamp

SUMMARY: The author, a German expert, cautions against expanding NATO further and faster than the institution can bear. He calls for "the pragmatic step-by-step linking of Central and Eastern Europe to the transatlantic security structure below the level of full membership at the outset. Such a procedure along the lines of NATO'S Partnership for Peace concept — with all its shortcomings and inconsistencies — may lack the attractiveness of a `comprehensive strategic concept,' but it does have the advantage of addressing the security needs of the Central and East European democracies without straining the viability of NATO to the breaking point." (Length: 4,900 words.)

BOSNIA: IS IT TOO LATE? — TWO VIEWS
By Patrick Glynn and Eugene V. Rostow

SUMMARY: Patrick Glynn supported limited intervention in Bosnia by the United States and its allies when the conflict began. He believes that such intervention now would be a mistake, because in his view, the Serbs have already won. Any allied military involvement now, he believes, would fail at great cost in casualties, and would only strain U.S. relations with NATO and Russia. Eugene V. Rostow, on the other hand, sees strong parallels between the Bosnian conflict and the Korean War, in which President Truman committed U.S. forces to throw back North Korea's invasion of South Korea. According to Rostow, the principle is the same: aggression must be punished and peace preserved. This, he believes, can only be done by a coalition of the strong, led by the "the strongest of the strong" — the United States. (Length: 4,600 words.)

MEDIA INTERNATIONALIZATION IN CHINA
By Joseph Man Chan

SUMMARY: The Chinese media have become more international by five major processes: (a) the offering of free goods, (b) regulated trade, (c) competition, (d) demonstration and (e) cooperation. These processes interact and interconnect. Media trade, signal spillover and direct satellite broadcasting create competitive pressure on the domestic media to imitate their foreign rivals and reinvent what they learn from them. The influence of foreign media culture in China is uneven and is contingent on the strength of ideological control at both the central and local level, as well as on the media's nature, geographical location and degree of commercialization. (Length: 8,100 words.)

SUMMARY

In the post-Cold War setting, the American military faces a new set of missions — from concrete defense against high-tech attacks and insurance that others will not risk nuclear attack, to coalition-maintenance and the upholding of world order. The author traces the real challenges that American civilian leaders face in attempting to guide and shape the military for its future missions. (Length: 10,100 words.)

AUTHOR

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WHAT TO DO ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE

By Eliot A. Cohen

OLD IDEAS

Great struggles leave their marks on the institutions that wage them.

The ambience of the Cold War saturated every element of the U.S. defense establishment, including the intellectual establishment that grew up around it. Our ways of thinking, our assumptions about the world, our views of statecraft and of the American role in the world — all bore, and still bear, the imprint of the duel with communism. American defense planners have found it far easier to scrap some of the hardware of the Cold War than the software, the intellectual algorithms for thinking about defense.

When a staff officer prepares a briefing justifying a defense budget with carefully constructed scenarios of Iraq invading Saudi Arabia, he does so using a frame of reference shaped by the Cold War, even if the Russians no longer figure as the enemy. When administration representatives discuss the need to "contain" regional opponents, they think in categories concocted by George Kennan and Paul Nitze at the dawn of the contest between East and West. When defense contractors offer studies to the Defense Department on "deterrence after the Cold War," they unwittingly perpetuate concepts of American strategy that have decreasing relevance to the real troubles of the new age. It will be many years before self-conscious examination of the intellectual legacy of the Cold War, and the smack of reality contradicting it, breed new ways of thinking.

One of the least fortunate aspects of all this has been an oversimplification of our own strategic history. When American strategists in the late 1980's and early 1990's first set out to consider a new posture for the post-Cold War period, they were haunted by the specter of a rapid and ruinously complete demobilization of U.S. forces. This, they said, was a peculiarly American temptation.

Thus, Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense during the Bush administration: ". . . historically we've always gotten it wrong. We've never done it right. You can't find a time in this century when we've been through one of these cycles where we did, in fact, take the force down in an intelligent fashion." In making this assertion, Cheney was merely echoing the anxieties of other American military writers who have discerned repeated "cycles" in America's strategic posture, from extreme underpreparedness, to a belated rush to arms in the face of emergency, and back again.

In fact, however, the essential American story is far more complex than this. From the time of colonial settlement, to the Founding, and throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, our strategic record was far better than is commonly supposed, and certainly superior to that of most of the European states with which we had to contend. Moreover,

even in the 20th century, the so-called cycle disintegrates on closer inspection. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, for instance, the United States returned to adequately-equipped regular services, with a considerably larger establishment than that of 1914, and a Navy on the edge of parity with that of Great Britain. America's serious interwar military troubles began only in the late 1920's and early 1930's, when the Great Depression struck.

In more recent times, American military thinkers have found themselves transfixed not only by the theory of "cycles" but by four particular uses of force — three of them failures, and one a success. The failures are Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia; the success was the Persian Gulf war. Many officers (and not a few civilians) read into these cumulative experiences the following half-truths or, in some cases, falsehoods: wars can be won easily if civilian authorities will set clear objectives and then get out of the way; the press is invariably hostile to the military and should, where possible, be excluded or manipulated by it; the American people lack the stomach for casualties and will only support war if it is conducted with the utmost speed.

Careful reflection reveals a far more complicated set of truths. The military in Vietnam had much more discretion (particularly in the south) than is usually acknowledged. When the use of force is likely to have political repercussions (i.e., always), some measure of civilian control is entirely appropriate. The press is no more hostile to the military, at least initially, than it is to any other institution of government or private enterprise; it is, in any event, an inescapable feature of modern life. And the sensitivity over casualties shown in the Gulf war stemmed far more from military officers (for a variety of reasons) than from the public, whose sons and daughters had no fear of conscription to induce in their parents a moderating aversion to bloodshed.

The Cold War put an even greater premium on apodictic statements than is the norm in politics. The first task in rethinking American strategy after the Cold War, then, is to develop a healthy mistrust of the shibboleths and folk wisdom of the American national-security debate. To revise our strategy in accordance with our needs will require not merely an attempt to limn our future, but a careful and, insofar as is possible, dispassionate examination of our past. This requires no small effort; most American policy analysts and decision-makers have little interest in serious study of our history, and too few military historians think they have much to contribute to an understanding of our present and future.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

For many people today, the world is a dismal place; the atrocities of war in cities from Bihac to Aden, and from Sukhumi to Kigali remind us of that. The trends in other parts of the world — where Japan anxiously eyes a Korean peninsula soon to be kitted out with nuclear weapons, or ethnic Russians think of secession from an economically moribund Ukraine — are not terribly encouraging. But from a purely American point of view, the world is, and for some length of time promises to be, a more secure place than it was during the Cold War. For now, Americans have the luxury, as peoples very rarely do in their history, to rethink their fundamental national-security policy.

The new strategic environment has three dominant characteristics: international disorder; a revolution in military affairs; and a crisis of demotic culture. Let us consider each in turn.

That the Cold War imposed an order on international politics and provided a strategic rationale for American behavior is a truism. It also imposed a global logic on American defense policy: the essential decisions, in such a world, were decisions not to engage the Soviet Union or its clients. Although American leaders distinguished between areas of greater and lesser importance to the United States, they often did so on the basis of cost and benefit, rather than intrinsic interest.

After the Cold War, American interests have become altogether hazier; they have also in some measure contracted. To take only two cases: during the contest with the Soviet Union, Somalia and Yugoslavia had some importance as points d'appui for military power. The United States could not be indifferent to what happened in those countries, because of repercussions for the balance of power in their respective regions. Although the immediate *military* consequences of a shift of either of those countries from one camp to the other would have been small, the geopolitical and certainly the psychological effects would not.

Today, the situation is different. The United States has no immediate strategic interest in either country. Its prestige does not ride on the outcome of clan warfare in Mogadishu or Sarajevo, at least as long as Washington refrains from making foolish pronouncements about what it will do in either place. Our interest in the resolution of these civil conflicts is firstly humanitarian and only secondarily, and in the long term, strategic. (The long-term consequences of the Yugoslav civil war could prove exceptionally ugly in the Balkans more generally, but that should properly concern inhabitants of Berlin, Paris and Rome far more than residents of Atlanta, St. Louis and Los Angeles.)

The stumblings of the Clinton administration conceal a far deeper problem in the conduct of American foreign policy than the failures of a particularly inept group of politicians. The calls often heard at home and abroad for a foreign-policy "vision," along the lines of containment in the Cold War, miss the point. It is highly unlikely that anyone can or will respond. The contrast between the situation now and that of 45 years ago reflects not only the superiority of the statesmen then (a fact, to be sure); it reflects the ambiguity of a world that faces challenges far more complex, if for the moment less ominous, than those of 1945-50.

The geopolitical challenge to American policy in those years was simple: the emergence of Soviet power and its expansion in Europe. The economics of that confrontation were also fairly straightforward: the American economy accounted for a staggering 50 percent of global production, and the European countries had most of the human resources necessary to rebuild their economies. Even so, it required several direct challenges, including communist coups, for American statesmen to devise the responses — containment, the Marshall Plan, and the rearmament prompted by National Security Council Memorandum Number 68 and the Korean war — that the times demanded.

Today, the geopolitical problems before us are far more diffuse, and the remedies far less obvious. There is, and can be, no global scheme for American foreign policy, save for the vague objective of promoting an open international trading and communications order. American statesmen have no dragons to slay, or even to tame; partners may be competitors, but no state poses a direct challenge to our security or that of our allies. Moreover, in this new world, our economy, although thriving, commands barely a quarter of the world's gross product, a portion likely to shrink as growth continues to spread in Asia.

So much for the new element of international disorder. A second broad development is what defense thinkers call the "revolution in military affairs." We are in the early stages of a transformation of warfare which, like changes in the economy more generally, will be driven by the new technologies of information.

Until quite recently — say, the 1970's — military technology essentially resembled that of World War II, albeit vastly improved and upgraded. The advent of the microchip and various advanced materials (e.g., for the construction of stealth aircraft) now promises a far more radical change in the conduct of war.

Thus, armed forces in advanced states can deploy unparalleled capabilities to see and track opponents, and to deliver precise conventional fire. The Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, for example, put accurate navigation within the grasp of human beings almost anywhere on the planet. Satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, and remote acoustic, infrared and other sensors have transformed the gathering of intelligence.

Above all, the networking of military organizations by electronic communications will radically alter their efficacy, even as it creates new opportunities for warfare by electronic means as varied as electromagnetic pulse weapons (which disable electronic devices by brute force) and computer worms or viruses (which do the same by stealth).

Conventional warfare in the 21st century may look very different from warfare today. It may be preceded by periods of covert warfare involving electronic sabotage. Fighting may consist of barrages of accurate long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, while mobile forces such as ships or tanks may find themselves caught in webs of "intelligent" minefields that can detect their presence in a half-dozen different ways. Rather than fighting as individual platforms, ships and planes will increasingly fight as networks, and what constitutes the high ground in such contests will be an advantage in information as much as in terrain. Attacks on command posts and on the other side's "eyes" will be accompanied by efforts to hide through the use of camouflage and deception.

The revolution in military affairs will have a number of effects. It will enable new competitors with the United States to amass certain kinds of military power relatively quickly. For example, until recently, satellite pictures that could discriminate among objects one meter long were the stuff of supersecret national organizations. Today, they are on the verge of becoming routinely available commercial products from American and overseas space vendors. Again, in the Gulf war, only the United States had, in any quantity, receivers that could allow precise geolocation using the GPS. Such receivers are already widely available commercially, and within a few years will fit comfortably in a shirt pocket.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has meant that the vast pool of scientific talent and military technology in the former Soviet bloc has become available for export around the world. And as some countries, particularly in Asia, have become wealthier, they have acquired a taste for the latest in military hardware. In the 1960's, the Northrop Corporation could enrich itself by selling the reliable but relatively low-technology F-5 fighter to America's allies. Today, countries like Malaysia will buy only the latest in American military technology.

These developments do not necessarily undermine the American military edge. The American defense budget still towers over all others. At some $244 billion a year, it is roughly seven times that of any major European country and about six times that of Japan. Minor troublemakers like Iran and Iraq do not spend 5 percent of what the United States spends on military power. In addition, during the Cold War, the United States amassed a vast capital stock, which retains enormous value. Our constellation of intelligence-gathering systems in outer space and on Earth, massive platforms like aircraft carriers and ships, and a technological establishment of astounding sophistication is unparalleled anywhere. Finally, only the United States has the know-how and logistical assets (including such mundane items as transport and refueling aircraft) to conduct large-scale and global operations.

In this respect in particular, analogies with the late 1940's are erroneous; the American lead in military technology is far more extensive today than it was 50 years ago. Advances in civilian technology may eventually subvert that lead, but whether that will occur depends very largely on decisions to be made over the next decade.

Strategists rarely discuss the cultural dimensions of strategy, but these are in fact a third conditioning force in the strategic environment. For the willingness to use military power and the capacity to amass it depend heavily on a country's culture.

During the Cold War, strategic planners could take pretty much for granted the willingness of Americans to engage in world politics, and to contend with the Soviet Union for global hegemony. Even when Americans were not willing, in John F. Kennedy's words, to pay any price, or to bear any burden, they certainly accepted a military burden unprecedented in our peacetime history. This included assigning between 4 and 10 percent of our gross national product to defense (the historical norm had been closer to 1 or 2 percent); peacetime conscription; the creation of a vast military establishment, including a large standing army; and acceptance of various real and potential infringements on civil liberties. These last included a hedge of laws to protect secrets and the creation of large agencies of government with the ability to spy on Americans overseas and, to a lesser extent, at home as well.

The price was surely worth it, but a price it was. True, Americans have shown no particular eagerness to shed these burdens and structures completely; it may be one of the lesser surprises of the end of the Cold War that Americans have become accustomed to world power, and have no intention of

giving it up. But it is equally true that Americans will look on global responsibilities with a colder eye, particularly if exertions of military power seem to be efforts on behalf of allies too miserly or timid to fend for themselves.

At the same time, it has become apparent that the United States, and perhaps the West more broadly, are undergoing a crisis of cultural self-confidence similar to those of the 1930's and the 1960's.

The dimensions of this crisis are difficult to sketch, but they surely include the rise of criminality in most Western societies, the erosion of traditional means of socialization (family, church), and a perceptible decay in popular culture. The replacement of fare like "The Andy Griffith Show" by "Beavis and Butthead" is a telling symbol of a deeper and more distressing trend. One quantitative indicator is the rise of illegitimacy, which (in the United States, at any rate) also translates into a rise of one-parent families. In 1970, births to unmarried women in the U.S. were 11 percent of all births; today, they are 28 percent.

These cultural trends affect national security in various ways. Among other things, they have induced American leaders to turn inward in the attempt to cope with a society that has lost much of its self-confidence. The election campaign of 1992, the first since 1936 which did not feature foreign affairs as a prominent issue, was an important sign of this change.

To be sure, the significance of the change has so far not penetrated a foreign-policy establishment that continues to hold earnest seminars on American policy vis-à-vis countries 10,000 miles away while ten blocks away thugs have driven all but the pluckiest, most foolhardy, or heavily armed citizens from the street. Indeed, the contrast between the formidable military power of the United States and its violent and disorderly cities suggests the hubris of an ambitious effort to police the world.

In the future, then, we can expect the American public to look askance at foreign adventures that aim to do for others what we have not yet done for ourselves. We can also expect politicians to learn from the experience of George Bush: no amount of success overseas will compensate for failure to solve problems at home.

The diseases afflicting American civilization have not escaped the notice of other nations. Americans tend to discount the cultural hostility of foreign intellectuals and politicians as mere window-dressing. In particular, many American intellectuals shrug off religious belief as a passing obstacle to the development of secular, humanistic and libertarian societies. Living as we do in the oldest constitutional democracy on the planet, we often assume that American ways — our package of individual liberties and a legalistic political system — must inevitably spread to all countries. These American assumptions will probably fail in the next century. They not only attract the anger of fundamentalist groups in the Islamic world; they have also begun to elicit hostile reactions from other societies, including the far more successful states of Asia.

Conceivably, we may have passed the high-water mark of the spread of American culture around the world, as the United States finds itself increasingly at odds with countries resentful of our attempts to impose a world order that to them looks far from benign or attractive.

Indeed, in what may be the greatest strategic revolution of all, two concepts that the United States itself applied to the Soviet Union — deterrence and containment — may be applied to *it*. Other countries (plus substate and transnational actors) may seek not to contend with the United States for global hegemony, but to keep it out of their spheres of interest and influence. In such struggles, even modest amounts of force, if wielded dexterously and with determination, can thwart the objectives of a morose and troubled American giant.

MISSIONS

In a "Bottom-Up Review," published early in its term, the Clinton administration described the forces it believed the country would require. Based on a Cold-War-style analysis, it called for ten Army and three Marine divisions, 12 aircraft carriers, and 13 active Air Force wings. Civilians occasionally sneer at generals for preparing to fight the last war; here, the analysts played the generals' part, albeit with an elaborate theoretical superstructure.

The chief premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that the conflicts for which the United States should prepare itself would be reruns of the Gulf war of 1991. This proposition, dubious enough for the next five to ten years, becomes absurd if one looks further ahead. And in any case, the projected budget will simply not allow an armed force of that size, or at least one that could be adequately paid, trained and consistently modernized.

The Pentagon has confessed that over the next five years, it will fall $40 billion short of the force called for in the Bottom-Up Review; the Government Accounting Office, probably closer to reality, makes the gap out to be $150 billion. The 1.4-million-strong force envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review, then, will not survive. In the next 10 to 15 years, the armed forces will shrink to perhaps a million men and women, about 40 percent that of the Cold War.

Adjusting to the new size means giving up old structures and radically changing ways of conducting business. Some of the services are deeply reluctant to do so. The Marine Corps, for example, is clinging to a force level of over 170,000 men and women — a third the size of the Army — the maintenance of which will blot out funds for the sorely needed modernization of the Marines' equipment.

Not only will the United States military be smaller than at any time since 1940; it will have to change in other ways as well. In particular, it will have to reduce its reliance on permanent forward deployment of combat units, a policy that was sustainable in an era of a two-million-man force but that will impose insuperable strains on a force half that size. And a smaller military will have to concede that some missions are simply too big for it to handle alone. Indeed, one of the chief strategic choices that the United States faces is that between unilateral and multilateral capabilities.

American defense policy should emerge from answers to the question, What kind of world does the United States wish to mold? But it is more likely to emerge from answers to easier questions: What calamities does the United States wish to avert? and, What goals are worth even a modest fight?

From such considerations, four "missions" emerge:

First, the United States will have to think hard about *defense proper*. Since World War II, American strategists have regarded defense with only episodic interest. After a vigorous effort in the area of continental air defense in the 1950's and the attempted development of ballistic-missile defenses in the 1960s,1/ this strategic option lapsed into a state of somnolence. The Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative never attracted wide support, and came under severe criticism for the stress it would place on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with the Soviet Union.

Defense in the narrow sense, however, is a long and honorable American strategic tradition. Three waves of fortification — one from the Federalist period through the War of 1812 and its immediate aftermath, another in the 1840's, and a third in the 1880's — provided the United States with admirable protection for its ports. In the early 20th century, much of American military planning focused on the protection of installations such as the Panama Canal.

During the Cold War, the balance of American strategic thinking and military action shifted decisively to the offense, and for good reason: nuclear weapons seemed an overwhelmingly offensive military tool, and political considerations mandated a forward strategy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. But that has now changed somewhat. The proliferation of long-range ballistic (and, later, cruise) missiles will make it increasingly possible for even small and relatively weak powers to strike at the United States. The technologies of low-level warfare — everything from car bombs to computer-hacking — make it easier to cross the oceanic distances that to this day insulate the United States from many traditional security concerns. The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 was, most likely, a sign of things to come.

Large segments of the American military will resist conversion to essentially defensive roles. For one thing, the dominant combat-arms organizations have grown up as forward-deployed, expeditionary forces; this is their definition of what soldiering is. For another, many defensive missions are intrinsically more complicated and less promising than offensive ones; it is easier to build and operate a long-range missile than to defend against it, easier to launch long-raid special operations than to prevent them (and more fun as well).

A second broad mission of the armed forces will be that of *insurance*. The United States today faces no imminent threats, except for the serious but nonetheless contained prospects of war in the Korean peninsula and renewed Iraqi adventurism in the Persian Gulf. But it does face a world of tremendous uncertainty.

Defense planners have attempted to bound such uncertainty by suggesting standards like those contained in the Bottom-Up Review, which calls for the United States to prepare to fight two nearly simultaneous "major regional contingencies." Of course, subsequent examination has showed that American forces would have logistical difficulty enough in sustaining one contingency, and that two would exceed our capabilities. But even if the artificial standards of the Bottom-Up Review did represent achievable targets, this is the wrong way of thinking about our requirements. The essence of insurance is the preservation of certain *competencies*, upon which future forces could be built should they be needed.

To begin with, the United States may, at some juncture, need to deploy substantial land forces overseas, as it did during the Gulf war. In the short term, this is not too likely: following a resolution of the division of the Korean peninsula, it will become less likely still. In general, it should be the task of local allies to defend themselves on the ground, while the United States supplies various kinds of support from air, sea and space. In a pinch, the United States might provide the high-technology core of a ground expeditionary force, and the technology and organizations capable of higher-level command and control.

The heavy portion of the U.S. Army should therefore preserve and indeed hone its expertise in ground combat, preparing to serve as the decisive nucleus for multinational forces or, if necessary in the long term, for a larger American force. Such a nucleus would not only be smaller than the Army of today, it would be different. It would consist exclusively of regular forces, as opposed to the Army's current practice of relying heavily on reserve units to support regular units, which makes the force less deployable (because of the political costs associated with reserve mobilizations). It would also be different by virtue of its dependence on other states in the event of a major contingency.

Another broad area of insurance lies in the realm of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, questions of nuclear strategy occupied center stage in the American policy debate. Today, our nuclear forces are the stepchild of a government eager to see them go away, and of a military establishment that has always viewed them with a certain amount of distaste. "The nuclear weapon is obsolete. . . . I want to get rid of them all," said one Air Force four-star general recently. The Navy and Army, in particular, have been delighted to see these awkward devices removed from their European arsenals, for they required specialized handling, posed tremendous operational problems, and made each service, in different ways, unpopular with local allies.

But the genie cannot be so easily put back into the bottle. Many small states will take from the Gulf war the lesson that the best counter to American conventional strength lies in the possession of a nuclear arsenal. To deter the use of such weapons (and, perhaps, chemical and biological ones as well), and if necessary to preempt nuclear forces, the United States will require a small but always modern nuclear force of its own. This ultimately also requires a low-level testing-and-development program, particularly for tactical weapons. By failing to develop and publicly defend small, clean nuclear weapons that might be useful for preemptive destruction of the small, crude arsenals of potential enemies, the Clinton administration may be making one of its most damaging long-term mistakes.

A third mission for the armed forces is the *maintenance of world order*. To a degree not found in any other country, the United States combines military, economic and cultural power. It will wish to use that power in three ways: to limit, to punish and to excise.

By "limitation," I mean the denial of certain kinds of capabilities to other countries. For example, the United

States, as guarantor of an open commercial order, will wish to prevent other countries (or substate actors) from blocking or interfering with the free use of the sea and air lanes. What follows from this is, say, the ability to detect and destroy ships, aircraft or submarines laying mines in the Straits of Hormuz or the Magellan Straits.

The idea of using military power to punish does not normally appeal to Americans. But in the future, the United States may not wish to change a political situation on the ground through the direct use of force — by occupying a country and pacifying it. Rather, it may wish to affect the calculations of a local troublemaker, or simply lay down a marker for future troublemakers. For example, were the United States to have used military power in the former Yugoslavia early on — at the time of the shelling of Dubrovnik in the fall of 1991 — it would have done best not to have placed tens of thousands of troops on the ground but to have used its air and naval power to make the Serbian government suffer at home.

During the Cold War, the use of military power for punitive purposes acquired a bad name. To hawks, it smacked of timidity in engaging one's real opponents, and perhaps of a suspect enthrallment to academic notions of force as a mere means of signaling. To doves, it seemed innately cruel and impossible to reconcile with a concept of just war. To both, it appeared highly unlikely to be effective. Indeed, the experiences of the Vietnam war seemed to bear out the suspicions of hawks and doves alike.

Here again, however, it is time to reexamine our strategic assumptions. Punitive strategies failed during the Cold War because the opponents against whom they were directed were in the grip of a messianic ideology and because they had at their disposal the resources of a superpower and a dozen major clients. Such strategies frequently failed as well because the largely peasant societies against whom they were directed were less vulnerable to the kind of punishment (chiefly bombing and blockade) that the United States could deliver.

Today, circumstances are quite different. In the next decade or two, the United States will find itself engaged in what the British once called imperial policing: the maintenance of some rough order in unruly parts of the world. Our future opponents will not have a superpower patron to rebuild their dams and power plants, or to buy them a comprehensive air-defense system. They will probably be more porous societies than the old communist states — more aware of the world through the mass media — and probably less totalitarian domestically. They will have more-sophisticated economies, which means they will have more to lose, and, no less important, they will know that the key to survival lies in some kind of engagement in the world economy, even if not in a completely open fashion.

Within broad limits, strategies of punishment will work to moderate the behavior of such states — to curtail (if not to stop completely) efforts to subvert a neighbor or to mistreat an ethnic minority. In addition, the technologies of precision-strike open up new operational concepts for punishment. It is probably feasible, for instance, to damage or destroy most of a country's major road and rail bridges. To be sure, temporary bridges, rafts and the like will enable the country to continue to function, and even to move armed forces around. But the economic dislocation will inflict considerable pain on society and, ultimately, government.

Finally, the maintenance of world order will require a capability to *excise* certain kinds of capabilities, specifically weapons of mass destruction. In 1991, when the United States went to war against Iraq, it lacked the intelligence and, in some cases, the specialized procedures to attack storage sites for the Iraqi nuclear and biological-weapons programs. When the war began, American planners had only two Iraqi nuclear targets on their hit lists; by the time International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors had finished their work, *sixteen* main facilities had been identified.

From a purely technical point of view, locating and destroying the capability of countries to use weapons of mass destruction is likely to be an extremely difficult task; this is particularly true in the case of biological weapons, which can be manufactured in small laboratories and distributed clandestinely. But should we ever witness the actual use of such weapons, there will be no choice but to move swiftly, and even at high cost, to prevent their repeated use.

The fourth and last mission of the armed forces will be *coalition-maintenance*. The U.S. is unique not only in its raw military power but in its ability to call on a wide variety of allies for assistance. These allies, in turn, often make claims on our own military capacity. It is in the American interest to provide key elements of support both to our core allies (for example, the British) and to occasional partners with whom we may have a more mixed relationship.

Indeed, one feature of the new international politics is a far greater ambiguity in our alliances. Thus, while American aircraft operated from Italy to surveil air space over the former Yugoslavia, American soldiers in Somalia were wondering whether their Italian colleagues were tipping off the Somali warlord they were attempting to track down.

But it would be almost as foolish to walk away from assisting allies when it is in our interest to do so as it would be to ignore such events when they occur. The United States will want allies for many reasons: to ensure political support at home and minimize opposition abroad to certain uses of force; to tap unique skills or local knowledge; to minimize our own weaknesses; and to shift some of the burdens of world policing to others. At the same time, there are some things that the United States does so well, or some goods it has in such quantity, that other countries will have to go on depending on us for support.

CHOICES

These, then, are the likely purposes of American military power: defense, insurance, the maintenance of world order and the maintenance of coalitions. What choices will the American government have to make if a much smaller military is to serve these purposes adequately?

The first question for consideration is that of forward presence. During the Cold War, the United States became accustomed to stationing vast forces overseas — a third of a million in Europe alone, more than a half-million all told in the mid-1980's. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has still kept a substantial force stationed overseas (more than 300,000 men and women all told) and has made

increasingly frequent temporary deployments of troops for peacekeeping (as in Macedonia), so-called peacemaking (as in Somalia), and humanitarian intervention (northern Iraq and Rwanda). We have also staged training or showing-the-flag exercises designed to reassure friends or build relations with other countries (e.g., deployments to Kuwait).

This trend has given no sign of abating, as the occupation of Haiti by 10,000 American troops makes clear. Meanwhile, the administration promises to send tens of thousands of American troops to the former Yugoslavia in support of a peace settlement among the successor states, and diplomats talk loosely of a brigade or two on the Golan Heights in support of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty.

It may be some time before the truly pernicious effects of this overstretching are felt. But one effect is already evident, in the strain imposed on service marriages and on morale. Specialized units suffer particularly: for example, airborne warning-and-control crews deploy overseas 170 days a year, whereas the normal limit is 120. The more forces are tied down in missions that are incidental to warfighting, the less time and opportunity they will have to develop their combat skills.

One might argue that such activities may serve the purposes of American foreign policy, and provide a sense of mission and purpose for the men and women who undertake them. And it may be argued that in the next decade or two, it will be less important that American forces sharpen their skills for all-out warfare.

Nonetheless, such activities exact a price on the organizations that sustain them — including a monetary one. The Haiti escapade will have run up at least $250 million in direct costs in 1993, not to mention a billion dollars of planned aid to that pathetic demi-island. The deployment to Somalia alone cost $2.2 billion from 1991 through 1994, and the emergency movement of aid and troops to Rwanda in 1994 gobbled up several hundred million dollars within a couple of months. The recent suspension of all Naval-reserve training because of a shortage of funds to pay reservists is one of the smaller consequences of these unforeseen expenditures. Such costs come on top of less-visible drains, like the Clinton administration's effort to take $300 million from the defense budget as a contribution to the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts.

What is all too little realized is that these sums come out of the operations and maintenance accounts of the armed services, and have begun cutting into the ability of American forces to train and to keep their equipment in good operating condition. Humanitarian adventurism induces an insidious kind of muscle fatigue, consuming sinew in what appears to be a beneficial exercise.

It is a cliché of American strategic thinking (and one to which I largely subscribe) that the United States will henceforth fight increasingly as a member of a coalition. But we will find ourselves choosing among different kinds of coalitions — those brought together under the banner of the United Nations; those locked in formal mechanisms of military cooperation such as NATO; and those constructed on an ad-hoc basis.

During the Gulf war, the Bush administration set a precedent that appears likely to last, and according to which the United States will frequently use the cover of the United Nations for its military actions overseas. The U.S. has benefited both at home and abroad from the air of legitimacy this authority has provided. But if the atmosphere at the United Nations were to deteriorate — for example, if China should choose to exercise its veto in the Security Council — the United States might wind up embarrassed by these precedents. The proper course is likely to be one of pragmatic use of the United Nations if it will provide the necessary support, but a periodic reaffirmation (and even demonstration) of American willingness to act even without its endorsement. A reflexive appeal to the United Nations for legitimacy even in cases abutting the American mainland — as has occurred in Haiti — sets precedents that will be used to confine and restrict American power in the future.

NATO remains the most durable and important of formal American coalitions. In the long run, however, unless Russia reemerges as a threat to the security of Europe, NATO is bound to deteriorate slowly. Europe, as it expands, is likely to have more, not less, difficulty in agreeing on a common foreign and defense policy; the debacle in Bosnia is ample evidence of that. So, too, are the persistent disagreements between Germany and some of its Western neighbors on the eastward expansion of both NATO and the European Union.

Europe's difficulty in acting collectively does not diminish American interest in keeping NATO alive, but alive less as a command structure in time of war than as a means of harmonizing procedures and familiarizing soldiers with one another in times of peace. NATO's most useful work takes place when soldiers, sailors and airmen agree on standardized means of issuing orders, controlling air traffic or managing naval operations.

From this common basis, NATO members can operate in ad-hoc coalitions on the fringes of Europe, even if not under NATO auspices. The Gulf war, in which the United States managed to coordinate the activities of a half-dozen air forces with the procedures and planning tools devised for use in Europe, demonstrated the value of this experience.

To generalize from the case of NATO: American coalition operations should most often take place through the medium of temporary or local alliances, operating in some cases under a diffuse authority granted by larger organizations, but not dependent upon them.

If the path to America's future coalitions is relatively clear, one cannot say as much for military acquisition. The issue here is not so much how the Pentagon develops and buys hardware (William Perry's Defense Department deserves credit for trying to streamline a cumbersome process) as in what it buys.

There are three broad trade-offs. One is between what one might call mega- and micro-systems. The United States did very well in the Cold War with exceedingly large and complex military platforms — aircraft carriers, for example, but also such marvels of modern military technology as the B-2 bomber, the JSTARS surveillance aircraft, or even the M-1 Abrams tank.

For a time, in the 1970's, military reformers argued that the United States was ill-advised to build larger and more complex systems. They pressed instead for the purchase of cheaper aircraft like the single-engine F-16 fighter, or simple diesel-electric submarines, rather than the far more costly F-15 or the Navy's standard nuclear-powered submarine. The "military reformers" were proved wrong, at least insofar as hardware was concerned. In the Gulf war, the more sophisticated aircraft such as the F-111 and the F-15 far outperformed the F-16.

Ironically, however, the tide may have turned in the reformers' favor after they have been driven from the field, thanks to the "revolution in military affairs" discussed earlier. In brief, and to repeat, the advent of "smart weapons" — cruise missiles that can fly hundreds of kilometers and hit with an accuracy of a few meters; off-road mines that can listen for moving vehicles and attack them; remotely-piloted vehicles that can locate targets and bring in artillery fire; cheap glide bombs that can pick their own targets or hit predesignated ones — has wrought a transformation in warfare. Just as massive mainframe computers have lost a great deal of ground to networks of smaller computers engaged in parallel processing, so, too, the future of military technology may turn away from the megasystems and toward networks of smaller and cheaper systems linked together by the new information technologies.

This trend toward warfare by micro-system points to a second trade-off, between quality and quantity. As the defense budget falls, the tendency will be to concentrate on smaller numbers of high-value platforms. These are not only aesthetically more satisfying and imposing, but politically more comprehensible. But the true indices of power in the future may lie in the possession of large numbers of cruise missiles and sensors. For as impressive as the performance of individual pieces of equipment may be, the key to their effective use will be their deployment in *quantity*.

This will be so because of those elements of war which Clausewitz termed "friction": malfunctioning of equipment, inadequate intelligence, and enemy countermeasures.

Thus, the January and June 1993 punitive attacks on Baghdad used 69 Tomahawk land-attack missiles and ate up $75-million worth of ordnance for uncertain, if not negligible, effects. To have real military and hence political effect, American generals will need to be able to launch hundreds of strikes repeatedly over time against enemy targets. Not only will scarce defense dollars have to go to keeping adequate stocks of munitions; the United States will have to be willing to spend large sums on manufacturing technology in order to drive down the costs of individual rounds. Further refinements to a Tomahawk cruise missile may matter much less to its utility as an instrument of military power than to reducing its cost from $1.2 million to a tenth of that figure.

Large-scale acquisition of the new technologies will be difficult in the face of pressure to keep up substantial forces and to maintain their operations tempo. Indeed, it is acquisition of new hardware that is taking the hardest hits from the Clinton cutbacks. Furthermore, the imperatives of day-to-day operations create pressures contrary to those of a sound, long-term strategy.

From a long-term point of view, for instance, it might be worth having the Navy invest in so-called "arsenal ships" — large, stealthy, semi-submersible vessels densely packed with missiles in vertical launch tubes. Such vessels — which might carry hundreds of rounds, plus reloads — could lurk hundreds of miles from their targets, reprogram their missiles using information transmitted by satellite, and open fire. Yet, although an arsenal ship might be a handy vessel to have for actual war-fighting, it is considerably less valuable for showing the flag or administering a blockade.

In the same vein, it makes sense to purchase more than the 20 B-2 bombers now on order by the United States Air Force, and in general to do everything possible to make up for the retirement of older bombers such as the Air Force's F-111 and B-52, and the US Navy's A-6. Bombers, however, have little utility for shows of force, and none at all for humanitarian rescues or peacekeeping operations.

The last set of choices before the American defense establishment concerns its most important constituent elements: the armed services. Over the last decade, a consensus has emerged that equates the services with parochial and self-seeking behavior, at odds with the requirements of joint action in war and sound administration in peace. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, itself the product of several years of debate prompted by congressional dissatisfaction with the Department of Defense's internal management, crystallized this disenchantment.

From Goldwater-Nichols there emerged a system that put increasing power in the hands of the chairman, and even the vice chairman, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with the Joint Staff itself, which increasingly came under the direct control and supervision of the chairman. When Congress in 1994 created a commission to examine the roles and missions of the armed services, it complained once again about duplication of effort by the services, and the supposed inefficiencies of their mutual competition.

One might infer from much of the contemporary debate that the ideal armed service would consist of one kind of soldier wearing one uniform. Canada actually experimented with such a system in the mid-1960s, and soon discovered that even in its tiny military there was a natural breakdown among land, sea and air services. It further discovered that morale suffered from even apparently minor matters like the discarding of traditional uniforms, a decision reversed 20 years later in 1985. (The U.S. Navy relearned this lesson in 1977 when it reinstated the cherished bell-bottom trousers and white sailors' caps taken away in 1971 by a chief of naval operations zealous for efficiency.)

Soldiers, sailors and airmen inhabit very different worlds, and have very different cultures. This differentiation of service cultures is inevitable, bred by the physical environments in which soldiers, sailors and airmen operate. It is also highly desirable. There may be no compelling operational requirement for a distinct Marine Corps (armies can conduct amphibious operations with adequate training), but the Marines' élan and professionalism, combined with the peculiar organizational forms they have evolved, make them a unique and invaluable asset. Even when they do the same things the Army does, they do them differently, and occasionally better. And as anyone who has associated with both services knows, each often attracts its own kind of people.

We take it for granted in business that customers will get better service from three or four competing franchises than from a monopoly; we do not call the existence of several national newspapers a deplorable failure of rationalization, or regard the existence of bicameral legislatures as evidence of inefficient government. In the same way, it is a good thing and not a bad thing to have services compete with one another for such missions as counterinsurgency or theater ballistic-missile defense.

In any case, much of the so-called duplication of the services does not represent unnecessary effort. If the Air Force controlled all combat aircraft, we would probably still have pretty much the same number of airplanes at sea on aircraft carriers, albeit supported by an organization far less familiar with the operating environment than the Navy. Because of the technological flux that characterizes military developments, it makes good sense to let competition, and not a master plan, shape the choices about which organizations take on which new missions.

This does not mean, however, that the current array of services is inevitable or desirable. There may be a case for expanding the number of the services by creating one devoted solely to space and long-range missile operations. And it is surely desirable to shape the competition among the services, which, after all, do not produce their own revenues.

But it must be remembered that it is the services that have the longest-term view. Goldwater-Nichols gave more power to the theater commanders-in-chief (the so-called CINC's), including a voice in making budget decisions. By the nature of their tasks, however, theater commanders, and to some extent even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have to look to immediate operational concerns and problems — whether, for instance, there is enough airlift to send soldiers to a trouble spot tomorrow. By contrast, a chief of staff of one of the services worries about equipping the force ten years from now.

One supposedly obsolete element of the service structure is the continued existence of service secretaries — civilian heads of the different departments. Too often these posts go to valued presidential campaign contributors, or to figureheads who enable an administration to score points with assorted constituencies. For their part, the uniformed services know very well how to lull their nominal civilian superiors with endless rounds of ceremonial speeches and enjoyable excursions — driving tanks, flying airplanes, conning a submarine.

Yet, the secretaries of the services are potentially the most important figures for asserting civilian control over the military. They control (in theory, at any rate) the service personnel and promotional systems. They can, and sometimes do, know the general officers far better than a busy Secretary of Defense or his deputy. And if they do their job well, they can turn military tourism into an intimate knowledge of the working conditions, spirit and needs of both officer and enlisted ranks.

Admittedly, most civilian secretaries do not measure up in all these ways, but occasionally some do. John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration, and Don Rice, Secretary of the Air Force during the Bush administration, though very different men, are examples of just how much important work a competent service secretary can do.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

One reason good service secretaries are needed now more than ever is that American civil-military relations seem to be undergoing long-term deterioration. This has been noted by a number of observers and is evident in dozens of incidents: the failure of Admiral Frank Kelso, chief of naval operations, to retire despite the request of his superior, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, that he do so; the instruction by General Barry McCaffrey, commander of U.S. Southern Command, that his subordinates report to him and not (as the law requires) to the ambassadors in their respective countries. The Clinton administration has managed at once to show a lack of understanding of the military and on occasion even a contempt for it, while meekly submitting to insubordinate behavior by all too many of its members.

But the problem goes far deeper. It was evident in the willingness of Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly to oppose government policy in Yugoslavia, and it appeared in the generally hostile attitude of military staffs to both press and civilian policymakers during the Gulf crisis. It has been reported as well in the writings of thoughtful officers like Colonel Charles Dunlap, Jr., especially in his disturbing (and prizewinning) fantasy, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."2/

What are the sources of the contemporary distemper? One is the trauma of Vietnam. Only 40 percent of draft-age men served in the military during that war; of this group, only a quarter (that is, 10 percent of all draft-age men) went to Vietnam, and a rather small minority of these saw combat. The artful public reconciliation of the Reagan years, replete with parades and the construction of a Vietnam memorial, together with the mere passing of time, has smoothed over the overt consequences of that war. But if one probes deeper, down to the organizational culture of the American defense establishment, one finds scars that will not fade.

For American soldiers — even for those who did not serve during the war — Vietnam is an *un*-memory. Believing as they do that the United States had never before lost a war, American officers feel a certain humiliation at the failure of American arms to reduce to submission an impoverished country with barely a tenth of our population. Many, and probably most, are convinced that this failure stemmed in large part from the interference of civilians in the conduct of the war, and from the failure of politicians to assign clear guidelines for waging it.

The debacles of the Lebanon intervention in the early 1980's and the Somali intervention a decade later, though far smaller in scale, have only confirmed these lessons. Quixotically conceived and erratically executed acts of social work masquerading as strategy, such as the Haitian occupation, reinforce soldiers' suspicion that politicians do not understand the military instrument's limitations, or comprehend the damage that misuse does to it. And officers are very well aware that the Vietnam experience corroded the morale, discipline and professional expertise of the military itself. It took at least a decade to repair the damage.

On the other side, politicians, particularly those of the Vietnam generation who evaded service there (probably the majority in both parties of that age cohort), are often shy to exert strenuous civilian control. Accepting, as many do, the military assessment of the war — an evaluation that actually has less merit than one might think — they fear the penalties of putting a now-popular military in harm's way under any but benign circumstances. For both soldiers and politicians, the model of the Gulf war is the one to follow: conducting a war for nominally limited and concrete (although in reality ambiguous) objectives, with overwhelming force, against an enemy who has been completely isolated and who, indeed, practically invites attack.

There is a further factor to be considered here. The American government, and in some ways even the military itself, poorly comprehended the enormous relative advantage we had over the Iraqis in the Persian Gulf. For military technology is becoming increasingly obscure, and military assessment increasingly recondite.

In the old days, one could in some fashion count items — battleships, tanks, heavy bombers — and have a rough sense of what kind of power they purchased. Today, one missile may look very much like another, and a great deal of combat takes place invisibly, in the jamming of radars or the cloaking of planes, ships and tanks by exotic materials and design. And as fewer and fewer politicians bring any kind of military experience of their own to bear, civilians find themselves increasingly dependent on military staffs. At the same time, civilian leaders put a premium on finding senior officers who mouth the right formulas about matters of gender and race.

This mixture of politicians' incomprehension on the one hand, and their desire for sycophancy on the other, poses long-term risks. One can imagine the emergence out of this of an officer corps, leading members of which identify themselves, if not with political parties, then with politicians. Indeed, in the 1992 election, this occurred, as retired officers lined up behind presidential candidates with little thought to the pernicious consequences of their actions.

The evolution of warfare itself may produce further challenges. As we have seen, one of the few burgeoning areas of military thought and activity is "information warfare" — the conduct of conflict through the manipulation (and not merely the interception or exclusion) of information. Future tools of information warfare will include satellite television broadcasts, the disruption of financial systems, the forging of all kinds of electronic messages, and the corruption of databases. It is the kind of activity that mischievous teenagers and greedy computer wizards have engaged in for decades now. The military, being as large and efficient as it is, can carry such activities to new heights, and increase the role played by the American military in a variety of everyday transactions.

At a lower level, other kinds of frictions will occur. Elite commando units worry about their members' — trained in the black arts of breaking and entering, not to mention other, far nastier criminal skills — going bad. It has rarely happened, in part thanks to successful screening and training; but as the military breeds more information warriors, one wonders if such screening will continue to be effective. The temptations of computer hacking are far wider and stronger (among other things, it is much less violent and can be far more lucrative) than, say, assassination for pay. Far more worrisome, however, is the possibility that a military fighting the shadowy battles of "information warfare" may find itself engaging the country in foreign-policy tangles of a particularly messy kind.

None of this is to suggest that the United States has a rogue military, or anything like it. Quite the contrary. In many ways, this is the most acutely self-aware armed force the country has ever known, and one that (in part) worries a good deal about its relationship with the broader society. As the Gulf war demonstrated, its leaders are far more politically astute and sensitive to the imperatives of foreign policy than their predecessors of bygone generations.

The difficulty is much more on the other side, in the absence of a civilian class familiar with military matters and comfortable with military people. As a generation that served in the military yields its place in public life to one whose members not only have not served but probably do not know anyone who has, an unfortunate gap grows. It is the civilians, not the soldiers, who have abdicated their responsibilities.

How to remedy matters? One recourse may be to increase the intermixing of civilians and soldiers by sending more civilians — not just civil servants but journalists, congressional staffers, business people, and others — for year-long stints in the country's war colleges. Another might be the deliberate creation and preservation of routes for brief active duty or longer-term reserve duty by young men and women who will, later on, become this country's civic leaders. Yet another course might be a more extensive use of programs that place soldiers in educational and even business institutions for a year or two at a time.

One of the chief legacies of the Cold War was a narrowing of debate about national defense to an obsession with weapon systems (should we buy cheap single-engine fighters or more costly twin-engine fighters?) or simply the bottom line of the defense budget. This cramping of debate resulted from the existence of an altogether desirable consensus about the essential parameters of the defense problem. All responsible people agreed that the United States should have a very large military, that it should be forward-deployed, that it should be embedded in NATO, and so on.

That consensus helped win the Cold War. But it has resulted in the atrophy of our capacities for a debate of the kind that occurred at the turn of the century, when the United States became a great power, or in the late 1940's, when the United States accepted its status as a superpower.

In the absence of events forcing our hand, we may find it hard to engage in such comprehensive self-scrutiny, and it is even conceivable that in the short term, we will pay no large penalty. In a longer view, however — say, 20 years — matters may be different. If Francis Fukuyama's famous verdict turns out to be right, and we do in fact reach the end of history, defined as the rise of essentially pacific liberal-democratic states, all this concern about defense will seem an atavism, a survival of an older and bloodier age. The greater wisdom, however, may rest with Winston Churchill, who once wrote:

Certain it is that while men are gathering knowledge and power with ever-increasing and measureless speed, their virtues and their wisdom have not shown any notable improvement as the centuries have rolled. The brain of a modern man does not differ in essentials from that of the human beings who fought and loved here millions of years ago. The nature of man has remained hitherto practically unchanged. Under sufficient stress — starvation, terror, warlike passion, or even cold intellectual frenzy — the modern man we know so well will do the most terrible deeds. . . . We have the spectacle of the powers and weapons of man far outstripping the march of his intelligence; we have the march of his intelligence proceeding far more rapidly than the development of his nobility. We may find ourselves in the presence of the strength of civilization without its mercy.

In the wreckage of Saddam Hussein's extensive nuclear program, in the dimly glimpsed transactions of Russian plutonium merchants, in the anonymous ferocity of those who bomb office buildings in New York and Argentina, one catches flashes of what "the strength of civilization without its mercy" may look like.

Beyond these menaces of the next decade, others may await us. Soon science will open up fantastic new possibilities — say, in the development of biological weapons and in the manipulation of human life itself — that some men or states will almost certainly turn to evil ends. Surely, it would be rank folly to shrug aside the possible rise of a Napoleon, a Hitler who would cunningly exploit "perverted science," as Churchill called it. And lesser men — the Milosevics, Husseins, and Aidids — will make trouble enough.

All the more reason, then, to break the habits of the Cold War and prepare to meet a possibly less dangerous but almost certainly more turbulent age.

NOTES:

1. For evidence, one need only look at the spate of articles in *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1993) triggered by Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" (Summer 1993).

2. *Parameters* (Winter 1992-93). See also Dunlap's article, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," *Wake Forest Law Review* (Summer 1994).

SUMMARY

The author argues that efforts to keep countries that currently do not possess nuclear weapons from developing them are doomed to failure, unless the existing nuclear powers support a policy that over time would eliminate atomic weapons completely. He maintains that this is a policy which all nations will find feasible, practical and in their interest. (Length: 3,700 words.)

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS: ELIMINATE OR MARGINALIZE?

By Michael MccGwire

THE DECADES-OLD ROLE of nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of Western defense policy is coming into question. As a 1993 Council on Foreign Relations book put it, Weapons "From the beginning of the Cold War in 1946 to its end in 1990, the U.S. government would have rejected any offer from the gods to take all nuclear weapons off the table of international affairs." Today, by contrast, such an offer "would deserve instant acceptance."

Lamenting that "no one knows how to abolish nuclear weapons," the book's authors — McGeorge Bundy (special assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1961-66), Admiral William Crowe (chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, 1985-89, now U.S. ambassador to London), and Sidney Drell (physicist and long-time adviser to the U.S. government on security issues) — nonetheless put on record their belief that nuclear weapons diminish rather than enhance U.S. security.

Nor are they alone. In November 1992, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who has long argued that nuclear weapons have no military value, advocated "returning to a non-nuclear world" — though with the caveat, "insofar as possible." Similar statements are now being made in forums throughout the United States. Many of these so-called "marginalizers" — as this wing of the current nuclear weapons debate is coming to be known — believe that deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy will lead to their atrophy and ultimate extinction. But only a few marginalizers are ready to accept the logic of that belief: adopt today the policy goal of achieving a nuclear-free world within the next 20-30 years. Most consider that goal politically unfeasible or are daunted by the problem of nuclear breakout.

Their assumption — or hope — is that policymakers can preserve today's rather reassuringly low-salience nuclear world indefinitely into the future by changing America's stated nuclear doctrine and reducing existing arsenals. But that assumption ignores current international trends and the history of this century and is not a workable option.

The real choice is between actively pursuing a nuclear-free world over the next quarter century or returning inevitably to the high-salience nuclear world from which we have just been set free. What are the risks and benefits of these alternative courses, with particular reference to the ultimate danger of a nuclear exchange?

INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTS

The present lull in power confrontation is a historical anomaly, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Failing a radical change in Western policies now, the conjunction of two historical trends suggests that world affairs in the future will be at least as turbulent as in the past.

One trend is the end of European global domination, an era that left behind deep resentments in many areas, some of which have been reinforced by the experience of the past 30-40 years. The other trend is differing rates of growth in world populations. Today, for example, Asians outnumber Westerners more than 2:1, a disparity for which the West's economic and military power more than compensates. But by 2025, the disparity may grow to 4 or 5:1, with no compensating advantages, and may well lead to a shift in hegemonic power.

One needn't subscribe to Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" to conclude that a quarter century from now global relations are likely to be at least as conflict-ridden as they were during the Cold War years, albeit in ways that have yet to be foreseen. And despite the lesson of the two World Wars that war is no longer a rational instrument of policy in great-power relations, arms racing will remain a feature of the international scene, with nuclear weapons having a totemic value unrelated to military utility.

Experience also suggests that the nuclear arms race will continue to have a logic and dynamic of its own. Even as the superpowers were actively negotiating the successive treaties on strategic arms "limitations" and "reductions," the number of warheads on each side rose from less than 2,000 to more than 11,000. Nor was the upward spiral a quirk of communist intransigence; the United States was the first to diversify into multiple warheads and strategic cruise missiles, and then it sought to take the arms race into space. Even after the Soviet Union had disintegrated, the United States proposed a START II ceiling of 4,700 warheads — enough to destroy Russia as a functioning society several times over. And although some "marginalizers" talk of 1,000 warheads by the year 2000, others see institutional obstacles to going below 2,500.

China, meanwhile, continues to add to its nuclear arsenal, and the problem of proliferation worsens. It is generally accepted that halting the spread of nuclear weapons will only grow harder. Technological advance and diffusion have steadily lowered the barriers to entering the weapon business, and 20-30 states already have the requisite technological capacity. It is becoming ever easier for would-be proliferators to design bombs and acquire fissile materials and other components, often exploiting Western commercial competition, while the number of countries that can afford to do so is steadily increasing. And the Gulf War provided the lesson that to be safe from U.S. military intervention, third world states need a nuclear capability.

New problems have also arisen. The Cold War's end eroded intra-bloc discipline and weakened the constraints that superpowers were able to impose on allies and clients. Weapons-grade material and people with nuclear skills are newly available worldwide. And if the Soviet Union can disintegrate, why not China, or India, or the new Russian state, and why should the break-up be peaceable? If Muslim politic identity strengthens, could Pakistan choose to share its weapons know-how with Indonesia, Malaya even Iran? Will Japan and Germany always be content with a U.S. security umbrella?

Rumbling in the background is the continuing resentment of the two-class nature of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (PT), which perpetuates the arbitrary privileging of the five original nuclear states (three of them Western). And dissatisfaction is growing over the five's failure to meet their treaty obligations regarding nuclear disarmament. Willing acceptance of the PT's control and verification measures is less than universal, while Iraq and North Korea have highlighted the problems of policing and reversing evasions.

In sum, current trends and suggest that while patterns will change, international relations will continue to be conflictual and will generate arms races. Failing a change in Western policy, we will certainly face a world of many nuclear states within the next several decades, and it is most unlikely that all will settle for minimum deterrence. Nuclear arms racing will surely reappear.

THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR

The claim by Western "traditionalists" that nuclear weapons are the key to peace is subject to several problems. The argument that the "very existence of nuclear weapons" accounts for the absence of major war between advanced military powers during the past 40 years is a case of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The superpowers, fresh from World War 11, were determined to avoid war at almost any cost. By the early 1950s, they had set a pattern of war avoidance that was well established when the strategic nuclear arms race took off in the 1960s. The new danger of nuclear escalation merely underlined the point. And nuclear weapons were singularly ineffective in preventing other kinds of war, even in areas of the world where the United States had an effective monopoly.

The nuclear arms race and swollen arsenals did, however, create a particular perception of threat. And that perception was reinforced by each nation's need to maintain the credibility of deterrence by demonstrating its will to inflict massive devastation on its opponent and to suffer it, if need be, itself. The consequent exaggerated rhetoric, aimed at domestic constituents as well as opponents, hardened attitudes and inflamed mutual hostility, heightening international tension.

But war does not stem only from deliberate aggression, which can be deterred by threats of unacceptable punishment. History is replete with examples of inadvertent hostilities — one thinks of the Cuban missile crisis — triggered by mutual misunderstanding or the momentum of events. And in times of tension there is the new possibility of accidental war, a consequence of nuclear-armed missiles. Analysts now know, for example, that the command, control, and communications systems of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces during the Cold War were subject to a significant probability of procedural and systems malfunctions (and hence mistaken activation of strike plans). The world was immensely fortunate that neither side made a fatal mistake during the 25 years of bipolar confrontation. But what lies ahead is a multipolar game of indefinite duration, where the new players' nuclear command, control, and communications will be more prone to system errors, and each player's understanding of the others' thought processes will be even more rudimentary. Can we still rely on luck? As Robert McNamara puts it, "Human beings are fallible ... The indefinite combination of nuclear weapons and human fallibility will lead to a nuclear exchange."

THE ALTERNATIVE — IS IT ACHIEVABLE?

Is a nuclear-free world achievable? Allowing that the process may take as long as 30 years, is it feasible in

technical, institutional, and political terms? And if feasible, does the possibility that a state might break out from such a regime invalidate the concept?

To be feasible, three requirements must be met. The nuclear states must embrace the goal and actively support the process. A nuclear-weapons-free regime must be devised and agreed. And nuclear arsenals must be progressively eliminated.

The last requirement is the least problematic. The political, administrative, and technical processes involved in drawing down and dismantling the existing nuclear arsenals have been the staple of arms control specialists for the past seven years, though the move to very low numbers and then total elimination will take some new thinking. Happily, verifying *zero* weapons or warheads is much easier than verifying specific limits.

Similarly, devising an effective nuclear-weapons-free regime and its associated institutions can build on existing experience and practice, most notably the 15-year negotiations leading to the complex but comprehensive legal regime on the use of the sea and its resources and most recently the Chemical Weapons Convention signed in 1993.

The treaty-making process could be structured in many different ways, but in its final form the regime would be governed by a universal treaty of indefinite duration and without the right of withdrawal. Administrative, scientific, and technical problems will be formidable, but not insoluble. A nuclear-free treaty would build on the foundation of existing treaties and agreements relating to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. But, unlike the Law of the Sea treaty and successive arms control agreements, negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be favored by a high coincidence of interests among parties. While the effectiveness of verification measures will be critical to the acceptability and success of a nuclear-free regime, all measures need not be in place before negotiations on the shape of the regime begin, let alone before a treaty of serious intent is signed. The required procedures over time, with progressive increases in stringency. The new discipline of control and verification is still in its infancy, the potential of information technology is largely untapped, and with the necessary resources, massive improvements in procedures and scientific techniques are possible. The excuse that "we don't know how" sits ill with a nation that was preparing to spend hundreds of billions (thousands of millions) of dollars on a futuristic Strategic Defense Initiative.

Account must also be taken of improvements in the climate of international relations consequent to a Western decision to adopt the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Enforcing the PT, for example, would become a matter of universal concern, rather than, as seen by many nonnuclear states, a dispute between haves and have-nots.

Progress toward a nuclear-free world would be paced by the process of dismantling the existing arsenals and establishing the necessary politico-legal regime and its associated means of control, verification, and enforcement. The pressures driving nuclear proliferation would steadily diminish. The security requirement for countervailing force would be progressively removed. The urge to preserve independence in foreign affairs through a nuclear capability would be assuaged by the leveling down process. And while the potential role of nuclear weapons as the great equalizer would remain, it is relevant that the generous supply of U.S. arms to Israel managed to compensate for a gross disparity in numbers.

WILL THE NUCLEAR STATES AGREE?

Three developments could push the United States to commit itself to the goal of a nuclear-free world. One is the growing realization that with the Soviet Union out of the picture, nuclear weapons bring no tangible benefits and pose deadly long-run dangers. Another is the increased importance of the PT. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by third world states will negate U.S. conventional superiority; and a fully effective non-proliferation treaty (along with good intelligence) is the only counter to nuclear terrorism. The heavily populated cities that line its richly indented seaboards make the United States particularly vulnerable to the devastating effects of waterborne fallout.

The third development concerns possible changes in the distribution of world power. It is in the West's interest to have firmly in place an internationally accepted political-legal regime that can manage such change peaceably. Comprehensive conventions banning nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons would serve as the foundations of such a regime.

If Washington were to adopt the goal of a nuclear-free world, the other nuclear nations would follow suit. Britain and France would fall into line, albeit reluctantly. China, given its conventional potential, has every reason to welcome a nuclear-free world and is on record supporting the idea. A nuclear-free China would remove the rationale for India's and hence Pakistan's capability. (India has officially proposed a nuclear-free world on several occasions.) And Israel recognizes its vulnerability to attack by primitive delivery systems, has shown that its territorial integrity can be ensured by conventional means, and knows that the greatest danger now comes from internal forces impervious to nuclear threats.

And Russia? Given China's potential and the traditional enmity of Germany and Japan, Russia could legitimately claim a continuing need for "the great equalizer." But it was Russia (in the shape of the Soviet Union) that first faced up to the deadly logic of the nuclear arms race and explicitly adopted the goal of a nuclear-free world. The policy predated Mikhail Gorbachev, but he pursued the goal with particular vigor and enjoyed strong military support. Through 1992 Russia continued to advocate complete nuclear disarmament, and although current policy is more fluid, last September Boris Yeltsin called for further cuts in strategic weapons to provide the eventual possibility of a nuclear-free world.

THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR BREAKOUT

What if a state manages to "break out" from the nuclear-free regime? Many in the West assume that nuclear breakout would be so dangerous that we should not even set foot down the nuclear-free path, notwithstanding the immediate gains in international security and the broader political benefits of working toward that goal. Such an assumption, however, ignores the changes that will take place once we adopt the nuclear-free goal. By the time we are ready to cross the nuclear-free threshold, all the institutional

infrastructure will long have been in place, and all control and verification procedures will have been proven and refined during the intervening years of enforcing the PT. Meanwhile, the world will have negotiated and agreed on a raft of mutually supporting treaties, conventions, and protocols relating to the permanent elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the control of all relevant material and technologies. In this and other important respects (particularly attitudes and expectations), a nuclear-free world will be very different from the one we know today.

It must, of course, be accepted that the regime's controls could be evaded. But it must also be asked what the incentive would be for a state to embark on such a hazardous course. It turns out that the net incentive is much smaller than is generally assumed, partly because no one has yet discovered how to translate the national power of a nuclear monopoly into practical gains. We have lived with nuclear weapons for 50 years, 10 of which saw a U.S. monopoly, and despite the theorists' best efforts, no example of nuclear compellence yet exists.

And what about the potential costs to a breakout nation? Unlike territorial claims and questions of aggression, which tie the United Nations into knots, a serious breach of the nuclear-weapons-free regime would be indisputable and would clearly threaten the interests of all other states, rich or poor, large or small. Collective action will therefore be assured, strengthening the deterrent effect of the wide array of available instruments, including conventional weapons, which will by then have become immeasurably more destructive. Classical deterrence does not depend on retribution being instantaneous or in kind — only certain.

Postulated treaty evaders are of three types. Two — the rogue and the high-tech state — will secretly develop new nuclear devices. The third — by implication, Russia or China — will have held back a sizable arsenal from the weapons dismantling process. From the Western standpoint, the rogue state is dangerous because it may not observe conventional calculations of national self-interest. But few such states will exist, and they will be particularly closely monitored and vulnerable to ongoing sanctions. If a state does achieve breakout, it will still have to solve the problem of translating its monopoly into practical gains. And even if irrationality prevails and one or even several weapons are detonated, the resultant calamity would be comparable, in global terms, to a range of natural and man-made disasters that, unlike a nuclear exchange, world society has shown it can tolerate.

In the case of a high-tech evader, the danger is said to be strategic instability, as other powers scramble to develop a countervailing capability, generating pressure for a preemptive strike. But the worst-case analysts make no attempt to identify the net balance of incentives that would prompt a high-tech state to embark on such a damaging course of action in the first place or to justify the risks involved in a preemptive strike. And, again, if the worst did happen, the resultant devastation would be small compared with the effects of a nuclear exchange between fully developed arsenals of the kind that existed in the past and are likely to reemerge in the future.

A net incentive to cheat arguably exists for the third category of evader, at least for Russia. Moscow might deem it prudent to secrete some weapons from its dwindling arsenal as insurance against future developments in China. But such a deterrent to Chinese invasion could be used only once before being matched, and, besides, armed invasion poses less of a threat to Russian territory than occupation by illegal immigrants. Russian leaders would surely have thought of all that before signing the treaty, in which case the danger of nuclear war must have taken precedence over the potential threat from China.

In sum, the threat of breakout from a nuclear-free world is neither as substantial nor as potentially calamitous as is usually depicted and deep-six (to shove overboard) the concept. To be sure, a successful breakout would pose a danger to a nuclear-free regime. But that danger must be set against the equally real danger of a nuclear exchange inherent in a nuclear world.

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA

We have reached an unusual juncture in world affairs. One distinct and turbulent era has come to an end. The next has yet to take shape. We have the opportunity to make a real choice about the future of nuclear weapons. We cannot choose the status quo. In the long run, we will be unable to prevent proliferation. Our current low-salience nuclear world will become a world of many nuclear states. The strategic arms race will begin anew, and with it the danger of inadvertent or accidental nuclear war.

If we were to adopt the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world, halting proliferation would become more feasible and the world would grow progressively less dangerous. Even the threat of nuclear breakout turns out to be less ominous than generally claimed — certainly less calamitous than the nuclear exchange latent in a nuclear-weapons world — and assuredly not of a kind to render the concept infeasible. And the prospects that the United States and the other nuclear states will come to see a nuclear-free world as being to their advantage also turn out to be surprisingly favorable.

Eliminating the danger of nuclear war is one reason why a nuclear-free world is desirable. Another, and one that should be of particular interest to the West, is that the process of working toward a nuclear-free world would greatly reinforce the slowly growing international structure of laws that constrain state behavior and reduce the incentive to resort to force.

Today the Western alliance, which currently embraces much of Asia, is singularly well placed to embark on establishing such a regime. We would not be seeking to achieve a nuclear-free world overnight, but over some 20-30 years. The process would itself be continuously reshaping the international political environment in a way generally favorable to achieving its goal. Nor need we be sure of the exact path to follow or even of immediate success before we set out.

The goal is all-important. The alternative to a nuclear-free world is not the reassuring low-salience nuclear world we live in today. Today's nuclear world is inherently unsustainable. The future will be either a nuclear-free world or a high-salience nuclear world. A unique confluence of events extracted us from one high-salience nuclear world, but if we fail to take radical action, there are no good reasons why we will not revert to that dangerous state.

The only way to avoid taking that terrible step backward is to adopt the firm and serious goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world and then to strive mightily to achieve it.

SUMMARY

In the post-Cold War world, the United States "has become a European power in a sense that goes beyond traditional assertions of America's `commitment' to Europe," argues this prominent American official. Washington has a vital and active interest in the adjustment and expansion of proven "Western" institutions to create a security architecture capable of encompassing eastern and central Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union toward solution of the "local conflicts, internal political and economic instability" and revived "historical grievances" that "have now replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe." (Length: 4,800 words.)

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AMERICA: A EUROPEAN POWER

By Richard Holbrooke

THE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

President Clinton made four trips to Europe in 1994. This commitment of presidential time and attention underlines an inescapable but little-realized fact: the United States has become a European power in a sense that goes beyond traditional assertions of America's "commitment" to Europe. In the 21st century, Europe will still need the active American involvement that has been a necessary component of the continental balance for half a century. Conversely, an unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests of the United States. This is as true after as it was during the Cold War.

I do not intend, of course, to suggest that nothing has changed. The end of the Cold War, which can best be dated to that symbolic moment at midnight on December 25, 1991, when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time, began an era of change of historic proportions. Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return of historical grievances have now replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. Western Europe and America must jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past are contained and solved.

THE FOURTH ARCHITECTURAL MOMENT

Only three times since the French Revolution has Europe peacefully reshaped its basic security architecture. Today, the continent is in the middle of nothing less than the fourth such moment in the last two centuries. The first post-Napoleonic security architecture for Europe, designed in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, helped prevent all-out continental war for 99 years. The young United States, having fought two wars with England in only 40 years, successfully kept its distance, but for the last time.

In the second period of redesign, at Versailles in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson played a central role, but the United States withdrew almost immediately from the very structures it had helped create, thereby weakening them and thus virtually guaranteeing the tragic resumption of total war 20 years later. When the third opportunity arose in 1945, the great powers initially built a system based on Yalta, Potsdam and the United Nations. But starting in 1947, when the leaders of the West realized that this system would not suffice to stem Soviet expansion, they created the most successful peacetime collective security system in history, centered around the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Atlantic partnership — and American leadership.

This creative architecture reflected the underlying goals of America's postwar engagement in Europe. Its post-Cold War engagement must focus again on structures, old and new. This time, the United States must lead in the creation of a

security architecture that includes and thereby stabilizes all of Europe — the West, the former Soviet satellites of central Europe and, most critically, Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union.

All the key participants in the new security equation in Europe — the United States, the western and central European countries, and the other nations of the former Soviet Union — desire a peaceful, stable and democratic Russia, integrated into the institutions of an undivided Europe. No more important political goal has existed in Europe since a newly democratic West Germany was successfully integrated into the European political and security structure after World War II. It is for this and other reasons that the crisis in Chechnya, discussed more fully below, has been so disturbing.

Fortunately, most of the great structures of the postwar period offer a usable foundation for building stability. The essential challenge is to maintain their coherence, project their influence, and adapt to new circumstances without diluting their basic functions.

Measured on the post-World War II calendar, the United States is now slightly past the point in the late spring of 1947 when Secretary of State George C. Marshall made his historic speech at Harvard University. The Marshall Plan he outlined that day was not charity. Rather, it was a program of assistance and credits designed to stimulate cooperation among the European states. And it is important to remember that Marshall offered the plan not only to Western Europe but to the Soviet Union, which turned it down for itself and its satellites and instead embarked on a 45-year epoch that condemned an entire region to political and economic ruin.

Today, as after World War II, early euphoria has yielded to a more sober appreciation of the problems, new and old. The tragedy of Bosnia does not diminish the responsibility to build a new comprehensive structure of relationships to form a new security architecture. On the contrary, Bosnia, the greatest collective-security failure of the West since the 1930s, only underscores the urgency of that task.

In 1947, Americans learned that those with the ability to preserve the peace have a special responsibility to assist in building stable structures in newly democratic neighbors. Then, only the United States was secure and prosperous enough to offer Western Europe the assistance it needed. Today, an equally prosperous Western Europe (and Japan, which has a stake in and benefits from a stable Europe) will have to put up the bulk of the actual financial assistance, but the United States must continue to play a leading part. In the words of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the central goal of the United States is "to help extend to all of Europe the benefits and obligations of the same liberal trading and collective-security order that have been pillars of strength for the West."

A final lesson of the Marshall Plan is equally important. Those receiving support must build their own futures. The new democracies must contribute to their own security through both responsible behavior toward neighbors and democracy-building from within. The United States understands, welcomes and encourages the desire of new European democracies to join the West through membership in its key institutions. But NATO, the European Union (EU), and the other major institutions of the West are not clubs that one joins simply by filling out membership applications. Over time, each has evolved values and obligations that must be accepted by each new member.

THE CHALLENGE OF CENTRAL EUROPE

Any blueprint for the new security architecture of Europe must focus first on central Europe, the seedbed of more turmoil and tragedy in this century than any other area on the continent. The two most destructive wars in human history began from events on its plains, and the Cold War played itself out in its ancient and storied cities, all within the last 80 years.

Other historic watersheds also have not treated this area well. First the treaties of Versailles and Trianon, then the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, and finally the collapse of the Soviet empire — those three benchmark events left throughout central Europe a legacy of unresolved and often conflicting historical resentments, ambitions and, most dangerous, territorial and ethnic disputes. Without democracy, stability and free-market economies, these lands remain vulnerable to the same problems, often exacerbated by an obsession with righting historical wrongs, real or mythical. If any of these malignancies spread — as they have already in parts of the Balkans and Transcaucasus — general European stability is again at risk. And for Germany and Russia, the two large nations on the flanks of central Europe, insecurity has historically been a major contributor to aggressive behavior.

But if there are great problems, there are also great possibilities. For the first time in history, the nations of this region have the chance simultaneously to enjoy stability, freedom and independence based on another first: the adoption of Western democratic ideals as a common foundation for all of Europe. The emotional but also practical lure of the West can be the strongest unifying force Europe has seen in generations, but only if unnecessary delay does not squander the opportunity.

The West owes much of its success to the great institutions created in the 1940s and 1950s. They serve an important internal function for their members, and they also project a sense of stability and security to others. If those institutions were to remain closed to new members, they would become progressively more isolated from new challenges and less relevant to the problems of the post-Cold War world. It would be a tragedy if, through delay or indecision, the West helped create conditions that brought about the very problems it fears the most. The West must expand to central Europe as fast as possible in fact as well as in spirit, and the United States is ready to lead the way. Stability in central Europe is essential to general European security, and it is still far from assured.

THE BUILDING BLOCKS

The central security pillar of the new architecture is a venerable organization: NATO. To some, the 45-year-old Atlantic alliance may seem irrelevant or poorly designed for the challenges of the new Europe. To others, NATO's extraordinary record of success may suggest that nothing needs to be changed. Both views are equally wrong. Expansion of NATO is a logical and essential consequence of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the need to widen

European unity based on shared democratic values. But even before NATO expands, its strength and know-how are already playing an important role in building a new sense of security throughout Europe.

Designed decades ago to counter a single, clearly defined threat, NATO is only just beginning a historic transformation. NATO'S core purpose of collective defense remains, but new goals and programs have been added. Collective crisis management, out-of-area force projection, and the encouragement of stability to the east through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and other programs have been undertaken. Command structures have been streamlined. Static forces formerly concentrated to meet a possible Soviet attack across central Europe have been turned into more lightly armed, mobile and flexible multinational corps designed to respond to a different, less stable world.

Two new structures — the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the PFP — are specifically designed to reach out to countries that are not NATO members. They deserve closer attention, especially the creative new concept so appropriately named the Partnership for Peace. In just one year, this innovative idea has become an integral part of the European security scene, but it remains somewhat misunderstood and underestimated. Contrary to a fairly widespread impression, PFP is not a single organization; rather, it is a series of individual agreements between NATO and, at last count, 24 other countries ranging from Poland to Armenia, including Russia. Each "partner" country creates an individual program to meet its own needs.

PFP is an invaluable tool that encourages NATO and individual partners to work together. It helps newly democratic states restructure and establish democratic control of their military forces and learn new forms of military doctrine, environmental control and disaster relief. In the future, it will provide a framework in which NATO and individual partners can cooperate in crisis management or out-of-area peacekeeping.

PFP proved its value immediately. In its first year of existence, allies and partners held joint military exercises in Poland, the Netherlands and the north Atlantic. Ten partners have already established liaison offices with the NATO military command. Sixteen partners have begun joint activities with NATO, and others will follow. A defense planning and review process has been established within the partnership to advance compatibility and transparency between allies and partners. PFP is also a vehicle for partners to learn about NATO procedures and standards, thus helping each partner make an informed decision as to whether it wishes to be considered for membership in the alliance.

From the alliance perspective, PFP will provide a valuable framework for judging the ability of each partner to assume the obligations and commitments of NATO membership — a testing ground for their capabilities. And for those partners that do not become NATO members, the PFP will provide a structure for increasingly close cooperation with NATO — in itself an important building block for European security. If U.S. hopes are realized, and the first year gives every reason to be optimistic, the PFP will be a permanent part of the European security scene even as NATO expands to take in some, but not all, PFP members.

EXPANDING NATO

No issue has been more important, controversial or misunderstood than whether NATO should remain an alliance of its 16 current members or expand, and if it expands, why, where, when, and how. At the beginning of an important year on this issue, it is useful to clarify where the United States stands, and where it is going.

In essence, 1994 was the year in which, led by the United States, NATO decided it would eventually expand. This decision was reached during the January NATO summit in Brussels and reaffirmed by President Clinton during his return to Europe last June, when he stated that the question was no longer whether NATO would expand but how and when.

Last December, the NATO foreign ministers met again in Brussels, and, again led by the United States, they committed themselves to a two-phase program for 1995. During the first part of this year, NATO will determine through an internal discussion that is already under way the rationale and process for expanding the new, post-Cold War NATO. Then, in the months prior to the December 1995 ministerial meeting, NATO's views on these two issues — "why" and "how" — will be presented individually to PFP members who have expressed an interest in such discussions. This critical step will mark the first time detailed discussions on this subject have taken place outside the alliance. Then, the ministers will meet again in Brussels in December and review the results of the discussions with the partners before deciding how to proceed.

This process, which at every stage requires the agreement of all 16 NATO members, is still in its initial stages. It is not yet widely understood. Given the importance of NATO, it is not surprising that some outside observers wish to accelerate the process while others do not want it to commence at all. The Clinton administration and its NATO allies, after some initial disagreements, have chosen a gradual and deliberate middle course — and have begun the process.

Several key points should be stressed:

o First, the goal remains the defense of the alliance's vital interests and the promotion of European stability. NATO expansion must strengthen security in the entire region, including nations that are not members. The goal is to promote security in central Europe by integrating countries that qualify into the stabilizing framework of NATO.

o Second, the rationale and process for NATO's expansion, once decided, will be transparent, not secret. Both Warsaw and Moscow, for example, will have the opportunity to hear exactly the same presentation from NATO later this year, and both should have access to all aspects of the alliance's thinking in order to understand that NATO should no longer be considered an anti-Russian alliance. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, an advocate of rapid expansion, wrote in the January/February 1995 issue of *Foreign Affairs*:

Neither the alliance nor its prospective new members are facing any imminent threat. Talk of a `new Yalta' or of a Russian military threat is not justified, either by actual circumstances or even by worst-case scenarios for the near future. The expansion of NATO should, therefore, not be

driven by whipping up anti-Russian hysteria that could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

o Third, there is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join NATO. The answers to the critical questions of who and when will emerge after completion of this phase of the process.

o Fourth, each nation will be considered individually, not as part of some grouping.

o Fifth, the decisions as to who joins NATO and when will be made exclusively by the alliance. No outside nation will exercise a veto.

o Sixth, although criteria for membership have not been determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949: new members must be democratic, have market economies, be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to contribute to the alliance. As President Clinton has stated, "Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply."

o Lastly, it should be remembered that each new NATO member constitutes for the United States the most solemn of all commitments: a bilateral defense treaty that extends the U.S. security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, a point that advocates of immediate expansion often overlook.

A BROAD CONCEPT OF SECURITY

NATO expansion cannot occur in a vacuum. If it did, it would encourage the very imbalances and instabilities it was seeking to avoid. In addition to NATO, a variety of organizations and institutions must contribute to the new structure of peace. The new architecture should involve both such institutions as NATO and the EU, which strive for true integration among members, and others such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which provide a wide, inclusive framework for looser forms of cooperation.

Although the EU is primarily a political and economic entity, it also makes an important contribution to European security. The integration of West European nations has virtually transcended the territorial disputes, irredentist claims, social cleavages, and ethnic grievances that tore apart European societies in earlier eras.

The extension of the EU eastward (and southward, if Cyprus and Malta join) will therefore be immensely important. It will integrate and stabilize the two halves of Europe. This process began with the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden at the beginning of this year. Europe agreements committed the EU and six central European nations to industrial free trade on January 1, 1995, except in steel and textiles, which will follow in 1996 and 1998. Slovenia and the Baltic states are expected to sign similar agreements soon. In December, the EU heads of state and government agreed on a "pre-accession" strategy for eventual entry, presumably sometime early in the next century, of the central European states, Cyprus, and Malta. For Germany, which, in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's powerful phrase, "cannot remain indefinitely Europe's eastern boundary," the extension of the EU is especially important, which is why Germany led this move during its term in the EU presidency.

Expansion of NATO and the EU will not proceed at exactly the same pace. Their memberships will never be identical. But the two organizations are clearly mutually supportive. Although the relationship between NATO and the EU is complex, particularly as the EU seeks to define its relationship with the WEU to create a European defense identity, it is clearly mutually supportive; the expansion of both are equally necessary for an undivided and stable Europe.

It would be self-defeating for the WEU to create military structures to duplicate the successful European integration already achieved in NATO. But a stronger European pillar of the alliance can be an important contribution to European stability and transatlantic burden-sharing, provided it does not dilute NATO. The WEU establishes a new premise of collective defense: the United States should not be the only NATO member that can protect vital common interests outside Europe.

STRENGTHENING THE OSCE

Neither NATO nor the EU can be everything to everyone, and the other organizations above are focused on narrower issues. There is, therefore, a need in the new European architectural concept for a larger, looser region-wide security organization — smaller, of course, than the United Nations — that offers a framework for dealing with a variety of challenges that neither NATO nor the EU is designed to address, one that includes both NATO members and other countries on an equal basis.

Fortunately, the core for such a structure has existed for some years — the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its 53-nation structure of human rights commitments, consultations, and efforts at cooperative or preventive diplomacy was intended to fill a niche in the new Europe. Born out of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the CSCE unexpectedly provided, through its famous Basket III, a lever on human rights and democratic values that played a major role in undermining communism. But it was clear by the middle of last year that the CSCE, while offering intriguing possibilities, had neither the internal coherence nor the political mandate to meet the challenges facing it.

Moscow and the major NATO allies shared this view. By the fall of last year, all had agreed that as NATO began to look at expansion, the CSCE should be strengthened and upgraded. A significant evolution of this organization, including a name change, began in December 1994 at the Budapest summit attended by President Clinton and Secretary Christopher. The result was a series of steps toward a clearer political and operational mandate, a strengthened consultative apparatus and a new status. The old "conference" became a full-fledged "organization," and the OSCE was born.

The role of the new OSCE must now be more clearly established. Rather than enforcing behavior through legal or military action, it seeks to improve security by building new forms of cooperation based on consensus. With a membership that literally spans all 24 time zones and a huge array of cultures and nations, OSCE members will often disagree on how its standards are to be implemented. Taking such disagreement as a given, the OSCE must be more aggressive in the search for common ground.

Today, security in Europe requires addressing potential conflicts earlier. The OSCE must prove its worth in this area, as the CSCE did in spreading democratic values and legitimizing human rights. The organization has pioneered efforts, however limited, at conflict prevention and crisis management through innovations such as establishing a high commissioner for national minorities and sending resident missions to conflict areas. More must be done.

The United States has taken the lead in pursuing innovations within the OSCE. In the future, the United States will make more vigorous use of the OSCE'S consultative and conflict-prevention mechanisms. The goal is to establish the OSCE as an integral element of the new security architecture. In a time of great burdens for the United Nations, the OSCE, as a regional organization under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, can perform many functions normally expected from the United Nations. The participation of U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in the OSCE Budapest summit underlined the importance of such cooperation.

Under no circumstances can the OSCE be a substitute for NATO or the EU. The OSCE can in no way be superior to NATO; the functions of the two organizations are and shall remain entirely different. Conversely, expansion of the role of the OSCE does not conflict with the responsibilities of NATO. Its methods occupy a totally different dimension than those of NATO.

A recent example of this function was the agreement reached at Budapest between Russia and the OSCE to merge negotiating efforts on the difficult issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and provide peacekeeping troops once a political agreement is reached — important steps on the OSCE's path to becoming a more meaningful organization. More recently, the Russians agreed to an OSCE fact-finding mission on Chechnya. The very fact that Moscow accepted OSCE involvement is significant, but this involvement came far too late and is too limited.

Without question, Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the United States has maintained from the outset that the Russian government should adhere to international standards, enshrined in OSCE resolutions and elsewhere, of respect for human rights. Tragically and unnecessarily, the Russian government prosecuted its military campaign against the city of Grozny in ways certain to cause large numbers of civilian casualties and hinder humanitarian assistance.

The West's overall objective in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union remains integration — bringing emerging democracies into the fold of Western political, economic and security institutions. From the beginning of the battle for Grozny, Chechnya worked in exactly the opposite direction for Russia. Chechnya also has proved a deeply divisive element in Russian political life and has become a serious setback for the cause of reform, democratization and the evolution of the Russian Federation as a stable, democratic, multiethnic state. The Chechnya conflict, terrible though it is, has not changed the nature of U.S. interests. President Clinton stated in January that as Russia undergoes a historic transformation, reacting reflexively to each of the ups and downs that it is bound to experience, perhaps for decades to come, would be a terrible mistake. If the forces of reform are embattled, the United States must reinforce, not retreat from, its support for them.

The U.S. objective remains a healthy Russia — a democratic Russia pursuing reform and respecting the rights of its citizens, not fragmenting into ethnic conflict and civil war. America's ability to pursue and develop its partnership with Russia depends on a common pursuit of these values and objectives. The reason Russia has qualified as a friend and partner of the United States is that its people and government have embarked on a path of democratization, development of an open civil society and respect for basic human rights. That is what the United States continues to support in Russia.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

To repeat: if the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, into a stable European security system. Russia is already involved in most aspects of the emerging architecture. It participates actively in the OSCE and worked closely with the United States in upgrading that organization. Russia has signed an ambitious partnership agreement with the EU. It has joined the Partnership for Peace with NATO. It is a candidate for membership in the Council of Europe. The United States supports deeper Russian participation in the Group of Seven industrialized nations and is sponsoring Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization, successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For the first time since 1945, Russia is participating, as a member of the Contact Group on Bosnia, in a multinational negotiating team presenting a unified position on a difficult security issue.

Enhancement of stability in central Europe is a mutual interest of Russia and the United States. NATO, which poses no threat to Russian security, seeks a direct and open relationship with Russia that both recognizes Russia's special position and stature and reinforces the integrity of the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. There have been proposals, including one by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in late 1993, for a special arrangement between NATO and Russia, which could take a number of forms. In urging rapid expansion of NATO, Brzezinski proposed in his *Foreign Affairs* article a "formal treaty of global security cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation," in conjunction with an upgrade of the OSCE.

Any negotiations between NATO and Russia on this or any other arrangement would be quite complex. They would need to take into account a wide range of factors, including the pace of NATO expansion, the state of other Russian-NATO ties such as the Partnership for Peace, the degree to which the OSCE has been turned into a more useful organization, and the implications of events such as the fighting in Chechnya. Notwithstanding this array of issues, the U.S. government as well as its major allies have supported development of this important new track in the European security framework. Informal discussions of this possibility, while in a highly preliminary phase, began in January when Secretary Christopher met in Geneva with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

Any such arrangement must consider the special case of Ukraine. Its geostrategic position makes its independence and integrity a critical element of European security. In Budapest

last December, President Clinton and the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine exchanged documents of ratification for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, formally bringing START I into force. At the same time, Ukraine also deposited its instrument of accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom provided security assurances to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

The basic goals of those seeking to take advantage of this moment in history are the expansion of democracy and prosperity, the integration of political and security institutions, and a unity that has always eluded Europe, even with American involvement. Leaders will have to lead the way through the layers of ambivalence, confusion, complacence and history that inhibit reforms. As the great architect of European unity, Jean Monnet, observed, "Nothing is possible without men, but nothing is lasting without institutions." The efforts of Monnet, Marshall and others produced unparalleled peace and prosperity for half a century — but for only half a continent. The task ahead is as daunting as its necessity is evident. To turn away from the challenge would only mean paying a higher price later.

SUMMARY

Russian officials are heard increasingly often to proclaim the country's status as a "great power". This article examines how the country's perceptions of its role in world affairs have evolved since the declining years of the Soviet Union. The author identifies two dominant paradigms, the "Ideological and Imperial" and the "New Thinking", and discusses the reasons for the ebb and flow of the latter in the years since Russia's establishment as a sovereign state after the collapse of the USSR. (Length: 17,200 words.)

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RUSSIA AS A GREAT POWER IN WORLD AFFAIRS: IMAGES AND REALITY

By Hannes Adomeit

THERE is hardly an opportunity let slip these days by Russian officials to proclaim Russia once again to be a "great power". But true greatness, whether among men or among nations, does not need advertising. It should be evident. Public assertions are therefore often indicative of the existence of reasonable doubt as to whether they accurately reflect reality. In fact, claims of a state's greatness will often proliferate precisely when international and self-perception coincide in the diagnosis that its status, power and influence in world affairs have declined. One example of such circumstances is France under General Charles de Gaulle, who — faced with the loss of empire, persisting American influence in Europe, and the rising economic and political power of West Germany — excelled in playing many variations on the themes of *gloire* and glamour, and France as a *grande nation*. Another is the United States' President Ronald Reagan, who reacted to the reality and widespread images of the decline of American power in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate and to growing Soviet military capabilities, with affirmations that the United States was still a "great country" and "number one" in the world.

Nations and governments engaging in "great-power advertising" typically embody more irrational, unpredictable and contradictory traits than the more self-assured and self-confident states. This also applies to Russia, whose current policies are rife with confusing "clarifications" and retractions, with denials and defensive reactions — amply demonstrated by the strange responses in Moscow to several seizures of contraband plutonium in Germany in the spring and summer of 1994. For many outside observers, Russia today is what the Soviet Union had been for Churchill, an "enigma wrapped in a riddle."

Many of these contradictions can undoubtedly be explained by the continuing search for a new Russian national identity after the collapse of the Soviet empire. But foreign policy also seems to have an erratic, haphazard and unprofessional quality. Some analysts have been tempted to have recourse to psychological categories of interpretation, diagnosing hurt pride, anger, resentment, frustration and inferiority complexes among Russian officials. Such frames of reference are being reinforced by the current trend of detecting ever more "ethnic conflicts" and clashes of civilization after communism, rather than regarding them as conflicts of interest in international affairs.

Other analysts of Russian foreign policy have been more skeptical of irrationality as an explanatory factor. In their diagnosis, the proponents of democratic reform in Russia and comprehensive cooperation with the West had always "occupied an extreme position within the Moscow elite."1/ A

return to more assertive and unilateralist policies was therefore to be considered quite normal and indeed predictable. In extension of this view, new certainties are being discovered — a new consensus consisting of Russian nationalism, unilateralism and "neo-imperialism," designed to restore the Soviet empire in one form or another.2/

One variant of the last school of thought invests the evolution of Russian foreign policy with an aura of inevitability. It uncritically repeats convenient rationalizations of the new advocates of Russian "greatness" and legitimate use of military power and pressure in the near and potentially far abroad, the *derzhavniki,* to the effect that the policies of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in the last year of the Soviet Union's existence, and of their successors Yeltsin and Kozyrev in the first year of the new Russia, had essentially been full of illusions about some sort of Euro-Atlantic community, a strategic partnership with the West and large-scale economic assistance to be gained from the industrialized countries for the rapid modernization of Russia. In short, they argue, these leaders had conducted unrealistic, romantic and naive policies. In accordance with such perspectives, the purported new consensus is often portrayed by both Russian advocates and Western analysts as a predictable and necessary "corrective."3/ As coup plotters are being pardoned and rehabilitated in Moscow today, it is not only of considerable intellectual interest, but also of great political importance, to take issue with such perceptions and thus to try to prevent the hardening of new myths about the causes of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Soviet state, and to forestall the emergence of new misconceptions about Russia's role in world affairs.

In order to explain the current and likely future state of affairs, the approach adopted here is to look at five phases of Soviet and Russian foreign policy with the help of two paradigms. One will be called the Imperial and Ideological paradigm, and the other the paradigm of New Thinking. The first paradigm, it will be argued, consistently guided Soviet foreign policy from the end of the Second World War until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its constituent elements were competitive and confrontational, with ideological, geopolitical and military-strategic factors playing the dominating role in policy formulation and providing the rationales and rationalizations for global expansion and imperial control, notably in central and eastern Europe. Power and ideology, in this paradigm, reinforced each other.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, that is, in the last years of the Brezhnev era and the Andropov and Chernenko "interregnum," this paradigm underwent a serious crisis. In this second phase of Soviet foreign policy, it will be shown, significant failures and setbacks coincided in all dimensions of state activity. There was widespread recognition among Russians at all levels of the state, society and the Party that "administrative streamlining," the replacement of incompetent officials and correction of "mistakes" were no longer sufficient. Imperial decay, they realized, required fundamentally new conceptual approaches and systemic reform.

A third phase of Soviet and Russian foreign policy was based on a new paradigm — the New Thinking — and lasted from the mid-1980s to the end of 1992. This new foreign policy approach, in both its philosophical and its practical aspects, evolved tentatively and hesitatingly at first and then precipitously. Moscow often improvised and reacted to unplanned and unforeseen events. But in contrast to schools of thought that see the Gorbachev era as one of blundering and bungling, which is undoubtedly true to an extent of domestic affairs, the emphasis here is on relative consistency and conceptual guidance in both Gorbachev's and, later, Yeltsin's foreign policy.

A fourth phase, of increasing attacks on the new paradigm and corresponding changes in policy, started in 1992 and gathered momentum in the spring of 1993. This interval will not be characterized here as yet another comprehensive crisis of paradigm, but as a response by the Russian political leadership to a determined attempt by conservative and reactionary political forces to reassert themselves and regain power. The response included, in domestic affairs, a slowing down of the processes of democratization, federalization and market-oriented reform, and in international affairs, a return to military and geostrategic frameworks of analysis.

To complete this overview, the fifth and present phase of Russian foreign policy consists of a moderation and mitigation of the assertive nationalist and unilateralist stance. The conservative and reactionary opposition had made their point. They had enhanced their domestic power position and could now warn and act against those who might become "dizzy with success."4/ But some of them may also have come to realize that any reconstitution of empire and reassertion of influence through military-political pressures would be costly and counterproductive.5/

Much has been written about the first three phases of Soviet foreign policy. Analysis here will therefore concentrate on the last two phases: the transition from Soviet to Russian foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR, and the meaning of the subsequent conceptual and political changes.

THE IMPERIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGM

The essence of the conceptual approach to international affairs in the period from Stalin to the end of the Brezhnev era was that of a close interrelationship between power and ideology: Marxist/Leninist ideology had mobilizing and motivating functions in Soviet foreign policy and contributed to the construction of empire; imperial control in turn was legitimized by ideology. There was no particular preference in Marx's body of thought for the use of military power in order to advance "world socialism". But as non-military instruments of state power remained blunt and military power grew both in relative and absolute terms, the foreign policy practice under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev increasingly came to be one of using the military boot to kick history forward. Military and geopolitical factors took precedence over economic considerations. As if in crude application of Western realist theories of international relations, power came to be seen as the addition of quantitative indicators, such as size of population, the volume of industrial output, the geographical expanse of empire, and the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, missiles and nuclear warheads. Parity meant having just as many divisions and arms as all other potential adversaries combined.

The emphasis on quantitative indicators, furthermore, was not contradicted by the idea that these weapons, produced in great numbers, should also embody the latest in technology

and perform as well as Western systems. The *ultima ratio* of the paradigm, finally, was the idea that military power could be transformed into political influence and that growing arsenals translated into enhanced status, prestige and power in international affairs.6/

A CRISIS OF PARADIGM

By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, all the major premises on which the paradigm was built had turned out to be inaccurate or inapplicable. The two major pillars on which it was built — ideology and military power — began to crumble and threatened to collapse due to the convergence of basic structural deficiencies and acute shocks emanating from specific domestic and international conditions of this period.

The problem with the ideology was that each and every one of the major cognitive and predictive elements of Marxist/Leninist ideology turned out to be erroneous. These included the notions that the "contradictions" between the "power centers of imperialism" were more basic than the links that unite them; that the "correlation of forces," in the long run, would shift in favor of socialism; that conflict would end with the victory of socialism; that the socialist mode of production is superior to that of capitalism; that the "national-liberation movements" would bring about states with anti-imperialist, non-capitalist and ultimately socialist orientation; that class relations are the determining factor of international affairs; and that nationalism would wither away.7/

The widening gap between ideology and reality and the decline in the effectiveness of the Soviet system led to a world-wide diminution of the attractiveness of the Soviet model of development. In western Europe, in the late 1970s, ideological insurrection and resistance against the model took place under the label of "Eurocommunism." In central and eastern Europe, similar developments occurred under the slogans of "market socialism" and "socialism with a human face." In the Third World, Moscow's military support could often decide the question of power, but its economic assistance was incapable of contributing meaningfully to long-term socioeconomic development. More often than not, after a period of cooperation with the Warsaw Pact in security matters, these countries turned to the West for development aid. As Aleksandr Yakovlev later told a conference of Communist Party secretaries for ideological questions, the model of socialist development as exemplified by the Soviet Union before the advent of *perestroika* had essentially "exhausted" itself.8/

As for military power, the second main pillar of the paradigm, failures occurred more or less simultaneously in Soviet policies toward the United States, western Europe, central and eastern Europe, Japan, China and the Third World. The use of force by the Soviet Union in neighboring countries had from Moscow's perspective often helped "normalize" adverse conditions at relatively low political, military and economic cost. But the "quick fix" was not working in Afghanistan — a fact that had a major impact on Soviet domestic politics and affected Soviet choices on how to cope with the rise of Solidarity and the demise of the communist system in Poland: faced with the high probability that the Poles would fight back in the event of Soviet military intervention and that the West would react with another round of economic sanctions, the Soviet leaders were facing agonizing dilemmas. Although the imposition of martial law by General Jaruzelski made it unnecessary for Brezhnev to intervene, the internal ferment in Poland did not end. No stable solution was achieved.

Soviet policy in western Europe also reflected the overall crisis of the paradigm. The supreme failure in this area was the campaign against the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear (INF) missiles — the Pershing II and cruise missiles. With the help of a "peace movement" that reached impressive strength in 1983, the Soviet leaders sought to delay or prevent NATO counterdeployments in western Europe. But whereas they came out of the INF controversy with military advantages, politically the end result of the campaign was loss of influence in Europe, the demise of the SPD-FDP government under Schmidt and the formation of a CDU-CSU-FDP coalition government under Kohl. The "peace movement" decreased in strength and ceased to be a useful instrument of Soviet policy.

As for relations with the United States, in the early to mid-1970s it may have appeared to Soviet political leaders and analysts that Washington was no longer able successfully to compete with the Warsaw Pact in the arms race; that it was primarily reacting to Soviet initiatives; and that it was increasingly putting faith in arms control negotiations to redress a military balance seemingly tilting in Moscow's favor.

But, starting from the late 1970s, these trends were reversed. Defense outlays in the United States began to rise sharply. New challenges were issued to the Warsaw Pact with the development of more sophisticated, computerized conventional weapons and command-and-control systems, and Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. It was now the Soviet Union that was put into a position to respond — and to do so in the area of high technology, in which it could not compete as easily and effectively.

The likely outcome of the competition crucially depended on improvements in the performance of the Soviet economy. Yet, Soviet economic growth rates took a sharp downturn at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Even for political leaders ignorant of economic affairs — essentially, all of the Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev — it was becoming impossible to ignore the fact that the share of military expenditures in the gross national product could not continue to rise indefinitely; that a technologically advanced military sector could not exist in isolation from the economy; that the future effectiveness and modernity of the Soviet armed forces were being eroded by economic decline; and that basic structural reforms were needed to address these serious problems.

The corrosion of the ideological and military pillars of the paradigm was intertwined with severe problems of leadership and succession. An embarrassing procession of the infirm and incompetent at the apex of power contributed to the by then almost universal international isolation of the Soviet Union. Incapable of or unwilling to embark on fundamental change, the leaders in Moscow adopted the attitude of "insulted giant."9/ They broke off arms control negotiations on strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons and conventional arms. They removed the last vestiges of selective détente from the west European diplomatic agenda, attacking not only American "adventurism" and Japanese "militarism" but also

the West German government for allegedly abetting "revanchist" and "neo-Nazi" tendencies. Faced with this hostile posture and possibly dangerous policies, China and the West moved closer to each other. In the Islamic world, the standing of the Soviet Union remained as low as ever. The Imperial and Ideological paradigm, in short, had finally relegated the Soviet Union to the role of mere irritant in international politics. Moscow still had sufficient power to obstruct and threaten, but no longer actively and constructively to shape world affairs.

THE PARADIGM OF NEW THINKING

The Gorbachev era began with only minor revisions of theory but culminated in the complete replacement of the Imperial and Ideological paradigm. The new paradigm, constructed under the heading of New Thinking, was carried forward and applied also in the first year and a half of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. The fact that the "Gorbachev revolution" did not start out as a revolution and was initially not even admitted to be radical reform has frankly been admitted by the then Party leader and his chief advisers. "It would be a great exaggeration to say that we envisaged from the very beginning the scope and difficulties of *perestroika,*" Gorbachev has acknowledged in retrospect. "Its starting designs, furthermore, did not go beyond the framework of the system, neither ideologically nor politically. For us it was then a matter of improving the existing society, `forcing the system to work'."10/ Similarly, Yakovlev remembers that, "at the beginning, we had little idea where events would take us";11/ there was only a general "understanding of what needed to be cast aside."12/

This general understanding, however, is precisely what explains the progressive, in its ultimate scope unintended, dismantling of the Imperial and Ideological paradigm and its replacement by the New Thinking. As in the "left"-"right" dichotomy of the traditional Marxist/Leninist approaches, with its inner logic that linked a set of policies to either one or the other orientation of domestic and foreign policy,13/ the theoreticians and practitioners of the new paradigm recognized that the effectiveness of the new approaches depended upon conceptual coherence.

What, then, were the main ingredients of Gorbachev's New Thinking? The new paradigm essentially included the following major elements:14/

1. The use of military power, geopolitical expansionism and empire building are outdated forms of international conduct. They impose significant costs and impede socioeconomic development.

2. Status and power in international affairs are determined by qualitative indicators, such as the effectiveness of the political system, economic efficiency and the ability to adapt to rapid scientific and technological progress.

3. The internal resources of a nation, including a high level of education and technical skill of the population, as well as the country's quality and way of life, are important factors in international influence.

4. Interests in world affairs are to be promoted through multilateral approaches and participation in international institutions. This applies also to security, which can be safeguarded neither unilaterally nor through military/technical means but only politically and cooperatively.

5. Although the nation-state continues to be an important organizing principle in the international system, nationalism is one of the many forms of unilateralism that needs to be replaced by processes of integration.

6. The main actors and factors of stability in the international system are the industrialized countries (the G-7), who adhere to a common system of values, laws and norms.

7. The main factors of instability and threats to world peace are nationalism, ethnic conflict, religious fundamentalism, political extremism, migration, terrorism, environmental catastrophes, weapons proliferation and armed aggression from the south.

Several important examples of the consistent application of the various parts of the paradigm can easily be adduced. These include the agreement, at the Stockholm CSCE conference in 1986, to on-site inspection of military facilities; the scrapping of the Soviet Union's superiority in intermediate-range nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1987 Washington treaty; the dismantling of preponderance in conventional power in Europe in the 1990 conventional forces in Europe (CFE) treaty; the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 1989; the refusal to intervene in the internal changes taking place in central and eastern Europe in the same year; the consent to German unification and to united Germany's membership in NATO in 1990; and the support in the United Nations Security Council for economic sanctions and later the use of force against Iraq in 1990 and 1991.

But what about Russia under Yeltsin? What have been its foreign policy principles? In June 1990, a year and a half before the official collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation (then the RSFSR, one of the fifteen Union republics) declared state sovereignty and began to develop domestic and foreign policy agendas distinct from those of the Soviet Union.15/ This process was driven not only by institutional emancipation, with the establishment of separate Communist Party and government structures, including the ministries of foreign affairs and foreign economic relations in September 1990, and the appointment of Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister one month later, but also by the personal and political rivalries between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in June 1990 and popularly elected president a year later. Yeltsin's and the Russian Federation's political orientation in domestic and foreign policy was clearly *left* of Gorbachev and the then still-existing CPSU and USSR — that is, more market-oriented, more democratic, more in favor of devolution of power to the republics, and more European and Atlanticist.16/

Some of the more important indications of this orientation, even before the August 1991 coup attempt, were the conclusion of treaties on inter-state relations between the RSFSR, on the one hand, and Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan and Moldova, on the other; the trips by Yeltsin to the European Parliament in Strasbourg and

Paris in April, Prague in May, and Washington in June 1991; and the visit by the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Security Committee, Sergei Stepashin, to NATO headquarters in Brussels, with the idea in mind to gain observer status for Russia in the Atlantic alliance.17/ Reflecting on the conceptual basis of early Russian foreign policy, Yeltsin's foreign policy adviser Gennady Burbulis explained that none of the pressing domestic problems of the Russian Federation could be "solved without learning from the European experience." A revival of Russia, in his view, was "impossible outside the renewed Europe," whereas a renewed Europe in turn could not fully realize its destiny unless it took "Russia into consideration."18

But despite their staunchly reformist and Atlanticist course, Yeltsin and Kozyrev had great difficulty in persuading Western governments to abandon their exclusive concentration on the Soviet Union and to deal simultaneously with the USSR and the RSFSR, and to embark on what the Russian foreign minister called "constructive parallelism."19/ The international community, as Russian officials realized, was reluctant to deal with Yeltsin. It was concerned about Russian nationalism and a possible breakup of the Soviet Union, and wanted to avoid everything that could potentially undermine Gorbachev's authority.

It was only the August 1991 coup attempt that cast serious doubt on the domestic and foreign policy effectiveness and legitimacy of the Soviet leader's rule and the wisdom of putting all Western eggs into the Union basket. The coup attempt in Western eyes also discredited the Soviet foreign minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and his first deputy, Yulii Kvitsinsky, and enhanced the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's stature. Whereas the two top USSR foreign ministry officials had signed orders to their ambassadors to disseminate the communications of the Emergency Committee to foreign governments, the Russian Foreign Minister, who was in Paris on the first day of the putsch, had discussed the idea of a Russian government-in-exile and sought Western backing for it if the need arose.20/

The coup attempt reinforced the democratic and reformist credentials of the Russian leadership, rallied popular support behind it and demoralized the communist, conservative and nationalist opposition. As a result, Russian foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 constituted a continuation and broadening of the New Thinking paradigm. Devolution of empire, eradication of regional military preponderance, abandonment of military-strategic parity, pursuit of broad political cooperation with newly found partners in the UN Security Council, full participation in international economic institutions such as GATT, IMF and the G-7, and even membership in NATO, came to be the declared goals of the new Russia.21/

In the period from the end of 1991 to mid-1992, Yeltsin's visits to Germany, Italy, France, Britain, the United States, Canada and the UN Security Council, and plans for visits to Japan and South Korea, as well as his participation in the G-7 economic summit in Munich, accurately reflected these preferences. Yet another failure "to integrate into the democratic community of states and thus the world economy," Kozyrev warned, "would amount to a betrayal of the nation and the final slide of Russia down to the category of third-rank states."22/ The complete departure from Soviet conduct in international affairs and the ambition to forge a "strategic partnership," both economically and militarily, with the United States was emphasized also by Yeltsin. In his address to the United Nations at the beginning of 1992, he stated that Russia regarded the Western countries as "allies."23/ Such perceptions found some practical expression in an agreement reached at the June 1992 Russian-American summit in Washington "to work together, along with the allies and other interested states, to develop a concept for a global protection system against limited ballistic missile attack."24/

REVISION OF PARADIGM: THE NEW ASSERTIVENESS

As if in a replay of Haydn's "Surprise Symphony," Foreign Minister Kozyrev in December 1992 rudely awakened the slumbering audience of his CSCE colleagues assembled in Stockholm by denouncing Western interference in the Baltic states, telling the conference to keep its nose out of the territory of all former Soviet republics, demanding an end to UN sanctions against Serbia and stating that Belgrade could count on full military support from Russia. He also shocked his listeners by stating that "the territory of the former Soviet Union cannot be considered a zone in which CSCE norms are wholly applicable." It was in essence a post-imperial area in which Russia had to protect its own interests through the use of all available means, including military and economic.25/ To the relief of the stunned listeners, Kozyrev went on to clarify that he had only pretended to be uttering a hard line to show what would happen if Yeltsin were defeated by the domestic opposition.26/ However, the Kozyrev of 1993 and 1994 reiterated such statements, and apparently no longer in jest but in all seriousness. His new approach was part of a shift in Russian domestic and foreign policy that became evident in the second half of 1992.

Several elements of the Imperial and Ideological paradigm received a new lease of life among the top Russian political leaders. Although monolithic and absolutist Marxism/Leninism remained discarded, neo-imperialist tendencies reappeared in Russian foreign policy, notably in the area of the former Soviet Union, and were supplemented by a quasi-ideological melange of nationalism, pan-Slavism, "Eurasianism" and Western-style neo-realism. According to this medley, "Russia was and continues to be a great world power"27/ that should rid itself of the "anti-imperialist syndrome" and not "shy away from defending [its] own interests," even when such action would be criticized as "Imperialist."28/

There are several important manifestations of neo-imperialist restoration and nationalist revival. Some of these are limited to the period from autumn 1992 to spring 1994. Others still persist. What, then, have been some of the indications for this new — fourth — phase of Russian foreign policy?

Russian relations with Japan provide a first major indication. In February 1992, before the new line had become effective, Yeltsin had sent a letter to Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa, in which he had referred to Japan as a potential alliance partner.29/ Furthermore, in August 1992, Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Poltoranin had acknowledged at a news conference in Tokyo concerning the contentious issue of the Kurile islands that Yeltsin supported a formula, agreed upon in 1956 but never implemented, according to which the two smaller islands of the chain would be returned in

exchange for the conclusion of a peace treaty and a normalization of relations.30/ However, on 9 September, reflecting the policy change, a well-prepared visit by Yeltsin to Japan was abruptly cancelled only four days before it was scheduled to take place. Opposition in Russia to making any concessions to Japan on the disputed islands had evidently hardened. Such opponents included senior officers and officials from the military and intelligence establishment in the Russian Security Council. Yeltsin's spokesman hinted at this shortly before the official announcement on the cancellation of the trip, when he stated that a meeting of the Council on that issue was "proceeding with great difficulty."31/ A subsequent visit scheduled for May 1993 was also cancelled.

Russian policy toward the conflict in the former Yugoslavia provided another example of change. The ostensible aim of the shift in policy was for Moscow to adopt a more "evenhanded" approach toward the war, that is, a more pro-Serbian stance. This was reflected in Kozyrev's eight-point peace plan of February 1993, which called for a tightening of the arms embargo against the Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and for the imposition of UN economic sanctions on Croatia if the Zagreb government continued to attack Serb-controlled enclaves in that republic.32/ Moscow subsequently remained adamantly opposed to lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and to the adoption of military measures against the Bosnian Serbs — above all, NATO air strikes on Serb gun positions.

The policy change was particularly evident in Russia's approach to the newly independent countries of the region — the "near abroad" in current Russian parlance — and in the assertion of "special rights" in that area. In February 1993, Yeltsin said that Russia "continues to have a vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR," adding that "the moment has come when responsible international organizations, including the United Nations, should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region of the former Union. Russia has a heartfelt interest in stopping all armed conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union."33/ Russian representatives at the UN and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) later tried to dispel the notion that Russia was intent on pursuing neo-imperialist policies and wanted to proclaim the equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine for Eurasia. Such denials are not entirely convincing. The problem is that Russia's "peacekeeping" can hardly be regarded as a neutral exercise. Its military operations and even the mere presence of its armed forces in the CIS, the Baltic states and Georgia (in some of the countries affected without any stationing of forces agreements) are not coordinated with the international community and serve more or less well-conceived Russian interests.34/

Specific examples of the trend of military-political pressures in the post-Soviet geopolitical sphere, notably in 1992-93, have included Tajikistan, where Russian forces helped stabilize a pro-Russian government and openly intervened to close the border with Afghanistan; Georgia and Abkhazia, where 100,000 Abkhaz took on four million Georgians and won, and where the threat to Georgia's survival as a state posed by the forces of Gamsakhurdia was averted by the timely appearance of Russian marines at Poti; Moldova, where the Russian 14th Army helped establish and guarantee the continued existence of the separatist Trans-Dniester region; and Latvia and Estonia, where Moscow condemned "mass violations of human rights" and openly supported the "rights" of the Russian minority, by linking the withdrawal of Russian forces in Estonia to a "satisfactory" resolution of the minority issue.35/

The more assertive stance in the "near abroad" has intimately been connected with the issue of military bases. Part of the settlement of the conflict in Georgia in November 1993 was the legalization of the presence of 20,000 Russian troops at three major bases in Georgia, with no date set for their withdrawal. Russia also gained the right to use the Black Sea naval base of Poti. Yeltsin was reported as having approved, in April 1994, a Russian defense ministry plan to create military bases in other CIS countries and Latvia "for the security of those states and for the testing of new weaponry and military technology."36/

Russia supported its claims for "special rights" and military bases by the alleged need to "protect the rights" of the 25 million ethnic Russians (according to the 1989 and last Soviet census) living outside the Russian Federation. It included in that category of "Russians" the much larger number of ethnically non-Russian, but culturally assimilated, citizens in the new independent states — the "Russian-speaking" or *russko-iazychnie* — group of persons, thereby increasing the number of persons eligible for Russian "protection" to at least 30 million.37/ The ethnically Russian and *russko-iazychnie* outside the Russian Federation in principle provide Moscow with an instrument that can be used for the assertion of larger foreign policy and strategic objectives, including the reestablishment of a greater degree of political control in the area covered by the former USSR.

The law on defense adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet in February 1993 ordered the military to cut the overall strength of the armed forces by nearly half — to 1.5 million men. However, in December 1993, Defense Minister Grachev announced that the figure decreed by the now-defunct parliament was far too low and that Russia needed a force totalling 2.1 million officers and men.38/ Furthermore, the coup attempt of August 1991 and the violent confrontation of October 1993 demonstrated yet again the importance of the armed forces in the domestic power struggle. Both events enhanced the role of the military in domestic and foreign policy decision-making. In recognition of this fact, Yeltsin raised soldiers' salaries and pensions, exempted them from income tax, paid high-profile visits to military bases and scaled back plans for converting factories from defense to civilian production.

The Russian military repositioned forces returning from central and eastern Europe along the country's northern and southern flanks. The redeployment at present exceeds ceilings scheduled to take effect in 1995 under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. It is still unclear at this stage whether the limits will indeed be broken unilaterally as part of an overall strategic concept to reestablish greater military power at Russia's flanks vis-à-vis Georgia and Ukraine and the Baltic states. It is possible that Russia's CFE partners will agree to modest treaty revisions to help Russia cope with instability in the south. However, the Russian requests for revision may also fit into the pattern of greater emphasis on military power in foreign policy.

Russia has made more stringent attempts at maintaining its military-industrial research, design and production capacity

by increasing arms exports. Advocates of a return to "great power" policies have claimed that the military-industrial complex, despite all the evident disruptions, is the only sector of the economy capable of successfully competing with Western industrialized countries. In a shift that may have negative strategic implications for Russia itself, Moscow has stepped up shipments of substantial amounts of military high technology to China, including missile guidance system, S-300 surface-to-air missiles and Su-27 fighters. Among many other items of its large arsenal, it has also sold submarines, SU-24 and MIG-29 aircraft to Iran, and T-72 tanks to Syria.

In 1993 and early 1994, as part and parcel of the shift away from Atlanticism, the Russian government revised its attitude toward NATO. In November 1993, a widely publicized study by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service characterized NATO as the "biggest military grouping in the world that possesses an enormous offensive potential." It called the alliance an organization wedded "to the stereotypes of bloc thinking."39/ It also charged that NATO wanted to remain a "defensive alliance" rather than embark on the "creation of a mechanism for the support of international security." The intelligence service's preference was clear: a system of collective security that would somehow range between NATO on the one hand and the CSCE and the United Nations on the other."40/ The authors of the study were emphatic in their opposition to membership of NATO for central and east European countries. Furthermore, Yeltsin's press spokesman, reacting to Lithuania's official request for membership of NATO, even warned that the expansion of NATO into areas in "direct proximity to the Russian border" would lead to a "military-political destabilization in the region."41/ And in respect of its possible participation in the Partnership for Peace (PFP), Russia's stance was characterized by indecisiveness and ambiguity, and replete with contradictory statements.42/ The crux of the matter was that Russia wanted a "special status" in any security arrangement in Europe that would reflect its "position in world and European affairs" and its "military might and nuclear status."43/

What, then, were the rationales and rationalizations for the move away from many aspects of the New Thinking paradigm, and who were its advocates?

REVISION OF THE PARADIGM: THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS

Western identification and categorization of the challenges to the New Thinking paradigm often begin with the familiar dichotomy in Russian history between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" or, in modern versions, between "Atlanticists" and "Eurasianists."44/ But such a typology can only be a crude starting-point: the political spectrum in Russia is too complicated and differentiated to allow for a simple division into two camps. One is probably better advised to recognize several political tendencies in addition to the "Westernizing," "Atlanticist" or New Thinking paradigm. Such attempts have been made by several analysts. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, for instance, posit four additional "schools of thought."45/ The adherents to the first school, according to the authors, still want Russia to develop along essentially democratic and market-oriented lines and retain a multi-ethnic, secular, pluralist and cosmopolitan character but with a strong, if need be authoritarian, government and an activist and assertive "great power" foreign policy, above all in the "near abroad." Leaders associated by the authors with such preferences are State Counsellor Sergei Stankevich; St. Petersburg's mayor, Anatoly Sobchak (a questionable designation); Duma deputy Yevgeny Ambartsumov; the former ambassador to the United States and current head of the Duma foreign affairs committee, Vladimir Lukin; and the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, Nikolai Travkin. In extension of these designations, one could add a member of the presidential council, Andranik Migranian, and the deputy head of the Institute on Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sergei Karaganov. Political parties that can be associated with this orientation are the Yabloko Bloc, led by Lukin, Grigory Yavlinsky and Yury Boldyrev, and sections of the Russian Party of Unity and Accord, with Sergei Shakhrai and Aleksandr Shokhin as the leading figures.46/

A second school of thought regards Russia as a great power but one resting on a more ethnically defined Russian base. Great Russia, in this view, should lay its emphasis on protecting the rights of the more than 25 million Russians and several million Russophones living outside the Russian Federation. Adherents of this school do not necessarily accept the current borders of Russia as final, and some of them advocate the reconstitution of empire. Mentioned by the authors as exponents of this view are former parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and ex vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoy. In institutional terms, one could include large sections of the Russian armed forces, the internal security services, the collective farms and the "military-industrial complex." Political parties and movements that could be associated with this tendency are Arkady Volsky's Civic Union and Sergei Baburin's Russian All-National Union.47/

A third school of thought sees Russia as being in the midst of a spiritual rebirth and religious revival. Its innermost values and economic resources are interpreted as having been squandered in the previous periods of communist terror and global expansion. This group can be defined as Slavophile and isolationist, stressing self-made domestic reconstruction and spiritual revival. Its foremost representatives, according to the authors, are writers like Vasily Belov, Valentin Rasputin and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the mathematician Igor Shafarevich and segments of the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy.

A fourth school of thought considers the dissolution of the Soviet Union to have been the result of treachery and part of an international conspiracy. Their prime supporters are not very squeamish in the methods they advocate not only for the establishment of "law and order" in Russia but also for the restoration of the Soviet Union and its influence in world affairs. They blame Russia's current predicament on Gorbachev and Yeltsin, foreigners, Jews, the Vatican and the Freemasons. Supporters are said by the two authors to include many leaders and members of the Russian Communist Party, as well as right-wing and pro-fascist groups, such as the National Salvation Assembly under ex-KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov. To be added to this "red-brown" unholy alliance are General Makashov, Viktor Anpilov and other participants in the October 1993 insurrection; the Agrarian Union, led by Vasily Starodubtsev; the Party of National Unity, headed by Vladimir Danilov; and last but not least, the — decidedly illiberal and undemocratic — Liberal Democratic Party under Vladimir Zhirinovsky.48/

Useful as this typology may be, one needs to be conscious of its several limitations. First, one should guard against the temptation of considering it as descriptive of well-defined groups with stable membership and clear concepts. It is more appropriate to picture the deviations from the New Thinking paradigm as lying on a continuum, with fluid transitions, from moderate to extreme, from authoritarian to fascist, from non-violent to coercive, and from multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilateralist to Russian nationalist, isolationist and xenophobic.

Second, it is necessary to make allowance for the fact that presumed adherents to a particular orientation will frequently mix ideas and images from various parts of the spectrum and thus defy categorization. It is for this very reason difficult and at times hopeless for Western analysts to try to discover the logical consistency and rationality of every strand of current thinking. Indeed, as one of the early critics of the New Thinking paradigm has disarmingly admitted, "I would be very upset if a certain Russian variant of a strictly rational persuasion in foreign policy became predominant in Russian foreign policy."49/

Third, it may be fruitless even to try to understand all the subtleties and nuances of great-power advocacy, such as the difference between *Russkaia ideia* (the Russian idea) and *ideia Rossii* (the idea of Russia);50/ between *messianstvo* (missionary zeal), presumably to be avoided in Russia's foreign policy, and *missiia* (mission), which any self-respecting country allegedly must have;51/ and between bad, old-fashioned imperialism and the "enlightened post-imperial role" Russia ought to play on the territory of the former Soviet Union.52/

Finally, advocacy of particular ideological tenets and policy positions is often divorced from genuine perception and political conviction but directly related to the rationalization of special interests and the exigencies of power struggle. Convictions often change with shifts in the constellation of power. Both Soviet and Russian foreign policy contain numerous examples of this fact of international affairs. It is essential to be aware of this because it conditions the analyst against unwarranted confidence that he has finally established the true philosophical origins and orientation of various participants in the Russian conceptual debate.

The impact of these participants, notably of the "Eurasianist," nationalist, conservative, communist and fascist opposition, on the policies of the Russian government was noted in the previous section. To be added here is their impact on official and semi-official foreign policy guidelines and concepts. Kozyrev had initially tried to avoid being shackled by official foreign policy doctrines, which could pose constraints characteristic of the Soviet period, with its Party programmes, Central Committee resolutions and "main tasks of foreign policy" to be derived from them.53/ He preferred pragmatic cooperation with the West. It was only in response to political pressure exerted by the opposition, notably by vociferous hard-line factions in the Congress of People's Deputies, that a draft document, "Concerning the Basic Points of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," was submitted to and discussed by the parliamentary foreign affairs committee in February 1992.54/ The draft document was amended and resubmitted, without major changes and with detailed explanatory notes, to the committee in April.55/ After further discussion, it was approved in October 1992 56/ and published in early 1993.57/ In competition with the foreign ministry, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) — a group of influential political leaders, administrators, diplomats, military officers and foreign policy experts, established upon Karaganov's initiative in August 1992 — issued a foreign policy concept of its own, entitled "Strategy for Russia."58/ This effort in turn was superseded by an even more authoritative document than that of the foreign ministry or the CFDP — the "Basic Principles of a Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" — agreed upon by all the major institutions directly involved in Russian foreign policymaking, including the foreign ministry, the ministry for foreign economic relations, the defense ministry, the intelligence services, the defense council, and the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and foreign economic relations, and on defense and security.59/ Yury Skokov, the then-secretary of the defense council, had overall responsibility for drafting the document.

There are several noteworthy features that distinguish the defense council's document (and also the CFDP's "Strategy for Russia") from the foreign ministry's concept. First, the document displays a greater sense of self-confidence. This is evident, for instance, in its claim that Russia, "despite the crisis which it is experiencing, remains one of the great powers because of its potential as well as its influence on the course of world events." Second, it enumerates, among the developments that would threaten Russia's vital interests, "infraction of the integrity of the Russian Federation"; "obstruction of integration processes in the CIS"; "violations of human rights and freedoms"; and "military conflicts in neighboring countries." Third, it reverses the relative priorities accorded to the United States and Europe, focusing less on the American orientation and more on Europe, advocating close cooperation with western Europe and positing the desirability of reestablishing Russian influence in central and eastern Europe.

Finally, the document declares Russia's relationship with the countries of the former Soviet Union to be of crucial importance, on the grounds that Russia itself could not develop normally if the post-Soviet geopolitical house were not put in order. The structural features that the document envisages are based on such principles as the "creation of an effective system of collective defense"; "ensuring the status of Russia as the single nuclear power in the CIS"; "strengthening of the external borders of the Commonwealth"; "maintaining its military infrastructure and installations"; and ensuring an "integral system of military security for its members." The document also advocates the further development of a "peace-creating mechanism in the framework of a new integration with the participation of Russia and on the basis of a mandate by the UN or the CSCE."

What about the role of the President in all of this? As far as is known, Yeltsin did not personally involve himself in the drafting of any of the official or semiofficial documents. He did, however, sanction and encourage the shift to a more assertive stance. In the midst of the vigorous debate, he criticized the foreign ministry, charging that "until now, the work of the Ministry has been lacking consistency and has suffered from too much ad hoc-ism." Decisions made in the past had been "inconsistent" and "solid analysis" had not been done.60/ He also declared that "policy considerations in relation to other CIS countries have priority" — thus ignoring almost identical statements by Kozyrev and the foreign

ministry.61/ Yeltsin, furthermore, expressed "a certain disappointment with the attitude of some Western countries, including the United States," deploring that the West "sees Russia as a state that says only yes," apparently forgetting that "Russia is a great power" whose difficulties are only "temporary." Russia, he lamented, had shied away from defending its own interests "because of the apprehension that such actions would be criticized as imperialist. But the only ideology the Foreign Ministry should follow is the defense of Russia's interests and Russia's security."62/

As shown, subsequent foreign policy documents and policies conformed to the spirit of this criticism — a fact of Russian political life that raises the question as to the reasons for the retreat from Atlanticism and the New Thinking paradigm.

REASONS FOR THE NEW ASSERTIVENESS

The first main reason for the changes in mood, concepts and policy in all likelihood lies in the failures of Russian economic development. In 1992 and 1993, Russia continued the downward economic slide which the Soviet Union had begun in 1989. Spectacular falls in production occurred in both years, by far exceeding the United States' experience in the Great Depression. Structural readjustment was painfully slow. The public international aid effort was high on figures and rhetoric but stingy on the disbursement of funds and thus ineffective; nevertheless, Russia's indebtedness rose to above $80 billion. The volume of private international investment remained insignificant, given the bureaucratic confusion, political uncertainties and vicious power struggles in Moscow, and between Moscow and the regions. In short, Russia did not succeed in achieving its stated objective of integrating into the world economy and becoming a viable partner and member of the G-7 rather than remaining an aid recipient. New ideas and inventions, educational opportunities and cultural achievements that other countries, such as the United States, France or Britain, have often been able to use effectively in their foreign policies, could not be utilized by Russia because of the internal disarray and the new narrow-minded nationalist mood in Moscow. All of these factors contributed to the restoration of the importance of that instrument of state policy that had been prominent in both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union: military power.

The failures in the economic realm are particularly glaring when the crucial political and economic relationship between Russia and Germany is considered. Gorbachev's consent to united Germany's membership in NATO at the Soviet-German negotiations in Moscow and Arkhiz (northern Caucasus) in July 1990 was predicated on the idea of a fundamental change in the relations between Germans and Russians, and the conclusion of comprehensive agreements and treaties to formalize such a change.63/ It was obvious to all the participants in the negotiations that Germany would help reimburse the Soviet Union for expenditures directly connected with German unification, such as the obsolescence of the GDR's contractual obligations to the USSR; the hard-currency costs of the upkeep of the Soviet forces in eastern Germany until 1994; the withdrawal of these forces; and the resettlement of military officers in Russia. But there were also widely held assumptions on both sides that the Kohl government, grateful for Gorbachev's consent to unification, would generously help the Soviet Union's reform and modernization effort and take the lead in speeding the country's integration into the world economy. It was also thought that Bonn would, on a large scale, guarantee commodity credits to German export firms and persuade potential private investors to look for investment opportunities in the Soviet Union. On the basis of such perceptions, German experts estimated in 1990 that economic interaction with the eastern half of the European continent would rapidly rise and that the share of the east (*Ostanteil*) in overall German trade would increase from the 4.9 percent then applying to 10.8 percent after unification and ultimately, after a few years, to about 20 percent.64/

The German government lived up to some of these expectations. It honored the GDR's contractual obligations to the USSR and in the period from the end of 1990 to the beginning of 1993, supported the newly independent states with DM 81.2 billion.65/ However, this sum was inadequate (as probably almost any sum would have been) to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union both as a political entity and as an economic organism. German industry shunned the risks associated with political instability and bureaucratic confusion in Russia. Many of the German-Russian joint ventures (1,141 in 1993) existed only on paper, and when they did function, they were equipped only with very small capital sums.66/ German direct private investment in the USSR and Russia in 1990-93 added up to a barely discernible blip on the computer screens of international economic transactions — DM 33 million in 1990 (in the USSR) and DM 15 million in 1991; DM 8 million in 1992 (in Russia); and DM 31 million in 1993.67/ Yet, it was not only German private direct investment in Russia that was almost negligible: the cumulative foreign direct investment in the Soviet Union and Russia from all countries in the past six years amounts to only $2.7 billion.68/ Such figures stand in stark contrast to international investment in China, which totalled $155 billion in 1993.69/ As for trade, although Germany occupies first place among Russia's trading partners world-wide, the combined share for the countries of central, eastern and southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in German trade actually fell below the 4.9 percent of trade with pre-unification West Germany.70/

What, then, were the political consequences of Russia's continuing economic decline? Most important, the disappointing developments in the economic realm undermined the foundation on which the New Thinking paradigm was constructed. They discredited the adherents of reform and international cooperation in Russia. They provided grist to the mill of the conservative opposition and its propagandist charges that the Western industrialized countries were unabashedly "plundering" Russian resources and "dictating" conditions. And they put the government on the defensive. "This is a normal credit,"

Yeltsin was to assert regarding the US $24 billion package of 1 April 1992, and the IMF conditions connected with it, "and you cannot force us to our knees. Russia is a great country and it will not permit such a thing."71/ Some academic specialists turned *derzhavnik*, like Georgy A. Arbatov, Director of the USA and Canada Institute, were to chime in and accuse Yeltsin and Gaidar of allowing the IMF "to treat Russia like a third-world country."72/

The second major reason for the return to "great power" rhetoric and policies rested in the reassertion of the power of the conservative institutions from the Soviet period: namely,

the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, the gas and oil lobby, the collective farms and, last but not least, the KGB, which, perhaps more than any other institution, had survived the transition from the USSR to the Russian Federation almost completely unscathed. The influence of these pillars of the Imperial and Ideological paradigm had progressively been whittled down following the introduction of the New Thinking in 1986. They had suffered one defeat and setback after another: loss of the external empire in the Third World; collapse of empire in central and eastern Europe, and of the Soviet Union itself; dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; German unification and united Germany's NATO membership; asymmetrical reductions in conventional and nuclear weapons; and economic and military sanctions against erstwhile allies such as Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia. Their agitation in 1992 and 1993, therefore, can well be understood as a determined attempt at making a political comeback and regaining lost power positions. The President, sensitive to the realities of power, shifted positions — a fact clearly demonstrated by his yielding to the pressures exerted by the Congress of People's Deputies, his abandonment of reformist premier Yegor Gaidar and the appointment of previous Soviet gas and oil minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as Gaidar's successor in December 1992.73/

One of the major instruments used by conservatives and hard-liners to promote their influence was the decline in Soviet and Russian arms sales. The volume of such sales had fallen sharply from a fairly stable $12 billion a year in the 1980s to $7.8 billion in 1991, $3 billion in 1992 and $2.5 billion in 1993.74/ The Soviet Union had always ranked as first or second in international arms sales — just ahead of or just behind the United States. Russia in 1993 ranked sixth. The conservative opposition thus charged that it was not only humiliating for Russia to be begging for hand-outs from the West and caving in to the dictates of the IMF but also economically counterproductive and socially disruptive. Participation in the sanctions against Iraq, Libya and former Yugoslavia alone had cost the country up to $30 billion in lost contracts, it argued. Military technology was one important area in which Russia could very well compete with the West. Thus, rather than close down military plants and create unemployment, it was proper to modernize the arms industry and pursue a more aggressive arms export policy.75/ Furthermore, the "Eurasianist" strand of thinking — seeing Russia as a unique power straddling Europe and Asia — provided useful ideological underpinning for an expansion of military cooperation and arms exports to China, India and countries in the Near and Middle East. The agreements signed by Yeltsin in Beijing and New Delhi, in late December 1992 and early 1993 respectively, on arms trade and joint military production, are ample testimony to the impact of these rationalizations on policy.76/ This is true also of the Russian government's plans to establish an export-import bank and to use export credits to finance the sale of arms and expand arms sales to about $9 billion a year.77/

The continuing economic downturn in 1992 and 1993 produced two more reasons for the new assertiveness in Russian foreign policy: the disenchantment of popular opinion with the reformist course, and the demoralization of the Atlanticists and their adaptation to new realities of power. Yeltsin's power base in the period after his election as Russian president in June 1991, reinforced by the August 1991 coup attempt, lay in popular legitimacy. The reformist course also depended on it. However, many factors combined to undermine support for the reformist course, including the hardship suffered by large segments of the population after the freeing of prices in January 1992 and soaring inflation in the following two years. Other socioeconomic factors were widespread job insecurity as a result of privatization, the absence of a social net to prevent people from sliding into abysmal poverty, and personal insecurity as a consequence of rising crime. Political factors also took their toll. This applies first and foremost to the unsavory spectacle of vicious power struggles between the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, on the one hand, and Yeltsin and the reformist camp, on the other. But the disunity and conflicting ambitions among the reformers themselves did not help either. Thus, while the electorate was still willing to give moral support to Yeltsin in the April 1993 referendum, it reacted largely with indifference to the violent confrontation between the executive and the legislature in October and finally provided the nationalist, conservative, communist and neo-fascist forces with a majority in the December parliamentary elections.78/

CONSTRAINTS ON THE RETURN TO AN IMPERIAL PARADIGM

Although "great power," "Eurasianist," Slavophile, nationalist, orthodox religious and neo-fascist ideas and ideologies did emerge in the second half of 1992 and had an impact on foreign policy, it is important not to overstate the case. The record of Russia's foreign policy even in the period from the second half of 1992 to early 1994 was mixed. Moscow did indeed in several instances act unilaterally, apply military-political pressures and intervene as if it had a *droit de regard* in the former Soviet Union; but even in that period, the overall character of Russian external policies was not one of restoration of empire and abandonment of cooperation with the West.79/ Furthermore, as noted at the beginning of this article, the drift of Russian government attitudes and policies in a unilateralist, anti-Western direction has weakened since the spring of 1994. Thus, the following both general and specific observations about the limited character, scope and feasibility of a return to an Imperial and Ideological paradigm appear appropriate.

Empires in the past often collapsed after a series of catastrophic military defeats or civil war. In comparison, the dissolution of the Soviet external and internal empire and the emergence of 15 new states has occurred in an extraordinarily benign fashion. Hundreds of thousands of troops have been withdrawn from foreign soil and resettled; more than five million men under arms have been reduced, reorganized and recruited into new sovereign states; huge arsenals of conventional weapons were cut and redistributed; and control over the approximately 45,000 nuclear warheads was vested in a single state — all without a major conflagration. Most miraculous of all, the mainstay of empire — the Communist Party — also laid down arms without a serious fight.

Russia is still in the midst of a painful transformation process in four dimensions of policy. It is engaged simultaneously in a transition from a command economy and state ownership to a market economy and private property; from an authoritarian or totalitarian one-party regime to a state with a greater degree of pluralism, democratic procedures and the rule of law; from a unitary, centralized state to a federation with power to be devolved to ethnically non-Russian titular entities and Russian administrative units; and

from imperial structures and consciousness to a more modest Russian identity. No one can expect this momentous transformation to take place without significant stress and strain.

The neo-imperialist bark has been worse than its bite; aggressiveness has been more a matter of words than deeds. This discrepancy is in all likelihood due to the fact that several of the *derzhavniki,* Kozyrev among them, are essentially sheep in wolves' clothing. They retain a fundamentally Western outlook but feel obliged to make verbal concessions and tactical adjustments to changes in popular mood and pressures exerted from within the political establishment.

To turn to specific policy issues, Russia has played a largely successful role in preventing the proliferation of the Soviet Union's huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. After the disintegration of the USSR, Moscow declared itself responsible for the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy. By July 1992, it had completed the transfer of all tactical nuclear weapons without a single accident. In January 1994, it was one of the signatories of the Trilateral Agreement, providing for the transfer of Ukrainian strategic warheads to Russia, thereby opening the way to the ratification and implementation of the severe cuts in strategic nuclear weapons pursuant to the START II agreement. By 2003, if the proposed cuts are carried out, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal will be reduced to 3,000 warheads and that of the United States to 3,500, roughly their levels in the 1960s, before the advent of multiple-warhead missiles. Dissent among international theory "realists," surrealists and structuralists notwithstanding, it would seem that these developments are to be welcomed.80/ It is also appropriate to credit the Russian government with making an honest effort at controlling trade in fissionable materials and discouraging the thousands of underpaid nuclear scientists and missile engineers employed by the military-industrial complex from concluding contracts for more lucrative work on nuclear weapons and missile projects abroad.81/

Russia has also continued to contribute to a significant reduction in the level of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. It has completed the withdrawal of its forces from central and eastern Europe and made further cuts in the size of its own armed forces. Concerning the controversy on force levels, the total discussed has ranged from 2.1 million to 1.5 million men (see above), with the government having now apparently committed itself to the figure on the lower end of the scale.82/ Russia has also continued to carry out the provisions of the 1990 treaty on military forces and armaments in Europe and the supplementary July 1992 Vienna accord on maximum numbers of ground and air forces, and it has dismantled large numbers of conventional weapons. As for Moscow's requests for a revision of the treaty limits for equipment at the flanks, there is undeniable instability in the Caucasus, both north and south of the Russian border, and Russian military officers have expressed concern about possible security threats from Turkey and Iran.83/ In the north, the Kaliningrad region is gaining in importance now that Russian forces have been withdrawn from Germany and the Baltic states. However, the CFE flank limits include equipment in both the North Caucasus and Leningrad military districts, thereby constraining possible Russian redeployments to both geographical areas. A convincing argument can thus be made that it is not unreasonable for Russia to request modification or reinterpretation of the CFE provisions on its flanks and for the Western treaty partners to be accommodating to such requests.

Military-political pressures in the "near abroad" have not added up to a comprehensive strategy of imperial restoration. Despite all the hue and cry about "mass violations of human rights" in the Baltic states, Moscow completed its troop withdrawals from Lithuania in September 1993. Despite differences with Latvia and Estonia over citizenship rights and the treatment of the Russian minority in these countries, and occasional threats to suspend the troop withdrawals, Russia continued its pull-out and completed it at the end of August 1994. It also reached an amicable solution on the contentious issue of the radar station at Skrunda by placing it under civilian control for a maximum of four years with an additional 18 months allowed for its dismantling.84/ In Ukraine, despite all the sparring with Kiev over nuclear weapons and the Black Sea fleet, Moscow has abstained from pursuing a blatant policy of destabilization. It has refused to mobilize and organize the Russian-speaking communities in eastern Ukraine and refrained from supporting a Crimean Russian, Ruthenian or any other separatist movement in Ukraine. If that country were to fall apart, or fall into Russia's lap, it would not be because of destabilization attempts from the outside but because of Kiev's inability to make the best of its independence.

It is an incontrovertible fact that Russia has special interests and responsibilities in its "near abroad." Russia is both a European and an Asian power and has retained many of the former Soviet connections in the Baltics, Transcaucasus, Black Sea area, Central Asia and the Far Eastern region. Objective conditions are also such that success in Russia's overall reform effort depends very much on progress in the other newly independent states. It would, therefore, be shortsighted from a Western perspective to applaud progress in west European integration and, at the same time, brand any attempt made by Russia at regional economic cooperation as "neo-imperialist." The forms of integration are the crucial point; that is, whether there is to be reintegration "from above" or a new, market-based integration.

A similar reasoning applies to peacekeeping, peacemaking or "peace creation" (*mirotvorchestvo*) in the former Soviet Union. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts on CIS territory ultimately affect Western security and other interests, for example, in the creation of refugees. Reliable numbers for CIS refugees in Russia today are difficult to obtain but probably exceed the one million mark. They are a drain on Russian resources, diminish the chances of economic reform and could spill over the borders into central and eastern Europe. However, international institutions such as the UN, CSCE, the EU or NATO have been unable or unwilling effectively to address such conflicts. Typical of this state of affairs are the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the fighting between Abkhazia and Georgia, ethnic strife in the North Caucasus and border transgressions from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. The Russian role has varied in each and every one of these conflicts. However, given the unwillingness of Western countries to expose their soldiers to the risk of getting involved in ground combat in the former Yugoslavia — an area close to central and eastern Europe — it is almost inconceivable that European countries other than Russia would be willing to commit forces for enforcement action farther afield. Given the Western

reluctance to commit significant forces and resources to CIS conflict management, yet the ease with which charges of Moscow's "neo-imperialism" are made, Russian policymakers may perhaps be forgiven for thinking that the West is somewhat hypocritical on the issue of CIS conflict management.

In its relations with Germany, the Russian government has refrained from helping the Draculas of the "balance of power" — geopolitics and military-strategic competition — rise from the grave. At Germany's unification in 1990, the Western Group of Forces (WGF) stationed in eastern Germany comprised 338,000 soldiers and 207,400 civilians.85/ Domestic critics of the Soviet consent to German unification claimed that their withdrawal might take up to 19 years.86/ However, the withdrawal of the Russian military and civilian personnel was completed in three and a half years, that is, six months earlier than originally agreed upon, and it took place efficiently, quietly and amicably.87/ Today, even the advocates of "great power" policies remain favorably inclined toward Russian-German cooperation. There are several issues that could have soured relations: the assertion of German support for the Baltic states in their controversies with Russia over the Russian troop presence and minority rights; the German desire to open a general consulate in Kaliningrad; grievances by ethnic Germans on Russian soil; German support for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia in the Balkans; and the expansion of German economic and political influence in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. None of these traditional geopolitical bones of contention has had a major negative impact on the relationship. This was clearly shown at the May 1994 Kohl-Yeltsin summit in Bonn. In a quid pro quo, the German Chancellor supported Russia's desire to participate in G-7 decision-making — first, on political matters and later, on economic affairs, and called such participation a step that would lead "to the G-8," while the Russian President, in turn, supported Germany as a "worthy candidate" for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.88/ Both leaders were confident that a long-delayed cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia would be signed after Germany's assumption of the European Union presidency in July 1994. In the event, the agreement was signed earlier, at the June 1994 Corfu EU summit.89/

Notwithstanding all the right-wing ranting and raving about the pernicious role of NATO, the official opposition to membership of the Visegrad countries in the Atlantic alliance and the declared preference for all-European institutions such as the CSCE, the Russian government entered a formal partnership with NATO in June 1994, acceding to the Partnership for Peace programme. The appointment of Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin as liaison official lends weight to the idea that Russia is intent on cooperating with NATO in a constructive spirit rather than attempting to play fox in the chicken coop. "Russia," Kozyrev said in Brussels, stands by its choice of principle — the carrying out of national and state interests "through cooperation rather than confrontation."90/

If, then, the drift of Russian government attitudes and policies in a unilateralist, anti-Western direction has weakened since the spring of 1994, what are some of the reasons for this trend?

The shift to the right in the preceding phase, as argued above, was driven by the interaction of four factors: (1) the determined attempt by supporters of the ancien regime to regain lost power positions; (2) the continuation of economic deterioration; (3) popular disillusionment with the reform process; and (4) demoralization of the reformist forces and their adaptation to new realities of power. The ebbing of the tidal wave of nationalism and unilateralism is in all likelihood due to changes in the strength and direction of the first two factors.

Concerning the first, political, factor, the push of the Soviet-era elite for greater access to power has to some extent been successful. But, perhaps paradoxically, this has produced the effect — as so often in Soviet times — that platforms and positions attacked in the struggle for power are being coopted and integrated into the policies of the new leaders. The results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections, the elevation of professional Communist Party bureaucrat Ivan Rybkin to the post of speaker of the State Duma and the resignation of then first deputy prime minister Gaidar, finance minister Boris Fyodorov and other committed reformers from the cabinet gave rise to widespread fears that the damaging stalemate and polarization between the President and the cabinet, on the one hand, and the State Duma, on the other, would even be worse than in the era of the Congress of People's Deputies and its recurrent impeachment attempts.91/ Anxiety was also widespread that government policies, reeling under the shock of Zhirinovksy's electoral success, would drift even further in nationalist and neo-imperialist directions. Initial developments appeared to justify such sentiments. But the prevailing mood in Russian domestic politics in spring 1994 was one of exhaustion and aversion to political confrontation — sentiments that found expression in the April 1994 Accord on Social Unity concluded among major social and political forces and parties. Tenuous and superficial as the accord may be, it is nevertheless an indication of a general desire for a respite and reconciliation. Most important, despite the disappointing outcome of the elections and the make-up of parliament, Russia does finally have a constitution and a government that is able to function.

As for the second, economic, factor, the most important development until the autumn of 1994 were perceived tendencies of stabilization. According to one Western economic adviser to the Russian government, Russia by this time had turned into a "market economy" and had become a "success story."91/ The reasons cited by this and other Western economists were that the government had conducted tight monetary policies, cut subsidies and the budget deficit, achieved a positive interest rate on savings, brought down the inflation rate to below 5 percent a month in August, and stabilized the exchange rate of the ruble. Real income, retail sales and private consumption as a share of GDP had "started rising"; shortages of goods had all but disappeared. The steep decline in production was "not real." As for basic structural trends, Russia had solved "many basic institutional problems." It had privatized "70 percent of Russian industrial enterprises" and had successfully achieved "conversion of the arms industry." Private farms accounted for 36 percent of agricultural production.94/ Another Western adviser also said in October 1994 that "Russia is on the brink of moving beyond crisis management and could soon be a G-8 country with low inflation, low inflationary expectations and low, medium-term interest rates."95/ Perhaps surprisingly, even Russian reformers excluded from the inner circle of government decision-makers, such as Gaidar, Grigory Yavlinsky and Anatoly Sobchak, applauded Chernomyrdin's course and

endorsed the idea that Russia was on the path of political and economic stabilization.96/

However, the "Black Tuesday" of October 1994, when the ruble lost 21.5 percent of its value in one single day (later to recover), reinforced doubt as to whether the tendencies of stabilization were solid. Indeed, by the end of that month, double-digit rates of inflation had returned. Some of the factors contributing to this reversal and lack of confidence in the economic reform process include: large shortfalls in budget revenue in the first half of 1994 because of widespread tax evasion by firms and regions; an estimated 120 trillion rubles in inter-enterprise debt; lack of reform in the energy and agricultural sector; hidden subsidies to powerful lobbies and enterprises; the failure to make enterprises bankrupt even whey they are unprofitable and have no future; weakness or absence of viable institutions to make the market work; low rates of domestic savings; high external debts; the continuing net outflow of funds despite some return of capital; and the serious distortion of competition by corrupt state agencies and powerful mafia groups. Most important, perhaps, it is not at all clear whether the rigorous monetary and economic stabilization attempted in 1994 is socially sustainable. Firms have arbitrarily been withholding workers' wages totalling 3.9 trillion rubles (about US$1.3 billion), and there are probably limits to the degree to which impoverished workers and pensioners can be expected to tighten their belts even further.

What then are the foreign policy implications of economic stringencies and austerity policies? The new domestic political consensus, to the extent that it exists, is more cost-conscious. Almost repeating the experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ruling political elite in Moscow has demonstrated heightened awareness of the "costs of empire." This applies to the likely costs of any forcible reintegration of the new independent states and reconstitution of the Soviet Union as well as to policies in the "far abroad."97/ Cost-consciousness could also be seen in action on the budget (adopted on 24 June and in force since 6 July 1994); it was particularly visible on the budget item of some relevance for "great power" policies abroad — defense. In accordance with commitments made by the Russian government to the IMF, the planned overall budget deficit did not exceed 10 percent of the gross domestic product. The defense ministry and the Duma committee for defense had supported defense allocations amounting to 55 trillion rubles — a sum testifying to significant self-restraint by the armed forces lobby since, allowing for inflation, this would have amounted to the same level of defense expenditures as in 1993.98/ Yeltsin, Chemomyrdin and the Federation Council had supported this figure.99/ The spending authority ultimately approved by the Duma, however, was only 40.6 trillion rubles.100/ Equally important for an assessment of trends concerning the likely use of military power for foreign policy purposes is the fact that, whereas the share of operating costs in the total budget in the period from 1989 to 1994 more than doubled (from 26.1 percent to 54.4 percent), the share of procurement was cut in half (from 42.2 percent to 20.8 percent) and that of research and development by more than two-thirds (from 19.8 to 6 percent).101/ Such trends bode ill for an effective modernization of the Russian armed forces.

Heightened awareness of the costs of imperial restoration, and a swing back to greater restraint and cooperative approaches in foreign policy, are also reflected in the current drift of conceptual discussion. As noted above, one of the more important semi-official attacks on the Atlanticist orientation and the New Thinking had been launched by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in its "theses" on a Strategy for Russia, published in August 1992.102/ In their May 1994 sequel, "Strategy for Russia (2)," they explain that their criticism almost two years earlier "was prompted by the concern the CFDP members felt over the fact that the leadership of this country lacked any coherent understanding of Russia's interests and objectives in the foreign policy sphere" and by "apprehensions" about a "lopsided pro-Western orientation." They also profess satisfaction with the changes put into effect since then.103/ In a reversal of positions very much resembling time-honored Soviet practices of warning against becoming "dizzy with success" and replacing "revisionism" by "dogmatism" as the main danger in Soviet foreign policy, they now deplore that the necessary change in 1992 from the "unilateral pro-Western orientation toward the advocacy of real national interests" had lately been "accompanied by `great power' rhetoric spouted by high officials."104/ This created a danger of Russia distancing itself, becoming suspicious of the outside world and displaying "arrogance of force."105/ But any "new isolation" of Russia today "would be far more unwelcome than the one faced by the USSR during the first Cold War" — and unnecessary, at that, since conflicts of interest between Russia and the major Western countries are "minor." There are "no profound reasons for relations to become more strained."106/

CONCLUSION

The problems raised by the new "theses" and the present article are essentially the same: on what should Russia base "greatness" in world affairs, and how is it to be achieved? Should "greatness" be realized within the context of a neo-realist, geopolitically oriented Imperial paradigm with ideological overtones, or a New Thinking paradigm, with the emphasis on political and economic cooperation? This is also the question Shevardnadze asked after his resignation from the post of foreign minister in December 1990. Very much like his "conservative critics," he wrote, he had "a deep-rooted belief that we are a great country and must be respected." But, he asked, "What makes us great? Territory? Size of population? The number of weapons?" If so, what about all "the national disasters? The lack of human rights? The disorder of life? What do we have to be proud of if our infant mortality is almost the highest on the planet?"107/

Indeed, conservative and more extreme critics of Atlanticism have often confused greatness with the ability to threaten or use force and the possession of nuclear weapons.108/ They prefer to ignore the fact that a nation's status and power in contemporary international affairs depend "above all, on technological resources and achievements, and the availability of `soft power,' that is, the ability to exert influence . . . through `persuasion,' without the use of force."109/ As Yeltsin told his critics, even without nuclear weapons, Russia would be a great power: "Russia is rightfully a great power by virtue of its history, of its place in the world, and of its material and spiritual potential."110/

Such ideas of Russia's identity, dominant in the conceptual debate and in government policies immediately before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but under attack in the period from the autumn of 1992 have made a comeback since early 1994. The assertive "great power" rhetoric to a great extent served the function of helping

members of the traditional elite regain lost power positions. Now that their purpose has at least to some extent been achieved, policies of internal reform and voices advocating reason and restraint in international affairs have returned to center stage. Such tendencies are likely to continue for some time: Russia, despite some economic stabilization at present, is still in the initial stages of the necessary restructuring and modernization of the economy. It needs to attract international investment; create a whole new set of financial and economic institutions; strengthen the weak legal system and eradicate organized crime; reorder the relations between the center and the ethnically based and Russian administrative regions; develop new forms of market-based integration and cooperation with the new independent states; and cope with the challenges of military reform and conversion. International cooperation, it would seem, is needed to achieve any of these tasks, but is difficult to obtain in an isolationist or neo-imperialist framework.111/ The New Thinking that was an entirely appropriate response to the conceptual and practical political crisis of the late 1970s to the mid-1980s would still seem to be the appropriate framework to cope with the challenges.

NOTES:

1. Judith S. Kullberg, "The End of New Thinking? Elite Ideologies and the Future of Russian Foreign policy," paper prepared for the panel on "Russian Foreign and Security Policy," The Midwest Slavic Conference, 30 April-2 May 1993, published by the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, Occasional Papers, July 1993, p. 22.

2. "The spirit of Russian imperialism is making a dramatic comeback," was the conclusion drawn from an interview with Russian foreign minister Kozyrev by Therese Raphael and Claudia Rosett of *The Wall Street Journal*, and Suzanne Crow of RFE/RL Research Institute, as summarized by the first-named interviewer in "Kozyrev Doctrine: The CIS Is Our Turf, *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 20 June 1994: the full text of the interview was published in *RFE/RL Research Report* 3:28, 15 July 1994; similarly, "`Back in the USSR': Russia's Intervention in the International Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia," Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, January 1994.

3. Some of the best examples of Russian support for the theory of necessary "corrective" are the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy's "theses" on a "Strategy for Russia," published in *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 19 August 1992; Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava v poiskakh sebia," ibid., 28 March 1992; Evgeny Ambartsumov, "Vneshnepoliticheskaia doktrina novoi Rossii," interview conducted by V. Ostrovskii, *Modus vivendi* (Moscow), No, 7, May 1993; Aleksandr Vladislavlev and Sergei Karaganov, "Tiazhkii krest Rossii," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 17 November 1992. Concerning, more specifically, the assertion that a correction of Russian policies in the "near abroad" had been necessary, see Andranik Migranian, "Rossiia i blizhnoe zarubezh'e," ibid., 12 January 1994.

4. "Dizzy with success", is the charge Stalin made on 2 March 1930, after he realized that forced collectivization had produced disastrous consequences, blaming subordinate officials for excesses and calling for restraint: J.V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, authorized English translation of the eleventh Russian Edition (Moscow: Politizdat, 1945), pp. 326-29.

5. See for instance, the follow-up document of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy to their August 1992 "theses", "Strategiia dlia Rossii (2): Tezisy Soveta po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 27 May 1994.

6. See Hannes Adomeit et al., *Die Sowjetunion als Militärmacht* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1987); "The Political Rationale of Soviet Military Capabilities and Doctrine," in *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s*. Report of the European Security Study (ESECS) (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 67-104.

7. For a detailed study of these failures of ideology see Jonathan C. Valdez, *Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence*, Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Sigmund Krancberg, *A Soviet Postmortem: Philosophical Roots of the "Grand Failure"* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).

8. Speech by Aleksandr Yakovlev at the conference of Communist Party secretaries for ideological questions, held in Varna (Bulgaria), 26-28 September 1989, included for agenda item 8 of SED Politburo meeting of 17 October 1989; SED, Central Archives, Politburo, *Arbeitsprotokolle*, J IV 2/2A/3247.

9. Thus an aptly named title story in *The Economist* of that period.

10. M.S. Gorbachev, "Mir na perelome," *Svobodnaia Mysl*, 16 November 1992, p. 10.

11. Lecture at Harvard University, 7 November 1991.

12. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, *Muki prochteniia bytiia: perestroika — nadezhdy i real'nosti* (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), p. 330

13. This "inner logic" was best described by Alexander Dallin, "Linkage Patterns: from Brest to Brezhnev." in Seweryn Bialer, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colorado, Oxford: Westview, 1981), pp. 344-47 and earlier in his "Soviet foreign policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework of Analysis," *Journal of International Affairs*, 2, 1969, pp. 250-65.

14. On the origins, content and evolution of the new paradigm through the eyes of its architects see M.S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988); Eduard A. Shevardnadze, *Moi vybor. V zashchitu demokratii i svobody*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Novosti, 1991); Yakovlev, *Muki prochteniia bytiia*; and A.S. Chernyaev, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym: Po dnevnikovym zapisiam* (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia gruppa "Progress," "Kul'tura," 1993).

15. The text of the Russian sovereignty declaration as published in *Vedomosti RSFSR*, 14 June 1990.

16. Later, Kozyrev was to reply to the question of "Why did you take the job of RSFSR foreign minister in October 1990?" by saying that "My feeling was that the momentum of democratic reform in the country was shifting from the group around Gorbachev to the group around Yeltsin": "An interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3:28, 15 July 1994, p. 36.

17. See the apt description and analysis of this period by John Lowenhardt, "The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," paper presented to the International Symposium 1991 in Tokyo, November 1991.

18. "Obnovlennaia Rossiia i obnovlennaia Yevrope. K poezdke B.N. Yeltsina vo Frantsiiu" (interview with G.V. Burbulis), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 20 April 1991.

19. V. Razuvaev, "100 Days at the Post of Foreign Minister" (interview with Andrei Kozyrev), *New Times* (Moscow), 9 March 1991, pp. 8-10, as quoted by Lowenhardt, loc. cit., p. 6.

20. Statement by Boris Pankin, Bessmertnykh's successor, on Central Television, 30 August 1991, as quoted by Lowenhardt, loc. cit., pp. 6-7.

21. During his visit to the United States in June 1992, Yeltsin *expresses verbis* abandoned the "ominous parity" on which the Soviet Union had insisted for so long; see the excerpts from the Bush-Yeltsin summit press conference, *The New York Times*, 17 June 1992. On NATO membership as a long-term goal of Russian foreign policy see *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1, 15 January 1992, p. 13; for an analysis see Hannes Adomeit, "The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet and Russian Perspective," in Neil Malcolm, ed., *Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?* (London: Pinter for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 31-54.

22. "Preobrazhenie ili kafkianskaia metamorfoza?" *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 20 August 1992; similarly in his interview with *Izvestia*, 10 October, 1991.

23. *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 4-5, 29 February-15 March 1992, p. 49 (emphasis added).

24. "Excerpts from Bush-Yeltsin Summit Conference," *The New York Times*, 17 June 1992.

25. Craig R. Whitney, "Russian Carries on Like in the Bad Old Days, Then Says It Was All a Ruse." *The New York Times*, 15 December 1992.

26. Interfax (Moscow), 14 December 1992. Earlier, in an interview with *Izvestia,* Kozyrev had warned in all earnestness that pressure for the Russian army to intervene in support of ethnic Russians living outside Russia's borders was being orchestrated by politicians opposed to Yeltsin. What was "happening in Russia today" reminded him very much of the events in Germany in 1933, when "democrats began to change over to nationalist positions." He feared that in Russia the "party of war, the party of neo-Bolsheviks, are raising their heads" and that there was an acute "threat of an anti-democratic coup": Andrei Kozyrev, "Partiia voiny nastupaet — i v Moldove, i v Gruzii, i v Rossii," *Izvestia,* 30 June 1992.

27. Yeltsin in a speech to the collegium of the defense ministry, *Krasnaia zvezda,* 25 November 1992.

28. Yeltsin in an address to foreign ministry officials, Interfax, 28 October 1992.

29. See Kyoji Komachi, "Concept Building in Russian Diplomacy: The Struggle for Identity," Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 3 May 1994, pp. 3-4.

30. James Sterngold, "Japan and Russia End Talks on Disputed Isles," *The New York Times,* 6 August 1992.

31. Serge Schmemann, "Yeltsin Cancels Visit to Japan as Dispute over Islands Simmers," *The New York Times,* 10 September 1992.

32. "Russia Offers Balkan Peace Plan with Pro-Serb Tilt," *Washington Post,* 25 February 1993.

33. In a speech to a congress of the Civic Union, a center-right alliance, in late February 1993: ITAR-TASS, 1 March 1993.

34. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Russia's `Monroe Doctrine': Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Imperial Outreach," in Maureen Appel and Harald von Riekhoff, eds, *Russia among Nations* (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University Press, 1994).

35. Yeltsin participated in the mobilization of pressures against the Baltic states. In July 1993, for instance, when he met Chancellor Kohl in Irkutsk, he said that the "withdrawal of troops from these states" would "take place strictly according to plan *if* the problems of the Russian-speaking population were solved in a just manner and *if* there were no discrimination in these states against the Russian population": ITAR-TASS and DPA (German press agency), 11 July 1993 (emphasis added).

36. The text of the presidential approval, as published in *Rossiiskie vesti,* 7 April 1994.

37. See, for instance, the "programme" formulated in the Russian foreign ministry "for the protection of 30 million Russians in the Near Abroad": "Moskva razrabotala programmu za zashchitu 30 millionov russkikh v blizhnem zarubezh'e," *Izvestia,* 17 February 1994.

38. Larry Ryckman, "Moscow Scraps Bid to Halve Army," Associated Press report, 29 December 1993; on the controversies over the size of the Russian armed forces, see John Lepingwell, "The Military in Russian Security Policy: Redeployment, Doctrine, Strategy," paper presented to the Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies on Russia and regional security, St. Petersburg, Russia, 24-27 April 1994.

39. The text (30 pages) of the study was distributed to journalists at a press conference in Moscow and published in full or in excerpts in all the major national newspapers; quotes here are from "Perspektivy rasshireniia NATO i interesy Rossii. Doklad sluzhby vvneshnei razvedki," *Izvestia,* 26 November 1993.

40. Ibid.

41. ITAR-TASS, 5 January 1994.

42. On 31 March 1994, for instance, the President's press spokesman stated that Russia would not be ready to sign on to PFP for at least six or seven months. This was flatly denied the next day by Kozyrev, who said that PFP would be signed later in the month. It was not, however; and, indeed, in April, after the NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb gun positions outside Gorazde, Kozyrev announced that Russia would not sign on to PFP after all. On these contradictory statements and attitudes, see Interfax, 6 April 1994, and John Lloyd, "Russian Government in State of Disarray," *Financial Times,* 8 April 1994.

43. Interfax, 6 April 1994.

44. These two tendencies in Russian foreign policy were singled out by Stankevich, "Derzhava v poiskakh sebia," loc. cit., and further systematized and described in the West by Alexander Rahr, "`Atlanticists' versus `Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report,* 1: 22, 29 May 1992, pp. 17-22.

45. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 199-203.

46. Particularly prolific writers of this group are Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava v poiskakh sebia"; "Rossiia voznikla ne vchera i ne konchitsia zavtra," *Izvestia,* 12 June 1992 and "Formula stabilizatsii v `goriachikh tochkakh'," *Rossiiskaia Gazeta,* 28 July 1992; Yevgenii Ambartsumov, "Otstaivat' interesy Rossii." *Narodnyi deputat,* 16, 1992; Andranik Migranian, "Podlinnye i mnimiye orientiry vo vneshnei politike," *Rossiiskaia Gazeta,* 4 August 1992, and "Rossiia i blizhnoe zarubezh'e: Formirovanie novogo vneshno-politicheskogo kursa Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 12 January 1994; and Sergei Karaganov, who is one of the main authors of both the August 1992 and May 1994 "theses" of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 19 August 1992 and 27 May 1994.

47. As one of the architects of the parliamentary group Rossiiskoe edinstvo in the Russian parliament before its dissolution — a faction linking communist and nationalist deputies — Baburin could also be "allocated" to the fourth school of thought; this would also be warranted by his strident "Mondializm i taina Rossii," *Elementy,* 2, 1992. 50

48. See, for instance, his book: Vladimir Zhirinovsky, *Poslednyi brosok na iug* (Moscow: Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia, 1993).

49. Presidential adviser and state counsellor Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava v poiskakh sebia."

50. This is a nuance (or is it more than that?) that Sergei Stankevich discussed in an interview in *Komsomol'skaia pravda,* 26 May 1992.

51. Stankevich, "Derzhava v poiskakh sebia."

52. Aleksandr Vladislavlev and Sergei Karaganov, "Tiazhkii krest Rossii," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 17 November 1992; similarly, and not surprisingly given the membership of both of the authors in the Foreign Defense and Policy Council, the August 1992 report calls for an "enlightened post-imperial integration course"; ibid., 19 August 1992.

53. Interviews conducted by this author with foreign ministry officials in Moscow, June 1993.

54. Interfax, 21 February 1992, reported the content of the document but did not explicitly say that it had been issued by the foreign ministry; see Suzanne Crow, "Russia Debates Its National Interest," *RFE/RL Research Report,* 1: 28, 10 July 1992.

55. The documents were entitled "On Basic Directions of the Foreign Policy Activities of Russia and the Activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation"; and "On International Relations and the Foreign Policy of Russia, Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia" (both unpublished).

56. "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" (mimeograph); on the background of the foreign policy concept's origins and content see *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 21 October 1992.

57. *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* (January 1993).

58. "Strategiia Rossii. Nekotorye tezisy dlia doklada Soveta po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 19 August 1992. Nominally, foreign minister Kozyrev was one of the 37 members. Other members have included (positions listed are the most recent known to this author) deputy director of the Institute on Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences Sergei Karaganov; deputy foreign minister Anatolii Adamyshin; Duma deputy Evgenii Ambartsumov; first deputy defense minister Andrei Kokoshin; chief of general staff of the Russian armed forces Col. Gen. Kolesnikov; Duma foreign affairs committee chairman Vladimir Lukin; Duma deputy and presidential adviser Sergei Stankevich; the chief of the Russian Counterintelligence Agency, Lt.-Gen. Stepashin; vice-premier Sergei Shakhrai; President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Arkady Volsky; Duma deputy and Chairman of the Center for Economic and Political research Grigory Yavlinsky; and chairman ofthe Duma CIS affairs committee Konstantin Zatulin.

59. The full title of the document is "Basic Principles of a Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation." The only publicly available summary of its origins and content together with excerpts from the document is by Vladislav Chernov, "Natsional'nye interesy Rossii i ugrozy dlia ee bezopasnosti," *Nesavisimaia Gazeta*, 29 April 1993. The author is deputy head of the department for strategic security at the Russian Security Council.

60. In an address to the Russian foreign ministry, Interfax, 28 October 1992.

61. "Russia's main foreign policy priority is relations with our partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States." Kozyrev wrote in "Russia: Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, 71: 2, Spring 1992, pp. 1-16; the foreign ministry's draft document of 10 February 1992, "Concerning the basic points of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation," also contained a reference to that effect; see Komachi, "Concept Building in Russian Diplomacy," p. 5. Kozyrev also was to state later that he devoted "more than 70 percent" of his time in office to CIS affairs; Andrei Kozyrev, "Otkrovennaia diplomatiia," *Argumenti i fakti*, 23, June 1993 (interview with V. Starkov, chief editor of the journal).

62. Interfax, 28 October 1992.

63. See the account by Chancellor Kohl's then foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenan-sichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991), p. 321; confirmed to this author in interviews with Teltschik on 26 July 1994, in Munich; with Anatolii S. Chernyaev, Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser, on 25 June 1993 and 29 April 1994, in Moscow; and with Sergei P. Tarasenko, Shevardnadze's personal assistant, on 29 April 1994, also in Moscow. For details on the economic dimension in the Soviet consent to German unification, see Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev, German Unification and the Collapse of Empire," *Post-Soviet Affairs* (Berkeley), 10:3, July-September 1994, pp. 197-230.

64. "Brisante Studie aus Kohls Denkfabrik: Der Preis der Einheit," *Capital*, 4, 1990, pp. 110-12. The experts were Achim von Heynitz and Hanns Maull, both then affiliated with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen.

65. German government figures as compiled by Fred Oldenburg, "Germany's Interest in Russian Stability," Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Cologne, *Berichte*, 3, 1993, p. 19. For approximate conversion of German marks to US $ divide by 1.6.

66. Figures according to *Finansovie Izvestia*, 1 July 1993.

67. Figures provided to this author by Karl-Heinz Fink and Peter Danylow of the Eastern Committee (Ostausschuss) of the German Federation of Industry (BDI) in Cologne. For comparison, the last sum amounts to less than 0.4 per cent of German investment in France.

68. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report, Russia*, 3rd quarter, 1994.

69. Figures on China as provided by Peat Marwick Accountants, quoted by AFP, 24 January 1994.

70. Oldenburg, "Germany's Interest in Russia's Stability," p. 29; and Fink and Danylow of the Ostausschuss.

71. Reuters, from Moscow, 4 July 1992; Steven Erlanger, "Yeltsin to Seek More Time to Repay Old Soviet Debts," *The New York Times*, 5 July 1992. Yeltsin made these comments in Moscow two days prior to his departure for the G-7 Munich summit.

72. Ibid.

73. On the comeback of the conservative and hard-line opposition, see John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 297-301.

74. Interfax, 18 November 1992; and John Lloyd, "Russia Boosts Arms Trade," *Financial Times*, 1 December 1993.

75. As, for instance, Sergei Karaoglanov, chairman of the Russian government agency dealing with arms sales; see Fred Kaplan, "Hard-pressed Russia Seeks to Revive Global Arms Sales," *The Boston Globe*, 30 July 1992; one of the first to notice and deplore the pressures on the Russian government to increase arms exports even at the expense of political relations with the West was military expert P. Felgengauer, "Vse v Rossii khatiat torgovat' oruzhiem," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 1 October 1992.

76. "Yeltsin Sees Military Sales to China," *Los Angeles Times* report, *Boston Globe*, 18 December 1992; Sanjoy Hazarika, "Despite US, Yeltsin Backs Rocket Deal with India," *The New York Times*, 30 January 1993.

77. Alexander Shokhin, Russia's deputy prime minister for foreign economic relations, as reported by Lloyd, "Russia Boosts Arms Trade." Shokhin made these announcements after a trip by senior Russian officials to the United Arab Emirates, during which contracts were signed for exports of arms, including the newest armored personnel carriers.

78. The electoral results were consistent with a poll conducted at the beginning of December 1993. Fifty-four percent of the respondents were either sure or at least thought it possible that the West aimed at economically weakening Russia; see *Za rubezhom*, 5, 1994, p. 3.

79. This argument was developed earlier by Hannes Adomeit in "Russia: Partner or Risk Factor in European Security?" in *European Security after the Cold War*, papers from the 35th Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brussels, 9-12 September 1992, published as *Adelphi Paper* No. 285, February 1994, pp. 15-33.

80. In the debate on the issue of nuclear proliferation, as exemplified by the question as to whether Ukraine should retain the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union, this author agrees with the arguments advanced by Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3, Summer 1993, pp. 67-80, rather than John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," ibid., pp. 50-66.

81. See, for instance, the agreement reached after three days of talks in Moscow between top German and Russian security officials on bilateral cooperation in preventing the smuggling of nuclear materials, Interfax, 22 August 1994.

82. Defense minister Grachev criticized the government's decision to reduce the strength of the armed forces to 1.5 million troops, arguing that the nation would be better served by an army of 1.9 or 2.1 million men; Radio Mayak, 19 August 1994, as quoted by *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 158, 22 August 1994.

83. See, for instance, chief of the general staff Mikhail Kolesnikov's comments on the Islamic threat and Turkish ambitions, BTA, 19 November 1993; defense minister Grachev's press conference on his return from Turkey, Ostankino TV (Moscow), 17 May 1993; and ITAR-TASS, 14 May 1993, as quoted by Lepingwell, "The Military in Russian Security Policy," p. 4.

84. Dzintra Bungs, "Russia Agrees to Withdraw Troops from Latvia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3:22, 3 June 1994, pp. 1-9.

85. *The Week in Germany* (German Information Center, New York), 13 May 1994.

86. Colonel Petrushenko, the head of the Soyuz parliamentary group in the Soviet parliament, in an interview with *Pravda*, 3 March 1991.

87. The complaints voiced by Soviet officers about the process were not directed at the German authorities or population but at the Russian authorities; see, for instance, Aleksandr Polotskii, "Germanskie problemy rossiiskikh voisk — kak ikh vidit glavnokomanduiushchii Zapadnoi gruppi voisk general-polkovnik Matvei Burlakov," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 14 January 1993. Agreement in principle on the time-scale (four years) for the withdrawal was reached at the Kohl-Gorbachev summit in Moscow and Arkihz in July 1990 and codified in a corresponding treaty in October 1990; in December 1992, in talks between Kohl and Yeltsin in Moscow, the two leaders agreed to advance the date for the completion of the pullback of the WGF to 31 August 1994.

88. "Kohl stellt Jelzin ein Kooperationsabkommen mit der Europäischen Union in Aussicht," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 May 1994.

89. "Corfu Summit: EU Agrees on Expansion, Cooperation with Russia," *The Week in Germany*, 1 July 1994.

90. Daniel Williams, "Russia Signs on with NATO in Peace Alliance," *International Herald Tribune*, 23 June 1994.

91. Gaidar had made a comeback in mid-September 1993, when Yeltsin appointed him one of three first deputy prime ministers and, at least nominally, put him in charge of economic policy.

92. In mid-January 1994, for instance, foreign minister Kozyrev delivered a speech on the need to keep Russian troops inside the former Soviet republics, a statement that especially alarmed the leaders of the Baltic states: Fred Kaplan, "As Reformers Retreat, New Russia Yields to Old: Yeltsin Is Called `Lonely and Suffering'," *Boston Globe*, 28 January 1994.

93. Anders Aslund, "Russia's Success Story," *Foreign Affairs*, 73: 5, September/October 1994, pp. 58-71.

94. Ibid., pp. 61, 65-66, 68.

95. Jochen Wermuth, "A Case of Cut And Thrust," *Financial Times,* 18 October 1994. The author is identified by the paper as being affiliated with Balliol College, Oxford, and acting as adviser to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.

96. The first, in a lecture and discussion at Harvard University on 6 May 1994, the last two, in remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies conference on regional security, St Petersburg, 23-27 April 1994 (author's notes).

97. Thus, for instance, when deputy finance minister Andrei Kazmin, the official responsible for the negotiations with Belarus, was asked which CIS country would — after the conclusion of the agreement on economic and financial union with Belarus — be the next "candidate" for economic union, he replied that Belarus would remain the *only* example. Author interview with Kazmin, Munich, 22 July 1994.

98. Sergei Parkhomenko, "Duma namerena zashchitit' biudzhet Soveta Federatsii," *Segodnia,* 7 June 1994; Vladislav Fridman, "Gosbiudzhet nakonets-to doduman'," *Moskovskie novosti,* 24, 12-19 June 1994.

99. The presidential and government support, however, may only have been lukewarm. They supported the 55-trillion-rouble figure between the first and second reading of the bill but failed to table and defend a corresponding motion when the bill was voted; see *Moskovskie novosti,* 12 June 1994.

100. "Federal'nyi zakon o Federal'nom biudzhete na 1994g.," *Rossiiskaia Gazeta,* 6 July 1994.

101. See the detailed analysis by Nicola A. Mögel, "Das russische Wehrbudget: Schwierige Balance zwischen politischen Interessen und ökonomischen Möglichkeiten," Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Cologne, *Aktuelle Analysen,* 46, August 1993, pp. 1-6.

102. "Strategiia dlia Rossii. Nekotorye tezisy dlia doklada Soveta po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 19 August 1992.

103. "Strategiia dlia Rossii (2)."

104. Ibid., thesis I.1.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., theses I.4 and I.5.

107. Shevardnadze, *Moi vybor,* p. 211.

108. This was a point made early on in the debate in a commentary in *Izvestia,* 21 February 1992.

109. This is the realization expressed in the most recent report by the Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences, *Novaia geopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Yevrope, pozitsiia Zapada i interesy bezopasnosti Rossii* (Moscow: Institute of Europe, 1994), p. 67. The report is a collective work; its authors are Dmitrii Danilov, Sergei Karaganov (chief editor), Igor Maksymichev, Boris Pichugin and Pavel Podlesnyi.

110. Speech to the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies, 7 April 1992, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta,* 8 April 1992.

111. This analysis coincides with the conclusions of Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities in the 1990s," in Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller, eds, *Russian Security after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow,* CSIA Studies in International Security (Washington: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 1-41.

SUMMARY

The author, a German expert, cautions against expanding NATO further and faster than the institution can bear. He calls for "the pragmatic step-by-step linking of Central and Eastern Europe to the transatlantic security structure below the level of full membership at the outset. Such a procedure along the lines of NATO'S Partnership for Peace concept — with all its shortcomings and inconsistencies — may lack the attractiveness of a 'comprehensive strategic concept,' but it does have the advantage of addressing the security needs of the Central and East European democracies without straining the viability of NATO to the breaking point." (Length: 4,900 words.)

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THE FOLLY OF RAPID NATO EXPANSION

By Karl-Heinz Kamp

WITH THE FUTURE of the Western Alliance in question, the issue of whether to include the Central and East European countries in Western security structures has come to the fore. Prominent voices inside and outside Western governments argue that NATO must expand or die. It must "go out of area or out of business." Some of the young democracies in Eastern Europe such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic urge that they be placed on a "fast track" for full membership. In opposition, critics of NATO expansion hold that the ups and downs of the Maastricht process by now should have taught diplomats and politicians that integration is not a value per se, but works only when there is a discernible, functional gain. Rigid timetables may raise unrealistic expectations among the East Europeans, when only the passage of time can fulfill their desires and demands.

In its summit meeting in January 1994, as an interim step, NATO offered military cooperation and consultation to all the states of the former Soviet empire under the "Partnership for Peace" (PFP). PFP enables the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to make their military structures compatible with NATO, an essential condition for future membership. At first, PFP seemed to have squared the circle. It allowed NATO to gain time by postponing the membership question until the positions of key allies had been clarified. For the "Visegrad Countries" — the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia — it offered at least the clear prospect of NATO membership, the maximum they could have realistically expected. In addition, they were admitted into practical military cooperation with NATO countries. Russia also gained, since PFP delayed any rapid extension of NATO toward the Russian border — a possibility vigorously opposed by influential circles in Moscow.

Partnership for Peace also satisfied the German government, notwithstanding Germany's announced preference for quickly enlarging the Western Alliance. Germany's position toward NATO expansion has always been less unified than it appeared in public. German defense minister Volker Rühe was the most vocal in urging a rapid widening of NATO, but even within his own ministry, there was some skepticism. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, though actively urging Western support for Eastern security requirements, expressed strong reservations about a rapid eastward extension of NATO's security umbrella. The chancellor's office also remained cautious: It did not object to a NATO security guarantee for Eastern Europe in principle, but it showed serious resistance to the time frame suggested by advocates of a speedy NATO extension. Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself has steered a careful course on NATO expansion, opting to take Russian security interests into account, particularly after Russian president Boris Yeltsin reversed his earlier endorsement of NATO membership for the Czech Republic and Poland after the October 1993 government crisis in Moscow, when troops loyal to Yeltsin shelled the Russian Parliament into submission.

According to press reports, Kohl admonished his defense minister for pressing the NATO extension issue so precipitously.

But only a few months after NATO postponed the question of extending membership eastward through the PFP, the issue has resurfaced. There are several reasons. The Central Europeans continue to press the issue at every occasion. Their unending pressure is understandable, since NATO membership is at least in part a political metaphor that suggests final, institutional independence from Moscow. Also motivating the Central Europeans is their historical experience of living between Germany and Russia, which has taught them not to be overly optimistic about human nature. But pressure for NATO expansion is also coming from influential sectors within NATO. Partisans of rapid expansion cite the necessity of "exporting stability," urge a "widening of the community of democracies," and want to provide "visions and incentives for the former foes in the East."

But the arguments advanced in favor of expansion overlook three pitfalls. First, NATO expansion amounts to an arrangement of "enlarge now — pay later." Enlargement's positive connotations make it useful for political declarations and almost irresistible in its appeal to broader public audiences, but there is usually little discussion of the real costs. Second, proponents of NATO expansion invalidate an important merit of PFP — namely, gaining the time necessary to clarify a security environment that is still in flux. And third, proponents tend to ignore the fundamental problem in the relations among Russia, Central Europe and the West: The Central European countries may be grasping for security from Russia by establishing permanent links with the West, but all NATO members are interested in maintaining security and stability in Central Europe and beyond in association with Russia. Moscow, in turn, is trying to increase its influence in Central Europe and in the West by being recognized as a major power globally and as a key player in the management of European security matters.

In addition to these frequently overlooked objections to rapid NATO expansion, as least four specific questions regarding expansion remain unanswered:

- o Is NATO politically willing and able to implement security guarantees to new members in the East?
- o Is it possible to maintain alliance cohesion in an expanded NATO?
- o How will an enlarged NATO handle the issue of nuclear weapons?
- o What will be the implications of rapid NATO extension for Russia?

THE POLITICS OF EXPANSION

The core purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance is codified in Article 5 of the NATO treaty: mutual military assistance among member countries and collective defense of their territories. Building on this basis, NATO since the end of the Cold War has initiated an evolutionary process of transformation. It started with the development of the New Strategic Concept in 1991, which began to embrace new roles in crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. But the evolutionary expansion of NATO responsibilities has not replaced its key purpose of collective defense and mutual assistance; rather, it provides a rationale for keeping NATO vital so that it remains capable of defending its members in the event a new, serious threat emerges. Indeed, the traditional obligation of NATO members is in fact the driving force behind the East Europeans' desire to join the alliance; they are primarily interested in the "old" function of NATO, not its new agenda. Consequently, the common argument that it takes the participation of new members to underwrite NATO'S "new" role is far from compelling.

Once the traditional defense obligation of the alliance is extended to the East, the question arises: Would the current NATO allies really be prepared to inject military forces into conflicts that might arise in Central or Eastern Europe? While the question remains hypothetical, educated guesses can be made on the basis of the responses of individual alliance members to actual crises and conflicts. The war in the former Yugoslavia has clearly demonstrated that NATO members are unprepared to use force to repel aggression in a conflict outside NATO'S traditional area. They are only prepared to offer humanitarian aid and participation in peacekeeping efforts. The reasons for NATO'S passivity in the Balkans are manifold. Members have differing views on the origin of the conflict, the identity of the "aggressor," and the efficacy of military force in an ethnic conflict. The central reason, though, is that most Western states do not regard the conflict in the Balkans as affecting their vital interests and hence requiring military intervention, particularly in light of the considerable risks involved and the uncertainty of success. In the event of a similar conflict in Central or Eastern Europe, which might also be marked by diffuse causes and uncertain prospects for settlement, the alliance would most likely again subject any decision to use military force to the same cost-benefit analysis, particularly if the conflict were caused by ethnic tensions. The result could be nonintervention on the part of key alliance members and NATO passivity as a consequence, this time within NATO's accepted security zone. The effect would be devastating for the alliance's survival. Unfortunately, it is the very problem of ethnic conflicts that is the most daunting threat to stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Some uncertainty over whether NATO states would actually honor their treaty obligations and come to the aid of a threatened fellow member has always existed. But during the Cold War, most military crises probably would have escalated into a full-scale East-West confrontation and thus would have automatically engaged the vital interests of alliance members. Today, the indivisibility of security interests is not necessarily a given; regional or more limited conflicts have once again become possible. The question of how to define vital interests is particularly acute for the United States and Canada, which, because of their geopolitical location, would be least affected by a crisis in Central or Eastern Europe.

The United States is in the process of redefining its foreign policy goals and instrumentalities. Although its new look at America's international role in a changed world is not yet completed, it is already clear that the United States will pay increased attention to non-European problem areas. The Clinton administration has sent conflicting signals about America's future geopolitical involvement, and President Bill Clinton himself has not been as enthusiastic about U.S. engagement in Central and Eastern Europe as states in that region had hoped. It is highly unlikely that Congress would approve an expansion of American treaty obligations. The Senate may have overwhelmingly voted in favor of "prompt" NATO expansion, but the vote was nonbinding, and the new

role of NATO would cost billions of dollars and would also trigger a new debate over NATO engagement in areas outside of Europe.

Not least among the reasons that NATO is important to the United States is that it can be used as an instrument of American global strategy, but this use of NATO has made several European alliance members extremely apprehensive. Will the United States agree to an eastward expansion of NATO responsibilities if an extension of NATO commitments to other regions meets with European resistance?

Germany will be key. Its attitude toward existing and future alliance obligations is marked by ambiguities. On the one hand, the Federal Republic has taken concrete steps within a remarkably short time toward assuming greater responsibility in the international arena. Large segments of the public have supported the presence of German soldiers in Cambodia and Somalia and German participation in relief flights to Bosnia. In July 1994, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Germany could constitutionally accept the obligations stemming from its membership in international security organizations, including participation in peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, whatever the constitutional foundation for German participation in United Nations or NATO peacekeeping operations may be, German involvement in activities that are purely military rather than largely humanitarian will encounter great opposition.

Heated internal debate over relocation to Turkey of the Allied Mobile Force during the 1991 Persian Gulf war proved that even the deployment of German troops to combat zones within the Atlantic Alliance can meet with strong resistance. While the German public is definitely moving along a learning curve in that respect, it will take some time before Germans, in fulfillment of treaty obligations, agree to accept the participation of their soldiers in crisis management operations. Indeed, after the supreme court ruling, key German politicians stated that a "culture of military restraint" will continue to characterize German foreign policy.

The ambiguous signals given by alliance members regarding their willingness to extend treaty obligations to East European countries must be regarded as a significant roadblock to the admission of new members. According to NATO rules, the admission of new members requires unanimous support from the existing membership. That an eastward expansion of NATO today would receive a "yes" vote from every alliance member is highly unlikely. That holds not only for the key members of NATO but also for the smaller ones to the south. They subscribe to a risk assessment radically different from that of their northern partners, since North Africa and the Middle East pose more immediate threats to their security. They are also afraid that arms assistance from the rich member states would dry up with the admission of new members in even greater need of financial aid than they.

CAN NATO FUNCTION?

A second question posed by an eastward expansion of NATO relates to the effect such growth would have on the alliance's ability to function. With the end of the East-West conflict, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the democratization of a number of members of the former Warsaw Pact, NATO has entered a phase of fundamental reformulation of its responsibilities. A reorientation is also taking place among individual alliance members. All the key alliance partners are subjecting their security policies to rigorous reassessments in an effort to adjust to the new realities. Inevitable differences of opinion and new frictions are a major reason for the obvious difficulties that NATO — an organization built on consensus — has had in formulating a coherent response to new problems. Examples of dispute have been such large-scale issues as the shape of any European security identity and the Yugoslavia question.

At times, internal differences have put such a strain on the alliance that its cohesion has been seriously imperiled. The admission of new members also engaged in a process of political and military redefinition because of their recent history would exacerbate NATO's difficulty in arriving at common positions. Communications and the decision-making process, already strained, could become more difficult still, or even paralyzed at times. It was instructive that Hungary, for example, refused to cooperate with NATO's effort to police a no-fly zone over Bosnia, because of concern over the Hungarian minorities within the province of Vojvodina in Serbia. New members would bring new problems, such as historical differences with particular neighbors, as well as a problem they all have in common, namely an uncertain domestic situation.

The counterargument frequently advanced is that admission of these reform-minded countries into the transatlantic security structure would help stabilize their democratic institutions. The historical experience of bringing West Germany into the community of Western states after the Second World War and of NATO'S success in limiting the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus suggests to some that inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe in NATO would be the surest way of pacifying a region fraught with conflict. What this argument fails to recognize is that the democratization of Germany and the management of the Greek-Turkish dispute took place under specific historical and political circumstances. The fact that NATO stayed intact even in times of internal strife was due to the constant presence of two "enforcer" states, which applied the pressure necessary to keep the alliance together. The external force was the Soviet Union, whose political and military threat drove the Western democracies to act in concert and stifle intra-alliance differences. The internal force was the United States, which was able to keep peace within the alliance because of the dominant position it purchased in part through its massive financial commitments to the alliance. Yet, even with America's enormous political and military power within the alliance and great moral authority (as it saw it), the United States could not resolve the Greek-Turkish hostilities, only prevent their escalation into full-scale war.

Today, the situation is dramatically different. One of the former "enforcer" states, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, while the other, the United States, seems bent on reducing its role in the alliance — as indicated, for instance, by the gradual shrinkage of the American military presence in Europe and America's unwillingness to make a sufficient financial effort to assist the transitional economies. Moreover, the notion that the internal political situation of the Visegrad countries can be influenced from the outside seems overly optimistic when one considers the differences between today and the postwar years when the United States was able to "export democracy" to a vanquished Germany.

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

The nuclear component of the mutual defense obligations has received short shrift in discussions of NATO expansion. If the willingness of the NATO members to extend their treaty obligations to the East is a question mark to begin with, the uncertainties surrounding America's readiness to extend its nuclear protection to new countries further exacerbate the situation. For decades, the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence — that is, its willingness to defend Europe with nuclear weapons if necessary — has been a cornerstone of the alliance. But it has always been marked by contradictions. America naturally sought to minimize the danger to its own territory inherent in the promise to use nuclear force to defend Europe. As a consequence, under the complex procedure for the deployment of nuclear weapons, the United States rejected any provision that would make an American nuclear response automatic under predetermined conditions. The resulting ambiguity understandably raised apprehensions in countries ostensibly under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The question "Would the Americans sacrifice New York to save Hamburg?" summed up European doubts.

Were the Visegrad countries to become members, there would be even greater cause for doubt. Would the Americans sacrifice New York to save Warsaw? The American promise of nuclear protection was essentially a response to the East-West conflict and was credible only insofar as Soviet threats against Western Europe also threatened vital U.S. interests. Without a resurgence of Russian power, the East-West dichotomy has lost its sway over security policy for good.

To illustrate the new dynamics, let us hypothesize a regional armed conflict between Poland and Ukraine after Poland has attained membership in NATO. If one assumes further that Ukraine has managed to gain full control over the nuclear weapons stationed on its soil and threatened Poland with their use, the United States would find itself in an extremely difficult position. As a member of NATO, Poland would expect the United States to counter-threaten Ukraine with a nuclear strike in order to deter it from further aggression. That would put America at risk of being the target of retaliatory strikes by Ukraine, which would have the capacity to launch them. Since the United States in such a situation could easily come to the conclusion that a Ukrainian-Polish border dispute does not involve its vital interests (because the conflict is unlikely to escalate into a global confrontation), it would in all probability refuse to intervene militarily. After all, there is nothing in the NATO treaty prohibiting a refusal to act. Under Article 5, NATO members are only obligated to employ such means as they deem necessary.

One might argue that since this dilemma is as old as the nuclear age and since an attack on a NATO member, if tolerated, would surely throw the continued existence of the alliance into doubt, the United States would have a strong incentive to live up to its commitments. But again, the end of the Cold War has changed the American "risk equation" significantly. What is more, a broader realization of a further erosion of nuclear deterrence could reopen the nuclear debate in NATO, something that none of the present NATO members are currently interested in seeing. This is particularly true of the NATO applicants themselves. If the Visegrad countries gain admission, it is to be expected that the credibility problems associated with any kind of nuclear commitment will quickly become obvious to these new members and lead to a critical reappraisal of alliance guarantees by their publics.

In the early 1980s, some West Germans became greatly aroused over the question of whether nuclear weapons couple or decouple nuclear and nonnuclear allies and whether the United States would actually honor its nuclear commitment. These painful debates over the credibility of security guarantees took place in a country on whose soil thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons were located and legions of American soldiers were stationed. Would it not be necessary, for the sake of credibility of nuclear commitments, to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members? Aside from the reaction of the publics in Central and Eastern Europe, what would be the reaction of Russia or Ukraine if NATO nuclear weapons were stationed in their immediate neighborhood?

We arrive at the most important and acute problem surrounding NATO expansion: What would be the Russian response to a hasty expansion of NATO, which would move it closer to Russia's borders? Although Moscow is troubled by political turmoil and economic chaos, it is still a nuclear superpower and the key player within the former Soviet Union. In addition, it is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council with the option to veto all U.N. resolutions on peacekeeping or crisis management the United States and NATO may wish to make, and it still retains the potential to influence developments far beyond its own borders.

Not long ago, many in the West, particularly in the United States, argued in favor of a "strategic partnership" between Russia and the West. That concept, however, assumes a compatibility of interests between Russia and the West — an assumption that seemed realistic in light of sweeping Russian acquiescence in Western wishes in the early 1990s. Today, even the architects of the "strategic partnership" admit that the honeymoon in Russia's relations with the West is over. Recent Russian complaints about Western military actions in Somalia and against the Serbs and Moscow's increasing efforts to reassert its influence over the former republics of the Soviet Union have revealed that Russia's own delineations of its national security will not necessarily be in harmony with the West's preferences. Nationalism, with significant anti-Western components, has reemerged as a defining factor in Russian foreign relations. In this context, some Russians are suspicious that Western governments hope to fragment the Russian Federation and thus will try to tip the geopolitical balance permanently in the West's favor.

These tendencies do not at all mean that a return to the old patterns of East-West conflict is inevitable. But avoiding a return will require a careful Western strategy of managing the difficult and sometimes prickly relationship with Russia. In particular, it is important to take special precautions to avoid a Russian perception of Western encirclement, since it would inevitably weaken democratic forces in Moscow in favor of nationalists around the country. The reform process itself might then be seriously endangered. Russia must not be isolated unless it isolates itself by returning to the aggressive or imperialist tendencies of the past. Expanding NATO now would necessarily fuel Moscow's fears of Western attempts to fill the power vacuum in Eastern Europe at the expense of Russia. Explaining to a humiliated Russian military establishment that an extension of NATO for the sake of stabilizing Russia's western periphery would be a net gain for them, not another defeat, would probably exceed the ingenuity of even the most eloquent NATO expansionists.

EXPAND LATER

Those within NATO who now advocate an expansion of the alliance within the next three or four years or before the turn of the century tend to underestimate the questions outlined above. Perhaps they truly believe in quick and painless solutions for difficult security issues still characterized by inconsistencies and conundrums. Perhaps they reveal a desire to put the "vision thing" above the crude realities of post-Cold War Europe. Yet, it is far from clear that quick NATO membership is the most urgent precondition for stabilizing the new democracies in Eastern Europe domestically. A very strong case can be made that economic cooperation through full access to West European markets is a much more promising approach.

Identifying crucial problems that must be resolved before NATO can be widened should not be interpreted as rejection of enlargement in general, much less as a reason to go slowly on closer cooperation now. But all involved in this debate need to be reminded that NATO, unlike the European Union, cannot choose between "deepening" and "widening" according to the preference of its members. There is either a collective defense structure or there is none. Thus, it seems prudent to attempt to widen NATO after the questions identified have been answered to the satisfaction of all alliance members.

If the admission of new members today is likely to meet with resistance within and without the Western Alliance, what are the policy developments that might remove the objections to extension in the following years? One is the ongoing evolution of NATO itself. Since the upheavals of 1989, the alliance has extended its strategic sphere of action, both geographically and substantively. It now includes the area of the former Warsaw Pact and the entire spectrum of security-related issues. To varying degrees, NATO offers the U.N., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western European Union (WEU) political and military assistance with peacekeeping efforts and crisis and conflict management. It is also focusing on new risks and threats, whether emanating from the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East, or the overall geopolitical situation. NATO's progress along the course it has already started could clarify the role of individual NATO members within the alliance and strengthen NATO as a whole.

Second, the relationship of the United States, the pivotal NATO partner, to Europe and the alliance should become clearer as NATO progresses on its present course. Despite the present administration's concentration on domestic problems, there is little doubt that the United States — the only remaining superpower in terms of size and economic and military resources — will continue to play a leading role in global politics and stay engaged in Europe. An evolution of NATO'S role to encompass crisis management and conflict prevention beyond the traditional geographical limits should considerably increase NATO's value to the United States and make the latter more willing to assume further obligations, since NATO would then be a valuable instrument for power projection within U.S. global strategy.

Third, progress in European integration, including in security policy, would do much to clarify the respective roles and functions of NATO and the "European security pillar," possibly in the form of the WEU, and contribute to the stabilization of the alliance.

Fourth, and closely tied to the third development, is the clarification of the future function of nuclear weapons in European security. On the one hand, continued evolution in nuclear strategic thinking would clarify the future viability of the concept of extended deterrence; on the other, decisive progress toward a European political union could present the nuclear question in a wholly different light.

Fifth, there might be political and military improvements in Eastern Europe or changes in attitude. The more interaction that takes place between NATO allies and PFP partners, including in peacekeeping, the more compatible the forces and military structures of Central and Eastern Europe will become with those of NATO. While military compatibility would not automatically translate into an entrance ticket for NATO — since the decision about who would be admitted to the alliance needs to be made on strategic assessments, and not on the mere fulfillment of any criteria — it would certainly make future membership easier. Of equal importance in that respect would be developments in the economic field. Should the East European countries, in particular the Visegrad Four, improve their economies over the medium term, they would be better positioned to participate in the burden-sharing required by NATO.

Sixth, the process of defining the new international role of Germany might be completed. Notwithstanding the important constitutional decision made in July 1994 regarding German participation in peacekeeping, it will take time to complete the process of accommodating the German public to new military tasks beyond the traditional NATO writ. The same holds true for the military hardware that needs to be procured if the Bundeswehr is to undertake new missions. In short, it will take a significant time span to transform Germany from an "importer" to an "exporter" of security and to permit it to make a contribution to the maintenance or establishment of peace.

Last, and perhaps most important, the situation within Russia and Ukraine and their relations to the West might become more stable and better defined. Despite recent setbacks, democratic and reform-oriented forces might strengthen their positions and thus make the domestic situation in these countries more predictable.

From NATO'S perspective, what is not needed now is a revived debate on a rapid expansion of NATO to the East, or even specific timetables for the admission of particular Central and East European countries. This would put an unhealthy pressure on an alliance still in the process of adjusting to new realities, and it would raise expectations in Eastern Europe that the West cannot realistically meet. Extending NATO rapidly without first building the necessary political support at home will lead to commitments for Eastern Europe as empty as the hollow guarantees that France and Great Britain gave Poland on the eve of World War II.

What remains is the pragmatic step-by-step linking of Central and Eastern Europe to the transatlantic security structure below the level of full membership at the outset. Such a procedure along the lines of NATO'S Partnership for Peace concept — with all its shortcomings and inconsistencies — may lack the attractiveness of a "comprehensive strategic concept," but it does have the advantage of addressing the security needs of the Central and East European democracies without straining the viability of NATO to the breaking point.

Such a compromise is certainly in the interest of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, since they deserve to join a vital and effective NATO when the time is ripe.

SUMMARY:

Patrick Glynn supported limited intervention in Bosnia by the United States and its allies when the conflict began. He believes that such intervention now would be a mistake, because in his view, the Serbs have already won. Any allied military involvement now, he believes, would fail at great cost in casualties, and would only strain U.S. relations with NATO and Russia. Eugene V. Rostow, on the other hand, sees strong parallels between the Bosnian conflict and the Korean War, in which President Truman committed U.S. forces to throw back North Korea's invasion of South Korea. According to Rostow, the principle is the same: aggression must be punished and peace preserved. This, he believes, can only be done by a coalition of the strong, led by the "the strongest of the strong" — the United States. (Length: 4,600 words.)

AUTHOR

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BOSNIA: IS IT TOO LATE? — TWO VIEWS

By Patrick Glynn and Eugene V. Rostow

MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING a number who — like Patrick Glynn — formerly supported at least some degree of armed intervention into the war in Bosnia by the United States and its NATO allies, and who continue to see that war as an act of Serbian aggression, have by now concluded that such a policy would at this point do more harm than good.

Eugene V. Rostow is among those who strongly disagree with this position, arguing that there is still a chance to do what they believe we should have done from the beginning in response to the Serbian aggression.

IS IT TOO LATE? YES
Patrick Glynn

ALMOST NO ONE doubts today that Bosnia has been a moral lure, for America and for the West. To have recognized this tiny republic as a sovereign state while denying it the means to defend itself — and to have stood by essentially passively as rampaging Serbs pursued a brutal war of aggression against their Muslim neighbors — these are sins of commission and omission for which both Europe and America must share the blame. There was a time, as some of us once urged, when limited, relatively low-risk actions — a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, the supplying of arms, and a well-targeted use of air power — might have been sufficient to curtail the Serbian program of "ethnic cleansing" and create the basis for a tense but sustainable peace in Bosnia. That time, however, is long past.

Today, unfortunately, it is no longer possible to talk about a simple lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. The fact is that over the past two years, the situation on the ground — and in the politics surrounding the crisis — has fundamentally changed. Any attempt to reshape conditions at this late stage will require as a first step tens of tens of thousands of NATO and U.S. ground troops in the Balkans to remove the UN peacekeeping forces now stationed there.

What we face, in other words, is no longer a range of limited, low-risk options. The choice we confront is rather one between the admittedly inadequate policies of the present and a full-scale U.S. intervention involving not only enormous risks and costs, but very uncertain prospects of success.

In international affairs, as in life, timing is everything. Between August 1992, when the first reports surfaced of Muslims perishing in Serbian concentration camps, until the end of the Bush administration in January 1993, the United

States had ample scope and power to act in Bosnia. Public opinion was deeply engaged by the suffering of the Muslims and the moral outrage of mass murder in the heart of Europe. America's international prestige and military credibility under George Bush were at a high point. Serbs both in Bosnia and Belgrade worried hard about the possibility of U.S. intervention. And Bosnia's ill-armed forces, while beleaguered, maintained a semblance of control over major population centers in the predominantly Muslim regions of the country.

During this period, I numbered among the most vocal advocates of limited but timely action,1/ including a lifting of the arms embargo and selective use of air power against Serbian forces — but never the insertion of American ground troops.

Since then, however, all has changed. Public opinion has become numbed to the suffering in Bihac and Sarajevo. Bush has been succeeded by a president lacking credibility in defense and foreign affairs. Serbs have become emboldened by a series of half-measures and empty threats from Western leaders. And Bosnia's now somewhat better-armed government forces, while fighting on, have essentially lost control of their major population centers, which remain under the nominal protection of lightly armed UN peacekeeping troops.

In a sense, of course, one key to the problem of Bosnia has been, and continues to be, the UN presence. Ironically, when the first contingent of UN troops arrived in Sarajevo in the summer of 1992, they were greeted as heroes and saviors, the first hope the besieged city had experienced in weeks. And indeed, whatever the failures or sins of the UN mission in Bosnia, it has been responsible for a measure of order-keeping and the provision of humanitarian relief, without which the Bosnian civilian population would almost certainly have faced extermination. It is a fact, as defenders of the UN mission often state, that over the past three years, the level of violence in Bosnia has greatly declined, owing partly of course to Serb satiation, but also to measures taken by NATO in conjunction with the UN. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the presence of the UN forces has operated from the start as the chief barrier to more decisive military action on behalf of the newly constituted Bosnian state.

Whether it was a mistake to send UN peacekeepers to Bosnia in the summer of 1992 will be left for historians to debate. Certainly, no other direct military action on behalf of beleaguered Bosnia was seriously contemplated in any major capital at the time, least of all in Washington. But once UN troops had arrived in Bosnia, they became a serious factor to be dealt with in any proposed solution to the crisis; they have become even more so today.

The critical issue concerns the safety not merely of the UN peacekeepers themselves, but of the civilian populations now under their protection. In February 1994, Sarajevo was on the verge of strangulation; a few weeks later, Gorazde was ready to fall. Bosnian government forces, in short, were losing the ability to defend their major population centers. It was in this period, through a combination of coercive air power and diplomacy, and amid many disputes between NATO and the UN, that a measure of security was purchased for the so-called UN "safe areas," including not only Sarajevo but such Bosnian towns as Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Bihac.

At present, the safety of the civilians in these major population centers of Bosnia, though admittedly uncertain, depends entirely upon the thin blue line of the UN presence. In the wake of a major, and probably ill-advised, Muslim offensive this past summer, Bihac has already come under heavy counterattack by the Serbs. Absent UN guarantees and troops, the rest of these population centers would inevitably be subject to renewed, intensified offensives by Serb forces, and most would almost certainly fall.

Those who have advocated a precipitous withdrawal of the UN contingent from Bosnia, like Senator William Cohen of Maine, as well as those who have advocated such a withdrawal followed by a unilateral U.S. abrogation of the arms embargo, like Senate majority leader Robert Dole, have tended to downplay or simply ignore the enormous risks that such a rash action would pose to U.S. and NATO troops responsible for affecting this withdrawal. If the U.S. lifts the arms embargo, American servicemen and women would arrive on the ground in Bosnia not as representatives of an ostensibly neutral international force, but as allies of one of the belligerents in the war. The likelihood of attacks on American troops — not slight in any case — would vastly increase. (American troops could conceivably be sent in smaller numbers to the Balkans anyway, to assist in withdrawing UN peacekeepers from Croatia.)

Beyond all this, a host of rudimentary military questions about executing the lifting of the embargo remain unanswered, or even, in some cases, unasked. First, and most urgent, is the question of how civilians in the UN safe areas will be protected once UN troops are removed. Here, air power is often brought forth as a panacea.

To be sure, there is much that can be done with air power, including attacks on Serbian weapons caches, bridges, supply lines and large, exposed pieces of equipment. But most experts agree that air power alone cannot halt a land advance. Bosnia's Serbs have stockpiled vast quantities of weapons and ammunition; it will be impossible to destroy all of them. And when it comes to close air support, planners and pilots will have to cope with mountainous, often heavily forested terrain, iffy weather, and the grave risk of collateral civilian casualties. Then there is practical issue of when the U.S. air campaign would begin — after American troops have departed, or while they are still on the ground and vulnerable? This is to say nothing of the dollar cost of such potentially massive air operations.

There are other, all-too-basic questions to addressed. How, in fact, do we plan to supply arms to the Bosnians? Some major U.S. ground presence in Croatia, if not in Bosnia itself, will certainly be necessary. Do we wish to be deeply involved with, and dependent upon, Croatia in this undertaking, given the authoritarian predilections and poor human-rights record of its government? Will we have to send U.S. advisers to Bosnia to train Bosnian forces in the use of the arms? If we fly Bosnian troops to some third-country location for training, will there not be a rather long lag between the lifting of the embargo and positive effects on the battlefield? If we supply high-tech weaponry, is it not a certainty that some of it will find its way into the hands of the Bosnian Muslims' less savory allies-of-convenience in the Middle East?

It is also worth remembering the basic strategic point that Bosnian forces, albeit better-armed, will have not simply the task of defending terrain but the enormous, perhaps ultimately impossible, task of retaking Bosnia's population centers against well-motivated and well-armed Serb defenders — unless of course U.S. troops have somehow assumed responsibility for the protection of safe areas in the interim.

Here the question raised so often at the Pentagon these days resonates: *What if it doesn't work?* What if, after having made Bosnia America's cause, and having completely engaged American air power and prestige, the United States discovers that the Bosnian government army is failing to gain or even is losing ground? How deeply are we willing to go in our involvement? Bombing Serbia proper? Bombing Belgrade? Sending troops to fight side by side with Bosnians? There is a potential Vietnam-like logic to involvement, which promises to take the U.S. and deeper into war without necessarily providing victory in the end.

The problem is certain to be compounded by the condition of acute, truly unprecedented, diplomatic isolation in which we would undertake this great effort. Rightly or wrongly, Britain and France adamantly oppose lifting the embargo, seeing it only as a trigger to a far wider and more violent Balkan war. These countries and Russia will oppose any effort to repeal the currently applicable resolutions in the Security Council.

So we would begin our great undertaking, in all likelihood, with the unprecedented act of deliberately violating UN Security Council resolutions for which we originally voted. International lawyers may quibble about the interpretation and constitutionality (vis-à-vis Article 51 of the UN Charter) of the applicable Security Council resolutions. (The language extending the arms embargo, originally imposed on Yugoslav republics, to a sovereign Bosnia is less than clear, and the resolution seems to violate the spirit of Article 51, which guarantees each sovereign nation the fundamental right to self-defense.) But the fact remains that we have accepted the consensus interpretation up till now. It is going to look strange, to put it mildly, if the United States attempts to Philadelphia-lawyer [disingenuously argue] its way into a new interpretation of the resolutions that is 180-degrees opposed to its present one.

The alternative, of course, would be the first open violation of Security Council resolutions by an American government — an extremely hazardous precedent and one that, as the present administration has so often argued, threatens to undercut embargoes against Iraq and Libya that touch on our vital interests.

Beyond that, having dealt an unprecedentedly grave blow to our relations with Britain and France, and having split NATO, we would be far from assured of access to NATO air bases for our planned operations in Bosnia. Indeed, I believe American advocates of discarding NATO would pretty much have achieved their goal; it would be hard to salvage the alliance in the wake of such an open breach. Without access to NATO air bases, an air campaign in Bosnia would be difficult, to put it mildly.

This is to say nothing of our relations with Russia, far from smooth at present but still critical to long-term global security. It seems unlikely that Russia would become engaged in a major confrontation with the United States over Bosnia and Serbia — the Russians have too many other problems — but one can expect some very rough riding along the way. Russia would no doubt feel compelled to provide further military equipment to the Serbs in order to counter American weapons. And the perceived insult to Russian policy and prestige in the Balkans would almost certainly play into the hands of those in Russia who distrust and hate the West and who wish to turn that great country in an openly anti-Western and fascistic direction.

In other words, a vast array of concerns ultimately far more vital to our basic interests would have to be cast aside or actively put in jeopardy as we embark on this policy. We would be betting the mortgage on Bosnia.

Some, of course would still argue that the moral and international legal principles of guaranteeing the inviolability of borders (albeit of a state whose early international recognition was probably ill-advised) and of punishing aggression as well as war crimes, including possible genocide, demand a robust U.S. response. When such a response would have been timely and effective, I was wholly in agreement. But today these legitimate moral and geopolitical considerations must be weighed not only against the vast military and political hazards of belated intervention, including the hazard of total failure, but also against the moral dubiousness of exposing tens of thousands more civilians — Serbs, Croats, and Muslims — as well as NATO and American troops, to injury, death and abuse in a uselessly reignited, widened war.

Current Western diplomacy in this crisis — a diplomacy, increasingly, of ineffectual appeasement of Serbia — is not pretty and may not succeed in preventing a re-escalation and widening of the struggle. America, willy-nilly, may still be drawn in on the ground. But given the unholy complexities of what is at bottom a senseless civil war in a land now awash with unfathomable ethnic hatreds, the present goals of the diplomats — lessening of violence, protection of civilians, provision of relief, containment of the war and, possibly, some sort of negotiated end to it all — seem to me to be the only rational course. Three years ago, we might have done something decisive and effective in Bosnia. Today, it is simply too late.

NOTE:

1. See my "The Age of Balkanization," *Commentary,* July 1933.

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IS IT TOO LATE? NO
By Eugene V. Rostow

THANKS TO President François Mitterrand of France, who has proposed a summit meeting of the main protagonists of the war in what was once Yugoslavia, the United States and its allies have received a gift almost unprecedented in the history of diplomacy: an opportunity to correct their mistakes — in this case, the mistakes they have been making steadily for nearly three years in allowing what began as a minor local

quarrel in the Balkans to become a major threat to the general peace.

The basic reason for the failure of the negotiations to end the war is extremely simple. George Bush and Bill Clinton both announced publicly that while we were willing to use air power to facilitate agreement, we would not commit ground forces to that end. Yet, to instruct ambassadors to negotiate peace in the midst of an active war without the influence of adequate military force behind them violates the first principle of diplomacy (and of common sense) and is a cruel and unusual punishment for the poor ambassadors, to boot. There is, however, good reason for optimism about the outcome if President Clinton respects this principle in the new round of negotiations to be initiated by President Mitterrand's recent call.

There are three possible procedures that could be used in carrying out the French plan: a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council; a special meeting of the UN Security Council; or simply a conference of the interested powers, in the style of the 19th-century "Congresses" of the Concert of Europe, the most successful peacekeeping experiment since the end of the Roman empire.

Since any serious procedure for making peace at this point will require the visible determination of the major powers to use ample force if necessary in behalf of the settlement, the choice among possible procedures is not in itself crucial to the possibility of success in the negotiations. But from the point of view of American policy, the preferred course would be to hold the conference in a NATO setting. It is an illusion to imagine that the UN Security Council can conduct a peace-enforcement action where serious hostilities may be necessary. This has never been done or even attempted, and there are no grounds for supposing that the Security Council is better equipped to undertake the responsibility now than has been the case for the last 50 years.1/

On the other hand, the combined forces of NATO were trained to face down and, if necessary, to defeat the Red Army at the peak of its formidable powers. They could surely deal with Serbia. In doing so, moreover, NATO would be acting in accordance with three resolutions, the Harmel Resolution on Future Tasks adopted in 1967, and the two resolutions it adopted during 1991 and 1992 — one at Oslo, the other at Gleneagles in Scotland — in response to the end of the Soviet Union and the political turbulence to be expected in the wake of that volcanic event. These resolutions declare the interest of NATO in the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic land mass, and they provide a firm legal and political foundation for the use of the alliance as the principal instrument for countering aggression in Europe.

The present state of the conventional wisdom on Bosnia among the major powers was summed up perfectly by Lord Peter Carrington, a consummate and quintessential member of the international establishment. When asked by an interviewer whether there was a British national interest in Bosnia, he answered, "Plainly, there isn't."

Both President Bush and President Clinton similarly said that the war in Bosnia does not yet affect the national interest of the United States. But the national interest of United States cannot be so narrowly defined.

I recently made a study of the national-security interests of the United States — the interests worth fighting for even in the nuclear age. I concluded the supreme national interest of the United was and necessarily would remain the successful management of the state system as a system of peace. That goal could only be sought by cooperation of the major powers acting in accordance with the norms enunciated for our time in the Charter of the United Nations. The rule against aggression, understood as the greatest possible danger to political stability and hence general peace, is the key provision of the U.N. Charter, and the key lesson of diplomatic experience since 1815. Another key lesson, confirmed by 20th-century experience with war, is that here as elsewhere in law, duty arises from circumstance; and since only the strong have the capacity to keep the peace, they have the duty to do so.

This duty is acknowledged by Lord Carrington in connection with the war in Bosnia, but *only* if the war spreads beyond the boundaries of the defunct state of Yugoslavia. Thus, when pressed by the interviewer's question, "If there is no British interest, nor French, then who is going to keep the peace?" Lord Carrington responded that the European interest probably consisted of making sure that the war was contained within former Yugoslavia's borders. If it spread outside, "we would be bound to intervene against the aggressor."

The reasoning here derives from the belief that Serbia has already won the war; that the Bosnians must be made to accept their defeat and the end of their national hopes; and that they must also be made to accept Greater Serbia as the inevitable outcome. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, speaking in London recently, reminded the British Foreign Minister that this reasoning closely resembled the argument made by American opponents of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941. France had surrendered in 1940; Britain had gone through Dunkirk and faced an apparently hopeless military situation. The American advocates of preemptive capitulation, like Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, were urging Britain to follow France's example, for the sake of "peace." Even with American Lend-Lease help, they contended, further British resistance could only prolong the war without affecting its outcome. Led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, and driven by a strong tide in American public opinion, Congress rejected the counsel of defeat and passed the Lend-Lease Act.

In the Balkans, the time has come to reject similar counsels of defeat and to begin pursuing negotiations visibly and convincingly based on the threat of adequate force. As things now stand, the prospect is for more war, worse war, and spreading war (perhaps involving Greece, Turkey and Albania) when the present cease-fire comes to an end. The risks in the situation for the NATO allies and for the other nations of the region are considerable, and certainly worth substantial exertion to anticipate and head off. After all, if, as Lord Carrington concedes, armed intervention will be necessary in the event that the war spreads, would it not be better to intervene with lesser force now to prevent the worst from happening later?

What the NATO allies — along with Russia, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary — should do now is to recognize that the Great Power policy for Bosnia has failed, and start over on a concerted program to defeat and undo the Serbian (and Croatian) aggression which is the cause of the Balkan tragedy; to make the resumption of such

aggression impossible; and to try to achieve the old dream of a Balkan federation which the Allies failed to establish at Versailles in 1919.

There is another and most important dimension of the American interest in the Balkans: our interest in helping to make sure the unstable system of weak states in that part of the world does not evolve in ways that could permit a new and hostile combination to dominate the whole of Europe. A number of hypothetical scenarios for the next 50 years would raise that warning flag. Perhaps the least remote among them is that of a German-Russian combination for joint control of the European heartland. The idea of a Russo-German military alliance has been popular for at least two centuries in the imperialist circles of both countries. Its most recent manifestations were the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917, through which the Soviet Union made a separate peace with Germany; the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, establishing a secret military alliance between the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic, and the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, the opening move of World War II. Germany, of course, is now anchored to the West by nearly 50 years of constructive participation in NATO and the European movement. The future orientation of Russia and Eastern Europe is by no means so assured. Prudent Western policy should therefore take pains to make sure that neither country is exposed to the imperial temptation again.

For nearly three years, the NATO allies and the permanent members of the Security Council have been hiding behind patently erroneous interpretations of international law in order to excuse their failure to restore and maintain peace in the small but volatile corner of Europe that used to be Yugoslavia. The war going on there is not, as they have claimed, a civil war, because Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been widely recognized as independent states; most of them have been admitted to the United Nations. Yet even if it really were a civil war, the United Nations Charter (Article 2 [7]) acknowledges that an event (like a civil war), which would normally be characterized as within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, can also be a breach of international peace and be treated accordingly under Chapter VII of the Charter.

This war, surely, is quite as much a threat to the general peace as the one that began in Korea in 1950. The Korean war was also described by many at the time as a civil war. And South Korea, too, was at first thought to be outside the sphere of American interests. Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had made a remark that was interpreted by the Soviets as an "invitation" to unleash a North Korean invasion of the South.

But President Truman decided to intervene — a decision that turned out to be the defining application of Western containment policy, and the greatest and most difficult single achievement of his lustrous term of office. It remains the model of what Western policy should be in response to significant aggression.

Like Lord Carrington, both President Bush and President Clinton have failed to explain how their warning ("we want a better peace plan, but we will not use American ground forces to achieve it") could be expected to deter the Serbian armed forces, or anybody else. In 1950, the U.S. Air Force advised Truman that it could stop the North Korean invasion of South Korea with air power alone. Truman, who had been an artillery captain in World War I, and the conscientious chairman of the Senate Committee on the Conduct of World War II, knew better.

The sensible course ahead for the U.S. and its allies in ex-Yugoslavia is thus clear. It is the policy of President Truman, not that of President Carter or President Clinton. Truman's policy does not make the United States the world's only policeman. Nor does it imply that every breach of the peace requires armed intervention as a remedy. The Roman maxim, *De minimis non curat lex* ("The law does not concern itself with trifles") still applies, just as it did, for example, when India annexed the Portuguese city-state of Goa some 30 years ago without provoking a response from the UN and without any significant disturbance of world public order.

Truman's policy, however, does acknowledge that aggression can be deterred and that peace can be kept only by a coalition of the strong powers like the 19th-century Concert of Europe. In the post-Soviet world order now taking shape, only such a coalition of the strong can be effective, and only if it is led by the strongest of the strong. To provide this leadership is in the highest national interest of the United States.

NOTE:

1. Many believe that the operations in Korea and in the Persian Gulf were Security Council enforcement actions. This is not the case. They were actions of collective self-defense, which were approved by the Security Council, not operations decided upon and conducted by the Security Council and a multilateral force organized and commanded by the Security Council.

SUMMARY

The Chinese media have become more international by five major processes: (a) the offering of free goods, (b) regulated trade, (c) competition, (d) demonstration and (e) cooperation. These processes interact and interconnect. Media trade, signal spillover and direct satellite broadcasting create competitive pressure on the domestic media to imitate their foreign rivals and reinvent what they learn from them. The influence of foreign media culture in China is uneven and is contingent on the strength of ideological control at both the central and local level, as well as on the media's nature, geographical location and degree of commercialization. (Length: 8,100 words.)

AUTHOR

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MEDIA INTERNATIONAL-IZATION IN CHINA

By Joseph Man Chan

THE MODERN HISTORY of China, like that of many third world countries, has been shaped to a large extent by its responses to the military, economic and cultural expansion of foreign powers. Imperialist invasions in the 19th century gave rise to "antiforeignism," a mass hostile sentiment toward foreign nations (Liao, 1990). After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949, antiforeignism became an ideological tool both for intra-party strife and for the mobilization of mass campaigns. So strong was the current at the height of the Cultural Revolution that China was virtually cut off from the world, resulting in an extreme form of cultural protectionism.

Antiforeignism began to ebb in the 1970s, when China entered the United Nations and established diplomatic relations with the United States and other countries. Contact with the capitalist world expanded following the CCP's adoption in 1979 of modernizing reforms and an open-door policy. Since then, Western culture has been an increasingly strong presence in the lives of the Chinese people (Chu & Ju, 1993; Lull, 1991). Perhaps nothing is more symbolic of this than the experimental introduction of the disco beat to the venerable Beijing opera by one of its leading singers in an attempt to resuscitate the traditional art in the face of competition from foreign culture and the mass media (Turner, 1991).

At the same time, the mass media in China have advanced rapidly. In the case of broadcasting, which is the focus of this article, China in 1978 had only 32 television stations and 93 radio stations; by 1990, the numbers had multiplied to 521 and 666, respectively (Ai, 1991). In the same period, the ownership of television sets per 100 people had increased from less than 1 to 16.2. In 1990, radio ownership per 100 people had already reached 32.4. Cable networks of various sorts had expanded since 1991 to about 2,000 by early 1993 (Liu, 1993). The advertising industry has grown at an annual rate of more than 40 percent since 1981 (Chinese Advertising Association, 1993). From 1981 to 1990, per capita advertising expenditure grew more than 12 times, from .18 yuan (renminbi) to 2.19 yuan.

It is against this backdrop of social opening and media growth that this article seeks to examine the processes and tensions of media internationalization in China.

THE CONCEPT OF MEDIA INTERNATIONALIZATION

"Media internationalization" refers to the process by which the ownership, structure, production, distribution or content of a country's media is influenced by foreign media interests, culture and markets. It can be examined either from the perspective of the country that imports foreign media culture or from that of the exporting country. The internationalized and the internationalizing are two sides of the same coin. In this article, the emphasis is on China as a receiver of foreign media culture.

Media internationalization is different from "media imperialism" (e.g., Boyd-Barrett, 1977; Lee, 1980). First, the former does not assume the asymmetrical influence that the media interests of a few Western powers have over the media in other countries. Media influence among nations can be reciprocal; moreover, asymmetrical influence can be exerted by relatively weak countries as well as by Western superpowers. Important as it may be, media imperialism is only one form of media internationalization. Second, media internationalization does not necessarily involve the "cultural invasion" (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 118) of one country by another. Foreign media may, after all, be useful in meeting audience needs in the affected nations, providing stimuli for the growth of indigenous media, and so on.

Media internationalization is a kind of "diffusion," which, according to Rogers, is "the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system" (1983, p. 34). Media internationalization, of course, happen not only within a social system but also across organizational and national boundaries; and the relevant innovations may be in content, production values and industrial organization.1/ No judgment about the desirability of such innovations or superiority of foreign media culture is here implied.

The designation of a media culture as "foreign" carries two assumptions: First, it belongs to another sovereign country. Second, it is different from the media culture to which it is being compared. These assumptions can be readily applied to a comparison of Chinese media culture and Western ones. However, the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan — which, as is discussed later, exert great influence on the Chinese media culture — need some clarification. Politically, they are not independent states but are recognized as parts of China. Culturally, they differ from mainland China by being more Westernized and capitalist, although they still share some Chinese traditions. As the focus of this article is on cultural difference, we shall treat Hong Kong and Taiwan as "foreign." After all, they remain separate political entities at the time of this writing.

Methodologically, this paper depends on document analysis and cross-validation interviews done in the summer of 1993. The interviewees or informants, numbering about 30, included journalists, media managers and regulators from China and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The time frame for this article covers the reform era since the late 1970s; its focus is on television and radio.

PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

Media internationalization has taken place in China through five major processes: (a) the offering of free goods, (b) regulated trade, (c) competition, (d) demonstration and (e) cooperation. The first two are more useful in explaining the prevalence of foreign content in China's media fare. Competition, demonstration and cooperation help account for the increasing importation of production values and ideas about media organization.

The Offering of Free Goods. This is perhaps the major way for foreign media fare, especially radio and television, to get into countries with relatively tight regulations over media importation. Media signals are made available in the reception country with minimal cost through signal spillover, piracy and direct broadcast. Of course, this mode of media internationalization is effective only to the extent that the audience finds the foreign fare more attractive than domestic ones.

The most significant spillover of broadcasting signals occurs in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, which are, respectively, in the vicinity of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Foreign television signals are received there through collectively operated reception dishes and redistributed through rudimentary cable networks, often without payment of copyright fees.

Hong Kong television, for instance, can reach a large part of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong, covering a mainland population of about 18 million (J. Lu, 1993). Surveys in 1993 in the Pearl River Delta show that more than 97 percent of the households in the major cities, with the exception of Guangdong's provincial capital Guangzhou, own at least one television, and all have access to Hong Kong television through cable networks (Hong Kong ATV, 1993; Hong Kong TVB, 1992). This took about a decade; before the mid-1980s, reception of Hong Kong television was scattered because of restrictions and the scarcity of receiving sets. As more people set up independent antennae to receive Hong Kong television, factories, residential organizations and local governments all tried to make a profit by intercepting and redistributing the signals. Some local stations even inserted advertisements of their own (Lee, 1993). After several failed attempts to stop it, the provincial government acquiesced in this illegal but widespread practice.

Piracy and direct broadcast are two other important internationalization "channels." Despite the introduction of some copyright laws, media piracy is so common in China that it has become an extension of the spillover process. According to a video operator in southern China, foreign movies and television programs accessible in Guangdong and Fujian are often reproduced illegally and shipped inland for a profit. These illicit goods can be rented, sold or shown in small video shops. It is also through piracy that videocassette tapes, laser discs, compact discs and movie videos originating from Hong Kong and Taiwan have made inroads into China in recent years (Gui, 1993; "Pirated Compact," 1993).

STAR TV is the first foreign, direct satellite television service to have an important impact in China. Beamed from AsiaSat I and based in Hong Kong, STAR TV carries five channels, with a footprint that covers all of Asia. Although officially banned, STAR TV is spreading fast in China through redistribution by formal or rudimentary cable networks, which have found STAR TV to be a handy and cheap program source attractive to potential subscribers (J. Chan, 1994). Most popular is its Mandarin-language channel, featuring soap operas and entertainment programs from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, mainland China and elsewhere. By November 1993, the number of households capable of receiving STAR TV had mushroomed to roughly 30 million, accounting for about one-fifth of China's television households.

Internationalization through free goods occurs only when foreign media products are widely perceived to be more attractive than domestic ones. Chinese television programs are often criticized as "amateurish" (Lull, 1991, p. 161), "sluggish," "dragging" and "faked" (Shi, 1993, P. 41). The Chinese television managers interviewed generally agreed that foreign

media products are "more entertaining," "more relaxing," "more varied" and "better produced." It appears that the competitive pressure posed by foreign media will dissipate only when Chinese products can match their rivals in quality, quantity and variety.

Regulated Trade. Regulated internationalization refers to the inflow of foreign media culture through formal, officially recognized channels. It usually takes the form of media import, which is susceptible to policy controls at the central level. The import of foreign television programs, for instance, has undergone drastic changes as Beijing has shifted its policies over the last four decades (Hong, 1993). The protectionist and self-reliant cultural policies that prevailed in China before the mid-1960s had resulted in very limited television import, which dwindled further in the fervor of anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism during the Cultural Revolution. It was not until the introduction of the open-door policy in the late 1970s that imported programs begin to make up a significant portion of China's television menu.

According to the Chinese television managers interviewed, showing foreign programs on Chinese television helps retain the audience, attract multinational advertisers and fill up the channel time. The last function, noted in other third world countries (Katz & Wedell, 1977), appears to carry particular importance because of China's lack of capacity to produce its own programs. Z.S. Ai (1991), China's minister of radio, film and television, has revealed that even Chinese Central Television (CCTV) could produce only one-third of all the programs it broadcast in 1990; television stations at the provincial and city level could produce no more than two hours of their daily programming. Foreign programs, which cost about 90 percent less than producing one's own programs, thus become natural substitutes for domestic programming. TV stations cannot, however, show as many foreign programs as they wish because of the shortage of foreign currency as well as restraints by the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, which runs a quota system, censors the programs and balances the programs by genre and origins.

Centralized censorship of foreign programs is deemed essential for maintaining a uniform standard throughout China (L. Liu, 1993). However, the provincial television stations in Guangdong, Fujian and Sichuan, as well as those in Beijing and Shanghai, are authorized to import their own programs for exhibition within provincial or metropolitan boundaries. These places owe their greater autonomy to the practice of a decentralization policy in the 1980s (Hong, 1993) and to their unique economic-political status in China or their political proximity to foreign territories.

One solution to the foreign currency shortage is for the Chinese media to exchange advertising space for the right to show foreign fare, with advertising revenue divided in some negotiated proportions. Sometimes, the foreign media will solicit advertising themselves, which may lead to a greater proportion of foreign commercials. One example is CBS's trading 60 hours of American programming for 320 minutes of advertising time on Chinese television (Lull, 1991). The more notable shows in this package included "Count Basie in Concert," "NBA Basketball," "60 Minutes" and the "Tournament of Roses Parade," while among the international advertisers were IBM, Boeing, Proctor & Gamble and Kodak.

While Chinese rules require cable networks to limit foreign programs to no more than one-third of their total programming (L. Liu, 1993), a fixed quota is no longer being strictly enforced among broadcast television stations. They can import as many foreign programs as they can afford, provided they are politically cleared. Many, however, take care not to let foreign programs exceed an informal quota of about 20 percent for fear of provoking interference from Beijing, and television stations that exceed this proportion during prime time nevertheless abide by the ceiling for the overall broadcast period.

Table 1. Percentage of Foreign Programs on Selected Chinese TV Stations

Year	*CCTV*	*Shanghai TV*	*Gansu TV*
1970	5.7	13.3	28.6
1975	—	1.5	7.4
1980	15.5	4.0	5.6
1985	11.2	11.8	11.8
1990	17.3	42.6	15.6

Source: J.Wang (1993), p.58. Dash indicates no data available.

Table 1 shows the proportion of foreign programming broadcast on three television stations in China. Before 1980, most foreign imports were from other socialist countries; in the 1980s, most were from the United States, East Asia (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and Western Europe (e.g., U.K., West Germany) (J. Wang, 1993).

It is clear from Table 1 that the proportion of foreign programs varies over time and between stations. In general, imports from the Western nations and East Asia have been increasing since 1980 for all three stations. The majority of these are television series, movies and other entertainment genres. The station with the highest proportion of foreign programming in 1990 was Shanghai TV, a resource-rich station

located in China's largest metropolitan center. The levels of foreign programming at CCTV and Gansu TV lagged behind, though probably for different reasons. Since CCTV is the centrally controlled national station, one would not expect it to exceed the informal quota of 20 percent. Lack of resources is the more likely explanation in the case of Gansu TV, a remote provincial station in northwest China.

Competition. Competition can be viewed as a systemic consequence of media trade and internationalization through free goods, which impose strong competitive pressure on the media industry of the recipient country. In a marketized situation, the domestic media will likely imitate and reinvent what they observe to have given the foreign media the competitive edge.

Internationalization through competition may be illustrated by the radio industry of Guangdong, which was once under intense pressure from its Hong Kong rivals. Before 1986, the radio market in the Pearl River Delta, including Guangzhou, was overwhelmed by Hong Kong radio stations (Yu, 1988). Out of professional or propaganda need, the more conscientious broadcasters and regulators started to search for ways to compete, all the more so in anticipation of the growing importance of advertising revenues.

Given the relatively liberal leadership in Guangdong, which is designated as a general test site for reforms, Guangdong People's Radio (GPR) chose to respond by learning from its Hong Kong counterparts. Before the mid-1980s, GPR tried to introduce new production values and techniques piecemeal, such as a new emphasis on the timeliness of news and an enlargement of the news net among non-officials (Fang, 1990). However, these micro or small-scale reforms failed to lure back the lost audience. Finally GPR decided in 1986 to build a whole new radio channel and introduce more macro reforms that range from programming and mode of presentation to management practice.

The resulting Pearl River Economic Radio (PRER) heavily emphasized entertainment, information about daily life and societal news instead of official preaching (Fang, 1988; GPR, 1988; Yu, 1988). "Personality" program hosts and disc jockeys were allowed, even encouraged. As opposed to radio "readers" of the past, they were permitted impromptu utterances. Magazine-type programs, phone-ins and more natural modes of presentation were introduced. Even the hourly newscast at PRER was inspired by Radio Hong Kong, which broadcasts news every half hour.

PRER was an instant success. From 1986 to 1987, GPR's overall share of listeners in Guangzhou jumped from 46.7 percent to 78.0 percent, with PRER alone accounting for 54.9 percent (Fang, 1988; Zeng, 1990). In 1988, the share of listeners for Hong Kong radio dropped to 20 percent, with PRER commanding 50 percent. As we shall see later, the success of PRER has made it a model for the rest of China.

While PRER's innovations may be a matter of course on foreign radio, they were carefully weighed before adoption. A chief broadcaster involved in the project said that in their original proposal to Beijing, GPR had to emphasize that the reform was "a change in form but not in nature" and that it was intended "to break the domination of foreign radio." The new measures adopted were framed as "laws" of mass communication that are universally applicable (GPR, 1988).

Table 2. Percentage of TV Viewership in Selected Guangdong Cities Origin of TV Stations

City	*Hong Kong*	*City(Local)*	*Provincial (Guangdong)*	*National CCTV*
Dongguan	81	24	13	7
Zhongshan	90	19	12	3
Foshan	73	41	15	7
Jiangmen	85	74	11	9
Shantou	58	55	39	24
Guangzhou	24	26	45	11
Zhanjiang	23	24	38	25

Source: Adapted from Hong Kong ATV (1993) and Chan (1994).

Note: The percentages register the past viewership attained by the most popular stations of the same origin. Multiple responses were allowed. All cities were surveyed in 1993 with the exception of Guangzhou, which was surveyed in 1992.

Competition from Hong Kong television has also influenced Guangdong Television (GTV). Table 2 shows the viewership of television stations of various origins in the province of Guangdong. Television originating from Hong Kong includes the satellite broadcaster STAR TV and the terrestrial stations TVB and ATV. Except in Guangzhou and Zhanjiang, Hong Kong television has outcompeted Chinese television at the local, provincial and national levels. The anomaly of Guangzhou may result from the fact that only 51 percent of its households can receive Hong Kong television, whereas virtually all can do so in other cities (Hong Kong ATV, 1993; Hong Kong TVB, 1992). In addition, Guangzhou has stronger local programming than other sampled cities. Reception difficulty helps explain the case of Zhanjiang, which

is the most distant from Hong Kong (K.T. Chan, 1994). Not shown in the table is Shenzhen, China's showcase city bordering Hong Kong, where Hong Kong television enjoys, at its peak, more than a 70 percent share of the audience (Hong Kong TVB, 1992).

The stiff competitive pressure led some top broadcasting cadres in Guangdong to believe that their survival was at stake and to call for the "bold" adoption of whatever is useful from overseas through "screening, absorption and reinvention" (Fang & Yu, 1988, p. 14). The reform process started with a comparison of Hong Kong and Guangdong broadcasts, which resulted in making the news timelier, shorter, more plentiful and more inclusive of societal information and unfolding events (Fang, 1988, 1990). A pioneering soap opera producer said that the comparison also led GTV to the use of multiple cameras, studio scenes, synchronized recording and naturalistic acting. Other television reforms included the introduction of program hosts, variety shows, talk shows and other genres inspired by GTV's foreign rivals.

This competitive pressure is felt not only in Guangdong and Fujian but gradually in other inland places as well, most notably in the remote Guizhou province, where domestic television is traditionally weak. Because of the rugged terrain, television broadcast is done largely by downlinking signals from AsiaSat I with an elaborate terrestrial microwave network. As STAR TV is being carried by AsiaSat I as well, the majority of the audience simply switch to STAR's Mandarin channel. The response from Guizhou Television, according to one of its producers, was to critically examine itself and model its new programs after STAR TV in 1993, hoping to regain its deserting audience.

Demonstration. Internationalization by demonstration results when the adopter of foreign media culture extracts what is relevant by observing foreign fare or media organization, frequently as a response to competitive pressure. Sometimes an innovation speaks by virtue of its very existence. In either case, demonstration effects are enhanced when formal exchanges occur between foreign media and adopters.

As mentioned earlier, the successful use of foreign media culture by Pearl River Economic Radio (PRER) has extended its influence beyond Guangdong. PRER's undisputable record in outcompeting Hong Kong radio had made it a credible national model for radio reform. Once approved by the central broadcasting authorities, the experience of PRER was spread through national conferences, demonstration courses, internal journals, informal networks and site visits. From late 1986 to 1987, more than 70 delegations from Chinese radio stations visited PRER (Fang, 1991). More than 20 economic stations are now modeled after PRER, and many more stations have adopted some of its innovations.

The PRER model made an escalation when Oriental Radio of Shanghai was launched in 1992. While adopting PRER's mode of presentation and programming, Oriental Radio has greater autonomy from the state, using a bank loan rather than a state subsidy as start-up capital (Q. Chan, 1993; Wu, 1993). Organizationally independent from the preexisting Shanghai People's Radio, it competes with its predecessor on equal footing. Contracted out to a team, Oriental Radio pays its staff on a merit-based salary scale. All these arrangements require the radio station to be responsive to audience needs, which is conducive to the adoption of management practices, programming policy and program formats that have proved to be competitive in Guangzhou, Hong Kong and elsewhere. According to Shanghai broadcasters, the instant success of Oriental Radio has already created immense pressure on more orthodox radio stations to make similar changes.

The diffusion of the PRER model shows that communication between the early and late adopters of foreign media culture may take place in two or more steps. While it usually takes longer for the first adopter to import foreign media culture, its success helps reduce resistance to the introduction of similar innovations elsewhere. In addition, reinventions and escalations based on the original innovation are possible along the diffusion chain. In other words, the foreign media culture first imported may evolve to fit local needs, adding new and bolder features.

Demonstration can also take place during exchanges with foreign media. Many foreign media delegations visit China nowadays, and foreign professionals are frequently invited to lecture. Four major cities — Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing and Guangzhou — have institutionalized this exchange by organizing large-scale international television festivals or international television weeks, during which seminars, exhibitions, trade fairs and award presentations are held (Hong, 1993; Xiao, 1992). Trips abroad were particularly influential when China first opened up to the world in the early 1980s. According to a former Shanghai television manager who was with the first delegation to the United States in 1982, the trip was "eye-opening," showing him how a television station could be run differently, how news could be directly relayed, and so on. "It is through comparison with the outside world," he said, "that we become more aware of what needs to be improved in China."

Hong Kong plays a special role in this process of internationalization by demonstration. Since the reform era, thousands of Chinese cadres and professionals, including media personnel, have visited Hong Kong. Hong Kong offers a space in which Chinese visitors can observe first-hand how, for instance, press freedom works, exemplified by the peaceful coexistence of newspapers run by the CCP and the KMT (Kuomintang Party in Taiwan) and the expression of anticolonial views (Chan & Lee, 1991). Such exposure, according to some Chinese visitors, provides a point of reference for reflecting on the configuration of media in China.

Cooperation. In this mode of internationalization, the adopter of foreign media culture learns through cooperative experience such as coproduction or joint venture. In such projects, foreign media commonly provide capital and expertise while the Chinese provide general personnel and local support. Through these affiliations, Chinese media workers can observe foreign approaches to professional problems and familiarize themselves with international networks.

While no official statistics are available, media coproductions appear to be on the rise. In 1993, Taiwan alone jointly produced seven television series with Chinese television stations (Pao, 1993). Meanwhile, radio and television coproductions have been moving from coverage of traditional festivals to coverage of more social topics, such as radio programs on economic and legal issues and television programs on efforts to help the poor (Guangdong Radio and Television Bureau, 1992).

The dynamics of internationalization through coproduction is illustrated by a radio program jointly produced by PRER and Hong Kong Radio and Television (RTHK) in 1991. To reduce ideological resistance from China, RTHK suggested that PRER coproduce a phone-in program on the politically less sensitive topic of economics and trade. Broadcasters at PRER said the perceived positive impact of this program on economic development helped secure approval from authorities at the provincial and central levels. RTHK did not explicitly raise the issue of editorial control but argued that it should have the final say in screening the phone callers by virtue of its richer experience. In retrospect, RTHK organizers thought that building rapport with their Chinese counterparts during the long course of negotiation was crucial in winning their confidence. The smooth operation of the first coproduction paved the way for a joint broadcast on the more sensitive topic of laws and security in 1992, and finally on an open topic in 1993. It appears that through coproduction the technical as well as the ideological space of Chinese media can be expanded.

Foreign ownership of mass media is one of the most sensitive issues in China. A symbolic breakthrough was achieved when Sally Au, the director of Sing Tao Groups, originally based in Hong Kong, signed up with the *People's Daily* to copublish a weekly on economic development, one of the first press joint ventures in China (Hsia, 1993). A few other experimental joint ventures are known to have taken place in movie production, advertising, cable network formation and video and television program production (J. Chan, 1993). When China allows joint ventures on a larger scale, co-ownership will play a more important role in the internationalization of China's media.

Innovative attempts are being made to get around ownership restrictions. The City Television network formed in Guangzhou in 1993 is a notable example. As allowed by law, it first established a video-production joint venture with a Hong Kong partner, which then contracted with the television network to exchange prime-time programs for advertising. If this indirect form of foreign media ownership proves successful, foreign media will play a larger role in shaping Chinese television programming.

Foreign ownership and joint ventures are now allowed in the advertising industry on economic grounds. More than 40 multinational advertising agencies from Japan, the United States and Hong Kong have set up joint ventures with Chinese counterparts in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and other cities (J. Chan, 1993). Since advertising is the fuel of media commercialization, such joint ventures will likely speed up the diffusion within China of foreign media culture in general and Western advertising culture in particular.

TENSIONS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

The overall pattern that emerges from the above analysis is clear. Media internationalization in China is not linear and uniform, it fluctuates over time, and it varies across media. In general, the influence of foreign media culture is stronger in times when the CCP relaxes its ideological control and in media that have undergone a higher degree of commercialization, are located in metropolitan centers and coastal areas, face immense foreign competition, lack attractive domestic program content or have liberal leadership.

Ideological Control and Media Commercialization. Much of the tension arising from media internationalization in China results from its disjunctive approach to national development — trying to fend off democratization with economic growth. Economically, China has gone far in replacing its planned economy with one regulated by the market and has achieved remarkable economic growth in the last decade. But politically, it still insists on the dictatorial rule of the CCP, resorting to the bloody crackdown on massive demands for democratization in 1989. As the CCP responds variously to power struggles and political crises, the influence of foreign media culture fluctuates over time.

Adoption of the reform and open-door policy in 1979 was critical in paving the way for the importation of foreign media culture. This policy has shifted the CCP's focus from class struggle to economic construction and has relaxed ideological and social controls. In turn, China's increasingly market-based and internationalized economy requires that antiforeignism be tamed and exerts structural pressure on China's media, the CCP's ideological bastion, to reform. Indeed, since the early 1980s, Chinese media have been undergoing a commercialization process, which intensified in 1992 when economic reforms familiar in the manufacturing and service industries began to be applied in the mass media (J. Chan, 1993).

The most important of these changes is the media's reduced reliance on state subsidy and increasing dependence on advertising revenues. By 1990, about one-third of the operating cost of Chinese television was derived not from the state but from advertising and other business sources (Ai, 1991). In developed areas such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, commercial revenues have begun to make up the bulk of television stations' income. The profit motive has driven the media to search for ways to enhance their competitiveness. Given their popularity, foreign media have become models in this respect. Thus, the increasing commercialization of Chinese media tends to promote and reinforce media internationalization in China.

Nonetheless, the CCP continues to resort to antiforeignism to suppress dissenters during the reform years. Three such political and cultural swings have occurred: the CCP's campaigns against "spiritual pollution" in 1983, against "bourgeois liberalization" in 1987 and against "peaceful evolution" in 1989. The perceived threat, in each case, was the influence of Western culture, and especially Western conceptions of freedom and democracy. The importation of foreign media culture subsided during such campaigns, resulting in a wavelike pattern of internationalization within the reform era.2/ For instance, the Propaganda Department directed that foreign television and movies be "strictly controlled" and "greatly suppressed" in early 1990 when the CCP was still trying to reconsolidate its power after the 1989 prodemocracy movement (Ai, 1991). The Ministry of Radio, Film and Television responded by cutting in half the number of time slots on CCTV that were designated for imported programs.

But it does not always take a political crisis to trigger the CCP's instinct for cultural protectionism. The high visibility of foreign media culture may have the same effect. As Z.S. Ai, minister of radio, film and television, saw it, the majority of foreign television programs available in China were in poor taste, concerned mainly with sex and violence. To him, the

proliferation of such foreign media fare, including popular songs from Taiwan and Hong Kong, was part of a Western conspiracy to transform China through "peaceful evolution." Ai forbade television to spread "spiritual pollution" and "political mistakes" (Ai, 1991, p. 10), ordered television managers to take measures to cool down the craze for popular music from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and reminded them of the need to compose the "major melody" of Chinese society from "socialism, patriotism and collectivism" (Ai, 1993, p. 6).

By the same token, the rapid penetration of STAR TV has also prompted China to take a restrictive stance on foreign satellite television services. Regarding the control of satellite reception as a "struggle against subversion" and a "struggle to defend national sovereignty" (F. Wang, 1993, p. 12), China has banned unauthorized reception and redistribution by individuals or institutions, including cable networks, broadcast television and video centers (J. Chan, 1994; L. Liu, 1993).

However, the CCP is not monolithic. Policy differences may exist among factions, departments and individuals at the central and lower levels, resulting in varying degrees of policy implementation. For instance, the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television were at odds with the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics over foreign satellite television because the latter ministry benefited from the manufacture and sales of reception dishes (Chan, 1993). In effect, dishes for satellite television continued on the market despite the state's ban on reception. Such differences should not be overemphasized, since the CCP still has the organizational efficiency to arrive at a unified policy when necessary.

Ideological differences at the local level may also affect the adoption of foreign media culture. The central policies are usually general enough to leave some leeway, though whether it is exploited depends on the boldness of leadership at the operational and supervisory level. In a centralized system like China's, it is difficult if not impossible for the lower ranks to innovate without support from their supervisors; hence broadcasters I interviewed generally agreed that they owed their reforms to sympathetic support from political leaders.

Nature of Media and Geographical Location. While the tension between economic development and ideological control sets the parameters for media internationalization in China, the nature and specific location of the media may also matter. Foreign media culture is more visible in "apolitical" cultural domains, such as production practices, entertainment and economic information, than in ideologically sensitive areas such as media ownership, journalism and news control. This is a logical outcome of the CCP's disjunctive approach to development, which favors a differential treatment of the technical and metaphysical aspect of foreign culture: By and large only technical subjects such as science, technology and management have received official blessing for importation.

The CCP attaches differing political status to different media institutions. The centrally controlled media such as CCTV, Central People's Radio and the *People's Daily* are considered to be nothing but official mouthpieces. For instance, the CCP demands that "every sentence and every word [of the *People's Daily*] represent the will of the Party and be absolutely correct" (Liu, 1990, p. 91). Such strict requirements do not apply to media at lower levels, which is why television stations at the county level that do not have the resources to produce or purchase their own programs rely heavily (up to 80 percent in some cases) on foreign videos and programs (Yang, 1992).

Geographically, the adoption of foreign media culture is associated with the more developed areas, such as metropolitan centers, the coastal regions, and particularly the provinces neighboring Hong Kong and Taiwan. These places usually have a higher degree of pluralism, which tends to breed a more liberal environment. Media in these areas often have more qualified staff, capital and advertising support. According to a TVB manager in Hong Kong, foreign media approach only those Chinese markets that are attractive to multinational advertisers. As a rule, these markets are the metropolitan centers that have relatively high purchasing power. In fact, all the current talk about the huge China media market refers mainly to the coastal regions and the urban centers. The special economic zones and provinces designated as experimental sites for reforms are also located mostly in the coastal region. And naturally — because of frequent interaction, geographical proximity and the sharing of language and tradition — media from Hong Kong and Taiwan are the major sources of foreign influence.

PROTECTIONISM AND MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

The processes of media internationalization discussed in this article do not act in isolation but interact and interconnect. A primary chain diffusion process begins with the proliferation of foreign media following the introduction of free goods and regulated trade. This exerts strong pressure on domestic media to imitate and to reinvent what they can learn from foreign competitors through observation and formal exchanges. Foreign media culture is initially applied on a piecemeal basis to individual programs or media organizations. When such micro reforms exhaust their function in a fast-changing socioeconomic environment, more macro reforms — which range from programming, mode of presentation, management practice, even to institutional arrangement — are introduced.

At present, it is through demonstration that these innovations and reinventions spread to other media throughout China. As media marketization grows, internationalization by domestic competition is likely to play an increasingly important role. The flow of information from the early adopters of foreign media culture takes place in two or more steps. Reinventions may occur at any point along the diffusion chain. The precedence and popularization of such innovations help pave the way for escalations in media reforms, in which case the diffusion chain will repeat, forming an upward spiral which, given enough turns, may eventually change the fabric and even some of the structure of China's media system.

Although foreign media culture has played an important role in accelerating China's media reforms, the limits to this process reside within China. Without appropriate social conditions, foreign media culture is like seed sown in a barren land. In a centralized communication system like China's, central policies are the most critical factor at the national level, and policy fluctuations result in the uneven diffusion of foreign media culture over time. Other relevant factors include the media's location, level of commercialization, political status, and the strength of ideological control at the local level. While it is the interaction among all these factors that largely determines the speed and extent of diffusion, the force of

commercialization is expected to play a greater role in the future.

Hong Kong and Taiwan stand out as China's major sources of foreign influence. The media culture originated from Hong Kong and Taiwan represents their accommodation of Western influence, resulting in the formation of a hybridized but distinctly Chinese culture. The passing of cultural values from Hong Kong and Taiwan to mainland China is an extension of Western influence; at the same time, it is a continuation of the domestication of foreign culture in Chinese societies. How successful China will be in assimilating foreign media influence to create a new indigenous cultural identity depends very much on its responses to foreign culture.

China has dealt with the proliferation of foreign media culture in two main ways. On the one hand, it has resorted to cultural protectionism. Regarding foreign cultural influence as "spiritual pollution," it has been trying to restrict people's access to foreign satellite television, to popular songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan and to other foreign media. While protectionist measures may buy time for an infant media industry to grow to meet foreign competition, whether they will he effective in the long run is questionable in light of the increasing power of communication technology to evade national boundaries. In addition, as evidenced in China's radical past, overprotection not only gives rise to cultural monotony and sterility but also deprives the media of their ability to compete internationally, thus making way for the inroads of foreign media when they become accessible.

On the other hand, China has tried to increase its domestic production and more actively export its media products. To reduce its cultural deficit, China has made plans to double its domestic production in the decade 1990-2000 (Ai, 1991). For CCTV and major provincial stations, the target is to be able to produce 10 hours of their daily programming; for others, four hours. China also plans to boost the international sales of its media products and to launch satellite television services over other countries. Instances of such efforts include the dedication of CCTV's fourth channel for overseas Chinese (Ai, 1993); the daily broadcast of 12 hours of Chinese television programs in the United States (Yiu, 1993); plans for a satellite television service based in Fujian over Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia and for a global Chinese channel by the year 2000 (Y. Lu, 1993).

Increased local production does reduce the need for foreign programs, but whether the people will watch the new domestic programming is another question. They may still turn to foreign media fare if they find the local productions to be propagandistic, limited in variety or of low quality. A more fundamental approach is for Chinese media to more effectively meet the needs of their audience. As illustrated by the successes of Pearl River Economic Radio, it is through intense competition that Chinese media can reinvent the industry and face up to outside competition.

Competition among Chinese broadcast media should be allowed within and across administrative boundaries, as opposed to the present system, which generally forbids such competition. Many more media players should be allowed to compete on equal footing in a given field. In addition, for competition to work, Chinese media will have to be given much greater autonomy, without which the cultural market will not be able to function effectively and the talk of meeting the challenge of competition from foreign media will remain empty.

Greater autonomy is at the core of many of the demands made by media organizations, which range from the right of provincial stations to broadcast international news (Cai, 1989), to the argument that mass media belong to the tertiary sector and should be treated as "enterprises," which are entitled to greater decision-making power (Fang, 1993; Fang et al., 1993), to the initiation of quasi-private media ownership.3/ Such demands may be expected to grow and intensify as China continues moving toward marketization, which requires accurate information, breeds social pluralism and reduces dependence on the Party and state — all of which call for a media arrangement that stresses greater autonomy.

The tension between the CCP's desires to deflect foreign media influence and to develop economically is growing. The increasing marketization and internationalization of China's economy have put structural pressure on the media to follow suit. But as this happens, Beijing's fear of losing its political grip, as well as its tendency to resort to cultural crackdowns, intensifies. For a large and populous country like China with growing differences in terms of resources, locations, autonomy and leadership, it is becoming more difficult for the central authority to impose a uniform, restrictive policy toward foreign media culture.

In sum, the diffusion of foreign media culture works in tandem with media commercialization in China. While both represent an erosion of ideological control, they are not equivalent to, nor will they necessarily lead to, a free communication system that, as argued elsewhere (Chan, 1993), presupposes democracy, the rule of law and private media ownership. The CCP still has ultimate control over the mass media, which, for the most part, continue to serve as its mouthpiece. Party control remains the most important limiting factor of Chinese media reforms. Antiforeignism and cultural protectionism will ebb and flow as political struggle takes its turns. The pressure for a more liberal and open communication system is bound to persist and increase as economic reform and social differentiation continue.

NOTES:

1. These three categories are adapted from the four dimensions of international media activities identified by Boyd-Barrett (1977). Omitted from the list is what he calls "the shape of the communication vehicle" or media hardware, which is of no concern to this article.

2. This pattern is in phase with media reform that has followed the swing of the political pendulum during the 1980s, as observed by Lee (1990).

3. Some media managers are known to be making plans to turn media organizations into collectively owned corporations through the issuance of stocks. Some argue that television stations and radio stations should be contracted out, giving the contractor full autonomy.

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LA VANGUARDIA

OFICINA DE INFORMACION DIPLOMATICA

22 JUN. 1995

Marruecos condena a más de 15 años de prisión a ocho independentistas saharauis

KIM AMOR
Servicio especial

RABAT. – Un total de ocho jóvenes saharauis simpatizantes del independentista Frente Polisario fueron condenados ayer por el Tribunal Militar de Rabat a penas que oscilan entre los 20 y los 15 años de prisión.

El tribunal marroquí encontró a los ocho jóvenes procesados culpables de haber "atentado contra la seguridad exterior del Estado" marroquí, al protagonizar en El Aaiún –capital del Sáhara occidental– una manifestarse a favor de la independencia del la ex colonia española.

La sentencia fue leída de forma pública por el presidente del tribunal a primera hora de la tarde de ayer, después de que el juicio se desarrollara a puerta cerrada. Durante la lectura de la sentencia, la amplia sala del tribunal estaba prácticamente vacía, tal sólo contaba con la presencia de algunos familiares de los condenados y un puñado de periodistas todos ellos representantes de medios de comunicación extranjeros.

Fuentes que estuvieron presentes durante el proceso manifestaron que los jóvenes, de edades comprendidas entre los 18 y 21 años, negaron en todo momento los cargos imputados y aunque todos ellos son de nacionalidad marroquí dijeron que se consideraban simplemente saharauis. A pesar de la dureza de las penas, los ocho jóvenes reaccionaron prácticamente sin inmutarse cuando escucharon la sentencia.

Los hechos por los que los ocho jóvenes saharauis han sido juzgados se remontan al pasado día 10 de mayo. Ese día en El Aaiún, una treintena de personas se echaron a la calle portando cartones pintados con la bandera de la autoproclamada República Árabe Saharaui Democrática (RASD), mientras gritaban a favor de la independencia del Sáhara Occidental.●

ABC

22 JUN. 1995

Condenados los jóvenes independentistas del Sahara

Rabat. **E. S.**

En un gesto destinado claramente a demostrar que Marruecos ejerce soberanía absoluta sobre el territorio del Sahara Occidental, el Tribunal Militar de Rabat condenó ayer a penas que oscilan entre 15 y 20 años a ocho jóvenes saharauis que el pasado 11 de mayo intentaron manifestarse en favor de la independencia de este territorio. La inusitada celeridad con la que se ha llevado este proceso, que es el primero del que se ha tenido noticia desde que en 1991 se puso en marcha el plan de paz de las Naciones Unidas para esta antigua colonia española, puede considerarse como parte de esta exhibición de soberanía sobre este territorio, entregado oficialmente para la administración por parte del Gobierno de Marruecos y pendiente aún de la celebración de un referéndum de autodeterminación.

El tribunal los ha declarado culpables de un «atentado a la seguridad del Estado», uno de los más graves delitos contemplados en el código penal marroquí y competencia de la jurisdicción militar. No aceptar el carácter marroquí del Sahara es la única disidencia que el Rey de Marruecos Hassan II no perdonó en la amnistía del año pasado. El proceso ha sido llevado de espaldas a los medios de comunicación, y las filtraciones sobre el juicio han sido también las primeras noticias que han permitido conocer el intento de celebrar en El Aaiún el pasado 11 de mayo una manifestación en favor de la independencia del Sahara.

OFICINA DE INFORMACION DIPLOMATICA

EL PAIS

22 JUN. 1995

Penas de hasta 20 años para 8 independentistas saharauis por manifestarse en El Aaiún

FERRAN SALES, **Rabat**

El tribunal militar de Rabat impuso ayer penas de hasta 20 años de cárcel para un grupo de ocho independentistas saharauis que el pasado mayo se manifestaron por las calles de El Aaiún, la antigua capital administrativa del Sáhara español. Ésta es la primera vez, desde la celebración de la Marcha Verde en 1975, que el Gobierno de Marruecos reconoce la existencia de manifestaciones políticas hostiles en el Sáhara, da publicidad e informa sobre la celebración de juicios contra nacionalistas saharauis.

Este grupo de nacionalistas saharauis, con edades comprendidas entre los 17 y los 21 años, comparecieron ayer a las diez de la mañana ante el tribunal militar de Rabat para ser juzgados por un delito de atentado exterior contra la seguridad del Estado, supuestamente cometido el pasado 11 de mayo cuando se manifestaron por las calles de El Aaiún ondeando banderas del Frente Polisario, distribuyendo octavillas y lanzando frases a favor de la República Árabe Saharaui Democrática.

El juicio, que duró aproximadamente tres horas, se celebró a puerta cerrada por decisión del presidente del tribunal militar, que ordenó a los familiares, periodistas y observadores internacionales abandonar la sala. Entre estos observadores se encontraba el diplomático norteamericano Erik McBride, responsable del departamento de derechos humanos en la delegación de Rabat, quien cortésmente fue invitado, como el resto del público, a desalojar la audiencia.

Banderas polisarias

A la vista no acudió ningún observador de la Embajada española. A lo largo del juicio, todos los acusados negaron las declaraciones efectuadas en su día ante las autoridades y recogidas en el atestado policial, en el que se confesaban militantes del Frente Polisario y reconocían haber participado en la manifestación. En este mismo documento se aseguraba además que los acusados habían intentado llevar a término una *revolución interior*, y, como principales elementos de acusación, la policía aportó numerosas octavillas, así como 887 banderas del Frente Polisario que fueron localizadas en sus domicilios.

Media hora después de finalizado el juicio, los magistrados convocaron a los ocho acusados, quienes de pie, enfrente de la mesa del tribunal, escucharon en silencio el veredicto, por el que cuatro de ellos fueron condenados a 20 años de cárcel, dos a 17 y otros dos a 15 años de prisión.

El tribunal notificó a los acusados que disponen de un plazo de ocho días para presentar un recurso ante el Tribunal Supremo. La actitud de las autoridades de Rabat, dando publicidad a este juicio contra los independentistas saharauis, ha provocado cierto asombro en medios políticos marroquíes, donde hasta ahora este tipo de procedimientos judiciales venían celebrándose en medio del más estricto de los silencios.

En los citados medios se especula con la posibilidad de que esta publicidad sea el fruto de las presiones y recomendaciones ejercidas por la delegación del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU sobre el Gobierno de Marruecos, tras plantear el tema de los manifestantes detenidos en El Aaiún, con ocasión de la visita que efectuaron a la región durante la primera semana de junio.

OFICINA DE INFORMACION DIPLOMATICA

EL PAIS

29

22 JUN. 1995

Los apuros de Goliat

FERNANDO SAVATER

La tormentosa relación bíblica entre David y Goliat se ha puesto últimamente de moda en nuestro país: comenzó Arzalluz recurriendo a ella con dudoso tino para aconsejar a los vascos más maña que fuerza en su contencioso con el Estado; siguió después Floren Aoiz sacando la lección opuesta y justificando así la guerrilla de los mozos de reemplazo de Jarrai; luego la utilizó Pedro J. Ramírez como emblema de su batalla personal contra la corrupción felipista (excurso: ¿por qué no prefirió éste un mito clásico, como el de Hércules limpiando los establos del rey Augías? ¿Quizá porque en la leyenda griega faltan las pedradas certeras, la decapitación del coloso caído y, sobre todo, falta el pastorcillo que acaba convertido en rey?) ...y ya veremos quién toma la vez. Es evidente que reina entre los filisteos una admiración creciente por David. Pido permiso, en cambio, para insistir en la metáfora, pero desde la compasión y hasta una recelosa simpatía por Goliat. En mi cuento, el gigante que se tambalea medio *groggy* a fuerza de cantazos es la ONU y los Davides que le acosan (¡davide y vencerás!) son o somos casi todos los demás.

El proyecto de una organización gubernativa a escala mundial, monopolizadora de la fuerza legítima y capaz de impedir las contiendas locales, no es conceptualmente demasiado diferente (reléase el *De Monarchia* de Dante, por ejemplo) de la justificación centralizadora del poder monárquico sobre la belicosa conflictividad de los señoríos feudales. Cuenta con similares abogados (los intereses del comercio pacífico y la industria, los humanistas que piensan el mundo como una comunidad multiforme pero unificada por la razón, las clases populares que aborrecen los saqueos y las levas forzosas, los cosmopolitas desarraigados) y con parejos adversarios: los negociantes de armamento, los caciques locales, los que idolatran las identidades colectivas pero desconfían de la mundialización individualista, los que prefieren sus fueros y privilegios a una homogeneización legal sin raíces históricas, los que temen los excesos de la concentración de poder en pocas manos. El mayor problema teórico es cómo fundar esa autoridad supranacional sin recurrir a la genealogía dinástica, ni al derecho divino, ni a la conquista imperial, es decir, respetando los principios de las repúblicas democráticas que hoy son ya el código genético irrenunciable de cualquier política civilizada. Hace años, Raymond Aron calificó a Estados Unidos de América como "la república imperial": ¿serán posibles alguna vez unos Estados Unidos del Mundo que merezcan ser llamados "un imperio republicano"?

Por supuesto, este imperio republicano no puede surgir más que del previo acuerdo interesado de unas cuantas partes poderosas, no de la asamblea paritaria de todos los pueblos y comunidades: así se fundó la ONU a partir del núcleo formado por los vencedores de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Estos países habían derrotado al nazismo y al fascismo, pero entre ellos había uno tan totalitario como cualquiera de los vencidos. El vicio de origen de la ONU es que no ha exigido la democracia interna de cada uno de sus miembros como requisito esencial para que éstos participasen en las decisiones democráticas del organismo. Hoy buena parte de los socios son tiranías de uno u otro tipo, alzadas a la respetabilidad *de facto* por su admisión de pleno derecho en la gran asamblea, donde tienen ocasión de participar con la libertad igualitaria que niegan a sus ciudadanos. Es muy deseable que en el futuro inmediato renuncien a su derecho a veto los socios fundadores, pero no lo es menos que pierdan su derecho a voto cuantos Estados no se atengan a unas pautas mínimas de homologación democrática.

¿Serán posibles alguna vez unos Estados Unidos del Mundo que merezcan ser llamados 'un imperio republicano'?

El objetivo principal de la ONU ha sido desde su origen evitar la guerra; también debe serlo hacer respetar los derechos humanos (que han de tener prioridad sobre las soberanías nacionales, tantas veces invocadas para conculcarlos), fomentar la educación y el desarrollo social, combatir el hambre y la malversación de los recursos naturales, acudir en ayuda de los damnificados por epidemias o catástrofes... Resulta obvio que también tendrá que ocuparse de formas nuevas de delincuencia internacional y de terrorismo, por lo que sería muy aconsejable que no ayudase a las multinacionales del gangsterismo con legislaciones absurdas como el prohibicionismo en materia de drogas. Todos estos objetivos resultarán inalcanzables mientras no cuente con un cierto monopolio de la fuerza coactiva y con el respaldo consensual de que debe aplicarla cuando sea el caso. Este Goliat internacional, aún tan lejano en su efectividad, no promete ningún paraíso en la Tierra, pero es la única respuesta imaginable a un mundo superpoblado que no puede sobrevivir en el simple tribalismo nacionalista. Si alguna vez llegase a funcionar tendría todas las contraindicaciones de cualquiera de los Estados conocidos (burocratismo, corrupción, ineficiencia local, arbitrariedad) y multiplicadas por la globalidad de su empresa. Pero también impondría algunas de las ventajas estatales que los individuos de las repúblicas democráticas conocemos bien, por mucho que nos quejemos de lo que nos las garantiza. Aunque sea con prudentes recelos, debemos ayudar a este Goliat torpe y tambaleante. Y a los Davides, que les den sopas con honda.

Fernando Savater es catedrático de Filosofía de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

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OFICINA DE INFORMACION DIPLOMATICA

EL PAIS

22 JUN. 1995

Paradojas de un orden nuevo

ANTONIO REMIRO

Cincuenta años después de la firma de la Carta sería incorrecto justificar a la ONU sólo porque, sin ella, todo habría ido peor. La Organización ha sacado un considerable partido de recursos escasos y, sobre todo, ha sabido, a partir de una coalición de vencedores, hacerse *universal,* animando un proceso de descolonización y de cooperación para el desarrollo económico, social y humano, a menudo mal apreciado. Pero, ¿qué le ha de deparar el futuro?

Hay quienes —como el mismo secretario general, Butros-Gali— hubieran deseado aprovechar el cincuentenario para plasmar una nueva Carta, aliviada de disposiciones anacrónicas y enriquecida con las funciones, competencias, órganos y recursos que requiere la supervivencia de la humanidad a las puertas del siglo XXI (de la era cristiana). Las sugerencias han sido numerosas y, algunas, muy imaginativas. Hoy, sin embargo, ya sabemos que esta reforma no será posible y habrá que confiar de nuevo en la capacidad de la ONU para adaptarse a las circunstancias.

Las necesidades objetivas de la humanidad casan mal con un poder constituyente que la Carta atribuyó a una mayoría de dos tercios de sus miembros (que son ya 185), en la que han de contarse inexcusablemente China, EE UU, Francia, Reino Unido y Rusia, que se reservaron no sólo la membresía permanente y el derecho de veto en el Consejo de Seguridad, sino también las llaves de cualquier reforma. Sólo un cataclismo acabaría con su estatuto privilegiado, calificado por algunos como cuasi divino (y debe serlo, pues les permite situar sus actos por encima de una legalidad que aplican a parias y marginales cuando la ocasión y el pasmo lucrativo de China lo consienten).

Nunca el Consejo de Seguridad fue menos representativo que ahora. Arreglarlo exige un compromiso de los más numerosos con los más poderosos, lo que no es fácil. La atribución de poltronas permanentes a Alemania y Japón, que de Estados *enemigos* se convirtieron en principales contribuyentes de una Organización plagada de morosos, respondería a la nueva realidad del poder superpuesta a la vieja, caracterizada por el derecho histórico de la victoria, la posesión de *la bomba* y el oligopolio del tráfico de armas. Pero su incorporación no bastará para hacer más representativo el Consejo. Tampoco nunca el Consejo fue tan laborioso. Su formidable poder no siempre ha ido acompañado, sin embargo, de la indiscutible legitimidad de sus decisiones, algunas de las cuales podrían considerarse sectarias (por aplicar un doble rasero) e irresponsables (por ordenar misiones sin contar con medios para satisfacerlas o controlarlas). El Consejo no siempre actúa cuando y como debe, sino, por el contrario, a veces actúa cuando y como no debe, estirando abusivamente sus competencias.

Desde la perspectiva de los países en desarrollo la importancia acumulada en los últimos años por las dimensiones *económica* (comercio, recursos estratégicos) y *social* (migraciones, dumping laboral) de la *seguridad* y la renovación de la doctrina de la soberanía *limitada,* aplicada a expensas de los Estados *renegados,* es tanto más negativa cuanto se pone en manos de quienes no consienten la verificación política (Asamblea General) o judicial (Corte Internacional de Justicia) de la conformidad de sus acciones con la Carta. ¿Cómo no sentir el escalofrío de la resurrección bajo terminologías dulces de los criterios de barbarie y salvajismo con los que, apenas hace cien años, se pretendió justificar el colonialismo?

Quienes reivindican un orden realmente pluralista hacen bien en reclamar una presencia más firme del Sur en órganos como el Consejo, con una especie de *veto regional* que sirva a los más débiles. Por si las moscas (que son tercermundistas), los *ricos* han venido acomodando grupos informales, como el G-7, aunque el exceso de gallos sólo haya producido hasta ahora cacareos desafinados. Estos grupos, explicables desde el poder establecido, son inadmisibles para un pensamiento progresista movido por la utopía de un entramado institucional de la sociedad internacional redistributivo del poder y sometido al Derecho para la eficaz protección de hombres, pueblos y gentes en su espléndido abigarramiento.

¿Existe voluntad para hacer de la Organización la columna maestra del sistema de coexistencia y cooperación de los Estados a escala universal? Ésa es la cuestión. Se tiene frecuentemente la impresión que algunas grandes potencias se proponen aprovechar la ONU como una herramienta más de su política, o que se apoyan en su fracaso para patrocinar la entrada en escena, sin trabas, de organismos regionales y coaliciones de fortuna. "Los hechos revelan", confesaba el secretario general de la ONU en su última Memoria, "que la participación plena y responsable en las N U no es cuestión prioritaria para la mayoría de los Estados miembros".

Así, nos toparemos con la muerte entre las flores. Gracias a los derechos humanos, el hombre ha dejado de ser un perro, pero los hombres del *mondo cane* envidian la suerte de los perros falderos del primer mundo; los pueblos coloniales se han emancipado sólo para caer en decenas de nuevos Estados fallidos; las operaciones de paz son más ambiciosas que nunca, pero algunas se transforman en eslóganes comerciales y campañas de saldo. Y además, los mismos que practican la injerencia humanitaria se sirven del tráfico alimentario como arma de presión; las bases más profundas de la libertad son socavadas con ingenierías democráticas ocupadas por clientelas locales; la vida y el bienestar se los llevan por delante los especuladores financieros con la libre ciculación de capitales, la parca de los pobres. Al final, predicamos la tolerancia porque hemos perdido el auténtico cosmopolitismo. Paradojas de un orden nuevo al que le baila la jota.

Antonio Remiro es catedrático de Derecho Internacional Público en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

SECRETARIA GENERAL TECNICA

FAX

FAX REMITENTE 366.39.53	**SECRETARIA GENERAL TECNICA**	
NUMERO SGT0175	**Autor:** CL/CB	**Fecha:** 7-3-94
Unidad: SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL DE PLANIFICACION Y ORGANIZACION	**Asunto:**	

DESTINATARIO: CLARO JOSE FERNANDEZ CARNICERO , DIRECTOR DE RELACIONES PARLAMENTARIAS DEL CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS.

TEXTO

POR SI FUERA DE INTERES PARA LA RECIENTE PONENCIA FORMADA EN ESA CAMARA SOBRE LA REFORMA DE NACIONES UNIDAS, ADJUNTO SE REMITE LA DOCUMENTACION ENVIADA POR LA MISION PERMANENTE DE ESPAÑA ANTE DICHO ORGANISMO SOBRE LA CREACION DE UN GRUPO INTERNACIONAL PARA EL ESTUDIO DEL FUTURO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CREADO A INICIATIVA DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL, SR. BOUTROS GHALI CON LA COLABORACION DE LA FUNDACION FORD Y DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE YALES.

CARLOS MARIA DE LOJENDIO

NOTA IMPORTANTE:

ESTE FAX CONSTA DE PAGINAS, INCLUIDA LA PORTADA

07/03/94 17:43 S G T 001

THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY

A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the U.N.

CONTACT: Shepard Forman/Brian Urquhart
The Ford Foundation
212/573-4800

Gary Fryer/Laurie Trotta
Yale University
203/432-1345

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

EMINENT INTERNATIONAL GROUP WILL EXAMINE THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, N.Y., March 3, 1994--Responding to a request by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the Ford Foundation and Yale University announced today the formation of an independent working group to examine the future of the United Nations in the context of the major changes that have taken place since its founding in 1945 and to update the original vision of the international organization.

The 12-member Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations will produce a report on the mission and functioning of the UN in its second half-century. The report is expected to be ready by the summer of 1995 in order to serve as a basis for discussion during the 50th anniversary debate in the UN General Assembly.

Co-chaired by Moeen Qureshi, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Richard von Weizsäcker, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Working Group includes Alicia Bárcena Ibarra of Mexico; Muchkund Dubey of India; Stephane Hessel of France; Koji Kakizawa of Japan; Wangari Maathai of Kenya; Xue Mouhong of China; Anthony Parsons of the United Kingdom; Felix Rohatyn of the United States; Roald Sagdeev of Russia; and Hanna Suchocka of Poland (see attached bios).

(MORE)

Yale University, 12 Prospect Place, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
tel: (203) 432 6240; fax: (203) 432 6966; Internet: UNst_grunberg@qm.yale.edu

The Working Group will examine the issues of peace, security, and human welfare that will face the world at the turn of the century and consider how the UN can be enabled to meet these challenges. During its deliberations the group will consult with experts from organizations and research institutions worldwide.

The meetings of the group will take place in Pocantico Hills, N.Y. at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, which will assist with related costs. The Fund's support reflects the Rockefeller family's longstanding interest in the United Nations.

The Working Group will have its first meeting in May 1994 and plans to issue a final report by mid-1995. The report will be given to all member governments of the UN and will be disseminated widely throughout the world.

A staff for the Working Group has been established in the United Nations Studies program at Yale. The co-directors of the project are Paul Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Programs, and Bruce Russett, Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Director of UN Studies at Yale.

"The need to improve and strengthen the present United Nations system is widely recognized," said Franklin Thomas, president of the Ford Foundation. "The enormous changes that have occurred in the world demand a reassessment, and possibly major reform of the present structure."

(MORE)

"Nothing could be more important at this turning point in world affairs than to create a new and compelling vision for concerted global action," said Richard C. Levin, president of Yale University. "Yale is proud to be at the center of this effort, not only to help the UN fulfill its original promise, but to make the coming century a time of unprecedented human progress."

The Yale staff and the Independent Working Group are funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Biographies are attached.

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THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY

A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the U.N.

CONTACT: Shepard Forman/Brian Urquhart
The Ford Foundation
212/573-4860

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Embargoed for Release: 12 Noon (New York Time) March 3, 1994

The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations

Members

Alicia Bárcena Ibarra is Executive Director of the Earth Council, an independent global agency based in Costa Rica that reports on governments' implementation of the accords reached at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. A Mexican citizen, she was Mexico's Undersecretary of the Secretariat of Ecology and Urban Environment, and Director General of the National Institute of Fisheries. Mrs. Bárcena worked with Maurice Strong at the UN Conference on Environment and Development Secretariat in Geneva during the two-year negotiating process that led to the Earth Summit.

Muchkund Dubey is a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. A former Foreign Secretary of India, he has served as High Commissioner in Bangladesh and Permanent Representative of India to UN Organizations in Geneva. Mr. Dubey chaired and prepared a background paper for the seventeen-member expert group, commissioned jointly by the South Center in Geneva and the Group of 77, which released a report on the UN system in September 1992.

Stephane Hessel, an expert on foreign aid and technical cooperation, is an ambassador of France who has held senior positions in successive French governments. In 1993, he headed his country's delegation to the Human Rights Commission and to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. He was permanent representative of France to the UN in Geneva from 1977 to 1981. In the early 1970s, he served as Assistant Administrator of the UN Development Program. From 1946 to 1950, he served in UN positions. Mr. Hessel has written extensively on various issues of foreign aid.

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Koji Kakizawa is a member of the Japanese Parliament and former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. An advocate for increased inter-regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, Mr. Kakizawa was appointed Secretary-General of both the Japan-Cambodia Parliamentary Association and the Japan-Vietnam Parliamentary Association in December 1993. In 1994, he will also serve as Secretary-General of Japan's Parliamentary League for Ending Hunger in Developing Countries. As president of Parliamentarians for Global Action, he has worked to increase Japan's participation in global environmental programs and UN peacekeeping.

Wangari Maathai is a Kenyan biologist and environmentalist. She was formerly Chairperson of the Department of Anatomy at the University of Nairobi, and Director of the Kenya Red Cross Society and of the National Council of Women of Kenya. In 1977, she founded the Green Belt Movement, a grassroots organization that seeks to fight deforestation, desertification, and erosion in Kenya, in coordination with global environmentalist networks. Dr. Maathai has received numerous distinctions for her work in environmental issues.

Xue Mouhong is a professor at Peking University and the College of Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the China Association of Asian and African Studies. He was sent to Nairobi from 1987 to 1989 as ambassador to Kenya and permanent representative to UNEP and HABITAT. He was also the editor-in-chief of the Journal of International Studies (Beijing) and the director of the editing board for the book, Diplomacy of Contemporary China.

Anthony Parsons is a British diplomat who has written widely on the United Nations and the UN system. He has worked at the Foreign Office in several positions, including serving twice as Under Secretary responsible for UN affairs. He was Counsellor in the United Kingdom Mission to the UN from 1969 to 1971 and Permanent Representative to the UN from 1979 to 1982. He was also Foreign Affairs Adviser to the British Prime Minister in the early 1980s.

Moeen Qureshi (co-chair) is Chairman of Emerging Markets Corporation, an international investment management firm based in Washington, D.C. He was interim Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1993, instituting comprehensive social and economic reforms while leading Pakistan through a democratic electoral process. In addition to serving in senior positions in the government of Pakistan and the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Qureshi was Chief Operating Officer of the International Finance Corporation, and Senior Vice President and Head of Operations of the World Bank until 1991.

Felix G. Rohatyn is a senior partner with the New York City investment banking firm Lazard Frères & Co. From 1975 to 1993, Mr. Rohatyn was Chairman of the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York (a state agency), where he directed the negotiations that restructured the city's obligations during the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Vice Chairman of Carnegie Hall and of a number of other nonprofit organizations.

Roald Sagdeev, a Russian physicist, is the founding director of the East-West Space Science Center at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a professor in the Department of Physics. He is the former director of Russia's Institute of Space Research and head of its Scientific Methodical Center for Analytical Research. He has been a member of the Council of Directors for the International Fund for the Survival and Development of Mankind. The recipient of numerous awards and honors, Dr. Sagdeev is a specialist on global warming, plasma physics, controllable thermonuclear synthesis, and cosmic ray physics.

Hanna Suchocka, a former Prime Minister of Poland, is a lawyer and politician. She is currently a member of the Polish Parliament and serves on the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission. She was elected to the Parliament in 1980 as a member of the Democratic Union Party, and joined Solidarity soon after its founding in August, 1980. Ms. Suchocka was Prime Minister from July 1992 until October 1993 during a critical time in Poland's economic and political transition.

Richard von Weizsäcker (co-chair) is President of the Federal Republic of Germany. He was elected Vice President of the Bundestag in 1979 after serving as Deputy Chairman of the CDU Parliamentary Party. He was Governing Mayor of Berlin from 1981 to 1984, when he became President. His presidential term ends in June 1994.

Project Co-Directors at Yale University

Paul Kennedy is J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Programs at Yale University. A contributor to journals and newspapers worldwide, he teaches international affairs and security studies. In 1992 Professor Kennedy delivered the first annual Nobel Peace Foundation lecture in Oslo. His recent books include The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1985) and Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (1993).

Bruce Russett is Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Chair of the Political Science Department at Yale University, and Director of UN Studies at Yale. Since 1972 he has served as Editor of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and is past President of the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society International. The most recent of his 20 books, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (1993), explains why democracies rarely fight one another.

ENVIO

CON UN SALUDO

de la

Dirección General

de Organizaciones y Conferencias

Internacionales

04/16/94 01:10

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

MISION PERMANENTE DE ESPAÑA

FAX

FAX REMITENTE 949-7247		
NUMERO 848	Autor: Salazar	Fecha: 12/4/94
Unidad: Misión ONU - N.Y.	Asunto: Grupo Trabajo Agma Reforma C.S.	
DESTINATARIO: SGPE/OCI/		

TEXTO

NOTA IMPORTANTE: ESTE FAX CONSTA DE 12 PAGINAS, INCLUIDA LA PORTADA

PERMANENT MISSION OF
GERMANY
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Statement

by

Ambassador Detlev Graf zu Rantzau

Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

to

the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in
the Membership of the Security Council

at

the United Nations:

The Relationship of the Security Council with the General Assembly, other Bodies and Organizations as well as non-members of the Security Council; and Reform by the Security Council of its working methods and procedures

New York, 8 April 1994

Check against delivery

600 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 TEL: (212) 856-6200 FAX (212) 856-6280

Mr. Chairman,

When I last took the floor in this working group I underlined that in our view the actions of the Security Council can only be effective if they are credible. Therefore, the Security Council, which according to Art. 24 of the Charter acts on behalf of the general membership of this organization, should - to be credible in its decision making - take into account opinions, information and recommendations deriving from the general membership.

Consequently, in our view, there must be a sufficient flow of information from the Security Council to the general membership and there should be regular mechanisms to channel information from the general membership to the Security Council.

Mr Chairman,

various areas, where improvement is necessary, have been identified by speakers in this working group as well as the working group on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly. Three key targets for reform have been suggested:

Firstly, the flow of information between the Security Council and non members of the Council: Germany supports the view that more regular ways should be found to better keep non-members informed about the Security Council's

discussions. We believe that informal meetings of the Security Council are necessary for its efficient functioning. They should be maintained. However, better ways of informing UN member states about "when there are meetings" and "what has been discussed" ought to be found.

My delegation appreciates the steps taken so far by the Security Council, such as the publication of the agenda of informal Security Council meetings in the UN journal. But further improvements should be sought. Therefore,

- we feel that the notification of all interested delegations about ad hoc Security Council meetings, particularly on week-ends, as suggested by the Permanent Representatives of Italy and Slovenia would be very helpful;

- we would welcome meetings between the President of the Security Council and groups of interested member states;

- we propose to create a mechanism through which delegations can be briefed about the Security Council's deliberations in informal meetings. The comments made in this regard in this working group by the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka merit further attention.

Mr Chairman,

The second key area is the reporting of the Security Council to the General Assembly, according to Articles 15(1) and 24(3) of the Charter: the annual

able to have greater input into the Council's deliberations or, as the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka has formulated, there should be a two way flow of information between the Security Council and the general membership. In our view individual member states or groups of member states should be given the regular opportunity to make relevant inputs into the council's work. In the same way views expressed by the General Assembly should be taken into account by the Council.

Mr. Chairman,

Let me elaborate briefly on these two points.

We consider it especially relevant to provide troop contributing countries with an opportunity to inform council members regularly about their views while at the same time receiving first hand information about the council's judgement of developments. In this context, a number of delegations have proposed to formalize already existing consultations of Security Council members with troop contributors, as well as groups of friends of the Secretary General and other interested member states. We strongly support such ideas.

Similarly, the Security Council ought to take every opportunity to consult with countries, which for geographical, historical or other reasons are in a position to contribute to the discussion of a particular conflict. The creation of groups of friends of the Secretary General has proven a useful institution in this regard. Furthermore, the collective wisdom of regional organizations could be of value for the decision making process of the Security Council.

With regard to views expressed by the General Assembly which might be of relevance for the Security Council's work, we share the opinion stated by the Permanent Representative of Colombia, that the General Assembly is a valuable source of information for the Security Council. It should therefore be in the Security Council's own interest to benefit from that source. Various ways of communication between the two organs exist already. More, such as for example a regular exchange of views between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, could be added.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Japan

PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
866 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017 (212)223-4300

Press Release

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHUNJI MARUYAMA AT THE 9TH MEETING OF THE OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

United Nations
New York, NY

8 April 1994

Mr. Chairman,

Today I would like to address the second item on the agenda of this Working Group, namely, "Other matters related to the Security Council."

Having participated in the work of the Security Council as a non-permanent member, most recently for the 1992-1993 term, Japan is acutely aware of the need to reform the Council. Indeed, given the importance of the United Nations in this post-Cold War world, it is essential that the functions of the Security Council be strengthened, not only by expanding its membership but also by improving the management of its work. In so doing, its legitimacy and credibility will also be enhanced. Japan's keen interest in the reform of the Security Council was confirmed by Prime Minister Hosokawa in his statement before the General Assembly last fall.

In order to strengthen the functions of the Security Council, it is important that the two-way flow of information between the Security Council and the UN membership be improved. This will ensure that the views of UN Member States will be more fully reflected in the Council's deliberations. As this two-way communication is improved, more information will be available to the Council as it addresses the regional conflicts that are proliferating in many parts of the world; this, in turn, will surely enable it to make wiser decisions and to ensure that they are more effectively implemented.

Mr. Chairman,

In view of the foregoing, Japan strongly supports measures to achieve greater transparency in the work of the Council. As a non-permanent member, Japan worked actively toward this end, particularly in the context of the working group on procedural matters. For example, when Japan served as President of the Council in January 1993, it engaged in more than sixty bilateral consultations in an effort to expand communication

between the Council and non-members. We note with appreciation that the Security Council itself has been making efforts in this regard, and hope they will be further consolidated. On the other hand, we wish to underline the point made by other delegations that due regard must be paid to a balance between enhancing the transparency and maintaining the efficiency of the Council's work.

Mr. Chairman,

As I indicated earlier, improving the transparency of the Security Council's work will require that efforts be made to ensure better communication between the Council and the UN membership. Toward this end, Japan would like to propose the following:

First, I would like to stress the importance of making information on Security Council activities more readily available. My delegation would like to propose in this context that the Council's activities be described in even greater detail in the Journal, that its monthly work plan be consolidated, and that a record of its decisions taken during the previous month be compiled and distributed to the UN membership. On the question of providing information on Security Council deliberations, we believe the briefings and consultations with the chairmen of the regional groups by the Security Council president – practices which were initiated last year – are extremely worthwhile and should be expanded. We also think it is worth examining how the UN membership as a whole might best be briefed on the informal consultations held by the Council.

Second, as regards the provision of related information on important issues, it would be helpful if analytical and factual studies, such as that prepared on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, were expanded and consolidated. We believe the briefings by the Secretary-General's Special Representatives on UNOSOM and UNPROFOR were

extremely useful, and would like to suggest that such briefings be held on a regular basis on important issues on which the Security Council has taken action, notably the launching of a peace-keeping operation.

Third, we would urge that a mechanism be established for consultation between the Security Council and the countries concerned in a peace-keeping operation, including those that make major contributions of funding and troops as well as other interested countries, such as those that are adjacent to a country in conflict.

Fourth, it is also important to improve the transparency of the activities of the Security Council's subordinate organs, such as the sanctions committees. Toward this end it would be advisable to expedite the work of these organs and to clarify their specific mandates. Greater consideration should be given to the views of those countries that could be affected by the decisions of the Security Council and its subordinate organs, particularly in the context of Article 50 of the UN Charter. At the same time, the entire UN membership should be kept apprised of such decisions.

Fifth, we stress the importance of improving relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly and of ensuring that the views of the latter body are reflected in the deliberations of the Council. It may be worthwhile, for example, to revitalize the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and instruct it to conduct comprehensive discussions on all aspects of PKO activities, the results of which might be reflected in Security Council decisions on the launching of PKOs.

Finally, Japan believes that if these reforms are to be achieved and the functions of the Security Council further consolidated, it will be necessary to reinforce the Secretariat staff.

report of the Security Council to the General Assembly in the past has been perceived by many delegations as lacking substance and analytical elements. Again, some improvements have been made - for instance the presentation of the report to the 48th General Assembly by the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Sardenberg of Brazil. This practice should be continued.

Demands for a more analytical report are understandable, but I feel that it would not be feasible for the Security Council to analyze and comment on its own actions. However, we think that further thought should be given to the suggestion made by the Permanent Representative of Slovenia to establish a working group of the General Assembly which should analyze the report in order to identify key points for discussion in the following debate.

We would also like to reiterate, that the presentation of more frequent reports - as suggested by the Permanent Representative of Tunesia - and the production of special reports, for example on issues related to measures taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, as spelled out in Art. 24(3), could improve the situation.

Mr. Chairman,

the third and in our view most important point is the creation of mechanisms to channel views from the general membership towards the Security Council. Art. 24(1) spells out clearly that the Security Council acts on behalf of all member states. As a consequence, members states feel that they ought to be

Mr. Chairman,

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to touch very briefly upon an obsolete element in the UN Charter – namely, the so-called "former enemy clauses" contained in Articles 53 and 107. Japan believes, as do several other countries that have expressed their views on the subject, that these clauses should be deleted when the UN Charter is revised in the context of the Security Council reform.

Mr. Chairman,

Japan has suggested these measures for the reform of the Security Council in an effort to enhance its credibility and legitimacy. For only when the Council enjoys the confidence and trust of all the Member States of the United Nations can it fulfill its fundamental purpose, the maintenance of international peace and security.

Thank you.

APR 15 '94 21:14 SPANISH MISSION

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

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FAX REMITENTE 9497247		
NUMERO 965	Autor: Salazar	Fecha: 15/4/94
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DESTINATARIO: SGPE/OCI		

TEXTO

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Brazil Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR

RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG,

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL

OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(check against delivery)

New York, 15 April 1994

Mr. Chairman.

The relationship of the Security Council with the General Assembly, other bodies and organizations as well as non-members of the Security Council, on the one hand, and the reform by the Security Council of its working methods and procedures, on the other, constitute two topics which are fundamentally interlinked with the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. All of them are critical aspects of our endeavours aimed at enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of that main organ.

Preceding speakers have underscored the organic relationship between the Security Council as a whole and the membership at large of the United Nations pursuant to article 24 of the Charter. In essence, we are addressing today the problem of the accountability and transparency of actions of the Security Council vis-à-vis the members of the Organization.

Its accountability stems from the fact that in acting on behalf of the members of the United Nations, the Security Council must effectively respond to the expectations of the international community. Each member of the Council, permanent and non-permanent alike, and the Council as a whole are therefore accountable to the membership at large of the Organization for their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Likewise, transparency derives from the necessity that non-members of the Council should be able to adequately follow and participate, as appropriate, in the discussion of any question of concern to them, as provided for in articles 31 and 32 of the Charter. Accountability and transparency would thus contribute to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of a more equitably represented Security Council.

Without further commenting on conceptual considerations, my delegation would like to put forward some practical suggestions for improving the accountability and transparency of the Security Council.

As a small contribution in this regard, the delegation of Brazil sought, during its presidency of the Security Council in October 1993, with the support of the other members of the Council, to introduce the report of that organ to the General Assembly. We are grateful for the kind words expressed by many delegations in this regard. It is our hope that this practice will be maintained and further improved in the future, with a view to establishing a true dialogue between these two main organs of the Organization.

We agree with other delegations that the reporting system of the Security Council should be improved, both in form and content. The Brazilian delegation is actively participating in the Working Group of the Security Council concerning the Council's documentation and other procedural questions, in order to make the paper work and the procedures of the Council less opaque and more user-friendly.

While concurring with the pertinent criticism that the reports of the Security Council make arid reading and could be more analytical, we note that the document in its current format only reports on the official proceedings. The crux of the problem is that the contents of the informal consultations, by their very nature, are not recorded and thus cannot be formally reported. In this regard, mechanisms could be devised to preserve, in some authoritative way, the main contents of the informal consultations, and to keep the interested public informed.

We fully support the current practice, inaugurated by the US delegation during its presidency in August 1993, of regular briefings by the President of the Council to the chairmen of regional groups on the programme of work of the month. We also deem it useful that the president of the Council attend, whenever appropriate, meetings of the regional groups to brief them on matters of their interest. Moreover, we believe that such practice could be further improved by another modality of briefing by the president at the end of his term, giving his assessment of the work accomplished by the Council during his tenure. Such briefings could be given to the membership at large in the form of a public informal meeting at the end of the month.

Similarly, we deem it appropriate that, at the end of each informal consultation, the president of the Council or a member of his delegation give a succint briefing of the deliberations to interested delegations present at the antechamber of the Consultation Room, in the same manner that he regularly gives such briefings to the representatives of the press.

Likewise, as regards the participation of non-members in the discussions of the Council, we believe that there is room for improvement somewhere in between the exclusionary nature of informal consultations and the rigid formality of the public meetings. To this effect:

a. there could be more recourse to article 29 of the Charter, establishing ad-hoc subsidiary organs which could assist the Council by performing a monitoring or a mediation role for the peaceful settlement of specific disputes with the participation, as appropriate, of interested non-members. Such a mechanism would greatly contribute to

restablishing the preeminence of the diplomatic function of the Council;

b. a special committee of the Security Council could be established, as suggested by the delegation of New Zealand, with the function of providing political oversight of the peace-keeping operations and forum for consultation with troop-contributing members not represented in the Council, as well as for liaison with and briefings from representatives of the Secretariat;

c. there could be more frequent recourse to the highly informal meetings in the "Diego Arria format" in order to allow Council members to receive briefings and inputs on matters before the Council from the different parties to conflicts or from representatives of relevant regional organizations or arrangements, as appropriate.

d. along the same lines, the Sanctions Committees could consider ways to better enable concerned member states to bring to the attention of members of the Council those problems faced by them in the implementation of the sanctions adopted by the Security Council;

e. the Security Council could also intensify its efforts to develop new channels and practices for an improved assessment of problems which arise from the implementation of sanctions regimes, with a view to giving a more concrete expression to the consultations under article 50 of the Charter.

These are some tentative suggestions that my delegation deems could be usefully explored by our Working Group. If adequately addressed, they would impart greater accountability and transparency to the actions of the Council vis-à-vis the membership of the Organization, thus enhancing the legitimacy and effectivity of a more equitably represented Security Council in the future.

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PRESS RELEASE

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PRESS RELEASE USUN 47-(94)

STATEMENT BY

AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH

UNITED STATES ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE

TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

IN THE

WORKING GROUP ON SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

APRIL 15, 1994

* * AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY * *

Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation has listened with interest to the views of colleagues in these last few weeks on the two subjects of this part of the Working Group's agenda, namely, the Security Council's relations with non-members, and with other bodies, especially the General Assembly, and the working methods and procedures of the Security Council. In our view, the intensity of debate on these themes affirms a very welcome fact of global life after the Cold War. It underscores that the goals of international security, such as prevention or settlement of regional conflicts, are no longer competing goals but universal ones. The tasks must, therefore, be widely shared, and the obligations fall equitably on every state.

This is a fundamental change, one that has placed a heavy demand on the Security Council while assigning it an equally heavy responsibility. The demand is to lead global security cooperation as effectively as possible and in a manner consonant with the UN Charter. The responsibility is to assure that its leadership flows from a broad and informed security consensus. It is our strong conviction that these objectives are of equal importance and that every UN member state has a stake in preserving both, and in maintaining the balance between them.

Like many of our colleagues, the United States believes that there are a number of constructive ways to reinforce this balance in the areas covered by this agenda item. Indeed, as others have stressed, the Security Council has already taken unprecedented steps to better inform non-members of Council activities and to broaden and regularize opportunities for concerned states to express views on pending Council matters and thus contribute to their consideration.

Starting last August for example, and at the initiative of the Permanent Representative of the United States, Security Council Presidents began to meet with the President of the General Assembly and representatives of regional groups early in their presidency to discuss the outlook for the Council's work that month and listen to members' views. In most cases this practice has been maintained. We believe these meetings have been beneficial and should be continued.

More recently the Security Council has authorized circulation to all UN members of a provisional forecast of its program of work each month. This has been complemented by publication in the daily Journal of the provisional agenda and the subjects likely to be addressed. Both are welcome innovations. Along these same lines the Permanent Representative of New Zealand recently suggested to this body that the monthly plan be expanded to cover two months. While a considerable part of the Council's agenda is obviously fluid and constantly changing, there are predictable elements too, such as the reauthorization of certain peacekeeping missions and other matters. It may be therefore be useful for the Council's Working Group on Procedures to explore this idea.

Another important change was the Council's decision last month to make available to all UN members draft Security Council resolutions "in blue" at the same time these are circulated to the Council itself.

The Security Council has also recently begun to make some progress on the arduous task of reviewing the list of subjects of which the Council is seized in order to make the format more self explanatory and to eliminate items to which Article 12 need no longer apply.

Last year the Brazilian Permanent Representative took the welcome initiative of promoting improvements in the analysis provided in the Security Council's Annual Report to the General Assembly. He subsequently presented it to the General Assembly personally during his presidency of the Security Council last fall. Further ways to strengthen the Report are being explored so that its consideration will afford even greater opportunities for useful exchanges of views with the General Assembly on matters being addressed by the Council.

Finally, a positive development too often overlooked is the increasing use by the members of the Security Council of small, informal groups of countries referred to as "friends" groups. These groups, of which there have been nearly half a dozen in recent years, normally consist of countries directly concerned by a particular security-related matter before the Council and committed to work for its resolution. As it happens, in every case they have included non-members of the Security Council. The members of these groups have often played a very significant role in forging peace settlements, carrying them through and assuring that the pertinent political realities and sensitivities are reflected in actions by the Council.

Mr. Chairman, in light of the nearly half-century of Security Council operation, in which quiet and confidential deliberations have played a critical part in the Council's role and in its recent effectiveness, the forgoeing list of innovations amounts - in the opinion of the United States - to impressive change.

Nevertheless in our view further incremental change should continue. This is particularly desirable for peacekeeping operations but it may also apply to the Council's general concern with situations threatening to peace and security, and with measures, including sanctions, taken to address them.

We therefore plan to encourage colleagues on the Security Council to consider several steps with the purpose of strengthening communication between Council members and non-members such as peacekeeping contributors or others directly concerned in a particular matter.

First, we believe that the members of the Security Council should make more frequent use of out-of-chambers meetings with troop contributors when circumstances require and especially in advance of changes or significant extensions of peacekeeping mandates. These meetings could be used for an exchange of views on possible resolution elements. Moreover, when regional or other relevant organizations are directly concerned in a given operation their participation should also be included.

On this matter let me say that other types of exchanges are also useful. For example the Organization of Islamic Countries' meeting on Bosnia last August, convened by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan, and attended by members of the Security Council was quite valuable. This approach, known as the "Arria" format, for the former Venezuelan Ambassador who introduced it, should be pursued in the future.

Second, it would be helpful for the Secretariat to provide more regular and frequent situation reports to the Council and to troop contributor countries on all major missions especially during critical periods in the life of a mission.

Third, we applaud the decision earlier this week by the current Council President, Ambassador Keating of New Zealand, to meet on an urgent basis with countries contributing troops to UNAMIR in order to elicit their views regarding that mission's future. The experience was instructive for my delegation and suggests to us that future Council Presidents might consider making use of such a format in the event similar circumstances befall other missions.

Fourth, we believe the Council should let the Secretariat know that it would welcome more regular briefings from peacekeeping Special Representatives or Force Commanders. On their visits to New York, the Council President might usefully arrange out-of-chambers meetings open to troop contributors and Security Council members for the purpose of broadening the dialogue with the Special Rep or Force Commander.

Fifth, in our view, Council members drafting resolutions which change or extend peacekeeping mandates should undertake to meet with major troop contributors in order to consider fully their views. This practice was followed with the most recent resolution on UNOSOM and it proved in our opinion very productive for all concerned.

Sixth, many of the innovations mentioned earlier were in fact initiated by the Security Council Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. We believe this Council working group is the appropriate forum to explore additional proposals on Council work methods and other aspects of the item before us.

And lastly, as an example of the proposal I just made, the United States believes that the Council's Working Group could usefully undertake a review of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure in order to update them as appropriate.

In closing Mr. Chairman I would like to offer a brief comment. We have devoted a great deal of attention in the last four meetings to various means of increasing opportunities for non-members and other bodies to contribute in some fashion to the work of the Security Council. That is to be expected given the agenda item. But I would submit that such an exercise creates at best an incomplete picture, because the General Assembly's own role with regard to international peace and security is significant.

The Assembly is indeed bounded by Article 12, it is also excluded, under Article 11-(2), from taking mandatory action. However, Articles 11, 14 and 35 are an important and under-used basis for a constructive General Assembly contribution to peace and security goals. Moreover, the provisions of the UN's Economic and Social Council provide ample basis for the Assembly, should it choose to do so, to deal directly and with great effect with the root and recurring causes of many conflicts now ongoing. Indeed, it seems to us that the concept of peacebuilding, as outlined by the Secretary General in his farreaching report, An Agenda For Peace, is an invitation to the Assembly, a suggestion that it work in cooperation with the Security Council to better secure the peace often tenuously and precariously achieved by Council mandated peacekeeping missions.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that the matters before this Working Group are narrower questions. And as our statement has shown, we are sincerely committed to addressing them. However, as we follow our agenda we want to keep in mind that the Security Council is only a part of a larger system and all of the parts of that system have a contribution to make to the preservation of international peace and security. Thank you.

* * * * *

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April 15, 1994

STATEMENT

by the Representative of the Russian Federation
at the meeting of the Working Group on
the question of equitable representation on and
increase in the membership of the Security Council

The Russian Federation believes that the mandate of the open-ended Working Group established under Resolution 48/26 of the General Assembly is focused on a thorough examination of the issue of increase in the membership of the Security Council. Accordingly, the "related matters" which constitute the subject of another item in our working agenda are aimed at ensuring the correspondence of a possible solution of this issue to the purpose of the enhancement of the efficiency of the Security Council as the organ on which is conferred, in accordance with the Charter, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the very outset, we would like to emphasize that in recent years the Security Council has attained – for the first time in decades – the work level provided for in the United Nations Charter. In its positive balance are a number of successful United Nations' peace-keeping operations, as well as important decisions pursuing the prevention and settlement of crises and conflicts, and strengthening stability and security in various regions of the world.

Naturally, the acquirement by the Security Council of the role in the United Nations system originally assigned to it by the Charter has ensued an increase in Member States' interest in its activities.

One cannot but welcome such a development, once it is an undoubtable acknowledgment of the fact that it is the United Nations the States are increasingly placing their hopes on – hopes for a solution of the world's most burning issues, first of all, those related to settlement of crises and conflict situations.

We realize that there is a real need for the Security Council to rely in its decision-making on a broad support of a whole world community so as to more fully employ the potential, set in the United Nations Charter.

Given a steep rise in the volume of objectives assigned to the Security Council, it has lately paid considerable attention to matters related to ensuring efficiency and transparency. Thus, since June of 1993, the activities of the Working Group which considers and reviews a vast set of issues regarding documentation and procedures have been carried out on a constant basis. Based on the recommendations issued by the Group, the Council has adopted a number of decisions meant to, inter alia, create broader possibilities for all Member States of the United Nations to be well-informed of the Council activities. Other distinguished representatives have already spoken of these decisions – the reason why I am not going to dwell upon them in particular. I would like to note, however, that the ameliorations put in practice by the Council constitute an important element of the United Nations reform as a

whole, and, in our view, they have improved the situation considerably, especially in comparison with what it used to be for a few decades.

We consider the maintenance and further increase in the achieved Council's operativeness and efficiency as a key condition for any possible steps in what regards the Security Council activities.

We are firmly convinced that the established system of unofficial consultations of the Security Council – the central element in the process of its decision-making – should be maintained in the light of its practically confirmed effectiveness.

The whole world diplomacy conference experience confirms the importance of an informal exchange of opinions between delegations at a preliminary stage, sometimes in the absence of instructions, i.e. at a stage when a general approach to an issue just begins to take shape. This considerably expedites and simplifies the procedure of decision-making. Obviously enough, any attempt to impart an official character to these consultations would only make sure that they take place in a different location and in less favorable conditions, as Members of the Council – one way or another – will not be able to do without preliminary informal deliberations on issues submitted to the Council. Evidently, any attempts to introduce innovations prone with disruption of an already established and efficiently functioning mechanism would contradict the purpose of improving the Council's effectiveness and, subsequently, diverge from the interests of an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations.

Our delegation supports the efforts aimed at the improvement of interaction between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, as provided for by the Charter, first and foremost the General Assembly, including intensification of its efforts in such important areas regarding the maintenance of security as protection of human rights and strengthening of democracies.

We also welcome briefings, already becoming a regular activity, for troop-contributing countries. We deem the developing practice of discussing matters with this category of States related to peace-keeping operations as a useful one and hope that this practice will be further developed.

We are ready to constructively cooperate on these and other matters with all interested States, proceeding from the principle that any steps in this field should be taken gradually, along the lines of consensus, after an agreement in principle have been reached - first of all, in the Security Council - and generally acceptable criteria established.

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

SECRETARIA GENERAL TÉCNICA

SUBDIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE PLANIFICACIÓN Y ORGANIZACIÓN

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DESTINATARIO:SR. FDEZ CARNICERO. DIRECTOR DE RELACIONES PARLAMENTARIAS. CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS.

TEXTO

COMO CONTINUACIÓN A MI FAX DE 28-3-94, EN RELACIÓN CON EL VIAJE A ESPAÑA DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL DE NACIONES UNIDAS, A CONTINUACIÓN SE DETALLA LA RELACIÓN DE PERSONAS QUE FORMARÁN LA DELEGACIÓN QUE ACOMPAÑA AL SR. BOUTROS-GHALI EN SU PRÓXIMA VISITA A ESPAÑA.

-SR. VLADIMIR PETROVSKY, DIRECTOR GRAL. OFICINA NNUU EN GINEBRA.
-SR. CHINMAYA GHAREKHAN, CONSEJERO POLITICO ESPECIAL DEL S.G.
-SRA. THERESE GASTAUT, PORTAVOZ DEL S.G.
-SRA. FAYZA ABOULNAGA, ASESORA ESPECIAL DEL S.G.
-SR, WOLFGANG WEISBROD-WEBER, OFICINA EJECUTIVA DEL S.G.
-SRA. MARIANNE DE LAPEROUSE, SECRETARIA DEL S.G.
-SR. NICHOLAS PANZARINO, JEFE DE OPERACIONES.
-SR. JANICK MANGIN, OFICIAL DE OPERACIONES.
-SR. LARRY GORDON, OFICIAL DE COMUNICACIONES.

EL SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL DE PLANIFICACION Y ORGANIZACION

Carlos María de Lojendio

NOTA IMPORTANTE:
ESTE FAX CONSTA DE 1 PAGINAS, INCLUIDA LA PORTADA

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

SECRETARIA GENERAL TECNICA

FAX

FAX REMITENTE 366.39.53	**SECRETARIA GENERAL TECNICA**
NUMERO SGT0175	**Autor:** CL/CB — **Fecha:** 7-3-94
Unidad: SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL DE PLANIFICACION Y ORGANIZACION	**Asunto:**

DESTINATARIO: CLARO JOSE FERNANDEZ CARNICERO , DIRECTOR DE RELACIONES PARLAMENTARIAS DEL CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS.

TEXTO

POR SI FUERA DE INTERES PARA LA RECIENTE PONENCIA FORMADA EN ESA CAMARA SOBRE LA REFORMA DE NACIONES UNIDAS, ADJUNTO SE REMITE LA DOCUMENTACION ENVIADA POR LA MISION PERMANENTE DE ESPAÑA ANTE DICHO ORGANISMO SOBRE LA CREACION DE UN GRUPO INTERNACIONAL PARA EL ESTUDIO DEL FUTURO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CREADO A INICIATIVA DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL, SR. BOUTROS GHALI CON LA COLABORACION DE LA FUNDACION FORD Y DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE YALES.

CARLOS MARIA DE LOJENDIO

NOTA IMPORTANTE:

ESTE FAX CONSTA DE PAGINAS, INCLUIDA LA PORTADA

07/03/94 17:43 S G T 001

THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY

A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the U.N.

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The Ford Foundation
212/573-4800

Gary Fryer/Laurie Trotta
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203/432-1345

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

EMINENT INTERNATIONAL GROUP WILL EXAMINE THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, N.Y., March 3, 1994--Responding to a request by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the Ford Foundation and Yale University announced today the formation of an independent working group to examine the future of the United Nations in the context of the major changes that have taken place since its founding in 1945 and to update the original vision of the international organization.

The 12-member Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations will produce a report on the mission and functioning of the UN in its second half-century. The report is expected to be ready by the summer of 1995 in order to serve as a basis for discussion during the 50th anniversary debate in the UN General Assembly.

Co-chaired by Moeen Qureshi, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Richard von Weizsäcker, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Working Group includes Alicia Bárcena Ibarra of Mexico; Muchkund Dubey of India; Stephane Hessel of France; Koji Kakizawa of Japan; Wangari Maathai of Kenya; Xue Mouhong of China; Anthony Parsons of the United Kingdom; Felix Rohatyn of the United States; Roald Sagdeev of Russia; and Hanna Suchocka of Poland (see attached bios).

(MORE)

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The Working Group will examine the issues of peace, security, and human welfare that will face the world at the turn of the century and consider how the UN can be enabled to meet these challenges. During its deliberations the group will consult with experts from organizations and research institutions worldwide.

The meetings of the group will take place in Pocantico Hills, N.Y. at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, which will assist with related costs. The Fund's support reflects the Rockefeller family's longstanding interest in the United Nations.

The Working Group will have its first meeting in May 1994 and plans to issue a final report by mid-1995. The report will be given to all member governments of the UN and will be disseminated widely throughout the world.

A staff for the Working Group has been established in the United Nations Studies program at Yale. The co-directors of the project are Paul Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Programs, and Bruce Russett, Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Director of UN Studies at Yale.

"The need to improve and strengthen the present United Nations system is widely recognized," said Franklin Thomas, president of the Ford Foundation. "The enormous changes that have occurred in the world demand a reassessment, and possibly major reform of the present structure."

(MORE)

"Nothing could be more important at this turning point in world affairs than to create a new and compelling vision for concerted global action," said Richard C. Levin, President of Yale University. "Yale is proud to be at the center of this effort, not only to help the UN fulfill its original promise, but to make the coming century a time of unprecedented human progress."

The Yale staff and the Independent Working Group are funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Biographies are attached.

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THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY

A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the U.N.

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The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations

Members

Alicia Bárcena Ibarra is Executive Director of the Earth Council, an independent global agency based in Costa Rica that reports on governments' implementation of the accords reached at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. A Mexican citizen, she was Mexico's Undersecretary of the Secretariat of Ecology and Urban Environment, and Director General of the National Institute of Fisheries. Mrs. Bárcena worked with Maurice Strong at the UN Conference on Environment and Development Secretariat in Geneva during the two-year negotiating process that led to the Earth Summit.

Muchkund Dubey is a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. A former Foreign Secretary of India, he has served as High Commissioner in Bangladesh and Permanent Representative of India to UN Organizations in Geneva. Mr. Dubey chaired and prepared a background paper for the seventeen-member expert group, commissioned jointly by the South Center in Geneva and the Group of 77, which released a report on the UN system in September 1992.

Stephane Hessel, an expert on foreign aid and technical cooperation, is an ambassador of France who has held senior positions in successive French governments. In 1993, he headed his country's delegation to the Human Rights Commission and to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. He was permanent representative of France to the UN in Geneva from 1977 to 1981. In the early 1970s, he served as Assistant Administrator of the UN Development Program. From 1946 to 1950, he served in UN positions. Mr. Hessel has written extensively on various issues of foreign aid.

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Koji Kakizawa is a member of the Japanese Parliament and former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. An advocate for increased inter-regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, Mr. Kakizawa was appointed Secretary-General of both the Japan-Cambodia Parliamentary Association and the Japan-Vietnam Parliamentary Association in December 1993. In 1994, he will also serve as Secretary-General of Japan's Parliamentary League for Ending Hunger in Developing Countries. As president of Parliamentarians for Global Action, he has worked to increase Japan's participation in global environmental programs and UN peacekeeping.

Wangari Maathai is a Kenyan biologist and environmentalist. She was formerly Chairperson of the Department of Anatomy at the University of Nairobi, and Director of the Kenya Red Cross Society and of the National Council of Women of Kenya. In 1977, she founded the Green Belt Movement, a grassroots organization that seeks to fight deforestation, desertification, and erosion in Kenya, in coordination with global environmentalist networks. Dr. Maathai has received numerous distinctions for her work in environmental issues.

Xue Mouhong is a professor at Peking University and the College of Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the China Association of Asian and African Studies. He was sent to Nairobi from 1987 to 1989 as ambassador to Kenya and permanent representative to UNEP and HABITAT. He was also the editor-in-chief of the Journal of International Studies (Beijing) and the director of the editing board for the book, Diplomacy of Contemporary China.

Anthony Parsons is a British diplomat who has written widely on the United Nations and the UN system. He has worked at the Foreign Office in several positions, including serving twice as Under Secretary responsible for UN affairs. He was Counsellor in the United Kingdom Mission to the UN from 1969 to 1971 and Permanent Representative to the UN from 1979 to 1982. He was also Foreign Affairs Adviser to the British Prime Minister in the early 1980s.

Moeen Qureshi (co-chair) is Chairman of Emerging Markets Corporation, an international investment management firm based in Washington, D.C. He was interim Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1993, instituting comprehensive social and economic reforms while leading Pakistan through a democratic electoral process. In addition to serving in senior positions in the government of Pakistan and the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Qureshi was Chief Operating Officer of the International Finance Corporation, and Senior Vice President and Head of Operations of the World Bank until 1991.

Felix G. Rohatyn is a senior partner with the New York City investment banking firm Lazard Frères & Co. From 1975 to 1993, Mr. Rohatyn was Chairman of the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York (a state agency), where he directed the negotiations that restructured the city's obligations during the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Vice Chairman of Carnegie Hall and of a number of other nonprofit organizations.

Roald Sagdeev, a Russian physicist, is the founding director of the East-West Space Science Center at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a professor in the Department of Physics. He is the former director of Russia's Institute of Space Research and head of its Scientific Methodical Center for Analytical Research. He has been a member of the Council of Directors for the International Fund for the Survival and Development of Mankind. The recipient of numerous awards and honors, Dr. Sagdeev is a specialist on global warming, plasma physics, controllable thermonuclear synthesis, and cosmic ray physics.

Hanna Suchocka, a former Prime Minister of Poland, is a lawyer and politician. She is currently a member of the Polish Parliament and serves on the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission. She was elected to the Parliament in 1980 as a member of the Democratic Union Party, and joined Solidarity soon after its founding in August, 1980. Ms. Suchocka was Prime Minister from July 1992 until October 1993 during a critical time in Poland's economic and political transition.

Richard von Weizsäcker (co-chair) is President of the Federal Republic of Germany. He was elected Vice President of the Bundestag in 1979 after serving as Deputy Chairman of the CDU Parliamentary Party. He was Governing Mayor of Berlin from 1981 to 1984, when he became President. His presidential term ends in June 1994.

Project Co-Directors at Yale University

Paul Kennedy is J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Programs at Yale University. A contributor to journals and newspapers worldwide, he teaches international affairs and security studies. In 1992 Professor Kennedy delivered the first annual Nobel Peace Foundation lecture in Oslo. His recent books include The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1985) and Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (1993).

Bruce Russett is Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Chair of the Political Science Department at Yale University, and Director of UN Studies at Yale. Since 1972 he has served as Editor of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and is past President of the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society International. The most recent of his 20 books, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (1993), explains why democracies rarely fight one another.

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

NATIONS UNIES
OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX POUR LES REFUGIES DE PALESTINE DANS LE PROCHE-ORIENT

وكالة الأمم المتحدة
لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى

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FI 307/2

17 February 1994

I have pleasure in informing you that UNRWA's Commissioner-General Mr Ilter Türkmen will pay an official visit to Madrid on 24 & 25 February. In addition to his meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other government officials the Commissioner-General would be very happy to meet interested members of Parliament. Knowing your long standing involvement in Middle Eastern Affairs process and your support of UNRWA in particular, I would be delighted if you and perhaps other ~~exchange~~ fellows Parliamentarians could meet Mr Türkmen for an

As the visit is co-ordinated by the Spanish Mission in Vienna and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it would be advisable to be in touch with the Ministry for possible dates.

Looking forward to hearing from you and hopefully seeing you in Madrid.

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,

H. P. Kotthaus

Hans Peter Kotthaus
Chief, External Relations Office

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Madrid, 17 de febrero de 1994

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

SECRETARIA DE ESTADO
PARA LA COOPERACION INTERNACIONAL
Y PARA IBEROAMERICA

GABINETE

VISITA DE TRABAJO A ESPAÑA DEL COMISARIO GENERAL DE LA UNRWA, SR. TURKMEN

23 de febrero

Llegada a Madrid (vuelo a confirmar) y traslado al Hotel Palace donde tienen reservadas dos habitaciones individuales.

24 de febrero

Por la mañana entrevista (a confirmar) con miembros de la Comisión de Exteriores del Congreso.

17,00 h. Entrevista con el Sr. Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores.

25 de febrero

13,00 h. Entrevista con el Director General de Africa y Medio Oriente acompañado del Embajador Yturriaga.

13,30 h. Entrevista con el Secretario de Estado para la CIPI.

14,00 h. Almuerzo en Viana seguido de entrevista con los Directores Generales de OCI y del ICMA que asisten al almuerzo.

UNRWA

UNRWA, siglas de United Nations Relief and Works Agency, parece llamada a jugar un papel importante en el desarrollo de los proyectos financiados con la ayuda internacional durante la etapa de transición hasta la previsible creación de un Estado Palestino, sea cual sea la forma que éste finalmente adopte.

En reuniones de caracter económico los representantes palestinos, los del Estado de Israel y del Banco Mundial han coincidido en que, con una experiencia de más de cuarenta años, la Agencia es capaz de suministrar satisfactoriamente servicios de caracter social y parecen dispuestos a reforzarla asignándole una serie de programas que se consideran urgentes.

I. El Origen de la UNRWA y la Asistencia a los Refugiados Palestinos.

UNRWA fue creada por la Resolución N°. 302 (IV) de la Asamblea General de la ONU. de 8 de diciembre de 1949 e inició sus actividades el 1 de mayo de 1950. En cooperación con gobiernos huéspedes, UNRWA en un principio facilitó asistencia humanitaria y ayuda de emergencia a unas 750.000 personas, principalmente árabes palestinos, que habían perdido sus viviendas y su medio de vida como consecuencia del conflicto árabe-israelí de 1948 y se habían refugiado en países árabes vecinos. El mandato de UNRWA ha sido renovado periodicamente, más recientemente por la Resolución 47/73A de la Asamblea General, de fecha 14 de diciembre de 1992 hasta junio de 1996.

UNRWA define como refugiado palestino una persona cuya residencia habitual se encontró en Palestina durante un mínimo de dos años antes del conflicto de 1948 y quien, como consecuencia de las hostilidades entre árabes e israelíes, perdió tanto su hogar como su medio de vida, y se refugió en 1948 en una de las áreas que hoy comprenden Jordania, Líbano, la República Arabe Siria y la Ribera Occidental del Jordán y Franja de Gaza. Esta definición ha sido adaptada con el paso del tiempo abarcando a los descendientes. A finales de marzo de 1993, UNRWA facilitó ayuda, educación y asistencia así como servicios sociales a más de 2,7 millones de refugiados palestinos. De esta

cantidad, más del 34 % (unas 940.000 personas) residieron en 59 campamentos atendidos por la Agencia.

1) Ayuda humanitaria

La asistencia humanitaria de la Agencia para los refugiados palestinos se ha concentrado a lo largo de su historia en tres programas prioritarios: educación, sanidad, ayuda y servicios sociales. En 1992, estos programas acapararon un 80 % del monto total que la Agencia destinó a gastos regulares y de emergencia.

a) Programas ordinarios

- ***Educación***

El programa ordinario más importante de UNRWA es la Educación. UNRWA administra 641 escuelas elementales y de primer ciclo de enseñanaza secundaria, a las que acuden unos 392.000 alumnos, y ocho centros de formación profesional y de capacitación de maestros con cabida para más de 5.100 estudiantes; proporciona más de 746 becas universitarias al año a refugiados.

- ***Salud***

La UNRWA ofrece un servicio básico de Salud a partir de 119 centros que reciben casi seis millones de visitas de pacientes al año. Los esfuerzos del organismo se centran en la medicina preventiva y la atención materno-infantil. Procura mejorar el abastecimiento de agua potable y el alcantarillado en los campamentos de refugiados.

- ***Servicios sociales y de beneficencia***

En virtud de su programa de Servicios Sociales y Beneficencia, el organismo proporciona alimentos, ropa y cierta asistencia monetaria a unos 167.000 refugiados particularmente menesterosos, inscritos como casos especialmente necesitados. Al mismo tiempo, fomenta entre los refugiados la autosuficiencia por medio de pequeños proyectos generadores de ingresos. Los servicios de bienestar del organismo abarcan centros de actividades juveniles y para las mujeres en los

campamentos de refugiados y centros de rehabilitación para los incapacitados. Las viviendas dañadas de los refugiados y los edficios de UNRWA - escuelas, dispensarios, centros de abastecimiento - requieren constantes obras de rehabilitación y mantenimiento.

b) Programas de Emergencia

En el Líbano y en los teritorios ocupados de la Ribera Occidental y la Franja de Gaza, entre las medidas de emergencia de UNRWA figuran:

- la distribución de raciones alimentarias a las familias refugiadas necesitadas;
- la distribución de asistencia en metálico a familias refugiadas, necesitadas o desplazadas, o a a aquéllas cuyas viviendas han sido destruídas;
- el suministro de servicios médicos de urgencia más amplios;
- la introducción de programas especiales de compensación de los cierres de las escuelas mediante el estudio en el hogar;
- la introducción de un programa general de asistencia con personal internacional adicional, cuya tarea consiste en facilitar las operaciones del organismo y proporcionar cierta protección general y jurídica a los refugiados.

En el Cuadro nº. 1 se recoge un resumen de las actividades descritas.

2) Organización

Para llevar a cabo su mandato humanitario, UNRWA emplea actualmente personal internacional (unas 180 personas de más de 30 países) y personal local (aproximadamente 19.000 personas, principalmente refugiados palestinos.) El Comisionado General, quien informa directamente a la Asamblea General de las N.U. está al frente de todas las operaciones de UNRWA. Es asistido por una Comisión Asesora, compuesta por 10 países miembros, que se reúne anualmente para estudiar el borrador de la Memoria Anual que éste eleva a la Asamblea General, y en otras ocasiones, según lo requieran las circunstancias. Los cinco campos de operaciones de UNRWA en Jordania, Líbano, la República Arabe Siria y el territorio ocupado de la Ribera Occidental y

Franja de Gaza son supervisados y organizados por la sede principal de UNRWA en Viena, Austria, con una delegación en Amán, Jordania. De las casi 19.000 personas que constituyen el personal local, 12.000 son maestros de los cuales un 99 % son refugiados palestinos. Sólo 1818 empleados son funcionarios internacionales contratados en más de 30 países. Varios funcionarios de categoría superior, encargados de la enseñanaza y la sanidad, son funcionarios de la UNESCO y la OMS adscritos a UNRWA.

El nuevo Comisionado General, Sr. Ilter Türkmen, de Turquía, ocupó su cargo el 4 de marzo de 1991. (Cuadro nº. 2)

II. Las contribuciones voluntarias a la Organización

La financiación de la UNRWA es independiente del resto de las agencias de las N.U.

La UNRWA depende totalmente de las contribuciones voluntarias de los gobiernos y de las organizaciones internacionales para financiar su presupuesto ordinario (257 millones de dólares en 1992) y sus programas de emergencia (10 millones de dólares en el mismo año).

La organización entiende que necesita incrementar su presupuesto en un 5 % anual al menos, para ganarle la batalla al crecimiento demográfico y a la inflación. Se necesitan asimismo fondos adicionales para construir nuevas escuelas, mejorar las instalaciones y los servicios de sanidad y ampliar los proyectos en pro de la autonomía de los refugiados.

La situación financiera de la agencia se deterioró durante el año 92, en particular debido al agravamiento de la situación en el Líbano y en los territorios ocupados, y el déficit estimado a principios del ejercicio era de 28,5 millones de dólares: 17 millones para el presupuesto ordinario y 11,5 millones para el presupuesto extraordinario en el Líbano y en los territorios ocupados. De aquí que se tomaron medidas de austeridad que tuvieron un efecto inmediato en la calidad de los servicios aumentándose por ejemplo el número de estudiantes por clase ó fijando un techo al número de familias que podían inscribirse para recibir determinadas ayudas.

Las contribuciones de la CE y de España:

El principal contribuyente de UNRWA en el año 92 fueron los EE.UU. con 69 millones de dólares; detrás, con una cifra casi equivalente, se sitúa la CE con 67 millones de dólares (véase Cuadro Aportaciones en Efectivo y en Especie de los Gobiernos y de la CE en 1992).

Contribuyen también, a título individual, casi todos los países de la CE: si se ordenan por orden de mayor a menor las contribuciones de los países comunitarios, prescindiendo del resto, aparecen en cabeza el Reino Unido (10.431.379 dólares), Dinamarca (10.098.598 de dólares) y Alemania (8.535.165 de dólares). España ocupa el 6° lugar con 2.606.614 dólares, seguida de Francia y de Italia (Cuadro n°. 3).

La contribución total de España a la UNRWA se cifra en unos 10 millones de dólares de los cuales, 2.606.614 dólares es ayuda bilateral como se ha dicho, y 7.657.142 dólares es ayuda multilateral, a través de la CE (se asigna a España el coeficiente de 8,75 %).

Del conjunto de los Programas de Desarrollo de las N.U. destacan un grupo de seis países (Canadá, Dinamarca, Finlandia, Holanda; Noruega y Suecia) como principales países donantes infrautilizados, que son aquellos para los cuales se produce un desfase importante entre retornos en términos de contratos en relación con sus respectivas contribuciones voluntarias.

Esto es así también para UNRWA.

En el caso de España la contribución total (bilateral y multilateral) es de 10 millones de dólares. El volumen total de compras de bienes y servicios de UNRWA para el año 92 se cifra, como se describe más adelante, en 63 millones de dólares de los cuales 486.134 han sido contratados con empresas españolas.

III. Sistema de Contratación; vinculación con la ONU

A lo largo de los más de 40 años de funcionamiento de UNRWA, los programas que se podrían calificar, estrictamente, de ayuda humanitaria han perdido peso relativo en favor de la prestación de servicios regulares de educación y asistencia sanitaria básica. Por otra parte, la pauta en el desarrollo de los diversos programas (tanto ordinarios como de emergencia) ha sido contratar el mayor volumen posible de recursos in situ al objeto de incrementar los niveles de renta de los refugiados palestinos.

Del presupuesto total de UNRWA para el año 92 (267 millones de dólares) el volumen total de compras asciende a 63 millones de dólares incluídas las contribuciones en especie.

Las adquisiciones de bienes y servicios (Procurement) incluyen en el caso de los bienes, bienes de equipo y suministros, y en el de los servicios la contratación de empresas de consultoría con las que se subcontrata, quedando excluída la contratación de expertos individuales.

De esta cifra global 486.134 $ han sido contratados con empresas españolas

Al igual que sucede con la financiación, la gestión del gasto de la UNRWA es independiente del resto de las agencias de la ONU y la forma en la que se reparten las adquisiciones de bienes y servicios entre los países donantes no está ligada al volumen de las contribuciones de cada uno de estos países con el objetivo de conseguir una gestión más eficaz.

Con todo, una parte de las compras se efectúan en los países en los que desarrolla sus actividades la UNRWA, es decir, Egipto, Israel, Jordania, Líbano y Siria.

1) El Departamento de Contratación de UNRWA en Viena:

El volumen total de bienes y servicios adquiridos en el año 92 asciende a 63.554.091 millones de dólares, algo inferior al del año 91 (85.719.100 millones de $).

La división de compras de UNRWA se halla en Viena (dirección y persona de contacto en lista adjunta) y está subdividida en cuatro departamentos:

- Productos Básicos: para la adquisición de artículos de primera necesidad como alimentos, mantas, ropa, etc. y son los que alcalzan el mayor volumen, 37.836.472 $ para el 92. Abarca todas las compras de este tipo de productos y en los últimos años han perdido peso relativo los alimentos. En España se adquirieron productos por un importe de 400.000 $, (en su mayor parte mantas).

  Las compras las realiza la organización directamente en los diferentes países, a excepción de las donaciones en especie como sucede a veces con las contribuciones de la CE, aunque esta modalidad está abierta a todos los países y empresas.

  En el caso de las donaciones en especie de la CE, es ésta quien se encarga directamente del suministro a través del Departamento de

Ayuda Alimentaria (dirección y personas de contacto en la lista adjunta).

- Material de transporte: incluídos repuestos, la cifra de compras es de 3.163.147 $ para el año 92.

- Material sanitario: equipo médico, vacunas y en su mayor parte medicamentos; facturó 4.756.471 $, una pequeña parte de procedencia española (39.949$).

- Varios: recoge una gran diversidad de productos como equipamiento escolar, material de enseñanza, equipos audio-visuales, herramientas manuales, etc., de los cuales se adquirió 6.985.157 $ en 1992.

Finalmente, en Egipto, Israel, Jordania, Líbano y Siria las adquisiciones de bienes y servicios ascendieron a 10.812.845 $.

2) Proceso de contratación de bienes y servicios:

La División de Compras de UNRWA, localizada en Viena, sede central de la organización, hace públicas las condiciones de los concursos; normalmente el plazo para presentar ofertas es de dos meses. Las empresas españolas pueden recibir esta información a través del Boletín de Información Selectiva de Exportación (BISE) del Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior (ICEX), (dirección y persona de contacto en la lista adjunta.)

Condición necesaria para poder presentar una oferta es estar inscrito en el registro de proveedores aprobados.

La solicitud de inscripción se hace rellenando un impreso de una hoja y se acepta la inscripción en el Registro si la empresa ofrece a la organización garantías de que podría entregar los productos en condiciones aceptables (calidad, precio, plazo de entrega, ...).

Una via alternativa a la División de Compras de UNRWA en Viena para acceder a los consursos es la Oficina de Servicios de Compras entre Organismos (IAPSO) que tiene su sede en Copenhague.

Compras de UNRWA en Viena como la Oficina de Servicios de Compras entre Organismos (IAPSO) en Copenhague sean fuente de referencia.

Para una información más detallada se recomienda a las empresas interesadas consultar "La Guía General de Relaciones Comerciales" para proveedores potenciales de Bienes y Servicios del Sistema de la ONU que edita el IAPSO (ver dirección en la lista adjunta).

IV. El Programa Respuesta de UNRWA a la Declaración de Principios firmada por la OLP y el Estado de Israel en septiembre de 1993:

Con el objetivo de contribuir al proceso de paz mejorando las condiciones de vida en la Franja de Gaza y en el margen occidental del río Jordan, la UNRWA ha elaborado un Programa de apoyo al proceso de paz (Peace Implementation Programme).

El coste total estimado del Programa es de 100 millones de dólares, de ellos 40 millones para el margen occidental y 60 millones para la Franja de Gaza donde la situación como es sabido es muy grave.

Los proyectos que incluye se clasifican en proyectos a corto plazo, con un tiempo de realización estimado de un año, y proyectos a largo plazo, que requerirían dos años a contar a partir de la fecha en que sean dotados.

El programa incluye no sólo proyectos relacionados con las actividades "tradicionales" de la Agencia como son la educación, asistencia sanitaria de base, servicios sociales y de beneficiencia, sino que recoge también mejora y ampliación de redes de alcantarillados y agua, sistemas de eliminación de residuos sólidos, formación y asesoramiento a pequeñas empresas etc.

Al ser un programa especial, la financiación ha de proceder de las contribuciones voluntarias adicionales a las contribuciones anuales de los países donantes de la UNRWA; en el momento de escribir este artículo (finales de enero) no todos los proyectos han sido dotados pero este problema podría quedar resuelto en las próximas reuniones de países donantes occidentales coordinadas por el Banco Muncial.

En el ANEJO I se refleja la lista de proyectos facilitada por la Agencia para la Franja de Gaza y la Ribera Occidental.

V. A modo de conclusión

El cometido de la UNRWA cuando arranca en 1950 era la asistencia humanitaria al pueblo palestino desplazado a raíz de la guerra árabe-israelí de 1948.

Desde entonces, como las partes implicadas no han coincidido en el tiempo en aceptar el reparto de la tierra objeto del conflicto, hoy la UNRWA presta asistencia en algunos casos a refugiados de cuarta generación.

Esto no significa cuestionar la necesidad de la ayuda prestada hasta ahora al pueblo palestino que ha sufrido además numerosos trasiegos, incluso durante la invasión de Kuwait por Irak en el año 90 y ha vivido al borde de la desesperación, sino que cuestiona el caracter de la ayuda de inmediato.

Este debate está ya sobre la mesa. En artículos aparecidos recientemente en la prensa y desde puntos de partida distintos, expertos en la economía de Oriente Medio exponen la necesidad de sentar unas nuevas bases. Me refiero por ej. al artículo de A. Mansour "Cisjordanie et Gaza, une économie mutilée", Le Monde Diplomatique (octubre del 93) o al de D. Doron "Cuando la ayuda no es ayuda" de The Wall Street Journal publicado también en Cinco Días (septiembre del 93).

Es sabida la fuerte dependencia de la economía de la Franja de Gaza y de la Ribera Occidental de la economía israelí utilizada a veces como medida de represión - limitándose los pases a los palestinos que van a trabajar a Israel - en los momentos en los que se han multiplicado los atentados terroristas.

El proceso hacia la paz no podría consolidarse si no cambia la situación social y económica en la región, eso es una idea ya bastante extendida pero requiere no sólo que se alcancen acuerdos para aportar fondos sino también que se involucren los países donantes en la fijación de los objetivos y en la gestión de los fondos.

Viena, febrero 94


Cuadro nº. 1

La UNRWA en Cifras

	Jordania	Franja de Gaza	Ribera Occidental	Líbano	República Arabe Siria	TOTAL
Porcentaje del total de refugiados	38 %	20 %	17 %	13 %	12 %	100 %
Campamentos	10	8	20	13	10	61
Porcentaje de refugiados en campamentos	24 %	55 %	27 %	51 %	29 %	35 % medio
Beneficiarios de asistencia especial para casos especialmente necesitados	28.898	54.447	29.110	35.054	19.879	167.388
Centros de sanidad y abastecimiento	21	17	34	26	21	119
Colegios UNRWA	201	153	100	76	111	641
Alumnos en colegios UNRWA	152.350	104.709	42.310	33.172	60.216	392.737
Estudiantes universitarios con beca de UNRWA	187	203	158	42	156	746
Personal de UNRWA	6.107	4.923	3.157	2.469	2.708	19.786

Cuadro n°. 2

Organigrama de UNRWA



Cuadro n°. 3

Aportaciones en efectivo y en especie de los gobiernos y de la CEE en 1992

(en dólares USA)

Aportante	Presupuesto y Proyectos Ordinarios (a)	Emergencias (b)	Total
Alemania	8.535.165	-	8.535.165
Arabia Saudí	2.400.000	-	2.400.000
Argentina	19.462	-	19.462
Australia	1.936.048	228.540	2.164.588
Austria	2.479.156	272.450	2.751.606
Bahrain	15.000	-	15.000
Bélgica	896.108	2.850.000	3.746.108
Canadá	9.229	415.958	9.645.127
Colombia	2.072	-	2.072
República de Corea	10.000	-	10.000
China	60.533	594.126	654.659
Chipre	7.163	-	7.163
Dinamarca	9.933.404	165.194	10.098.598
Egipto	3.021	-	3.021
Emiratos Unidos Arabes	500.000	-	500.000
España	2.606.614	-	2.606.614
Estados Unidos	68.168.000	832.000	69.000.000
Filipinas	2.272	-	2.272
Finlandia	2.203.614	1.412.220	3.615.834
Francia	2.067.547	-	2.067.547
Grecia	80.000	-	80.000
India	9.988		9.988
Indonesia	8.000	-	8.000

Aportante	Presupuesto y Proyectos Ordinarios (a)	Emergencias (b)	Total
Irán. República Islámica	120.000	-	120.000
Irlanda	132.920	-	132.920
Islandia	39.252	-	39.252
Israel	182.337	-	182.337
Italia	2.174.678	-	2.174.678
Japón	16.267.956	-	16.267.956
Líbano	223	-	223
Malasia	10.000	-	10.000
Maldivias	1.000	-	1.000
Malta	1.332	-	1.332
Marruecos	-	326.179	326.179
Méjico	3.000	-	3.000
Monaco	5.185	-	5.185
Myanmar	1.000	-	1.000
Namibia	500	-	500
Noruega	10.484.422	-	10.484.422
Nueva Zelanda	107.910	-	107.910
Omán	25.000	-	25.000
Países Bajos	7.289.476	-	7.289.476
Pakistán	13.847	-	13.847
Panamá	500	-	500
Reino Unido	10.431.379	-	10.431.379
Santa Sede	20.000	-	20.000
Siria	25.286	-	25.286
Suecia	26.314.228	-	26.314.228
Suiza	7.731.011	576.633	8.307.644
Tailandia	14.115	-	14.115
Trinidad y Tobago	2.107	-	2.107
Túnez	13.187	-	13.187
Turquía	134.430	-	134.430
Venezuela	10.000	-	10.000

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

SECRETARIA DE ESTADO
PARA LA COOPERACION INTERNACIONAL
Y PARA IBEROAMERICA

AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA
DE COOPERACION
INTERNACIONAL

Dirección General del Instituto
de Cooperación con el Mundo Arabe

Madrid, 22 de febrero de 1994

NOTA INFORMATIVA

ASUNTO: Visita Comisario General UNRWA a España (25-2-94)

I.- ORIGENES Y FINES DE LA UNRWA

La UNRWA es una Agencia de las Naciones Unidas, creada en 1949 con el propósito de prestar ayuda humanitaria y procurar alojamiento a los refugiados palestinos desplazados a consecuencia de los sucesivos conflictos de Oriente Medio.

Durante sus 34 años de existencia, la UNRWA ha sido el instrumento fundamental de cooperación y ayuda internacional e incluso de subsistencia para una buena parte del pueblo palestino, calculándose que en la actualidad más de 2,7 millones de refugiados reciben distintos tipos de asistencia de la Agencia.

La ayuda prestada, si bien está dirigida fundamentalmente a la instalación y mantenimiento de los refugiados en campos, de los que hay 59 en funcionamiento, no se limita a este aspecto sino que abarca otras areas como la educación, sanidad, servicios sociales, etc.

La UNRWA depende totalmente de las contribuciones voluntarias de los gobiernos y de las organizaciones internacionales para financiar su presupuesto ordinario y sus programas de emergencia. El principal contribuyente de la UNRWA son los Estados Unidos, seguidos de la Unión Europea, casi todos los países de la Unión Europea individualmente y otros países donantes como Canadá y los países escandinavos.

II.- CONTRIBUCION ESPAÑOLA

España inició sus aportaciones financieras a la Agencia en 1979 con una donación anual de 1 millón de dólares, cantidad que se mantuvo durante casi 10 años para, a partir de 1988, iniciar un

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incremento hasta alcanzar, en 1994, la cifra de casi 1.000 millones de Ptas., sumadas la contribución bilateral y la contribución española a través de la Unión Europea. Nuestra contribución nos situaba en 1992 en sexto lugar entre los países de la Unión Europea, colocándonos por encima de Francia e Italia.

Las cifras de la contribución bilateral española a la UNRWA desde 1988, año de creación de la AECI, son las siguientes:

1988	180 millones ptas.	
1989	200 " "	
1990	225 " "	
1991	265 " "	(20 millones como ayuda de emergencia destinados a un hospital en Gaza)
1992	270 " "	
1993	274 " "	(7 millones ayuda emergencia a centro de minusvalidos "Husn" en Jordania)
1994	310 " "	

Las cifras de la contribución española a la UNRWA a través de la Unión Europea, desde 1988 hasta el presente, son las siguientes:

(España participa en un 8,75% de la aportación comunitaria a la UNRWA)

Año	Total contribución UE	Aportación española
1988	38,49 MECUS	3,37 MECUS
1989	39,49 "	3,46 "
1990	41,23 "	3,61 "
1991	58 "	5,08 "
1992	46,55 "	4,07 "
1993	21,95 "	1,92 "
1994	50 "	4,35 "

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III.- POSIBLES TEMAS A TRATAR CON EL COMISARIO GENERAL DE LA UNRWA

- La UNRWA en el nuevo contexto del Proceso de Paz

España considera que en el nuevo contexto creado por el Proceso de Paz, la UNRWA tiene una importantísima labor que desempeñar continuando su contribución a la mejora de vida de la población palestina y utilizando su experiencia acumulada para asistir a las nuevas autoridades palestinas, en cuestiones de su competencia, durante la etapa inicial de la creación del futuro Estado palestino. Desde este convencimiento, España, que ha venido apoyando el Proceso de Paz desde la conferencia de Madrid, continuará su apoyo y su contribución generosa al presupuesto de la Agencia.

- Contribución española al presupuesto de la UNRWA

Como se ha señalado más arriba, España es uno de los principales contribuyentes al presupuesto de la Agencia y se puede anunciar al Sr. Turkmen el propósito de las Autoridades españolas de continuar enviando una sustanciosa contribución al presupuesto de la misma durante los próximos años.

Caso de que el Sr. Turkmen propusiera una nueva contribución nuestro país para el presente año, convendría responderle que la actual crisis presupuestaria hará imposible aumentar nuestra ya notable contribución para 1994.

El aumento del papel de nuestro país en la financiación de la Organización durante los últimos años hace necesario un replanteamiento de su participación en las estructuras y suministros de la Organización que, hasta el momento, está situada en un nivel muy inferior al que, por nuestra presencia y contribución, debería correspondernos. En particular, convendría plantear al Comisario Turkmen las tres cuestiones que a continuación se enuncian.

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- La no pertenencia de España a la Comisión Asesora

Pese a ser uno de los principales donantes, España no forma parte de los diez estados miembros de la Comisión Asesora de UNRWA que actualmente son: Bélgica, Egipto, Estados Unidos, Francia, Gran Bretaña, Japón, Jordania, Líbano, Siria y Turquía.

- Ausencia de funcionarios españoles

No hay un solo funcionario español en UNRWA. Recientemente se presentó la candidatura de Julio Fernández Torrejón al puesto de Director Adjunto de Relaciones Exteriores y, pese a quedar finalista, el puesto fue dado a la esposa del Representante Permanente de Gran Bretaña ante la CSCE, con un "Curriculum Vitae" inferior al de nuestro compatriota y que ni siquiera aparecía en la lista de los cuatro finalistas que facilitó el organismo.

- La escasa participación de las empresas españolas en los suministros

De 63 millones de dólares contratados por UNRWA en 1992, sólo 486.134 dólares correspondieron a empresas españolas.

Pedro Martínez-Avial
Subdirector General.

OOPS

Organismo de Obras Públicas y Socorro de las Naciones Unidas
para los Refugiados de Palestina en el Cercano Oriente

Enero de 1994

EL SR. ILTER TÜRKMEN, COMISIONADO GENERAL DEL OOPS

El Comisionado General del Organismo de Obras Públicas y Socorro de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados de Palestina en el Cercano Oriente (OOPS), Sr. Ilter Türkmen, nació en Estambul el 8 de noviembre de 1927. Tras obtener la licenciatura por la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas de Ankara, ingresó en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores turco en 1949.

En el curso de su carrera profesional, el Sr. Türkmen ha sido Secretario General, Subsecretario General de Asuntos Políticos y Director General de Planificación Política del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de su país. Fue asimismo embajador ante Grecia (1968-1972), la Unión Soviética (1972-1975) y Francia (1988-1991).

El Sr. Türkmen desempeño el cargo de Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Turquía en 1980-1983.

Fue en dos ocasiones Representante Permanente de Turquía ante las Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York (1975-1978 y 1985-1988), y Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra (1983-1985). En la Sede de las Naciones Unidas, Nueva York, presidió el Grupo de Trabajo sobre la Financiación del OOPS. En 1979-1980, fue Representante Especial del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas para asuntos humanitarios en Asia Sudoriental.

El Sr. Türkmen fue nombrado Comisionado General del OOPS por el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas en enero de 1991, cargo que asumió el 1 de marzo de 1991.

El OOPS, cuya sede está en Viena y que tiene una filial en Ammán, presta servicios educativos, sanitarios, de socorro y sociales a casi 2.900.000 refugiados palestinos inscritos que viven en Jordania, el Líbano, la República Arabe Siria, la Ribera Occidental y la Faja de Gaza. Con algo más de 20.000 empleados - en su mayoría, profesores y profesionales de la atención de salud -, el OOPS es el organismo de las Naciones Unidas que tiene más personal. El presupuesto ordinario bienal del Organismo asciende a 632 millones de dólares en 1994-1995.

■ ■ ■

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MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

MISION PERMANENTE DE ESPAÑA

1 -> Poncia Congreso Diputados

CS

FAX

FAX REMITENTE 949-7247		
NUMERO 548	Autor: JRMS/msm	Fecha: 9-3-94
Unidad: PRIMERA COMISION CONSEJO SEGURIDAD	Asunto: GRUPO TRABAJO AGNU REFORMA C.S.	
DESTINATARIO: SGPE - OCI.		

TEXTO

NOTA IMPORTANTE: ESTE FAX CONSTA DE 32 PAGINAS, INCLUIDA LA PORTADA

I T A L Y

STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY

AMBASSADOR FRANCESCO PAOLO FULCI

TO

THE OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

AT

THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK, MARCH 8, 1994

Check against delivery

Mr. President,

Italy intends to make a constructive and imaginative contribution to the reform of the Security Council. This is the goal put forward last September by my Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beniamino Andreatta, in his speech to the General Assembly. It is a goal that I have been instructed to pursue vigorously, in coordination with like-minded Members of the United Nations.

It is the second time since our foundation way back in 1945 that the opportunity has arisen for a meaningful reform of the Council's membership, and its working methods and procedures.

The reform, in our belief, should ensure first and foremost that the new Security Council adequately reflect the steady rise in membership of the UN, which has grown from the original 51 members in 1945, to 113 in 1965, to 184 today. A true reform cannot consist in simply increasing the number of permanent members in order to benefit 2, 5, or 12 Countries. This would be no reform at all. It would simply leave things as they stand now, or aggravate them by widening the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots."

Universalism, democracy, and participation--participation of all--must be our guiding principles: to provide for a greater involvement of the many, not of the few, in the Security Council. Attached to the text of my statement you will find a graph that shows how, over the past 48 years, fully 80 Countries have never been members of the Security Council. Furthermore, 43 other Countries have been able to serve in the Council only once. And quite a number of them are founding Members or have been Member States for 30 years or more.

This is an unfair situation, that we must clearly address at its roots. Everybody in this room knows that the problem is essentially caused by the fact that, within each geographic group, several mid- to large-size Countries--and my Country is no exception--tend to compete for a Security Council seat on a more frequent basis. By doing so, they block, often at the last minute, the legitimate aspirations of Countries that are smaller or have fewer resources.

We propose to redress this chronic situation by providing for a category of mid- to large-sized States, so that they no longer pose such a stumbling bock within their regional groups.

In our opinion, a new Security Council should consist of a maximum of 25 Countries--a number which is still manageable and compatible with effectiveness--subdivided as follows:

- The five current permanent Members, whose veto power, however, should be progressively phased out through non-use;

- The ten non-permanent members;

- Ten members from a new category, which could perhaps be called "semipermanent," consisting of 20 or so Countries that alternate Council seats every two years. Let me add that the number 20 is a hypothetical figure: a higher number of such Countries could be identified, but this would obviously result in a less frequent rotation.

The Countries making up this group Countries should--in our view--meet a series of objective criteria and parameters, namely:

1) A more equitable geographic distribution;

2) The ability and political willingness--and I underline the willingness--to make a special, qualified contribution in military personnel, and not only in financial resources, to the maintenance of international peace and security;

3) The ability to contribute financially to the other purposes of the Organization (for example, to the regular budget of the UN);

4) The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for political and economic development as well as in the humanitarian field.

Additional factors could also be considered:

- the geographic size and population of a Country;

- its economic dimensions;

- the degree to which its internal organization enables it to guarantee effective support to the United Nations in terms of civilian and humanitarian personnel;

- the level of its cultural contribution;

- whether its mass media technology enables it to marshall strong public support for the Organization;

- the number of refugees from war-torn areas to which it has given shelter.

This list of criteria is by no means exhaustive. Needless to say, we are open to any proposals, improvements, or criticism, since we are fully aware that the identification of the Countries to be included in this new category is the most crucial aspect of our proposal.

Another important feature we would recommend is that the composition of this group should not be carved in stone. We must be prepared for the changes of history. Therefore, a provision should be made for a periodic revision of the group (every 15 or 20 years, for instance) to adapt to evolving circumstances.

Of course, the basic premise of this proposal is that there be no increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council. Any further addition to them would subtract space from the semipermanent members and consequently impair the rotation mechanism for all other members.

Mr. President,

We are convinced that this proposal presents real advantages for all the Member States of the United Nations:

- For the five permanent members, since their current burden of costs for peace-keeping operations could be shared with the larger group of semipermanent members, rather than with two or five new permanent members;

- For the ten non-permanent Members, since the exclusion of the 20 or so mid- to large-size Countries from the competition inside the various geographic groups would eliminate the stumbling blocks and therefore make possible an orderly and fair rotation;

- For the semipermanent Countries, whose commitment to the United Nations would grow as a consequence of their more steady involvement in the life and activities of the Security Council.

A further, specific advantage for the smaller and less prosperous countries could be the possibility of reducing their burden for peace-keeping operations to a symbolic contribution. This could be done by transferring a considerable part of it to semipermanent members. This possibility should be seen in the broader context of a greater interaction between the Security Council and other UN organs and bodies, such as to allow all Member States to feel included in the Council's activities.

Mr. President,


These are the ideas that we offer to the consideration of our partners. Perhaps we can explore them together. We are more than ready to hear other ideas, proposals, suggestions.

One final point. In the last few days I have presented our proposal to individual colleagues. One concern expressed by some of them was that in the end, a new group would add to the present system yet one more privileged caste. With all due respect, I believe such criticism misses the mark. For one thing, what would be the net result of other proposals, which for instance aim to create a new category of permanent members without veto power, or very small groups rotating as permanent--in name if not in fact--from three geographic areas? Wouldn't they be a new caste?

Let us be realistic, and not be misled by slogans or stereotypes. As in the Olympic Games, not all the participating Countries will wind up on the winners' stand. What counts is that everyone is given a real and fair chance to participate in the games, and not remain shut out of the stadium.

Terms in the Security Council

Non-Permanent Members



March 1994

03/11/94 21:38 007

28 de febrero de 1994

GRUPO DE TRABAJO DE COMPOSICION ABIERTA SOBRE LA CUESTION DE LA REPRESENTACION EQUITATIVA EN EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD Y DEL AUMENTO DEL NUMERO DE SUS MIEMBROS

El presente texto oficioso se ha preparado sobre la base de las opiniones expresadas por los Estados Miembros y los grupos regionales, y por las organizaciones o acuerdos regionales, en las respuestas escritas presentadas en atención a la resolución 47/62 de la Asamblea General (A/48/264 y Add.1 a 8). Se basa también en las opiniones expresadas durante el debate general, así como en el examen posterior de los temas 10, 11 y 33 por la Asamblea General en su cuadragésimo octavo período de sesiones.

La lista de las opiniones consignadas en el presente texto oficioso tiene por objeto proporcionar materiales que sirvan de antecedentes al Grupo de Trabajo. En modo alguno representa un sumario completo de todos los puntos de vista expuestos por las delegaciones respectivas, sino que en él se procuran señalar más bien los puntos importantes y las tendencias más amplias.

Las opiniones consignadas en el presente texto oficioso han sido formuladas por uno o varios Estados Miembros. Además, las opiniones que figuran en la lista no contienen necesariamente expresiones idénticas a las utilizadas por los Estados Miembros ya que las posiciones similares se han agrupado dentro de las distintas categorías. Cabe observar también que el orden en que figuran los distintos puntos no refleja ni supone ningún orden de prioridad.

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A. Representación equitativa

1. Consideraciones generales

1) Cada grupo regional debería tener puestos permanentes y puestos no permanentes.

2) La relación entre los puestos permanentes y los puestos no permanentes debería ser proporcionalmente equilibrada, al igual que la relación entre los grupos regionales; las regiones principales del mundo deberían estar representadas adecuadamente en las distintas categorías de miembros del Consejo.

3) Una estructura (del Consejo) más representativa y equilibrada no sólo fortalecería la autoridad del Consejo para llevar a cabo las difíciles tareas que tiene ante sí sino que también estaría en consonancia con el espíritu democrático prevaleciente en la actualidad.

4) La representación debería ser amplia, equilibrada y equitativa y basarse en el principio de la justicia y la igualdad entre los Estados Miembros en materia de derechos y obligaciones.

5) Los nuevos miembros del Consejo deberían ser elegidos por los grupos regionales, en forma rotativa.

6) A cada grupo regional dentro del Consejo de Seguridad debería corresponderle un miembro más, aparte de cualquier aumento del número de miembros permanentes.

7) Debería invitarse a los grupos regionales a establecer un sistema de rotación con miras a garantizar la representación equitativa de los miembros de cada grupo regional.

8) Deben respetarse los propósitos y principios de la Carta, y en particular la igualdad soberana de todos los Estados Miembros; los miembros del Consejo deberían ser elegidos siempre sobre una base geográfica, con arreglo a criterios no discriminatorios.

9) Es necesario examinar e invertir la tendencia actual hacia un acusado desequilibrio en la distribución geográfica de los puestos del Consejo de Seguridad; un grupo regional en particular está excesivamente representado.

10) La ampliación del Consejo debiera reflejar la naturaleza y alcance del nuevo equilibrio de poder y la preeminencia de las Potencias regionales como factores importantes en la escena internacional.

11) El considerable aumento del número total de miembros de las Naciones Unidas y el fin de la guerra fría y de la rivalidad ideológica entre Oriente y

Occidente han distorsionado, de hecho, la distribución de los puestos del Consejo en beneficio de los países europeos/occidentales.

12) Ninguna región debe estar en condiciones de ejercer, mediante el número de sus representantes en el Consejo, un poder fuera de proporción con su importancia numérica real en relación con el número total de Miembros de las Naciones Unidas.

13) Debería procurarse lograr una representación geográfica adecuada teniendo en cuenta la composición del Consejo en su conjunto.

Opiniones favorables a la modificación de los grupos regionales

14) Deberían revisarse los acuerdos regionales existentes, que se establecieron cuando las circunstancias políticas prevalecientes eran distintas.

15) Debería establecerse un nuevo Grupo de Europa Central, que debería estar representado en el Consejo.

16) Debería haber un solo "puesto europeo", el que debería ser ocupado rotativamente por los tres miembros permanentes "europeos" actuales más uno; los grupos regionales más pequeños deberían estar representados por miembros no permanentes.

17) La consolidación de la Comunidad Europea como entidad política eficaz en las relaciones internacionales podría dar lugar a que en el futuro se planteara la cuestión de su propio nivel de representación en el Consejo.

Opiniones contrarias a la modificación de los grupos regionales

18) Reconózcase a los grupos regionales tradicionales de las Naciones Unidas una responsabilidad mayor en la determinación de la representación que debiera corresponderles en un Consejo de Seguridad ampliado.

Observaciones generales sobre criterios

19) Los criterios de la Carta son válidos, pero deberían interpretarse de manera amplia.

20) Deberían reconsiderarse los criterios de la Carta.

21) Los criterios deberían incluir: una representación regional equitativa; el apoyo y la participación consecuentes en operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz y en actividades políticas y económicas importantes de las Naciones Unidas; el cumplimiento consecuente de las obligaciones financieras para con las Naciones Unidas y sus organismos especializados; y la población, el tamaño de la economía y la potencialidad futura de los distintos países.

22) Todo aumento del número de miembros permanentes o no permanentes debería basarse en los criterios actuales en la materia; las consideraciones expuestas en el Artículo 23 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas brindan la orientación básica: debería prestarse especial atención, en primer término, a

la contribución de los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales y a los demás propósitos de la Organización.

23) La reestructuración del Consejo de Seguridad debería basarse en un enfoque en que se tuviera en cuenta la cooperación económica internacional y la asistencia a los países en desarrollo.

24) La ampliación debería contemplar las aspiraciones e intereses de los Estados de mediano tamaño con una función reconocida en sus respectivas regiones.

2. Nuevos puestos

a) Puestos permanentes*

- Distribución regional

1) Los puestos permanentes deberían asignarse a un grupo de Estados Miembros o a una organización regional determinada.

2) Debería reconocerse oficialmente a las organizaciones regionales como entidades que se han de considerar para los puestos permanentes.

3) Para lo concerniente a la representación permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad podrían utilizarse los recursos de las organizaciones regionales, tales como la Organización de la Unidad Africana; mediante arreglos por determinarse, podría establecerse la forma de rotación de los Estados que ocuparan los puestos permanentes asignados a los grupos de Estados miembros de una organización regional determinada.

4) Debería tenerse en cuenta la importancia que han adquirido ciertos Estados Miembros en la vida internacional, no sólo por su desarrollo económico sino también por estar dispuestos a desempeñar un papel internacional activo; la posible admisión de nuevos miembros permanentes no debería limitar las posibilidades de los Estados Miembros de otras regiones que presten servicios como miembros no permanentes.

5) La seguridad y prosperidad internacionales pueden promoverse de manera eficaz y equitativa reconociendo la importancia política y económica de los países en desarrollo, en particular los de mayor población; ese criterio razonable, junto con el que se basa en la distribución geográfica equitativa, garantizaría que el Consejo tuviera un carácter más representativo.

Propuestas concretas

6) Deberían asignarse a Asia, Africa y América Latina uno o más puestos permanentes para cada uno de esos grupos.

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* Véase también V. "Elecciones y duración del mandato", secc. V.A.1. "Puestos permanentes".

7) Debería triplicarse el número de miembros permanentes de modo que a Africa, Asia y América Latina y el Caribe les correspondieran más de dos puestos de esa categoría.

8) Deberían darse otros dos o tres puestos más a los grupos Estados de Asia, Africa y América Latina y el Caribe, respectivamente, y deberían asignarse puestos permanentes a los países No Alineados.

9) Africa debería tener dos puestos permanentes con facultad de veto.

10) Debería haber un puesto permanente para cada uno de los siguientes grupos: Estados de Africa, Estados de Asia y Estados de América Latina y el Caribe; y ninguno para los Estados de Europa oriental o Europa occidental y otros Estados.

11) Debería haber un puesto permanente para Europa y otro para Asia, sin derecho de veto.

12) Debería haber dos puestos permanentes para los Estados africanos; un puesto permanente para los Estados de Asia y otro para los Estados de América Latina y el Caribe, así como para dos países industriales importantes.

13) Debería haber dos puestos permanentes para Africa, dos para Asia, uno para América Latina, uno para Europa occidental y uno para Europa oriental.

14) Debería haber dos puestos permanentes para las Américas; cuatro para Europa occidental; uno para Europa oriental; dos para Africa; tres para Asia, sin derecho de veto.

15) El total (incluidos los miembros actuales) debería ser un miembro para cada uno de los siguientes grupos de Estados: Estados de América Latina y el Caribe, Estados de Europa occidental y otros Estados y Estados de Europa oriental; dos puestos para los Estados de Asia y dos puestos para los Estados de Africa.

16) La composición ampliada debería incluir por lo menos cuatro países en desarrollo y cuatro países industrializados en calidad de miembros permanentes.

17) Debería designarse miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad a dos naciones industriales importantes en razón de su poderío económico y de sus contribuciones a las diversas actividades de las Naciones Unidas.

18) El Artículo 23 debería enmendarse de la manera siguiente:

a) El Consejo estará integrado por un total de 20 miembros;

b) La cláusula actual en la que se nombran miembros permanentes concretos debería ser sustituida por otra en que limitara el número de miembros permanentes a 8 ó 9 y se especificaran las siguientes categorías de miembros:

i) Países cuya población sea superior a 800 millones de habitantes;

ii) Países cuya población sea superior a 100 millones de habitantes y que aporten por lo menos el 6,5% del presupuesto de las Naciones Unidas.

19) El número actual de miembros del Consejo debería aumentarse de 15 a 25: cinco de ellos serían los miembros permanentes actuales y los 20 restantes corresponderían a: Africa (6), Asia (5), América Latina y el Caribe (4), Europa occidental (3) y Europa oriental (2); la aplicación del párrafo 3 del Artículo 27 debería limitarse a las medidas adoptadas con arreglo al Capítulo VII de la Carta; en virtud de su poderío económico y de su capacidad de asumir mayores obligaciones, dos Estados industriales importantes deberían pasar a ser miembros permanentes ocupando puestos asignados a sus respectivos grupos geográficos; deberían asignarse dos puestos permanentes a Africa, de sus seis puestos; debería asignarse un puesto permanente a América Latina y el Caribe de sus cuatro puestos; debería asignarse a Asia, que ya tendría a China y a otro Estado importante como miembros permanentes, otro puesto permanente de los cinco asignados a ese continente.

- Modalidades de la selección

1) Podría considerarse un umbral financiero para los miembros permanentes.

2) Los criterios deberían incluir: la buena disposición para asumir responsabilidades financieras; la situación geográfica; la reputación de seguir una conducta razonable; la necesidad de que estén representados las formas de civilización más importantes y los sistemas jurídicos más importantes.

3) Los criterios deberían incluir: una larga tradición de cumplimiento de los Propósitos y Principios de la Carta; la voluntad y capacidad de poner a disposición de las Naciones Unidas, en caso de crisis, recursos militares, civiles y materiales; buenos antecedentes en materia de contribuciones al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales; y el apoyo o consenso de todos los miembros en respaldo de la candidatura de un aspirante a un puesto permanente.

4) En ningún caso se concederá un estatuto privilegiado a los países que hayan desafiado los Principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y se hayan rehusado a cumplir las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

5) Toda consideración del aumento del número de miembros permanentes debe tener en cuenta no sólo la importancia relativa adquirida por algunos Estados Miembros en razón de su desarrollo económico sino también la participación o la buena disposición a participar en las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz y el interés manifestado en asumir responsabilidades mundiales en lo relativo a la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

6) Hay algunos países que, en virtud de sus intereses mundiales, su contribución a la seguridad internacional y su contribución a las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas, podrían asumir toda la gama de responsabilidades que corresponden a un miembro permanente y sin duda cabría esperar que lo hicieran.

7) Deben reconocerse los principios de interdependencia y reflejarse en la composición del Consejo de Seguridad mediante la inclusión de países en desarrollo en la categoría de los miembros permanentes.

8) Los privilegios deben pagarse; una función ampliada del Consejo de Seguridad requerirá más recursos; en consecuencia, los miembros permanentes deberían asumir una porción mayor de la carga financiera de las Naciones Unidas.

9) Todos los miembros permanentes deberían estar dispuestos a aplicar el Artículo 43 de la Carta y a poner sus fuerzas militares a disposición de las Naciones Unidas para mantener el orden internacional.

10) El reconocimiento del carácter de miembros permanentes a nuevos Estados debe ser el resultado de una deliberación juiciosa, como parte de un proceso en que no sólo se tengan en cuenta las realidades del mundo de hoy sino que se base también en criterios innovadores que gocen del mayor grado de aceptación posible por parte de la comunidad internacional; desde este punto de vista debería lograrse un equilibrio equitativo entre los países desarrollados y los países en desarrollo, en cuanto a los Estados Miembros destinados a llegar a ser miembros permanentes del Consejo.

b) Puestos "semipermanentes"*

- Distribución regional

1) Uno para Europa y otro para Asia (nuevos puestos sin derecho de veto).

2) Es una necesidad política y práctica aumentar el número de miembros del Consejo de Seguridad de modo que incluya 12 países en desarrollo y cinco países industrializados como integrantes en forma rotativa.

3) Determinados Estados Miembros de las principales regiones del mundo en desarrollo podrían incorporarse al Consejo en nombre de las distintas regiones o subregiones, como representantes regionales que prestarían servicios por un período prolongado, sin derecho de veto.

- Modalidades de la selección

1) Sugerencias concretas sobre las condiciones que deberían satisfacerse: población, situación geopolítica, capacidad militar, potencialidad económica, historial de cooperación en el marco de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, contribución al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales, distribución geográfica equitativa.

2) Podría considerarse un segundo grupo integrado por unos 10 puestos, destinados a Estados Miembros de los cinco continentes evaluados en función del apoyo financiero que pudieran aportar, o teniendo en cuenta su gran superficie, el tamaño de su población y su organización interna eficiente, que les permitan garantizar un apoyo eficaz en materia de personal, militar o de otro tipo, o

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* Véase también V. "Elecciones y duración del mandato", sección V.A.2. "Puestos semipermanentes".

12) Cinco miembros originales de Africa, Asia, Europa, América Latina y el Caribe y el Pacífico; siete u ocho nuevos miembros.

13) El número de miembros no permanentes debería aumentarse a 15, que se seleccionarían de la manera siguiente:

a) Cuatro miembros de Asia, distribuidos de la siguiente forma:

i) Un miembro en representacion de Asia oriental y sudoriental;

ii) Un miembro en representación de Asia occidental;

iii) Un miembro en representación de Asia central;

iv) Un miembro en representación del Pacífico, Australia y Nueva Zelandia;

b) Cinco miembros de Africa, distribuidos de la siguiente forma:

i) Tres miembros de la zona al norte del Ecuador;

ii) Dos miembros de la zona al sur del Ecuador;

c) Tres miembros de las Américas, distribuidos de la siguiente forma:

i) Dos miembros en representación de América del Norte y América central y el Caribe;

ii) Un miembro en representación de América del Sur;

d) Tres miembros en representación de Europa, distribuidos en la siguiente forma:

i) Un miembro en representación de Europa oriental;

ii) Un miembro en representación de Europa septentrional;

iii) Un miembro en representación de Europa occidental.

14) Del total de 12 ó 13 miembros no permanentes, cinco deberían representar a Africa, Asia, Europa, América Latina y el Caribe y el Pacífico.

- Modalidades de la selección

1) Creación de un grupo oficioso de los "cincuenta" (Estados con una población superior a los 50 millones de habitantes).

2) Para la asignación de puestos no permanentes deberían tenerse en cuenta las cifras pertinentes de población de cada grupo.

3) Los nuevos puestos no permanentes deberían distribuirse equitativamente sobre la base del número de Estados Miembros, la población y otros factores pertinentes en cada región.

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4) Asignación de los puestos no permanentes a tres Estados Miembros sobre la base de intereses comunes; ésta ha sido la práctica seguida por las instituciones creadas en Bretton Woods; aunque el puesto se dé a un solo Estado, los otros dos Estados se desempeñarían en calidad de suplentes y tendrían todos los privilegios correspondientes a esa condición.

5) La distribución de los puestos no permanentes debería examinarse en los grupos regionales una vez que se haya convenido aumentar su número.

B. Número y categorías[1]

1. Número total de puestos

- Total: menos de 15 Estados Miembros sugirieron cifras concretas, que oscilaron de 20 a 30.
- Permanentes: menos de 10 Estados Miembros sugirieron cifras concretas, que oscilaron de 7 a 12.
- "Semipermanentes": menos de 10 Estados Miembros sugirieron cifras concretas, que oscilaron de 5 a 20.
- No permanentes: menos de 10 Estados Miembros sugirieron cifras concretas, que oscilaron de 9 (una disminución de 1) a 19.

2. Categorías de miembros

a) Puestos permanentes

Ningún cambio en el statu quo

1) Ningún sitio permanente adicional.

2) El estatuto de los miembros permanentes actuales no debe cambiar.

3) No debería producirse aumento alguno del número de los miembros permanentes que pudiere servir para alterar el equilibrio entre los miembros permanentes y los no permanentes.

Cambios sugeridos en el statu quo

4) Debería revisarse el estatuto de los miembros permanentes actuales.

5) Debería revisarse el estatuto de los miembros permanentes y deberían renovarse cada dos a tres años como candidatos de sus grupos regionales.

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[1] Basado en A/48/264 y Add.1 a 8; debido a diferentes interpretaciones de las distintas categorías y cálculos las cifras tienen simplemente un valor indicativo.

6) Debería estudiarse la conveniencia de mantener el sistema de miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad.

Nuevos miembros permanentes

7) Debe aumentarse el número de miembros permanentes con derecho de veto.

8) El aumento de puestos permanentes no debería hacerse en detrimento de los puestos designados a miembros no permanentes.

9) Debería asignarse a Estados Miembros específicos un número limitado de puestos permanentes.

b) Puestos "semipermanentes"

1) Debería establecerse una nueva categoría de miembros sin derecho de veto; los detalles se determinarían más adelante.

2) El Consejo debería tener únicamente miembros permanentes y no permanentes; los nuevos miembros permanentes deberían tener un estatuto igual al de los miembros permanentes actuales.

3) Ningún país capaz de aportar una contribución como nuevo miembro permanente aceptaría un estatuto de segunda clase.

4) La creación de una nueva clase de miembros (en el Consejo) no sería una medida positiva, por antidemocrática y elitista.

5) Las sugerencias de que podrían existir diferentes clases de miembros permanentes sin derecho de veto carecen de sentido práctico.

c) Puestos no permanentes

1) Deberían crearse más puestos no permanentes adicionales; cada miembro no permanente tendría dos suplentes.

2) Un número limitado o mínimo de puestos no permanentes adicionales.

3) No debería reducirse el número actual de miembros no permanentes del Consejo, si se acordara aumentar el número de miembros permanentes.

II. OTROS ASUNTOS RELACIONADOS CON EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD

A. Relación del Consejo de Seguridad con la Asamblea General y demás organismos y organizaciones, al igual que con los Estados no miembros del Consejo de Seguridad

Relación del Consejo de Seguridad con la Asamblea General

1) Deberían enviarse con mayor frecuencia informes analíticos y sustantivos, con recomendaciones, a la Asamblea General (trimestralmente, anualmente o con motivo de ocasiones especiales).

2) Debería haber una constancia de las actividades de los comités del Consejo de Seguridad que vigilan las sanciones impuestas en virtud del Capítulo VII.

3) Debería ponerse fin a la práctica de limitar el informe anual del Consejo de Seguridad a la Asamblea General a un simple registro de temas y decisiones, a fin de transformarlo en un documento en que se analizaran y describieran las principales cuestiones que configuran la situación política internacional y que examina el Consejo.

4) La Asamblea General debería poder supervisar efectivamente las actividades del Consejo.

5) Debería existir una coordinación mejor y más amplia de actividades.

6) Debería también establecerse un mecanismo, que quizá incluyera el nombramiento de un relator especial del Consejo de Seguridad, para asegurar la completa observancia de las disposiciones del Artículo 24 de la Carta.

7) Debería mantenerse informada a la Asamblea General a intervalos regulares de los resultados de las consultas oficiosas.

8) La Asamblea General debería servir de contrapeso a la influencia y poderes del Consejo de Seguridad.

9) El Consejo debería solicitar directrices para la acción a la Asamblea General.

Secretario General/Secretaría

10) La relación con el Secretario General debería cimentarse sobre una base más sólida y estrecha.

11) Debería fortalecerse la autoridad del Secretario General en sus relaciones con el Consejo de Seguridad; el Consejo no debería actuar haciendo caso omiso de su existencia.

12) Debería mejorarse la capacidad de la Secretaría para proporcionar información amplia y de calidad al Consejo de Seguridad.

13) Debería designarse a un miembro de la Secretaría de categoría superior como relator o coordinador en el Consejo, para que actuara como centro de coordinación de un mayor volumen de información y como mecanismo de retroinformación, mediante la celebración de reuniones periódicas con los presidentes de los grupos regionales.

Organizaciones/acuerdos regionales

14) Deberían mejorarse los contactos y la cooperación con los organismos y acuerdos regionales.

15) Deberían fomentarse los contactos y la cooperación entre el Consejo y los organismos regionales a fin de asegurar que las controversias

internacionales recibieran una atención más rápida y eficaz - sin perjuicio del derecho de cada Estado Miembro a someter el asunto al Consejo.

16) Debería examinarse la interrelación del Consejo con los acuerdos y organismos regionales presentes y futuros.

17) Los organismos regionales deberían participar en las deliberaciones del Consejo de Seguridad sobre los asuntos que afectan a sus respectivas regiones.

18) Debería celebrarse una reunión mensual del Consejo de Seguridad con los Estados no miembros y los representantes de grupos regionales, a fin de examinar sus actividades y cuestiones sustantivas.

Estados Miembros de las Naciones Unidas que no son miembros del Consejo de Seguridad

19) El aumento del número de miembros debería ir acompañado de un mayor protagonismo y participación de los Estados no miembros en el proceso de toma de decisiones del Consejo, mediante consultas más abiertas, transparentes, regulares y estructuradas, entre los miembros del Consejo y la Asamblea General.

20) El principal objetivo de la reforma del Consejo debería apuntar a convertirlo en un órgano más democrático, asegurando de este modo su responsabilidad frente a todos los demás Estados Miembros de las Naciones Unidas.

21) El Consejo debería mejorar la transparencia de sus trabajos, a fin de que sus actividades reflejasen mejor la voluntad colectiva y las aspiraciones comunes de los Estados Miembros de las Naciones Unidas.

22) Deberían llevarse a cabo más consultas, en particular con aquellos países que contribuyen con tropas, los Estados involucrados en las cuestiones que se examinan y aquellos afectados por las sanciones económicas. Dichos Estados deberían poder intervenir en los debates.

23) Deberían arbitrarse nuevas formas de participación en las funciones del Consejo de Seguridad que difirieran cualitativamente de las categorías y sistemas actuales.

24) Debería alentarse la adopción de un proceso consultivo, sobre una base ad hoc, en el que participaran los Estados Miembros importantes no representados en el Consejo de Seguridad, en conjunción con el proceso de toma de decisiones del Consejo; de este modo, se realzaría la transparencia del proceso de toma de decisiones.

Otros órganos y organismos

25) El Consejo de Seguridad debería establecer relaciones más estrechas con los demás órganos y organismos de las Naciones Unidas que se ocupan de cuestiones relativas a las amenazas no militares a la seguridad en las esferas económica, social, humanitaria y ecológica.

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Organos subsidiarios

15) El Consejo podría establecer "órganos subsidiarios", tal como se estipula en el Artículo 29, para ocuparse de cuestiones específicas; se debería permitir a los Estados Miembros de las Naciones Unidas que no sean miembros del Consejo de Seguridad participar en dichos órganos.

16) Debería establecerse órganos/"salas" subsidiarios del Consejo de Seguridad para que se encarguen más activamente de estudiar cuestiones, realizar la labor inicial y preparatoria, elaborar recomendaciones para algunas cuestiones regionales y vigilar la aplicación de sanciones, la diplomacia preventiva y las evaluaciones de la determinación de hechos.

17) Podrían establecerse comités permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad (Artículo 29 de la Carta), cuyas funciones podrían incluir el estudio oficioso de cuestiones y la preparación de recomendaciones al Consejo relativas a la intervención de las Naciones Unidas en el arreglo de situaciones de crisis.

18) Podrían establecerse órganos subsidiarios para vigilar la evolución de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz más importantes.

19) Un número cada vez mayor de Estados Miembros contribuyen con fuerzas militares a las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz; parecería existir una clara necesidad de hacer participar a dichos Estados Miembros que contribuyen con fuerzas militares en el proceso de toma de decisiones del Consejo; a la luz del Artículo 29 de la Carta, un posible enfoque podría ser el establecimiento de órganos subsidiarios para vigilar la evolución de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz más importantes; los Estados Miembros que contribuyan con tropas, si así lo desearan, podrían estar representados en dichos órganos.

20) Debería prestarse más atención a la experiencia de los Estados Miembros que contribuyen con tropas.

21) Debería revitalizarse el Comité de Estado Mayor, asignando a sus miembros el papel establecido en el Artículo 46; debería ampliarse la composición del Comité que no debería limitarse a los miembros permanentes.

Consultas oficiosas

22) Debería limitarse el número de consultas oficiosas.

23) La eficacia del Consejo no se vería comprometida por hacer un uso mayor del mecanismo de la consultas oficiosas.

24) Las sesiones a puerta cerrada son incongruentes con el espíritu del Artículo 24 de la Carta; el Consejo de Seguridad debería celebrar sesiones públicas con mayor frecuencia, a fin de permitir a los Estados no miembros del Consejo participar en los debates sobre los asuntos que les conciernen.

25) Deberían aplicarse las disposiciones del Artículo 31 de la Carta con respecto a las cuestiones que afectan a los intereses de los Estados Miembros que no son miembros del Consejo; el Consejo no debería recurrir al mecanismo de las consultas oficiosas excepto a una escala mínima, ya que este procedimiento,

que ha predominado en la labor del Consejo durante los últimos dos años, ha sido explotado por algunos miembros permanentes para imponer sus puntos de vista y llevar a cabo sus planes.

26) Debería permitirse que las partes en un conflicto participaran en las consultas oficiosas.

III. FUNCIONAMIENTO EFECTIVO Y EFICAZ DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD

1) La principal razón para reestructurar el Consejo de Seguridad debería ser aumentar la eficacia de sus trabajos.

2) Cualquier ampliación que se haga del número de miembros no debe reducir la responsabilidad especial que tienen los miembros permanentes ni el ámbito actual de los miembros no permanentes.

3) La renuncia por parte de los Estados Miembros del uso de la fuerza, incluso con la excepción prevista en el Artículo 51 de la Carta, requiere que el Consejo pueda actuar de manera pronta y eficaz; esta eficacia debe estar garantizada no sólo mediante la rápida adopción de decisiones oportunas, sino también asegurando que dichas decisiones se ejecuten y observen cabalmente, con prontitud y sin distinciones; sólo de esta manera quedarán garantizados el prestigio y la autoridad del Consejo.

4) No debería consentirse que un debate prolongado sobre la ampliación ni una toma precipitada de medidas hicieran disminuir la eficacia del Consejo; la prioridad principal debería ser salvaguardar el funcionamiento efectivo del Consejo, así como su capacidad para cumplir su responsabilidad primordial en virtud de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas a saber, el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

5) Los Estados Miembros pequeños tienen un interés intrínseco en asegurar la existencia de un Consejo de Seguridad que sea eficaz y capaz de responder a las situaciones; este debe ser el principio rector más importante en el ejercicio de reforma, en vez de los aspectos relativos al número de miembros y a su carácter representativo.

Argumentos a favor de un aumento limitado

6) Cualquier aumento que se haga debe ser mínimo.

7) El aumento debe ser limitado para mantener la eficacia del Consejo, así como su capacidad operacional para una acción inmediata.

8) La eficacia del Consejo se basa en su número limitado de miembros, lo que permite llegar a una transacción y tomar decisiones que reflejan no pocas veces un consenso de las Naciones Unidas en su conjunto.

9) Es importante que el Consejo continúe manteniendo una composición que lo permita ser un mecanismo eficaz para coordinar las opiniones y las medidas de los Estados Miembros de las Naciones Unidas; cualquier cambio que se produzca debería hacerse de modo tal que no disminuya en absoluto la eficacia del Consejo

/...

y de su labor; los cambios deberían también efectuarse de manera que no fuera preciso realizar una revisión importante de la Carta.

Preocupan acerca de los vínculos entre el número de miembros y la eficacia

10) Debería evitarse por todos los medios la tentación de establecer una relación en exceso simplista entre el número de miembros del Consejo y su eficacia; una expansión moderada de la composición del Consejo no menoscabaría necesariamente su eficacia; ni tampoco es cierto que un Consejo de composición más reducida sería más eficaz.

11) Debería tenerse en cuenta no sólo la necesidad de asegurar, como se estipula en la Carta "una acción rápida y eficaz" por parte del Consejo sino también la necesidad de que la composición del Consejo asegure la igualdad soberana de los Estados Miembros y una representación adecuada, así como la necesidad de que el Consejo actúe en nombre de todos los Estados cuando adopta decisiones; sólo una representación aceptada por todos infundiría en el Consejo la seguridad de que sus decisiones tendrán la autoridad moral necesaria para ser efectivas.

12) Una composición más representativa y equilibrada del Consejo realzaría la eficacia de sus actividades y la autoridad de sus decisiones.

13) El argumento de que consideraciones de eficacia imponen una congelación del número de miembros del Consejo ha de sopesarse con el hecho de que la unidad de propósito, más que el número de sus miembros, es el factor determinante de la eficacia de la Organización.

IV. ADOPCION DE DECISIONES DE CONFORMIDAD CON LAS DISPOSICIONES DE LA CARTA

Revisión del veto

1) El veto debería abolirse ahora o más tarde.

2) No se debería otorgar el derecho de veto a nuevos miembros permanentes.

3) El derecho de veto debería limitarse en su aplicación a las cuestiones relacionadas con el Capítulo VII.

4) El veto debería basarse en dos votos negativos de los miembros permanentes ("doble veto").

5) Debería considerarse la cuestión de dar a la Asamblea General o a un Consejo de Seguridad "especialmente ampliado" la posibilidad de suspender o limitar el veto de un miembro permanente.

6) Ningún miembro permanente debería poder vetar una decisión sobre una cuestión respecto de la cual los demás miembros permanentes consideren unánimemente que ese miembro permanente tiene un interés personal.

7) El mecanismo de veto debería sustituirse por una mayoría calificada o por un voto ponderado, según el tipo de decisión que se deba adoptar, o si esto no se acepta, por la participación activa de otros órganos del sistema de las Naciones Unidas en calidad de mecanismos de apelación.

8) Se debería eliminar la contradicción que existe entre la aplicación de las medidas de seguridad colectiva en caso de que se produzca una agresión, por una parte, y el derecho de un miembro permanente a utilizar el veto en una cuestión en que tenga un interés directo, por otra parte.

Mantenimiento del veto

9) No debería modificarse la disposición sobre la votación unánime de los miembros permanentes.

10) El hecho de que se haya abusado del veto no va en detrimento de la función que se previó que desempeñara, sino que es un reconocimiento de la dura realidad de que las grandes Potencias no aceptarán poner su poder a disposición de una mayoría para ejecutar decisiones con las que no están de acuerdo.

11) El derecho de veto debería otorgarse a los nuevos miembros permanentes.

12) Los esfuerzos para modificar el sistema de veto no son fáciles y deberían tratar de establecer métodos para regular y/o controlar su utilización y mantener la eficacia del Consejo de Seguridad.

13) Un Consejo de 20 miembros permitiría el mantenimiento de la actual proporción de votos afirmativos que constituyen una mayoría calificada (9 votos afirmativos de 15 miembros), que se transformaría en 12 votos afirmativos de 20 miembros.

V. ELECCIONES Y DURACION DEL MANDATO

A. Elecciones

1. Puestos permanentes

14) Un puesto permanente o varios puestos permanentes deberían ser asignados a un grupo de Estados, que los ocuparían de modo rotatorio.

Dos Potencias principales industriales y económicas y un Estado [illegible] de cada uno de los tres grupos regionales de los países en desarrollo; rotación de los Estados Miembros que ocupan puestos permanentes asignados a [illegible] de Estados Miembros que son miembros de una organización regional [illegible].

15) Un puesto de los países europeos debería ser ocupado por rotación por los tres miembros permanentes actuales más un nuevo puesto; un puesto adicional para los países asiáticos ocupado por rotación; un nuevo puesto para los países africanos ocupado por rotación; un puesto para los países latinoamericanos ocupado por rotación.

aplicados a los organismos financieros internacionales, en lo que se utiliza el "puesto compartido" u otro mecanismo de rotación; de ese modo, un miembro del Consejo de esa categoría podría contar con dos "representantes suplentes" de otros países de la región que representa.

f) La representación regional no debería atribuirse nunca a un solo país, y los votos de los representantes de la región deberían reflejar las opiniones de todas las naciones de la región, aunque en último término el voto expresado sería el del país realmente representado en el Consejo.

3. Puestos no permanentes

a) Inclusión de cada una de las organizaciones regionales como miembro no permanente mediante representación por el Presidente actual de su órgano supremo.

2) Un puesto para cada grupo regional que se asignaría por rotación en esos grupos, de conformidad con su propia decisión.

3) Dos o tres Estados Miembros importantes de cada grupo regional que serían miembros del Consejo siguiendo un turno.

4) Dos grupos de miembros no permanentes: a) cinco miembros de las regiones de Africa, Asia, Europa, América Latina y el Caribe, y el Pacífico serían miembros durante dos años y serían elegidos por los Estados de la región; b) siete u ocho miembros por un período de dos años.

c) Debería establecerse una rotación de la representación regional sobre la base de la adopción de acuerdos.

d) Se deberían dar más oportunidades a los países que no hayan estado representados en el Consejo en los últimos 10 años.

e) Debería haber dos grupos de miembros no permanentes:

i) Cinco miembros regionales en representación de Africa, Asia, Europa, América Latina y el Caribe, y el Pacífico; cada uno de esos miembros, cuyo mandato sería de dos años, sería seleccionado por los Estados de la región respectiva; los miembros permanentes quedarían excluidos de los grupos regionales y de sus procesos de selección;

ii) Siete u ocho miembros, cada uno con un mandato de dos años.

B. Duración del mandato

La cláusula del Artículo 23 en que se indican de modo concreto los mandatos de los miembros permanentes debería sustituirse por una cláusula que limitara su número a ocho o nueve y especificara las siguientes categorías: 1) los países cuya población es superior a 800 millones de habitantes; 2) los países cuya población es superior a 100 millones de habitantes y que aportan por lo menos el 5,5% del presupuesto de las Naciones Unidas; 3) los "miembros

competentes": cualesquiera dos países contiguos con una población combinada de más de 100 millones de habitantes y una contribución conjunta al presupuesto de por lo menos el 8,5% podrían ser elegidos por períodos renovables de dos años y compartirían por rotación un voto único y el derecho de veto; el número de esos países quizá debiera estar limitado a tres.

2) Los miembros deberían dividirse en cuatro categorías: miembros permanentes, miembros permanentes sin derecho a veto, miembros no permanentes con un mandato de duración más prolongada (para determinadas Potencias regionales) y miembros no permanentes con un mandato de dos años.

3) Posibilidad de reelección o de mandatos de duración más prolongada; revisión del párrafo 2 del Artículo 23.

4) Se debería crear un nuevo tipo de miembro para una categoría apropiada [illegible] Estados, con un mandato más prolongado que el actual mandato de dos años.

5) Deberían establecerse acuerdos regionales sobre la rotación de los puestos no permanentes y semipermanentes.

6) Se debería enmendar el párrafo 2 del Artículo 23 a fin de que los Estados que sean elegidos para representar a grupos regionales puedan mantener su calidad de miembros durante más de un mandato; un puesto por grupo regional debería quedar exento de la prohibición de reelección inmediata.

7) Se debería eliminar la prohibición de no reelección para un mandato subsiguiente y la prohibición del aumento de la duración del mandato.

VI. MODALIDADES DE INTRODUCCION DE LOS CAMBIOS Y EXAMEN DE LAS MODIFICACIONES CORRESPONDIENTES DE LA CARTA

A. Plazo para introducir los cambios

1) Iniciar el proceso de enmiendas para 1995.

2) Darle expresión concreta durante el 50º aniversario (para 1995).

3) Iniciar las negociaciones a la mayor brevedad posible.

4) El Grupo de Trabajo debería concluir con éxito su labor antes de [illegible] del período de sesiones en curso de la Asamblea General e informar a [illegible] en su cuadragésimo noveno período de sesiones a fin de comenzar el proceso [illegible] de modificación de la Carta a la mayor brevedad posible.

5) No hay que precipitarse, pero no hay que demorarse.

6) Se debería considerar cuidadosamente el proceso, que debería contar [illegible] tiempo necesario y basarse en consultas lo más amplias posibles.

7) No se debería establecer un plazo particular para la conclusión del proceso.

8) Se debería adoptar un método gradual y realista.

9) Se podría lograr rápidamente la transparencia y la apertura a otros Estados Miembros; los cambios en la composición requerirían el logro de un consenso, lo que quizá llevaría tiempo; se debería disponer del tiempo necesario para lograr ajustes ventajosos de la composición.

10) El proceso debería llevarse a cabo con prudencia y discreción.

B. Métodos de abordar el proceso de modificación de la Carta

1. Consideraciones generales

1) Los cambios deberían hacerse de conformidad con las disposiciones pertinentes de la Carta.

2) Los cambios en la estructura y el tamaño actuales del Consejo de Seguridad deberían ir acompañados de una modificación correspondiente de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas para asegurar que dichos cambios desemboquen en una mayor transparencia de las actividades y el proceso de adopción de decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad.

3) Los cambios numéricos deberían efectuarse conjuntamente con las modificaciones pertinentes del procedimiento (teniendo en cuenta el proceso de adopción de decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad).

4) Los cambios numéricos deberían efectuarse conjuntamente con las mejoras en los mecanismos existentes o el establecimiento de nuevos mecanismos para la solución pacífica de controversias.

Opiniones sobre el consenso

5) Todos los cambios deberían hacerse por acuerdo consensual de todos los Estados y, en particular, de los miembros permanentes actuales.

6) Los cambios en la composición requerirían el logro de un consenso.

7) Se debería lograr un consenso respecto de los criterios para establecer puestos adicionales y lograr una representación regional equilibrada.

8) El aumento de los puestos permanentes y no permanentes debería realizarse mediante negociaciones basadas en el consenso y el acuerdo de todos los Estados Miembros.

9) La exigencia del logro de un acuerdo general debería limitarse al texto final del proceso y no debería aplicarse a las diversas fases de dicho proceso.

Opiniones sobre un enfoque amplio

10) La reestructuración del Consejo de Seguridad debería ser una parte integrante de un proceso de reforma del sistema de las Naciones Unidas amplio y de gran alcance.

11) Debería realizarse un examen amplio de la Carta; la reestructuración forma parte de un proceso de reforma de la Carta amplio y de largo alcance.

12) Las propuestas relativas a la condición de miembro del Consejo de Seguridad deberían ir precedidas por una evaluación exhaustiva y exacta de todos los aspectos de su papel en el nuevo panorama político, económico y social posterior a la guerra fría.

Opiniones contrarias a la vinculación; enfoque "gradual"

13) Los cambios de la composición deberían examinarse sobre la base de sus propios méritos y no vincularse a otros cambios propuestos.

14) El aumento del número de miembros no debería vincularse a ninguna enmienda importante de la Carta.

15) El mandato del Grupo de Trabajo debería limitarse al aumento del número de miembros si se desea que dé resultados; el Grupo debería ser prudente a fin de no abordar tareas que corresponden a otros órganos.

16) El proceso de reformas graduales debería llevarse a cabo abordando en primer lugar la cuestión de la ampliación y posteriormente las demás cuestiones, como los métodos de trabajo y los procedimientos del Consejo.

17) Las cuestiones de composición y de métodos de trabajo deberían abordarse inmediatamente, mientras que las relativas al alcance del mandato deberían abordarse gradualmente.

2. Artículos 108 y 109 de la Carta

1) Todo lo que se necesita es la aprobación por la Asamblea General de una resolución en que decida aprobar modificaciones muy concretas de los Artículos 23 y 27 de la Carta y presentar esas enmiendas al procedimiento de ratificación enunciado en el Artículo 108.

2) El proceso de reforma debería en su debido momento desembocar en la elaboración de un proyecto de resolución de la Asamblea General y de las enmiendas que finalmente se presenten a la ratificación de los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas, de conformidad con las disposiciones del Artículo 108 de la Carta.

3) La revisión de la composición del Consejo debería realizarse en el contexto de una revisión más amplia de la Carta con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el Artículo 109.

Chaillot Papers

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PEACEKEEPING IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES

Roy Allison

INSTITUT D'ETUDES DE SECURITE
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CHAILLOT PAPER 18

Peacekeeping in the Soviet successor states

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CHAILLOT PAPER 18
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PREFACE

The Institute was very pleased that Dr Roy Allison, one of the leading British scholars in the field of Russian security affairs, accepted its invitation to prepare this *Chaillot Paper*. The issue of crisis management and conflict prevention in post-communist Europe is an issue which has already been addressed by the Institute in earlier *Chaillot Papers*, and this paper takes the discussion further by looking at the problems arising over peacekeeping in the member states of the CIS.

The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Institute in April 1994; it has been revised by Dr Allison in the light of comments made on that occasion, and reflects events that occurred up to September 1994. We believe it will make a valuable contribution to the discussion of what is currently one of the critical security issues in our continent.

John Roper

Paris, November 1994

Peacekeeping in the Soviet successor states

Roy Allison

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of Russian/CIS 'peacekeeping' on the territory of the Soviet successor states has become one of the most controversial elements of the post-Soviet heritage. It is apparent that Russian views on peacekeeping or 'peacemaking' (see below) in this region differ significantly from those which have traditionally prevailed in the West, or the United Nations, in terms of the national composition of the forces involved and the nature of measures applied. However, Russian views on the subject have not yet been studied rigorously.

Such study is essential to unravel the current controversy over the 'bona fide' character of Russian-led peacekeeping and to judge accusations by a variety of Western commentators that Russia has tended to manipulate certain conflicts for its own political/strategic ends and has used peacekeeping units as an instrument for attaining those ends. The conclusions drawn on this matter by the international community will serve to deny or reinforce current Russian claims for a UN mandate (or separate mandates) for Russian-led peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union (FSU).

The outcome has broad implications, since the decision whether to grant some form of UN authorization for Russian-led operations in the FSU has to take into account the effect of such a step for the credibility of established UN international peacekeeping operations beyond the CIS region. Yet at the same time traditional UN principles for peacekeeping missions are themselves under review and the permissible extent of 'peace enforcement' in any given operation is open to debate. In these

circumstances it may be possible to conceive of a new model of peacekeeping for conflicts in the CIS region.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyse current thinking within the Russian political and military élite concerning current and future peacekeeping operations on the territory of the FSU. The following topics will be examined: current peacekeeping operations within the CIS; Russian military capabilities to actually maintain the peace in this region; the collective CIS dimension of Russian-led peacekeeping activities; Russian views of Western or other UN involvement in peacekeeping in the CIS and the extent of such involvement; the potential link between Russian peacekeeping efforts and nascent neo-imperialist ambitions; and the implications of these matters for the European security environment.

This paper adopts the convenient shorthand description of Russian 'peacekeeping' forces and operations in the FSU. In fact, as the paper identifies, such 'peacekeeping' covers a wide range of activities, some of which clearly diverge from the traditional United Nations and Western understanding of that term. In fact Russian statesmen use the term *mirotvorcheskiye operatsii* ('peacemaking' or 'peace-creating' operations) more frequently in this context than that of *operatsii po poderzhaniyu mira* (operations for the maintenance of peace). The former assertive, even coercive, function may involve a strong element of enforcement. It requires careful examination if Western states are to be consistent in their advocacy of international norms of conduct in conflict management on former Soviet territory.

FORMER AND CURRENT 'PEACEKEEPING' OPERATIONS

Military/diplomatic requirements on the ground, rather than preconceived principles, appear to determine the character of the Russian or CIS 'peacekeeping' presence in various zones of conflict in the Soviet successor states. The diverse practices and operating procedures of forces designated for peacekeeping by Russia, or by CIS states in collective agreements, have become the basis for Russian and CIS peacekeeping 'doctrines' — to the extent that these have developed. It would be helpful initially, therefore, to analyse the main operations which engage over 16,000 Russian soldiers

in peacekeeping/peacemaking, as well as those which involve some 20,000 more Russian troops in 'peace support' roles in the Former USSR.[1]

Transdniester/Moldova

The arrangements developed in summer 1992 to dampen down conflict in the Transdniester region in eastern Moldova deserve particular attention since they have been promoted by Russian political and military leaders as a successful precedent for peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the CIS.

In July 1992 the Russian and Moldovan presidents agreed to a package of measures to resolve the Transdniester conflict: negotiating a ceasefire; creating a demarcation corridor between the forces; introducing 'neutral' peacekeeping forces; granting 'political status' to the left bank of the Dniester; and implementing bilateral negotiations on the removal of the Russian 14th Army from Moldova. CIS heads of state subsequently agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force in eastern Moldova consisting of Ukrainian, Belarussian, Russian and Moldovan troops. However, this plan was displaced by another, promoted by Russian military leaders, for the deployment of 'disengagement forces' from Russia, Moldova and Transdniester.

In all, five Russian battalions (2,130 men), three Moldovan battalions (1,200 men) and three 'Transdniester' battalions were deployed (the latter from the 'Dniester Republic' national guard), though only four of the Russian battalions may remain. The tasks of these forces include monitoring the ceasefire agreement and suppressing its violation by 'uncontrolled' armed formations.

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[1]Before the Russian announcement in June 1994 that it would send a 3,000-man peacekeeping force to Abkhazia, Deputy Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev claimed that over 16,000 Russian troops were performing peacekeeping tasks; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 February 1994.

This section of the paper does not analyse the much publicized cases of the 'internal' use of Soviet forces (regular, Ministry of Interior and paramilitary) in the late Gorbachev period in the non-Russian republics, chiefly in Baku, Tbilisi and Vilnius, although some limited lessons may have been drawn from these interventions for subsequent Russian peacekeeping operations. The limits of the paper also prevent an examination of the role of those Cossack units which have been integrated into Russian regular forces and border troops to police border regions, such as in the Far East.

This arrangement ended the fighting in the area. But Moldovan accusations soon followed that insurgents of the 'Dniester Republic' were permitted to maintain armed units and munitions stockpiles in the disengagement zone. In fact such partiality may be inescapable given the overshadowing presence in the region of the highly politicised Russian 14th Army, which had previously provided military assistance to Russian nationalists in Transdniester. The commander of the 14th Army, General Lebed, has continued to act almost as a proconsul in the region and has openly advocated the incorporation of Transdniester into a greater Russia.

The July 1992 arrangement is certainly preferable to the earlier Russian idea of exclusively using units of the 14th Army as a peacekeeping or 'separation' force.[2] But the current disposition of forces is still clearly open to abuse by Russia. Such abuse would have been limited if an alternative plan, discussed in July 1992, to establish multilateral forces drawn from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria and Romania had been adopted. But Russia was unhappy with the precedent of inviting foreign troops onto the territory of the former USSR. Despite this, the Moldovan government has keenly sought the involvement of international organisations to dilute Russian dominance in the present tripartite agreement.

Georgia/South Ossetia

The second model of peacekeeping operations referred to by Russian leaders is that of South Ossetia, the autonomous region in Georgia. The South Ossetian intention to gain independence from Georgia and to unify with North Ossetia (within the Russian Federation) had led to protracted conflict with Georgian forces.

After strong Russian pressure, an agreement to deploy a peacekeeping force to separate the warring factions was signed in June 1992 by the leaders of Russia, Georgia, and North and South Ossetia. The four parties agreed to provide a battalion each 'to monitor the ceasefire, withdraw [supervise the withdrawal of] armed units, dissolve self-defence forces and ensure security in the region'. The joint forces include one Russian airborne regiment of 950 men and three Georgian-Ossetian

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[2]See Resolution of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 11 April 1992.

battalions totalling about 1,100 men, while another 1,000-man Georgian-Ossetian force is held in reserve.

This arrangement has managed to implement the ceasefire quite successfully, despite sporadic violence. The Russian forces are the key element in this task. Yet Russian partiality is less of an issue in this case, since stability in the region has clearly been a Russian interest (given the volatility of the North Caucasus) and since ethnic Russians have not been so much an issue here. However, the conflict will remain merely frozen unless the negotiation process between the Georgian and Ossetian sides is revived.

Georgia/Abkhazia

The conflict which flared up between Abkhazian separatists and the central Georgian authorities in August 1992 engaged intrinsic Russian interests from the outset: ethnic Russians in Abkhazia, Russian army units in the zone of conflict and the stability of the North Caucasian frontiers of the Russian Federation. By autumn 1993 these factors, and Russian influence on Abkhazia, persuaded the Georgian president to endorse the idea of the Russian army playing the central role in a peacekeeping plan for the conflict.

Already in July 1993 a Russian-brokered peacekeeping plan, worked out with UN and CSCE representatives, had been signed by the Georgian and Abkhazian authorities. It provided for a staged demilitarization of the region and for Georgian-Abkhazian-Russian supervisory groups to monitor compliance with the cease-fire regime.[3] The plan required the Russian troops still deployed in Abkhazia to observe strict neutrality. At the same time it was agreed that a limited number of Russian military observers would be stationed along the Gumista river overlooking Sukhumi, the Abkhazian capital. But initially this failed to end Georgian-Abkhaz military clashes and an appeal for UN peacekeeping forces was made by the negotiating parties in December 1993.

Negotiations on this issue were influenced by Georgian suspicions of Russian intentions. In 1992-93 Georgia frequently accused Russian

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[3]See report in Itar-Tass Moscow, World Service 27 July 1993, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Former USSR* (henceforth SU), 1753 B/4-5.

forces of providing military assistance to the Abkhazian insurgents, and the extent to which Russian troops participated in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and their exploitation of the separate civil war in autumn 1993 in western Georgia were unclear.[4] This helps explain the Georgian rejection of a proposal by Russian Defence Minister Grachev in September 1993 to deploy two Russian divisions and one brigade as peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia. The function of these forces, Grachev claimed, would have been to block the opposing forces and disarm them.[5] Even without this level of Russian military commitment, the effect of Russian mediation was to confirm the Georgian defeat and retreat from Abkhazia.

Yet Russian military forces clearly assisted Georgia in autumn 1993 in the efforts by Tbilisi to regain central control of western parts of the state from the insurgency led by supporters of the deposed leader Gamsarkhurdia (a challenge distinct from that of Abkhaz secession). The situation was stabilized through the conclusion of an agreement between the leaders of Russia and the Transcaucasian states, with the consent of Ukraine, empowering Black Sea Fleet marines and Russian units to take under their protection major roads, railways and shipping lines in west Georgia.[6]

This assistance was real but not altruistic. In autumn 1993 it was accompanied by President Shevardnadze's reluctant decisions to bring Georgia into the CIS and to conclude agreements which establish Russian military bases in Georgia (at Tbilisi, Akhalkalaki and Batumi). While Georgian entry into the CIS was decided upon partly for economic reasons, and Russia rejected the notion of a Russian-Georgian alliance against Abkhazia, it appeared overall that Moscow had been manœuvring for geopolitical gain through its position as peace-broker and military stabilizer in the region.

The new Russian military agreements with Georgia mean that peacekeeping is not needed as a pretext for introducing military contingents

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[4]There is evidence that the Russian army did indeed render assistance to Abkhaz military formations during 1992-93. This was not denied by Foreign Minister Kozyrev when questioned closely in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

[5]See report of this proposal in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 September 1993.

[6]On this agreement see *Izvestiya*, 5 November 1993; *Sevodnya*, 9 October 1993. Potentially it had a broader, extra-Russian dimension since Azerbaijan considered the possibility of sending military contingents to Georgia under its terms.

into that state, but Russian participation in peacekeeping efforts can help justify its military presence in Georgia and place Georgia in a position of greater dependence on Russia. During negotiations in spring 1994, Russia agreed to contribute a military contingent to a peacekeeping force stationed along the Inguri River under UN auspices. But the size of the Russian contribution to such a force was not clarified and for various reasons the UN concept ran into problems.

Consequently, in June 1994 Yeltsin decided to offer Russian troops to Abkhazia as part of a 'joint CIS peacekeeping force' and the decision was taken to send a 3,000-strong Russian force. The four battalions making up this force (two from the Group of Russian Forces in the Caucasus and two from the territory of Russia) were deployed principally along the River Inguri, separating Georgian and Abkhazian formations. The proclaimed intention is to concentrate the combat material of the conflicting sides in specially allotted regions[7] and to implement a process of demilitarisation throughout the territory of Abkhazia, stage by stage. The United Nations endorsed the Russian-led operation in August and decided to establish a strong UN observer force to monitor it. Such transparency is important, since in the absence of a clear remit for the Russian force, or the presence of units from other regional or CIS states, it will be difficult to distinguish its role from that of the Russian forces based in Georgia under the recently signed bilateral agreements.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The war over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan is the most long-standing of major conflicts on CIS territory. Yet until recently it was not a priority target for Russian-led peacekeeping efforts. This is a consequence of the humiliating withdrawal of former Soviet forces, including the garrison in Nagorno-Karabakh, from Azerbaijani territory, and the difficulty in reaching a compromise between the warring parties. It could also reflect a Russian strategy of 'divide and rule' in the region which has undermined the confidence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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[7]See V. Litovkin, *Izvestiya*, 23 June 1994.

The initial Russian deployment of military observers along the Armenian-Azeri border failed to encourage the implementation of various internationally brokered cease-fire agreements. A more ambitious Russian plan followed to introduce a limited contingent of its peacekeeping forces into Nagorno-Karabakh. This idea was accepted by Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh representatives in November 1993, even though it would strengthen Russia's role in the region.[8] By early 1994 the plan envisaged Russian troops as a 'separating force': Russian peacekeeping troops would be deployed in areas around Nagorno-Karabakh from which Armenian forces would then withdraw.

This plan was rejected by the Azerbaijani president, Geidar Aliyev, on the grounds that it would freeze Armenian territorial gains from Azerbaijan. Since spring 1993 Aliyev preferred to accept the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Azerbaijan only within the CSCE framework (see later).[9] However, he began to give ground on this issue. Initially, in February 1994 the defence ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh signed a protocol on a troop withdrawal and the creation of mutual security zones controlled by a Joint Staff composed of their representatives (of 250 officers, 69 would be Russian).[10] Russian officials now argued openly that only Russia would in practice provide troops for the disengagement forces (an idea that was anathema to Turkey).

Finally, on 16 May the three local parties agreed in principle to deploy observers, alongside observers from Russia and 'possibly' the CIS and CSCE, at 49 posts in a disengagement zone. The observers would be protected be some 1,800 CIS troops, mainly Russians under Russian command. Therefore the principal role in monitoring and enforcing the cease-fire was assigned to the Russian military (displacing the CSCE) since the heads of the observation posts would all be Russian officers.[11] This

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[8]See report by D. Yuryev in *Sevodnya*, 9 October 1993.

[9]See E. Fuller 'Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Karabakh mediation process', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 8, 25 February 1994, pp. 32-6.

[10]See interview of Deputy Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 1 March 1994.

[11]See E. Fuller, 'The Karabakh mediation process: Grachev versus the CSCE?', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 23, 10 June 1994.

in turn could be interpreted as a Russian pretext for stationing its troops in Azerbaijan. However, by late 1994 this plan had still not been implemented, and Azerbaijan still favoured a larger CSCE role in the region.

During 1993-94 Azerbaijan has reacted with suspicion and resisted Russian proposals for the redeployment of *regular* Russian military units in Azerbaijan (perhaps stationed in bases), and has also resisted any agreement on the presence of Russian border troops to guard the state's southern borders. The other Transcaucasian states (and most recently Turkmenistan) have in fact reached such arrangements with Russia over the defence of their non-CIS borders. Although such border troops are not viewed by Russia as peacekeeping units, this distinction is becoming less clear, as illustrated by the case of Tajikistan.

Tajikistan

By far the largest and most extensive role for Russian peacekeeping operations has been in Tajikistan, both in defence of the government (or at least ethnic Russians) in the civil war raging in the state and for border defence against armed infiltration from Afghanistan. This role has remained highly controversial within Russia itself and it underlies much of the debate examined later in this paper on the mandate and mission of peacekeeping operations.

Russia has tried to characterise its presence in Tajikistan as operating under CIS aegis, but efforts to establish a CIS peacekeeping operation to stabilize the political situation in Tajikistan and restore the integrity of the Tajik-Afghan border have made only faltering progress. These efforts followed an initial request by the Tajik government for military assistance in September 1992.[12] The 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD), based in Dushanbe, would be brought to full strength, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would each introduce a battalion and Uzbekistan would contribute a mobile regiment from Uzbekistan. A 'strike group' would be formed for use against anti-government forces in Tajikistan and cross-border raids from Afghanistan. But the so-called CIS coalition peacekeeping forces in

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[12]For discussion of this at the Bishkek CIS summit see 'Itogi vstrechi v Bishkeke', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 October 1992.

Tajikistan (commanded first by Colonel-General Pyankov, and since April 1994 by Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev) have been a fig-leaf for the operations of the Russian army and Ministry of Defence.

The intended strength of the joint peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan is about 25,000 men, of whom the overwhelming majority must be from the Russian army. The 201st MRD (now with over 18,000 personnel), along with some other units, has reportedly been 'assigned' to the peacekeeping forces. Yet so far only one battalion of this division has been specifically earmarked as a 'peacekeeping' unit, despite the broad functions assigned to the division as a whole (such as protecting key installations, patrolling key areas and accompanying relief convoys). This confusion of roles may account for some low Russian estimates of the size of the peacekeeping force or of the 201st MRD itself in Tajikistan.[13]

So long as Tajik leaders remain dependent on Russian peacekeeping or regular forces to contain the spread of regional and clan-based opposition groups and to guarantee the integrity of the border with Afghanistan, Moscow will retain strong political influence in Dushanbe. At the same time, the Uzbek leadership may be using the Russian military presence in the region to seek regional political domination. Russia is left with dilemmas which arise from clan and sub-ethnic divisions. Russia may judge that the essential Uzbek role in helping ensure medium-term political stability in the region makes it desirable to support the pro-Uzbek Khodzhent clan. Yet any such pro-Uzbek bias in peacekeeping would aggravate Russian relations with Kazakhstan. Moreover, the majority of the 201st MRD are ethnic Tajiks from the Kulyab area.

Irrespective of the Uzbek role, for Russian leaders any political gains in Tajikistan are secondary, since their primary objective (one shared by Tajikistan's CIS neighbours) is to prevent the spread of Tajik instabilities further into former Soviet Central Asia, as well as to protect the Russian diaspora.[14] This 'peace-enforcing' and security policy mission is one for which Moscow has called for understanding at least, if not material support,

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[13]The Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma claimed in March 1994 that a division of only 5,982 men is in Tajikistan. Report by Yelena Tregubova in *Sevodnya*, 1 March 1994.

[14]For a broad assessment of Russian objectives dilemmas in peacekeeping in Tajikistan see the article by I. Rotar in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 November 1993,

from the international community. However, the broader implications of the Tajik experience for the content of Russian-led peacekeeping elsewhere are still disturbing.

Operations in the Russian Federation

So far the only significant military conflict which has engaged hostile ethnic communities in the Russian Federation has been that between the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetiya (which are in dispute over the Prigorodny district). A large grouping of Russian forces designated for peacekeeping has been formed since mid-1992 on the territories of both North Ossetia and Ingushetiya. These forces appear to have favoured Ossetians against Ingush militias since their military intervention in November 1992,[15] but Russian spokesmen claim that, in conjunction with Russian Ministry of the Interior (MVD) forces, the Russian formation has successfully disengaged conflicting groups here and enforced a state of emergency. Possibly 1,000 Russian troops continue to perform this function in the region.

Whatever the details of this operation, it is misleading to view it and others which may arise in the Russian Federation (chiefly in the North Caucasus in the near term) as peacekeeping in the same fashion as operations undertaken outside Russia in the FSU. Although Russian MVD commanders customarily refer to their growing experience in 'peacekeeping' as a result of involvement in these conflicts in the Russian Federation, this internal mission cannot properly be distinguished from policing or other internal security measures. It certainly is not subject to the constraints which apply to the use of Russian forces abroad. Indeed, the MVD forces have their own training camps and doctrine for operations.

CIS COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCES

In most of these case studies of peacekeeping and peace enforcement on former Soviet territory Russia has sought to present the operations undertaken as being in some way CIS-led rather than Russian-led. This

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[15]See, for example, Peter Jarman, 'Ethnic cleansing in the Northern Caucasus', *Moscow News*, 6, February 11-17, 1994, p. 13.

reflects a belief that the CIS umbrella could offer greater legitimacy, or at least respectability, to these operations and serve to some extent to spread the financial and military burden borne so far principally by Russia.[16] The notion of 'CIS operations' has also included the expression of persistent Russian efforts to create a collective defence identity and some kind of joint military organisational framework within the CIS.

A Treaty on Collective Security was signed by Russia, Armenia and the Central Asian CIS states except Turkmenistan at the Tashkent summit in May 1992. It was accompanied by two decisions: first, to set up CIS forces designed to prevent local conflicts on the external borders of the CIS, and second, to establish collective peacekeeping forces. These decisions were partly the outgrowth of an earlier Russian impulse, even before the collapse of the USSR, to replace regular military forces in regions of inter-ethnic conflict with special-purpose units of MVD troops tasked to resolve such conflicts.[17]

A succession of CIS meetings failed to reach agreement to develop joint forces to prevent local conflicts under the CIS aegis and therefore frustrated the plans by CIS Joint Armed Forces staff officers during 1992-3 to develop peacekeeping forces as the bottom rung of a ladder of escalating intervention (see below on peacekeeping doctrine). The other option raised at the 1992 Tashkent CIS summit, the establishment of collective peacekeeping forces — in which CIS states assign armed units for peacekeeping — has also remained unfulfilled. The activities of Russian peacekeeping forces have been governed so far mainly by a series of (formal or informal) bilateral agreements between the states concerned rather than by CIS multilateral treaties. The CIS states, other than Russia, have been very hesitant in their actual commitment to peacekeeping, despite the adoption of fine-sounding resolutions at CIS meetings.

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[16]This may be optimistic, especially if Russia continues its efforts to control any such operations. However, such control does not necessarily preclude the financial burden being spread. The 16 May 1994 agreement to establish a peacekeeping operation for Nagorno-Karabakh stipulates that Russia will contribute only a token 1% of the costs.

[17]The intention to create such 'rapid action' troubleshooting units, formed of internal troops, was announced by USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Barannikov in November 1991; see Tass World Service, 6 November 1991, in SU/1224 B/2. This was preceded by a decree by Yeltsin to form 'inter-republican special-purpose units for participation in resolving inter-ethnic conflicts'; see *Sovetskaya rossiya*, 14 December 1990.

Initially, a CIS summit in Kiev in March 1992 produced an agreement on 'Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS', signed by ten of the eleven CIS states. It set out important principles:

* that the decision to use such forces be adopted 'only in the event of a request being made by all the conflicting sides, and also on condition that agreement is reached between them on a cessation of fire and other hostile actions before the peacekeeping group is sent';

* that 'the peacekeeping group may not be used for participation in combat actions';

* that it should be formed 'on a voluntary basis by the states that are party to this agreement, with the exception of the conflicting parties'.[18]

But decisions taken at CIS summits later in 1992 to establish CIS peacekeepers and military observers under the CIS Joint Armed Forces command led to the loss of a number of the original CIS signatories. Indeed, only four Central Asian states, Moldova, Armenia and Russia signed a protocol at a CIS summit in July 1992 which required each of them to establish and train forces and military observers for peacekeeping operations. It also established a broad operational doctrine which permitted peacekeepers to return fire in self-defence and use force to separate warring parties.

This appeared to be a response to the expansion of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after the former Soviet army and MVD units were withdrawn from the region. The Russian and Kazakh presidents favoured setting up 'interstate restraining forces within the CIS framework in place of the troops that have been withdrawn.'[19] The CIS Bishkek summit in September 1992 proceeded to an agreement that the CIS Joint Armed Forces command would be responsible for the operational command of peacekeeping forces once individual countries had decided to take part in a given action. However, no standing CIS peacekeeping force resulted; the idea fell victim to Russian attempts to reassert central control over CIS

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[18]'Agreement on groups of military observers and collective peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States', signed on 20 March 1992; Itar-Tass World Service, 23 March 1992, in SU/1339 C2/2-3.

[19]As related by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan; interview in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 5 March 1992.

armed forces overall, which were rejected by other CIS states in a period of nationalist assertion. In July 1993 the CIS Joint Military Command was downgraded to a 'coordinating body' with no command authority.

The conflict in Tajikistan has since late 1993 provided a means for the former Joint CIS Command idea (which transcends the scope of the 1992 Treaty on Collective Security) gradually to revive as pressures have built up for a broader reintegration within the CIS. Russia has simultaneously promoted the CIS as a regional organisation in peacekeeping terms. But this diplomatic campaign and renewed efforts to develop some form of CIS defence alliance should not disguise Russia's continued determination to dominate in peacekeeping operations on the soil of the FSU (whether or not they have a CIS label).

A formal agreement on a 'collective' operation in Tajikistan signed in September 1993 obliges Russia and the Central Asian states of the CIS, apart from Turkmenistan, to dispatch military units to the region.[20] In principle the 201st MRD and Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz battalions are to be operationally subordinated to the Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF). But in fact the Russian ground troops commander is directly in command of the 201st MRD, while subunits from the other CIS states are under the command of their respective ministries of defence. The CPF possesses neither its own soldiers nor logistic support. Its former commander, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov claimed that 'all planned peacekeeping operations are coordinated with the defence ministers of the signatory countries [to the September 1993 agreement] and are implemented only with their approval'. But this claim is rather academic, since only the 201st MRD is fit for combat and, to complicate matters further, a serious internal disagreement has arisen between the CPF commander and the commander of the 201st MRD.[21]

In February 1994 the CIS role was formally extended when nine CIS defence ministers (excluding those from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) signed a document obliging each member state to send peacekeeping troops

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[20]'Agreement on collective peacemaking forces and joint measures on the material and technical supply', in *Military News Bulletin*, 10, October 1993, pp. 1-2.

[21]See reports in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 21 December 1993; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 24 December 1993. Pyankov's views are explicit in the interviews 'My obyazany utverdit' mir v Tadzhikistane', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 November 1993 and in *Pravda*, 18 January 1994. The current commander of the 201st Division is Colonel Yuri Naumov.

to Tajikistan.[22] Russia appeared to view this agreement more as a means to gain international approval or legitimacy for peacekeeping operations in the region than as a practical step towards joint military coordination. The non-Russian forces still offer little effective military contribution in Tajikistan, despite the staging of a limited joint Russian-Uzbek-Tajik military exercise in March 1994 and the promise of more such exercises.[23] An Uzbek battalion of 350 men has been deployed in a rear area of Tajikistan, probably for political ends (in a region where the population is half ethnic Uzbek), and a weak Kyrgyz battalion of 286 men has been stationed in Badakhshan but domestic pressure in Bishkek could force its withdrawal, while the Kazakh battalion of the CPF has failed so far to materialize.[24]

The February CIS agreement on Tajikistan was probably also intended to allay growing worries among a number of CIS states, including Central Asian ones, over the deployment of Russian-only peacekeeping forces in troubled former Soviet republics.[25] Such states are aware that some of the earlier principles for (and constraints on) CIS peacekeeping first promoted in 1992 have been supplanted by new, more assertive principles for Russian peacekeeping operations. A CIS 'Permanent Consultative Committee for Peacekeeping Operations' has now been established, but the ability of other CIS states to dilute Russian peacekeeping operations through setting them in a putative CIS framework is not promising. At a meeting of CIS defence ministers in July 1994, the Russian Defence Minister reacted angrily to the refusal of his CIS counterparts to contribute military personnel and funds to peacekeeping operations.

The Council for Collective Security of the CIS agreed, at a CIS summit in Moscow on 15 April 1994, on a protocol sanctioning the use of Russian troops to separate Azeri and Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The parties to the CIS collective security agreement also agreed in principle to deploy military contingents from their states as peacekeeping

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[22]*RFE/RL News Brief*, vol. 3, no. 10, 1994.

[23]See article by Y. Golotyuk in *Sevodnya*, 29 March 1994.

[24]See article by Boris Vinogradov in *Izvestiya*, 3 March 1994.

[25]Kazakh President Nazarbayev explicitly opposed this option during a visit to Britain in March 1994. As reported in *Financial Times*, 23 March 1994.

forces in Abzhazia if no UN agreement on peacekeeping in this region could be achieved. In practice this has provided Russia with a CIS mandate to deploy locally predominantly Russian peacekeeping units in these two regions.

A real dilution of Russian CIS forces would only follow if Ukraine (although it lies outside the CIS Council for Collective Security) or Belarus (despite its self-imposed restriction on deploying its forces outside its borders) were to offer peacekeeping units for CIS operations. But this is unlikely so long as the promotion of CIS military structures appears to be a vehicle for resuscitating a Russian-dominated 'defensive union'. This suspicion of Russian intentions is likely to inhibit any Ukrainian contribution to CIS-mandated peacekeeping efforts even if Kiev becomes more involved in CIS military structures (perhaps through participation in the CIS Defence Ministerial Council) under President Kuchma.

RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The scale and content of Russian-led peacekeeping or 'peace-enforcing' operations on the territory of the former USSR will be determined to a large degree by the military and military-economic means at the disposal of the Russian Federation. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the viability of Russian plans to create a new force structure, within which certain units earmarked for peacekeeping duties could be developed.

Russian mobile forces

Russian forces designated for peacekeeping will form part of the state's new Mobile Force structure, even though their training and mission mean that their role should not be viewed simply as an extension of the activities of rapid deployment forces in the spectrum of conflict (despite the views of some Russian officers and earlier CIS General Staff plans).

It is true that in the current transitional period specialised military units (the Airborne and Special Designation (Spetsnaz) forces) and those of the Ministry of the Interior of the former USSR may be used for muscular 'peace-enforcing' duties. But these forces are not properly structured for

this mission and are in high demand for other tasks.[26] They are better able to provide the core of the new Russian Mobile Force structure.

In autumn 1992, when Moscow took stock of its military inheritance from the Soviet Union, the Russian state found it was left with almost no combat-ready reserves, and what still existed could only be dispatched to trouble spots with difficulty. Since then plans have been developed rapidly.

Overall, the Mobile Forces will total some 100,000 men and be based largely (60%) on airborne troops, but they will include some motor rifle formations, equipped with light weapons, which can be airlifted, naval infantry, military transport aircraft and logistic units. Planned light Mobile Forces of about five division equivalents could in principle be centred on units from the 76th Pskov and 106th Tula Airborne Divisions (ABDs) plus a number of special units.[27]

Initially it was reported that the Mobile Forces might be composed of an Instant Deployment Force (capable of deploying in 3-5 days) and a Rapid Deployment Force (capable of deploying in 30 days, each having a strength of 100,000 to 150,000 men).[28] But a structure capable of a much faster response is now envisaged. In December 1993 Grachev referred to a force on permanent stand-by and able to mobilise in 4-10 hours (an 'Immediate Reaction Force'), while the Rapid Deployment Force (as in the NATO concept) should be ready to move within three days.[29]

In terms of deployment, the Volga and Urals Military Districts are becoming the central base for the Mobile Forces, which need to be located in the centre of Russia and capable of being airlifted anywhere there is a

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[26]The problem is illustrated by the fact that in January 1990 a partial mobilization had to be carried out in the Northern Caucasian Military District for the rather limited operation in Baku.

[27]Another structure suggested by the Airborne Forces commander envisages mobile forces, for immediate response purposes, of two airborne divisions, three airborne brigades, several helicopter regiments from ground forces army aviation, three marine infantry battalions and some air defence and communications units.

[28]For detailed proposals for the structure of these forces see ibid., and S. Ovsienko, 'Sily bystrogo reagirovaniya', *Rossiyskie vesti*, 5 March 1993.

[29]This structure was predicted as early as July 1993 by the Airborne Troops commander, Colonel-General Ye. Podkolzin, in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 31 July 1993. See also Colonel O. Vladykin, 'Mobil'nye sily rossii', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 December 1992.

threat (though the 76th and 106th ABDs are not centrally located).[30] Russia initially designated a special division in the Volga Military District for peacekeeping (the 27th MRD redeployed in 1992 from east Germany) and some of its units have already executed missions. The division retains its full combined-arms structure, however, and is subsumed within the new Rapid Reaction element of the Russian Mobile Force structure.[31] More recently, a second division, the 45th MRD (from the Leningrad Military District), has also been assigned to peacekeeping missions. It has been suggested that these two divisions should acquire a new organizational staff structure and greater autonomy for their subunits in peacekeeping missions.[32]

Irrespective of reorganisations in the Volga MD, south Russia (Stavropol-Krasnodar-Rostov-Don) is becoming the main regional base area for the Mobile Forces and for specific peacekeeping forces drawn from them. A grouping of these forces is intended to form a firebreak, since the North Caucasus is viewed as the most dangerous region for the next few years and the most obvious focus for peacekeeping. Consequently the North Caucasus Military District is being reorganised, into a 'border-adjacent military district'.[33] Mobile Forces are being established there on the basis of two airborne brigades (which have already been formed), an airborne division, two motor rifle brigades, and several elements of military transport and army aviation.[34] New units and subunits are being set up for the 49th Army based at Krasnodar.

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[30]See interview of Chief of General Staff Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, in *Armiya*, no. 9, 1993, pp. 25-8.

[31]For a full breakdown of the distribution of units which could be used as the basis of the Russian Mobile Forces, see Colonel O. Vladykin, 'Mobil'nye sily Rossii', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 December 1992.

[32]Article by Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 February 1994.

[33]See Yeltsin's edict of 15 March 1993 on the reform of the Russian military in the North Caucasus, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 March 1993.

[34]Statement by Grachev reported by Interfax, 2 March 1993, in SU/1628 C1/1. Although next month Grachev reported that five additional Motor Rifle brigades, rather than two, had been attached to the district; interfax, Moscow 16 April 1993, in SU/1668 C1/4.

Despite the special emphasis on the North Caucasus, recent reports suggest that compact, mobile units are likely to be formed in all Russian military districts. One is even planned for Western Kaliningrad, which will become a special defence area. Such ambitions raise practical questions. Defence Minister Grachev may well obtain the bulk of the resources he needs to meet the requirements of the Mobile Forces overall. This will probably be done by revitalising the units withdrawn from the Baltics and Germany, and by the construction of new facilities and bases,[35] but peacekeeping demands will eat into the funds available in the defence budget for these larger purposes, and certain key weaknesses in developing the Mobile Forces and their peacekeeping elements remain. Indeed, despite the recent reconstitution of Russia's armed forces, there appears to be a growing, politically dangerous gap between Russian ambitions for peacekeeping and the resources available to perform the tasks envisaged, especially in relation to Tajikistan.

Problem areas and new demands

First, military bases are still lacking in Russia for elements of the new Mobile Forces. For example, the 104th ABD, which was withdrawn to Russia from Gyandzha, Azerbaijan, in February-March 1993, has been without basing facilities and so unable to function as a military entity. For peacekeeping (whether or not benign), this problem is compounded by the uncertain status of military base arrangements in CIS states. It is true that in April 1994 Yeltsin issued a directive for the Russian Foreign Ministry and MOD to negotiate and sign agreements on military bases in CIS states, but the huge costs which Russia would need to bear may lead to the abandonment of this plan.[36]

Secondly, the lack of strategic airlift (much of it lost to Ukraine and Belarus) seriously hampers mobility. It would make it very difficult, for

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[35]P. Baev, 'Russia's rapid reaction forces: politics and pitfalls', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, 9, February 1993, pp. 15-16.

[36]See article by P. Felgengauer in *Sevodnya*, 8 April 1994.

example, to deploy mobile units from the Far East and Siberia to areas of potential conflict in western sectors.[37]

Thirdly, continuing conscription problems for the armed forces as a whole are reflected in undermanning, even in the case of the key 27th MRD. This division has only 8,500 men, a deficit of 2,000), even though it has been earmarked as a basic unit for peacekeeping missions (and was chosen to conduct the postponed joint exercises with the 3rd Infantry Division of the US Army).[38] In general it has been difficult to attract volunteers to specialist peacekeeping subunits, since the salaries offered, which are still low, provide insufficient compensation for the more hazardous duties involved. This problem has been well aired in the Russian military press.[39] In March 1994 it was announced that, in the previous eighteen months, 105 Russian servicemen had been killed in the 'near abroad' and almost 200 wounded.[40]

The general erosion and degradation of the military forces overall has not yet been arrested, and continued uncertainty over military budget allocations, which could have grave consequences for the integrity of the armed forces, exacerbates such problems. The limited funds available for peacekeeping activities, which continue to be funded from the central defence budget, means that Russian decisions in this area frequently can only be taken at high levels for budgetary reasons. Cost criteria may explain the view expressed in March 1994 by Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev (who is responsible for peacekeeping operations) that 'a limit

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[37]For an analysis of the Russian need for a programme for the development of its military transport aviation see 'Uderzhitsya li "Ruslan" v nebesakh?', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 December 1993.

[38]P. Baev, 'Russia's armed forces: spontaneous demobilisation?', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, no. 13, February 1994, p. 11.

[39]See, for example, article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Kutishchev in *Voyennyy vestnik*, 7 July 1993, pp. 16-17.

[40]Statement by Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev, Russia TV channel, 22 March 1994, in SU/1954 S1/3.

be set' on the permitted participation of Russian servicemen in operations in 'hot spots'.[41]

The specific weaknesses outlined here should be measured against the growing and perhaps open-ended demands of peacekeeping or peace enforcement in the former CIS. The principal immediate challenge for Russia is the conflict in Tajikistan. In autumn 1993 some 25,000 men were loosely earmarked for peacekeeping there,[42] yet only a fraction of that number have been specially trained. In fact Defence Minister Grachev admitted in February 1994 that Russia had in total only 16,000 troops capable of carrying out peacekeeping operations (whatever their level of training) throughout the territory of the former USSR.[43] Russian mobile reserves remain very limited in number. In autumn 1993 it was estimated by one well-informed analyst that Russia could not put more than 15-20,000 men on the Tajik border unless it mobilised reserves or drafted students into the army (indeed the latter soon took place). But their potential military opponents in Afghanistan would continue to outnumber such a force.[44]

The danger in tying down well trained forces in Tajikistan is obvious at a time when the stability of the Russian Federation itself is being threatened, particularly in the North Caucasus, and requirements here may resemble those of peacekeeping outside Russia's borders. The Russian Border Troops (some 100,000 strong) cannot be relied on effectively to guard the borders of the Russian Federation where this is necessary, since

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[41]Statement in the Russian State Duma during discussions on the draft federal law on peacekeeping, in *Sevodnya*, 17 March 1994.

[42]Lieutenant-General Boris Pyankov on Mayak Radio, 29 September 1993, in SU/1808 S1/4. It is necessary to keep in mind also that the call to assign large numbers of troops for peacekeeping and the military emphasis on peacekeeping requirements may also be used as an attempt by Russian military leaders to reverse cuts in the overall military budget.

[43]Reuters report of Grachev on 4 February in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 7-11 February 1994. In March Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev set the number of Russian peacekeepers at 16,500; *Sevodnya*, 17 March 1994.

[44]P. Felgengauer in *Sevodnya*, 13 August 1993. At the same time the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan have a significant arsenal at their disposal. In January 1994, according to Pyankov, this included up to 2,000 tanks, 350 infantry fighting vehicles, 350 artillery pieces, aviation and helicopters (see *Rossiya*, no. 4, 26 January 1994-1 February 1994, p. 5; in JPRS-UMA-94-009, 4 March 1994, p. 20).

most of Russia's southern borders lack border installations, while the task of keeping order within the Russian Federation can no longer be reliably left to MVD troops and those of the former KGB.

Of some 70,000 Russian MVD troops, 40,000 are largely confined to static duties. Only 30,000 Operational Designation (Opnaz) forces have some mobility and are militarily equipped. Efforts to boost the numerical strength of the MVD troops are hard to fulfil since the shortage of conscripts affects this area also. Therefore, the new Russian military doctrine envisages that Russian armed forces units may be enlisted to help MVD troops 'in localizing and blockading the conflict region, suppressing armed clashes, and separating the conflicting sides and also in defending strategically important installations.' The armed forces may also have to assist the Border Guards in their various missions.[45]

To the extent that tensions in the Russian Federation absorb the capacities of regular military personnel this will constrain and weaken any peacekeeping operations in CIS states, or at least siphon off the units trained for more sophisticated non-combat roles. Such tensions, or political strife in Moscow, would also be likely to diminish the effectiveness of central control of outlying Russian forces despite the best efforts of the Russian Defence Ministry.

PEACEKEEPING IN RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

Certain characteristic principles that are to be observed in Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations are beginning to emerge, partly as a result of practice on the ground (from which implicit principles may be derived) and partly from the statements of military and political leaders. It may be premature to speak of a Russian or CIS peacekeeping doctrine, but certain doctrinal strands are discernible. Russian military views are particularly influential in the development of such principles.

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[45]As set down in the new Russian military doctrine, 'Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii', in *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1993.

The military high command as a lobby

The most controversial aspect of any attempt to identify such principles is the contention that they reflect a covert Russian agenda (though one increasingly visible), that they have been devised to promote a combination of military and diplomatic goals for Russia in the 'near abroad'. This possibility is examined more fully later, but the influence on Russian peacekeeping 'doctrine' of a nationalist-minded military lobby should be addressed at this stage.

This hypothesis is supported first by the claim that there exists a caucus, composed of the highest-ranking Russian military commanders, which is openly engaged in military-political actions in CIS states under the guise of 'peacekeeping'. This is not to deny that this caucus of generals may itself be divided over the acceptable extent of military intervention (see below), or that there may be frictions between officers representing the Russian Defence Ministry and those formally attached to CIS structures or the MVD.[46] It could be argued, however, that the members of this powerful military clique have together pressed for an activist military role in the CIS to support Russian minorities and to settle secessionist or ethnically inspired conflicts on terms favourable to Russia.

The May 1992 General Staff draft military doctrine for Russia tried to assign a new role to the armed forces: 'the defence of the rights and interests of citizens of Russia and people linked with it ethnically and culturally abroad.'[47] The wording of the document on military doctrine finally adopted in November 1993 significantly refers more narrowly to a

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[46]This clique includes Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov (a former commander of Russian forces in Afghanistan who now is responsible for Russian troops abroad and CIS activities), Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Georgi Kondratyev (the commander currently responsible for peacekeeping operations; he commanded Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia after initially taking part in the introduction of peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia), Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed (the 14th Army commander in Moldova), and Colonel-General Viktor Sorokin (who headed the task force of Russian troops in Abkhazia during November 1992-March 1993). For short biographies of these generals see *Moscow News*, 14, 9 April 1993. For a profile of Sorokin see *Krasnaya zvezda*, 20 March 1993.

[47]'Osnovy voennoy doktriny Rossii', *Voennaya mysl'*, May 1992, special issue, pp. 4 and 7.

danger arising from the 'suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states.'[48] None the less, an assumption of a broader Russian commitment to Russian-speaking communities in CIS states is popular among the Russian military élite. While the issue of endangered Russians has not been paramount in the South Ossetian, Abkhaz and arguably even the Tajik conflicts, and has been absent from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it could be a vital factor in various possible future conflicts.

Secondly, the case could be advanced that the Russian Defence Ministry itself appears to view peacekeeping to a significant extent as a means of promoting Russian security interests and legitimising the Russian troop presence in certain of the Soviet successor states. It also provides these troops with an active and immediate function. The Russian Defence Ministry has tended to oppose Western involvement in CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations (see below) and has maintained strong operational control over the three established peacekeeping operations within former Soviet borders (in South Ossetia and Moldova since mid-1992 and in Tajikistan since December 1992).[49] It seems that in general the Russian Defence Ministry would prefer a free hand and therefore favours as unclear a peacekeeping mandate as possible.

This institutional interest has, however, been camouflaged by statements by the Russian high command, which carefully combine diplomatic and military approaches to peacekeeping. Defence Minister Grachev has only exceptionally let his guard slip to support more belligerent views.[50] Thus in autumn 1993 he claimed that Russian forces in Georgia should maintain strict neutrality and refrain from combat in the regional

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[48]'Osnovye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1993.

[49]See J. Green, 'The peacekeeping doctrines of the CIS', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, April 1993, pp. 158-9.

[50]For example, after an attack on a Russian-held border post by Tajik rebels and Afghan *Mujaheddin*, Grachev promised to develop adequate measures 'to restrain the enemy and inflict such destruction on him that nobody will dare lift up their hand against the Russian people again.' Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 16 July 1993, in SU/1744 C2/1.

conflict.[51] Similarly Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Boris Gromov has argued that peacekeeping forces only have a chance of success if an agreement exists between the opposing sides, and troops are sent in with their consent. He claims to accept that peace cannot be enforced.[52]

Yet such statements may also reflect some real military anxieties. The trauma of Soviet failure in Afghanistan in the 1980s induces caution over the idea of dispatching troops outside the home country in the absence of a firm political consensus on the policy to be pursued in the conflict — in current circumstances this applies particularly to Tajikistan. Russian commanders may not be fully convinced by the argument that if the Tajik domino falls the Uzbek one will follow, and so on. Moreover, some officers in the high command are concerned that the participation of the army in peacekeeping operations results in an unnecessary and undesirable politicization of the army. On the basis of their professional instincts, they would prefer to avoid the army being pulled further into such internal political contests.

The Russian military command is probably not united, therefore, in promoting a military-diplomatic campaign under the banner of peacekeeping. It is also important to recognise that a significant and rapidly moving debate has arisen among Russian military commanders on the appropriate training, structure and role for the nascent 'peacekeeping forces' in the CIS. This debate may extend to the highest levels and divide Grachev and Deputy Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev, who associate themselves with one view of peace enforcement, from Chief of General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov and Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov, who may represent an alternative, much more interventionist approach. The debate under way expresses differing underlying principles and doctrinal assumptions. Its outcome will be crucial in determining the character of Russian peacekeeping or peace enforcement in the former USSR.

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[51]In article by V. Urban, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 September 1993.

[52]Interview in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 27 November 1993.

Training, structure and duties: the dominant view

One view, which should be regarded at least as quasi-official, is associated with the centre for training units in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace support operations which has been established by the Russian Defence Ministry in Totskoye, Volga Military District, on the southern Russian-Kazakhstan border. Here, the 27th Guards Motor Rifle Division (commanded by Major-General Anatoly Sidyakin) is being reconstituted into a peacekeeping division under the supervision of the First Deputy Commander of the Volga MD, Lieutenant-General Anatoly Shapovalov.

Battalion-size task forces from this division have already been operating in South Ossetia and the Transdniester region. So far three battalions with a new organic structure have been formed from the division. They are armed only with light weapons, armoured personnel carriers, and troop transport trucks. They lack artillery, tanks and air defence weapons, but a reserve of artillery, helicopters and aircraft may be formed and used to pursue 'illegal armed formations' in support of a peacekeeping battalion.

The battalion troop training programme for peacekeeping forces includes training in establishing contacts between opposing sides in a conflict zone, traffic monitoring, security and communications, operating checkpoints and patrolling. In actual operations, peacekeeping forces are said to be committed to separating hostile sides in a conflict region and to establishing a demilitarized zone.[53]

In contrast to traditional UN peacekeeping practice, however, these Russian 'peacekeepers' are ready forcefully to separate the opposing sides before a cease-fire has come into effect. Their duties, as described by Shapovalov, include 'the pursuit, apprehension or destruction by fire of groups and individuals who are not following the rules of a given situation'. The impression is that combatants will be pressed very hard by the Russian forces to reach agreements. At the same time the prospects for impartiality in the use of force will be helped by the fact that direct control of

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[53]These objectives are similar to the actual practice of peacekeeping in the North Caucasus. Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Shirinsky, deputy commander of the peacekeeping contingent there describes its duties as follows: confiscating illegal weapons; locating and destroying 'bandit groups'; developing a 'security zone' where peacekeepers are directly responsible for the security of the local population; escorting convoys carrying food and other products; and maintaining a curfew in one town. *Syn rodiny*, 40, 1993, p. 1; cited in *Former Soviet Union Fifteen Nations: Policy and Security*, February 1994, p. 38.

peacekeeping forces in a region will be exercised by a Joint Staff composed of representatives from both the Russian Armed Forces and from combatants in the conflict zone.[54]

Training, structure and duties: alternative views

This more official position (at least to date) on the training, structure and duties of Russian peacekeeping forces has been criticised by certain Russian military officers who promote a still more assertive view of the requirements of peacekeeping, or in reality peace enforcement, operations. Such views may find sympathy from key figures such as Generals Boris Gromov and Mikhail Kolesnikov.

For example, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Zhilin of the Volga MD points to the experience of peace enforcement in the Transdniester region, where the carnage in the town of Bendery was ended by the actions of the Russian 14th Army before the formal peacekeeping units were set up. He argues that 'surprise, precise, powerful, pre-emptive strikes, as well as the availability of back-up mobile armoured groups, forced the initiators of the military conflict to come to the negotiating table.' Zhilin scorns the decision to set up light peacekeeping battalions which do not have a reserve of artillery and mobile forces. He supports the view of Lieutenant-General Alexander Lebed (the controversial commander of the 14th Army in Moldova) that a readiness for decisive action and absolute superiority in force will deter and break the will of opponents of the 'peacekeeping forces'.

This alternative assessment leads to the conclusion that 'the men in the blue helmets must have real power': they should be backed by a powerful strike force of long-range artillery groups, combat helicopters and ground attack aircraft, and have a mobile reserve of tactical armoured or mechanized forces. From this perspective a division of peacekeeping forces (as part of the Russian rapid reaction forces) could include 12 separate

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[54]See interview of Volga MD First Deputy Commander, Lieutenant-General A. Shapovalov, in *Voyennyy vestnik*, 22 March 1993, pp. 2-5. See assessment of this also in Major M. Davis, 'Russian "peacemaking operations": an issue of national security?', 'Pink Paper', 20 September 1993, distributed by Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs, Office of NATO Secretary-General.

motor rifle battalions, of which four would be 'heavy', that is equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Taking account of additional support elements, this structure is comparable to a US mechanized division.[55]

Russian doctrine on peacekeeping: emerging military principles

The first, less assertive set of views outlined here is currently shaping Russia's nascent doctrine on peacekeeping, but over time the advocates of powerful, less constrained enforcement operations could become more influential.

In this period of flux it is important to consider the formal programme for training Russian units in peacekeeping forces, which has been developed by the Chief Directorate of Combat Training for the ground forces. In the words of Lieutenant-General Shapovalov it is 'based on the programme for the UN "blue helmets" and with a regard for our experience in Afghanistan, the Transcaucasus and other "hot" spots.'[56] The problem is that an emphasis on the latter experiences overshadows reference to UN practice. This is implicit in Russia's abandonment of certain broad principles — guidelines based on UN conduct — which were contained in the documents on peacekeeping forces adopted at CIS summits in 1992.

In particular Russia now accepts that peacekeeping forces may be introduced into zones where fighting is still taking place; and that the states contributing troops need not be neutral, but may be involved in the conflict (though Russia tends to deny that it is itself a party to such conflicts). We may infer certain other military principles and operational characteristics of Russian peacekeeping or peace enforcement.[57]

The first of these is a readiness to use considerable force (the precondition stressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Zhilin). Russian commanders have sought to ensure that they have preponderant forces available so that

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[55]Lieutenant-Colonel G. Zhilin in *Voyennyy vestnik*, no. 9, September 1993, pp. 17-19.

[56]*Voyennyy vestnik*, 22 March 1993, p. 5.

[57]See the excellent analysis by J. Green, 'The peacekeeping doctrines of the CIS', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, April 1993, pp. 156-9. This is drawn from the longer assessment 'Russia's "peacekeeping doctrine"; The CIS, Russia and the General Staff', unpublished paper, NATO - SHAPE, Brussels, February 1993.

they can dominate the local military situation and forcibly separate warring parties. The Russians have also maintained their pre-eminence *within* multinational peacekeeping forces qualitatively and quantitatively. This has enabled them to control joint commissions established to oversee these operations.

Other characteristics are more encouraging, and indicate that Moscow is mindful of certain international norms and expectations. Thus Russia has resolved that peacekeepers be specially trained professional soldiers. This is shown in the intention to turn the 201st MRD into the first completely professional Russian division. Russia has tried also to maintain an image of operational neutrality for its own forces in peacekeeping activities — even in Tajikistan, where it is formally present to support the Tajik government.

But such principles are being challenged by the military 'opposition', which draws support from earlier plans developed by staff officers of the CIS Joint Armed Forces during 1992-93 (before the Joint Staff was downgraded to a military coordination body in July 1993). These officers (who were largely Russian) had been tasked to plan the structure of joint CIS 'forces to prevent local wars', as envisaged by the Tashkent CIS summit in 1992. But in doing this they tended to merge the concept for such forces — essentially forces for low intensity operations and a variety of internal security missions — with those appropriate for 'peacekeeping'. In other words, 'forces to prevent local conflicts' were assigned a combat role and the peacekeeping mission was integrated into the spectrum of conflict.[58] In this way the 'peacekeeping forces' would be fused with the 'Immediate Reaction Forces' and, if the escalation of conflict justified this, with the 'Rapid Reaction Forces' under development by Russia (as outlined above).

Arguments in favour of integrating forces which are assigned a combat role with those earmarked for peacekeeping or peace enforcement, of removing the essential distinction between these functions, are still alive among some Russian officers. For example, they are reflected in the views of Lieutenant-Colonel Zhilin. Such thinking could become more widespread and begin to influence Russian military planning for crises in the 'near abroad' if the expanding and essentially Russian involvement in Tajikistan

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[58]This strain of thinking in the CIS General Staff is noted by Green in 'The peacekeeping doctrines of the CIS', p. 158.

crosses new military thresholds. This option may be encouraged by current efforts to revive the staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.[59]

This fluidity in Russian military thinking makes the idea of even limited joint Russian-American peacekeeping exercises, originally scheduled for July 1994, more sensitive than appears on the surface. The unprecedented command and staff exercises planned for units of the US Army 3rd Mechanized Division and those of the Russian 27th Guards MRD took place in September 1994 at Totskoye in the Volga Military District — the main Russian training centre for peacekeeping operations. The 27th MRD has been designated for inclusion in the UN's reserve of peacekeeping forces but has little experience of interacting with the peacekeeping forces of other countries. The exercises were aimed *inter alia* at 'working out a single standard of documentation for coalition peacekeeping forces; working out similar approaches to the tactics of peacekeeping forces in the performance of joint tasks.'[60] Although this joint approach was aimed at operations outside the CIS, such as Bosnia, given the Russian debate on peacekeeping requirements in the CIS, Russian officers and deputies may have been reluctant to expose the nature of their peacekeeping training and restructuring to American scrutiny at this sensitive time.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING IN THE CIS REGION

The reluctance of most of the international community to accept the phenomenon of unconstrained Russian or Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping activities in the Soviet successor states has led to an intensive search during 1993-94 for institutional mechanisms for broader international engagement in CIS conflicts. This effort has been accompanied by strenuous Russian diplomatic lobbying, which shows an awareness in Moscow that unilateral peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations by

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[59]In April 1994 the first commander of the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov, was appointed deputy commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. His special experience confirms the link between peacekeeping efforts and larger plans for developing joint CIS military forces.

[60]Interview of first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian land forces, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 5 March 1994.

Russia could freeze the developing partnership with the Western states and seriously damage the international image of the new Russian state.

At the same time, even the more Western-oriented of Russian politicians are under domestic nationalist and military pressure to stabilise CIS frontiers lest they threaten Russian borderlands further, to identify Russian strategic interests in the CIS and to protect Russian-speaking communities from civil strife. These contrary impulses are expressed in Russian attitudes towards the potential roles of outside states and international organisations in the unfolding conflicts in the Soviet successor states.

Increasingly, however, Russian statesmen have emphasised the need to deny or limit such foreign involvement in the CIS region — an emphasis reinforced by the controversy over NATO air strikes in Bosnia and sustained by the efforts to advance the CIS as a regional organisation. This section considers the potential contribution towards peacekeeping in the FSU of non-CIS states and international bodies against the background of these fluid Russian perspectives.

The Russian diplomatic campaign

Since spring 1993 Russian statesmen have led a diplomatic campaign for international approval and possible assistance (especially financial) for Russian 'peacekeeping' activities in the former USSR. In this campaign the Russian Foreign Ministry has tended to project a softer, more conciliatory line than that adopted by Russian military officers on the correct use of peacekeeping forces, arguing that their deployment should comply with international law. This emphasis could be expected of diplomats and may also have reflected Kozyrev's personal interest in international organisations. To some extent Russian diplomats have viewed peacekeeping as an instrument for raising the prestige of Russia, both in the 'near abroad' and internationally. But a more self-interested interpretation of peacekeeping has been promoted since autumn 1993 as a new, more nationalist consensus on Russian foreign policy interests has established itself in Moscow.

From the outset the international debate has revolved around the nature and legitimacy of Russian intervention in conflicts in former Soviet states, in particular the limits of unilateral action. Yeltsin's initial call, in

March 1993, for 'international organisations, including the United Nations, to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in the region of the former USSR' suggests that he was claiming exclusive rights and obligations for Moscow. Certainly the Baltic states and Ukraine interpreted his appeal as a crude attempt to apply a Monroe Doctrine to cover the successor states, in breach of international legal norms.

International scepticism about regional Russian-led (nominally CIS) peacekeeping operations has reflected in the first place Russia's failure to maintain credible impartiality in the conflicts in question and, secondly, the use of other non-neutral contingents (such as Georgians in Georgia or Moldovans in Moldova). Russian statesmen have failed to take these concerns seriously. In September 1993, speaking before the United Nations, Foreign Minister Kozyrev dismissed the problem posed by such 'unconventional methods' and recommended that such methods be employed and also introduced in other conflicts. Proposing a UN mandate for certain operations in the former Soviet Union, during autumn 1993 Kozyrev claimed that 'the fact that methods which the United Nations does not normally use are being employed in these conflicts (for example, direct participation by the warring sides themselves in the peacekeeping contingents, and, with their consent, that of neighbouring states) cannot be an argument against mounting such operations under the organisation's flag.'[61]

In the absence so far of such properly constituted CIS forces or of more effective UN assistance (even if this does not extend to the provision of UN contingents — see below) Kozyrev has maintained that there could be 'simply no alternative to Russia's peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet area'. Russia was filling a 'vacuum', for example in Abkhazia, which otherwise 'quite different forces might rush to fill'[62] — an ambiguous reference which indicates strategic considerations as much as the wish to ward off anarchy. However, the Russian commitment to stability

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[61]Speech by Kozyrev to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1993, as reported by S. Crow, 'Russia asserts its strategic agenda', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 50, 17 December 1993, p. 4; although these points are not evident in the report of the speech by Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28 September 1993, in SU/1807 B/3-4. They are explicit, however, in Kozyrev's article 'OON: trevogi i nadezhdy mira', in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 30 October 1993.

[62]*Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 30 October 1993.

in such regions is vitally bound up with its own national interests, on two levels. First, in the form it has taken it tends to uphold a Russian strategic presence and influence. Secondly, it is tied to the specific issue of the Russian ethnic and cultural diaspora.

Irrespective of Russian military-strategic thinking, the presence of communities of ethnic Russians and Russified non-Russians in many of the crisis zones of the former USSR (though significantly not in Nagorno-Karabakh) makes it very difficult in practice for Moscow to maintain a neutral presence (even where such groups are not acknowledged as Russian citizens). This is especially the case at a time of a resurgence of nationalism throughout Russia. Russia, Kozyrev has informed the UN, 'has made peacemaking and the protection of human rights, particularly that of national minorities, the priority of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory of the former USSR.'[63] The linkage between peacekeeping and the protection of Russian-speaking minorities is one which threatens the national self-identity of many of the newly independent states.

This perception of a threat is shared both by states which host Russian-led peacekeepers, such as Georgia, and those with disputes over Russian diaspora which have no association with these peacekeeping operations, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine. Such worries have been fuelled since autumn 1993 by an explicit linkage between the use of Russian peacekeeping forces on former Soviet territory and the preservation of Russia's influence in the region. In November 1993, Kozyrev openly rejected the idea of Russia fully withdrawing from 'the zones of traditional influence which evolved or, if you like, were won over centuries' and offered the solution of Russia maintaining military bases in conflict zones which could be used for the conduct of peacekeeping operations.[64] Such thinking exposes the gulf between Russian views on peacekeeping and those of the international community at large.

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[63]Speech on 29 September 1993, Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28 September, in SU/1807 B/3.

[64]Interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

Russian promotion of the CIS as a 'regional structure'

To deflect criticism of Russian unilateralism and the assertion of Russian interests in the FSU, since autumn 1993 Kozyrev has emphasised the need to mobilise bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the CIS framework for peacekeeping tasks. The Tajikistan model, he has suggested, could be extended to the Transcaucasus. The fact that this would also fit in with renewed Russian efforts to create CIS Joint Armed Forces under Russian control has been glossed over. Instead, Russian statesmen have focused their efforts on raising the international standing of the CIS.

Already in March 1993, in a draft declaration to the committee responsible for reviewing the UN Charter, Russia argued that regional organisations, such as the CIS, could deal with the new generation of conflicts through peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. CIS leaders received an appeal to create an effective security system within the structures of the CIS to sustain peace in the entire Eurasian region.[65] Russia mobilised Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan later in a joint appeal to the UN Security Council to give political support to CIS joint peacekeeping forces.[66] In February 1994, in his capacity as chairman of the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers, Kozyrev formally requested that the CIS be granted observer status at the UN.[67] The following month he called for recognition of the CIS as a 'regional structure' by European organisations such as the European Union and the CSCE.

The latter request is significant, since the Russian goal is to promote the CIS as a serious regional organisation in peacekeeping terms as defined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. If the CIS were to gain this status it would provide Russia with a channel to gain international legitimacy and support for peacekeeping operations undertaken by the CIS. In August 1994, a representative of the CIS was invited to the UN alongside the representatives of other regional organisations. Although approval of the CIS as a 'regional structure' so far has only been given in a tentative way,

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[65]Appeal by Yeltsin on 17 March 1993, in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 March 1993.

[66]Document circulated in UN Headquarters on 2 November 1993; reported by Itar-Tass, Moscow, 3 November, in SU/1848 A1/1.

[67]Request made to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 3 February 1994. See Itar-Tass report, 3 February 1994, in SU/1914 B/3.

Russia is increasingly acting as if it had this status and is inclined to equate the CIS with NATO, NACC, WEU and so on. This in turn is used to deny these organisations a role in the FSU and to constrain the deployment of international forces for peacekeeping in this region even under UN or CSCE auspices.

The role of the United States

The United States is unlikely to undertake unilateral peace-keeping initiatives, let alone become militarily involved in the conflicts in the successor states, but Washington developed some interest in the idea of US mediation in the regional disputes on former Soviet territory during summer 1993. The United States can exert influence more indirectly through recognition or rejection of the Russian arrogation of responsibility for peacekeeping operations in the region and by focusing on the required principles of Russian conduct.

This approach is illustrated by a US State Department 'non-paper' (Presidential Review Directive 13) circulated in August 1993, which rejected a greater Russian role in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. The draft policy directive insisted that all such peacekeeping efforts should comply fully with the CSCE rules laid down in the July 1992 Helsinki summit — that is that they should only act with the consent of involved parties, and observe neutrality. It also stipulated that such operations should respect all borders, preserve democratic policies, be of finite duration and remain under strict political control by UN officials in New York.[68] In February 1994 the new US Defence Secretary, William Perry, similarly spoke out against Russian 'thoughts of creating spheres of influence or interest' and warned that 'If Russian forces operate beyond Russia's borders, they must do so in accord with international law.'[69]

The question of the United States playing a direct role in the conflicts in the successor states is especially sensitive. The August 1993 draft US directive called for greater American involvement in the former Soviet Union and stated that the United States should be prepared to support

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[68]'US to intervene in ex-Soviet Union', *The Guardian*, 6 August 1993.

[69]'Russia warned to respect borders', *Financial Times*, 7 February 1994.

UN peacekeeping operations in the FSU even if these opposed Russia's interests. However, as clarified by Strobe Talbott, the then special adviser to the US Secretary of State, Washington claimed no formal role in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. It would instead continue to lead international efforts to solve conflicts using bodies such as the UN, CSCE and NACC.[70]

It would be counterproductive at this stage for Washington to adopt a more explicitly unilateral approach than that suggested by Talbott, since this would be seized on by Russian nationalist politicians and military commanders and used to intensify anti-Western currents in Russian society. It would certainly be stridently rejected by Moscow, as indicated by a Russian Foreign Ministry statement of 13 August 1993, which bluntly asserted that the United States would not be permitted to become involved in peacekeeping in the region.[71] In fact the United States specified in spring 1994 that American armed forces would not participate in any UN peacekeeping operation in Georgia that might have emerged from the negotiations then under way.[72]

This leaves an American role in developing confidence-building measures with Russia — an activity encouraged by the agreement by the Russian and American defence ministries to hold a joint US-Russian military peacekeeping exercise.[73] Despite some domestic Russian political opposition, the first Russian-American command and staff exercises, under the codename MIROTVORETS (PEACEKEEPER)-94, were held near Orenburg in the Totskoye region in September 1994. One practical result of the exercises was the preparation of a joint manual for peacekeeping operations.

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[70]Peter van Ham, 'Ukraine, Russia and European security: implications for Western policy', *Chaillot Paper* 13 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, February 1994), pp. 39-40. See report in *Washington Times*, 20 August 1993.

[71]Crow, 'Russia asserts its strategic agenda'. p. 5; statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin in *RFE/RL News Brief*, 16-20 August 1993.

[72]Discussions between presidents Clinton and Shevardnadze on 7 March 1994; Itar-Tass, Moscow, 8 March 1994, in SU/1942 F/5.

[73]See 'Amerikanskaya i rossiyskaya divizii provedut sovmestnye ucheniya', *Izvestiya*, 9 September 1993.

The role of regional powers

Russia has been equally concerned about the potential involvement of influential regional powers, such as Turkey or Iran, in peacekeeping activities on its southern marches. Moscow would reject the involvement of such states even if they were only to be present as part of a larger international force. In the Russian view such states cannot make up the shortfall of troops for UN or CSCE operations on the territory of the former USSR, since the region is a 'zone of Russian interests'. Thus Kozyrev claimed in November 1993 that 'the transfer of peacekeeping functions to regional powers is absolutely unacceptable', since 'as soon as we leave these areas, the resultant vacuum will be immediately filled by other forces, possibly not always friendly and maybe even hostile to Russian interests.'[74]

Moscow clearly does not tolerate the idea of regional powers 'balancing' the Russian presence in the southern conflict zones. The argument adopted on this issue is based on little more than *realpolitik*. In this respect Russian statesmen choose to ignore the fact that the security interests of Turkey and Iran are affected by the conflicts close to their northern borders, and that their designs in the region may be far from predatory.

The role of NATO

The option of direct NATO involvement in peacekeeping tasks on former Soviet territory is highly sensitive for Russian diplomats and has been uncompromisingly rejected by Russian military chiefs and nationalist deputies. It may even have prompted Yeltsin's original proposal for Russia to act as a subcontractor of the UN to guarantee stability on former Soviet territory. Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, first deputy chief (now chief) of the Russian General Staff argued in summer 1992 that the

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[74]Interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

intensification of military conflicts between former Soviet republics could lead to direct intervention by NATO forces.[75]

This scenario was evoked again by Marshal Shaposhnikov the CIS Joint Forces Commander-in-Chief, at the end of 1992. He flatly opposed NATO obtaining, within the CSCE framework, the right to use its armed forces to settle conflicts on the external borders of the CIS.[76] These reactions reflect continued suspicion of NATO's emerging post-Cold War role among many Russian military officers and nationalist deputies. Indeed, one reason why Russian conservatives opposed NATO military intervention under a UN mandate to support peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia appears to have been to avoid establishing a precedent and in this way to preclude the possibility of similar NATO intervention against Russia or on the Russian periphery at some future date.

In fact there are no reasonable grounds to draw such a parallel, whether the scenario is one of NATO operations with or without a UN imprimatur. NATO as a military organisation could not justify intervention in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus to public opinion in its member states. The scenario of NATO being drawn into the Transcaucasus to support Turkish designs or interests (under whatever guise) in the region is not credible in the medium term. It is true that NATO has an interest in the security implications of a disintegration of the Ukrainian state, of military actions on its borders and of direct Ukrainian-Russian military clashes. NATO may have developed some contingency planning for a number of lesser contingencies in Eastern Europe involving Ukraine,[77] but it is most unlikely to intervene directly in a Russian-Ukrainian military clash,

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[75]Kolesnikov claimed that this could be under the pretext of guaranteeing 'international control' over the nuclear potential of the former USSR; see *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 1 August 1992. He was first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff at the time he made this statement.

[76]*Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 June 1992.

[77]The Ukrainian scholar D. Tabachnik maintains that West European military experts consider Ukraine to occupy a central place in practically all possible armed conflicts in Europe. To illustrate this he provides details of four principal scenarios (with sub-scenarios) of conflict in Eastern Europe and the European part of Russia developed by NATO analysts. According to most of these scenarios NATO armed forces or structures become involved in the conflicts at one stage or another. See *Golos Ukrainy*, 21 April 1992, p. 6.

regardless of whether this is inadvertent or initiated by some unsolicited intervention by Russian 'peacekeeping' forces in Ukraine (such as over Crimea).

None of this prevents practical contributions by NATO towards peacekeeping efforts on former Soviet territory, perhaps through the medium of a draft programme of military cooperation which has been developed between NATO and the Russian Defence Ministry. Joint discussions on the settlement of crises at CIS flashpoints were held in January 1994. NATO offered assistance to Russian and CIS peacekeeping forces, especially in training specialists as observers. While NATO emphasised that its military units would not be sent to settle conflicts on the peripheries of the former USSR, it could offer 'logistical support' (in particular for communications and observation).[78]

The role of NACC and PFP

In addition, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) could act as a vehicle for training Russian peacekeeping forces in the skills which they sorely lack despite the roles they have assumed in CIS states. However, this NACC role is now largely eclipsed by the Partnership for Peace (PFP) scheme. Russia has also sponsored a more extensive role for NACC in peacekeeping, but this initiative is in turn being displaced by Moscow's recent efforts to promote the CIS as a regional structure.

Kozyrev has proposed that NACC be transformed into a body that is independent of NATO, but closely linked to the CSCE. With its own small secretariat and auxiliary structures NACC could become a 'peacekeeping laboratory',[79] but this idea, which has received no Western support, has not been fleshed out, and the Russian view on the potential role of NACC has been in flux. In summer 1993 Kozyrev suggested that a 'clear vertical line of political responsibility — from the UN and CSCE to

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[78]As reported in Itar-Tass (World Service), Moscow, 28 January 1994, in SU/1909 S1/1. See also 'NATO protyagivaet ruku druzhby rossii', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 January 1994.

[79]Speech in Krakow, 23 February 1994; *Sevodnya*, 25 February 1994. See also the assessment of the NATO-NACC relationship by D. Gornostayev in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 December 1993.

NACC' be drawn on the question of peacekeeping.[80] Other Russian specialists at the time identified NACC as the body best equipped to actually implement a UN peacekeeping mandate in the Russian geopolitical periphery.[81] By the time NACC met in December 1993, however, Kozyrev's emphasis had shifted. He now envisaged NACC assuming merely a 'coordinating role in settling conflicts that arise on the basis of aggressive nationalism' and called on NACC members to support Russia's leadership of peacekeeping operations in the former USSR and to send observers and render 'moral-political, diplomatic and material support'.[82] Even this potential role for NACC has been displaced in 1994 by Russian efforts to raise the status of the CIS. Kozyrev now calls on the CSCE to assume the task of coordinating the efforts of NATO, the EU, WEU and the CIS in peacekeeping in Europe.

The PFP military agreement, which Russia finally signed in June 1994, could act as a vehicle for joint NATO-Russian manœuvres to prepare for peacekeeping missions. At the least this may help draw some distinction between the formal combat role of Russia's rapid reaction forces and the supplementary task of peacekeeping to which an element of them will be committed. However, senior Russian military officers are unimpressed by Western discussion of peacekeeping definitions. A common view among these officers is that their own experience of peacekeeping to date (based on involvement in low intensity-conflicts both in the Russian Federation and other CIS states) means that they have little to learn from the West.

This attitude may partly explain the Russian failure to take part in the first exercises held in the PFP framework, those held in September 1994 near Poznan, Poland (codenamed 'COOPERATION BRIDGE'), which practised the military fulfilment of UN peacekeeping missions. Despite this, Kozyrev now claims that Moscow attaches great importance to the joint training of Russian and NATO peacekeeping forces, as well as to joint

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[80]See A. Kozyrev, 'Partnerstvo v utverzhdenii mira', *Sevodnya*, 6 July 1993.

[81]Dmitriy Trenin in *Novoye vremya*, 24, June 1993, pp. 8-12. This role is made possible, he notes, since NACC 'encompasses all the main powers, it includes all the states which are actually threatened by the current instability' and 'it obtains support from the powerful NATO infrastructure.'

[82]Kozyrev speaking at the 3 December 1993 meeting of NACC foreign ministers at NATO headquarters. Itar-Tass report, in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 6-10 December 1993.

planning of peacekeeping operations under UN or CSCE auspices. The catch is his suggestion that Russia's NATO partners 'could take upon themselves part of the expenses of the Russian and CIS peacekeeping operations.'[83]

The role of Western European Union

In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, WEU declared its readiness to support the implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures under UN or CSCE auspices, which would involve peacekeeping activities. It has been correctly observed that this has potentially far-reaching implications for Western involvement in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and conflict prevention in the former Soviet Union.[84]

The assumption of such a role by WEU is likely to be viewed with less trepidation by Russian military officers than would equivalent NATO involvement, although there has been little response to the subject so far in Moscow. WEU countries, including the Central and East European states which in May 1994 acquired WEU 'Associate Partner' status, will be keen and critical observers of Russian practice in peacekeeping and enforcement measures in CIS states. Russia may hope to increase European support for selected, limited operations in crisis zones if WEU observers could report back on the activities of Russian forces and if the WEU were to be offered certain other practical tasks alongside the CIS in conflicts affecting at least the more western of the CIS states.

The role of the United Nations: the debate

Russia has extended only a qualified welcome to the involvement of the United Nations in the resolution of conflicts in the Soviet successor states. Kozyrev and other Russian diplomats have viewed the input of international

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[83]Article by Kozyrev on the strategy of Russia's partnership with NATO, *Rossiyskiye vesti*, 17 August 1994.

[84]WEU Luxembourg Declaration approved by WEU Council of Ministers on 22 November 1993; see van Ham, op. cit. in note 70, p. 56.

organisations with the standing of the UN and the CSCE as being in itself as a positive factor in principle, facilitating negotiations in the FSU, but since late 1993 this motivation has gradually been overshadowed as the emphasis on Russian national interests in foreign policy planning has come to the fore. This has roused Russian suspicion of the idea of foreign forces (even under a UN flag) on CIS territory. For Russian leaders this leaves a role for the UN in the zones of conflict on former Soviet territory in providing international authorization and sponsorship for Russian or Russian-led CIS peacekeeping operations. But since Russia has begun to argue that UN 'permission' is not required for such peacekeeping, the dominant motive may now be to gain UN financial subsidies for these operations.

However, if the mandate Russia seeks were granted, this would be in contradiction to traditional UN peacekeeping operating principles and procedures, in particular those relating to the impartiality of peacekeeping units. As previously analysed, Kozyrev has sought to circumvent this issue. He claims that all peacekeeping operations in the FSU to date comply with the aims and principles of the UN Charter and are being conducted at the request of the parties in conflict. He insists that a UN flag should not be denied to these operations just because they involve direct participation by the belligerents themselves and (with the consent of the latter) by neighbouring states in the peacekeeping contingents. In his view, the participation of the UN (and the CSCE) would 'guarantee the neutrality of peacekeeping operations',[85] but this has failed to convince UN officials.

Is there a practical alternative to the exclusive use of Russian/CIS peacekeeping forces in former Soviet territory which might help justify a UN umbrella? In autumn 1993 Kozyrev held out the option of involving peacekeepers from the neutral European states, Sweden, Finland and Austria, alongside those from Russia in FSU conflict zones. Russian forces, like the American troops in Somalia, could provide the core of the peacekeepers, provided that auxiliary forces are committed from the neutral states.[86] In fact this was a rather empty offer since Kozyrev was surely aware of the reluctance of these states to assume the controversial

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[85]See, for example, interview of Kozyrev, 'OON: trevogi i nadezhdy mira', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 October 1993.

[86]See, for example, interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

commitment involved. Quite apart from the political dimensions of Russian policy, the European neutrals are unwilling to cross the threshold and take part in the kind of peace enforcement Russian troops have engaged in. Partly in response to this, in 1994 the Russian emphasis has shifted to the more limited idea of UN or CSCE observers which can be rapidly directed to conflict zones on former Soviet territory where they 'can reinforce the Russian peacekeeping contingent as a third force.'[87]

Kozyrev also advances the practical argument that no alternative exists to Russian peacekeepers, and that the burden will inevitably fall on Russian forces, which could be better trained with UN assistance.[88] This seems reasonable, as does the Russian view that UN political support to bolster even flawed peacekeeping operations is desirable if this helps prevent civil wars from raging out of control. Western states would agree that a Russian-held peace is preferable to no peace in regions where the UN is unable to provide peacekeepers.

However, to provide such Russian peacekeeping efforts with the same authority and mandate as those in other parts of the world would undermine the credibility of these other operations. It would imply sudden and radical changes to the traditional cultivated norms of UN-sponsored international peacekeeping. Not only is the issue of the impartiality and neutrality of the forces engaged at stake: the requirement that peacekeeping forces should be fully multinational is also challenged by the Russian-led model of operations, as is the requirement that they be placed under sole UN command, through local commanders.

In fact, despite controversy about peacekeeping principles, Russia's endeavours to gain a UN mandate for its peacekeeping activities may be driven as much financially as by the wish to earn international approval. Kozyrev has called on the UN to allocate funds to support peacekeeping activities by governments in the former territories of the USSR, especially in Tajikistan, through the establishment of a voluntary fund under the aegis

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[87]A. Kozyrev, 'Rossiyskoe mirotvorchestvo: legkikh resheniy ne byvaet, *Novoe vremya*, 4, 1994, p. 20.

[88]Interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

of the UN. This fund would receive contributions from interested governments, international and regional organisations.[89]

Since this fund is unlikely to materialize, Russia will persist with a second financial claim — that Russian expenditure on Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations in the FSU should be viewed 'as a direct proportionate contribution by Russia to the UN budget for peacekeeping operations' globally.[90] Russian military spokesmen argue that Russian peacekeeping expenditure in the CIS should be a substitute for Russia's contributions to UN finances for peacekeeping generally. In 1993 alone, it is claimed, the Russian Defence Ministry spent over 26 billion roubles for peacekeeping purposes.[91]

Overall, however, Russian proposals to the UN have been received sceptically and critically in Western states. The CIS aspect of Russian-led peacekeeping operations in the FSU has not been taken seriously and Russia's ability to remain neutral when participating in peacekeeping forces has been doubted by the United States, among others. This has set back the idea of placing Russian troops in Tajikistan under the control of the UN (or the CSCE). Such doubts have been fuelled by the strong opposition voiced by Ukraine and the Baltic states to the idea of granting Russia a mandate for intervention outside its borders.

It is true that in autumn 1993 Kozyrev secured some support from Britain, when Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd accepted that in reality only Russian forces are in a position to stabilise the southern crisis zones of the FSU. British and Russian officials agreed to work out a set of criteria under which Russian peacekeeping could be covered by an international mandate.[92] But Britain appeared to be interested in UN monitors which

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[89]This was proposed by Kozyrev on 27 October 1993 during a visit to London and elaborated by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin on Radio Moscow World Service, 3 November 1993, in SU/1844 B/7.

[90]See Deputy Defence Minister Georgiy Kondratyev in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 February 1994.

[91]Kondratyev in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 June 1994.

[92]See 'Britain to study UN role for Russian peacekeepers', *The Daily Telegraph*, 29 October 1993. The main principles involved are outlined in the joint article by Douglas Hurd and Andrei Kozyrev in *Izvestiya*, 14 December 1993.

would be monitoring the peacekeeping actions of Russian forces, rather than the actions of the conflicting parties — a role deemed unacceptable by Moscow.

Against this background it is not surprising that the UN itself has ultimately been unconvinced by Russian claims. In autumn 1993 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that troops from Latin American, Africa and Asia, rather than from Russia, should be sent to the former Soviet republics.[93] The following April, after meeting President Yeltsin and Defence Minister Grachev, he gave some ground in accepting the option of Russian forces taking part in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR under a Russian flag. But at the same time he suggested that 'independent peacekeeping operations would be taking place there in close cooperation with Russia, involving UN observers, for example'. The point he reaffirmed was that Russian peacekeeping forces could not simply be transformed into a UN force. The second option was that the Russian forces be drawn into a broader international peacekeeping contingent. But this contingent would need to be fully multinational; Russian servicemen should account for no more than 20-30% of its total number, the remaining 70% being made up of troops from five or six other countries. It would also need to be under sole UN command. Only in these circumstances would the UN be ready to defray the cost of the operation.[94]

So long as Russia fails to meet these criteria it is unlikely to gain the UN mandate it seeks. However, Russian leaders have begun to shrug off this prospect. In April 1994 Defence Minister Grachev stated bluntly that Russian peacekeeping forces in CIS crisis zones could not be replaced by UN subunits, that only UN observers could be present in these zones. He claimed this partly reflected the UN's own unwillingness to become more fully engaged in the CIS, but also reflected the preference of the majority of CIS members for the Russian army as peacekeeper on their territories.[95] This followed a joint statement to the UN by the Russian foreign and

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[93]See report 'Rossiyskie voyska ne poluchat golubykh kasok dlya mirotvorcheskikh operatsiy v blizhnem zarubezh'e', *Izvestiya*, 28 October 1993.

[94]NTV, Moscow, television interview of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, 3 April 1994, in SU/1963 B/9-10.

[95]Interview on Russia's Radio, 15 April 1994, in SU/1975 S1/3.

defence ministries that they had no need of 'permission' from the UN and the CSCE to carry out peacemaking operations in CIS countries.[96] This could presage a more defiant exclusion of non-CIS agencies from these operations.

The role of the United Nations: potential operations

Against this background it is not surprising that the UN's commitment of ground forces in the crises besetting the former Soviet states has so far been minor and confined essentially to Georgia. The first military mission dispatched by the UN to the Soviet successor states was a group of observers established in August 1993 (by Resolution 858) to monitor for six months the Georgian-Abkhazian ceasefire (a force of 88 observers was eventually approved).[97] Russia did not block a larger UN role, but defined it in a way that obtained legitimacy for a Russian presence. In autumn 1993 Kozyrev urged the UN, without success, to send peacekeeping forces to the conflict area and 'temporarily' to use the Russian military contingent stationed in Sukhumi for this purpose. This mission was also supported by Georgia and Abkhazia.[98] But in calling for a full-scale UN peacekeeping operation to be launched throughout the Abkhaz region, Georgia hoped that Russian peacekeeping units would be part of a broader international force, accompanied by UN observers.[99]

The decision by the UN Secretary-General in May 1994 not to send UN peacekeeping troops to Georgia reflected disagreements between the

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[96]Joint statement on 4 April 1994. See Itar-Tass, Moscow, 5 April 1994, in SU/1971 B/5-6; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 1 April 1994.

[97]This followed an appeal by the Georgian president Shevardnadze and a Security Council meeting on 24 August 1993. As reported by Georgian Radio, 28 July 1993, in SU/1755 B/9; and Itar-Tass World Service, 25 August 1993, in SU/1781 A1/2.

[98]See article in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 22 September 1993. The appeal to the UN was made formal on 1 December; see article by N. Roslova, *Sevodnya*, 3 December 1993. In fact in March 1994 the option of sending such a UN force was ruled out by the UN Secretary-General pending 'substantial progress' on a political settlement in the region.

[99]See letter from Georgia to UN Security Council on 27 January 1994; Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28 January 1994, in SU/1911 F/5.

Georgian and Abkhaz authorities over where and how such troops should be deployed. This left the option of a CIS peacekeeping contingent that could subsequently become part of a UN presence there, but in practice it precipitated the introduction of CIS-sanctioned Russian peacekeeping forces and left an image of UN weakness. In July 1994, the abandonment of the idea of a more extensive UN peacekeeping role in Georgia was confirmed when the Security Council endorsed Russia's peacekeeping effort there and resolved merely to establish a 136-strong UN observer force to monitor it. This appeared to follow a tacit or more explicit deal, whereby American support for UN endorsement of Russian peacekeeping in Georgia would earn Russian support for the UN overseeing the concurrent American-led mission in Haiti. Russian officials denied the existence of any deal of this kind but were undoubtedly pleased by the precedent of UN support for an essentially Russian-controlled peacekeeping operation.[100]

In the case of Tajikistan, Kozyrev has called for UN observers to be placed on the Tajik borders, and for UN financial support for the Russian-dominated CIS collective peacekeeping forces there.[101] But the military leadership of these forces appears to be opposed to the introduction of UN observers in the region and also appears to reject a proposal by the Russian Foreign Ministry that government and opposition units in Tajikistan be disarmed under the supervision of such observers. This stand can only fuel suspicion over the nature of the CIS peacekeeping operation in this region. Despite such military resistance, a new UN observer force could be established in Tajikistan to monitor an uncertain peace accord reached in September 1994.

The role of the CSCE: the debate

In 1993-94, Russia's campaign to obtain CSCE approval for the peacekeeping operations it has sponsored has paralleled its lobbying to secure UN support. CSCE observers have already been assigned to South Ossetia, Transdniester and Abkhazia. Beyond this limited commitment,

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[100]See Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 'Russia reserved about new peacekeeping operations', *Moscow News*, no. 34, 26 August-1 September 1994, p. 4.

[101]See article by Kozyrev in *Izvestiya*, 4 August 1993.

Moscow has hoped to take advantage of the fact that, in July 1992, the CSCE was proclaimed a regional agency as defined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and was authorised to carry out peacekeeping operations. Building on this, Kozyrev has proposed that the CSCE provide the political coordination of peacekeeping missions organized by the CIS, NACC, NATO and WEU but it has been implicit in this proposal that any such missions on former Soviet territory should be organised by the CIS/Russia. Moscow has pressed the CSCE to accept the idea of Russian forces operating in areas of inter-ethnic conflict in the FSU as CSCE peacekeeping forces.

Kozyrev lobbied strongly but unsuccessfully for this objective at the meeting of the CSCE Council in Rome in December 1993.[102] At that meeting, a model of CSCE monitoring of Russian and other CIS peacekeeping was advanced. However, this activity would not involve CSCE *forces* or even CSCE command and control, but rather some CSCE physical presence (both in Russian regional headquarters and with Russia's troops on the ground) to monitor how the Russians carry out peacekeeping. But even this limited plan would have represented CSCE legitimation of Russian peacekeeping in the FSU, and it was finally rejected at the CSCE Rome meeting. Most Western and Nordic states were close to accepting it but the Baltic states, among others, were fearful of any signs of a 'new Yalta' which would assign Russia geopolitical responsibilities over former Soviet territories.

Since that meeting, Russian diplomats have pressed for a looser interpretation of the nature of peacekeeping permitted by CSCE regulations (they prohibit, for example, the use of enforcement measures). In February 1994 the head of the Russian delegation to the CSCE, Vladimir Shustov, called for the introduction of the use of 'third party' peacekeeping operations. Such operations would be undertaken, with CSCE sponsorship and funding, by a single state or a group of states belonging to a regional organisation, to act under the CSCE flag but with only limited CSCE involvement. The regional organisation Shustov had in mind was the CIS, and it would be the CIS which would be responsible for any such peacekeeping operation (rather than the CSCE). He suggested that any

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[102]The idea was opposed by Ukraine, Estonia, other former Soviet republics, the East European countries, Turkey and some Western states such as Canada and Norway. For a Russian assessment of the CSCE debate on this issue see *Izvestiya*, 3 December 1993.

CSCE monitoring would be qualified, distant and limited in its nature and in some cases might not require a presence on the ground. Overall, he tried to construct an international legal claim that no further UN or CSCE sanction was required to confirm the legality of existing Russian peacekeeping operations.[103]

This claim follows recent Russian assertions that Russia has no legal requirement to seek a UN mandate for these operations. It fully conforms with the new campaign for recognition of the CIS as a 'regional structure' for peacekeeping purposes. It represents a more confident and assertive diplomatic stance than that projected by Russia at the time of the Rome CSCE meeting. This was confirmed at a CSCE meeting in Vienna in June 1994 when Russia effectively vetoed a CSCE plan which was an outgrowth of the thinking on CSCE monitoring that had emerged at the previous Rome meeting. Russia rejected the idea of placing Russian activity under the scrutiny of CSCE monitors, and thereby undermined current efforts to provide the CSCE with a role in mediating settlements between combatants.[104] This has left the impression of a growing Russian insistence on the legitimacy of its unilateral initiatives.

The role of the CSCE: potential operations

These recent diplomatic clashes do not create an optimistic atmosphere for actual CSCE engagement in peacekeeping activities in the CIS region. Yet the CSCE does provide a potential framework for the settlement of conflicts in the former Soviet states, and such indirect efforts still impact on Russian/CIS peacekeeping activities already attempted in specific regions. This is indicated by the plan developed by the CSCE permanent mission to Moldova for settling the Transdniester conflict, which was endorsed by the Rome CSCE meeting in December 1993. The implementation of this plan would enhance the credibility of Russian-led peacekeeping efforts in the

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[103]Text of Sustov's statement at the information meeting of the Permanent Committee of the CSCE on 14 February 1994 in Vienna. As cited in S. Crow, 'Russia promotes the CIS as an international organization', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, pp. 35-6.

[104]See 'Russia insists on solo intervention', *The Guardian*, 25 June 1994.

region as a whole, since it obliges the complete and unconditional withdrawal from Moldova of the undoubtedly partisan Russian 14th Army. In August 1994 Russia and Moldova finalised an agreement which provided for the withdrawal of the 14th Army within three years. However, the implementation of this agreement remains in doubt. This has prompted the American UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright to explore ways in which the international community could encourage the departure of the 14th Army.

CSCE initiatives have been more active towards the five-year conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, but they have been frustrated by two factors. First, it has been particularly difficult to achieve an effective cease-fire between the warring parties — a precondition for the deployment of any peacekeeping units under the aegis of the CSCE. Secondly, despite Kozyrev's earlier endorsement of armed CSCE peacekeeping forces for the region,[105] recent Russian efforts to take the lead in mediation of the conflict are serving to marginalise CSCE mediation efforts (although, as noted above, Russian diplomats are also seeking to develop ways for the CSCE to provide a cover for CIS activity).

Since autumn 1993, Russia has implied that CSCE efforts for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are ineffective because the CSCE lacks the means to enforce any cease-fire agreement, whereas Russian forces could fill this gap.[106] This is reflected in the 16 May 1994 agreement between the defence ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the head of the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, chaired by Russian Defence Minister Grachev. Under its terms, Russia is ready to deploy its own peacekeeping forces, under the aegis of the CIS, to monitor a cease-fire agreement. Since it is planned that all the heads of observation posts will be Russian officers, the agreement would thwart the earlier CSCE proposal that international (not Russian/CIS) observers monitor the activities of the peacekeepers as well as those of the combatants. This CSCE idea stemmed from growing suspicions about the motives of Russian military

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[105]Already in March 1992, at a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers, Kozyrev proposed the creation of armed CSCE peacekeeping forces to settle the conflict around this region. At that time he did not even rule out the use of some NATO military infrastructure, primarily airfields, in the implementation of peace missions. See report by M. Yusin in *Izvestiya*, 27 March 1992.

[106]See Fuller, 'Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Karabakh mediation process', pp. 32-3.

policy in the region as a whole and ultimately this will need to be addressed.

RUSSIAN 'NEO-IMPERIALISM' UNDER THE GUISE OF PEACEKEEPING?

It is evident from this analysis that the international community is unlikely to grant Russia the unequivocal mandate it has sought whether from the UN or CSCE, for Russian-dominated peacekeeping operations on former Soviet territory. So far a separate mandate tied to a specific Russian/CIS operation has been offered by the United Nations only in the case of Georgia/Abkhazia. This caution is inspired by a recognition that it is unavoidable that Russia will pursue its own interests in dealing with local or regional conflicts on its peripheries. However, in itself this behaviour is only natural and not reprehensible (even if it does not conform with the principle of impartiality in peacekeeping efforts). The greater concern among Western and CIS states is the possibility that in defining Russian military-security and economic interests in the 'near abroad', Russian leaders may be tempted by revanchism or a softer form of neo-imperialism and that peacekeeping may become an instrument of coercion in the conduct of such a policy.[107]

This possibility means that careful attention must be paid to the changing definition of Russian interests. What is meant specifically by Russian claims, since spring 1993, that the former Soviet republics lie in a 'zone of interest and special responsibility' for Russia? What kind of 'special powers' does Russia expect the international community to confer on it to deal with conflicts in the FSU? To what extent do these claims reflect Russian military expectations in the near abroad?

The formal rationale for Russia's call for special powers in the FSU is based on the following points: that discrimination against Russian-

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[107]The views of the Russian specialist Sergei Karaganov (Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Moscow) in the Foreign Ministry's journal *Diplomaticheskiy vestnik* were interpreted as an early elaboration of this kind of policy, whereby 'Russia must begin to fulfil her traditional role again in the areas of the former Soviet empire, of cajoling the local leaders and, if necessary, sending in the troops'; Estonian Radio, Tallinn, 8 March 1993, in SU/1635 A2/2.

speakers living outside the Russian Federation imposes on Russia the duty to protect them; that it is in Russia that many thousands of those who suffer from bloody inter-ethnic strike place their hopes; that the conflicts on the Russian peripheries threaten 'fires in Russia's own house'; and that the international community is still veering away from active participation in peacekeeping efforts on former Soviet territory.[108]

These claims strongly influence the internal Russian debate on the need to engage in peacekeeping in the 'near abroad' and are not unreasonable as such, although the emphasis on beleaguered Russians is hardly appropriate for most of the regional conflicts where Russian-led peacekeeping operations have been established so far. But in practice such claims may be used to justify a form of Russian intervention which only freezes the conflict concerned and establishes Russia as indispensable in any solution of that conflict. A key question is whether this outcome, which provides Russia with strong leverage on the state or states involved, and the various Russians claims for intervention in the first place, provide the pretext and inducement for Russia to pursue a broader strategic agenda? Could Russian peacekeeping forces even develop into occupation forces under certain conditions?

In fact the Russian military command clearly does identify certain military-strategic state interests outside Russian borders for which a system of forward basing and military agreements with many of the erstwhile Soviet republics would be desirable. This was implied, for example, by Defence Minister Grachev's admission that 'the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and the area where our troops are stationed [in Batumi and Gudauta] is a strategically important area for the Russian army', and that Russia 'must take every measure to ensure that our troops remain there otherwise we will lose the Black Sea.'[109] This kind of thinking forms the backcloth to the Russian-Georgian agreement for Russian military bases to remain in Georgia, at a time when Russian 'peacekeepers' were vitally

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[108]These points were made, for example, following Yeltsin's renowned speech at the Civic Union forum calling for special powers for Russia in the FSU. See report by V. Nadein in *Izvestiya*, 4 March 1993.

[109]As cited in SU/1622 C1/6, 25 February 1993.

needed to bolster Georgia militarily.[110] The secondary bases linked to the Batumi base, which will be located in Sukhumi, Poti and Gudauta, will enable Russia to control the whole of the Georgian Black Sea coast.

Similarly, there is some evidence that Russian efforts to mediate and provide peacekeepers in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been accompanied by requests for the return of regular Russian troops (a division of airborne troops) to Azerbaijan. The 127th division, which remains in Armenia, is expected to assume the role of a Russian base (in this case with apparent Armenian support). Overall, Russia plans to maintain a grouping of 23,000 servicemen in the Transcaucasus. Even the Baltic states may not be excluded from such ambitions on basing. In January 1994 Kozyrev went so far as to stress the need to maintain a Russian military presence in this region — to the outrage of Baltic leaders — and described the idea of a complete military withdrawal as 'an extreme approach'.[111]

As previously observed, in autumn 1993 Kozyrev first suggested openly that Russian military bases be maintained in conflict zones in the FSU so that they could be used for the conduct of peacekeeping operations.[112] By February 1994 the Russian Chief of General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov, revealed that Moscow expected to sign bilateral agreements permitting Russia to establish about thirty military bases on the territory of other CIS states. He claimed that nearly all of these states were

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[110]The agreement was negotiated in autumn 1993 but finally concluded in February 1994. It also provides for Russian border troops to be deployed as border guards on the Georgian frontier with Turkey. See *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 February 1994. The Russian MOD will command the Russian military units in Georgia (via the Commander of the Transcaucasian Group of Forces). According to some reports the Russian MOD will even control the military actions of the Georgian MOD; see Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, 2 March 1994, in SU/1940 S1/2.

[111]Statement by Kozyrev on 13 January 1994 in speech to Russian ambassadors to the CIS and Baltic states, as reported in Itar-Tass (World Service), Moscow, 18 January 1994, in SU/1900 B/4; *Financial Times*, 14 January 1994; *RFE/Rl News Briefs*, 10-21 January 1994, p. 3. For the reactions of the foreign ministries of the Baltic states see SU/1901 S2/4-5.

[112]*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1994. This idea is consistent with the terms of the new Russian military doctrine, which confirm that Russian forces may be based outside its territory jointly with the forces of other (implicitly CIS) states or as Russian groupings; see *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1993.

considering allowing Russia to set up military bases, though none would be created in Ukraine or the Baltic states.[113] The intention to create this network of bases was confirmed by a presidential order at the beginning of April 1994.

This prospect of forward basing — perhaps on long-term lease arrangements — raises a vital question: do Russia's leaders accept the borders of the Russian Federation as the national frontier (notwithstanding all the manifest difficulties of constructing an effective border regime on the Russian periphery in the near-term)? Or is a concept of 'extended Russian borders' coinciding with former Soviet borders — a natural accompaniment to 'neo-imperialist' impulses — now influencing official thinking in Moscow? If the latter is the case then assertive Russian peacekeeping in its 'near abroad' (including border protection, which anyway contravenes accepted peacekeeping practice) clearly poses a challenge to the sovereignty of Russia's neighbours and to international norms.

This worrying possibility is indicated by a reported internal briefing by Defence Minister Grachev in September 1993 which revealed that a decision had been taken in the Russian Security Council not to pull back to Russia's borders, but to maintain old Soviet borders, especially in Central Asia and perhaps the Transcaucasus.[114] Such a decision is consistent with Yeltsin's description of the Tajik border as 'in essence the border of Russia'. This definition could be extended to cover the outer borders of other CIS states, although Russia also plans to create a state border on the northern Caucasus as a second line of protection.[115]

The foundation for an extended border system is a memorandum 'On cooperation on the protection of external state borders' signed in December 1993 by Russia and all the Central Asian CIS states.[116] The deployment

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[113]Statement on 28 February 1994, in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, vol. 3, no. 10, 1994.

[114]Reported by P. Felgengauer in 'Starye granitsy i "novye" bazy', *Sevodnya*, 16 September 1993.

[115]See interview of Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian border troops, in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 20 January 1994.

[116]See 'Interesy Rossii v blizhnem zarubezh'e: gde sevodnya vozvodit' granitsu?', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 2 March 1994. This also analyses the current border regimes of most of the CIS states and Russian responsibilities for these borders.

of 'CIS border guards' in Central Asia was confirmed at a CIS summit in April 1994, and Yeltsin referred to the possibility of similar agreements with Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia, which could put Russian troops back on the borders of Turkey, Poland, Slovakia and Romania under CIS auspices. He even suggested putting Russian troops between Moldova and Romania.[117]

It is true that the option of establishing an effective new Russian border defence regime would take years and pose a great financial challenge. However, given the strategic concerns of Russian military leaders and the growth of nationalist irredentism linked to the Russian diaspora, current plans on the 'outer' borders could bolster a policy of neo-imperialism in the states of the former USSR. This possibility makes the idea floated by a senior Russian diplomat of creating a rapid deployment force to protect the rights of Russian-speaking people outside the Russian Federation particularly worrying.[118] It is just this kind of concept that blurs the uncertain distinction between the role and structure of Russia's new Mobile Forces and that of the forces earmarked for peacekeeping. This has broader, unsettling implications for European security.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PRINCIPLES FOR PEACEKEEPING

The Russian-led peacekeeping operations analysed in this paper vary considerably in their characteristics and location in the diverse regions of the former USSR. For geopolitical reasons their implications for European security also vary widely. The most prominent of these operations, that in Tajikistan, has for obvious geostrategic reasons had little direct impact on European security. The same could be said of potential future conflict in Kyrgyzstan based on clan rivalry, which could attract Russian military intervention. Russian efforts to manage the Tajik conflict have also been less closely scrutinized, and measured against looser standards, than

[117] *The Guardian*, 19 April 1994.

[118] An idea proposed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Krylov on 3 December 1993. Itar-Tass report in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 6-10 December 1993, p. 2. So far this has not been endorsed as official policy.

peacekeeping further west, since European states have broadly accepted that any failure to dampen down the Tajik civil war or control Tajik borders would threaten stability in other CIS Central Asian states. On the other hand, the scenario of Russian peacekeepers becoming drawn into future separatist violence in northern Kazakhstan should be viewed by European leaders with considerable alarm, since this could lead to major long-term tensions between the two largest CIS states, both of which have nuclear weapons on their soil.

Despite the remoteness of Tajikistan, however, the Russian predisposition to blur the distinction between combat and 'peacekeeping' missions in the definition of forces for the Tajik conflict may be a dangerous precedent. In the context of Russian efforts to revive the idea of a CIS defence alliance, this raises further concerns for European FSU states that are worried about the possibility of finding themselves the object of unwanted Russian 'peacekeeping' operations in the future.

Conflicts in the Transcaucasian region are more likely to impinge on European security but are also much closer to the immediate security concerns of Russia. Military developments within and adjacent to the North Caucasian Military District are viewed by Moscow as critical to the stability of the Russian Federation and a necessary focus of peacekeeping efforts. Yet this region will continue to generate conflicts. To the extent that they destabilise the southern borders, they could escalate to involve Iran or a NATO state — Turkey. The threat of such an escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict into a large-scale regional war has already been discussed by Russian military officers.[119] One informed Russian analyst has even postulated a scenario leading to the outbreak of a Caucasian war that would draw Russia and Turkey into direct military conflict.[120] Russia's current determination to use its peacekeeping forces as the military broker in conflicts in the region at the expense of international mediation efforts may stabilize conditions in the short term but may also lock Russia into unresolved conflicts which could spill over FSU borders in the future.

But it is the potential use of Russian peacekeeping forces on the borders of or within the European CIS states which most clearly challenges

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[119]See, for example, Lieutenant-Colonel K. Petrov, in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 19 January 1994.

[120]P. Felgengauer in *Sevodnya*, 4 January 1994.

European security. The nightmare scenario evoked by one Russian specialist is that of 'mobile formations of the Russian army participating in peacemaking operations' not only in Central Asia and the North Caucasus but also, 'in north-eastern Estonia, in some oblasts of eastern Ukraine, in the Crimea.'[121] This may not be such a far-fetched scenario, given the idea floated recently by a senior Russian diplomat (Sergei Krylov) of creating a special rapid deployment force to protect Russian-speakers outside the Russian Federation.

Such intervention in the Baltic states, which is unlikely in the near-term or medium-term, would not only nullify Russian involvement in the PFP scheme but would signal the end of Russia's strategic partnership, or even cooperation, with Western and Central European states. The Baltic states have unambiguously remained outside all Russian-led plans for pooling the military structures of the FSU, and no CIS cover could be used to justify proposals for the reintroduction of Russian military units into their territories, whether in response to ethnically related instability (such as in the eastern regions of Estonia) or for other purposes. Yet Baltic leaders and their Polish counterparts remain suspicious of the substantial regular Russian forces in the Kaliningrad region.

The special Western commitment to the Baltic states, compared with non-European CIS states, was shown by the outcry in spring 1994 following the suggestion that Yeltsin's list of future Russian bases in the FSU might include one in Latvia. In fact the Russian military command appears to draw a line at the idea of Russian-led peacekeeping in the Baltic States. Despite this, Baltic leaders remain ready to veto CSCE proposals legitimising Russian unilateral peace enforcement measures in the CIS. They have also agreed to create their own joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion by the end of 1995, which will be trained with assistance from the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. This distances them further from any CIS plans for peacekeeping.

The scenario of Russian leaders projecting 'peacekeeping' forces into Ukraine, though still unlikely, is acutely worrying to Western leaders in security policy terms, and would create serious policy dilemmas. The assumption by most Western onlookers is likely to be that Russian or CIS peacekeepers would exacerbate rather than dampen down civil strife in Ukraine. At one level, Western concerns would centre around the risks of

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[121]Ibid.

conflict in Ukraine spilling over into Eastern/Central Europe as a result of any military and political maelstrom in Ukraine, perhaps fuelled by nationalist resistance to the Russian presence from western Ukraine. The example of Bosnia, where civil conflict has *not* spilled over to Western Europe, may, however, prove reassuring in this respect. At a more fundamental level, European leaders would fear the possibility of Russian leaders seeking control over the Ukrainian military infrastructure, which would remove Ukraine as a security buffer between Russia and Eastern/Central Europe and advance Russian forces westward again.

The pretext for any such Russian intervention would most likely be pro-Russian separatism in Ukraine, fuelled by growing political/economic centrifugal currents in the state. If Crimean separatism or economic chaos in eastern Ukraine were to result in violent clashes, and local Ukrainian military forces were divided or paralysed, then pressure in Moscow to deploy Russian peacekeepers, perhaps in the form of strong mobile forces, could quickly mount. Russia could try to justify such an intervention on the grounds that instability in Ukraine should be contained, but any such action would be likely to give rise to a feeling in Western public opinion of betrayal by Russia (even if Western commitments to Ukraine have so far been muted).

Even if Russian peacekeeping in Ukraine were to follow a collapse of central authority in that state (rather than precipitate it) its effect would be to polarise Europe and put great pressure on NATO to offer East/Central European states full NATO membership. However, so long as the latter states remain outside NATO, centrifugal or regional currents in Ukraine will represent less of an incentive for Russian military leaders to intervene in Ukraine for broader strategic reasons (though concern for Russian-speakers or border instabilities might still propel them towards such intervention). If the acceptance of new NATO members means that NATO borders approach the former USSR's borders, then the Russian incentive to exploit 'peacekeeping' as a means to establish military bases in Ukraine (in addition to the thirty bases currently planned in the southern CIS states) in order to ensure a buffer zone will be greatly enhanced. Over time, however, military interaction through the PFP scheme should make Russian military leaders less likely to think automatically in terms of such military countermeasures.

In another respect Russia's perceived peacekeeping requirements (and the wish to retain the option for future larger-scale peace enforcement)

jeopardise a key pillar of the post-Soviet European security infrastructure. Specifically, peacekeeping ambitions and the creation of the new Mobile Forces in the North Caucasus are the factors behind Russian insistence that the sub-limits for the flank regions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty be revised. Russia is seeking to exclude its units assigned to peacekeeping, both in the North Caucasus and elsewhere, from the count for levels of treaty-limited equipment. Defence Minister Grachev has argued, for example, that to include in this count the Leningrad Military District's 45th MRD, which is being fully prepared for peacekeeping duties, would weaken the Russian flank areas (as defined by the CFE Treaty) in an alarming way.[122] The effort to redefine the treaty in this way may undermine the implementation of this crucial treaty but is consistent with current Russian plans to establish military bases outside Russian borders to assist putative peacekeeping operations.

Russian diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the CFE Treaty, like Russia's growing reluctance to accept the involvement of the forces of international bodies in CIS conflicts, except perhaps as observers, is calculated to prevent future Russian options being closed off. Moscow is seeking greater freedom of action in a CIS that is steadily integrating. At the April 1994 CIS summit, Defence Minister Grachev described the strategic future as 'a united armed force of the Commonwealth states and the creation of a defensive union.' Since then, Yeltsin has envisaged a CIS military structure 'similar to NATO', although Russia is likely to seek dominance in any military system that emerges. The underlying problem for Russia is that its desire to become the guarantor of security for the CIS region, particularly if accompanied by a concept of forward defence for this region, is inconsistent with current Russian economic weakness.

This raises the danger of renewed imperial overstretch, which would undermine the overall Russian economic reform process and add to political volatility in Moscow and the regions. This would impinge on European security more broadly. The current Russian military budget is heavily committed to maintaining defence enterprises, and in the medium term financial resources and trained personnel for peacekeeping or peace enforcement will remain limited. In practice this will constrain any temptations by the Russian high command substantially to increase the scale

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[122]See report on discussion between Defence Minister Grachev and the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 4 April 1994, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 5 April 1994.

of such operations outside Russia, as in the case of the above scenarios for Ukraine, whatever the outcome of the current debates on military doctrine and peace enforcement. Pressures within the Russian Federation, and the expansion of internal conflicts, will also be important constraints on operations in other CIS states, but the gap between ambitions and capabilities may only be fully realised in Moscow after some disastrous Russian *démarche*, which could send shock waves through Europe.

If Russian leaders actually commit themselves to some form of neo-imperialist policy through assertive peacekeeping and a policy of divide and rule in the former Soviet states, many of these states in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus will probably be unable to avoid compromising their sovereignty in important areas of foreign and military policy decision-making. Equally, it could be argued that, without the heavy hand of Russian military assistance in some peacekeeping or peace enforcement role, the sovereignty of certain of these southern states would anyway be fatally undermined by the ethnic conflicts on their territories (as the case of Georgia in autumn 1993 suggests). It is not in the interests of Russia or of other European states that such states be permitted to fragment, or for their southern borders to dissolve in internecine strife, but this commonality of interests still does not provide a rationale for Western leaders to condone Russian efforts to transform these states into Russian protectorates.

Peacekeeping principles

It remains vital for Western leaders and the officials of international institutions to continue to engage Russian leaders in discussions about the reasonable limits of Russian military conduct in other CIS states, and about the desirability of adhering to principles of peacekeeping or peace enforcement which will command broad international support. This remains true even if in practice the material and financial assistance of Western states or international agencies to the maintenance of these operations in the CIS has remained marginal so far.

This does not mean that Russian-led operations should be condemned simply because they do not comply with the *modus operandi* of past UN peacekeeping actions. Nor should the assumption be made that Russian-led peacekeeping outside the UN/CSCE framework (a framework which calls for sole UN command, with mixed contingents, etc.) will necessarily take

the form of some kind of neo-imperialism, even if this is one possible outcome, as indicated above. A serious multilateral debate about such 'non-traditional' peacekeeping is a precondition for Russia to gain international recognition and approval for its efforts if and when these are deserved. Such debate should be prompted by recognition that the old international legal framework for peacekeeping is not necessarily appropriate for the conflicts of the CIS region.[123] In current conditions it would be helpful in fact to examine how far the tripartite model of peacekeeping (Russia plus other regional parties) that has been applied in South Ossetia or Transdniester has made a positive contribution.

Of course the serious problems that accompany Russian involvement in such peacekeeping activities, which are amply set out in this paper, should not be downplayed. A consistent Russian policy of divide and rule would be inconsistent with efforts to reconcile conflicts. Nor can Russian claims to have an exclusive sphere of interest throughout the CIS region be accepted. But it is difficult to imagine a security policy framework to tackle CIS conflicts which excludes Russia. From the perspective of Western states or international non-CIS bodies this makes it necessary to view the possibilities for effective cooperation with Russia over these conflicts on a case-by-case basis. For example, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ways could be found to merge the Russian and CSCE (Minsk process) efforts.

Similarly, Russian attempts to gain a UN mandate should be approached on a case-by-case basis. It is inconceivable in reality for the UN to accord Russia a *carte blanche* mandate for CIS operations as a whole, and this no longer seems to be a practical Russian diplomatic goal. It is logical instead for Russian claims to be considered for specific regions and operations, and in some cases Russia could seek UN or CSCE approval for different stages of any complicated or protracted operation, but the chances of receiving such international approval will depend on compliance with certain basic principles, even if not necessarily with all of those in the canon of traditional peacekeeping.

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[123]For example, the assumption of first generation peacekeeping was that it would occur *between* states rather than as commonly now *within* states. It assumed that neutral states but not great powers would engage in peacekeeping, whereas the expectation now is for great powers to commit themselves to peacekeeping.

At the end of 1993 British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev agreed on the following underlying principles for Russian or CIS peacekeeping operations: 'strict respect for the sovereignty of the countries involved; an invitation from the government concerned, and the consent of the parties to the conflict; commitment to a parallel political peace process; a clear mandate setting out the role of the peacekeeping forces (which should, wherever possible, be multinational in character); and an exit strategy for the peacekeeping forces.'[124] These remain a good starting point in examining options for peacekeeping in the CIS region, especially if they are supported by a process of monitoring by non-CIS, CSCE or UN representatives.

In the meantime, Western statesmen should not accept the loose Russian characterisation of 'peacekeeping' referred to in this section without the most careful scrutiny of Russian operational conduct in each given case. This suggests the following conclusion:

1. There undoubtedly exist genuine Russian interests in quelling conflict and consolidating cease-fires in neighbouring CIS states. In practical terms some of these conflicts may eventually be amenable to and soluble under UN-mandated and CSCE-monitored Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations which comply with the principles outlined above. In such cases Western support, including financial support, could be offered on a selective basis for these operations. This should be made conditional on the continued Russian/CIS commitment to the broad principles which frame the peacekeeping mission, and also on compliance with an additional agreed code on the conduct of peacekeeping on the ground.
2. In the cases of other conflicts, however, it may be apparent that Russia is intent on pursuing strong political or strategic interests in the region, which suggests that the outcome of any Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations would be the consolidation of Russian dominance in the internal and external affairs of vulnerable regional states. In these cases Western support for Russian actions should clearly be withheld and diplomatic leverage applied on Moscow to conduct a more impartial policy consistent with CSCE and other international norms.

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[124]Joint article published simultaneously in *Izvestiya* and *Financial Times*, 14 December 1993.

In practice the distinction between these two cases will be difficult to draw, and Russia's motives, like the role of its armed forces, will always be mixed, but the UN and CSCE are entitled to approve complicated or sensitive operations stage by stage to test compliance and gauge changes in Russian or CIS policy.

It is true that since spring 1994 Russian spokesmen have adopted a more assertive line in claiming that they have no need of a UN or CSCE mandate or additional international approval for the peacekeeping operations they lead on CIS territory. Moscow claims that the CIS as a regional structure can provide the necessary international legal authority for peacekeeping. Despite this defiant position, the burden of increasing peacekeeping demands in the CIS region, Russia's wish to become a responsible partner within a 'political' G-8 and its continued emphasis on the need for interlocking institutions to bolster security in the Eurasian region, all suggest that Moscow will continue to pay serious attention to UN and CSCE views on peacekeeping.

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The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly

Dieter Heinrich

WORLD FEDERALIST MOVEMENT

Summary

The problems facing humanity as the world's population swells toward 10 billion on a planet that is already nearing ecological exhaustion are truly unprecedented in complexity, scale and urgency. To solve them will require not only a new *level*, but a new *kind* of international co-operation based on a strengthened and democratized United Nations.

The UN must be strengthened to enable it to more effectively govern relations between nation-states, leaving them free to govern themselves in peace. It must be strengthened to deal with vital global concerns – from the world ecological crisis to humanitarian relief to disarmament – that can be treated in no other reliable way.

To strengthen the UN, it must also be democratized through more direct representation of citizens. Opening the UN to the involvement, imagination and energy of all people, not only those who speak for the institutions of national government, would make the UN more effective. We can afford nothing less. Citizens have a right, as well as a responsibility to become equal participants in the governance of their common global home.

Above all, citizen representation at the UN is essential to help propel a major reform and strengthening of the organization. Experience shows that governments, preoccupied with the national interest, cannot be relied upon to undertake this with real commitment.

The single most appropriate and important institution for enabling citizens to be represented at the UN, as in any government, is a *parliament.*

The European Parliament of the European Community provides an important example of how a supranational parliament can be organized, and how such a parliament can help propel the evolution of inter-governmental organizations.

The experience of the European Parliament suggests that the first stage of a UN parliament should be a consultative Parliamentary Assembly made up of representatives elected by the national parliaments. This would enable a UN parliament to be created easily and inexpensively in a way which nevertheless creates a valid democratic link between the UN and the world's citizens through their representatives in the national legislatures.

A Parliamentary Assembly would bring into being a very different

The great unknown is when and how quickly this evolution of the UN will occur, and how much more damage and suffering the world must sustain before the inevitable steps are taken.

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The problems facing humanity as the world's population swells toward 10 billion on a planet that is nearing environmental exhaustion are truly unprecedented in complexity, scale and urgency.

With each passing day, tens of thousands of human lives are lost to poverty. Uncounted millions of young minds are permanently damaged by malnutrition. Thousands of hectares of irreplaceable rainforests are destroyed. Hundreds of species of life are forever extinguished. Atmospheric ozone is further diminished while greenhouse gasses accumulate, threatening to alter the climate of the planet. Every day adds to an inventory of continuing destruction that is horrendous almost beyond belief. Meanwhile, national governments daily spend more than US$2 *billion* on their militaries, all the while protesting the lack of funds for global problems.

Nation-states acting in isolation cannot solve these problems that are international in scope. Solutions will require a new *level* of international co-operation, certainly – but more than this, they will require a new *kind* of co-operation.

The world needs a better method of making decisions and taking collective action in the common interest. We need, in fact, a system of world law, and we need a way to make those laws in a timely and democratic fashion. We need effective implementation of those laws, and a means for their enforcement. And, finally, the whole process has to be adequately funded. What this amounts to is *government.*

To achieve it, two basic premises of the nation-state system will have to change. The first concerns the distribution of sovereignty. The second concerns citizen representation in international decision-making.

• • •

Absolute state sovereignty remains the most fundamental premise of the present world order. Although it is under increasing pressure and has begun to admit exceptions, the general rule still is that a nation-state cannot be subjected to, or made accountable to, the decisions of any authority beyond itself. The direct consequence of this doctrine is that we cannot have law-making by majority decision within international institutions, including the UN. What we have instead is a slow, laborious process of treaty-making in which the resolutions of the UN General Assembly count for very little. The result is what we see: non-decision, leading to non-action, leading to deepening crisis.

Majority decision-making at the UN would mean that, on some global issues at least, the will of the world's majority could be binding on the minority. The behavior of states toward each other would become

governed by decisions made supranationally. States, then, would no longer be absolutely sovereign, a prospect many governments resist. Still, this is in the end the only equitable and workable way for humanity to collectively make decisions and take effective action on global problems. [1]

But for the UN to acquire a real decision-making authority, its way of making decisions must be democratized. This is the second major premise of today's international order that must change: that citizens have no place in global governance; that it is a process of deal-making between governments alone.

The UN can never become equal to the problems of our age as long as it remains closed to all but the most indirect participation of the world's citizens. Our crises have reached such proportions that governments can no longer hope to resolve them without engaging directly the will, the ideas, and the initiatives of the world's citizens as responsible participants in the solutions. Governments implicitly recognized this in the preparatory process for the UN Conference on Environment and Development, which saw unprecedented consultation between governments and citizens groups. Global governance must be opened up to take advantage of the best efforts of all the world's people. We can afford nothing less.

The participation of the world's citizens is needed not only in the design of lasting solutions to world problems, but also in the "retooling" of the UN itself into a more effective instrument. Citizen representation may well be essential to propell and oversee any process of real UN reform.

The most suitable vehicle for bringing the citizen voice to the UN, in the view of the World Federalist Movement, is a United Nations parliamentary body. Modelled on the European Parliament, it could begin as a consultative *parliamentary assembly* – not yet a real parliament, but the precursor of one – with its members chosen by the peoples' representatives in the existing legislatures of the world, a procedure both simple and easy to implement. Through a gradual, phased process – but more quickly, we would hope, than was the case with the European Parliament – it could become a citizen-elected body with a real role in the governance of international life.

Such a parliamentary body would bring not just a new voice, but a fundamentally different kind of voice to bear on the issues before the

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1. World federalists would only qualify this by saying that the questions upon which the UN has sovereignty must be constitutionally limited to specific, agreed-upon areas of international or global concern, leaving states full sovereignty to govern their own internal affairs. Sovereignty, in other words, would be divided between two levels of government, the global and the national, each sovereign within its jurisdiction — the essence of the federal model. Not only does the nation-state continue to exist under federalism, it is actually fortified in its security and ability to govern its own affairs.

UN. Where the voices in the General Assembly today are the voices of the *institutions* of national governments speaking through diplomats, the voice of a UN parliamentarian would be the voice of a *citizen* speaking for citizens. Where the positions a diplomat takes are decided in the national capitals by people often far removed from the give and take of debate, a parliamentarian would be able to take positions of individual conscience, ultimately accountable only to constituents. Parliamentarians would be free of instruction, free from the constraints of *raison d'état*, free to take a global perspective – free, among other things, to exhort the governments in the General Assembly to take faster action on issues and in ways they think citizens would want them to.

Both voices are needed, but only one now exists. As a result, the apparatus of the UN is bent to the interests of governments -as-institutions in ways that may correspond only indirectly to the real needs of citizens. The needs of citizens are to have problems solved quickly and fairly. But with so many governments convinced that their first interest is to preserve unfettered national sovereignty, they cannot be relied upon to consider all the possible solutions to world problems. They especially cannot be relied upon to take the initiatives needed to strengthen the authority of the UN, the single most important step in the solution to many problems.

The voice of citizens, heard through a UN parliament, is therefore essential to provide a different perspective on the problems before the UN, to act as a counter-balance to governments, and to overcome the institutional inertia of governments in the pursuit of UN reform.

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The transformation of the UN into a democratic governing authority for humankind is one of the single most important political tasks of our times. But, while states may be making greater efforts to cooperate than before, and using the United Nations more regularly to do so, they seem as indifferent as ever to the need for real systemic changes on behalf of greater UN sovereignty and democracy. Some of the biggest states have justified their resistance to change by claiming – in astonishing denial of our worsening predicament – that the UN is finally working well.

Nevertheless, it is the UN's member governments that will ultimately decide the pace of the UN's evolution. Will they be driven by a succession of calamities into restructuring the UN? Or can we, as a thinking species imbued with intelligence and foresight, act in advance of further suffering and tragedy by setting out and rationally working toward this goal? The present complacency of governments can only make us afraid.

Clearly, the initiative for change will have to come from somewhere, and if not from governments, then where else than from citizens? But how can a campaign of citizen pressure on governments be organized

and sustained around something as abstract as the reform and strengthening of the UN?

What if citizens' organizations could have an ally within the UN structure itself to promote the citizen interest in the UN and its transformation? Ideally, it would be an official UN body through which citizens could be directly represented. Fortunately many states have had experience with such a body – with an institutional structure that enables citizens to be represented in government. That structure is called parliament.

A parliamentary body at the UN would have a tremendous potential, even as a consultative body, to make the UN a more effective organization. From its earliest days, a UN Parliamentary Assembly could help in:

- fostering international co-operation;
- drafting treaties and conventions;
- building support for the UN back in national capitals;
- reinforcing the trend toward democracy in the countries of the world;
- fostering a new planetarian ethos by symbolizing the idea of the world as one community.

Above all, it could provide impetus, leverage, and oversight in the complex and highly political process of reforming the UN.

The Example of the European Community

The most instructive experience of recent times with the evolution of an organization that unites sovereign governments within a progressively developing supranational decision-making process is that of the European Community (EC).

In the early 1980s, the EC was floundering, suffering from a complex of paralyzing problems that had come to be known as "Eurosclerosis." Western Europe's crisis stemmed from its own obsolete institutions, especially its decision-making. With each of twelve sovereign governments able to block a consensus, decisions were not being made and progress had ground to a halt. While governments were frequently frustrated, they seemed incapable or unwilling to do anything about it. The inertia of governments was finally overcome through outside pressure from citizens. Citizens organizations of various kinds, including the business sector, campaigning for the "European idea" had a powerful ally in another kind of citizen organization – one that proved able, working from inside the structures of the EC, to provide the needed impetus for change. That organization was the European Parliament.

The European Parliament, after its beginnings as a parliamentary assembly, had become directly elected in 1979. Although it still had few powers, it was a chamber of politicians whose role it was to think about

Europe. In response to the disarray of governments, the parliament, led by the Italian federalist, Altiero Spinelli, wrote and presented to governments a draft constitution to create a federal Europe with a real legislature. This action by the parliament coincided precisely with the needs of the people of Europe for more effective representation within EC politics.

It was an audacious move, but one that could not be altogether dismissed by governments. Forced to respond, governments developed, and later adopted, a set of counterproposals that dramatically reformed and strengthened the structures of the EC. In many areas, consensus decision-making among the governments was replaced with binding, weighted voting. No longer could one or two governments stall all progress. With decisions starting to flow again, the European Community was re-invigorated and began moving energetically toward greater political and economic integration. Moreover, the parliament was also given additional powers.

The point to note is that it took the European Parliament to provide the impetus for institutional change. Governments well knew that change was needed, but seemed unable to act until spurred by the constitution effort of the European Parliament. While the European model cannot, obviously, be applied wholesale to the UN, this one point, at least, is relevant and intuitively right: that the UN, too, may need a parliamentary body to intercede in the process of the UN's transformation. This may be the most important lesson to be drawn from the European experience by those who are today working on behalf of reform of the UN.

Overcoming the limitations of nation-state sovereignty

If we are right that the world needs the UN as an instrument of governance, vested with real authority to act on global problems, and if it is true that the nation-states cannot be counted on to move on their own to transform the UN, then the establishment of a UN Parliamentary Assembly may be nothing less than vital to global survival. It may be, on this account, *one of the single most important political proposals of our time.*

Without a UN Parliamentary Assembly to influence events, there simply may never be enough political will to deal with what is, in the end, the core issue in building a more effective international order: redistributing sovereignty by limiting the sovereignty of the nation-state while expanding the sovereignty of democratic world bodies. By the term "sovereignty" we mean simply the authority to make and apply *law*.

Until the UN (or, conceivably, some new, unforeseeable world body superseding the UN) has sovereignty to make law for the world community, many of our worst problems will remain unsolvable and we will slip deeper into crisis. Our problems will remain unsolvable because

the world suffers from a condition similar to that of Europe in the early 1980s. In the face of the world's many and urgent needs, the process of international decision-making of today, consisting of treaty-making among sovereign governments, is starkly inadequate.

The doctrine of national sovereignty means that, in its external affairs, a state is bound only by the treaties it signs – it cannot be subjected to the terms of a treaty adopted by others, even if they are the vast majority. Being voluntary, treaties tend to reflect the lowest common denominator because their negotiators want to ensure enough signatories, especially among the major powers, to give them a chance to be effective. Then, major treaties on the most important subjects – for instance, the Law of the Sea Convention – can take *decades* to negotiate, by which time the situation may have changed. When the text of a treaty is finally agreed, the states that negotiated it don't have to sign it, and even if they do, they can always opt out again later since most treaties have escape clauses. The result is a patchwork legal order with different states living by different rules, usually only the ones they like, and then only tentatively.

The problems of rule by treaty-making are compounded by the lack of the other institutions of effective international government. There are, for instance, few mechanisms to enforce treaties or to adjudicate disputes. The UN's "civil service" is too small and too weak in its authority to implement many programs. Taken together, the nature of the negotiating process and the lack of implementing mechanisms conspire to make otherwise logical and necessary proposals on many things seem so unlikely of acceptance that they are never even ventured.

The idea of unfettered national sovereignty, with every state a law unto itself, may have been tolerable in the days of the steamship, the telegraph and the cavalry. It is disastrous in an age of jet travel, telecommunications, and ballistic nuclear missiles. Technology has made us materially interdependent and given us vast powers to affect – even destroy – one another. What can justify a doctrine that pretends the world's nearly 200 states can have unrestricted freedom with no requirement to co-operate or respect the needs or the opinions of others? In whose interest is this doctrine perpetuated? Not in the human interest, or the global one.

National sovereignty has long ceased to be synonymous with control of one's own affairs. If every state is sovereign, all must endure the random effects of the sovereign decisions of others. The most powerful, by bullying or buying off others, may sometimes have less to endure, but there are some consequences of state sovereignty that even the strong cannot escape: a case in point is the "tragedy of the commons." The commons in this case is the global biosphere. In the absence of a world authority to make and enforce regulations universally, the biosphere is

Escaping the tragedy of the commons: mutual regulation for mutual benefit

The "tragedy of the commons" describes a situation of contradiction where sovereign individuals or groups are "rationally" led to destroy a free, renewable – but finite – public resource through over-use. The original commons was the village pasture, but today the concept applies to such global public resources as the atmosphere or fish stocks in international waters.

For each user, the situation is as follows: if they use the resource – for example, by taking another catch of an endangered fish stock from the ocean – they will get all the benefits, while any costs (further damage to the stock) will be spread among the whole community of users, of which they are only one. From the point of view of each user, the costs to them of their *own* use of the resource are vastly offset by their immediate benefits.

If all the users think this way, however, and continue exploiting the endangered resource, the ultimate costs of *everyone* using the resource may outweigh the benefits. The ruin of the resource for all, perhaps for all time, may mean costs far greater than all the individual benefits combined – and therein lies the tragedy. The result is a situation that is in no one's interest and which all would have wished to avoid.

Yet, while all the users might prefer to save the resource, all are trapped by the logic of the situation. While the users may see the tragedy unfolding, they may do nothing to change course if they cannot be sure that other users will do likewise. Users that do try to improve matters, in this case by not fishing, would find that while they bore alone the loss of not using the resource, the benefits of their sacrifices would be spread equally to all, including those who irresponsibly continue fishing.

The way out of the predicament lies in finding a way to link benefits to sacrifice. That can only be done through social organization, for instance, by a system of regulation of the use of the resource.

Further analysis will show that, in many cases, effective regulation of a commons finally requires a central sovereign authority (ideally, of course, one established democratically by the users) that has powers of enforcement. For a regime of mutual regulation to work, it must be nearly universal. Too many non-participants or free-loaders and the regime will unravel as participants come to feel their sacrifices are being unjustly exploited by others.

The logic that leads to regulation of the commons is compelling, and is one of the main forces driving global political integration at a time of increasing interdependence.

being relentlessly degraded as each state, evaluating the matter from its own viewpoint, concludes it is more in its interest to abuse the environment along with everyone else than to take measures unilaterally to protect it (see box next page).

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It is no revelation that governments and their officials have, in addition to the interests of the country, another set of much narrower interests – those of their own institutions as self-perpetuating entities. If national governments drag their feet on strengthening the sovereignty of international organizations like the UN, it is in some part because of an inherent conflict of interest: it contradicts their institutional imperative to preserve the privileges and prestige of national power.

Under the pressure of necessity some governments, however, are softening their views on the absolute nature of national sovereignty. They are increasingly willing to compromise the principle in practice, by interceding against South Africa's apartheid laws, for instance, or by sending UN police to protect the Kurds in Iraq. But as we saw in Europe, even if governments should come one day to agree that the principle of national sovereignty should be more generally restricted in favor of collective approaches, it *still* may not lead to action to enhance the sovereignty of international institutions in ways that could make collective action possible.

The world has seen many examples of a head of government saying one thing while his or her foreign ministry passively subverts the politician's vision by endlessly overlooking opportunities to act on it. Initiatives for change, then, fail to follow rhetoric. Then there are times when governments welcome, even need, some outside pressure compelling them to do something they actually want to do, but can't be seen to be wanting to do – like compromising national power. In this case, governments may respond positively to initiatives coming from elsewhere, but do not want to appear to be too keen by making proposals themselves. To look to national governments to strengthen the UN, therefore, is like looking to a committee of foxes to design a more secure hen house. Their hearts just won't be in it. This is not to say governments will never yield – they *are* slowly yielding, because other interests also come into play – but it does help explain why they are unlikely to champion spontaneously the cause of UN reform and why, in consequence, some other impetus is needed.

We the Peoples . . .

The United Nations Charter begins with the words: "We the peoples of the United Nations." But in practice, the UN is not a meeting place of the peoples but of their governments – and even this is an exaggeration. A country's permanent representative at the UN may not even represent the

whole government of a country, if in the definition of government we include the legislature or parliament. Instead, he or she may represent only the *executive* branch of government. In the United States, for instance, it is the White House, the executive, that is represented through the State Department in the UN General Assembly, not the full government, which includes Congress, the legislative branch.

And yet, while parliaments are not represented at the UN, in many countries they do have responsibilities with respect to the UN. They are the final, legislative authority needed to ratify UN conventions, implement many UN resolutions, and approve other aspects of a government's policy toward the UN, including the payment of a state's contributions to the organization's budget. A link between parliaments and the United Nations could help consolidate the support of member states for the UN and for decisions taken there. But, instead of interacting directly with the UN, parliaments are largely limited to reacting to what is reported to them by their executives or by government officials.

The United Nations still fulfills an important role as a meeting place of those who hold executive power in the world (even if in practice it is a meeting place of their ambassadors). It provides a world forum where these powers can discuss and negotiate. But it puts the authority for global decision-making on our biggest problems in the hands of an impossibly small group of politicians.

The ability of national leaders also to be global decision-makers is seriously compromised by the competing demands of domestic responsibilities. Moreover, even the most conscientious leaders operate within a confining ethical matrix: by virtue of their office, they are sworn to promote and defend national interests ahead of global ones.

The present UN suffers, consequently, from both a lack of *capacity* for decision-making and the lack of an appropriately global frame of reference on the part of those who hold the ultimate power of decision on global matters. Many ideas that could save the planet simply never get into the system; or if they do, they fail because those who can approve them are not working from a concern for the whole earth.

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The right of citizens to be represented as directly as possible in the political decisions that affect their lives is fundamental to democracy. Today the most critical decisions affecting the lives of all citizens are international ones – the agreements, or non-agreements, about disarmament, the world economy, the protection of the global biosphere, and, bearing on all of these, the agreements concerning the workings of the international system, including the United Nations.

Having citizens only indirectly and distantly represented in dealing

with these great issues, their voices filtered through intervening layers of government and bureaucracy, has serious consequences for political culture world-wide. It leaves most citizens estranged from the global political process, and from the UN. It induces passivity as people conclude that they cannot affect what happens in the world, or that the problems in the world are not their personal responsibility, or that governments will solve them. It discourages public initiative and cuts off global decision-making from a vital source of ideas and energy.

Whatever the historical reasons for this, the situation can no longer be justified at a time when democratic movements are sweeping the world and the world itself is so greatly in need of radically improved international institutions of governance.

Human experience, especially in the latter half of this century, teaches that democratic government is the most effective and acceptable way to organize the management of public affairs. While democracy may not guarantee good government, the absence of democracy is a fairly reliable indicator of bad government. This is no less true in our largest human community, the world. Lack of democracy in world politics has the same consequences as lack of democracy in domestic politics: poor decisions, decisions that serve the decision-makers, wasted resources, and lack of effective action.

If it is true that the world is in serious need of better governance, then we should not have to re-travel the painful learning curve of national politics to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that citizen-based democracy is also the most enduringly reliable – not to mention the most just and legitimate – way of organizing planetary society.

PART II

Establishing a Parliamentary Assembly

The idea of a world parliament is not in itself new. Tennyson, in his poem "Locksley Hall," referred to a supranational "parliament of man" as long ago as the last century, and he was not the first. More recently, since the founding of the UN, there have been numerous proposals to provide the organization with a people's chamber, some of them not unlike the one being presented here.

What is new today is that a parliament at the UN has quite suddenly become feasible and achievable, not only because of the ending of the Cold War, but also because of the increasing tempo with which states are adopting parliamentary democracy at the national level. This provides more than ever before a basis in national politics to support citizen

democracy in international politics. As well, there is the increasingly successful European experiment itself, which has matured to the point where it can serve as an inspiration and a model for a similar process at the United Nations.

Another encouraging recent development is the establishment of a parliamentary assembly within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The 50 or so countries in the CSCE span the northern hemisphere from Vancouver to Vladivostok. They represent most of the world's economic and military power, and they include four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. If they have decided that the fledgling institutions they are now establishing under the CSCE umbrella would benefit from a parliamentary assembly, it gives us a reason to hope, and indeed expect, that they would also support the establishment of an assembly at the UN. Their numbers, combined with the other democracies of the world, could virtually assure its success.

There is good reason to be optimistic that the necessary support for a UN Parliamentary Assembly can be found among governments, particularly if citizens' groups are able to organize an effective international campaign in support of such an initiative. Still, we have to expect the proposal will also attract its share of opponents. The UN is well established, and many people whose minds are cast in the old state-centric way of looking at the UN, or who have careers invested in it, will not want a change. It is important, then, to propose the idea in its most persuasive possible formulation, one that is least vulnerable to attack and enables potential supporters of the idea within the UN and the world's foreign ministries to speak on behalf of the idea within very conservative environments.

Representation: a question of strategy

There are many ways of conceiving of a world parliament, and there have been over the years many proposals for achieving one. Some of the proposals, propounded in the days of the Cold War when government support for the idea was far less likely, call for citizens to get around governments by organizing a parliament themselves. There are proposals, for instance, for people to declare themselves world citizens and elect provisional world parliaments from among their numbers. Other proposals would create citizen chambers based on representation drawn from non-governmental organizations.

Whatever the merits of such do-it-yourself approaches may have been, in the circumstances of today there are good reasons to prefer a strategy that gets governments themselves to establish a UN parliamentary body. It avoids many of the pitfalls of the direct citizen-action approach, especially problems to do with the legitimacy

and effectiveness of the resulting body and with its cost to citizens' groups.

The citizen-action approach would take a heavy toll in both organizational energy and money. If it did succeed on any scale, it would divert resources from pressuring governments on thousands of specific issues, which citizens are good at, into the operation of a pan-global institutional structure, which citizens' groups are ill equipped to do. The result could be less pressure on governments for change rather than more. And the resulting assembly would always be of doubtful legitimacy (who does it really represent?) and of unlikely value as an evolutionary starting point for a real world parliament. These and other problems may explain why citizens' groups have not responded keenly to such an approach in the past.

An approach which has already proven its credibility with governments is the gradualist one followed by the European Parliament. This approach requires that governments themselves establish the parliamentary assembly, something that is essential anyway if it is really to function within the UN. The recognition and legitimation of a parliamentary assembly by governments is vital to its usefulness as an influence on those governments, to its power as a symbol, and to its potential to evolve into a bona fide parliament.

Any plan that aims to have the governments themselves establish a Parliamentary Assembly must necessarily be credible in the eyes of those governments. Yet it must also possess credibility in the eyes of the public and citizens' groups, whose efforts will be needed to move governments to act. There is a dichotomy here: the modest proposals that governments might find credible may seem so insubstantial that they may fail to inspire citizens' groups to campaign for them, whereas proposals bold enough to interest citizens' groups risk being seen by governments as unrealistic.

Nowhere does this dichotomy come into sharper focus than over the issue of how to select the members of a government-sponsored parliamentary assembly. To have legitimacy as representatives of the people, the members of a UN Parliamentary Assembly must be chosen in a way that gives them a valid democratic link to a citizen constituency. But to be acceptable to governments the process of selecting representatives must also be "realistic" and manageable, here and now. It must be simple and not costly. The dichotomy between "democracy" and "realism" arises because as procedures become more democratic they also become more complicated and expensive, and hence raise more objections from those who must implement them.

The need, therefore, is to find a compromise method of representation that has democratic legitimacy and yet is simple and inexpensive enough that governments will accept it. This, in fact, is the

key to establishing the overall acceptability of any proposal for a UN Parliamentary Assembly that has a hope of winning sufficient political support among both governments and the public. The proposal will likely live or die over the issue of representation.

Of all the things citizens groups might want most in a UN Parliamentary Assembly, the most difficult to defer in the name of strategic compromise is the idea that representation in an assembly should be by direct elections. It would be a fatal mistake, however, to insist on direct elections as anything other than a goal for the future. World elections, while democratically desirable, would require canvassing the preferences of billions of individuals. Such an electoral process would also be full of unknowables of the sort politicians and bureaucrats abhor.

Although there is no technical reason why it couldn't be done, it would be logistically complex, expensive and politically difficult to establish a world election apparatus for an unproven institution that governments may not want in the first place. World elections would require not just the minimal consent of hesitant governments, but their enthusiastic conviction, backed by an unflagging political will to see them succeed. If such a political will existed we might hope for bigger steps to be taken sooner, but the problem with a proposal like a parliamentary assembly is precisely that we are beginning to press for it in an environment where the political will is low. If there was a great coalition of social forces to bring to bear on governments, we might reasonably hope to move them from low to high political will at an early stage, but no such coalition of forces yet exists.

Thus, to insist from the outset on a full-blown parliament chosen by direct world elections would simply be self-defeating, handing governments the easiest possible excuse to do nothing. Without actually disagreeing with the proposal, they could beg off on secondary, technical issues of cost and feasibility. A directly elected parliament should remain our goal, but if we confuse goals with strategies by demanding the whole thing at once, we risk putting off the day when governments can be convinced to take the first steps toward its realization.

What is needed is a strategy whose first stage can succeed in a time of low political will and which, once implemented, can in and of itself help us build the will for subsequent, more difficult stages. On this crucial issue the European Parliament offers its most important lessons. That parliament matured into a directly elected body through just such a staged, evolutionary process, beginning as a parliamentary assembly with members appointed by and from the national legislatures of the member states. The idea of having members of a parliamentary assembly initially chosen by and from national parliaments has powerful advantages, and these advantages can work again in the context of the United Nations. It

satisfies, at least minimally, the competing requirements of democratic legitimacy (the concern of citizens and activists) and political realism (the concern of governments). A UN Parliamentary Assembly composed of actual parliamentarians would have an immediate credibility. Because parliamentarians in the majority of countries are now elected, they would have a legitimacy as representatives of the public that governments would have to recognize and respect. (For countries whose parliamentarians are not elected there may be good reason to admit them anyway. This problem, which in any case is diminishing with the spread of democracy, is discussed below.)

Because the parliaments of democratic states generally include opposition parties, a country's parliamentary delegates to the UN would be more truly representative of the whole people of a country than the appointees of the executive branch of government, which may only be the choice of a minority of the electorate. In any case, and more importantly, the parliamentarians will be understood to be going to the UN as representatives of citizens rather than as representatives of governments-as-institutions. This is the beginning of a citizen-UN link.

Another advantage to basing representation in a UN Parliamentary Assembly on national parliaments is that it may engage parliamentarians as allies in the cause of getting the assembly established, and, later, helping to build the political will for its evolution. The experience of being a UN parliamentarian will galvanize many of these politicians into going home as advocates for the UN, including the need for strengthening and democratizing the UN Parliamentary Assembly itself.

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There are two other issues that will require further study and exploration. One is whether candidates for election by national parliaments to the UN Parliamentary Assembly could be simply citizens-at-large rather than sitting members of the legislature. This approach would remedy the problem that sitting members of a national parliament might not be able to devote sufficient time to the world body. Their primary responsibility is to represent their constituents in national matters at home, and to be away more than a few weeks a year would become onerous for parliamentarians. Citizens-at-large, however, could serve full-time as UN parliamentarians.

In this model, the national parliament, would act as a kind of "electoral college." In the early years of the United States the electoral college played an important role in electing the president at a time when the huge size of the country made direct elections for the post impractical. The people would elect the members of the electoral college (in this case, the college would be the national parliament) which would then choose, on the people's behalf, their final representatives (in this case, the individuals to sit in the UN Parliamentary Assembly). Those

elected could be drawn from the whole population. The resulting UN body would still be made up of *citizens elected by citizens* rather than officials appointed by governments. It is indirect democracy, to be sure, but valid within its limitations and practical as an interim arrangement pending the first direct world elections.

A second issue is the method of election of parliamentary representatives. Should it be by a secret ballot? Ordinarily, parliaments do not take votes by secret ballot. But in the exceptional case of an electoral process of this kind, it may be desirable, even essential. A secret ballot would ensure that parliamentarians are free of peer or party pressure to vote according to their conscience – to vote for the best person, regardless of political affiliation.

The Problem of Representation from Undemocratic Countries

If there is one major difference between the European example and the United Nations as a whole, it is that the West Europeans built their institutions, including their parliament, on the basis of the shared democratic values of the member countries. In the UN, however, we have countries with undemocratic governments. In the past, it was here that the irresistible logic of the idea of a world parliament met its immovable object.

With the collapse of communism, most states now either have credible parliaments or are in the process of creating them. Countries with credible parliaments will likely become an ever increasing majority of the world's states. Even so, in the near term, we must expect there will be states without democratic parliaments, or without parliaments at all. It would be a terrible and unjustifiable surrender to these dictatorships if they were allowed to stand as an obstacle to the formation of a UN parliamentary body. And yet we cannot rule out that their existence will be used as an excuse for inaction even by opponents among some of the democratic members of the UN that are more concerned with preserving state power than with advancing the cause of democracy internationally.

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There are at least two ways the democratic majority, given the will, could deal with the issue of non-democratic countries while proceeding with a UN Parliamentary Assembly. First, it is conceivable that they could constitute the assembly in a way that could exclude those countries from participation. The democratic majority in the General Assembly could establish criteria for membership in a UN Parliamentary Assembly which would never need to explicitly use qualitative terms like democracy, but would have the effect of screening for democratic parliaments anyway. As an example, membership in the body could be open only to those parliaments whose powers include ratification of treaties, or approval of money for the UN in their national budgets.

This, however, may not be the most desirable course, at least not in the beginning when the UN Parliamentary Assembly's role is largely consultative and symbolic in any case. It may accomplish more to open the assembly to any country with a parliament, however constituted, in the knowledge that the majority would be democracies. Although the presence of too many pseudo-parliamentarians would risk diminishing the UN Parliamentary Assembly's legitimacy and moral authority, this disadvantage might be offset by advantages in other areas. In welcoming pseudo-parliamentarians into its midst, the assembly may well become a democratizing influence on *them*, and in this way become a force for the advancement of democracy in the non-democratic countries.

Pseudo-parliamentarians, arriving from the non-democratic countries, would not be able to pretend they were simply diplomats doing a job. They would come claiming to wear the mantle of true parliamentarians who freely believed what they were saying. As such, they would be subject, as in any parliament, to very direct attempts at persuasion by their peers in ways diplomats would never be to join coalitions and modify their positions. Some of these parliamentarians, arriving as obedient spokespeople for their governments, might well return as advocates for positions taken by the UN Parliamentary Assembly. (The assembly may even need to consider protection for such parliamentarians, if they came to feel themselves at risk from their own governments.)

In anticipation of this, some states with undemocratic parliaments might solve the problem for us by refusing to allow their parliamentarians to participate at all, for fear that they might become infected by the contagion of democracy. This, too, might help advance the cause of democracy undermining the legitimacy of those governments even further in the world community, and in the eyes of their own publics, adding to the pressure for change in those states.

Other Matters of Strategy

A parliamentary assembly could be created through a relatively easy procedure within the United Nations without having to pursue the politically difficult course of amending the organization's Charter. The General Assembly, through article 22 of the Charter, could establish it as a "subsidiary organ." Its role would initially be that of an advisory body. Its cited purpose might be to improve communication between the UN, the national parliaments, and the world public, and to contribute to a wider appreciation of the UN's work. This is the kind of rationale for creating such an assembly to which governments would be most responsive. As it established its credibility, as governments became more comfortable with it, as its own institutional roots took hold and its informal influence expanded, its formal powers would also grow.

Apart from representation, there are two additional strategic considerations which would enhance the possibility of winning the support of governments for the proposal: the UN Parliamentary Assembly should not be proposed as a replacement for any existing institution, but as an adjunct to them; and, the UN Parliamentary Assembly, while still an unproven and unknown body, should not be proposed to have substantive powers to make decisions binding on governments or the UN.

Proposing that the assembly replace, for instance, the General Assembly, or assume any of the General Assembly's present functions, will make instant adversaries of the very diplomats at the United Nations whose assistance we need to have the idea introduced in – where else? – the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in any case, is a useful institution in its own right and has a role to play in parallel with the UN Parliamentary Assembly as a kind of "house of the national governments." In terms of the European Community, the General Assembly is the equivalent, after allowing for differences, of the intergovernmental function vested in the Council of Ministers.

Similarly, proposing that the UN Parliamentary Assembly be given immediate responsibilities also adds complications that can only raise the "barriers to entry" and make more difficult the road to the basic goal of getting it established. The most effective strategy is simply to aim at *bringing the UN Parliamentary Assembly into being*. The prospects of this would be improved if the proposal is kept as simple and, from a government perspective, as innocuous as possible.

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The struggle with governments over whether an institution so loaded with implications as a UN Parliamentary Assembly should exist at all, even in its simplest form, will likely be the greatest battle it will ever face. The idea begins the struggle with neither established allies, nor resources, nor the luxury of time on its side. From this position of its greatest weakness, the idea must overcome the opposing ideological resistance – the state-centric prejudices, suspicions, and inertia of governments – at the time of their greatest strength.

However, once the assembly is established, the situation improves. It will then no longer fall to citizens' groups alone to fight the battle of its further development. Powerful allies and new assets would have joined the struggle. The assembly's own members can be expected to play a major role in pushing for its evolution by seeking a UN Charter amendment to make it a "principal organ" in parallel with the General Assembly. With their political know-how, their access to the highest levels of their national governments, and their credibility with the world public and the media, the politicians in the UN Parliamentary Assembly can be expected – again, based on the experience in Europe – to become

a strong and persistent political force for organizing the assembly's eventual transformation into a mature, directly elected parliament. The UN Parliamentary Assembly, buoyed by the support of citizens, empowered by its own legitimacy, will become its own best friend, the engine of its own evolution.

It would be going too far to say that if citizens' groups can succeed in getting it started, it will do the rest for us, but the truth is in that direction.

Other Approaches to Establishing a UN Parliamentary Assembly

People often ask whether a quicker and easier route to a UN Parliamentary Assembly might be to transform the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The IPU has existed for the past century to bring together legislators from countries with parliaments to meet, debate, and pass resolutions. The question of whether it could be brought within the UN as a parliament almost raises itself. Whether or not this could succeed as a strategy, and it doesn't seem likely, it would not necessarily be a good idea.

The IPU, while itself seeking to work more closely with the UN, could only be made into a UN body if the initiative came from the IPU itself, and at present there is no reason for thinking the organization has any interest in institutionalizing itself in this way. In becoming a UN Parliamentary Assembly, it would ultimately be so transformed in its purposes and methods of operation as to cease to be recognizable as the IPU. Such a transformation would amount to ending one successful organization in order to begin another. There is no compelling reason, apart from saving a truly small amount of money, for pursuing this course unless it became clear that this was really the only way to establish a UN Parliamentary Assembly.

There is not nearly enough activity in building international understanding among the world's parliaments. It would be useful to have both organizations. As the UN Parliamentary Assembly established itself, the IPU could develop its own unique role as a parliament-to-parliament organization, a very different role from a UN Parliamentary Assembly, and potentially as important far into the future.

There is a another possible approach to creating a UN Parliamentary Assembly, one that is even more gradual, and perhaps therefore that much more achievable. This approach envisages a parliamentary assembly attached to some other organization in the UN system rather than to the UN itself. (Again, this has a precedent in the European experience: the parliamentary assembly which was the precursor of the European Parliament was first attached to a specialized agency, the European Coal and Steel Community.)

Rather than seeking to attach an assembly to any existing UN agency

An environmental authority

An environmental authority was once proposed in a remarkable declaration issued in The Hague on March 11, 1989, by 24 heads of state and government. The declaration represents the highest possible political endorsement of the arguments made in this paper for vesting governing authority in world bodies.

Among those signing the declaration were French president François Mitterrand; West German chancellor Helmut Kohl; Egyptian president Muhammed Hosni Mubarak, as well as the prime ministers of Canada, Sweden and Norway. Other signatories of the Hague Declaration included leaders from Côte d'Ivoire, Australia, Brazil, Kenya, India, Indonesia, Italy, New Zealand, Hungary, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, Jordan, Senegal, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

The declaration begins by noting, "the very conditions of life on our planet are threatened by the severe attacks to which the earth's atmosphere is subjected.

"Solutions can only be devised on a global level. (The) situation calls not only for implementation of existing principles but also for a new approach, through the development of new principles of international law including new and more effective decision-making and enforcement mechanisms."

It calls for, "developing, within the framework of the United Nations, new institutional authority, either by strengthening existing institutions or by creating a new institution, which, in the context of the preservation of the earth's atmosphere, shall be responsible for combating any further global warming of the atmosphere and shall involve such decision-making procedures as may be effective *even if, on occasion, unanimous agreement has not been achieved.*" The emphasis here is ours. This is a reference to binding majority decision-making — nothing less than the transfer of sovereignty to the UN.

The declaration also advocated "appropriate measures to promote the effective implementation of and compliance with the decisions of the new institutional authority, decisions which will be subject to control by the International Court of Justice."

Although this declaration was later endorsed by leaders of some 20 other countries, nothing has yet come of the proposals it makes. The fate of the declaration shows again that even when the highest political officers agree on a vision, change may not be forthcoming without sustained pressure from other sources.

The declaration's arguments will prove perennial. They represent the only known way of escape from the tragedy of the commons. When the idea of an envirionmental authority next re-emerges, perhaps through citizen pressure, it should be accompanied by a proposal for a parliamentary assembly as part of its structure.

(UNESCO, UNICEF, etc.), which might entail the same difficulties as attaching it to the main body of the UN, we could plan now to put it forward as a component of some new future agency or authority. A new one is certain to be created for some purpose eventually, although the most likely one would be a world environmental authority.

Any umbrella convention on the world environment, when and if it is ever negotiated, could well include provisions to create new institutional mechanisms, such as an environmental authority within the United Nations system (see box). With the attention now being given to the environment by citizens' groups and governments alike, it is a fertile area, and an exceptionally appropriate one, in which to organize for a parliamentary assembly. On the subject of the environment, public interest is high, the case for direct public involvement is particularly strong, and citizen involvement, at least through non-governmental organizations, is already established at the UN.

A parliamentary assembly attached to an environmental authority would bring to that agency the same kinds of benefits as it would to the United Nations itself. It consequently deserves to be considered on its own merits for what it can do to improve the work of the environmental authority, and not only as a step toward something more.

Subsequent to the establishment of this environmental parliament, a way could be sought to either attach it to the UN as well, or to create another such assembly at the UN using the first as a precedent.

Composition

In considering the composition of a UN Parliamentary Assembly, we again face a dichotomy between democratic ideals and political realism over how seats should be apportioned among countries of radically different sizes.

The ideal would be representation by population. If the parliamentary assembly had, say, 1,000 seats, which is already large for a parliament, that would be one parliamentarian per 5 million people. Many countries have fewer than 5 million people. If each country is allowed at least one parliamentarian regardless of size, that would give citizens of smaller countries disproportionate representation.

An even bigger problem arises with the largest country, China, which alone would receive about 20 per cent of the seats. Since China cannot be said to have a democratic government, that could badly compromise the integrity of the assembly (unless it was decided to take the approach of excluding participation from non-democracies altogether).

Alternatively, members could be apportioned on a sliding scale with larger and larger increments of population needed for each additional representative from a state. The smallest countries might have one

member, with the largest limited to perhaps 10-20. There are many possible formulas for doing this.

This approach, although more immediately practical, has its own disadvantages. Larger countries would still have proportionately fewer representatives. More seriously, it links representation to the nation-state instead of to the citizen, thereby to some extent reinforcing the system we are trying to transform.

There probably is no perfect solution, but an acceptable solution may be to begin with the second model of the sliding scale while the assembly is in its first stage with members appointed by national legislatures, and then move to the first model of representation by population at the time the UN Parliamentary Assembly becomes directly elected.

Function

The long-term function of the parliamentary assembly is, of course, to evolve into a true UN parliament with the power to legislate. Initially, however, it would not likely have formal powers.

We could envisage that the assembly would, like the UN General Assembly, be able to draft and vote on resolutions. Officially, its resolutions could be taken as recommendations, and would not be binding on governments any more than the resolutions of the General Assembly itself are, but they would be a source of moral suasion and direction and would help in formulating a global political consensus around issues.

In the beginning, the General Assembly might simply receive the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly for information. A more advanced possibility would be to empower the Parliamentary Assembly to request that the General Assembly debate and vote on at least some of its resolutions as though they had been introduced by a member government. In this way the Parliamentary Assembly could force governments to at least speak to issues and proposals that otherwise would not or could not be raised. This is particularly important on questions which governments, as governments, are in collusion with each other not to address, such as reform of the United Nations.

Additionally, the Parliamentary Assembly might review and adopt resolutions of the General Assembly. Resolutions which passed with a certain specified majority in both assemblies, regardless of where they originated, could be accorded some higher status, conceivably even the status of binding international law in some situations.

As in any parliament, there would be standing committees formed in which most of the study of issues and drafting of resolutions would take place. This in itself would be a valuable process. (It is shocking to think how few independent, internationally constituted bodies exist for considering policies for government action on the major global issues of

our day. Many of those bodies that do exist, for instance UN experts groups, are made up of partisans appointed by governments because they can be relied upon to hold fast to the same rigid political positions all over again.) Parliamentary committees would provide an open-ended process of thought and discussion . This would be a new point of entry for citizens' action groups to introduce ideas into the UN process and to lobby to have them adopted.

Financial Issues

One of the main arguments we can expect governments to raise against the idea of a Parliamentary Assembly will be cost. With so many governments swimming in red ink, there is a plausibility to their reluctance to spend on anything new. But an unwillingness to spend on improving the United Nations is false economy at its ludicrous worst. The price of our international mechanisms of co-operation is by any rational calculation an incomparable bargain next to the vast costs of inaction or misguided action on the huge problems facing the world.

By "saving" money at the UN, governments must often spend many times more to do for themselves what the UN could do more cheaply on behalf of all. In a world without an adequate security system, states seek to defend themselves through national military means at a cost approaching US$1 *trillion* a year. That's 1,000 times more than the UN's basic budget! A UN security system with sufficient credibility to be able to prevent an incident like Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait would not cost a fraction of what was spent fighting the Gulf War at a later stage, an amount estimated at some US$50 billion, plus the unspeakable human costs, the huge costs of rebuilding Kuwait and Iraq, and the horrendous costs to the environment of oil spills in the Red Sea and 600 oil wells burning out of control for months.

Similar arguments can be made across the board. The lack of investment in the education and nutrition of the impoverished children of the third world – something that could conceivably be orchestrated through an improved and better funded UN system – will result in incalculable costs to the whole world community in the future through lost trade and lost knowledge and genius, quite apart from the personal agony of those who will not be helped.

As a last point under the heading of finances, it is *essential* that the salary and travel costs of UN parliamentarians should be paid by the institution of the UN Parliamentary Assembly from its own budget (which would be part of the UN budget), and not by the national governments individually. This is both to assure the independence of the UNPA politicians in their service to the UN and to assure equality of participation.

PART III

The UN Parliamentary Assembly and the Transformation of World Politics

Knowing how much change to expect in a political situation is part of the art of politics and negotiation. It helps when making such judgements to remember a basic characteristic of the evolutionary process: the apparently small initial developments in an immature system may require vastly more evolutionary "effort" than the huge strides made later within a mature system.

In biological evolution, the first simple multi-cellular creatures took billions of years to develop, whereas the path from there to the dinosaurs is measured in only hundreds of millions of years. The next steps to mammals and the infinite complexities of the human mind were accomplished in just tens of millions of years. The pace of change accelerates with complexity, something evident again today in the quickening pace of development of technology and society.

When we analyze the present international order, we see that in political terms it is an anarchical system, an immature system, almost a non-system, characterized by a lack of effective institutions of law and governance and even of a well-developed common ethos or identity. If in this primitive world order apparently small changes seem to require great energy, it may be because the changes are not so small at all. Establishing a UN Parliamentary Assembly that has no more than a consultative role might appear, next to the powerful dinosaur of the nation-state system, to be bringing forth no more than a mouse, but as with that first mammal far back in the fossil record, its significance lies not in its size, not in its strength, but in its revolutionary design.

The apparent smallness of the change represented by the UN Parliamentary Assembly proposed here masks its real significance as a breakthrough to a new paradigm – a breach, in fact, of the state-centric ideology that animates the nation-state system, a change similar to the way the parliaments of old represented a fundamental breach of the power of the monarchies by giving legitimacy to the rights of a new political category called "the people."

The struggle against state-centric ideology

The dinosaur of the day is state-centric thinking, which sees the world not in terms of its people, its humanity, but as a collection of governments, sovereign and separate. Individuals can be citizens and claim rights only within nation-states. Strictly speaking, there are no

citizens at the international level, there are only governments; there are neither citizen interests, nor global interests, only national interests; there are no citizen rights or responsibilities, there are only treaties among governments. State-centric thinking sees this as the objective order of the world – as indeed it is. But when it proceeds to say that this is how matters *should* be, it becomes ideological. State-centric thinking would hold, as a matter of doctrine, that humanity *should* not be conceptualized as a society of individuals, struggling to become free and equal, ultimately entitled as a whole people to self-government. It would add that the world *should* not strive to make progress toward such an ideal.

This ideology so often wears the clothes of empirical science, we hardly even recognize it as an ideology. We are so immersed in it, like fish in water, that we hardly know it's there – until we try to move against it and feel its resistance. The UN Parliamentary Assembly is a powerful challenge precisely to this ideological aspect of contemporary political "science" and the establishment view.

State-centric thinking is an inherently anti-democratic ideology because it refuses to acknowledge the very existence of a Demos, a world citizenry, that could have a collective will or sovereignty that governments must serve. Democracy means people have an inalienable right to be represented in the political decision-making that affects their lives. State-centric thinking, as espoused even by governments of the great democracies, denies democracy by asserting that there is no higher law-making authority than the nation-state, and that the views of the majority outside the borders of a state can therefore have no proper claim on decisions it makes, even if those decisions materially affect them. If the people of the world could somehow vote to end nuclear weapons testing, it would not be – and state-centric ideology would say *should not* be – of any legal or even moral consequence to the countries doing the testing. Nation-state ideology would also say that the proper loyalty of the citizen is to his or her own nation-state, again denying the possibility of democratic life beyond the sovereign state.

A UN Parliamentary Assembly, however, stands for a pro-democratic view of international life. It is much more than just another institution: it is a symbol of another kind of world order. Its very existence would legitimate a set of profound political ideas, among them:

- the idea of a direct person-planet relationship not mediated by national governments;
- the idea of the individual as world citizen in addition to national citizen;
- the idea of the world as one community, not just a collection of governments;
- the idea of a world moving beyond the nation-state system toward a destiny of increasing political integration.

In the way the European Parliament has stood for a view of Europe that is not only a regional arrangement of governments, but a larger society to which the *people* of Europe belong, so a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly would stand for a whole new view of the world . . . of a world whose peoples are, in some deep sense, truly one.

As a body of parliamentarians representing citizens, the assembly's members represent the idea that such a thing as a world citizenry exists and should be recognized as a political category. They confront state-centric ideology with the new idea that the world's individuals must be seen holistically as constituting a body politic, a political community whose members, the citizens, have a right to the most direct possible participation in their own self-government. And, in signifying the coming into existence of a world polity, a UN Parliamentary Assembly signifies also the emergence of a *planetarian* ethos distinct from, and juxtaposed to, the state-centric ethos of national self-interest.

How does it do all this? It is in its nature as a parliament. Where there is a parliament, empowered to legislate, there can be assumed to be a community of values and interests; where there is a parliamentary assembly, there can be presumed to be the *beginnings* of a community of values – which the assembly's own existence helps advance.

But there is something else, something simple and subtle but revelatory. When the European parliamentarians are sitting – and we would expect this would be the same for a UN Parliamentary Assembly – they group themselves not according to the states they come from, but *according to their parties and political affinities*. This act, which has no explanation within the nation-state system, is the consummating step that takes us across to the other paradigm beyond the nation-state system. Sitting with their colleagues according to shared *ideas* rather than nationality, they show that individuals can legitimately be united by identifications, values, interests, and loyalties beyond the nation-state. They shatter the idea of the supremacy of the nation-state with its separate and sovereign solitudes as the basis for organizing the world. They represent, instead, the idea of the integration of the world.

The power of a UN Parliamentary Assembly lies first of all in the power of the *ideas* which governments legitimize in the act of establishing it — because ideas, as a great philosopher once said, have consequences.

What <u>You</u> Can Do

1. Endorse the idea and become a member of the *International Network for a UN Parliamentary Assembly* by returning the Reply Coupon at the beginning of this booklet. We can then keep you informed of future developments.
2. Have your organization endorse.
3. Order extra copies of this booklet. Send copies to your legislator and your local and national media outlets.
4. Help organize a national working group in your country for a UN Parliamentary Assembly.
5. Organize a public forum in your community to discuss the proposal.
6. Send a financial contribution (very important!) to the World Federalist Movement or your national world federalist organization at the addresses on the inside front cover. You can use the Reply Coupon.

UN Parliamentary Assembly – The Campaign

A successful campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly must be broad-based, involving individuals and organizations from many sectors of society in many countries. The World Federalist Movement is working to launch such a campaign.

Our immediate objectives:

1. Collect endorsements of the UN Parliamentary Assembly idea from as many groups and individuals as possible. Endorsers will become part of the *International Network for a UN Parliamentary Assembly.*
2. Help organize *national working groups* in support of the proposal. We will put endorsing individuals and organizations in each country in touch with each other. A principal objective of these working groups will be to meet with national parliamentarians and organize support in as many national legislatures as possible.
3. Prepare *more information* on the UN Parliamentary Assembly idea, including translations of this booklet and a video.
5. Create an *International Group of Expert Advisors* for the campaign.
6. Seek *researchers* to continue developing aspects of the proposal. Additional research is required to fully elaborate the proposal, develop variations on the basic proposal, and explore various routes to implementation.
7. Find likely countries to be *sponsors of a resolution* in the UN General Assembly endorsing the concept and requesting a study on its implementation.
8 In co-operation with supportive governments, *draft a UN resolution* calling on the General Assembly to establish a Parliamentary Assembly.



IV Fórum Internacional

"LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Y LA SEGURIDAD GLOBAL"

Acto inaugural. Alocuciones de:

Ilmo. Sr. D. Joan Blanch, *Presidente de la FIOP*
Excma. Sra. Dña. Anna Balletbò, *Secretaria General de la FIOP*
Excmo. Sr. D. Narcís Serra, *Vicepresidente del Gobierno Español*
Excmo. Sr. D. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Secretario General de NNUU*



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Alocuciones realizadas en el marco del acto inaugural del
IV Fórum Internacional organizado en Badalona
por la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme el 16 y 17 de abril de 1994.

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ALOCUCIÓN DEL ALCALDE DE BADALONA Y PRESIDENTE DE LA FUNDACIÓN INTERNACIONAL OLOF PALME, ILMO. SR. D. JOAN BLANCH

Sr. Boutros Ghali, Secretario General de Naciones Unidas,
Sr. Narcís Serra, Vicepresidente del Gobierno de España,
Sr. Jordi Pujol, Presidente de la Generalitat de Catalunya:

Sean todos bienvenidos a la ciudad de Badalona

Sr. Secretario General, nos sentimos muy felices y orgullosos de contar con su presencia entre nosotros y de que haya podido encontrar en su densa agenda de trabajo el tiempo necesario para esta visita. Nos sentimos también muy felices de que haya Ud. aceptado pertenecer en calidad de patrono a esta Fundación Internacional Olof Palme, que fue creada en homenaje a este hombre que tanto trabajó por la Paz y por la seguridad, y por el entendimiento entre todos los pueblos de Europa y del mundo.

Nos sentimos felices, Sr. Secretario General, de que un hombre que vió la luz en las riberas del mismo mar junto al cual vivimos, sea hoy el Secretario General de Naciones Unidas. Badalona es una ciudad pequeña, que existe desde la época de la civilización romana, desde esa época en la que un único Estado era el Estado de todos los pueblos ribereños del Mediterráneo. En esta riqueza que significa el Mediterráneo con su diversidad de culturas: cristiana, árabe o judía, reside la importancia de este mar y de los pueblos que lo habitan.

Vamos a llevar a cabo, en estas sesiones de la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme, una reflexión sobre la cues-

tión de las Naciones Unidas y la seguridad global. Un debate que consideramos de gran trascendencia en este mundo difícil y convulsionado que nos ha tocado vivir en este tramo final del siglo XX.

Sabemos Sr. Secretario General, de sus esfuerzos y trabajo por la paz y la seguridad internacionales, y de la intensidad y determinación de su voluntad, pese a todas las dificultades, de seguir contribuyendo al buen entendimiento y cooperación entre todos los pueblos.

Quisiera agradecer muy especialmente, en nombre de los ciudadanos de Badalona, por el honor que nos hace al estar hoy entre nosotros. Estoy convencido que todos los esfuerzos que se hagan por la paz, la seguridad y la concordia entre las Naciones, son esfuerzos que nos hacen avanzar en el único camino importante: el de la felicidad de la especie humana. Sus esfuerzos en este sentido, tan decisivos y profundos, le aseguran el reconocimiento de la Historia y un lugar en los sentimientos de todos. Quisiera por mi parte, transmitirle el sincero reconocimiento que surge del corazón de los habitantes de Badalona.

Muchas gracias.

ALOCUCIÓN DE LA SECRETARIA GENERAL DE LA FUNDACIÓN INTERNACIONAL OLOF PALME, EXCMA. SRA. DÑA. ANNA BALLETBÒ

Excelentísimo Señor Secretario General de Naciones Unidas, Vicepresidente del Gobierno, Presidente de la Generalitat, distinguidas Autoridades, Miembros del Patronato, Profesores, alumnos, Señora Palme, amigos todos. Tengo el honor de presentar el Fórum Internacional organizado por nuestra Fundación sobre "Naciones Unidas y la Seguridad Global".

Es el IV Fórum que organizamos habiendo tratado los dos primeros sobre el conflicto del Próximo Oriente y el tercero sobre "La consolidación democrática en Latinoamérica".

Mientras se acerca 1995, fecha del cincuenta aniversario, de la creación de Naciones Unidas, la adecuación de nuestras instituciones de gobierno global y la necesidad de fortalecerlas serán cada vez más centro de interés tanto de los líderes mundiales como de los ciudadanos.

Diversos e importantes cambios se han producido en las relaciones internacionales. El número de naciones-estado se ha multiplicado y ha habido cambios en cuanto a su importancia. La división Este-Oeste ha terminado. Diversos países han estrechado sus relaciones, cediendo parte de su soberanía a entidades colectivas. Otras naciones se han fragmentado porque grupos étnicos, religiosos o de otro tipo, han hecho valer su identidad diferenciadora.

Los sistemas autoritarios están dando paso a gobiernos más democráticos pero la transición no ha finalizado y los derechos humanos son violados de forma generalizada.

Las dos superpotencias han empezado a desarmarse, pero la cantidad y proliferación de armas, incluídas las nucleares, continúa amenazando la paz. Nuevas fuentes de conflicto e inestabilidad -económicas, ecológicas, sociales, humanitarias- exigen respuestas colectivas rápidas y nuevos enfoques del concepto de seguridad.

Nuestra Fundación, creada en 1989 con el objetivo de trabajar guiándonos por los grandes principios defendidos por el dirigente sueco Olof Palme en defensa de los derechos humanos, la lucha contra las flagrantes desigualdades entre el Norte y el Sur y en favor de la Paz y la tolerancia, sabe que no le faltará trabajo y que los problemas y las demandas internacionales son como un enorme océano y nosotros una modesta gota de agua.

El último medio siglo ha sido testigo de un crecimiento y una transformación económica sin precedentes, estimuladas por una expansión del comercio y la inversión mundial y una aceleración de los cambios tecnológicos. El aumento de la liberalización del comercio y de la supresión de normas financieras ha impulsado un creciente mercado global. Pero aún existen muchas barreras proteccionistas y los países más débiles corren el riesgo de quedar marginados. La brecha entre ricos y pobres, entre naciones, y las contradicciones en su interior, se han agrandado. Aunque el progreso económico ha beneficiado a millones, una quinta parte de la población mundial vive en la más absoluta miseria. Incluso los países ricos deben hacer frente al problema de las clases pobres.

Tradicionalmente la migración ha sido una válvula de seguridad, mitigando la presión de los más pobres. Hoy, mientras las fronteras ceden frente a los agentes económicos, se cierran para la gente, aunque la pobreza, el hambre, los conflictos y el deterioro medioambiental están empujando a más personas a huir de sus hogares. Estas restricciones de acceso producen tensión y son elementos de conflicto.

La concepción del sistema internacional también está cambiando. La gente ha comenzado a considerarlo no como un escenario sólo para los estados y sus representantes sino

como una sociedad global con legítimos roles para otros actores. Esta nueva visión valora la diversidad cultural y considera la equidad y la justicia como fundamentos esenciales de las instituciones de gobierno.

El aumento de la seguridad global en sus muchos aspectos es el gran reto y es el tema del Fórum que hoy nos ocupa y en el que intervienen políticos, militares, investigadores y expertos internacionales. El mundo ha evitado una gran guerra en décadas recientes, pero los conflictos y la violencia no han disminuido. En concreto, ha habido un aumento de luchas en el interior de los estados. Algunos conflictos han evidenciado la vulnerabilidad de las minorías. Muchos han producido grandes sufrimientos, numerosos abusos de los derechos humanos y problemas de éxodo de refugiados. Estos conflictos han generado demandas de intervención externa. Es necesario considerar qué enfoques debería adoptar la comunidad internacional para hacer frente a las amenazas a la seguridad en su sentido más amplio.

Hay que implementar medidas para fortalecer el sistema colectivo de seguridad, creado al amparo de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, para prevenir o detener conflictos entre estados.Un sistema de seguridad colectiva que inspire confianza podría reducir la ambición de los estados por tener grandes arsenales, liberando recursos valiosos para fines sociales y asegurar que una parte del ahorro que proporcione se dedique a acelerar el desarrollo.

El interés del Fórum por la seguridad se ampliará a las consideraciones que deberían regir la acción internacional, tanto la diplomacia preventiva como la intervención coercitiva para solventar conflictos internos que pudieran expandirse de forma importante o que comporten un atropello de los derechos humanos. Ante el aumento de estos conflictos internos que demandan intervención, son necesarias directrices claras a fin de que las acciones sean efectivas y consistentes. El Fórum necesitará examinar lo que la comunidad internacional establece como límites de conducta permisibles en un abanico de temas, y considerar los mecanis-

mos- en el contexto de un futuro régimen de ley internacional-
para estimular y, si fuera necesario, imponer estas normas.

Los valores aceptados por la comunidad internacional deben ser reforzados por un sistema regulador del dictado mundial de la ley. Como los estados siguen siendo las unidades primarias del sistema internacional, la cambiante naturaleza de su soberanía y las relaciones entre autonomía nacional y responsabilidad internacional estarán relacionadas a lo largo de las distintas exposiciones.

La turbulencia económica de los últimos tiempos exige un aumento de los esfuerzos por aumentar la coordinación política, consiguiendo condiciones más estables para la inversión y el crecimiento mundiales. También es necesario que las naciones aseguren que se mantendrá el avance hacia un mercado libre y multilateral.

Un aspecto central es la necesidad de acelerar el crecimiento en los países menos desarrollados para que se consiga que la pobreza absoluta desaparezca y que millones de personas consigan unos niveles de vida aceptables. Hay que estudiar las vías para promover una situación internacional que dé más apoyo a los países en vías de desarrollo y acciones para reducir los obstáculos externos a los esfuerzos de esos países para salir de la pobreza. Mejores condiciones para comerciar con los países desarrollados mediante la supresión de barreras arancelarias, mejores condiciones para el comercio de materias primas y mejora en el acceso al mercado de capitales y a la tecnología, continúan siendo temas clave.

Señor Boutros Boutros-Ghali, como Secretaria General de la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme y miembro de la Commission on Global Governance, quiero agradecerle la deferencia que ha tenido en inaugurar este Fórum y también en aceptar formar parte del Patronato de nuestra Fundación. Es para nosotros un gran honor y un gran reto que sabremos no defraudar.

ALOCUCIÓN DEL VICEPRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO, EXCMO. SR. D. NARCÍS SERRA

Señor Secretario General de Naciones Unidas, Señor Presidente de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Señor Presidente de la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme, Señoras y Señores:

Quiero que mis primeras palabras sean de agradecimiento a la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme por invitarme a participar en este IV Fórum Internacional que, en torno al tema de "Naciones Unidas y la Seguridad Global", nos congrega hoy aquí bajo la hospitalidad tradicional del Ayuntamiento de Badalona.

Mi agradecimiento es especialmente grande cuando se me invita a dirigirles la palabra acompañando al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, el Excelentísimo Señor Don Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Su intensa y acertada actividad diplomática le ha convertido, no sólo en gestor esencial del nuevo orden internacional, sino en arquitecto principal de esta nueva Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Su Agenda para la Paz es una aportación esencial al nuevo debate. Por ello, puede tener la seguridad de que escucharemos con suma atención cuanto hoy tenga que decirnos.

El tema que va a ser analizado durante estas dos jornadas -las Naciones Unidas y la Seguridad Global- no es un tema que resulte lejano de los intereses y preocupaciones españoles sino, por el contrario, fundamental. No es algo que esté "ahí fuera", sino en el que nos ocupamos -y del que nos preocupamos- a diario.

España es, desde enero de 1993 y hasta finales de este año, miembro del Consejo de Seguridad. Allí llevamos a cabo una actividad abierta, y muchas actividades, no diría que secretas sino discretas, en las que España contribuye a la Seguridad Global y apoya plenamente el desarrollo de la actividad de las Naciones Unidas.

Por tomar una referencia temporal, en las dos últimas semanas, España ha seguido participando activamente en misiones de paz bajo mandato de la ONU en la antigua Yugoslavia -con contribuciones civiles, militares y policiales- y sigue desarrollando actividades de este tipo -encaminadas a objetivos humanitarios o al mantenimiento, imposición o reconstrucción de la paz- en El Salvador y Mozambique, entre otros lugares. La crisis de Ruanda ha afectado a ciudadanos españoles y de otros países europeos y hemos obrado en consecuencia. El Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ha estado en Líbano y Egipto aportando una colaboración española al proceso de paz en Oriente Medio. Con el Presidente ruso, Boris Yeltsin, estos días en Madrid, hemos hablado también de la seguridad global y del papel de las Naciones Unidas. En fin, podría seguir, pero mi propósito era sólo ilustrar, al hablar de las dos últimas semanas, la involucración de España en la seguridad global.

Estamos construyendo un nuevo mundo, y España influye -en la medida de sus posibilidades- a esta nueva configuración. Sin embargo, nos encontramos aún metidos en las turbulencias naturales de lo que es una transición global. Como indican los Toffler, "estamos viviendo la transformación más profunda del poder global desde el nacimiento de la civilización industrial". No obstante, no hemos llegado aún a un nuevo paradigma, una nueva configuración, a la nueva "sociedad civil de sociedades civiles", como se ha dicho, a la que aspiramos, y en la que todo ni es, ni puede ser nuevo.

El camino está lleno de escollos. No hay amenaza global de guerra, pero sí una multiplicidad de amenazas de guerra, y de conflictos abiertos. En las familias volvemos a al-

morzar o cenar a diario con imágenes terribles de las guerras y sus efectos, guerras de las que no nos sentimos aislados como país, y no sólo por el efecto global de las comunicaciones -lo que se ha venido a llamar el "efecto CNN" - sino porque nuestros propios intereses están en juego. Nadie puede estar ya aislado. Desde luego, España no.

Hay que ser realistas. Los cambios pueden ser difíciles y dolorosos. Pero creo que hay que seguir luchando, hay que redoblar el esfuerzo para que en la antigua Yugoslavia se imponga la convivencia sobre la guerra y se reduzcan los sufrimientos de sus gentes, para que Sudáfrica se normalice, para que Oriente Medio se pacifique y, en general, para que avance la democracia y el respeto por los Derechos Humanos en todo el mundo.

En el camino y en la posada final a la que queremos llegar, el papel de las Naciones Unidas es y va a ser fundamental. La seguridad global se puede ver como el resultado de una serie de seguridades parciales. Del mismo modo, la transición global podría verse como suma de una serie de transiciones parciales entre las que me gustaría citar las Europas, Rusia, el Magreb, África y Sudáfrica, Asia y en particular China.

Pero la suma de estas seguridades, o de las medidas que se toman frente a cada crisis o cada conflicto -real o potencial- no basta. Ni siquiera, por muy importantes que sean, bastan las organizaciones regionales. Cada vez más unas cosas que parecían alejadas afectan a otras cercanas. Es lo que yo llamaría la "interdependencia", ya no económica, sino política y social. La seguridad global, pues, necesita "algo más" para funcionar. Y este "algo más" es, fundamentalmente, el sistema de las Naciones Unidas.

España apuesta decididamente por este sistema; un sistema que debe, sin embargo, revisarse, incluso refundarse. El sistema de las Naciones Unidas es mucho más que el Consejo de Seguridad. Es una forma de orientar la evolución del mundo, una fuente de legitimidad sobre la que existe

consenso, pero que también debemos cultivar. El sistema de las Naciones Unidas debe permitir el triunfo de la legalidad y de la legitimidad en un mundo mucho más complejo, pero que reclama más derecho y más justicia. Debemos desarrollar nuevas reglas internacionales, aunque el vocablo "internacional" se haya quedado en parte -sólo en parte- obsoleto, y sea más correcto decir "transnacional".

Como se sabe, España defiende una cierta reforma de este sistema para hacerlo más eficaz, tanto para evitar conflictos mediante la diplomacia preventiva como para solucionar los que estallen. Por ello, España, a la hora de estudiar la reforma del sistema de las Naciones Unidas, pone el acento en las medidas para el arreglo pacífico de controversias. Esto, para nosotros, implica aceptar la jurisdicción obligatoria del Tribunal Internacional de Justicia. Implica también la necesidad de afrontar una cierta revisión del principio de no injerencia para que, en un momento histórico que Bobbio ha bautizado como "el tiempo de los derechos", la defensa de los derechos humanos sea el principio dominante de la convivencia universal. E implica, desde luego, el desarrollo de un derecho -y de los instrumentos para garantizar su respeto- de las minorías y de las personas pertenencientes a las minorías, que es uno de los problemas fundamentales del mundo actual.

El centro neurálgico de todo el sistema de las Naciones Unidas es el Consejo de Seguridad. Respecto a su necesaria reforma, la posición española se rige por el doble criterio de "representatividad" y "eficiencia". Respecto a la "representatividad", no es ningún secreto que defendemos adecuar más el Consejo de Seguridad a la nueva realidad mundial, ampliando el número de miembros y creando una nueva categoría de ellos. Pues las realidades políticas, demográficas, económicas y militares del mundo son hoy bien distintas que cuando se creó la organización pronto hará 50 años.

En cuanto a la "eficiencia", debemos dotar al Consejo de Seguridad de los medios necesarios. Desde luego de los

medios económicos. Y a este respecto nuestro esfuerzo es importante. Pero también debemos dotarle de los medios diplomáticos y militares necesarios. En este contexto, apoyamos en principio la idea del Secretario General de crear una fuerza de despliegue rápido de la ONU a la que estamos estudiando asignar de modo permanente una unidad.

Debo decir y me llena de satisfacción, pues en parte es una actividad que se inició bajo mi anterior puesto en el Ministerio de Defensa, que la participación española en operaciones de paz ha sido una experiencia muy fructífera para nosotros como país, pese a que no todas estas operaciones hayan tenido el éxito final deseado. Permítanme recordar que hemos participado o estamos participando en este tipo de operaciones desde 1990 en Centroamérica, Irak, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Haití y, por supuesto, la antiguaYugoslavia. El Gobierno español seguirá impulsando la participación española en este tipo de operaciones en la medida de nuestras posibilidades porque cree que ese es un camino de futuro hacia un nuevo orden mundial más justo y más pacífico. Creo que para nuestro país implica un cambio de mentalidad muy bien aceptado por la sociedad, y también un cambio de imagen de nuestras Fuerzas Armadas. Frutos, es necesario recordarlo, que se han alcanzado no sin esfuerzos porque han costado ya la vida de un puñado de españoles que la han entregado en defensa de la paz.

Ahora bien, tampoco debemos poner unas esperanzas desmesuradas en la actuación de las Naciones Unidas, pues tal actuación -incluso complementada por organizaciones regionales como la CSCE o la OTAN- tiene sus límites. Las Naciones Unidas no pueden pacificar todos los conflictos, ni resolver todos los problemas.

Para avanzar en la dirección hacia una mayor "gobernación" mundial, debemos desarrollar otros instrumentos y otras formas de interrelación y de tolerancia. El proceso de construcción europea que ha supuesto la Unión Europea puede servir de ejemplo para ir creando lo que los fundadores

del proyecto llamaban "solidaridades de hecho" y avanzar así hacia un mundo en el que los Estados y las naciones no desaparecen sino que aumentan sus aspectos positivos y disminuyen los negativos construyendo comunidades y configurando el mundo como "una comunidad de comunidades". Desde luego nos gustaría ver a la Unión Europea actuar como una unidad en este terreno.

Todos debemos aprender, los unos de los otros, si queremos evitar llegar a lo que Samuel Huntington ha calificado como un "choque de civilizaciones". Tenemos una gran oportunidad para ello. Dos mundos muy importantes, Asia y América Latina, están en un proceso de desarrollo que nos interesa a todos, y que puede constituir la gran oportunidad para un siglo XXI próspero y justo, si sabemos también no abandonar a su suerte a otras partes menos aventajadas del planeta, como África.

La seguridad global no es sólo militar. Es también económica y social. Las diferencias de renta disponible entre países y en el seno de cada una de las sociedades son una fuente mayor de inestabilidad y de inseguridad. Incluyo también en esta concepción abierta de la seguridad la tecnología, y, desde luego, el tremendo problema del narcotráfico y del crimen organizado frente al que tan oportunos avisos ha lanzado Boutros-Ghali.

Debemos llevar a cabo ante todo una revolución mental dentro de nosotros mismos para comprender las revoluciones estructurales en curso. Como dijo Heráclito: "quien no espere lo inesperado no será capaz de detectarlo".

A este respecto, creo muy importante el trabajo que está desarrollando la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme. Como en su día fue fundamental el cambio de mentalidad que trajo consigo nuestro añorado Olof Palme. Él formó parte de la Comisión Independiente sobre Asuntos de Desarrollo Internacional, más conocida como Comisión Brandt, y tomó la iniciativa para que se constituyera la Comisión Independiente

sobre el Desarme y Asuntos de Seguridad, que presentó su informe "Seguridad Común", durante la sesión dedicada al desarme de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en junio de 1982.

Quisiera reunir, al final de mi intervención, el legado moral de Olof Palme recogiendo sus propias palabras pronunciadas en las Naciones Unidas con motivo del 40 aniversario de su fundación: "No hagamos de las Naciones Unidas una víctima propiciatoria achacándole los problemas que reflejan nuestras propias deficiencias. No son las Naciones Unidas las que no han estado a nuestra altura; somos nosotros quienes no hemos estado a la altura de los ideales de las Naciones Unidas. Sólo mejorándonos nosotros mismos y nuestra política podremos mejorar las Naciones Unidas". Y finalizaba Olof Palme formulando un voto que el Gobierno español hace suyo: "Debe permitirse que las Naciones Unidas tengan éxito. Éxito en los esfuerzos para promover la paz y el desarme; éxito en la prevención de la catástrofe ecológica; éxito en la lucha contra el hambre y la privación. Simplemente, no existe alternativa para la cooperación internacional. Sólo mediante esfuerzos conjuntos podremos esperar pasar del terror común a la seguridad común".

Muchas gracias.

ALOCUCIÓN DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS, EXCMO. SR. D. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

Excelencias, Señora Palme, señoras y señores, queridos amigos: Antes de que este foro comience sus trabajos es importante que recordemos el motivo que nos ha congregado aquí. Estamos aquí para rendir homenaje, a nuestra manera, a la vida de Olof Palme. Olof Palme trabajó en pro de la paz, el desarme y el desarrollo; era un buen amigo y un valioso consejero de las Naciones Unidas. En estos tiempos de inquietudes y de dificultades echamos mucho de menos la clarividencia con que se percató de la necesidad de la paz, así como su profunda dedicación a la causa humanitaria.

Consagro, pues, mis comentarios a la memoria del difunto Olof Palme, en cuyo honor se ha creado esta Fundación. Dedico también mis comentarios a sus ideas acerca de la seguridad común, que hoy en día inspiran muchas operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz. Procuraré reseñar el historial más reciente de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz y explicarles cuándo no queda más remedio que comenzar una operación de este tipo, y cuándo tenemos que decir sí o no. También trataré de explicarles el mandato en que se encuadra una operación de mantenimiento de la paz, tanto si por mantenimiento de la paz se entiende el hecho de interponerse entre las fuerzas adversarias, como si se trata de algo más: la imposición de la paz, la obligación de respetarla , la forma de llevar adelante la operación y, por último, la forma de finalizar la intervención.

Empezaré por el principio, o sea por la primera cuestión: ¿cuándo tenemos que iniciar una operación de mantenimiento de la paz, y cuándo nosotros mismos, o la comuni-

dad internacional, debemos decir: "si, hay que intervenir", o "no, no podemos intervenir"?. Los requisitos previos para la intervención son numerosos: no podemos intervenir a no ser que contemos con la voluntad política de los diferentes protagonistas de la controversia, y a menos que haya un acuerdo, un alto al fuego o un tratado de paz. Para poder actuar, se nos tiene que pedir que ayudemos a mantener la paz.

Por lo tanto, la primera cuestión es que los protagonistas tengan la voluntad política de resolver un problema por medios pacíficos, y que necesiten o no la asistencia de las Naciones Unidas. Esto es exactamente lo que sucede cuando un médico le receta a uno un medicamento y le prescribe un tratamiento: si uno no toma el medicamento o no sigue el tratamiento, no podrá luchar contra la enfermedad. Por eso uno de los requisitos previos para la intervención de las Naciones Unidas es la voluntad política de los protagonistas de resolver el problema. Ahora bien, puede plantearse la situación en la que la voluntad política exista pero las Naciones Unidas no puedan intervenir, porque el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU es un órgano político y sólo intervendrá sobre la base de razones políticas. Por eso las Naciones Unidas no intervendrán siempre que una situación lo requiera ni intervendrán en todas las controversias que se planteen en todo el mundo.

Otro aspecto de la cuestión es la capacidad de las Naciones Unidas para intervenir en todas las regiones del mundo: Asia, África, América Latina, Centroamérica o la antigua Yugoslavia. Si no poseemos esa capacidad, ¿para qué intervenimos? ¿Para qué iniciamos operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz?. Esto plantea una cuestión ética: si existe la voluntad política de resolver una controversia por medios pacíficos, las Naciones Unidas, sean cuales fueran las dificultades que se planteen, tienen que intervenir. Volviendo al ejemplo anterior, si a un médico se le pide que ayude a un

paciente, no tiene más remedio que hacerlo. Sean cuales fueran las dificultades, y a pesar de que quizá no podamos encontrar soldados o fuerzas para la operación de mantenimiento de la paz, a pesar de que quizá no podamos disponer de la asistencia financiera necesaria para enviar en misión a las fuerzas encargadas del mantenimiento de la paz, tenemos que intervenir. ¿Por qué?. Sencillamente, porque la razón de ser de las Naciones Unidas es ayudar a sus Estados Miembros a resolver sus controversias internacionales.

La segunda cuestión se refiere al mandato que el Consejo de Seguridad da a las fuerzas encargadas del mantenimiento de la paz. En la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, el Capítulo VI se refiere al mantenimiento de la paz, y el Capítulo VII va más allá y preconiza la imposición de la paz. El Capítulo VI trata de los acuerdos de paz y se refiere a la situaciones de alto al fuego en las que las Naciones Unidas pueden enviar fuerzas en calidad de observadores, para que se interpongan entre los dos protagonistas de la controversia. Esto es lo que ha sucedido con las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas en el Golán, entre Siria e Israel; en Chipre, entre los grecochipriotas y los turcochipriotas, y en otras muchas regiones de todo el mundo.

Otro aspecto del problema se presenta cuando uno de los dos protagonistas infringe el alto al fuego y comienza una agresión. Entonces las Naciones Unidas pueden resolverse a imponer la paz, según se enuncia en el Capítulo VII. Eso significa que hay que esforzarse por imponer la paz y que hay que recurrir a la fuerza en su favor. Este es un caso que se nos plantea muy a menudo, pero no por ello desaparece la posibilidad de que las Naciones Unidas puedan recurrir al uso de la fuerza. El hecho de que queramos la paz pero que utilicemos la fuerza para conseguirla quizá parezca paradójico, pero hay casos en que no hay otra solución, pues hay un agresor y la comunidad internacional tiene la

obligación de condenarlo y sancionarlo. Un ejemplo clásico nos lo brinda la agresión de Iraq contra Kuwait, caso en el que la comunidad internacional asignó un mandato a un grupo de Estados para que pudieran contener la agresión.

No hay que olvidar otro aspecto: hay que desarrollar la operación durante todo el tiempo que sea necesario. Es posible que la operación requiera uno, dos o tres años de actividades, y eso nos plantea dos tipos diferentes de problemas: el primero consiste en obtener una fuerza de mantenimiento de la paz que participe en las operaciones. Esto no es cosa fácil, ya que los Estados Miembros quizá se muestren indecisos al principio, luego convengan en enviar fuerzas de mantenimiento de la paz y, al final, cambien de opinión. El hecho de que la participación de Estados Miembros en una operación de esta clase sea voluntaria crea a veces dificultades, ya que no tienen la obligación de hacerlo.

La segunda dificultad es de carácter financiero. El presupuesto para las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz es diferente del presupuesto ordinario de las Naciones Unidas. El presupuesto anual para el mantenimiento de la paz ascendió a unos 600 millones de dólares durante los 40 primeros años de las Naciones Unidas. Las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz se han multiplicado tanto en el mundo, que de tres o cuatro operaciones iniciales hemos pasado a 17 en 1994. Su presupuesto ha experimentado también un gran aumento y ha pasado a 3.600 millones de dólares; es posible que al final de este año llegue a 4.000 millones de dólares. En esta esfera se plantea otra dificultad, y es que a menudo los estados miembros no pagan sus contribuciones para las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz.

Esto suscita un problema: ¿cómo pagar a los Estados Miembros que contribuyen a las operaciones de mantenimento de la paz? Muy a menudo les pagamos con retraso, lo que significa que, en realidad, nos están prestando dinero sin cobrarnos interés. Por lo demás, el costo de estas operaciones es insignificante si lo comparamos con lo que la comunidad

internacional gastó durante la guerra fría, período durante el cual se gastaron en defensa y armamento más de 1.000 millones de dólares, y a veces incluso 2.000 millones de dólares diarios. Lo que ahora pedimos no es más que unos cuantos miles de millones de dólares para todo el año.

Otro problema consiste en que algunos países quizá resuelvan retirar sus fuerzas si ocurre un accidente, ya que su opinión pública no es partidaria de la presencia de sus tropas en una operación de mantenimiento de la paz en África, Asia o la antigua Yugoslavia. ¿Cómo vamos a reemplazar esas tropas, a fin de mantener el mismo número de soldados sobre el terreno?.

El problema final, que es complicadísimo, estriba en la forma de concluir la operación. Si tenemos éxito, es fácil conseguirlo, como se ha podido comprobar en Camboya; ahora bien, cuando la situación persiste año tras año, la comunidad internacional puede muy bien preguntarse si vale la pena participar en operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz cuando no parece haber solución.

Esto me retrotrae a Olof Palme y a su doctrina acerca de la seguridad común o global. La voluntad de conseguir una amplia seguridad nos acerca cada vez más a ese tipo de doctrina. En muchas de nuestas operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz -por ejemplo, en Angola, Mozambique, Camboya y El Salvador- no solamente nos ocupamos del mantenimiento de la paz propiamente dicho (enviando soldados para que vigilen un alto al fuego o procurando asegurar la distribución de ayuda humanitaria), sino que nos ocupamos también de proteger a los refugiados y a las personas desplazadas, de distribuir alimentos, de reconstruir carreteras, ciudades y hospitales, o de abrir escuelas. Por eso nuestra participación en una operación de mantenimiento de la paz no está ya circunscrita a la dimensión militar, sino que reviste así mismo dimensiones políticas, diplomáticas, sociales y humanas. En El Salvador, por ejemplo, estuvimos participando en la reforma del ejército, además de revisar la

Constitución y de establecer una academia de policía. Aprovecharé esta ocasión para dar las gracias al Gobierno de España, que ayudó a las Naciones Unidas a establecer esa academia de policía, y que incluso envió policías para que ayudasen a crear una nueva fuerza policial en El Salvador.

Cuando intervenimos en Somalia no había gobierno, ni escuelas, ni hospitales, ni carreteras, y centenares de millares de niños estaban muriéndose de hambre. En menos de un año pudimos vacunar a más de 200.000 niños, y pudimos abrir hospitales y escuelas primarias. Hemos creado una fuerza local de policía y un gobierno local en las diferentes provincias del país.

Olof Palme dijo hace unos cuantos años que la paz no consistía solamente en la ausencia de guerra, sino que tenía que caracterizarse por la integración del desarrollo, la democracia y la paz. Este concepto global de la paz es, en realidad, la nueva doctrina de las Naciones Unidas, que se esfuerzan por mejorar la situación que prevalece en las partes del mundo en que hay enfrentamientos, controversias étnicas y guerras.

Permítanme decir, para acabar, que a pesar de las dificultades con que tropezamos en el mundo de hoy, y a pesar de los numerosos y diversos conflictos y enfrentamientos militares, nuestro mundo empieza a cobrar conciencia de este nuevo papel de las Naciones Unidas. La opinión pública internacional se percata de que la ONU, puede y debe desempeñar un papel de promoción de la paz, el desarrollo y la democracia, y de que, gracias a esa doctrina global, podremos coayudar a la estabilidad, el desarrollo y la democracia en todo el mundo.

Una vez más quisiera dar las gracias a la Fundación Internacional Olof Palme, a la ciudad de Badalona, al Presidente de la Generalitat, al Vicepresidente del Gobierno y a todos los que me han brindado esta oportunidad de exponer algunas ideas acerca de las Naciones Unidas.


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AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1995

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INTRODUCTION

The Chicago Council survey was conducted not quite two years after the inauguration of Governor Bill Clinton as president of the United States, and five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. This is the first survey since the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, and the second in which the U.S.-Soviet competition was not a dominant factor in shaping the attitudes of Americans.

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

During the last four years the United States and its European allies have sought to support those in Russia seeking to build a democratic political system and market economy. Aid to Russia was strongly supported by the Bush administration and initially by the Clinton administration. During the past year, however, as President Boris Yeltsin's hold on power has become more tenuous, a more cautious stance has emerged, with greater recognition given to independent transformations in Ukraine and the Baltic states. Although the Clinton administration had opposed the eastward expansion of NATO so as not to provoke Russia, by the end of 1994 it endorsed, at least rhetorically, admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.

When Russian troops moved to quell a secessionist move in Chechnya in December of 1994, the administration initially claimed it was an internal matter. But by mid-January, when televised reports showed widespread bloodshed, the administration distanced itself from the Yeltsin government. It called on Yeltsin to end bombing of the Chechnyan capital of Grozny and reach a truce. In the period since our data was collected in late autumn, attitudes toward Russia and President Yeltsin may have changed as a result.

The year 1993 witnessed a dramatic breakthrough in the decades-old conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The historic meeting between Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin held at the White House signaled the beginning of peace agreements reached throughout the region. Although Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq and violence between Israelis and Palestinians is still erupting, news from the Middle East has been more encouraging during the past four years than at any time in recent decades. The Clinton administration is recognized for its role in bringing this about.

The period before the survey also witnessed a short-term American military involvement in Somalia in 1992-93, brief humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in the summer of 1994 and the landing of American troops in Haiti in late September 1994. Although the Haiti operation was accomplished without military confrontation, it drew criticism from Republican members of Congress.

American and European efforts to solve the crisis in Bosnia continued to be futile, with the Clinton administration's several initiatives proving unsuccessful. As the new Congress met in early 1995, Republican leaders were increasingly critical of the administration's policies, calling for a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnians, something strongly resisted by America's European allies.

China policy has become increasingly important over the past four years. President Clinton eventually reversed his stance of linking trade policy with human rights, one of the most disputed issues in his administration's first two years. Disputes over Chinese practices on intellectual property rights and debt repayment remained unresolved by mid-February 1995.

Additional attention was focused on Asia by reports of the death of longtime North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung and by the controversy over North Korea's suspected development of a nuclear weapons capability.

Two of the most impressive accomplishments of President Clinton's first two years in office were the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement and of the Uruguay Round GATT accords, both with strong bipartisan support. Such support was not forthcoming in late January this year for Clinton's rescue package for Mexico following the peso crisis.

THE MOOD IN THE UNITED STATES

At the time this study was undertaken four years ago, the United States was entering a recession that would soon spread to most other OECD member nations. Today the recession has receded in most of the industrialized countries, including the United States, even if most have not returned to the prosperity levels of the previous decade. Unemployment continues to be over 10 percent in virtually all countries of the European Union, but has declined in the United States to under 8 percent.

Although the United States is still the world's largest debtor, the budget deficit is now declining and stands at under $200 million. The trade deficit is running well over $100 billion a year. By objective standards of economic growth, inflation and unemployment, the United States was doing far better in the autumn of 1994 than four years earlier. Nevertheless, President Clinton's Democratic allies in Congress suffered an overwhelming defeat in the November elections. For the first time in four decades, Republicans captured majorities in both the House and Senate as well as a majority of the

nation's governorships. Foreign policy issues did not play a major role in the election, though the issue of presidential leadership was a factor. As the new year began, attention focused on whether the Clinton administration would be able to work with the new Congress, led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole.

THE SURVEY

This is the sixth public opinion survey and analysis sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The key question in all the surveys remains the extent to which the American public and leaders support an active role for the United States overseas. The report addresses such issues as the relationship between domestic and foreign policy priorities, the response to far-reaching changes in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and shifts in foreign policy goals and priorities.

The principal data on which the survey is based were collected just 20 years after the first survey, carried out in the autumn of 1974. The second survey was conducted in 1978, the third in 1982, the fourth in 1986 and the fifth in 1990. The results of those surveys were summarized and published in 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1991 under the title "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy."

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations commissioned the Gallup Organization to collect the data for this survey, using separate but similar questionnaires for the general public and a sample of national leaders. The survey of the public involved personal interviews with a stratified, systematic, random national sample of 1,492 American men and women 18 years of age and older. The questions were weighted to eliminate sampling distortion with respect to age, sex or race. The field work for the public survey was conducted between October 7 and October 25, 1994.

The leadership sample involved 383 individual interviews conducted by telephone between October 26 and December 7, 1994. The sample included Americans in senior positions with knowledge of international affairs. We included roughly equal proportions from the House of Representatives, the Senate and the administration. Leaders were drawn from the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services committees of Congress and from international offices in the State, Treasury, Defense and other federal departments. Leaders were also drawn from the business community (international vice presidents of large corporations), the media (editors and columnists of major newspapers and magazines, television and radio news directors and network newscasters), academia (presidents and scholars from major colleges and universities) and private foreign policy institutes. A smaller number of leaders was drawn from national labor unions, churches and special interest groups relevant to foreign policy.

The content of the questionnaire was prepared after consultation with the Gallup Organization by the editor and the following consultants: Arthur Cyr, vice president and program director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations; Catherine Hug, editorial consultant; Benjamin Page, Gordon Scott Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University; Bernard Roshco, former director of the Office of Opinion Analysis, U.S. Department of State; Trevor Tompson, doctoral student, Northwestern University.

The interviewing, tabulating of results and compiling of data were done through the facilities of the Gallup Organization. The analysis and interpretation of data presented in this report represent the joint efforts of the above consultants working with the editor. We have published the analysis as quickly as possible after the field work was completed. The response to earlier reports confirms our judgment that the advantages of a brief but timely summary analysis outweigh the disadvantages of doing a comprehensive study in so short a period of time. The report should be considered in that light. The data derived from this survey will be placed on deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the Roper Center for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut, and NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. It will be available to scholars and other interested professionals. The margin of error is plus or minus three percentage points for the public sample and plus or minus five percentage points for the leadership sample.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to take this opportunity to express my thanks and appreciation to my principal collaborators: Arthur Cyr, Catherine Hug, Benjamin Page, Bernard Roshco and Trevor Tompson. I want to extend a special word of thanks to Catherine Hug for her consultation and for her years as editor at the Chicago Council. She lent her critical judgment to the substance of the report, designed and produced most of the graphics and was responsible for all aspects of the publication. Special thanks are also due to Maureen O'Connor and Elaine Kemna-Irish, who displayed both skill and persistence in preparing and processing the various drafts of the manuscript, and to Sarah Connor, Marilyn Cahill and Teresa Davis-Hurst for their help in the dissemination of the report. I also want to thank the Gallup Organization for their cooperation while working under a tight schedule, especially David Moore and Christine McCarty.

On behalf of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, I want to express our gratitude to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for providing the principal financing for the project. I also want to extend our thanks to the Information Office of the Commission of the European Union in Washington, D.C. for its financial assistance.

John E. Rielly, President
February 15, 1995

THE FINDINGS IN SUMMARY

With the Cold War over and the Soviet Union neither a perceived superpower threat nor a unified nation-state, the international political landscape has changed drastically in only a few short years. Despite these dramatic changes in the external environment, American attitudes have remained remarkably stable on a number of important questions. Neither old-fashioned isolationism nor activist interventionism has captured public interest. Based on this study, the attitudes of Americans at both the public and leadership levels reflect a "pragmatic internationalism."

PRAGMATIC INTERNATIONALISM

Americans are committed to an active role for the United States in the world, to working with other countries through the United Nations and the NATO alliance, and to freer trade. At the same time, Americans are reluctant to become entangled in the affairs of other nations and to use military force where interests are not vital. Indeed, they are selective in identifying international issues or parts of the world as vital to the country. They are aware of the impact the international system has on life at home, but their focus has shifted toward that home life and feelings of personal economic vulnerability. Crime and unemployment are considered the biggest problems facing the country by the public. Foreign policy-related problems now constitute the smallest number of overall problems since 1978 for the public and the smallest ever among leaders. The preferred goals of foreign policy address matters directly related to local concerns: controlling and reducing illegal immigration and stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the country. Interest in local and state news, but not foreign news, has expanded.

THE LONE SUPERPOWER

Despite their personal insecurity, Americans are confident about the capacity of the nation to influence events in the world at large. Approximately one-half the public and leaders believe the United States plays a more important and powerful role in the world today than it did 10 years ago, the highest numbers recorded in these surveys. Many people also believe the United States will be even more influential 10 years from now. These results contrast with feelings of national insecurity and weakness recorded in the late 1970s.

The public sees the United States, China and Japan playing greater roles in 10 years, while the leaders envision a future world with China, Germany and Japan increasing in relative influence. This may reflect the leaders' greater awareness of the international economic environment, but also acknowledges the strong role the United States already plays in the world.

REGIONAL ISSUES


The post Cold-War world is one of diverse regional concerns and some threats, but none comparable to that of the former Soviet Union. There is still a perceived nuclear threat, though its source is unclear. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is considered one of the most important foreign policy goals by both the public and leaders.

Americans view Europe as more important to the United States than Asia, though by a narrow margin among the leaders. Economic unification of Europe is generally viewed as a good thing and concern about economic competition from the European Union has diminished. At the same time, concern about competition with Japan is still high among the public, and the concern about the power of China is growing.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is also viewed as a good thing by the public and leaders. Mexico is rated highly on both the vital interest and thermometer rankings, although the recent currency crisis provoked a divided response in the U.S. Congress and among the public in early 1995.


PREFERRED U.S. ROLE IN WORLD

"Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?"




FOREIGN PROBLEMS

Foreign policy problems as a percentage of the total problems facing the country.



IMPORTANCE OF U.S. ROLE

Respondents who say the U. S. plays a more important and powerful role as a world leader today than it did 10 years ago.



In the Middle East, there is support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially among the leaders. It is unclear whether these views will hold up given the latest rash of violence between Israel and the Palestinians. Islamic fundamentalism is a matter of strong and growing concern. Middle East policy is an area where the Clinton administration receives relatively high marks on its performance.

VITAL INTERESTS

As in the past, public and leaders see vital interests in various countries of the world, though in somewhat different orders of priority. The general public rates Japan, Saudi Arabia and Russia most important, followed by Kuwait and Mexico (tied) and Canada. The top countries for the leaders are Mexico and Russia (tied for first), followed by Japan, China, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Germany. Brazil, France and Poland rank relatively low on this scale.

On a thermometer of "feelings" toward world leaders and nations, Americans show the warmest feelings for Pope John Paul II, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tied with former President Jimmy Carter, former President George Bush and South African President Nelson Mandela. Nations viewed most warmly are Canada, Great Britain and Italy, followed by Germany and Mexico (tied). At the bottom of the scale are Haiti, Cuba, North Korea, Iran and—last—Iraq.

SECURITY ISSUES

Americans are not reacting to the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the Soviet bloc with further calls for drastic defense cuts or withdrawal from alliances. There appears to be a solidification of support for current levels of defense after previous backing of cuts. Americans favor participation in the NATO alliance and in U.N. peacekeeping operations. The public is divided on whether to insist on a U.S. commander when troops are taking part in such operations.

Germany and Japan are viewed favorably overall by the leaders. A solid majority of leaders would encourage both nations to play a more active military role in the world—though Canada receives much more encouragement for such action—and to hold seats on the U.N. Security Council.

General support remains for espionage by the CIA among the public. A plurality of the public, though only a minority of the leaders, believes the CIA should work inside other countries to weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly to the United States. There is majority support for spying on specific countries, including China, North Korea, Russia and even Japan.


ECONOMIC ISSUES

The public shows signs of economic concern, but no great sense of alarm. While the public is worried about Japan's trading practices and about unemployment, it has not turned protectionist. In fact, support for tariffs has gone down among the public and leaders to its lowest levels.

Economic aid, as in the past, is not popular with the public. The public prefers to decrease or stop aid altogether to Egypt, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, Russia and

U.N. PEACEKEEPING


Should the U.S. be part of a U.N. peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world when asked?




The Public

COMMANDER FOR PEACEKEEPING

Should the U.S. insist a U.S. commander be in charge of a U.N. force when U.S. troops take part, or should we accept a commander appointed by the United Nations?




The Public




The Leaders

NAFTA

Is NAFTA mostly good for the U.S. economy or mostly bad?




The Public



The Leaders

MEXICO

Vital interest in Mexico.



African countries. It would keep aid the same to the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and to Latin American countries, and increase aid to no one. Among leaders, pluralities favor increases to Eastern Europe and the Palestinians.

Concern over the federal budget deficit has declined from four years ago. While Americans are aware of the impact of U.S. foreign policy on such matters as our overall economy, the value of the dollar, the price of gasoline and unemployment, the numbers have gone down from four years ago. This may reflect a waning of concern about the state of the national economy that was evident four years ago.

LEADERSHIP

At a time when Americans perceive the greatest importance of the U.S. role as a world leader, many are disappointed in the performance of their president in foreign policy. The relative unhappiness is reflected in the list of problems facing the country. Weak leadership is cited as a major problem by notable numbers of the public and even more of the leaders. President Clinton receives some of the lowest ratings in these surveys for his handling of overall foreign policy. The leaders give the Clinton administration high marks for accomplishments in the Middle East and in international trade. The leaders give a divided response on handling of the North Korean nuclear threat.

The president is also ranked alongside nine other post-World War II presidents on his success in foreign policy. By almost every measure, he is ranked among the worst three. By one measure, George Bush, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, respectively, are at the top of the list of presidents considered either "very" or "somewhat" successful in the conduct of foreign policy, with Kennedy first when just the "very" successful category is considered.

Criticism of the administration does not translate into support for an activist Congress. There is a slight increase in the number who feel the role of Congress in foreign policy has become too strong.

CHAPTER ONE
THE PRIORITY OF FOREIGN POLICY

By placing foreign policy issues in the context of Americans' overall set of policy concerns, we can "map" the world view of the public and leaders. This chapter examines the priority Americans give foreign policy by reviewing the responses to three questions: How much attention is given to foreign policy news in contrast to domestic news? What are deemed the country's principal problems? Should the government expand or trim the funds it expends on various programs at home and abroad?


INTEREST IN THE NEWS

The 1990 survey recorded the highest attentiveness to foreign news since 1974. Furthermore, the 1990 highs were accompanied by less intense interest in local and state news. That survey was conducted just one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall and during the official reunification of Germany. The breaking apart of the Eastern bloc and the dramatic transformation of former Soviet satellites into free societies had been reported regularly. The future of the Soviet Union itself was hanging in the balance. At the same time, U.S. troops were undertaking a massive movement to Saudi Arabia in preparation for ousting Iraq from Kuwait, and it was unclear what the troops there might face.

At the time of the current survey in October 1994, the end of the Cold War was old news, and earlier attempts to define a "New World Order" had faded from view. Without emphasis from a new president or a looming international crisis, foreign policy had become secondary to domestic issues like health care, budgets and crime. The survey was also conducted during one of the most heated mid-term elections in recent history, when the American people were preparing to throw out the Democratic majority in Congress. U.S. troops had undertaken a limited occupation of Haiti, but a last-minute deal made with Haiti's military leaders virtually assured a bloodless operation. Against this backdrop, the 1994 responses reveal a jump in interest in news at the local and state levels and a slight decline in international news interest.

FIGURE I-1: INTEREST IN THE NEWS

Members of the public who are "very interested" in news about the following.



Since 1974, our surveys have measured attentiveness to the news by asking respondents if they are "very interested," "somewhat interested," or "hardly interested at all" in news about "your local community," "your state," "national news," "news about other countries" and "news about the relations of the United States with other countries." Some of the results are summarized in Figure I-1.

The percentage "very" interested in local community news is up 10 percentage points, reaching the highest level ever recorded for any news category (65%). This follows a period of decline in local news interest from 1982 to 1990. Strong interest in news at the state level has increased nine points, reaching its highest level, at 51%. By contrast, the percentage "very" interested in national news stays constant over the last two surveys, at 55%. Absent the seismic events of four years ago, those "very" interested in news about other countries has


FIGURE I-2: NATIONAL PROBLEMS

"What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today?"
The answers listed are spontaneous responses.


The Public	The Leaders
1. Crime (42%)	1. Crime (33%)
2. Unemployment (20%)	2. Economy: unspecified (23%)
3. Health care/insurance (19%)	3. Budget deficit (20%)
4. Drug abuse (18%)	4. Education (15%)
5. Poverty: hunger, homelessness (15%)	5. Dissatisfaction with government (15%)
6. Education: improving schools (12%)	6. Immorality (13%)
7. Economy: unspecified (10%)	7. Health care/insurance (13%)
8. Dissatisfaction with government (9%)	8. Unemployment (11%)
9. Budget deficit (9%)	9. Racism (7%)
10. Immorality (8%)	10. Foreign relations/policy: unspecified (7%)

FIGURE I-3: NATIONAL PROBLEM CATEGORIES

"What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today?"
Responses are grouped into four categories: economy, government, social, and foreign policy.



The Public



The Leaders

declined three points. The percentage "very" interested in news about U.S. relations with other countries also declined three percentage points, from a 1990 high of 53% to 50%, still the second highest level in 20 years. Despite the decline over the past four years, a review of changes in attentiveness to news over the past 20 years suggests that while interest in foreign news is not a growth entity, outright lack of interest in foreign news has diminished.

Interest in international news is partly a function of education. The farther from home the subject matter of a news story, the less interest it generates among the less educated. Sixty-five percent of high school graduates and 66% of college graduates say they are "very" interested in local news, while the percentage saying they are "hardly" interested is 5% for both groups. The percentage of high school graduates saying they are "very" interested in news about U.S. relations with other countries is 45%, compared to 57% for college graduates. The numbers "hardly" interested are 13% and 3%, respectively. The disparity increases regarding news about other countries, with 26% of high school graduates and 45% of college graduates saying they are "very" interested, and 25% of high school graduates and 8% of college graduates saying they are "hardly" interested.

FOREIGN POLICY'S PLACE ON THE NATIONAL AGENDA

The national agenda is defined here as the issues that come to mind spontaneously when respondents are asked, "What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today?" Because this question does not ask respondents to distinguish between foreign and domestic issues, the responses offer an insight into the relative priority the American public and leaders give to problems at home and abroad.

The 1991 report notes that while attentiveness to international news was up compared to 1986, concern about foreign policy problems had declined among leaders as well as the general public. The U.S.-Soviet political and military competition had receded dramatically and with it the public's concern about Cold-War issues, which had preoccupied both the public and leaders for four decades. With the complete disappearance of the Soviet Union since the 1990 survey, public concern about these issues has declined further.


It is not surprising, therefore, that this time not one foreign policy concern appears on the public's top 10 list of problems facing the country (see Figure I-2). Even among the leaders, only one foreign policy issue appears among the first 10—foreign relations in general, which ranks 10th, mentioned by 7%. Crime leads both lists, mentioned by 42% of the public (up 27 points from 1990) and 33% of the leaders (up 28 points). It displaces the budget deficit as the issue with highest priority on both lists in 1990.

The public's trio of top problems appears to reflect personal concerns. The second-ranking problem is unemployment (ninth in 1990) and the third is health care and health insurance (not among the top 10 in 1990). The budget deficit has fallen to ninth place. Seemingly, interest in local news reflects the public's concern with problems that strike close to home.

Among leaders, after crime, the economy in general again takes second priority, mentioned by 23% (down 13 points from 1990). The budget deficit has retreated to third place, mentioned by 20% (down 26 points).

FIGURE I-4: SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Social problems as a percentage of the total problems facing the country.



The changing emphasis of public concerns has been tracked over the years by dividing all mentioned problems into four policy categories: economic, governmental, social and foreign. The numbers for each category as a percentage of the total problems listed are displayed in Figure I-3.

In this survey, six of the top 10 problems facing the country mentioned by the public are designated as social, two as economic and two as governmental. For the leaders, five of the top 10 problems are categorized as social problems, two as economic, two as governmental and one as foreign.

Problems designated "social" have increasingly dominated the agendas of both leaders and public during the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure I-4). With crime as the top concern of the public and leaders today, it is no surprise that social problems now constitute by far the largest category for both, encompassing more than three-fifths (61.7%) of the problems named by the public and almost half (48.4%) of the problems named by leaders. Even when social items have another significant component—economic, for example—we consider them to have a distinctive impact on social relationships and the fabric of society. For example, "health care/health insurance" is classified as a social problem, as it was in the past.


The foreign policy category, having declined further since 1990, now comprises the lowest percentage of total problems ever among leaders (11.4%) and the lowest since 1978 for the public (11.5%).

PRIORITIES ASSIGNED TO FEDERAL SPENDING

Where people want to put their money certainly indicates their priorities. As in the past, an index of support for federal government expenditures is derived by subtracting the percentage that wants to "cut back" funding for a specific program from the percentage that wants to "expand." As usual, the preference for spending at home far exceeds the desire to spend abroad. The public and

FIGURE I-5: SPENDING ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Should the following be expanded, cut back or kept about the same?
Index: Percentage "expand" minus percentage "cut back."



leaders make similar choices for increased and reduced spending. The results are summarized in Figure I-5.

Spending preferences on domestic problems stand out. Among the public, a net 75% wants to increase spending on programs to combat violence and crime, a net 71% wants to increase spending on education (the same as in 1990), and a net 64% wants to expand spending on health care. Among leaders the figures are lower. The net figures for increasing aid to education is down from 73% in 1990 to 46% today.

The public's desire to cut back defense spending has declined since the 1990 survey. The current net margin for reduced spending is 13%, down from 29% in 1990. A plurality (41%) prefers to keep it the same. Among leaders, the net preference for cuts in defense spending (23%) is larger than the public's.

The public again prefers to cut aid to other nations by massive net margins, though not quite as large as last time. The net margin is 64% for cutting military aid (68% in 1990), and 49% for cutting economic aid (54% in 1990). Leaders' sentiment for cutting military aid is, like the public's, a net of 64% (73% in 1990). A notable reversal is found in leaders' reduced support for economic aid. The net margin in favor of cutting aid is now 11%, compared to 1990's net margin for raising aid of 22%.

As succeeding chapters will document, the American public and leaders have not closed their eyes to the world outside the United States. But their gaze is increasingly focused on problems closer to home.

CHAPTER TWO
THE GOALS OF FOREIGN POLICY

When the Cold War ended, the foreign policy goals of competing with the Soviet Union and opposing communism, which had long preoccupied Americans, became irrelevant. Experts and citizens alike wondered what goals would take their place. How should the United States behave in a more complex and unpredictable, if perhaps less dangerous, post-Cold War world? The current survey indicates some answers are beginning to emerge. While Americans remain internationalist overall, in the absence of a clear external threat and with growing concern over domestic ills, they now prefer a set of goals that reflect a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.

INTERNATIONALISM

An important barometer of internationalism is whether people think it best for the future of the country to "take an active part" in world affairs or to "stay out" of world affairs. The proportion of people saying we should "take an active part" is illustrated in Figure II-1. As indicated, most of the American public and an overwhelming proportion of leaders favor an active role. Roughly two-thirds of the American public has maintained this view in most surveys carried out since World War II. The current figure of 65% is a shade below the pre-Vietnam War peak, but well up from the depressed levels of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The figure for leaders continues to hover near 100%.


Internationalist thinking varies with education. College graduates are most supportive of an active U.S. role in the world (80% in favor). Those without a high school diploma are less supportive, with 55% in favor and 33% against.

The survey results also indicate that large pluralities of the public and leaders believe the United States is playing a more important and powerful role as a world leader compared to 10 years ago. These figures are up from the last survey by 10 percentage points among the public and 18 points among leaders. The pessimism about the relative strength of the United States evident in the autumn of 1990—at a time of economic recession, steep trade imbalances, perceived threatening competition from Europe and Japan, and before the victory in the Persian Gulf War—has dissipated. Americans today are feeling more confident about their country's overall strength.

Furthermore, an overwhelming majority (73%) of the public and a plurality (43%) of leaders say the United States will play a greater role in the next 10 years than it does today. Forty-one percent of leaders believe that our role will be the same. Among the general public, no other country we asked about—Japan, China, Germany or Russia—is given such a strong prognosis.

FIGURE II-1: PREFERRED U.S. ROLE

Respondents who favor an active role for the United States in world affairs.



FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS

Despite the continued strong support for an active role in the world, the public's more pragmatic approach is evident in its list of foreign policy problems. As in the past, we ask people to name two or three of the biggest foreign policy problems facing the United States today (see Figure II-2). Fully 19% of the public feels the biggest problem is getting involved in the affairs of other countries. This is up from 6% in 1990. The second biggest problem, listed by 16%, is that too much foreign aid is being sent to other countries, down

FIGURE II-2: FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS

"What do you feel are the two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing the United States today?"
The answers listed are spontaneous responses.

The Public	The Leaders
1. Getting involved in affairs of other countries (19%)	1. International trade: free trade with all countries, some countries too strict with trade policies (24%)
2. Foreign aid: too much sent to other countries (16%)	2. Dealings with Russia (23%)
3. Immigration: illegal aliens (12%)	3. Weak leadership (19%)
4. Iraq: Saddam Hussein, invasion of Kuwait (11%)	4. Stronger foreign policy needed: U.S. is compromising (16%)
5. Our relationship with Haiti (10%)	5. Relations with Bosnia (16%)
6. International trade: free trade with all countries, some countries too strict with trade policies (8%)	6. Arms control: nuclear weapons, too much military equipment sold or given to other countries (14%)
7. Weak leadership (7%)	7. World economy (11%)
8. Balance of payments (6%)	8. Mid-East situation: unspecified (7%)
9. Too much military involvement in other countries (6%)	9. Keeping peace (7%)
10. Stronger foreign policy needed: U.S. is compromising (6%)	10. We act like the world's police (6%)

two points from 1990. Significant numbers also object to too much military involvement in other countries (6%) and to a perceived U.S. role as "the world's police" (4%).

Substantial numbers of Americans now focus on problems directly bearing on their lives and livelihoods: illegal immigration (cited by 12%, up from just 1% in 1990), free trade (8%) and the balance of payments or trade deficit (6%).

It is noteworthy that four of the foreign policy issues that most bedeviled the early Clinton administration—Bosnia, North Korea, Rwanda and Somalia—arouse little public concern in the survey. Only 3% of the public mentions Bosnia—where Serbs, Muslims and Croatians have been at war for several years—as one of the biggest foreign policy problems. Only 2% cites the problem of North Korea, which has been suspected of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. None at all mention Rwanda or Somalia.

Haiti, where U.S. troops landed just prior to the survey, is seen as a big problem by 10% of the public. This undoubtedly reflects the well-publicized involvement of U.S. troops and is in part linked to concern over illegal immigration. Similarly, the public's relatively frequent mention of Iraq and Kuwait as a big foreign policy problem (11%) no doubt reflects the muscle-flexing by Saddam Hussein at the Kuwait border as this survey was being conducted.

Third World poverty drew mention by only 4% of the public. Nearly absent from the list of big problems (cited by 3% or fewer) are dangers of war, dealings with Russia, arms control, relations with Japan and China, world population, the global environment, human rights and relations with Europe.

In listing foreign policy problems, leaders cite almost a third more problems than does the public, though they list fewer than four years ago. Leaders focus on broader issues of concern to the country: international trade (24%), dealings with Russia (23%), Bosnia (16%), arms control (14%) and the world economy (11%). As discussed in more detail below, 19% lists "weak leadership" and 16% cites a need for stronger foreign policy as two of the biggest problems, both up markedly from 1990.


FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

The public and leaders are asked to rate the importance of 16 different foreign policy goals. The proportions of people citing particular goals as "very important" (as opposed to "somewhat important" or "not important at all") are graphed in Figure II-3. These responses outline the parameters of pragmatic internationalism.

While self-interest has consistently dominated the public's assessment of foreign policy priorities over the past decade, other motivations have also been evident. Today, however, support

FIGURE II-3: FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

The following should be a "very important" goal of the United States.



for many of the more altruistic goals among both the public and leaders has declined to the lowest level in two decades. There has been a substantial decline in public support for protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression (33-point drop), for promoting and defending human rights in other countries (24-point drop) and for helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations (19-point drop). A similar trend is evident among leaders.

The top goals of the public—stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, protecting the jobs of American workers, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and controlling and reducing illegal immigration—all have an impact close to home: drug abuse, wage and employment levels, nuclear attack or nuclear terrorism, and competition from immigrants. This suggests that pragmatic internationalism includes a strong element of material self-interest, using foreign policy as a tool to deal with domestic concerns.


Americans also feel more strongly about their top priorities now than at any other time in our survey. This time, the public's top three goals are each listed as "very" important by over 80% of those questioned. The highest numbers reached in the past were 78% in 1978 for securing adequate supplies of energy and for protecting the jobs of American workers. In 1990, the top three goals received support from only 61% to 65% of respondents.

Americans do care about what happens to people abroad. Substantial numbers of people cite the goals of improving the global environment (58%) and combating world hunger (56%) as "very" important. The chief focus here, however, seems to be on famines and crises rather than on long-term development, since helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations is rated lowest on the public's list (22%).

The resistance to involvement in affairs of other countries seems focused on resistance to unilateral action. While 50% of the public rates maintaining superior military power as "very" important, there is surprisingly strong support for strengthening the United Nations (51%, up 7 points since 1990). This suggests greater sympathy for collective peacekeeping through the United Nations.

FIGURE II-4: ADMINISTRATION'S PERFORMANCE

"Excellent" or "good" ratings given to the Clinton administration for handling of the following problems.



Responses about foreign policy goals point unmistakably away from other altruistic forms of internationalism that in previous years were rated highly. Even defending our allies' security, rated "very" important by 61% of the public in 1990, has dropped to 41% in this survey. Rated lower yet is the importance of helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations (25%).

Leaders embrace a broader agenda, with substantially different emphases. By far the most important goal of leaders is preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Leaders choose securing adequate supplies of energy and defending allies' security as the next most important goals, substantially above stopping the inflow of illegal drugs and protecting the jobs of American workers, the public's top two. Improving the global environment comes out in the top half of the list, though it has lost 23 percentage points since 1990, dropping from third to seventh place.

ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE


The Clinton administration has not translated these goals into foreign policy performance, according to the perceptions of the American public and leaders, and does less well than did the Bush administration in the autumn of 1990.

We ask the public and the leaders to rate the Clinton administration's handling of overall foreign policy and of problems in six other areas. The combination of responses gives a sense of how people think the administration has done. Results are given in Figure II-4.

Only 31% of the public rates the Clinton administration's handling of overall foreign policy as "good" or "excellent," down 14 percentage points from the Bush administration's ratings in 1990. Sixty-three percent of the public rates it "fair" or "poor." Similarly, only 32% gives high ratings to the administration's handling of relations

FIGURE II-5: GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE

"Excellent" or "good" ratings given to the U.S. government response to the following situations.



with Japan, only 31% to its handling of the Middle East and only 30% to overall trade policy. Even more dismal are ratings for the handling of relations with Latin America and of immigration policy (23% and 15% "good" or "excellent," respectively). On immigration fully 53% says "poor." The last two ratings reflect the recent sea-borne influx of refugees from Haiti and Cuba and concerns over illegal immigration from Mexico.

The only relative bright spot in public assessments of Clinton's performance concerns the handling of relations with Russia, which 49% calls "excellent" or "good" (41% "fair" or "poor"). Presumably, efforts to support President Boris Yeltsin in promoting a market economy and democracy in Russia, and to encourage nuclear disarmament have had a positive impact. Nevertheless, the figure is still 25 percentage points below the public's rating of the Bush administration's handling of relations with the Soviet Union in 1990, yet above that received by the Reagan administration in 1986.

The Clinton administration does not fare much better with leaders. Only 30% of leaders rate the handling of overall foreign policy as "excellent" or "good," and only slightly more approve the handling of relations with Japan (36%) or with Latin America (42%). The leaders, like the public, are especially critical of Clinton's handling of immigration, with only 14% rating it "excellent" or "good" (39% "fair," 45% "poor").

On the other hand, 57% of leaders give high marks ("excellent" or "good") to the handling of relations with Russia, 62% to overall trade policy and fully 73% to the administration's handling of the Middle East. The ratings on both trade policy and the Middle East represent marked improvements (34 and 23 percentage points, respectively) from leaders' 1990 ratings of the Bush administration.


Why is there a substantial difference between the public's and the leaders' ratings of the Clinton administration's overall performance? Part of the answer may reflect differences in their goals and values. For example, the leaders show greater enthusiasm for the administration's achievement in trade policy (the NAFTA and GATT free trade accords) because international trade is also their biggest foreign policy concern. But some differences may also reflect leaders' closer attention to issues and sharper distinctions among them. The leaders, for example, seem to have given the administration more credit for the 1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

Similar reactions are evident on the administration's handling of specific situations: the war in Bosnia, the potential nuclear threat from North Korea, the situations in Haiti, Cuba, and Rwanda, and the situation in the Middle East (see Figure II-5). In every case, more people among the public rate the government response as "fair" or "poor" than "excellent" or "good." The leaders draw sharper distinctions, giving particularly bleak assessments of Bosnia policy (59% "poor") and Cuba policy (39% "fair," 41% "poor"), but handing out higher marks on the Middle East (73% "good" or "excellent") and North Korea, where an agreement on nuclear restraint has been reached (51% "good" or "excellent").

When the public ranks American presidents of the past 50 years regarding their conduct of foreign policy, George Bush, by one measure, is at the top. He is regarded by 75% as either "very" or "somewhat" successful, and by 21% as "somewhat" or "very" unsuccessful. John Kennedy is second, with 69% "somewhat" or "very" successful, though he ranks first in the "very" successful category alone. Third is Ronald Reagan, with 68%. Bill Clinton is at the bottom of the scale, with 42% believing his foreign policy is either "somewhat" or "very" unsuccessful. It is important to note, however, that a substantial number of respondents answer "don't know" for presidents before Ronald Reagan (42% for Harry Truman, 38% for Dwight Eisenhower). Rankings are quite different when calculated with "don't know" responses omitted. Truman ranks first, with 90% "somewhat" or "very" successful, followed by Eisenhower (89%). By this measure, Lyndon Johnson ranks most unsuccessful in the conduct of foreign policy, followed by Gerald Ford and Bill Clinton.

FIGURE II-6: TRENDS IN FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

Those who believe the following should be a "very important" goal of the United States.



CONCLUSION

The dramatic changes of the past decade have tempered the internationalism of both the public and leaders. As will be detailed in later chapters, Americans are increasingly reluctant to shoulder the burdens of international leadership alone, but are willing to share responsibility through participation in multilateral organizations. As indicated in the last chapter, relief from competition with the Soviet Union and from any critical combat engagement of U.S. troops in the world, has shifted attention to domestic issues.

Yet this does not mean that Americans have become isolationist, despite the predictions of some observers in recent years. They still embrace an active world role for the United States, and predict growing importance in the future. The pessimism over perceived economic and political decline that prevailed during the recession of the early 1990s has given way to increased national self-confidence. Pragmatic internationalism does not involve a rejection of international involvement, but focuses attention on goals that bear directly on the well-being of Americans: stopping the inflow of illegal drugs, protecting jobs, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing illegal immigration, securing energy supplies, cutting trade deficits. As we will see, it also includes a continued commitment to diplomatic engagement, the NATO alliance, collective peacekeeping through the United Nations and a solid defense.

CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

At the end of 1994 the American public and leaders reacted to a global landscape drastically transformed from that of of four years earlier. How has this affected American attitudes about other nations and leaders around the globe? Where in the world are America's most vital interests? How do Americans perceive U.S. relations with the rest of the world?

VITAL INTERESTS

Americans continue to believe that the United States has a vital interest in many countries of the world for political, economic and security reasons. Out of a list of 24 different countries, the general public sees a vital interest in 14 of them, ranging from Japan to Saudi Arabia, Israel and South Africa. The leaders believe the United States has a stake in 14 out of 18 countries, including China, Germany, France and Ukraine. The results are summarized in Figure III-1.

As in the past, the selection of countries reflects understandable perceptions of American interests. The public ranks Japan, Saudi Arabia and Russia as most vital to the interests of the United States. Kuwait, Mexico and Canada follow. These countries qualify as important military and economic partners of the United States. Other partners high on the list are Great Britain and Germany. Mexico and China are ranked substantially higher by the public this time than four years ago. South Korea is also substantially higher, reflecting heightened attention on the Korean Peninsula because of the death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and the alleged development of a nuclear military capability there.

Among leaders, Mexico and Russia emerge at the top of the vital interest list, followed by Japan, China and Saudi Arabia. In both 1986 and 1990, Germany and Japan were at the top of the leaders' list. While Germany is still ranked high, at 91%, it has slipped to seventh in the ratings. As in the public rankings, China's rating among leaders has jumped more than any other (from 73% in 1990, to 95% in 1994). Great Britain has dropped slightly, from 86% to 82%. Surprisingly, South Africa's rating has remained virtually unchanged, as has that of Brazil. Perceived vital interests in the Middle East are down among the public and up among the leaders compared to 1990. Mexico, always perceived as important, has risen in the ratings of both leaders and public, in part because of the attention focused on it in the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement.

THREATS TO U.S. VITAL INTERESTS

Public and leaders were asked about possible threats to the vital interests of the United States during the next 10 years. Figure III-2 summarizes the responses. Fear of the military power of Russia (formerly "Soviet Union") has declined even further since 1990, when the Eastern bloc had broken up but the Soviet Union still existed. A majority of leaders and a plurality of the public now see Russia as an "important" but not "critical" threat. Concern about economic competition from Europe as a "critical" threat has also declined, quite substantially among the leaders (down 30 percentage points). By contrast, concern about the development of China as a world power has gone up 30 points among leaders and 17 points among the public. The public is still concerned about economic competition from Japan as a "critical" threat (up 2 points from 1990 to 62%), while the figure for leaders has dropped 42 points to only 21%. The newest and most critical threat in the view of the leaders is the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers. Among the public this item is tied for first with the threat of large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States.

FEELING THERMOMETER FOR COUNTRIES


In addition to evaluating the importance of various countries in terms of U.S. vital interests, the public was asked to rate 17 countries on a "feeling thermometer," ranging from 0 to 100 degrees. A warm feeling toward a country is defined as a temperature above 50 degrees, which is neutral. The mean rating for each country is shown in Figure III-3. As in previous Chicago Council surveys, Canada and Great Britain come out at the top, followed by Italy and a tie between Germany and Mexico. The warm temperature for Russia represents a radical change from the early years of this survey when it received temperatures from 26 to 34 degrees. It has declined only slightly from four years ago. Japan and Saudi Arabia, which are near the top of the vital interest ratings, fall only in the middle of the temperature range. Not surprisingly, Iran and Iraq are at the bottom. For over a decade the American people have consistently shown warm feelings toward France and Brazil, which rank low on the vital interest chart.

FEELING THERMOMETER FOR WORLD LEADERS

The public is also asked to rate a list of world leaders on the "feeling thermometer." The mean rating for each leader is also displayed in Figure III-3. Pope John Paul II, for the fourth time in

FIGURE III-1: U.S. VITAL INTERESTS

Perceptions of U.S. vital interests among the public.



The Public (shown above)

Over 70%	
Japan	85
Saudi Arabia	83
Russia*	79
Kuwait	76
Mexico	76
Canada	71

51% to 70%	
Great Britain	69
China**	68
Cuba	67
Germany***	66
South Korea	65
Israel	64
South Africa	57
Haiti	56

41% to 50%	
Taiwan	49
Egypt	45
Bosnia	45

40% or less	
France	39
Rwanda	35
Ukraine	35
Brazil	35
India	31
Poland	31
The Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania & Estonia	29

The Leaders

Russia*	98
Mexico	98
Japan	96
China**	95
Saudi Arabia	94
Canada	93
Germany***	91
South Korea	90
Israel	86
Great Britain	82
Egypt	78
Ukraine	66
France	59
South Africa	52
Brazil	49
Poland	46
The Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania & Estonia	34
Haiti	33


* *Prior to the 1994 survey this was the "Soviet Union."*

** *Prior to the 1994 survey this was "The People's Republic of China."*

*** *Prior to the 1990 survey this was "West Germany."*

FIGURE III-2: THREATS TO U.S. VITAL INTERESTS

Percentage of those who view the following as "critical threats" to the United States.



a row, emerges as the most popular leader, followed by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who are tied. Other than the Pope, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa emerges as the most highly rated foreign leader, followed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Former President George Bush comes after Carter and Kissinger, followed by President Clinton, whose lukewarm temperature reflects the mostly negative ratings his administration receives elsewhere in our survey.

Not surprisingly, Cuban President Fidel Castro and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein emerge once again at the bottom. Also near the bottom, just above Castro and Hussein, are President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti and Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, who continues to be unpopular in the United States despite the peace agreement in the Middle East. More surprisingly, President Aristide has a strongly negative rating despite the Clinton administration's support to reinstall him in office as Haiti's legitimate president. In all five past Chicago Council surveys, those at the bottom of the feeling thermometer have been leaders identified as American enemies: Idi Amin of Uganda in 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran in 1982, Libyan President Mu'ammar Gaddafi and Cuba's Fidel Castro in 1986. Fidel Castro has remained close to the bottom for over a decade, joined by Saddam Hussein of Iraq in 1990 and 1994. Hussein received a record low for world leaders in 1990 (9 degrees) and now stands at 11 degrees.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Despite the cool feelings the public shows for North Korea and Cuba and the continued reign of communist regimes in these countries, pluralities favor establishing normal diplomatic relations with them (50% for North Korea and 46% for Cuba). The public also favors establishing diplomatic relations with Vietnam (58%), but would not establish such relations with Iran (52% against). Opinion leaders agree that the United States should establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam (57%, 64% and 88%, respectively), but should not with Iran (57% against).

U.S.—RUSSIAN RELATIONS

As noted earlier, although the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union have changed the focus of American foreign policy dramatically, Russia is still considered one of the three most important countries in terms of U.S. vital interests. Russian leader Boris Yeltsin, at the time of the survey, was the most popular European leader. Although foreign aid is highly unpopular overall, 20% of the public and 40% of the leaders believe aid to Russia should be increased, while 34% of the public and 45% of the leaders think it should be kept the same, both comparatively high levels.

Russia also appears in the top third of countries on the thermometer, at 54 degrees, a temperature identical to that of Brazil and Israel. "Dealings with Russia" is still considered the second biggest foreign policy problem (for decidedly different reasons) by American leaders, although it is not in the top dozen foreign policy problems listed by the public.


At the same time, wariness about Russia is widespread among both the public and leaders, with 81% of the public and 67% of the leaders responding that the military power of Russia represents either a critical or an important possible threat to the vital interests of the United States in the next 10 years. Support for using American troops is highest in the case of a Russian invasion of Western Europe, with 54% of the public and 91% of the leaders in favor. Almost three-fifths of the leaders (59%) and slightly under half of the public (42%) favor expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, an action strongly opposed by Russia. Attitudes toward Russia are summarized on pages 24-25.

EUROPE

Whether ranked according to vital interests or feelings on a thermometer, European nations—especially Germany and Britain—remain America's closest friends. The end of the Cold War and the Soviet military threat has not produced a marked shift in attention away

FIGURE III-3: THERMOMETER RATINGS

Mean temperature given to various countries and world leaders by the public. Neutral feelings are given 50 degrees, warm feelings more than 50 and cool feelings less than 50 degrees.



from Europe. Europe is still considered more important to the United States than Asia by a wide margin on the public side (49% to 21%) and by a small margin on the part of leaders (42% to 38%). As mentioned, concern about economic competition from Europe has lessened during the last four years. A solid plurality of the public (49%) thinks the economic unification of Europe is a good thing for the United States, with only 22% regarding it a bad thing. Leaders' positive evaluation of European unification has increased from 79% in 1990 to 85%, with only 12% considering it a bad thing for the United States. Similarly, the European Union receives a favorable rating on trade practices among leaders, particularly compared to Japan. Among the public, a small plurality (35% to 32%) believes it practices unfair trade, although the number is down five percentage points from 1990 and one-third responds "don't know." More than twice as many leaders (65%) believe that the European Union practices fair trade, with 27% taking the opposite view.

The end of the Cold War four years ago led to a call for cutbacks, especially on the part of leaders, in the level of U.S. commitment to NATO. This trend has slowed considerably. The number of leaders wanting to maintain the current level of commitment has gone from 35% in 1990 to 57%, with only 37% wanting to decrease it, as compared with 61% in 1990. As in 1990, a strong majority of the public (56%) is in favor of maintaining the same level of commitment, with 26% (27% in 1990) wanting to decrease it. As indicated in Chapter Five, fears expressed by European countries about Russia's historical expansionist tendencies have had strong resonance on this side of the Atlantic, especially among American leaders. Attitudes toward Europe are summarized on pages 24-25.

JAPAN

The Council's survey in 1990 noted a strong feeling of economic vulnerability and concern about declining American competitiveness, which resulted in a very critical attitude toward Japan. Four years ago Japan fared worse overall than any other major industrial country in critical attitudes. Today, although both the public and leaders remain critical of Japan on a number of issues, the concern about Japan has diminished.

Japan remains a key U.S. ally and trading partner and continues to be regarded as one of the three most important countries in terms of vital interest by both the public and leaders. The lukewarm thermometer rating in 1990 (52 degrees) is relatively unchanged (up to 53 degrees). Economic competition from Japan is considered a critical threat by almost two-thirds (62%) of the public, but only one-fifth (21%) of the leaders. The perception that Japan practices unfair trade with the United States is relatively unchanged, held by 71% of the public and 80% of the leaders.

Over the past two decades, the issue of whether Japan should expand its military role in the world has been a contentious one, with successive administrations until Bush pressuring Japan to do so. When the public is asked if Japan should be encouraged to play an increased military role, 39% responds affirmatively, while almost half (47%) believes it should be discouraged. Leaders favor the opposite, with over half (55%) stating that Japan should be encouraged to expand its military role, and 43% saying it should be discouraged. Leaders overwhelmingly favor permanent membership for Japan on the U.N. Security Council, with over three-quarters (77%) in favor and only one-fifth (21%) opposed.

Several factors may be influencing the reduction of concern about Japan. First, the improved U.S. economic position in the world and our growing importance as a world leader have weakened perceptions of the United States as economically vulnerable. The bursting of Japan's "bubble" economy and reports of continuing political scandal have added a degree of cynicism to the view of Japan as a mighty economic challenger. Finally, the growth of China and other nations as economic competitors has diluted attention once solely focused on Japan. Attitudes toward Japan are summarized on pages 24-25.

CHINA

China is now one of the top five trading partners of the U.S. and, not surprisingly, is drawing significant attention as a growing power in Asia. Among both the public and leaders, China experienced the biggest change in perception among all countries. Two-thirds of the public (68%) believes we have a vital interest in China, up from 47% four years ago. A similar change has occurred among leaders, with 95% labeling China a vital interest, up from 73% in 1990.

The importance accorded China by both public and leaders on the vital interest scale is not accompanied by "warm" feelings on behalf of the American public. China receives a slightly cool 46 degrees on the thermometer, among the bottom quarter of all countries ranked and just above Haiti. China's rating is relatively unchanged from four years ago (45 degrees in 1990). The clash between the Chinese government and Chinese students in Tiananmen Square took place over five years ago, yet remains prominent in debate. The ongoing dispute between the Clinton administration and Chinese government on trade and human rights issues, the massive U.S. trade deficits with China and the perception of China still as a "hard-line" communist dictatorship has undoubtedly kept the American public's view of China guarded.


Neither the public nor the leaders consider relations with China to be among the biggest foreign policy problems facing the U.S. today. China does not rank in the top 20 issues listed by the public, and is 11th (only 5%) among the leaders. Yet there is a substantial increase in concern about the development of China as a world power. Over half of the public now sees this as a possible critical threat to the vital interests of the U.S. (57%), a substantial increase (17 points) over four years ago. Slightly under half of

RUSSIA


Thermometer rating




The U.S. does have a vital interest in Russia



Military power of Russia as a perceived "critical" threat




Support for spying on Russia




JAPAN


Thermometer rating




The U.S. does have a vital interest in Japan



Economic competition from Japan as a perceived "critical" threat




Support for spying on Japan




EUROPE


Thermometer rating




The U.S. does have a vital interest in European countries



Economic competition from Europe as a perceived "critical" threat




Support for spying on Britain




CHINA


Thermometer rating




The U.S. does have a vital interest in China




Development of China as a world power as a perceived "critical" threat




Support for spying on China




Predicted role for Russia in 10 years compared to today



Administration's handling of relations with Russia




Support for economic aid to Russia




Thermometer rating for Russian President Boris Yeltsin




Predicted role for Japan in 10 years compared to today




Administration's handling of relations with Japan




Those who believe Japan practices unfair trade




Support for larger military role in world for Japan




Predicted role for Germany in 10 years compared to today




European economic unification as good or bad for the U.S.




Those who believe the EU practices unfair trade



Support for using troops if Russia invaded Western Europe



Predicted role for China in 10 years compared to today



the leaders view China as a critical threat, a 30-point jump (from 16% to 46%) over four years ago. This is probably the strongest indicator of the shift in both public and leadership attitudes on China. For both the public and the leaders, China represents a greater threat than the military power of Russia. For the public, the threat of China as a world power is just slightly less than that of economic competition from Japan. And among leaders, the threat of China's power far exceeds that of economic competition from Japan. Attitudes toward China are summarized on pages 24-25.

THE PERSIAN GULF

In the absence of events like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 and the Persian Gulf War in early 1991, the region had receded from the foreign policy agenda by 1994.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia continues to be among the top countries considered of vital interest by both public and leaders. Over half of the public (52%) and four-fifths of the leaders (84%) would favor the use of American troops in the case of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. That is a higher figure than in the case of an Arab invasion of Israel or a North Korean invasion of South Korea. Kuwait is also one of the top five in the public rankings of vital interests.

Although concern about Iraq has substantially diminished, Iraq and Iran still emerge at the very bottom of the thermometer of countries, with Iran receiving a temperature of 28 degrees, and Iraq 24 degrees. Three widely perceived critical threats to the United States in the next 10 years have applicability to the Middle East. Almost three-quarters (72%) of the public and two-thirds (61%) of the leaders believe that the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers constitutes a critical threat. A third of the public and slightly more of the leaders (39%) believe that the possible expansion of Islamic fundamentalism could represent a critical threat.

A third possible critical threat is international terrorism, which over two-thirds of the public and a third of the leaders see as critical. Here again, Iran, Iraq and Syria have been widely suspected of having supported and funded international terrorism.

ISRAEL

Israel continues to be considered a key U.S. ally in the Middle East and ranks relatively high on both the vital interest scale and the thermometer of countries. Among the public there is little change from four years ago on either scale. Among leaders there is a substantial increase (from 78% to 86%) in the vital interest ranking.

Among world leaders, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ranks among the top four foreign leaders, substantially above the rating of Prime Minister Shamir in 1990. There is substantial public and leadership support (42% and 72%, respectively) for using American troops "if Arab forces invaded Israel," no significant change from four years ago. Despite the overall positive feelings toward Israel on the part of both leaders and public, just under half of the public (44%) and over half of the leaders (53%) believe the U.S. government should be secretly spying on the government of Israel.

On the question of aid to Israel, there are no significant changes. An identical 38% of the public favors keeping it the same in 1994 as in 1990, with 9% favoring an increase and 44% wanting to decrease or stop aid altogether. Among leaders, 45% favors keeping it the same (an increase of four points over 1990) and 50% favors decreasing or stopping it altogether (four points less than in 1990). Only 4% favors an increase.

By contrast, support for increasing aid to the Palestinians among leaders is significantly higher than for increasing aid to Israel (48% compared to 4%).

On the question of establishing an independent Palestinian State on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming four-fifths (81%) of leaders favor this. A plurality (39%) of the public favors it. In the public's case, however, 41% of the people are unsure of the issue. These attitudes may have shifted given the recent violence which has stalled the peace process.

In conclusion, there is no massive shift in attitudes toward Israel by either the public or leaders. The leaders, always more critical in the past, are slightly more positive this time.

CANADA

Canada has always received among the highest rankings both in terms of vital interests and "warm feelings." Canada is among the top six on the vital interest chart, cited by 71% of the public and 93% of the leaders. Once again, Canada emerges at the very top of the thermometer with a 73 degree temperature, only slightly below last time (76 degrees), but still well above any other country. As noted in the discussion of Mexico, the positive evaluation of the NAFTA agreement has undoubtedly influenced public and leadership attitudes toward Canada.

The debate about Quebec's role in the Canadian Federation, which has caused so much tension in Canada during the past year, has generated some interest in the United States. When the question is posed to the leaders as to their reaction "if Canada split up and Quebec became an independent country," less than half of the leaders (43%) say it would be mostly bad for the United States. It would not make any difference to exactly half, and it would be mostly good for the United States according to only 5%.

MEXICO

The one Latin American country that has consistently been given a high priority by both the public and leaders is Mexico. This was true long before the crisis over the devaluation of the peso in January of 1995. Mexico is among the top five on the vital interest list for the public in 1994, a substantial increase (13 points) over four years ago. It is tied for first on the leaders' vital interest chart, at 98%, up four points from 1990. In terms of the public's feelings about Mexico, it comes out among the top five, at 57 degrees. Also of importance, both the public and the leaders register support for the

North American Free Trade Agreement. Despite a long history of public support for tariffs, half of the public (50%) believes that the NAFTA agreement is mostly good for the United States, and only 31% says that it is mostly bad. Not surprisingly, over three-quarters of the leaders (86%) favor it, with only 13% opposed. Another interesting indicator of Mexico's popularity is that only a third of the public (34%) and less than half of the leaders (46%) believe that the U.S. should be secretly spying on Mexico, while over half of both are opposed. This represents a substantially stronger opposition to spying than is the case with most other countries surveyed.

BRAZIL

Some major countries still rank low among the public on the vital interest chart. Brazil is in the bottom quarter of the countries listed by both public and leaders. This is consistent with its low rating in the past. Leaders, however, have always placed it higher than the public (49% in 1994). Brazil does favorably on the thermometer, on a par with Russia and Israel.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

With the re-emergence of Haiti and Cuba as issues commanding the attention of the American public, U.S. policy toward Caribbean neighbors has once again come to the fore. Concern about Haiti and Cuba, however, appears linked to the explosive issue of immigration. Even though the spread of democracy in South America and the increase in both trade and investment between the U.S. and major South American countries have been highly positive developments, they received far less attention than the issues of Haiti and Cuba. These small island countries lie much closer to the United States and have been the source of recent inflows of immigrants, an issue seen by the public as the third most important foreign policy problem facing the country today. Whereas four years ago only 1% of respondents spontaneously listed immigration as a problem, today 12% does so. For leaders it is not considered one of the "biggest" issues, absent from the top dozen foreign policy problems listed.

Furthermore, almost three-quarters of the public (72%) believes that "large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States" represents a possible critical threat to the United States in the next 10 years. Only a third of the leaders (31%) share this view. Given the public's concern about immigration, it is not surprising that Haiti is given a much higher vital interest rating by the public than by the leaders. Two-thirds of the public (67%) believes that the U.S. has a vital interest in Cuba, and 56% believes we have a vital interest in Haiti. Only a third of the leaders believe we have a vital interest in Haiti, and fully two-thirds of leaders (66%) say we do not. Although the public considers Haiti and Cuba important, they do not have warm feelings toward either country. Haiti (44 degrees) and Cuba (38 degrees) are at the bottom of the thermometer, with only North Korea, Iran and Iraq below them.

AFRICA

African countries have generally attracted less attention than other regions in previous Council surveys, and this continues with one exception. South Africa is now listed as a country where the U.S. has a vital interest by over half of the American public (57%), and the leaders (52%). This represents an increase of 4 points on the public side, and a slight increase on the leadership side. Other African countries in the past have received a much lower rating. Nigeria received 29% in 1990. Rwanda receives 35% in this survey.

Although interest in South Africa has increased, over two-thirds of the public (69%) and an overwhelming majority of the leaders (92%) would oppose the use of American troops if civil war broke out in South Africa. Eighteen percent of the American public would favor sending troops, as would 6% of the leaders. However, when this question is broken down between white and non-white Americans, 32% of non-whites favor the use of troops in this situation, while only 16% of whites do.

DRUGS

One other issue that has drawn considerable attention in previous studies is the problem of international drug trafficking. Although it is not listed among the top 20 problems by the public or the leaders, stopping the flow of illegal drugs is the number one foreign policy goal identified as "very" important by the public. That goals ranks fourth among the leaders.

OBSERVATIONS

In analyzing political relationships, we encountered some ironical situations.

- Despite the desire of many to stay out of other countries' affairs, there is strong support for the United Nations and a sizable degree of willingness to place U.S. troops under a U.N. commander for peacekeeping operations.
- Despite the fact that North Korea is among Americans' least favorite countries, there is a basic willingness to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea.
- Despite the fact that Yassir Arafat is among Americans' least admired world leaders, there is predominant support for an independent Palestinian state.
- Despite the fact that Japan is viewed as an unfair trader, posing a major economic challenge to the United States, there is a strong belief that Japan should have a place on the U.N. Security Council.
- Despite the fact that Americans are paying more attention than ever to local news, they still prefer to play an "active" role in world affairs.

CHAPTER FOUR
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

Americans are more conscious than ever of global economic competition and interdependence. Over the past several years, controversies surrounding trade relations with Japan, the renewal of "most favored nation" trade status with China, the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada, and the conclusion of the GATT negotiations after seven years of debate, have replaced the arms race, the communist threat and other Cold War matters in the headlines. Not surprisingly, Americans are now more concerned about economic than military competition.

ECONOMIC CONCERNS

Four years ago we documented an increased feeling of economic vulnerability among Americans. More than two-thirds of the public believed the United States had declined as a world power because it was unable to solve its economic problems. Fear of economic competition from Japan and Europe was high. There was an increased number of people who felt that foreign policy had a major impact on our overall economy at home.

Today, however, that feeling of national economic vulnerability has diminished, even if personal vulnerability and job insecurity has not. Economic problems as a percentage of total problems facing the country are down, as are feelings of intimidation by Europe and Japan. The number that believes foreign policy has a major impact on the economy has dropped back to 1986 levels. Concern about inflation has dropped even further from four years ago, as has concern about industrial competitiveness. Even though fears of unemployment are up, the number listing it as a major problem (20%) is nowhere near the 1982 recessionary level (64%).

Despite the sense that the United States overall is faring better economically, our results indicate that personal insecurity among the public remains high. Fear of crime is in first place as one of the biggest problems facing the country, listed by a comparatively high 42% of the public, the second highest percentage ever for any problem facing the country. Unemployment is in second place. Most notably, protecting the jobs of American workers as a "very" important goal of foreign policy stands at an all time high.

There are some important distinctions between the public and leaders in their economic outlook. While unemployment ranks second on the public's list of the country's biggest problems, the economy in general ranks seventh. For leaders it is the reverse: the economy in general ranks second and unemployment ranks eighth.

Only a minority of the public thinks foreign policy has a significant impact on their personal well-being. While 63% of the public agrees that it has a major impact on "our overall economy at home," only 38% feels it has a major impact on "your own personal standard of living" (see Figure IV-1). This is further evidence of the public's feeling that they are not necessarily sharing in the economic success of the country. Nevertheless, those likeliest to say foreign policy has a major impact on their standard of living are those with less than a college education and incomes under $25,000. This item also evokes the largest number of those saying foreign policy has "no impact at all" (17%), a statement liberals are more likely to make than conservatives (23% versus 15%).

FIGURE IV-1: IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

Percentage of the public that believes U.S. foreign policy has a major impact on the following.

	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994
Gasoline prices	87	85	81	68	88	65
Our overall economy	76	72	72	62	73	63
Value of the dollar abroad	78	82	72	62	65	62
Unemployment in the U.S.	60	51	66	56	60	58
Your own personal standard of living	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	38

On the list of foreign policy problems for the general public, two of the top five can be considered related to economics. Foreign aid ranks second, cited by 16% (a decline of two percentage points since 1990). Immigration is third, named by 12% (up 11 points). International trade is sixth, named by 8% (a rise of three points). Leaders' broader economic emphasis is shown in the placement of international trade at the top of their list. Foreign aid among leaders is 13th and immigration is 21st. Concern with the world economy, mentioned by only 2% of the public, is seventh on the leaders' list, cited by 11%. Yet, concern related to the balance of payments and trade is eighth on the public's list, mentioned by 6%, and 24th on the leaders' list, mentioned by only 2%. On both lists the issue receives fewer mentions than ever before.


Turning from "problems" to "goals," the priority accorded primarily economic goals again reveals differences between the public and leaders. None of the top five goals considered "very" important by the leaders is primarily economic, either on a national or more personal level. However, two of the public's top five are directly related to their personal feelings of economic vulnerability: protecting the jobs of American workers and controlling and reducing immigration.

Perceptions of economic endangerment can be discerned in responses to the list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next 10 years. The intense concern with their personal economic plight is illustrated by the threats deemed "critical" by large proportions of the public. "Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S." is rated just as critical as the "possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers," both tying for first, at 72%. Among leaders, nuclear proliferation is considered a "critical" threat by 61%, while the immigration and refugee issue draws a high degree of concern from only 31%.

Evidence of a heightened awareness of more general economic over

FIGURE IV-2: TARIFFS AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS

Percentage that sympathizes with those who think tariffs are necessary.



military concerns is also clear. Almost twice as many members of the public see a critical threat to the United States in Japanese economic competition as in Russian military power, even though Russia is a highly unstable country that still possesses substantial nuclear arms. Leaders, however, are much less concerned about an economic threat from Japan than four years ago, with only 21% citing it a "critical" threat. This is still five points above the perceived threat from Russia. Only 4% of the public and 14% of leaders say that Japanese economic competition is not an important threat at all. Furthermore, Japan is regarded as a long-term, major competitor. Japan, a militarily non-nuclear power with constitutional restrictions on the use of its military, is presumed by 66% of the public to play a greater role in the world over the next 10 years, the second highest forecast after the United States.

News of economic transformation and growing markets in China make that country a looming presence for both public and leaders. Sixty-six percent of the public and 91% of leaders forecast a greater role for China in a decade.

Concern about the threat of economic competition from Europe has receded, especially among the leaders. Only 27% of the public considers it a "critical" threat, down from 30% in 1990. Leaders are even less concerned, with 11% considering it a "critical" threat, as opposed to 41% in 1990.


TRADE BARRIERS

Accompanying the concern about global economic competition is a surprising willingness among the public to reduce trade barriers (see Figure IV-2). Despite a long-held bias toward protectionism in the interest of "protecting jobs," readiness to eliminate tariffs has been slowly growing. Although retaining tariffs is supported by a plurality of the public (48%), this is the lowest figure ever recorded in our studies, having fallen below 50% for the first time. Similarly, sympathy for eliminating tariffs is at the highest level we've recorded, at 32%. Two groups with higher-


FIGURE IV-3: TRADE WITH THE EU AND JAPAN

Do the countries of the European Union/does Japan practice fair or unfair trade with the United States?

THE EUROPEAN UNION



JAPAN



than-average responses on both sides of the issue are the college educated (51% keep tariffs versus 39% drop them) and those with incomes above $50,000 a year (53% keep tariffs versus 36% drop them). Overall, the net margin in favor of retaining tariffs among the public is 16%, down from 29% in 1990 and 35% in 1982.

As usual on tariffs, the attitudes of leaders and public are quite different, but the trend is the same. At least two-thirds of leaders have always supported eliminating tariffs, though the number dropped slightly in 1990. Today, over three-quarters would drop them, the highest number ever. Only 20% wants to retain them, the lowest number ever. This puts leaders' net margin against tariffs at the highest level recorded for this question: 57% compared to 31% in 1990.

TRADE REGIONS

A new question asks for an evaluation of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. The public believes NAFTA is "mostly good" for the U.S. economy as opposed to "mostly bad" by 50% to 31%, and leaders by 86% to 13%. Whether these views have been affected by the subsequent currency crisis and the U.S. debate over a rescue package is unknown at this writing. As discussed in Chapter Three, Mexico, clearly for economic reasons, is assigned a very high place as a U.S. vital interest (tied for fourth among the public and for first among leaders).

Attitudes toward European economic unification are almost identical to those on NAFTA. Asked if the economic unification of Western Europe is mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for the United States, the public responds favorably (49% to 22%), as do leaders (85% to 12%). This is a small increase in support over 1990.

TRADE PRACTICES

The public is less sure when asked if the European Union practices fair trade or unfair trade with the United States. The results are summarized in Figure IV-3. The number of those who think the EU is an unfair trader has dropped by five percentage points from 1990, although one-third of respondents "don't know." Leaders, who thought the balance was in favor of fair trade four years ago, feel even more strongly that way today (fair trade up nine points, unfair trade down 11).

Public and leaders are in complete accord in their negative view of Japanese trading practices with the United States. By a substantial margin (matching 1990), the public continues to think that Japan is an unfair trader. Leaders concur to an even greater extent, as summarized in Figure IV-3. This is a slightly more negative view than was expressed in 1990. As with Mexico, Japan's economic importance is reflected in its high U.S. vital interest ranking. The public places Japan at the very head of the list, six percentage points higher than in 1990. Leaders rate Japan third as a vital interest, after Mexico and Russia. However, Americans distinguish between acknowledging a nation as a vital interest and feeling "warmly" toward it. Hard feelings toward Japan because of trade practices are reflected in its lukewarm, 53-degree thermometer rating.

ECONOMIC AID

Given that the public ranks foreign aid second among the country's principal foreign policy problems, it is not surprising to find substantial opposition to

FIGURE IV-4: ECONOMIC AID

Those who favor giving economic aid to other nations.





FIGURE IV-5: ECONOMIC AID TO COUNTRIES

Net support for economic aid to the following countries.



it when polled separately. The question about foreign aid has been asked in every survey since 1974: "On the whole, do you favor or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations?" The public's response this time is an evenly divided 45% in favor and 45% opposed, the same response as in 1990. These figures represent the lowest levels of support over the course of these surveys. This time, economic aid is favored by more than 50% of college graduates, liberals, those who have traveled outside the United States and those earning more than $50,000 a year. It is opposed by more than 50% of the unemployed, high school graduates, those living in the Midwest and those earning less than $25,000 a year. Although leaders have always favored economic aid by a wide margin, support has dipped somewhat in this survey, with 86% in favor and 12% opposed, down from 90% and 9% in 1990. The largest number of leaders opposed to foreign aid comes from business (24%), followed by Congress (19%).

As discussed in Chapter One, the question of support for economic aid is also asked in the context of a varied list of government programs. When weighed against domestic programs of high importance to the public, many more people (58%, down 3 points from 1990) want to cut back on spending for economic assistance than want to keep such spending the same (28%, up one point) or expand it (9%, up two points).

Views regarding economic aid are better understood if examined in terms of stated objectives and intended recipients. The public supports humanitarian aid far above developmental aid, presumably because the former is intended to ameliorate a short-term emergency, with any benefits quickly perceived, and the latter implies a long-term commitment, the results of which may be unclear. Thus, as we see in reviewing the public's foreign-policy goals, "combating world hunger" is rated "very important" by 56% while "helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries" is rated "very important" by 22%, down 19 points

from 1990 to the lowest figure for this goal recorded in these surveys. Leaders' responses are not very different, despite their greater stated willingness to give economic aid. Combating world hunger is rated "very important" by 41%, 15 points below the public, and 20 or more points below leaders' responses in the 1980s. Likewise, improving less developed nations' standard of living is rated "very important" by 28%, six points higher than the public, but 14 points lower than 1990 and the all-time low recorded for this question.

Another way to examine attitudes toward economic aid is to inquire whether aid to specific countries or regions should be "increased," "decreased," "kept about the same" or "stopped altogether." As usual, leaders favor aid more than the public. The public would increase aid to none of the seven countries, peoples or areas we asked about, and would keep aid the same only by slight margins to two of them (countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America). Pluralities favor cuts to the rest. The leaders would increase aid to Eastern Europe and the Palestinians, decrease it to Israel and keep the rest the same. Net margins for increasing versus decreasing aid are displayed in Figure IV-5.

As in 1990, public and leaders prefer to cut rather than increase aid to Israel. Forty-four percent of the public and 50% of leaders would decrease or stop aid to Israel, while 9% of the public and 4% of leaders would increase it. The public (and more leaders than in the past) now also favors cuts to Egypt. Forty-four percent of the public, four points more than in 1990, and 41% of leaders, up from 18% in 1990, would decrease or stop aid to Egypt. Only 3% of the public and 7% of leaders would increase it.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip fare better than Egypt and less well than Israel with the public, but get much more support than either country from leaders. Eight percent of the public (but 48% of leaders) would increase aid. Decreasing or stopping aid altogether to the Palestinians is favored by 45% of the public and 17% of leaders.


African and Latin American countries, newly asked, fare somewhat better with the public than Middle East recipients. Increased aid for African countries is favored by 24% of the public (40% of leaders), while 34% of the public (14% of leaders) would decrease or stop it. For Latin American countries, increased aid is favored by 13% of the public (32% of leaders), and a decrease is favored by 38% of the public (20% of leaders).

The most favored recipients of aid on the survey list among both public and leaders are the "newly independent countries in Eastern Europe." Twenty-two percent of the public (54% of leaders) would increase aid to Eastern European countries, a decline of two points for the public and 20 points for leaders. Decreasing or ending aid is favored by 32% of the public and 8% of leaders.

Regarding aid to Russia, newly asked in this survey, 20% of the public and 40% of leaders favor an increase. Whether these views are affected by the situation in Chechnya is not known at this writing. The preference for decreasing or ending aid to Russia is 39% among the public and 14% among leaders.

FIGURE IV-6: ARMS SALES

Those who favor selling military equipment to other nations.



ARMS SALES

Over the years, the question of whether the U.S. should sell military equipment to other nations has consistently been opposed by the public and more supported by leaders. This time, public opposition is higher than ever, with 77% opposed and 15% in favor (in 1990, 59% opposed and 32% in favor). Leaders are now 51% opposed and 45% in favor, a reversal from 1990, when 50% favored and 47% opposed sales.

Men are likelier than women to support arms sales (20% versus 11%). Regionally, the South, despite its military tradition, shares the predominant view on arms sales, with 78% opposed and 16% in favor, and the Midwest shows the highest opposition (83%) and least support (12%).

CHAPTER FIVE
MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

The 1994 survey reflects both continuity and change on the subject of national security. For four decades, attitudes toward defense spending have been related to views about the Soviet Union. The world the public perceives and policy-makers address has now changed dramatically. In addition to the changes in the former Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the opening of China are especially important for defense and security questions.

AMERICAN POWER

One important characteristic of public opinion in the post-Cold War environment is the degree to which the U.S. is seen as a uniquely influential power in the world, the "only" remaining superpower. As mentioned previously, 47% of the public believes that the U.S. plays a more important and powerful role in the world today than 10 years ago, the highest percentage since this series began in 1974. Among leaders, only 26% felt the U.S. was playing a more important role in 1990, while 44% of leaders feel this way today.

This image of American strength is reinforced when people are asked how they see the international system unfolding over the next 10 years. The public is much more inclined than the leaders to see a distinctively influential role for the United States (see Figure V-1). When asked whether certain countries will play a greater role or a lesser role in the next 10 years than they do today, a striking 73% of the public predicts that the U.S. will play a greater role. Only 20% says the United States will play a lesser role. This is notably ahead of any other country in public perception. Next are China and Japan, where 66% of the public in each case believes a greater role is in store. Only 45% feels that way about Germany, approximately on a par with Russia, where 44% predicts a greater role.


Only 43% of the leaders predict the United States will play a greater role in the world in 10 years, while 47% feels this way about Japan and a notable 56% about Germany. Most striking of all, 91% of the leaders predict China will play an expanded role in a decade. This no doubt reflects current economic interest in and optimism about China's future role, though the survey question asks only about overall power, not economic or military capacities per se. Perhaps no less striking is the finding that 40% of the leaders believe that Russia, despite current political and economic challenges, will play a greater role in the future.

The perception of the United States as the only remaining superpower is consistent with the general increase in such sentiments during the decade of the 1980s. It contrasts with the apparent lack of confidence and feeling of relative weakness compared to the Soviet Union prevalent during the Ford and Carter administrations.

The end of the Cold War and of the Soviet Union as a nation-state may mean that military power, especially nuclear military power, is relatively less consequential in gauging the overall power and influence of any nation, including the United States. Clearly economic power has emerged as vastly more important than before.

FIGURE V-1: FUTURE ROLE OF COUNTRIES

Those who believe the following countries will play a greater role in the next 10 years than they do today.



DEFENSE SPENDING

Attitudes on defense spending have varied with the public's perception of the military balance and foreign threats, specifically in the past regarding the Soviet Union. By 1990, Americans felt the U.S.-Soviet military balance, previously a source of anxiety and sometimes a sense of inferiority, had been restored in favor of the United States. As a result, support for greater defense spending declined in 1990 compared with 1986, from 20% to 12% among the public, and from 12% to 2% among the leaders. Cuts were supported by 32% of the public and an overwhelming 77% of leaders in 1990.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, one might expect a further decline in support for defense spending, since the Soviet threat was the principal incentive for the large U.S. defense establishment. This has not occurred. At least half the public and leaders are now in favor of keeping spending levels the same. There is more support for increased defense spending compared with four years ago, even though more people still favor cutting back than expanding.

In all of our surveys, attitudes toward defense spending have been measured in two ways. First, respondents are asked whether defense spending, along with a number of other federal government programs, should be "expanded," "cut back" or "kept about the same." In this context, people are reminded about the many different programs that compete for support in the national budget, including such popular items as education and Social Security. When asked in this context, 34% of the public wants to cut back, down from 43% in 1990. By this measure, 38% of leaders want to cut defense, while 15% would increase it. The percentage of the public wanting to increase defense rose from 14% four years ago to 21%. A plurality of 41% favors keeping it the same.

The defense question is also asked separately, following questions about foreign policy and with no implied domestic trade-offs (see Figure V-2). By this measure, support for cuts goes down slightly. Twenty-six percent of the public and 33% of the leaders want to cut back on defense. A total of 18% of the public wants to expand defense spending, compared with 12% in 1990. Sixteen percent of the leaders feel this way, compared with 2% in the earlier survey. Notable is the fact that support for increasing defense spending is greater when asked in the context of competing government programs. In the past, this has tended to discourage those who want to expand spending.

When those who want to expand are combined with those who want to keep defense spending the same, the results are equally instructive: this was 65% of the public response in 1990, 72% in 1994; 23% of the leadership response in 1990, 66% in 1994. Thus, those who expected that the end of the Cold War would bring about a fundamental change regarding defense—to a situation where there was virtually no public support for substantial spending—have clearly been mistaken. One must keep in mind that the leaders and public are conscious of the fact that defense spending has already been going down dramatically under Bush and Clinton and therefore are generally not supportive of further cutbacks. Current attitudes of both the public and leaders seem reflected in the views of the newly elected Republican Congressional leaders, who are calling for a halt to further cuts. This position is increasingly favored by the Clinton administration, a shift from earlier plans for continued reductions in defense spending.

Since the 1970s, there have been marked shifts in the levels of defense spending preferred by Americans. During the period 1974 to 1978, there was a 19-point shift in favor of increased defense spending, from 13% to 32%, and a related decline in those who favored cutting back on defense, from 32% to 16%. Other polls indicated that the two years following the 1978 Council survey witnessed an even stronger surge in support for defense. A majority of the public held this view in 1980-81, then shifted to support for the status quo in the years from 1982 to

FIGURE V-2: DEFENSE SPENDING

Should spending on national defense be expanded, kept about the same or cut back? Index: Percentage "expand" minus percentage "cut back."





FIGURE V-3: COMMITMENT TO NATO

Should we increase our commitment to NATO, keep it what it is now, decrease it or withdraw entirely? Index: Percentage "expand" minus percentage "cut back" or "withdraw entirely."



1986. The 1990 survey results showed a dramatic shift toward reducing defense. The 1994 results, contrary to what might be predicted from world developments, show notable moves toward increasing defense, perhaps in response to a more insecure world, perhaps in confirmation of the exceptional influence seen for the U.S. at present and in the future.

NATO

Support for defense is mirrored in support for the United States' most significant regional security pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see Figure V-3). A solid majority of the public (56%) wants to keep the commitment to the alliance the same, after a call for cutbacks in 1990. Among leaders, 57% wants to keep the same level of commitment, compared with only 35% who felt this way in 1990. Thirty-seven percent of leaders call for cutbacks today, compared to 61% in 1990. The shift away from further cuts in NATO no doubt reflects in part concern about insecurity in Europe encouraged by the

FIGURE V-4: USE OF TROOPS

Those who favor the use of U.S. troops in the following situations.





FIGURE V-5: USE OF TROOPS BY GENDER

Support for using troops in the following situations. Index: percentage "favor" minus percentage "oppose."



current Balkan war. Support for expansion of NATO to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland varies. A plurality of the public (42%), but 59% of the leaders would include these countries.

USE OF FORCE, WHEN AND HOW

The long-term caution about direct military intervention elsewhere in the world still holds. Majorities of the public are willing to use troops only to defend Western Europe against an invasion by Russia (54%, down from 58% in 1990) and Saudi Arabia against an invasion by Iraq (52% in 1994 and 1990). The leaders, as usual, are more willing to use troops, with majorities in favor of defending Western Europe and Saudi Arabia as well as South Korea against the North (a striking 82%, up 25 points from 1990), Israel against the Arabs (72%, up two points) and Poland against Russia (60%, not asked in 1990). These attitudes are summarized in Figure V-4.

There are instructive distinctions concerning those more and those less inclined to use troops. Perhaps the most dramatic division is along gender lines, with men consistently much more willing than women to use troops in various circumstances—the difference often involving almost 20 percentage points. Figure V-5 illustrates these differences. The split between men and women on use of force is especially great concerning areas of crisis importance (e.g., the Persian Gulf, the Korean Peninsula) or basic long-term policy concerns (e.g., a Russian invasion of Western Europe).


For each question, an index is calculated for males and females separately by subtracting those who were against using force from those in favor. By this measure, there is a 33-point spread between males and females regarding support for using troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, a 23-point difference regarding a North Korean invasion of South Korea and a 22-point spread regarding a Russian invasion of Western Europe.

Striking differences are also evident along racial lines. Interestingly, the greatest differences of opinion between whites and non-whites parallel those between men and women. Whites are more willing than non-whites to use troops by 18 points to defend Western Europe, by 14 points to defend South Korea and by 10 points to defend Saudi Arabia. Whites are 12 percentage points more willing than non-whites to use force to defend Israel against an Arab attack. The one case among the hypothetical situations polled where whites are less willing to use force is in the case of a civil war in South Africa, where 32% of non-whites but only 16% of whites are in favor of intervening with troops.

Other interesting differences appear along income and education lines, with lower income people and the less well educated much more reluctant to use troops in selected circumstances. These people are also much more likely to agree with the statement that the Vietnam War was "more than a mistake," it was "fundamentally wrong and immoral."

FIGURE V-6: MILITARY ROLE FOR JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA

Should Japan/Germany/Canada be encouraged or discouraged from playing an increased military role in the world?



The public remains cautious about using U.S. military tools for broad international goals. As discussed in detail in Chapter Two, only 24% of the public concurs that protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression is a "very" important foreign policy goal, down from 57% in 1990. Forty-one percent feels defending our allies' security is a "very" important goal, down from 61% four years ago. For the leaders, protecting weaker nations is considered "very" important by 21% (down 7 points from 1990), while defending U.S. allies is viewed as a high priority by 60% (up 4 points).

International peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the United Nations are supported, with agreement from 51% of the public that the United States should participate in such efforts. Over three-fifths of leaders (62%) feel that we should accept commanders appointed by the United Nations in these efforts, while only 36% of leaders would insist on American commanders. The public splits equally on this question, with 44% opting to accept leaders appointed by the United Nations and 44% insisting on leadership by the United States. Thus, while there is increasing reluctance to use American military force unilaterally, there is continuing willingness to participate in multilateral military efforts through the United Nations.

There is relative public caution about Germany or Japan playing a greater international military role, as Figure V-6 indicates. However, a majority of the leaders favor an expanded role for both. Not surprisingly, over two-thirds of both public and leaders support an expanded role for Canada, reflecting that country's very different national history and active involvement in recent decades of peacekeeping.

SPIES

Considering the skepticism about American involvement in the affairs of other countries, there is surprising support for covert activity. On the question of the CIA working secretly inside other countries to weaken or bring down unfriendly governments, 48% of the public supports such activity, with only 40% opposed. In contrast, 59% of the leaders feel we should not be spying, with only 36% in favor. There has been a slight increase in the percentage favoring covert operations on both the public and leadership levels compared with responses in 1990.

Respondents are also asked whether we should be secretly spying on the governments of various countries. There is relatively strong support for spying on China (67% of the public, 82% of the leaders) and North Korea (66% and 89%). A majority of both would support spying on Russia and on Japan. By contrast, there is strong opposition by the public to spying on France (66%) and Great Britain (73%). Both are opposed to spying on Mexico.

CONCLUSION

The Cold War's end has brought some shifts in American opinion, but not the dramatic changes that might be expected, given the drastically altered international political landscape. There is strong support for active involvement in the world, whether through military alliances, defense spending or espionage. While there is reluctance to use military force in the world, the overall attitudes of the American people reflect both stability and caution in the approach to international affairs.

CHAPTER SIX
GAPS IN FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES

According to some political theorists, democracy involves harmony between what citizens want and what the government does. When democracy is working properly, there is general agreement between the policy preferences of ordinary citizens and those of political leaders. Such harmony can come about because leaders respond to the public and carry out its wishes, or because leaders chart the course they think best and persuade the public to go along. If large, persistent gaps exist between the views of the public and leaders, tension may increase. Whether the trouble is lack of communication, knowledge or concern on the part of leaders or the public, the gaps in opinion are instructive.

LEADERS, THE PUBLIC, AND DEMOCRACY

Our surveys over the past 20 years have consistently revealed differences between the foreign policy opinions of the general public and those of leaders. Some differences have been short-lived and relatively untroubling, e.g. the gaps in 1990 between leaders who saw the Cold War as over, and the general public, which was slower to abandon its wariness about the Soviet Union. But other gaps have been substantial and enduring.

We calculate the gaps by recomputing all percentages to exclude "don't know" and "no opinion" responses, which are more common among the public than among leaders. For each survey question we then subtract the percentage of leaders taking a particular stand from the percentage of the public taking that same stand. The result, a percentage-point difference, has a positive sign if more members of the public than leaders take a particular position, and a negative sign if the opposite is true. A large percentage point difference indicates a large gap between the two. Some of the most substantial gaps are displayed in Figure VI-1.

DOMESTIC PRIMACY

One persistent difference between leaders and the public, which has shown up in all our surveys since 1974, is that the leaders show a greater awareness than the public of foreign policy issues. The leaders pay more attention to events abroad, have more information and more opinions, and study foreign policy problems more thoroughly. For example, in response to our open-ended question on foreign policy problems, the average leader mentions more problems than the public (see Chapter Two).

This difference, familiar in scholarly literature, is hardly surprising. Experts naturally focus on different issues than the general public. We chose our sample of leaders from government, the media, academia, business, and various foreign policy organizations precisely with the aim of studying people who are particularly attentive to foreign policy issues.

But the gaps between leaders and the public go beyond matters of interest and attention. They also concern many aspects of government policy, including trade-offs between foreign and domestic matters.

In every survey—especially in times of recession, but in relatively prosperous times as well—members of the public have wanted to put more money toward domestic problems and less toward foreign policy problems than the leaders have. This is true once again.

For example, there is a very large gap of 43 percentage points—one of the largest in our data—between the 51% of the general public and the 8% of the leaders wanting to expand Social Security (see Figure VI-1). In fact, many more leaders (25%) want to cut back Social Security than want to expand it, the opposite of the balance of opinion among the public. Large but less dramatic gaps exist between the proportions of public and leaders that want to expand other domestic programs, including health care (a gap of 28 percentage points), programs to combat violence and crime (20 points) and aid to education (17 points.) In each case, more members of the public than leaders want to expand these domestic programs.

Similarly, more members of the public than leaders want to cut foreign policy programs, particularly those that involve spending money or committing military force. This reflects a somewhat lower level of concern over foreign policy problems. Substantially fewer members of the public than leaders tend to see a "vital interest" for the United States in most parts of the world. There are gaps in the range of 15-20 percentage points with respect to Egypt, Ukraine, China, Germany, South Korea, and even Mexico and Canada. In each case, more leaders than members of the public perceive a vital interest. Of all the 18 countries for which we make comparisons, only in the cases of Haiti (by 29 percentage points) and South Africa (by 11 points) do more members of the public than leaders see a vital U.S. interest.

To be sure, the public is more prone than leaders to perceive "critical threats" to the United States from various sources, especially when they have distinct domestic implications. Fully 43 percentage points more of the public than leaders see economic competition from Japan as a critical threat, and an identical 43 points more see a critical threat from large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States. There is a similar, 37-percentage-point gap on the perceived threat of terrorism. But the tendency of the public to see more critical threats

FIGURE VI-1: GAPS: THE PUBLIC & LEADERS

Gaps: "Public" percent minus "Leaders" percent. Percentages are of those holding an opinion. "Don't know" responses are excluded.

	Public	Leaders	Gap
Domestic Concerns			
Expand Social Security	51%	8%	+43
Expand health care programs	75%	47%	+28
Immigrants and refugees a critical threat	74%	31%	+43
Controlling illegal immigration a very important goal	73%	28%	+45
Economic competition from Japan a critical threat	64%	21%	+43
Protecting jobs of American workers a very important goal	84%	51%	+33
Stopping the inflow of illegal drugs a very important goal	86%	57%	+29
International Involvement and Concern			
Best to take an active part in world affairs	69%	98%	-29
Egypt a vital U.S. interest	56%	78%	-22
Ukraine a vital U.S. interest	46%	67%	-21
Haiti a vital U.S. interest	63%	34%	+29
Foreign Aid			
Favor giving economic aid to other nations	50%	88%	-38
Cut back economic aid programs	62%	32%	+30
Increase economic aid to Palestinians	9%	49%	-40
Increase economic aid to E. Europe	26%	56%	-30
Favor selling military equipment to other nations	16%	47%	-31
Use of Force (*Favor use of U.S. troops if:*)			
North Korea invaded South Korea	45%	84%	-39
Russia invaded Western Europe	61%	92%	-31
Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia	58%	86%	-28
Arab forces invaded Israel	50%	74%	-24
Russia invaded Poland	39%	61%	-22
Cubans attempted to overthrow the Castro dictatorship	50%	19%	+31
Diplomatic activity			
Strengthening the United Nations a very important goal	53%	33%	+20
Favor restoring normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam	65	89%	-24
Trade			
Sympathize with eliminating tariffs	40%	79%	-39
NAFTA mostly good for U.S.	62%	87%	-25

from the other sources may reflect little more than acceptance of the extreme-sounding "critical threat" language. Other data point in the direction of lesser public concern over most foreign policy matters.

FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC CONCERNS

The public's brand of pragmatic internationalism, even more than the leaders', tends to see foreign policy largely as an instrument for achieving personal economic security. This is suggested by the public's much higher perceptions of critical threats from economic competition and immigration. It appears even more directly in the foreign policy goals the public rates as important.

There is a 45-percentage-point gap—the largest in our data—between the 73% of the public and the 28% of leaders who see controlling and reducing illegal immigration as a "very important" goal of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, though both leaders and the public give high priority to protecting jobs of American workers, substantially more of the public (by 33 percentage points) does so. There is a similar 29-point gap on the importance of stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, and a smaller, 12-point gap on securing adequate supplies of energy, with the public more in favor of both.

The public's heavy focus on protecting American jobs has long been reflected in more suspicion of free trade and more support for tariffs than is found among foreign policy leaders. Although both groups have recently shown more support for eliminating tariffs, the relative gap continues to exist. Leaders prefer to eliminate tariffs by 39 percentage points more than the public, and see NAFTA as mostly good for the U.S. economy by 25 points more. Fewer members of the public mention trade as one of our biggest foreign policy problems, a 16-point gap.

RELUCTANCE TO COMMIT MONEY OR TROOPS ABROAD

As in past surveys, smaller proportions of the public than leaders agree it is

best for the United States to take an "active part" in world affairs. The gap now stands at 29 percentage points. The public is also more reluctant to commit resources abroad—especially money or U.S. troops.

As illustrated in Chapter Four, the public is considerably less supportive than leaders of foreign aid. There is a 38-percentage-point gap on favoring "giving economic aid to other nations" and a 30-point gap on cutting back economic aid programs. More members of the public than leaders (16% versus 5%) spontaneously mention "too much foreign aid" as one of the biggest foreign policy problems facing the country. There are significant gaps on aid to nearly every specific country or group we asked about. Forty percentage points fewer citizens than leaders want to increase aid to the Palestinians, 30 points fewer want to increase aid to Eastern Europe, 19 points fewer favor more aid to Russia, 18 points fewer prefer expanded aid to Latin America, and 15 points fewer are for increasing aid to Africa. Ten percentage points more of the public than leaders want to decrease or stop aid to Egypt, and there is virtually no difference on Israel. The public is also much more opposed than leaders, by 31 percentage points, to selling military equipment to other nations. In 1990, when we asked about arms sales to specific countries, the public opposition was greater than leaders' in four out of five cases.

Another long-standing difference between leaders and the public is the public's greater reluctance to commit U.S. troops abroad. This is evidenced by the 18-point gap on whether defending our allies' security is a "very important" foreign policy goal, and by the 14-point gap on whether the Vietnam war was "fundamentally wrong and immoral" rather than just "a mistake." Large gaps also exist in willingness to use troops in the following hypothetical situations: a North Korean invasion of South Korea (39-point gap), a Russian invasion of Western Europe (31 points), an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (28 points), an Arab invasion of Israel (24 points), a Russian invasion of Poland (22 points). Only in two cases is the gap reversed. Many more citizens than leaders (by 31 points) would use troops if people in Cuba attempted to overthrow the Castro dictatorship or if civil war broke out in South Africa (by 15 points).

Although the public is fairly receptive to collective security and peacekeeping through the United Nations and NATO, more members of the public than leaders (by 13 points) would insist that a U.S. commander be in charge of peacekeeping operations in which U.S. troops participate.

The public is also somewhat less eager than leaders to spy secretly on various foreign governments, including North Korea (by 19 percentage points), China (by 13 points), Russia (by 12 points) and Great Britain (by 11 points). This gap is reversed on Mexico, with 12 percentage points more of the public in favor of spying. More of the public than leaders (by 16 points) think the CIA should work secretly inside unfriendly countries to weaken or overthrow their governments.

Surveys in the 1980s showed the public more receptive than leaders to negotiations and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. Now, however, somewhat fewer members of the public than leaders want to establish normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam (by 24 percentage points) or with Cuba (by 13 points).

Despite the primarily domestic focus of the public's foreign policy attitudes and the relative reluctance to intervene abroad, there are more traces of altruism among the public than among leaders. More members of the public see as "very important" the goals of strengthening the United Nations (by 20 percentage points) and combating world hunger (by 16 points). By smaller margins, more members of the public view promoting and defending human rights in other countries, helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations, and protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression as "very important"—though not helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations.

PERCEPTIONS

The general public differs from leaders in perceptions of other aspects of world affairs and U.S. foreign policy. More members of the public, for example, think the United States will play a greater role in the next 10 years than today (by 35 percentage points). More predict an increased role for Japan (by 29 points), and fewer (by 13 points) foresee a greater role for China. In line with concern about economic competition, fewer members of the public than leaders (by 18 percentage points) see the economic unification of Western Europe as "mostly a good thing" for the United States, and more of the public (by 22 points) see the countries of the European Union as practicing unfair trade with the United States.

Members of the public are harsher than leaders in their judgment of the Clinton administration's handling of the Middle East overall (by 38 points) and the response of the U.S. government to "the situation in the Middle East" (by 34 points). The public gives lower marks to the administration's handling of overall trade policy (by 29 points) and relations with Latin America (by 14 points). Yet, the public is more tolerant (by 22 points) of the government's response to the war in Bosnia.

CONCLUSION

The overall results of this survey show that the American people are now confident about the present and future role of their country, despite the perceived absence of strong foreign policy leadership from their president. The end of the Cold War has not shaken America's fundamental commitment to maintaining an active role in world affairs, as recognition of global economic competition and interdependence has grown. Relief from the long competition with the Soviet Union and the lack of a clear external threat have made Americans more reluctant to use force abroad and become involved in the affairs of other countries. But they want to maintain current levels of defense in an uncertain world and are committed to diplomatic engagement through alliances and multilateral organizations.



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Comentarios:

De part de Jordi Borja, et faig arribar la síntesi de la ponència que ell mateix va pronunciar a Lisboa en el marc del XIV Congrés de la Federació Mundial de Ciutats Unides (FMCU). En ella es planteja quina podria ésser l'estratègia de l'associacionisme mundial de ciutats en un futur proper i el paper a jugar per una possible Assemblea Mundial de Ciutats en el si de Nacions Unides.

Atentament,

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a. Local y nacional. Descentralización del Estado, reforzamiento de la autonomía local, nuevo bloque de competencias (que incluye promoción económica, medioambiente, seguridad y justicia, etc.) y de recursos y desarrollo de las relaciones interadministrativas y público-privadas de caracter contractual. Estructuración de los espacios urbano-metropolitanos sobre la base de la cooperación y la viabilidad de los poderes y los actores.

b. Internacional. Reconocimineto de los poderes locales y regionales, del poder urbano, como actores públicos de la vida internacional. Este reconocimiento se refiere tanto al desarrollo de las relaciones entre estos poderes como a su articulación con el actual sistema político de regulación internacional (sistema NNUU). Los gobiernos nacionales deben aceptar a los poderes locales y regionales en los organismos internacionales hasta ahora intergubernamentales.

1.5. El movimiento de CIUDADES se encuentra ante un gran desafío, o mejor dicho, ante una gran OPORTUNIDAD. Debe actuar unido para hacerse reconocer por los Estados y los organismos internacionales. Pero también para que las ciudades aparezcan ante las opiniones públicas como ACTORES relevantes del panorama internacional, que no solamente dan respuesta a los problemas que se concentran en las ciudades (congestión, degradación medioambiental, pobreza y marginación, déficit de servicios colectivos, etc), sinó que también intervienen en los procesos causales (económicos, demográficos, culturales, políticos) y que son agentes de cooperación y solidaridad a nivel internacional. El desafío es desarrollar la capacidad de actuar en los procesos globales derivados de la mundialización. La oportunidad está representada por la doble crisis de los Estados nacionales y

XIV CONGRESO FMCU, Lisboa, 27-29 abril, 1994I

SÍNTESIS PONENCIA J. BORJA

LAS CIUDADES EN UN MUNDO EN TRANSFORMACIÓN
EL ROL DE LAS CIUDADES EN EL MUNDO

1. Mundialización de la economía y de la comunicación y su efecto sobre el rol de las ciudades.

1.1 Hacia un nuevo sistema de regulación mundial: de la progresiva disolución de los grandes bloques político-militares a los acuerdos socio-económicos mundiales

Crisis de regulación y crisis de pertenencia.

1.2. Los espacios locales y regionales y sus puntos centrales. Las ciudades se convierten en gestores civiles de las regulaciones mundiales y en lugares de pertenencia múltiple (o interculturalidad).

1.3. La globalización de los intercambios (comercio, población, información) requiere respuestas integradas (no sectoriales) a nivel urbano . Esta es la forma mayoritaria que revisten hoy los espacios locales y regionales.

Asentamientos humanos = urbanos o la ciudad como forma de vida universal.

Sin embargo, la urbanización generalizada crea formas urbanas supranacionales y fragmenta, al tiempo que articula amplios espacios urbano-metropolitanos.

1.4. En consecuencia, hay que reivindicar un PODER URBANO en su doble dimensión:

sus fórmulas de organización (sean autoritarios o liberales) y de los bloques político-militares.

2. Las organizaciones mundiales de ciudades entre el desafío y las oportunidades de la "mundialización"

2.1. Multiplicidad y debilidad de las organizaciones mundiales de ciudades

Las dos organizaciones con vocación universal (por sus objetivos y composición), FMCU y IULA, en realidad, distan de serlo. La FMCU tiene un implantación muy desigual y la ventaja de contar con la adhesión directa de las ciudades se ve reducida por la escasa participación, incluso en países con bastantes ciudades adherentes, de muchas ciudades importantes (que actuan directamente ante los organismos internacionales y optan por las relaciones y la cooperción bilaterales).

IULA se encuentra más posicionada ante los organismos de NNUU y se apoya en estructuras administrativas y financieras más potentes (el CMRE y las asociaciones nacionales europeas). Sin embargo, también adolece de una débil implantación en diversas regiones del mundo, y de una debilidad política de sus direcciones a nivel mundial, causada por la escasa presencia de ciudades y personalidades líderes.

En ambos casos, las estructuras dirigentes y administrativas se revelan insuficientes con relación a los desafios que deben afrontar actualmente.

Los otros 2 organismos que completan el Grupo de los 4 que desde Rio 92 contribuyen a coordinar la acción mundial de las ciudades sobre la base del seguimiento de la Conferencia, son Summit y Metrópolis. Tienen la ventaja (política y mediática) de representar a las grandes ciudades. Sin embargo, Summit es sobretodo una Conferencia Trienal de Alcaldes de una veintena de

grandes ciudades, mientras que Metrópolis es una asociación heterogenea (reune algunas grandes ciudades, organismos metropolitanos, a veces provincias o regiones, e incluso representantes de ministerios nacionales, así como institutos de estudios y empresas públicas y privadas) que tiene más valor técnico que político. Es evidente, sin embargo, que Summit y Metrópolis, si actuan conjuntamente, representan un fuerte potencial político de las ciudades (como Eurociudades en Europa).

Las otras organizaciones de ciudades (las más importantes y significativas estuvieron en su mayoria en las reuniones de Curitiva y Río previas a la Conferencia de NNUU) tienen casi siempre una base territorial, cultural o sectorial. Son de importancia muy diversa y tienden a multiplicarse rápidamente. Por una parte expresan la riqueza y vitalidad del movimiento de ciudades. Pero por otra generan una imagen confusa y restan credibilidad, fuerza e incluso viaibilidad a cada una de las organizaciones, debido a la multiplicidad de organizaciones y actividades con objetivos similares y dirigidos a los mismos actores, las ciudades.

Es preciso tomar una iniciativa unificadora de la IMAGEN y la Representatividad de las organizaciones de ciudades sin que se pierda la razón de ser específica y la capacidad de movilizar recursos de cada una de ellas.

2.2. Necesidad de un proyecto político unificador del movimiento mundial de ciudades

Los recientes congresos y asambleas de las principales organizaciones de ciudades revelan la coincidencia de valores y objetivos existentes entre ellas.

Véase como ejemplo el congreso de IULA (Toronto, 93), EStados Generales del CMRE (Strasburgo, 93), Metrópolis (Montreal, 93) y FMCU (Lisboa, 94). La

Declaración Río - Barcelona de 1992 fue un precedente innovador de esta linea.

Entre estos objetivos coincidentes, destacan:

a. La reivindicación y la modernización conceptual de la Autonomía Local (ver la Carta de Autonomía Local IULA 85, actualizada en Toronto 93 y asumida por FMCU en Lisboa 94).

b. El rol de las ciudades en la articulación de estrategias globales y políticas contractuales que combinen las políticas económicas, sociales y medioambientales. En consecuencia, deben erigirse en *partners* de los gobiernos nacionales y de los organismos internacionales que establecen normas y acuerdan programas de esta naturaleza.

c. El reconocimiento de las ciudades como lugares de integración socio-cultural a partir de la aceptación de la diversidad y la multiculturalidad, de la igualdad jurídica de todos los residentes, y del rechazo a cualquier forma de discriminación negativa, y en especial el racismo y la xenofobia.

d. La revalorización de las ciudades como actores de intercambio, cooperación, solidaridad y acción humanitaria, a nivel internacional y en especial por su capacidad de conexión con situaciones locales concretas en otros países y de movilizar a la sociedad civil.

e. La exigencia de reconocimiento por parte de los gobiernos nacionales y de los organismos internacionales como actores públicos en la vida internacional.

Sobre esta base es posible plantear una mayor coordinación, convergencia y unión del movimiento mundial de ciudades.

2.3. ¿Es posible plantearse la unión del movimiento mundial de ciudades?

Es posible y necesario, porque:

- Los organismos internacionales (véase sistema NNUU, organismos económicos como el Banco Mundial, conferencias internacionales, etc) reclaman un interlocutor único, aunque sea una estructura de coordinación de los principales organismos existentes.
- Los gobiernos nacionales se muestran reticentes a perder el monopolio internacional y sólo aceptaran negociar con organizaciones fuertes y legitimadas por su representatitvidad e imagen ante la opinión pública.
- Las mismas ciudades soportan la actual dispersión, que sus ciudadanos no entienden, aunque no quieran perder en otros casos la utilidad específica de una organización particular.

Las organizaciones de ciudades ya hemos visto que tienden a aproximar sus objetivos y sus campos de actuación. Se constituyen redesy se gestionana programas internacionales en las que participan diversas organizaciones y muchas ciudades ciudades pertenecen a una multiplicidad de asociaciones regionales, sectoriales y mundiales.

La unión mundial de ciudades debe ser hoy nuestra respuesta a los desafios de la mundialización. Es una exigencia de los tiempos, y si no lo hacemos ahora, si no aprovechamos la oportunidad de hacer nuestra la unión ahora se acabarán creando organismos internacionales para las ciudades desde los gobiernos y desde el propio sistema de NNUU. Nos encontraremos

entonces en una posición de marginalidad en unos organismos creados para las ciudades pero sin sus representantes directos y sin sus actores sociales.

3. EL AVANCE HACIA LA UNIÓN MUNDIAL DE CIUDADES

3.1. El precedente se situa en Río 92, aunque hay que matizar sus efectos.

Por una lado, debe valorarse la importancia de convocar una reunión de más de 20 organizaciones de ciudades por iniciativa de la FMCU y IULA, junto con Metrópolis y Summit, primero en Río (enero 92) y luego en Curitiva y Río (mayo-junio 92). Sin embargo, si bien se consigue un "special event" en el marco de la Conferencia, éste pasa desapercibido (con aúsencia total de los gobiernos y de las principales autoridades de NNUU). Tampoco se consigue el efecto de movilización y de opinión pública que obtiene el Fórum Global de ONG's.

Para gestionar el seguimiento post-Río 92, se crea el Grupo de los 4, precedente importante ante el sistema de NNUU y con el valor añadido de ser un nucleo de coordinación estable formado por organizaciones de ciudades, posiblemente las más importantes o activas a nivel mundial. Sin embargo, su carácter ha sido eminentemente técnico, sin obtener interlocutores relevantes en NNUU y con escasos resultados visibles para las cuidades. De hecho, no ha producido ningún impacto en la opinión pública ni ha demostrado cpacidad de presión ante los organismos nacionales.

3.2. Proceso de aproximación de las organizaciones de ciudades.

Desde 1992 prácticamente todas las reuniones de las principales organizaciones han manifestado la proximidad de los objetivos y la convenienecia de la aproximación, y hasta de la unión, de las asociaciones de ciudades. Asímismo, se han dado tres tipos de procesos de especial importancia:

a. La aproximación entre las 2 principales organizaciones mundiales (FMCU y IULA) y las iniciativas conjuntas de sus presidentes (Sampaio y Triglia, junto a Maragall, presidente del CMRE, sección de IULA en Europa, que representa más del 80% de sus miembreos y recursos, pero que también integra a las ciudades que constituyen una gran parte de la FMCU). La oposición IULA-FMCU, enmarcada en la guerra fría está históricamente superada, mientras el CMRE juega un rol de eslabón unificador. El Grupo de les 4 (con Summit y Metrópolis), a pesar de su papel hasta ahora limitado, contribuye a la aproximación y a la coordinación mundiales, aportando una presencia significativa de grandes ciudades del mundo y una capacidad técnica, económica y mediática muy conveniente.

b. El reforzamiento , o la creación, de estructuras regionales o continentales de unión, directamente y/o mediante asociaciones nacionales. Se han consolidado organizaciones como Citynet (ciudades asiáticas), que además se han abierto a nivel mundial (por ejemplo, Citynet en CUD). Algo parecido ocurre con la Unión de Ciudades Árabes y sus crecientes relaciones con ciudades europeas. Se han creado asociaciones de municipios en América Latina y recientemente una estructura de coordinación de América del Sur (que complementa la ya existente en Centroamérica), que se apoya tanto en IULA como en la FMCU (por lo menos ésta es la voluntad de los principales alcaldes)

En Europa, la unificación del CMRE con IULA dió lugar a la creación de la más poderosa asosciación de ciudades existente (por el número de adherentes y los recursos disponibles).

c. La multiplicación de redes de ciudades, articuladas en unos casos con programas de organismos internacionales (financiadores y legitimadores), y en otros con organizaciones de carácter sectorial o temático (medio ambiente, automóvil y circulación, nuevas tecnologias de comunicación, observatorios urbanos, seguridad ciudadana, etc...). Casi siempre acaban concurriendo los dos tipos de articulación. Esta multiplicidad de redes exige un mínimo de coordinación y de visibilidad para racionalizar su actuación y para crear igualdad de oportunidades de participación en las mismas. Por ejemplo, para las ciudades medianas o pequeñas que tienden a crear estructuras internacionales propias para tener un peso especifico ante las grandes urbes, por una parte, y las organizaciones de ciudades más o menos burocratizadas, por otra.

3.3. La aceptación en el marco de NNUU del principio de participación de las ciudades y de la necesidad de su unión a nivel mundial.

La iniciativa conjunta por parte de los presidentes de IULA, FMCU y CMRE ante el Secretario General de NNUU (reunión de los tres presidentes con el Secretario General en Ginebra en enero del 94 y luego del presidente del CMRE en Barcelona en abril del 94) ha tenido una doble resultado positivo:

a. Aceptación de la celebración de la Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades conjuntamente con la Conferencia Habitat II (Estambul 1996) y con el apoyo de las autoridades de NNUU.

Esta posición de la Secretaría General de NNUU se ha reflejado ya en su aceptación de estar presente en los congresos de FMCU e IULA (ver mensaje de Boutros-Ghali al Congreso FMCU).

b. Estudio de un estatuto especial para la organización mundial de ciudades en el seno del sistema de NNUU (expertos de NNUU, IULA, FMCU y de Barcelona preparan propuestas)

Es significativo que esta gestión exitosa haya sido llevada a cabo precisamente por un número muy reducido de organizaciones y personas con funciones de alta representatividad a nivel nacional y local además de internacional.

Paralelamente, y también como efecto de lo anterior, la Conferencia de Habitat II (1996) se plantea como una "Cumbre de Ciudades". De hecho , NNUU propone a los gobiernos que integren en las delegaciones a los gobiernos locales (así como a la sociedad civil: ong's, organizaciones profesionales y empresas).

Nos encontarmos, por tanto, ante una oportunidad muy definida en el tiempo (1994-96) y en el tipo de acción a llevar a cabo: convocar una Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades y participar en la Conferencia de Habitat.

La actuación que se realice a partir de ahora tiene que ir determinada por la consecución de estos dos objetivos.

Se ha conseguido definir una perspectiva concreta de unión de ciudades y de articulación con el sistema de NNUU. Si embargo, no podemos obviar que es sólo el principio en el doble sentido: un comienzo y una base para empezar un nuevo y ambicioso proceso mundial.

4. LA CONFERENCIA DE HABITAT II O LA CUMBRE DE CIUDADES

4.1. El planteamiento de la Conferencia Habitat II y su "recentramiento" sobre las ciudades.

El primer lema propuesto por Habitat, "El futuro de las ciudades", ya indica una evolución desde "Asentaminetos Humanos" hacia un recentramiento en el tema de la ciudades. El mismo B.Ghali en el Prep-Com de Ginebra (abril 1994) propuso "La Cumbre de las Ciudades". La vocación de Habitat II hace referencia a una problemática integral de la ciudad como realidad territorial. De aquí la importancia quedeben adquirir las aportaciones "exteriores" para completar la visisón tradicional de la Oficina Técnica de Habitat centrada en la vivienda y los servicios básicos

La Conferencia será de carácter intergubernamental, por lo que es importante contar con una destacada presencia de Jefes de estado y de gobierno. Sin embargo, también deben estar presentes, formando parte de las delegaciones nacionales, los principales actores urbanos: alcaldes y representantes de gobiernos locales, y actores sociales, económicos y profesionales (empresas, ong's...).. Los organismos de ciudades deberán obtener un estauto especial en el seno de la Conferencia.

Algunas ideas fuerza a proponer en la Conferencia, podrían ser las sigüientes:

1. Reivindicar el "Poder urbano"
2. Cultura del "Contrato urbano" para desarrollar "estrategias globales" y "actuaciones integrales" en las ciudades
3. Ecourbanismo (ahorro energía y agua, mantenimiento de infrastructuras y servicios, etc.). Vinculación entre crecimiento económico y medio ambiente.

4. Regiones urbanas con desarrollo de pequeña producción agrícola y espacios naturales y de la biomasa.
5. Regiones urbanas como mercados de trabajo. Generación de empleo. Invención de roles y de puestos de trabajo via ecourbanismo y servicios personales. No mitificar la economía informal.
6. Comunicación y nuevas tecnologias en la ciudad .
7. Definición del concepto de "ciudadanía" (ver proyecto "Carta europea de la Ciudadanía" y "Carta Urbana Europea").
8. La Ciudad no puede ser el "lugar" de la política social para atenuar las exclusiones o la marginación. Sus causas debe ser atacadas con anterioridad (trabajo, igualdad jurídica, integración cultural).
9. Reconocimiento del rol internacional de las ciudades. Asignación del 25% de los programas nacionales e internacionales de cooperación a la cooperación descentralitzada . Establecimiento del 1% del PNB para la cooperación internacional. Desarrollo de sistemas regionales de cooperación entre ciudades (por ejemplo, area mediterránea).
10. Financiación internacional de proyectos urbanos. Censo y evaluación de los proyectos que actualmente tienen financiación (W.B., BID, EE.UU.). Propuesta de nuevos criterios.
11. Establecimiento de una red de observatorios urbanos (que permita asímismo racionalizar y coordinar la diversidad de redes de ciudades existentes).
12. Difusión de tecnologias urbanas, especialmente para la vivienda y las infrastructuras básicas.

4.2. El proceso organizativo de la Conferencia

a. Agenda

Para la preparación de Habitat II deben considerarse otras conferencias organizadas por NNUU en el binomio 1994-95, como la referente a la población (El Cairo), las mujeres (China) o bien la Cumbre Social (Copenhague, mars 1995).

También son destacables las iniciativas de las Comisiónes independientes, aunque vinculadas a NNUU, sobre los ámbitos siguientes: población (Pintasilgo). Educación siglo XXI (Delors), Cultura y Desarrollo (Pérez de Cuéllar) y Global Governance (Carlson).

Asímismo, debe mencionarse la propia agenda de reunions Prep-Com, que se reúne del 24 de abril al 4 de mayo de 1995 en Nairobi y el primer trimestre del 96 en Venecia, Nueva York o San Francisco (diciembre 1995).

Algunas reuniones internacionales de ciudades que deben celebrarse en los próximos meses pueden contribuir a difundir nuestras posiciones. Por ejemplo:

18 - 19 mayo

Estambul, Comité Ejecutivo IULA

24-27 mayo

Aalborg. Conferencia "Ciudades sostenibles". DG XI

22-23 junio

Barcelona, Conferencia Eurociudades-Euroempresas.

27-30 junio

Manchester, "Ciudades y desarrollo sostenido". Global Forum 94

17-19 agosto

Nueva York. Convocatoria a todas las organizaciones de ciudades el dia 17.

Los días 18 y 19, Conferencia de Ciudades sobre Desarrollo Sostenible, con el objetivo de preparar la Conferencia de Copenhaguen y también Habitat II. IULA ejerce la secretaría de la reunió.

Octubre, Taipei, Comité Ejecutivo IULA

Noviembre,

Bolonia, Conferencia de la Internacional Socialista sobre las ciudades

El proceso final de la preparación será tanto diplomático como técnico e intelectual y debe garantizarse la participación de los Actores Urbanos vía Comités Nacionales y en las Delegaciones Nacionales. Asimismo, deben realizarse actividades complementarias como las reuniones "regionales" y "especiales" con organismos internacionales, ong's, expertos, alcaldes, etc. Por ejemplo, Habitat con: OMS Visión integral de la salud en el medio urbano), OIT Mercados de trabajo en zonas urbanas) o UNESCO (Racismo y xenofobia).

b. Algunas iniciativas generales:

- Elaborar un libro blanco para la Conferencia sobre "El rol de las ciudades en el sistema mundial y las políticas nacionales e internacionales respecto a las ciudades"
- Declaraciones convergentes de organizaciones mundiales de ciudades, de personalidades (alcaldes, expertos, etc...) y de ONG's.
-Participación en las conferencias y encuentros anteriores a Habitat II (94-96) para popularizar los objetivos de la Conferencia.

c. Proceso preparatorio a nivel nacional

-Visita a los responsables de NNUU (B.Ghali, N'Dow, Dowdeswell, Wilheim, Garau), a los gobiernos nacionales (jefe de gobierno, Ministro Asuntos Exteriores, Ministro Vivienda-Obras Públicas, etc).

-Constitución de comités nacionales con representantes de ciudades. Si fuera posible, presididos o coordinados por un experto consensuado entre el ministerio especializado y las grandes ciudades.
-Elaboración de informes nacionales para la Conferencia de carácter sintético y de interés general (experiencias integrales transferibles).

Como comentario general podría añadirse que la Conferencia tiene por ahora un"low profile". Probablemente no alcanzará el efecto mediático de Río 92, pero hay que hacer desde este momente una fuerte promoción. Falta una definición importante de los objetivos. El mejor lema de los propuestos hasta el momente es: LA CUMBRE DE LAS CIUDADES (B.Ghali).

4.3. Sobre objetivos y conclusiones de la Conferencia

No se puede avanzar en esta linea, puesto que los documentos preparatorios no son muy precisos. Por una parte, los gobiernos nacionales no se han pronunciado, aunque algunos, como el de les Estados Unidos? han manifestado un gran interés.

Las organizaciones de ciudades y las ong's han puesto de manifiesto ya su voluntad de participar en todo el proceso.

El ACTA de la reunión del Comité Preparatorio Intergubernamental (Prep-Com, Ginebra 11-22 abril 1994) contempla la redacción de una Declaración de Principios y Compromisos y de un Plan Global de Acción, que deberán ser aprobados en Estambul. La Declaración deberá basarse en el principio 1 de la Declaración de Río sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo, que defiende el derecho de los seres humanos a vivir de forma saludable gracias a un desarrollo sostenido. El Plan Global de Acción, elaborado en base a los informes presentados por los Comités Nacionales, se empezará a discutir durante la 2a. sesión del Prep-Com (26 abril-2 mayo 1995, Nairobi). Deberá

estructurarse alrededor de los dos ejes principales de la Conferencia: vivienda para todo el mundo y desarrollo de asentamientos humanos sostenibles en un mundo en proceso de urbanización. (Actas completas en anexo).

Para las organizaciones de ciudades el interés de la Conferencia es doble:

a. Reivindicación del "poder urbano". Necesidad de políticas nacionales e internacionales para la ciudad. La participación de las ciudades en las mismas. La gestión y la ejecución local de las políticas urbanas.

b. El reconocimiento de las Ciudades en la vida internacional y en el sistema de NNUU. En concreto, se propone la dedicación del 1% del PNB de los países más desarrollados a la cooperación internacional, y un 25% de éste destinado a la cooperación descentralizada.

La Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades puede celebrarse, inmediatamente después de la Conferencia Habitat II y asumir el seguimiento y ejecución de los acuerdos (según sus competencias y capacidades).

5. ASAMBLEA MUNDIAL DE CIUDADES

5.1. Organización y convocatoria.

El Grupo de los 4 (comité de seguimiento de Río 92) puede convocar a las principales organizaciones internacionales de ciudades.

Propuesta: Nueva York, 17 agosto 1994

La FMCU asume inicialmente la secretaría de esta reunión y del trabajo preparatorio para Habitat II y la Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades.

(Nota: IULA-ICCLEI asumen la secretaría del Grupo de los 4 para el seguimiento de Río 92).

La reunión de las organizaciones de ciudades, unas 30, establecerá los elementos básicos para la preparación de la Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades y de participación en la Conferencia de Habitat a partir de las propuestas que presentará FMCU en nombre del Grupo de los 4.

5.2. La Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades aceptará a todas las organizaciones internacionales (mundiales, regionales y temáticas), pero se establecerá un baremo de mandatos con derecho a voto en función de la representatividad. A priori puede pensarse en un baremo como éste: 50% (ó 60%) para los organismos de carácter mundial (básicamente Grupo de los 4) y el resto a repartir entre las organizaciones regionales y temáticas. Por ejemplo: 25% IULA; 25% FMCU, 10% Metrópolis-Summit, 20% organizaciones regionales y 20% organizaciones temáticas.

5.3. FMCU y IULA, por su carácter de organizaciones mundiales con vocación universal deberán asegurar la presidencia del proceso preparatorio y de la propia Asamblea, así como del organismo coordinador permanente que se derive de elllas (Consejo Permanente). Asimismo, deberán explicitar su vocación de unirse o fundirse en el marco de la Asamblea y de su organismo coordinador posterior. Metrópolis y Summit unidas o conjuntamente pueden asumir la representación de las grandes ciudades.

5.4. La Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades deberá expresar la vitalidad y la diversidad de las organizaciones de ciudades, pero también la unidad de objetivos y la capacidad de coordinación y acción conjunta. Las organizaciones regionales y temáticas se mantendran independientes después de la Asamblea, pero al mismo tiempo se integrarán en estructuras de coordinación y de representación a nivel internacional.

5.5. El objetivo principal de la Asamblea es celebrar un gran acto que reúna a la vez a las autoridades de NNUU y nacionales y a los líderes de las ciudades y de las organizaciones internacionales de poderes locales. De la Asamble Mundial de Ciudades se derivará una estructura representativa y coordinadora que debe ser la interlocutora válida de gobiernos y de NNUU y otros organismos internacionales. Esta estructura de coordinación y representación puede denominarse : Consejo Permanente de la Asamblea Mundial de Ciudades.

5.6. La eficacia de la Asamblea dependerá mucho de su carácter mediático, que se basará en la presencia de los más importantes líderes políticos (internacionales, nacionales y locales).

5.7. El Consejo Permanente de la Asamblea deberá estar formado por los principales líderes y responsables de las más importantes organizaciones de ciudades, garantizando una adecuada presencia de todo tipo de organizaciones de todas las partes del mundo. Asimismo, deberán formar parte de él los Alcaldes más carismáticos y las ciudades que, por distintas razones, asumen liderazgos regionales y mundiales. Este Consejo asumirá la representación ordinaria de la Asamblea y convocará la siguiente para dos años más tarde, coordinará a las organizaciones de ciudades en relación a sus objetivos y actuará en común y ejecutará los acuerdos aprobados por la Asamblea.