I. P. S. A. International Political Science Association
A. I. S. P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

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Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E - Barcelona 34, Spain

October 22, 1987

Dear Jordi:

I have shown the essays delivered at our conference in Barcelona to Professor John Meisel, the Editor of the International Political Science Review -- the IPSA journal in political science. He was quite encouraging about the possibility of publishing the papers, perhaps with a delay of a couple of years. Obviously some of the papers could not be included because the publication is a fairly short one.* This would be mean deciding to drop some of the papers.

Obviously, as rapporteur général you would be the nataural person to serve as editor although Professor Meisel thought it might facilitate matters if there were two co-editors, and he asked me if I would be willing to serve. If you are prepared to do this could you please let me know your reactions as soon as possible. Also, could you pass this information on to the paper-givers, asking them to revise their papers for publication. We have still not received Daniel Seiler's paper, and I thought it was one of the more interesting ones presented. Please see that he is informed.

I was very encouraged by this possibility. As you may know, we had one of our previous conferences partly published in this journal (Pluralism and Federalism, which appeared in 1984 (Vol. 5, No. 4)). I was rapporteur général at that conference and edited that number. I think it is a fairly widely read journal and one which, of course, has considerable prestige.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman
Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 3N6

* maximum: 165 double spaced typewritten pages.

HGT:bg

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
priv. (02) 672 38 89

Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE : PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Telephone: (021)414-4970
after 30.11.87

Please reply to I.L.G.S.
University of Birmingham
P O Box 363
BIRMINGHAM
B15 2TT
Great Britain

4th November 1987

Dear Colleague

Subscriptions to the Research Committee

As you will know if you were at the Barcelona meeting, the Committee can no longer rely on any subsidy from outside. Our postage and management costs, as well as any other expenses that the Committee decides to incur, come only from your own contributions. In recent years these have been very few.

The Committee therefore decided at Barcelona that payment of the subscription must become a condition of membership, and confirmed the current rate as $ (U.S.) 15 per year. We shall not worry too much about arrears, though if you like to pay for any of your past years of membership this will be very welcome. However I am now asking you to send me your subscription for the academic year 1987/88, which will be taken to include the period of the Washington Congress.

Cheques or drafts should be in £ sterling for £9.00 and should be made out to "P N Mawhood re IPSA R.C.16".* (I am also willing to accept sums covering several years in advance if you feel this will save the effort of obtaining an annual draft). The change from dollars to sterling results from the high cost of maintaining an account in a non-national currency, and has the Chairman's approval.

With best wishes until we meet again.

Yours sincerely

Philip Mawhood
Secretary of the Research Committee.

* At the time of our July meeting, $15 translated almost exactly to £9.00, whatever may now be the fate of the dollar!

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P. WINCZOREK (Warszawa)

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Deprecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E-Barcelona 34
Spain

December 15, 1987

Dear Jordi,

I hope you got my letter of October 22nd, but in case you did not I enclose a photocopy. I think we should pursue the possibility of publishing some of our papers from the Barcelona conference in the International Political Science Review. I presume that you are prepared to act as editor and I was wondering what you thought about Meisel's suggestion that there be a co-editor. He suggested me since I am handy to him here and English is my first language. I shall be guided by your preference, however, in this matter. Do let me know.

I just received a copy of Daniel Seiler's paper. I trust he sent one to you as well. If not, let me know and I will send you a copy of this one.

With very best wishes for the coming holiday season,

Yours sincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

Hgt:bg

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
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Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Decano

Universidad de Barcelona
Facultad de Derecho

Barcelona, 11-1-88

Professor H.G. Thorburn
Department of Political Studies
Queen´s University
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 3N6

Dear Prof. Thorburn,

I apologize for so a long delay in answering your letter of October 22nd. I have been lecturing in Latin America for nearly two months and all my personal papers and letters have accumulated.

I´m happy to know the arrangements with Professor John Meisel, the Editer of the International Political Science Review, specially as regards to his suggestion that you could act as co-editor.

I´m prepared to act as editor, but I think mostly convenient that you take the lead as editor as well. I think that you are in a better situation than me to follow the developments of the eventual publication of the Barcelona papers and both from the academical and from the personal point of view it would be for me a great pleasure to be your co-editor.

I´ll do my best to pass the information to the paper givers.

With my best wishes for new year 1988

Yours sincerely

Av. Diagonal, 684 - 08034 Barcelona

Enviat a:

Prof. CRILICH | KORBONSKI
CLAEYS | HAWTHOOD
GRAZIANO | VLACHOS
CALVEZ | WINCZOREK
EISFELD | HUGGINS
SEILER | SHARPE

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Decano

Universidad de Barcelona
Facultad de Derecho

Dear Professor

Herewith I´m enclosing the letter that I have received from Prof. H. Thorburn and my own answer, both concerning the eventual publication of the papers presented at the Barcelona meeting, last year.

I should like to know your opinion about the matter and eventually your disponibility to rewrite your paper to meet the conditions of publication in the I.P.S.R. (International Political Science Review).

Hoping to hear from you soon, I remain

Yours sincerely

Av. Diagonal, 684 - 08034 Barcelona

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E - Barcelona 34, Spain

October 22, 1987

Dear Jordi:

I have shown the essays delivered at our conference in Barcelona to Professor John Meisel, the Editor of the International Political Science Review -- the IPSA journal in political science. He was quite encouraging about the possibility of publishing the papers, perhaps with a delay of a couple of years. Obviously some of the papers could not be included because the publication is a fairly short one. This would ~~be~~ mean deciding to drop some of the papers.

Obviously, as rapporteur général you would be the nataural person to serve as editor although Professor Meisel thought it might facilitate matters if there were two co-editors, and he asked me if I would be willing to serve. If you are prepared to do this could you please let me know your reactions as soon as possible. Also, could you pass this information on to the paper-givers, asking them to revise their papers for publication. We have still not received Daniel Ferler's paper, and I thought it was one of the more interesting ones presented. Please see that he is informed.

I was very encouraged by this possibility. As you may know, we had one of our previous conferences partly published in this journal (Pluralism and Federalism, which appeared in 1984 (Vol. 5, No. 4)). I was rapporteur général at that conference and edited that number. I think it is a fairly widely read journal and one which, of course, has considerable prestige.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman
Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 3N6

HGT:bg

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J. TOURNON (Grenoble)
G. VLACHOS (Athenai)
P. WINCZOREK (Warszawa)

15 January, 1988

Dear Jordi,

I hope you received my letters of Oct. 22nd and December 15, about the possibility of publishing a selection of the papers of our Barcelona conference, in the International Journal of Political Science. John Meisel spoke to me again yesterday to see if we are interested in following up on my earlier initiative. Therefore I must press you to let me know your decision. If it is positive we should get on with the job.

I just sent you the following telex:

"Please indicate immediately if you agree to edit papers of our Barcelona conference for the International Journal of Political Science. Editor Meisel has to know or our chances will be lost."

I apologize for the pdremptory tone, but I am sure you understand the situation. I think the participants would be pleased to appear in so prestigious a journal. So do let me know as soon as you can.

I hope this finds you in good health, after a good New Year's break. Personally I am just getting over a very trying period. My mother died on January 2nd, after a lengthy illness; and now I am burdened with an estate to settle.

All the best,

Sincerely,

Hugh Thorburn

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
priv. (02) 672 38 89

Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

STANISŁAW EHRLICH
Profesor Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
02-586 Warszawa, ul. J. Dąbrowskiego 75 m. 208

Warszawa, ~~data~~ 15. I. 88.


My dear Dean,

I am delighted to hear that there is a chance to get the Barcelona - papers printed. I agree with gratitude. You and Hugh are authorized to touch up the poor English of my paper and let it mature for print.

With my best wishes,

yours sincerely

St. Ehrlich



NAJLEPIEJ ZAMÓ
ABONA
ZNA
W URZĘDZIE

Prof. Jordi Solé Tura
Congreso
Tribunal de Derecho
Pg. Diagonal, 684.
08034 Barcelona
ESPAÑA

LOTNICZA
PAR AVION

Hiszpania

STANISŁAW EHRLICH
02-536 Warszawa
ul. Dąbrowskiego 75 m. 208
Poland

Development Administration Group

Institute of Local Government Studies
of the Department of Local Government and Development
The University of Birmingham
PO Box 363
Birmingham B15 2TT England

Cables: Inlogov Birmingham
Telex: 338938 SPAPHY G
Telephone: 021-414 ~~5009~~ 4970

pnm:aw

2 February 1988

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E - Barcelona 34
Spain

Dear Professor Sole Tura

Many thanks for your letter of 19 January. I think the proposal to publish our Barcelona papers in the International Political Science Review, with yourself and Hugh Thornburn as co-editors is an excellent one.

If it is decided to include my paper in the collection, I shall of course be willing to do any revision that is necessary. It will be for the co-editors to issue their specification of the form that such a revision should take - whether in terms of cutting the length of a paper or of actually varying the text to produce a more homogeneous collection.

Congratulations to you both on finding this opportunity of publication, and my best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Philip Mawhood

Dr P N Mawhood

c.c. Professor H G Thornburn

Could I please remind you about your subscription to the Committee — £9 sterling, payable to "P. N. Mawhood re IPSA R. C. 16" ?

Madrid
23.2.88
Tdé interesado.
Bcne Sr Ubao.

Head of Department: Professor K J Davey
Director, Development Administration: Dr M W Norris

Universität Osnabrück

Professor Rainer Eisfeld

Fachbereich
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Universität Osnabrück · Postfach 4469 · 4500 Osnabrück

Professor Jordi Solé Tura
Universidad de Barcelona
Facultad de Derecho
Av. Diagonal, 684
08034 Barcelona
SPANIEN

D-4500 Osnabrück,Postfach 4469
Albrechtstraße 28
Telefon (0541) 608-1
Telex 944887 uni os d

Ihr Zeichen	Ihre Nachricht vom	Mein Zeichen	Datum
			February 3,1988

Dear Professor Solé Tura:


Thank you for your letter of January 19 and enclosures, concerning a revision and eventual publication of papers from our Barcelona meeting.

I was, of course, happy to hear from you. Unfortunately, I am afraid the matter does not concern me directly; I did not present a paper, but participated as a discussant.

However, I hope that a publication will ensue from your efforts at preparing and chairing what I think was a very successful and stimulating conference.

With my best wishes,

Yours sincerely,



21+43.
98871 unb eprof. jordi sole tura
facultad de derecho
universidad de barcelona
avenida diagonal
e-barcelona 34, spain

meisel suggests deadline of 30 april, 1988 for receipt of revised papers here= suggest inclusion of sole tura introduction (revised), and d.l. seiler (in french), p. mawhood, a. korbonski, l.j. sharpe, t.o. hueglin, j. botella (if you are satisfied with it). we could still consider calvez and maybe vlachos if there is room (165 double spaced pages in all). please inform accepted authors immediately if you agree on the list. otherwise cable me your views.

thorburn
reply via new york (usa), tlx 961000. at 'enter mbx', type ale6741
textran feb 4, 1988 15:25

nnnn

98871 unb emmmm

I. P. S. A. International Political Science Association
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Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E-Barcelona 34
Spain

February 4, 1988

Dear Jordi,

Re: Publication of Papers from Barcelona Conference in IJPS

I just had a long talk with John Meisel on this question. Apparently we are able to get some of the papers to constitute an official issue of the Journal fairly soon. This will require that we get the papers, duly revised by the authors, to him in Kingston (Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6) by the end of April. This does not give much time to the authors for revision, but does give us an opportunity to see the papers in print in the not too distant future.

We have only about 165 pages, double-spaced to make up the issue, and this will necessitate dropping some of the papers. We agreed to include the following papers, which we both agreed were among the better ones:

J. Sole Tura, Introduction
D.L. Seiler, Peripheral Nationalism, between Pluralism and Monism
P. Mawhood, Governments and Pluralism in African States
A. Korbonski, Nationalism and Pluralism and the Process of Political Development in Eastern Europe
L.J. Sharpe, Fragmentation and Territoriality in the European State System
T.O. Hueglin, Better Small and Beautiful Than Big and Ugly: Regionalism, Capitalism and the Post-Industrial State
J. Botella Political Pluralism or Territorial Pluralism? "Old" and "New" Regions in Spain

Some of these papers are excessively long and, I believe, could be shortened by the authors. Here I think in particular of Sharpe and Korbonski.

.../2

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
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Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

There are one or two papers which are marginal and might be included if there is room. I think of J.Y. Calvez, Nations et Minorités dans l'enseignement récent de l'Eglise Catholique.

Professor Meisel suggested that he would like to have D.L. Seiler present his paper in French. He is a native French speaker and it's preferable to have some balance between the two languages of publication. As it stands, all the papers that I have listed are in English.

There is a somewhat delicate matter here as you no doubt noticed: the fact that the two Polish papers were not selected. I would like to hear your views on this and on others on which you may have an opinion with respect to inclusion or deletion. I think it is clear that the Kaplin paper should be dropped. I feel less strongly about the Vlachos one. It is in French and represents a country which one would like to give greater visibility to.

Could you please communicate immediately with the authors that I have indicated should be included, unless you yourself disagree. We really must meet the end of April deadline if we are to put our papers into the available timetable of publication of the Journal.

I think this is good news, but of course I regret the need to move so verry quickly now -- after such a long wait. Do let me know your views.

Yours sincerely,

B Gallagher for HG Thorburn

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

P.S. I cabled you today as follows:

"Meisel suggests deadline of 30 April, 1988 for receipt of revised papers here; suggest inclusion of Sole Tura Introduction (revised), and D.L. Seiler (in French), P. Mawhood, A. Korbonski, L.J. Sharpe, T.O. Hueglin, J. Botella (if you are satisfied with it). We could still consider Calvez and maybe Vlachos if there is room (165 double spaced pages in all). Please inform accepted authors immediately if you agree on the list. Otherwise cable me your views.

HGT:bg

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ Κ. ΒΛΑΧΟΣ
ΚΑΘΗΓΗΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ
ΑΚΑΔΗΜΑΪΚΟΣ
ΑΡΓΟΛΙΔΟΣ 68 - ΑΘΗΝΑ ~~680~~ 11523
ΤΗΛ. 69 16 497

Athènes, le 5 février 1988

Monsieur le Doyen
JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Av. Diagonal, 684-08034 BARCELONA
ESPAGNE

Monsieur le Doyen et Cher Collègue,

Je vous remercie de votre lettre du 19.1.88, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu m'informer sur les projets de publication des rapports présentés au Colloque de Barcelone.

Mon accord vous est acquis selon les termes de la proposition de Monsieur MEISEL. Il me sera, naturellement, possible d'apporter à mon texte les arrangements requis pour l'insertion dans la Revue de l'I.P.S.A.

Recevez, Monsieur le Doyen et Cher Collègue, l'assurance de mes sentiments très distingués et amicaux.

G. Vlachos

Prof. Georges C. Vlachos
de l'Académie d'Athènes.

CERAS
RECHERCHE
ET ACTION SOCIALES

14, RUE D'ASSAS - 75006 PARIS
TEL. 45 48 52 51

(jusqu'au 10 mars) 15 Hawthorn Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

le 10 février 1988

Cher ami,

Je suis aux States-Unis pour un enseignement. Je viens d'y recevoir votre correspondance. Vous me demandez si je suis prêt à mettre en point mon rapport de Barcelone aux conditions de l'IPSR.


Ma réponse est oui assurément quant à ma disponibilité. Cependant, j'aimerais mieux connaître les conditions de l'IPSR. S'agit-il de conditions de langue, de dimension, etc.? Je vous

Suis d'avance reconnaissant de toute information complémentaire à ce sujet.

Et je vous assure de mes sentiments dévoués et cordiaux,

V. Calvez

WESTON SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY RESIDENCE
15 Hawthorn Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138



Prof. Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho, U de Barcelona
Av. Diagonal 684
08034 BARCELONA

AIRMAIL

SPAIN

NUFFIELD COLLEGE

OXFORD OX1 1NF

Telephone: OXFORD(0865)278500
Direct Line 278570

18th February, 1988

Professor J.S.Tura,
University of Barcelona,
Facultad de Derecho,
Av. Diagonal,
684-08034 Barcelona,
Spain

Dear Professor Tura,

Thank you for your letter of January 19th and my profound apologies for the delay in replying.

I am quite willing for my contribution to the Barcelona Meeting of the Research Committee to appear, but it will need revision. Is is possible for either you or Hugh Thorburn to give a date when revised versions would be required.

Yours sincerely,

L.J.Sharpe

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, February 20, 1988.

Dear Prof.

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J. Sole Tura, "Introduction" / D.L. Seiler, "Peripheral Nationalism, between Pluralism and Monism" / P. Mawhood, "Governments and Pluralism in African States" / A. Korbonski, "Nationalism and Pluralism and the Process of Political Development in Eastern Europe" / L.J. Sharpe, "Fragmentation and Territoriality in the European State System" / T.O. Hueglin, "Better Small and Beautiful than Big and Ugly: Regionalism, Capitalism and Post-Industrial State" / J. Botella: "Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism? "Old" and "New" Regions in Spain". Some of this papers are excessively long and, I believe, could be shortened by the authors. Here I think in particular of Sharpe and Korbonski".

Prof. Thorburn suggests also the inclusion of the papers by profs. G. Vlachos and J.I. Calvez, but both conditioned to disponibility of room. In case of effective publication, it would be preferable to publish both -- and also the paper by prof. D.L. Seiler -- in French, to have some balance between the two languages of the publication.

This is the up-to-date information I have. Could you please let me know your views about the full matter and specially about your disponibility to revise your paper and send it before the end of April deadline ?

Yours sincerely

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, February 20, 1988.

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I have received a letter from prof. H.G. Thorburn dated on february 4, concerning the publication in IJPS of the papers of the Barcelona conference. He says as follows:

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JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

ADRECES PER ENVIAR LA CARTA.

Prof. A.KORBONSKI: University of California. Department of Political Science. LOS ANGELES, California 90024. USA.

Prof. L.J. SHARPE: Nuffield College, Oxford,OX1 1NF. Gran Bretanya.

Prof. Thomas O. HUEGLIN: Department of Political Science, Wilfred Laurier University,Waterloo,Ontario N2L 3C5 Canada.
Tel. (519) 884-1970

Prof. Daniel SEILER: 38, Chemin du Corgeon, CH-1095. Lutry.SUIZA. Tel. pers:4121-391204.
Institut de Science Politique, Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, Université de Lausanne. Avenue de l'Université,5 1005.LAUSANNE. Suiza. Tel.:(021) 44 42 40.

Prof. Georges C. VLACHOS: 68,r. Argolidos, ATHENES 11523.GRECIA.

Prof. P.N. MAWHOOD: Institute of Local Government Studies of the Department of Local Government and Development.
University of Birmingham .PO Box 363
Birmingham B15 2TT. GRAN BRETANYA.
Tel. 021-414.4970.

Prof.J.I. CALVEZ , CERAS, 14 rue d'Assas, 75006.PARIS, França
Tel. 45 48 52 51
(Adreça fins el 10 de març de 1988: 15 Hawthorn Street.Cambridge,Massachussets 02138,USA).

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, àtico, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

Development Administration Group

Institute of Local Government Studies
of the Department of Local Government and Development
The University of Birmingham
PO Box 363
Birmingham B15 2TT England

Cables: Inlogov Birmingham
Telex: 338938 SPAPHY G
Telephone: 021-414 ~~5089~~ 4970

pnm:aw

24 February 1988

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E - Barcelona 34
Spain

Dear Professor Sole Tura

Many thanks for your letter of 20 February regarding the publication of our Barcelona papers in the IJPS. The list that Hugh Thorburn proposes is thoroughly satisfactory in my view and includes all my preferences. I agree that it would be difficult to include the Vlachos and Calvez papers.

I can without difficulty send a revised version of my paper to Hugh - improved in minor respects but not substantially changed in length - by the end of April. This will be done unless any indications are sent to the contrary.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

Dr P N Mawhood

c.c. Professor H G Thorburn

Head of Department: Professor K J Davey
Director, Development Administration: Dr M W Norris

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, February 26 , 1988

Prof. H.g. Thorburn
Department of Political Studies. Queen's University.
Kingston. Canada K7L 3N6.

Dear prof. Thorburn,

I hope that you have received my previous letter, with the last developments of the IPSR papers. I'am writing you again to add a couple of questions.

The first concerns Prof. S. Ehrlich. I've just received a letter from him in which he takes for granted the publication of his paper and puts in our hands -- yours and mine -- the necessary arrangements to print it. I include a copy of the letter. It seems to me that we must make an effort to publish his paper and if we are short of pages I can renounce to publish my paper and appear only as your co-editor. Please try to convince prof. Meisel. I think that prof. Ehrlich, as Honorary Chairman of our Committee and as a worldly well-known political scientist must be in the list of our authors. But, at the same time, I think that we must tell him that we cannot take the responsability of "brushing" and arranging his paper and that we cannot publish it unless he himself accepts to revise it in due time, that is, till the end of april. If you agree with my proposal, please write him directly. If not, please give me an alternative. In any case, please let me know your opinion.

The second question concerns prof. D. Seiler. He phoned me yesterday and told me that he agrees with our proposal, but that he prefers to publish his paper in english, rather than in french. I understand that he has already published something about the same subject in french and that he wants it to be knowed by english speaking scientists. Besides, he has told me that he is short of time to translate it into french.

Please, cable or phone me about both questions.

Sincerely

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

Confidentially between ourselves, Professor Meisel said that he did not think that the Ehrlich and Kaplan papers were good enough to appear inIJPS ; I did not show him the Winczorek paper, for the same reason.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

26 Feb. 1988

Dear Jordi,

Your letter of Feb. 19 just arrived, and I was very pleased that you agreed to act as co-editor, and that you agree with the selection of papers agreed upon with Prof. Meisel. I agree that the deadline is very short, but we cannot do anything about it-- unless we simply decline, and lose our chance to have any of our papers included. Therefore let us persevere.

As you suggest I shall write to the authors too, to emphasize the importance of getting their papers in on time. I shall write Seiler asking him to have his paper published in French.

I agree that the matter of the Polish papers is delicate. However the reason we have editors is to make these difficult decisions. I think we are justified in choosing the papers we consider to be the best ones, and that is what we are doing. I cannot write to Prof. Ehrlich saying that his paper is not included because we have enough on Eastern Europe. That would suggest that his should be given preference over Korbonski, (who is American). Anyway he did not write about Eastern Europe. Therefere I prefer to let the situation speak for itself-- editors prerogative. He is experienced enough to understand that, and I am sure he would agree.

The case of Winczorek might be handled as you suggest-- since it does overlap with Korbonski's. I shall write to him explaining this to him.

I am surprised that you have only heard from Mawhood, Calvez and Vlachos. I do hope that the others have not made other plans for their papers. In any case I shall write to them and press for an answer, giving them the deadline of the end of March to let me know. If one or more fail to respond we can use the Calvez paper to fill in, and perhaps the Vlachos one as well.

What is the state of Prof. Botella's paper? He spoke from a brief summary, so I never saw a formal paper. However I thought we should include it because of the very interesting content, plus the need to include a substantive paper from the host country. Would you please be sure it is complete and up to standard.

Let us hope that the papers come in on time, and are suitably revised.

Sincerely,

Hugh Thorburn

P.S. Tell Fr. Calvez that the paper can remain in French--but inclusion depends on space availability.

This is the letter for the papers I'm sending.

I. P. S. A. International Political Science Association
A. I. S. P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
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G. VLACHOS (Athenai)
P. WINCZOREK (Warszawa)

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Catedratico de Derecho Politico
El Pedro de la Creu, 21
Atico, 1
Barcelona 34
Spain

February 26, 1988

Dear Professor Sole Tura:

I am writing to confirm that I have arranged with Professor John Meisel, Editor of the International Journal of Political Science (the publication of IPSA) that a selection of the papers from our Barcelona conference be published there. The problem is that there is very little time. The papers will have to be received by him by the end of April. The address is:

Professor John Meisel
Editor
International Journal of Political Science
c/o Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
K7L 3N6

Unfortunately we only have about 165 pages, double-spaced, and we would like to include about seven of the papers. This suggests that the average length should be about 23~~-1/2~~ pages in all, including notes.

I know these conditions are rather stringent, but then the opportunity is a very good one which I am anxious to take up. I ask you, therefore, to let me and Professor Sole Tura know before the end of March whether you are able to meet these conditions, and thereby have your paper printed. If we do not hear from you by then, we shall simply drop your paper in favour of one of the ones to which we have assigned lower priority.

I am very sorry to have to impose such stringent conditions upon you, but it is a matter of either doing this or losing our opportunity to have our papers published in the near future.

Professor Sole Tura, who is acting as co-editor of this issue, and I look forward to your cooperation. It will be good to see the papers in print.

Yours sincerely,

Encl.
HGT:bg

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
priv. (02) 672 38 89

Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

29 February 1988

Dean Jordi Solé Tura
Facultad de Derecho - Universidad de Barcelona
Av. Diagonal 684
Barcelona

Dear Dean Solé Tura:

Thank you for your letter of February 20 which I received today.

I am glad to hear that Professor Thorburn managed to get us some space in the International Journal of Political Science for the papers presented at your conference last June in Barcelona. I am greatly flattered for being invited to submit my paper for possible publication in IJPS.

I realize that my paper is too long and I see no difficulty in shortening it. Right now the paper, including footnotes, has 34 pages. As of now, I think I can reduce it to about 25 pages. I hope this would be acceptable: if not, please let me know. In any event, I shall be able to send the abbreviated paper to Thorburn by the end of April.

Thank you again for selecting my paper for publication.

Best regards,

Andrzej Korbonski

Andrzej Korbonski
Professor

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, March 1, 1988

Prof. L.J. Sharpe
Nuffield College
OXFORD OX1 1NF

Dear Prof. Sharpe,

Thank you for your letter of February 18. I hope that, meantime, you have received my letter of February 20, in which I think I answer some of the questions you raise.

As you see, the deadline for delivering the revised papers is the end of April. I think that it is a very effective and inchangeable deadline. You can see also that both prof. Thorburn and prof. Meisel suggest that you paper should be shortened, because of the limitation of pages at our disposition in the scheduled issue of IJPS.

Yours sincerely

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

Founded 1911

Wilfrid Laurier University *Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5. Telephone (519) 884-1970*

March 1, 1988

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal 684
E-08034 Barcelona 34
Spain

Dear Jordi:

Thanks so much for your two recent letters regarding the publication of our Barcelona papers. I am of course delighted that my paper has been considered to be included. I will revise as quickly as I can, and hopefully also shorten somewhat, and then send it off to Hugh Thorburn, with whom I have already spoken.

Personally, I would have preferred to see these papers published in Spain - in order to avoid the usual centrism of North American political science, of course. Maybe this is so because I have been secretly dreaming that one day I might find an opportunity to teach federalism, regionalism and political economy in Spain. But then there are so many young and excellent scholars in Spain now that they certainly don't need me. In any case I am very grateful that such a good opportunity was found so quickly, and I'll make every effort to submit my paper as well revised as possible.

Meanwhile I am looking forward to seeing you again in Washington.
Muchas gracias y cordiales saludos,

Thomas.

Thomas O. Hueglin
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science

TOH:hp
P.S. For your information I enclose one of my earlier pieces on regionalism.
Enc.

Regionalism in Western Europe

Conceptual Problems of a New Political Perspective

Thomas O. Hueglin

A conceptual discussion of regionalism in western Europe should bear in mind that we are confronted by a novel dimension of societal conflict unforeseen until recently by the analysis and prognoses of modern social science. Also, a new political perspective of territorial fragmentation can be observed in all advanced industrial democracies. One recent survey of regionalism in western Europe lists some fifty active regional movements,[1] while another account refers to no less than 187 ethnic activist associations in France alone.[2] A rapidly expanding body of literature has been focusing on ethnic conflict in the western world, territorial politics in industrial nations, the impact of center-periphery conflict on nation-building and spatial variations in politics, and the overall trends of decentralization in western democracies.[3] Critical observers have noted, however, that due to a centralist *Weltanschauung* both politicians and political scientists have been slow to recognize decentralization as a general trend. Consequently, they have failed to anticipate the impact of regional movements on politics in western Europe.[4]

Regionalism is used as a common denominator in order to understand such diverse and yet overlapping concepts as territoriality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic disparity as components of the same general phenomenon. The concept focuses on the objective existence of regional differences within and across the boundaries of nation-states and on the subjective perceptions of these differences. It is important to note that subjective perceptions, while often serving as the driving force of regional movements, may not accurately reflect objective conditions.[5] Regional differences can be political, economic, sociocultural, or, most likely, a combination of these. Regionalism can then be defined as the persistence of subnational and transnational differences, identities, and commitments. In the context of the modern centralized nation-state, the main characteristics of regionalism and its perception are geopolitical distance, sociocultural difference, and socioeconomic dependence.[6] It will be argued here that in these terms regionalism is an inevitable product and consequence of the uneven development of the modern capitalist state. Why, then, has the recognition of this fact been so late and reluctant?

The analytical endeavors of modern social science are much too focused on the explanation of existing sociopolitical phenomena and therefore lack a more anticipatory dimension. Lijphart cites an impressive list of reasons for this failure, with modernization and integration theories and their emphasis on the irreversible process of homogenization as the most plausible ones. Consequently, the conceptual efforts of catching up with anunexpected reality are described as a move from "falsified predictions" to "plausible postdictions".[7]

Apart from the persistence of modernization ideologies there is another major cause for

the reluctant recognition of the impact of regionalism on western politics. It has to do with the ideological contradictions of liberalism. As a doctrine of liberation, liberalism sets individuals free from the constraints of the traditional institutions and communities such as religion, ethnicity, and region. This is not only wishful thinking, but a blatant disregard of the contradictions on which liberal democracy and the welfare state are based. Postulating a general decline of the older group and conflict patterns in the age of consensus and affluence,[8] liberalism tended to ignore that it depended on "stable patterns of local, ethnic, religious, or class relationships" and that the present crisis of overload and ungovernability must probably be seen as a result of the liberal success in destroying these stabilizing relationships.[9]

It seems only logical that these older structures of community should be reemphasized when the efficacy of the liberal marketplace shows signs of decline. But recent efforts of conservative governments to unload, decentralize, and "reprivatize" must not be mistaken as a late recognition of the regionalist thrust in western politics. What these administrations seek is to unburden themselves from obligations which prevent them from rekindling the individualist entrepreneurial spirit of the postwar societies. They hope that this appeal of back-to-the-fifties will once again lead to an unhampered growth-generating mentality and action. Regionalism and localism, as new forms of territorial collective identity, constitute protest movements against such mentality and action. The irritations of modernization have aroused the very notions such modernization was supposed to overcome, and local or regional consciousness is being transformed into politically relevant action of a new kind.[10]

The difficulty in conceptualizing this new political perspective lies in a diversity which transcends ready macroanalytical explanation even when one looks only at the larger and politically organized regional movements. And yet it is the sheer quantitative dimension of European regionalism, as well as the "temporal parallelism" of this "continental political shift,"[11] which indicate that there must be some underlying rationale and common denominator. If regionalism and ethnicity were only "dormant"[12] during the liberal era of consensus and affluence, it must also be asked why they reemerged so massively at a time when the western world seemed to have come closer than ever to its desired goal of modernized homogenization.

But the essential question is yet another one. While conceding that regionalism bears some degree of legitimacy, many observers nevertheless tend to see it as a backward-oriented reaction against the defects of modernization and centralization, as a dependent variable of decreasing nation-state efficiency. Accordingly, the problem of regionalism should wither away with yet another effort to make the nation-state center more efficient. This ignores the possibility that regionalism may have become an independent variable, an irreversible process in itself which will shape the fate of western society and the nation-state at least for the foreseeable future. The essential question is one of authenticity: Is regionalism as a new political perspective a temporary phenomenon, maybe just a manifestation of a folklorist *Zeitgeist,* or is it a serious and lasting consequence of and challenge to the deficiencies of the declining nation-state and hence a new form of modernity?

Evidence and Explanation

The history of regionalism in Europe begins with the French Revolution. Until then territorial or dynastic conquest, the shifting of a region from one sovereign to another, had normally left most cultural, linguistic, and even political peculiarities untouched. The French Revolution, however, aimed at the suppression and outright destruction of such peculiarities in the name of individual liberation. It is still against the background of this "injection into politics of the notion of popular sovereignty" that ethnicity and regionalism are seen as "premodern" and incompatible with the pure form of the nation-state.[13] The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century then paved the way to socioeconomic homogenization as the productive foundation for the successful consolidation of the modern nation-state system. Success came faster where Jacobin centralism was already well established, as in France and Great Britain; it was retarded in the territories of the old Holy Roman Empire such as Germany and Italy, where the particularist tradition lasted longer.

Suppression and assimilation were nowhere entirely successful. Regional identities remained intact under the surface of Jacobinism. When time and circumstances allowed, regional movements became politically manifest.[14] Thus Catalan nationalism already surfaced in the nineteenth century due to early regional industrialization and the consequent support from a strong indigenous bourgeoisie. The Flemish quest for the ethnolinguistic federalization of Belgium dates from the early twentieth century and gained some momentum between the world wars. The movement may have drawn its main strength from the fact that the Flemings actually were the linguistic majority, but it lacked the support of Flemish elites who were "uniformly francophone."[15] After World War II regionalism also made some inroads in Italy. But here the creation of the various autonomous regions with special statute was not so much a result of regional economic or numerical strength as a calculus of the Italian state to avert the territorial claims of France, Austria, and Yugoslavia.[16]

Notwithstanding such instances of growing regionalism, the postwar European state system seemed to be moving closer than ever to the ordeal of complete national assimilation. Under the banner of economic rehabilitation and political consolidation the old restorative forces of nationalism could almost effortlessly call for societal unity. Franco's Spain decreed the prohibition of minority languages in public life, and even the Alsatians, victims for so long of the territorial struggle between France and Germany, finally seemed to accept their fate of "gallicization," in part because of the previous collaboration of some pro-German regionalist forces with Nazi Germany.[17]

It is in the context of this seeming victory of national assimilation that the recent rise of regionalism appears to be so unexpected. Given the large number and variety of its manifestations in contemporary Europe, it is almost impossible to grasp and systematize it entirely. However, in order to conceptualize its underlying rationale and common denominator, the delineation of a number of typical cases may suffice.

Delineation One of the most complete surveys of ethnic problems in Europe concludes that all ethnic groups currently lacking self-government yet strong enough to demand an improved political status live in the "time-honored nation-states" of Spain, France, and Great Britain.[18] These groups are the Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, Corsicans, and Welsh.

The movements of the Occitanians of southern France and the Galicians in northwestern Spain are considered too weak for linguistic and political emancipation. The Catalans and Scots, on the other hand, are listed as politically autonomous,[19] which is not to say that they are no longer salient forces of regionalism.

It seems plausible to base a conceptual discussion of regionalism in western Europe on the examples in these three countries. It is revealing that this variegated occurrence of mobilized ethnicity should take place in precisely those countries with the most centralist bias in historical development and political-administrative ambition. A discussion of similarities and dissimilarities will show, however, that ethnicity is not a sufficient basis to understand regionalism in Europe. If the number of people suffering from an incongruity between ethnic consciousness and political status has dropped to an all-time low of less than 2 percent,[20] it can hardly explain the fact that regionalism has come to dominate European politics to the degree it has. At least in the case of Spain it has affected the entire population. It will be suggested instead that, if the main emphasis of nation-state building has been on industrialization and modernization, this may be a better starting-point from which to examine regional problems. (A particularly intriguing and complementary question to be asked later is why West Germany, with its long particularist tradition, is today the only large territorial state in western Europe which is generally regarded as being free of any noticeable degree of regionalism.)

Spain The most dramatic case is Spain, where a bewildering array of regional claims and arrangements surfaced after Franco's death.[21] These claims and movements include not only the traditional linguistic minorities, but also Castilian-speaking regions like Andalusia, Aragon, and Asturia and even subregional areas like Valencia and the Balearic Islands, which are distinct from the rest of Catalonia only by some variation of dialect. The most obvious and historically successful case of regional resistance to national assimilation is in Catalonia, and it is generally agreed that it was early industrialization and modernization which accounts for this success.[22] Catalonia's nationalist and regionalist impetus did not so much come from a strong popular movement as from the early existence of a powerful bourgeoisie that resented the dominant political influence of the ruling center in Madrid.[23] An additional grievance was the massive immigration of a Castilian-speaking working force into the centers of Catalan industrialization which tightened the nationalist intransigence of Catalan elites. These immigrants were of a lower social and economic status but nevertheless spoke the hegemonic language of the political center.[24]

From this point of view the comparison with the Basque country is instructive. Early industrialization and modernization also took place there, but due to political and economic circumstances—forced centralization from Madrid and the loss of the American colonies—the Basque bourgeoisie split into a declining and increasingly ruralized segment radicalized by the retained memory of their "collective nobility"[25] and a hispanicized segment successfully linking itself to the prospects of a modernized Basque metal industry within a future Spanish national economy and market. Thus the principal attack of Basque nationalism was directed, not against Madrid, but against the new social and economic classes emerging inside the modernizing Basque community.[26] In comparison to Catalonia, then, the nationalist forces were at the same time weakened and radicalized.

While Catalonian and Basque nationalism clearly emanated from relative economic

strength and became mobilized in particular by the political-administrative discrimination of the Francoist state, the cases of Galician and Andalusian regionalism are different in nature. Economically the situation of Galicia is characterized by isolation and underdevelopment. Galician as a literary language disappeared after the 1400s and was revived only in the late nineteenth century. But then it was an effort of Galicia's literary elite, which found little or no support among the Galician bourgeoisie. Only in the 1960s did a "galicianization" take place; it was supported by the church and universities, eventually found its way into anti-Francoist and antibourgeois movements, and finally began to dominate politics in the 1970s.[27] It must not be overlooked, however, that Galician regionalism owes its success largely to the concessions pressed from the Spanish state by the other and much stronger peripheral movements in Catalonia and the Basque country.

This may be so also in the case of Andalusia, perhaps the most surprising case of Spanish regionalism and maybe the most important one for the future. But whereas the character and force of the autonomist movements in the three "historic regions"(so called because of their earlier autonomous status) can be related to the respective strength of their bourgeoisies and their commitment to the nationalist cause,[28] the situation in Andalusia is different. At stake here is the survival of a national Spanish party system. This may be surprising, as partisan support for regional autonomy is clearly less radicalized than in Catalonia or the Basque country.[29] But then the radicalism of demands is not necessarily the most important factor for the mobilization of regionalist aspirations. The success of the Andalusian regional party stems exactly from the fact that it is a "moderate party which does not demand truly radical reforms, let alone independence for Andalusia, possibly because the party knows that the Andalusian population would not be ready to follow."[30] There are other factors which may give Andalusians a crucial role in the further transformation of the Spanish state: numerically Andalusia's population equals that of Catalonia and the Basque country combined, and economically it is "currently the most dynamic region of Spain." Whereas the traditional industries in the Basque country and Catalonia are declining, Andalusia is "engaged in rapid economic growth." If this dynamic were to find expression in substantial support for the regional party in national elections, the chances of the main national parties "ever coming close to a majority of seats would ipso facto disappear."[31] While it is too early to test this possibility, there is yet another factor which makes it quite plausible. This is the grass roots character of the transformed political system: plans for autonomy must come from the regions and are then discussed and decided upon by the national parliament (Cortes). From this it follows that a strong regional party is indeed "the most obvious way by which such plans can be developed."[32] Though it is true that autonomy is ultimately granted from above and can also be withdrawn under certain conditions, it is nevertheless inappropriate to equate regionalization in Spain to the "model of devolution as practiced in Great Britain."[33] Beyond a formal comparative analysis, the evolution of the de facto sociopolitical forces in post-Franco Spain shows that the legitimacy of the Spanish state is now tied to a political structure which recognizes the creation and maintenance of "various territorial centres of political power" and that the Spanish state of the "autonomous communities" can be seen today as an "open state structure."[34] Success or failure of the democratic experiment in Spain has become inextricably tied to the causes of regionalism.

Great Britain Regionalization came to Spain as a process of democratization after a long

period of autocratic dictatorship. It may well be unique in scope and dimension. A brief look at Great Britain, however, does not seem to change the picture in principle. The discussion will focus on Scotland and Wales. For all practical purposes, Northern Ireland must be excluded as a case sui generis, especially for its overtones of religious cleavage "worn almost as a tribal badge."[35]

Like Catalonia and the Basque country, Scotland is in part heavily industrialized and on the whole rather overdeveloped by national comparison. But two factors are fundamentally different. One is the almost uninterrupted downward trend of Britain's economy from imperial heights at the turn of the century to the present. This trend hit Scotland the hardest, especially because its geoeconomic location provided few incentives for modernization and new investment. The second factor is the increasing centralization of economic ownership after World War II, the net effect of which "was the transfer of major economic decision making affecting Scotland to corporate headquarters in London and even in New York." In other words, "Scotland was becoming a branch-plant economy."[36]

The subsequent politicization of Scottish grievances during the 1960s and 1970s and the spectacular rise of the Scottish National Party between 1964 and 1974 must be seen in the context of unfulfilled promises, deepening grievances, and rising expectations. Mainly because of Scotland's importance as a regional battlefield for national party competition, home rule had been on the political agenda since the late nineteenth century. Whenever in opposition, national party leaders would promise devolution in order to improve their Scottish electoral chances. But when in office, nothing would be done as both major parties turned out to be "decidedly more decentralist when in opposition than when in government.[37] As grievances deepened with the general economic decline, they were perceived as an increasing discrepancy between Westminster's rhetoric about regional development and the actual situation. Thus, with the discovery of North Sea oil came the rising expectations of long-desired regional self-sufficiency and a new thrust toward separatism.[38]

What makes the Scottish case "unique" in the context of European regionalism is "the combination of a strong historical consciousness of separate identity with a complete disinterest in the development of a distinctive language."[39] Consequently, the electoral strategy of the Scottish National Party cannot draw upon the language factor, as regional parties can in the Basque country and Catalonia. The nationalist strategies in Scotland must demonstrate the general incompatibility between center and periphery and foucus on the antagonistic nature of this relationship.

Apparently the language/identity factor neither offers a general explanation for the mobilization of regionalist aspirations nor strongly correlates with nationalist and/or separatist movements and parties. This can be further demonstrated in the case of Wales, where the retention and revitalization of the Celtic language has been successful without altering its role as a minority language in the region. As a consequence, there is an incongruity between the linguistic and the political perception of that region, and conflict arises between the "culturalists," who mainly wish to preserve the language, and the "separatists," who want independence for the entire historical territory.[40] For the regionalist party, *Plaid Cymru,* the commitment to language preservation is a "two-edged sword" because electorally the party fails to attract those who do not speak the language but who are in favor of devolution.[41]

On the whole it seems that the electoral support of regionalist parties is an insufficient and even poor indicator of the regionalist potential. Committed to radical goals, regionalist parties can draw support only from a minority of those who are in favor of regionalization. From this it follows that the decline of the Scottish National Party and the defeat of the referendum on home rule in 1979 does not mean the end of Scottish regionalism. The referendum may have failed because the question posed was too simple for a complex situation and thereby could not find a sufficient number of committed supporters.[42] However, the major point for the future could be that the events of the 1960s and 1970s showed that "the British party system is vulnerable to this type of challenge."[43] The future will then be determined by the potential of further challenge and the responsive capacity of the nation-state system.

France France is a particularly instructive case of state responsiveness to the regionalist challenge. If it can be said that the success of the French Jacobin state was always paralleled and complemented by a high degree of tolerance for the various local cultures and collective memories[44] (the principally "benign" relationship between Scotland and England can be similarly described), then the recent effort of decentralization should be just another step in the same direction: "functional regionalism as the norm," only reluctantly accompanied by a "hesitation waltz" over an "authentic" decentralized development geared to the "sensibilization" of "*specificités locales.*"[45]

However, the hesitation waltz of decentralization has been accomplished by regionalist movements from below which have reached levels of mass support (Corsica) and radicalization (Corsica and Brittany) which can hardly be contained by functionalist sensibilization from above. Corsica is a particularly salient case because of its insular situation, and Brittany appears by and large to be similar to the Scottish and Welsh cases.[46] However, it is the rise of Occitanian regionalism which deserves particular attention here, precisely because it ranges at the lower end of both cultural and political-economic strength and mobilization.[47] What is obviously interesting in this case is not so much how it fares in comparison with others but that it is there at all. The evidence is surprising enough. In its widest sense Occitania comprises the entire south of France where the *langue d'oc* was once spoken. The area can hardly be defined geographically with exactitude and is divided linguistically by various dialects. As in the case of Galicia, the language ceased to exist as a major literary form after the Middle Ages. As in Galicia it was revived mainly by cultural elites.[48] Today there is a considerable self-consciousness among Occitanian elites about their language, and since the French state granted limited possibilities of school instruction in 1951 the number of voluntary students has been rising steadily.[49] What had been regarded derogatorily for centuries as a peasants' dialect has advanced to a new symbol of regional identity.

Occitania is a case of cultural regionalism with a low degree of politicization, expressed mainly through the revival of a nearly extinct language, whereas by comparison language has not been an issue at all in Scotland. Obviously, it is now time to reconsider the question of the underlying rationale and common denominator of regionalism.

Definitions The particularism of local cultures has always been one of the main characteristics of European civilization. Neither the age of absolutism nor the centripetal

thrust of the modern nation-state has been able to eradicate it. What is meant by a new phenomenon and political perspective, then, is its unexpected resurgence and potential for political mobilization and its capacity to make the nation-state responsive to its demands. This is also so in the case of Occitanian regionalism, not because it poses any existential threat to the French state, but because the state can no longer simply neglect its existence.

The recent literature has begun to change the popular notion of regionalism as something which mainly affects ethnic minorities living in peripheral or secluded and socioeconomically underdeveloped areas. Krejci, for example, links the salience of ethnic problems in Europe to a national consciousness based on cultural (language) and political (historical tradition and socioeconomic system) factors. But because these political factors are identified with formal political status, he is led to an unconvincing differentiation of cases: Basque nationalism before 1978 appears to be mobilized only by a cultural-linguistic consciousness.[50]

Esman more explicitly links problems of ethnicity to those of industrialization. Modern rationalization concentrates opportunity at the center, whereas the communications revolution makes peripheral backwardness apparent. Carried mainly by a newly educated middle class and strongly supported by the youth, a new "cultural authenticity" questions and demystifies the centralized state. However, the notion of cultural authenticity remains pale and especially unrelated to the defects of industrialization. The idea of peripheral liberation from outright and deliberate dependency ("internal colonialism") is dismissed as "dramatizing" left rhetoric, and repression is seen only as one of several possible responses of the state, not as a prior cause of regionalism.[51]

The deliberate repression of peripheral aspirations by a dominant center is Hechter's explanation of internal colonialism in Britain.[52] Center-periphery relations are conceptualized as a built-in mechanism of perpetual dependency and material exploitation of the sociocultural periphery. Hechter's approach has been widely criticized as too narrow in general and too simplistic particularly in the case of Britain. It tends to neglect the relations between central and peripheral elites and to simplify the intricate networks of center-periphery political participation and interdependence. Here Galtung's model of structural imperialism can still serve as a valid starting-point for the explanation of such center-periphery elite relationships by means of cooptation and polarization of the peripheral society.[53] But the dependency approach must be considerably differentiated in order to fit the complex situation in modern industrialized nation-states. As Nairn has shown, the situation of Scotland within the United Kingdom is rather one of industrial "overdevelopment."[54] Similarly, it was the immigration flow into the already industrialized centers of Catalonia and the Basque region which first created or at least increased socioethnic tension. However, when not merely conceived of as a model of economic dependence but of political domination as well, Hechter's model of internal colonialism as a model of "relative underdevelopment"[55] remains important for the understanding of regionalist mobilization.

The most extensive and recent attempt to provide such an extended definition of the "politicization of peripheral predicaments" is that of Rokkan and Urwin.[56] Peripheral mobilization can draw upon territorial, cultural, and economic resources, and it is important that the incentive for mobilization can be triggered by any of them. Then two "catalysts" are introduced, the "diffusion of democratic principles" and a "process of socio-economic change through the modification of capitalism towards the welfare state." A first wave of

mobilization arose from the nineteenth-century democratic and industrial revolutions and eventually led to universal suffrage and education. A second wave arose "more specifically from a combination of economic discrepancies and the more rapid tempo of economic change after 1945.[57] It resulted in a degree of functional centralization and standardization which was opposed to the liberal democratic principle of individual (and group) self-determination. But again, while this is certainly the most extensive and convincing treatment of regionalism, one question at least remains open. If western capitalist societies are "always ungovernable" because of this incompatibility between the functional requirements of their economies (centralization) and their underlying norms and values (plurality), and if the capitalist system is therefore "confronted constantly with the dilemma of having to abstract from the normative rules of action and the meaningful relations between subjects without being able to disregard them,"[58] then why now?

Offe's explanation is similar to Lijphart's. According to Lijphart, it should not be asked why regionalism reappeared so suddenly, but why it had been dormant so long. His answer is that it was temporarily displaced by more salient conflicts.[59] Offe's answer is that the general phenomenon of nation-state ungovernability was temporarily displaced by the "favourable circumstances associated with a long wave period of economic prosperity prior to the mid 1970s."[60]

However, regionalism began to spread before that, from the 1960s onward, and has often been associated since with the growth of postmaterial values made possible by the age of affluence.[61] Again it seems plausible to distinguish two "waves" of postmaterial mobilization. The first one coincided indeed with unprecedented economic growth, although this growth by no means was spread evenly or reached all areas. Scotland, for example, was just then struggling under the general decline of the British economy. A second wave then arose from relative scarcity in the aftermath of the oil and world economic crises. It was under such conditions of imminent or perceived scarcity that the discovery of sudden opportunities—for example, the North Sea oil—reinforced autonomist forces and their credibility.

Given its dominant structural and legal powers, it does not necessarily follow that the nation-state should dramatically lose its capacity to contain these forces successfully for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, if the nation-state is definitely caught between internal structural contradictions and international constraints, the problem of regionalism will hardly wither away either. It will become an authentic part of the modern industrialized world.

Authenticity Practically all recent definitions of regionalism are more or less tied to the spatial problems arising from industrialization. However, there is considerable dissent as to whether regionalist movements are backward-oriented and traditionalist reactions against modernity and its defects or part of the modernization process itself. On the one hand, regionalism is described as the "resurgence of tribal sentiments"[62] and as part of a rightist "backlash" politics.[63] On the other hand, it is also identified as a new leftist strategy, linked to the new social movements and arising from peripheral forms of anticapitalist struggle.

What puzzles many observers is this paradigmatic change on the left. Ever since the French Revolution, regionalism had been regarded as provincialism, as a feudal relic impeding the democratic goals of equality and participation. But when the demerits of the

centralized bourgeois intervention and welfare state became more and more obvious, the political left—or rather its non-Fabian faction—rediscovered the province as a new basis of emancipation. Often this rediscovery was interpreted as a disillusioned retreat of socialism into a reactionary kind of neo-Rousseauism.[64] But only when the belief in the further and basically unlimited progress of the capitalist growth system is unshattered can regionalism be interpreted as a reactionary resistance against centralization. The shortcomings of centralization are then understood as merely temporary problems of inefficient organization. Misunderstanding the present crisis of progress as a crisis of means and not of ends, those who denounce regionalism treat it as a rejection strategy against possible further progress and as a historicist territorialization of lost identities.[65]

Lipset wonders why the new backlash movements are so weak in comparison with the rightist mass movements between the two world wars.[66] One important answer is that the (fascist) interwar movements wanted to (and did) capture the center. Today this may be so in the case of a new "moral majority" but not in the case of regionalism and the new issue movements. As sociologists have asserted, these movements are characterized by a new kind of "marginality" indicating a process of fundamental societal change. This new marginality is no longer perceived as a deficit status in the societal macrosystem (as failed integration) but offensively practiced as an authentic subcultural status and new collective identity.[67] It no longer aims at acculturation but instead at subcultural fragmentation. Accordingly, the strategies of such movements are directed against the very dynamic on which the success of the modern nation-state was built.

It is in this sense that regionalism cannot be understood apart from the effects of modernization on advanced industrial democracies. The spatial aspect of these effects is overwhelmingly described as center-periphery disparity. But as the earlier delineation of cases has shown, peripherality is by no means synonymous with underdevelopment. Rokkan and Urwin define peripherality as "distance, difference and dependence." Peripheries depend on one or more centers with regard to "political decision-making," "cultural standardization," and "economic life." Thus peripherality includes both a horizontal dimension of spatial asymmetry and a vertical dimension of socioeconomic and political interaction characterized by central control. However, peripherality cannot be understood without its counterpart, centrality. "Minimally defined as privileged locations within a territory," centers are characterized by a vertical pattern of social interaction. They control "a disproportionately greater share of the total communication flow in the system than any alternative location." The emphasis on communication is crucial to the understanding of the problem of center and periphery. While the distribution of primary, secondary, and even tertiary economic activities in modern and complex industrial societies can be concentrated or spatially separated, decentralized, and regionally allocated, it is a fourth or "quaternary" sector of communication which is a "more cogent indicator of centrality." This quaternary sector covers "all the agencies responsible for the registration and diffusion of decision, orders, instructions and information across a wide territory."[68]

From this perspective regionalism appears as a protest movement against political-administrative and socioeconomic centrality. It is not so important whether its goals are sociocultural autonomy, political federalism, or outright separatism, whether its driving force is a small intellectual elite or politically organized party, nor whether its motives are predominantly cultural, economic, or political.[69] The common characteristic of all

peripheral regions is their position with regard to the overarching system of centrality.[70] Thus the spectacular rise of western European regionalism does not derive its authenticity from the degree of organized political salience—let alone from success—but from its potential for breaking up the historical mode of centralized integration and peripheral dependency.

If the empirically relevant common denominator of regionalism is its anticentralism, the underlying rationale of its dynamic is fragmentation. Again, the authenticity of regionalism as a fragmentizing force in advanced industrial democracies does not so much stem from its capacity—or lack of capacity—to organize mass mobilization, but from the stability of subcultural collective identity.[71] Its rationale is not the attempt to impose an alternative set of postmaterial values on the social system, but the establishment of value differentiation as a strategy against the selective responsiveness of systemic centrality. Regionalism, in this conceptual context, can be seen as one important step in the direction of a generally more fragmented type of political accommodation in postindustrial societies.

Conceptual Reorientation

Most extant explanations of regionalism focus on ethnicity, uneven socioeconomic development, and territorial/political peripherality. They are unsatisfactory, for the most part, because they fail to explain what exactly set these peripheral predicaments in motion. Ethnicity and language can hardly explain why regional identities would become salient exactly at a moment when ethnic minorities had almost ceased to differ from their majoritarian mass culture surroundings.[72] Moreover, defining region by means of ethnicity suggests that there is something like a natural, or even biological, ethnic identity, an assumption which might pick up a racist connotation too easily, especially under conditions of conflict.[73] When exclusively defined *par la langue*, on the other hand,[74] the concept of ethnicity can hardly account for the rise of something like the Occitanian movement, nor for the autonomist aspirations of Andalusia. In Occitania the revival of an almost extinct variety of local dialects probably helped to stir up more general and diffuse resentment of the subordination of southern France to Paris and the north, and in the case of Andalusia there is no language which could be reactivated. Language also in not an issue in Scotland. Where it is, it should probably be regarded as a means to other ends.

These ends are now commonly explained in socioeconomic terms. But while the "unevenness" of the "tidal wave of modernization"[75] goes a long way in explaining particular regionalist reactions against centralist national policymaking, as in Andalusia or in Scotland during the 1950s and 1960s, it must nevertheless be differentiated. A study of the correlation of regionalism and industrial development in 1975 showed that regionalism and anticentralism in the European Economic Community were most pronounced in those areas that had already attained some degree of modernization,[76] whereas the poorest and predominantly agrarian regions sided with the industrialized centers, showing considerable faith in centralist national problem-solving.[77] Hence the mere factor of unevenness does not explain regionalist mobilization sufficiently. If the most underdeveloped regions show the fewest signs of anticentralism, then this may be due to a general condition of apathy and/or to the lack of support from peripheral elites, as in Galicia. Mobilization may occur, on the

other hand, when elites seek benefits from a higher degree of regional autonomy once the process of industrialization is underway, as perhaps in nineteenth-century Catalonia, or especially when some dramatic economic change improves the peripheral opportunity structure, as in the case of the oil discovery off the Scottish shores. But it is language and ethnicity which must account for the difference between the anticentralist bias of the Catalan industrial elite and the centralism of its hispanicized Basque counterpart. Regional mobilization, then, is a "question of inconsistency between economic strength/potential and cultural status."[78]

Generally speaking, the phenomenon of uneven development in the process of modernization (which is a rather constant factor of capitalist development) does not seem to correlate very well with the epochal rise of regionalism. Further explanation must be found in causal factors which are more specifically linked to the socioeconomic turbulences of that epoch. The substantial change in the structure of the international system, the decline of the nation-state's regulatory capacities, and the impact of the world economic crisis are such factors. It appears that the rise of regionalism is an integral part of the general crisis of the modern centralized welfare state.

Challenges to Centrality The traditional role of the nation-state as the sovereign guardian of the people's security and economic interests has been challenged to a hitherto unknown degree since World War II. The threat of global nuclear war and the polarization of military blocs have generally reduced the potential and perception of national security, whether in time of crisis or of détente.[79] Likewise, global economic interdependence and European integration both have lowered the scope of what national governments can do. An "open international economy, one with low tariff barriers and free movement of capital and labor, reduces the economic functions played by the existing state, thereby encouraging peripheral nationalisms."[80] For the same reason, the process of European economic integration may have exacerbated peripheral mobilization, in part because the Community's promises of substantial regional equalization remain unfulfilled,[81] but also because the European nation-states have become more centralized while at the same time increasingly less sovereign and more dependent on Community regulations. So it is a mixture of uneven development, economic interdependence, and the adverse political effects of incongruent national and supranational economic integration which move complex industrial societies towards peripheral disintegration.[82]

Parallel to the incongruence of national centralization and regional/global interdependence, national centers have also become weaker internally both in absolute terms and relative to growing peripheral strength, sometimes induced by the central policymaking process itself. It has been pointed out that the peripheral revolts in Britain were "increased by the declining legitimacy and effectiveness of the post-imperial center."[83] And the decentralist trends which developed alongside centralization and are, "paradoxically, also a product of the centralization of society and the state machine"[84] have strengthened communities, localities, and regions, as the "proliferation of new agencies and programs" created a new localism based on "the effects of technocracy."[85] Local spending has increased overproportionately in most western countries.[86] This does not necessarily mean that a peripheral financial erosion has not taken place, especially when local spending depends on central transfers, and peripherality must indeed be seen as the lack of control

over the communicative or quaternary sector. But the decentralization of such spending functions can certainly contribute to the formation of regional and local identity, because people tend to identify authority with those agencies from which fiscal resources flow most directly. This is why the regionalization process is Spain must be seen as a de facto irreversible process, even though regional autonomy is not guaranteed by a federal constitution. The same can be said for France, where decentralization as a calculus "from above" has nevertheless sharpened regional consciousness.

These processes of center-periphery turbulence became exacerbated by the generally accelerated pace of economic change and by the deepening and persistence of the world economic crisis. Rapid economic and technological change particularly affected the spatial distribution of "activities, population, and resources." However, what may have begun in the postwar decades of consensus and affluence as a general "perspective of a fluid, malleable world environment that could be molded to obtain a new order with greater justice and more equality amongst people or between regions,"[87] turned sour for the peripheries with the growing perception of economic crisis. While growth and prosperity lasted, "quiet revolutions" may have occurred, as in Quebec, which aimed at increasing the regional share in a generally growing pie.[88] It was after the mid 1970s, when the pie was beginning to shrink under the impact of the world economic crisis, that some regionalist demands became nastier and destabilizing. Again, this is a matter of the particular opportunity structure, as some national economies (Britain) declined faster that others, some regions (Scotland, Andalusia) possessed a better internal opportunity structure than others, and some nation-states were more responsive to regional demands by granting some degree of decentralization (France) or were pushed to wholesale regionalization (Spain). In all cases, the character and dynamic of nation-state politics have been changed, and regional identities have become a new and lasting political perspective.

Regional Identity Observers of the new politics outside the traditional nation-state institutions have pointed out that "with the end of growth . . . the irreducible issues of priority, value, choice, and conflict lay once again exposed." At the same time, however, they stressed that the "protest movements everywhere preceded the economic crisis."[89] Two important extensions of these observations seem necessary. First, if it was the successful liberal system of growth which allowed for the formation of new collective identities and for the fragmentation of the traditional liberal-pluralist interest structures, then it may now be the persistence of economic crisis and turbulence which will account for the lasting quality of such fragmentation. Second, given the center-periphery syndrome of the capitalist mode of production in advanced industrial societies, it can be predicted that regionalist grievances and the fragmentizing structures of organized interests will become increasingly reinforcing.

The importance and authenticity of western European regionalism must therefore be seen in the context of the increasing fragmentation of highly complex industrial democracies. Where corporatism, consociationalism, and the new corporative federalism[90] can be seen as functional and centripetal answers to the challenge of governance in highly complex industrial states, regionalism appears to be the complementary territorial and centrifugal aspect of the same phenomenon. The authenticity of regionalism does not lie in its claims of

historical identity, but in the creation of new identities challenging the centralized system of governance and administration.

In so far as regionalism seriously envisages a new set of political values in which the traditional role of the nation-state is reduced to that of one subsystem among several, the problem of left- or right-wing orientation also becomes obsolete. Until now the crucial question has been whether the state is to be used as the central enforcer of a liberal and self-regulating or of a planned and interventionist economy, that is, in what way and to what ends the centralized state is to be instrumentalized. The question now is whether and when it should be used and instrumentalized at all. This explains the fact which is so alarming to most party politicians that the various new movements and organizations can encompass such a wide range of political and ideological diversity. The dividing line is no longer a perspective from left or right, but from above or below.

At one end, seen from above, regionalism appears as some sort of disturbed systems integration due to economic crisis and scarcity. In this view regionalism is an overreaction to the problems of overloaded government. Strategic responses aim at a measure of decentralization or devolution to canalize and pacify the centrifugal forces of regionalism; at the same time they aim at an even more sophisticated concentration of power at the center which will reestablish system stability and economic growth. In the end, societal centrifugalism is to be met with political centripetalism.[91]

At the other end, seen from below, regionalism is viewed as the legitimate revolt against the permanent demerits of centralization. Fragmentation is no longer seen as a consequence of the temporary mismanagement of the system, but as a product of the system itself. Regionalist systems rejection may very well be triggered by the disappointment over unfulfilled expectations, and it may also be that initially it is manifested in old-fashioned and folkloristic self-identification. But this may only be the least common denominator of solidarity against the shortcomings and alienations of socioeconomic systems dependency, that is, a wrong means to the right ends.[92]

West Germany If regionalism is seen as an inevitable consequence of the defects of the centripetal politics in advanced capitalism, something must be said about West Germany at this point because it is generally regarded as one of the most successful models of capitalist concentration in the postwar western world.[93] Reasons given for the apparent absence of regionalism include the lack of socioethnic fragmentation in postwar West German society, the homogenizing success of the postwar German "economic miracle," and especially the reconstruction of West Germany as a federal state. Whereas sociopolitical and economic discontent spawned regionalist and federalist movements in almost all unitary state systems in western Europe, it led to the opposite demand for more centralization in the case of the German federation.[94]

The facts seem to follow this argument only in part. The postwar reconstruction of West Germany indeed put a strong emphasis on a federal separation of powers. But unlike other federations, where this separation consists of an enumeration of legislative powers at the two levels of government, Germany followed a pattern already established under Bismarck: most legislative powers were concentrated at the federal level, and the provinces (*Länder*) retained most executive and administrative functions. Nevertheless, the *Länder* possessed considerable competence, for example fiscal and cultural autonomy. When economic

recession hit West Germany for the first time in the mid 1960s, however, this competence was substantially restrained by a constitutional reform which reduced fiscal autonomy and established a tight system of federal-*Land* cooperation known as "interlocked federalism" and pertaining to almost all crucial policy areas.[95]

To argue that regional protest did not occur because the Federal Republic is "a country without a center"[96] is therefore misleading. There is a political center, and because its policymaking process requires the permanent cooperation of all federal subsystems one might conclude that it is the centripetal system of interlocked federalism which accounts for the lack of regionalism. The *Länder* are tied into central decision-making through the second chamber (Bundesrat). However, given the high degree of spatial homogeneity, they have rarely pursued regional interests, and the Bundesrat must rather be seen as an additional site of federal policy formation. In particular, it is the highly centralized party system which obstructs the original federal constitutional intention to a considerable degree.[97] And when divergent majorities existed in the two chambers of federal parliament, as during the social-liberal coalition government in the 1970s when the Christian Democrats controlled a majority in the Bundesrat, federal policymaking became inflexible and conflictive.

This deadlock may have been one of the causes for the spectacular rise of single issue movements and the Green Party in Germany. Interlocked federalism failed to address the grievances of the various segments of a West German society increasingly affected by structural and environmental crises. Under the impact of these crises the form and content of politics became incongruent.[98] If the earlier hypothesis, that regional grievances and the fragmentizing structures of organized interests tend to become reinforcing and complementary under the conditions of advanced capitalism, is correct, then a growing tendency towards regional tension can also be predicted for West Germany. Signs are already visible, such as the regional/sectoral crisis of the German steel industry,[99] the growing importance of regional prime ministers and party leaders like Spaeth in Baden-Württemberg and Lafontaine in the Saarland, and the imminent variegation of regional party coalitions through the regional success of the Green Party.[100]

Towards a Theory of Political Fragmentation

The most obvious factor in the context of regionalism as a new political perspective must be seen in societal fragmentation and political centrifugalism. As Haas observed, the turbulences of economic stagnation, the rising costs of energy, the ecology, and social discontent will necessarily result in the increasing obsolescence of centralized "institutional tidiness" when the stabilizing effects of spillovers can no longer be expected to spread over the total spatial as well as functional expanse of a given economy.[101] Policymaking in highly complex and fragmented socioeconomic systems will result in the "untidy" uncertainties of fragmentation and asymmetry.

These last and self-invalidating findings of regional integration theory in the context of European integration may also apply to the nation-state systems in so far as they show the same symptoms. The traditional nation-states, as well as the European Community, were primarily designed as homogenized market systems for growth accumulation. Under the auspices of a steady-state economy, the myth of centralized efficiency may very quickly

crumble. Regionalism may well play a crucial and lasting role in the politics of fragmentation. As an attempt to determine the role of regionalism in the context of highly complex industrial societies, the simple formula of "fragmentation followed by consolidation followed by differentiation"[102] will hardly do.

Association As Galtung pointed out with a good deal of anticipatory insight, there are three basic dimensions of human interaction: territorial integration based on neighborhood affinity, organizational integration based on hierarchical interdependence and division of labor, and associational integration based on horizontal cooperation and social affinity. These different dimensions are, of course, dialectically interconnected and coexisting. Thus neighborhood affinity becomes challenged by the dynamics of socioeconomic organization; the social conflict created by such organization leads to the formation of associations of mutual interest and social affinity; and the fragmentizing effects of such associational cleavage may then lead back to a revitalization of territorial unity.[103]

In the case of regionalism, one might be inclined to assume automatically that it must be some sort of territorial revitalization. In that case the criticism of regionalism as an antiquated and narrow-minded recourse to a fragmented territorial identity would be justified as, for example, in the case of Occitania. Taking into consideration, however, that the notion of territorial integration and identity is for the most part occupied by the nation-state and that of organizational integration by the centralized economic system, one can raise the question as to whether the new phenomenon of regionalism must be understood as a basically associational movement. Aside from the few cases of nationalist separatism, the regionalist claims for autonomy seem to be not so much indicators of territorial fragmentation alone, but of peripheral, that is, spatial as well as sectoral, interest fragmentation. Regionalism thus becomes part of the general problem of societal fragmentation in highly complex industrial democracies, as it is presently being discussed mainly (and from above) in terms of neocorporatism, consociational democracy, and societal federalism.[104] As such, regionalism acquires the dimension of a political perspective (from below) which lies clearly beyond that of folklore or historicism.

Organized Social Complexity Thus what seems to make little sense as an isolated phenomenon in the context of European, or even global, socioeconomic and political crisis, and what as such could hardly be explained other than in terms of an almost irrational outbreak of a "small-is-beautiful-Zeitgeist," appears to make a lot more sense when looked at as one of the relevant factors in the transition of complex to highly complex systems under the conditions of economic crisis and growing relative scarcity.[105]

As we have seen, it is not sufficient to explain regionalism in terms of these conditions alone. Whereas it may be a general phenomenon that regional discontent arises over the diminishing spillovers in a centralized system due to scarcity, such cases as those of Scotland and Catalonia at least demonstrate that this cannot be the only cause of regional turbulence.

And indeed it has been suggested that the deeper reason for systems instability in modern industrialized nation-states lies in their degree of complexity itself.[106] Especially when trying to cope with the imminent turbulences of scarcity, hierarchically centralized systems pass from the complex to the highly complex stage of organization, and there the efficiency

benefits of centralized systems control and regulation may be superseded by the costs of system maintenance. The resulting financial and administrative impasse may then trigger revolts against the system where the demerits are felt most strongly, at the periphery.

Hence it is suggested for the successful administration and regulation of highly complex systems to replace hierarchical organization by nonhierarchical, interdependent, and "reticular" forms of interaction among the horizontally associated subsystems and thus to reduce rationally the state's role of sovereign exclusivity to one subsystem among several.[107] The result would be a nonhierarchical (and hence noncybernetic) form of systems regulation characterized by a modified form of efficiency: whereas the costs of decision-making would inevitably be increased, those of decision implementation might become considerably lowered. In an on-coming age of turbulence this might be the only viable form of efficiency left. It can work only when societal complexity is perceived and organized as an "independent variable" and no longer as a dependent function of hierarchical nation-state efficiency.[108]

With corporatism, federalism, and consociationalism deeply incorporated into the hierarchical game, regionalism may indeed prove to be a particularly promising mode of reticular interest intermediation. In the context of European integration, theorists and political engineers have expressed hope that the present stalemate may be overcome by regionalist efforts.[109] However, the nation-states are already aware of this, and, as much as they have tried to channel the centrifugal forces of interest association by means of a "politics of concentration,"[110] they are now trying to channel the forces of regionalism by either granting some degree of decentralized autonomy (as in Italy) or by putting the regionally voiced interests on the agenda of their centralized party systems (as in Spain and France). The outcome of this struggle between the state's "trick" of centralized concentration and "society's ruse" of horizontal cooperation and autonomization[111] is still undecided.[112] That this much can even be said may be taken as significant progress along the road to the final demystification of the nation-state and to the end of hierarchical organization in a postcompetitive world.

NOTES

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1st March 1988

Professor J.S. Tura,
Catedratico de Derecho Politico,
El Pedro de la Creu, 21,
atico 1º,
Barcelona 34,
SPAIN

Dear Professor Tura,

Thank you for your letter about the publication of last year's conference papers on Pluralism. I will have a look at my paper with a view to revision and forward it to John Meisel at Queens by late April.

Yours sincerely,

L.J.Sharpe

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1.3.88

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E - Barcelona 34
Spain

Dear Professor Sole Tura

Many thanks for your letter of 23 February and cheque for £9 sterling.

I enclose copies of the IPSA documents dated 1.12.87 about the Congress. You should note that the Registration Form and Hotel Registration Form were issued in 5 (differently coloured) copies; since you do not have the originals, you might do well to post them off in quintuplicate photocopies!

Bank drafts have to be made out to APSA ~~and~~ not IPSA. I have not sent you any details of IPSA funding, since I am sure this would not be available to a well-established European university. "3 year members of IPSA" means those who pay their subscription in advance at a Congree for the whole period up to the next Congress.

Best wishes

Yours sincerely

Dr P Mawhood

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December 1, 1987

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
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Association Internationale de Science Politique

International Political Science Association

Quatorzième Congrès Mondial, Washington, DC, Etats-Unis
28 août - 1 septembre 1988

Fourteenth World Congress, Washington, DC, USA
August 28—September 1, 1988

HOTEL INFORMATION FOR THE XIVTH IPSA WORLD CONGRESS

The Sheraton-Washington Hotel

The Sheraton-Washington Hotel is the headquarters hotel for the XIVth IPSA World Congress, the location of all program sessions. For the convenience of Congress participants and attendees, a block of guest rooms has been reserved at special rates for IPSA members. (Please see the hotel form for the special rates.) Furthermore, reservations at the Sheraton-Washington may be extended beyond the World Congress to accommodate your stay during the APSA Annual Meeting to be held at the nearby Washington Hilton.

The Sheraton-Washington Hotel also offers a special rate for IPSA members traveling with their families. Children under the age of 18 may stay free in their parents room (limit of four people per room).

The Windsor Inn or Embassy Inn

A limited number of rooms have been reserved at the Windsor Inn and Embassy Inn at special rates for IPSA members. (Please see the hotel form for the special rates.) All rooms have private baths and complimentary breakfasts. Please note that the Inns **are not** designed with any handicapped facilities. Both Inns are located on 16th Sreet, N.W. approximately two miles from the headquarters hotel.

Deposit:

In order to hold your hotel reservation a deposit is required. The deposit must equal one night's stay plus a 10% D.C. sales tax and $1.00 per room, per night occupancy tax. A bank draft or a valid VISA, MasterCard, American Express, Diners Club or Carte Blanche are acceptable for the deposit. **Without a deposit your hotel reservation cannot be guaranteed.** All payments must be in U.S. dollars.

Deadline:

Hotel reservation and deposit must be received at the APSA no later than June 1, 1988.


Transportation:

The Sheraton-Washington Hotel is easily reached by the Metro subway. The Woodley Park-Zoo subway station is a short distance from the Sheraton-Washington Hotel's entrance.

All of the hotels may be reached from the area's three major airports by taxi. The approximate fares per person or family are:

Washington National Airport: US $10
Dulles International Airport: US $30
Baltimore-Washington International Airport: US $35

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FORMULAIRE D'INSCRIPTION POUR LOGEMENT /HOTEL REGISTRATION FORM

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L'Hôtel principal pour le XIVème Congrès Mondial de l'AISP et l'endroit de toutes les sessions du programme.

VEUILLEZ RESERVER:

(cochez un) **Tarif membre de l'AISP**

- ☐ Chambre individuelle *(un lit/une personne)* ..... US $60
- ☐ Chambre avec grand lit *(un lit/deux personnes)* ..... US $80
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jour mois

Heure d'arrivée: _____

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LE WINDSOR INN ou EMBASSY INN

Logements supplémentaires pour le XIVème Congrès Mondial de l'AISP; non équipés pour les handicapés.

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- ☐ Chambre individuelle *(un lit/une personne)* ..... US $50
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Heure d'arrivée: _____

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jour mois

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Un acompte est exigé afin de retenir une chambre. L'acompte (seulement en dollars U.S.) doit être égal au tarif pour une nuit plus la taxe locale de 10% et la taxe de résidence de $1.00 U.S. par chambre. Le service est inclus dans le prix de la chambre. Un chèque bancaire ou carte de crédit valable VISA, MasterCard, American Express, Diners Club ou Carte Blanche peuvent être acceptés pour l'acompte. Aucune réservation ne peut être garantie à moins d'avoir été confirmée par un acompte.

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La réservation et l'acompte doivent être reçus au plus tard le 1er juin 1988. (cochez un)

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- ☐ Diners Club
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(numéro de compte)

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Date d'expiration mois année

THE SHERATON-WASHINGTON HOTEL

Headquarters hotel for IPSA XIVth World Congress and location of all program sessions.

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- ☐ Personal check
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- ☐ Carte Blanche
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(account number)

_____
Expiration date month year

Saludos,
Thomas.



DR. THOMAS O. HUEGLIN
Associate Professor of
Political Science

WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
WATERLOO, ONTARIO, CANADA N2L 3C5
(519) 884-1970 EXT. 2294

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March 10, 1988

Professor Hugh Thorburn
Department of Political Science
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 3N6

Dear Hugh:

Here is my revised piece on regionalism. Please note the following changes:

1) Introduction and Conclusion have been shortened and partially re-written. In particular I have eliminated the lengthy discussions on international conflict (Introduction) and class theory (Conclusion) which did not seem to contribute much to the paper's argumentation.

2) The sections in between have been tightened and (to some extent) reorganized (e.g., the beginning of "Peripheral Mobilization).

3) Notes and references have been adapted to IPSR style.

4) An Abstract containing 138 words has been added at the beginning.

5) A biographical note containing 5 lines has been added at the end.

6) As a result, the completed document now contains 6,635 words which should comply with the journal's length requirements (on a basis of 23 pages x 30 lines x 10 words = 6,900 words).

In conclusion, let me thank you very much again for your help and support. I hope that my paper has substantively improved from the revisions mentioned above, and I am looking forward to seeing it in print alongside with the others. Apart from everything else, it will be a welcome souvenir of a wonderful conference.

Best regards,

Thomas.

Thomas O. Hueglin
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science

TOH:hp
Enc.
cc: John Meisel
Jordi Sole Tura ✓

BETTER SMALL AND BEAUTIFUL THAN BIG AND UGLY?

Regionalism, Capitalism, and the Postindustrial State

Thomas O. Hueglin

ABSTRACT. Regionalism appears as the authentic response to the obsolescence of nation-state politics under conditions of global economic interdependence and crisis. While postmaterialist value change may have served as a first common denominator for the mobilization of peripheral protest, the real cause lies in the incompatibility of the capitalist accumulation process with regional development. Failed modernization and relative regional deprivation have fomented a new marginality and anti-centralist identity. Peripheral regions no longer aim at (re)integration, but instead at autonomization. However given the paucity of peripheral opportunity structures, they have to steer a shrewd course between exit (autonomization from) and voice (participation in nation-state politics). A general theory of fragmentation ought to explore further the role and potential of regionalism in the transformation of capitalist society.

> Just as the cause by its nature precedes the effect, and the simple or primary precedes in order what has been composed or derived from it, so also provinces precede realms, and the doctrine of symbiotic association must precede that of the state.
>
> [Johannes Althusius, 1557-1638]

Introduction

The most obvious and triumphant victor arising from the ashes of two two world wars fought in the name of national interests - once again was the territorial nation-state. Its success has essentially been tied to unprecedented economic growth in the wake of globalised capitalist reconstruction. The experience of ever-increasing prosperity muted continuing grievances as to ethnic or regional self-determination. The process of socioeconomic modernization, so it was assumed, would acculturate whatever traces of dissent were left at the nation-states' outer and inner peripheries. Looking back at the exceptional experience of economic growth and political stability, Robert Lane by the mid 1960s could redefine the agenda of the modern territorial nation-state as the "politics of consensus in an age of affluence" (1965: 874-95).

Only a few years later this idyllic perception of consensual national harmony was shattered by the bombs thrown in Ulster and the Basque country, by the spectacular rise of aggressive separatist parties in Scotland and Quebec, and by the amazing array of some fifty active regionalist movements in western Europe alone (Blaschke, 1980). This outburst of peripheral protest was initially dismissed as anachronistic nostalgia, or linked to specific historical circumstances to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In the meantime, as national efforts to sustain affluence have become more difficult in the wake of a global economic crisis, the dramatic increase of regionalism may have become a general indicator of the erosion and obsolescence of nation-state politics. Far from being a postmaterialist revival of folklore in the name of small-is-beautiful, it seems to be part of a much wider phenomenon, possibly a rejection of the false consciousness of consensus provided by nation-state politics.

In late capitalist societies this consciousness is nurtured by the assumption that the interventionist state seeks and secures wide-spread national prosperity via international competitiveness. Under the conditions of an interdependent world economy with highly saturated markets and new competitors, however, such international competitiveness requires a national agenda of aggressive economic restructuring which in reality aims at national resources mobilization at the expense of all-encompassing prosperity. Undermining the domestic consensus

of the welfare state and substituting it by a new public philosophy of disciplinarian austerity, nation-state politics gears up to reclaim lost ground in the global economy arena by getting tough with its peripheries. As all industrialised states try to do the same, this presumption of national pre-eminence via domestic austerity may amount to a "dangerous conceit" (Reich, 1985: 68-78), and the management/governability crises of national/international politics far more than just a dilemma of overload.

In fact, the nation-state's pre-eminence has been challenged throughout the postwar period. While national sovereignty became undermined by the chaos of competition and interdependence in the globalising market place, regional protest successfully challenged the national ideology of political centrality. Attacking this national political centrality, regionalism appears not only as a symptom of the ailing world of centralized statehood, but also as its possible cure. The hypothesis is bold: If the modern nation-state (the Jacobin institutions of which are some two hundred years old) can no longer cope with the political conflicts and challenges of the twenty-first century, and regionalism (which is usually regarded as a fallback to the primordial values of the past) is an authentic political response to that deficiency, then it could be that it is the territorial nation-state which is primordial while regionalism turns out to be the real symptom of modernization. The decentralizing tendencies recorded everywhere in the industrialised world

(Sharpe, 1979) would appear to be the nation-state's last stand, an attempt of dinosaurs to regain flexibility, while the quest for regional autonomy and self-sufficiency (not as a decentralizing strategy from above, but as a self-organizing demand from below) might prove to be a better or even only road to survival.

This essay will attempt to reassess the substance and options of regionalism within the set of assumptions made above. Given its variegated ethnic, social and institutional components, regionalism will be broadly defined as a general commitment to subnational territorial identity. This will be discussed as Peripheral Mobilization in late capitalist societies. Threatened by an increasing degree of cultural, socioeconomic and political peripheralization (the result of the national process of modernization), regionalist as other new social movements no longer seem to aim at national assimilaton and (re)integration, but at the development of a new sense of identity and autonomy which can no longer be accommodated by the central calculus of administrative decentralization and its transfer hand-outs. Regionalism is therefore characterized by a substantial degree of attitudinal change, the common denominator of which will be identified as Anticentralism and New Marginality. As in other cases of sociopolitical marginality, the options available to regionalist movements are limited: they can fight against dependency by either cutting their ties with the centre, or trying to gain influence over central policy formation. This the

classical dilemma of Exit and Voice. An Extended Conclusion will finally return to the potential role of regionalism in the future of territorial politics and suggest a theoretical framework for its analysis.

Peripheral Mobilization

By the end of the 1970s social scientists looked at the transformation of 'consensual' politics with awe. The stability and predictability of the politics of consensus had become dramatically challenged by "massive politicization and mobilization." New social movements "rejected recourse to the traditional political agents." As a consequence, there had been a "vast new wave of collective activity outside traditional political institutions" (Berger, 1979:27-38). The main thrust of this challenge to traditional politics was directed against the state. One reason for this was the enormous expansion of state intervention in the name of 'Keynesianism'. The state had become responsible for the regulation of practically all aspects of socioeconomic life, and the visibility of the state's regulatory hand made it the new focus and arena of expectations and distributional conflicts. The earlier optimism that these conflicts could be contained or even dissolved by the revenues of affluence and the all-pervasive web of public policy, gradually gave way to the sobering realization of governmental overload.

The most widely accepted explanation of this new development was provided by Inglehart's theory of postmaterialist value change (1971; 1984). According to this theory, it was the abundance of material goods during the affluent years which spawned the desire for a new 'quality of life' aiming at non-materialist values. Regionalism, in this context, came to be seen as a romantic anachronism and obstacle to necessary further modernization. It was criticized as the anti-industrial attitude of a new middle-class spoiled and bored by the easy availability of material acquisition. But while regionalism - as other new social movements - indeed began to gain momentum during the affluent 1960s, and postmaterialism hence undeniably played a major role in the formation of protest politics, the monocausal focus on the irrevocability of attitudinal change overlooked another source of discontent: the growing incongruence between expectations and the fiscal capacities in the wake of a deepening economic crisis. As the state's visible hand moved from universality to selectivity, both the material and postmaterial aspirations of regional movements became frustrated.

Three phases in the formation of regionalism ought to be distinguished: During the 1960s the experience of unprecedented economic growth surely fostered postmaterialist attitudes. At the same time, however, peripheral modernization, the spreading of industrialization and the administrative state, brought know-how, expertise and ambition to the regions. During the 1970s, when the tremors of economic crisis began to be felt, regional discontent

not only resulted from the persistence of postmaterialist attitudes, but were also a consequence of this existence of a new peripheral elite which possessed the expertise and administrative skills to fight for the retention of the achieved level of material well-being. Regionalism had become an attitudinal and acquisitive issue. In the 1980s the regionalist thrust seems to have subsided. The picture is misleading, though. While neoconservative governments succeeded in containing regionalist and other forms of mobilization by proclaiming national economic recovery as a bread-and-butter issue cutting across regional interests, the potential failure of such recovery may well lead to a new and nastier round of regional conflict. The peripheries of postindustrial societies find themselves in a situation which is largely determined by grievance and opportunity.

Sweeping over the attitudes of an entire generation, the postmaterialist paradigm also failed to differentiate between the material achievement levels of centres and peripheries. Persisting regional disparities falsified the earlier assumptions of modernization theorists (Lijphart, 1970: 47-49). While the age of affluence certainly raised the overall level of living standards, the fork of relative regional deprivation rather widened than narrowed. And relative socioeconomic modernization in the peripheries did not automatically lead to national

assimilation. Even in cases of 'relative regional overdevelopment' (e.g. the peripheral location of traditional heavy industry as in Scotland, Catalonia, or the Basque country), nationalist and/or ethnolinguistic sentiments survived.

The point to be made here is twofold: On the one hand, as modernization did not spread evenly across the territorial space of advanced industrial societies, regionalist protest and aspirations cannot be seen simply as postmaterialist sentiments. Retained sociocultural identities rather helped to foment regional protest when it became clear that the promises of modernization remained unfulfilled, when expectations which had been awakened during the affluent years became first frustrated by the continued experience of deprivation and disparity (despite growing prosperity and regional development programs) and later by the experience of economic crisis and the reduction of such programs.

On the other hand, the objective condition of relative deprivation was not a sufficient cause for the rise of regionalism. As in the case of Quebec, regionalist aspirations had remained dormant for almost a century despite the province's socioeconomic underdevelopment, and they became a salient force of political conflict precisely when it seemed least likely, i.e. when socioeconomic living conditions had improved as never before. Why did Quebec's 'Quiet Revolution' occur at that moment? Through partial and relative modernization, the province had

become exposed to the promises of industrialization. A new middle-class elite had acquired expertise and ambition. Expertise and general affluence had raised their aspirations and expectations. There was an opportunity as never before. Grievance and opportunity formed a powerful movement. Sociocultural identity, economic ambition and political power became mutually reinforcing (McRoberts, 1984).

With some variegation of time and circumstances this picture of regional mobilization also applies to other cases. In Scotland the spectacular rise of nationalism was fostered by the decline of the traditional industries (grievance), and by the discovery of the North Sea oil (opportunity) (Esman, 1970). Similarly, the nationalism of Catalonia could only be preserved through the years of Franco centralism because it was supported by the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and its financial as well as organizational resources. The strong industrial base of Catalonia was the material base on which regionalism could survive (Linz, 1973). Where this material and sociopolitical opportunity was lacking, regionalism either remained a sociocultural movement among an intellectual or literary elite (as in Galicia until its movement was propelled forward by the success of other regions in Spain (Diaz Lopez, 1982), or as in Occitania, that southern French region which miraculously revived

an almost extinct language) (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 96-98), or it turned to violent forms of protest (as in the Basque country where nationalism clashed with an industrial bourgeoisie which was Madrid-centred and unsupportive) (Heiberg, 1982).

There are several explanations for the apparent decline of regionalist activism in the 1980s. Scotland did not get its oil, and the separatism of the Scottish National Party did not find a majority among a population basically seeking improved opportunity structures through home rule. The decline of the Parti Quebecois, on the other hand, may well be explained by the success of its earlier achievements: socioeconomic modernization, sociocultural stabilization and dramatically increased political co-determination. When all this appeared to be possible within the opportunity structure of Canadian federalism, separation no longer seemed desirable. And in the case of post-Franco Spain, political democratization became synonymous with regionalization. The reasons for the current decline of regionalist aspirations then are many. In some cases opportunities did not materialize, or waned under the impact of economic and fiscal constraints. In other cases the nation-state successfully contained regionalism by granting various degrees of decentralization. And in some cases regionalism obviously achieved impressive successes. The question remains, however, why such a massive wave of regionalism

would erupt at the same time out of so many different and seemingly unrelated situations. The only obvious common denominator is the existence of the modern industrial nation-state and the regionalist opposition to its centrality.

Anticentralism and New Marginality

It is ironic that those same theorists of postmaterialist overload who advocate a spiritual revival of family- and group-oriented attitudes in order to relieve the burden of overloaded governments, at the same time see the retention of regionalist aspirations as a fallback to anachronistic values and threat to the efficiency of national economic recovery (Etzioni, 1983). They overlook that it is the very business ethic they want to revitalize which is responsible for the deterioration of organic family and group life in the first place (Wolfe, 1981). Thus they also misunderstand the 'nature' of regionalism. While the naturalism of family and group life they seek to rekindle must appear "synthetic" in the context of modern capitalist life (ibid.), regionalism may instead turn out to be not anachronistic and obstructive, but a creative and promising path to societal revitalization. Indeed, since neigbourhood stores and family restaurants are preconditions for natural group life, regionalism may be the answer to the problems of societies which expect everything from the state because they can no longer find anything around the corner.

In this sense regionalism can be conceived as an authentic part of modernization itself, and not its rejection. It is an answer to the complexity of modern life, to the overload of modern government especially under conditions of scarcity, i.e. when the limits of growth, the fiscal capacities of intervention, and the possibilities of expansion in the overcrowded national and global markets, begin to become a permanent symptom of the postindustrial age. Under such conditions the centralized nation-state is losing its capacity of adequate problem-solving. Facing the challenge of global constraints and competition (which would require global institutions of intervention), the capitalist state is forced to neglect such structural problems and conflicts which are subnational by nature. Regionalism is a response to the obsolescence of national political institutions, and to the attempt of sacrificing regional interests on the altar of national resources maximization.

Reaction and action of regionalist aspirations have to be distinguished. Whether asserting a postmaterialist desire of cultural identity, or responding to an objective condition of relative deprivation and alienation, regionalist movements have reacted against the polarizing dynamic of peripheralization inherent in the capitalist system. As long as the capitalist mode of production is based on capital concentration, and the optimal spacial allocation of resources, it is incompatible with regional development. This contradiction of the territorial state corresponds to that of the welfare state: every effort to

maximize the efficiency of the system from which the means for legitimizing redistribution have to be derived, at the same time increases the need for such redistribution. During periods of exceptional growth this contradictory dynamic of capitalism can be patched over by the general rise of living standards, but not so in times of scarcity, when painful choices of distribution and the outright allocation of economic losses are on the agenda (Hueglin, 1987).

Obviously the authenticity of the regionalist reaction against spatial discrimination depends on peripheralization as an objective condition. This is where most critics of the regionalist cause disagree. Either they argue that it was achieved modernization and not continued deprivation which fomented the formation of peripheral protest, or they argue that peripheral betterment can only come from a truly national strategy of economic recovery, whereas regionalist resistance would be a cure worse than the disease. And indeed, the old parameters of centre-periphery relations seem no longer adequate in the hi-tech age, when wide-spread decentralization seems possible through electronic communication, factor mobility is no longer a problem, and former peripheral cinderellas can achieve sunbelt status almost overnight.

However, these possibilities of structural flexibility have not changed the basic fact and requirement of capitalist centrality. As Rokkan and Urwin redefined it, centrality is today based on a new 'quaternary' sector of the economy which encompasses "all the agencies responsible for the registration, handling and diffusion of decisions, orders, instructions and information across a wide territory." With regard to this new central sector of information and communication, peripherality has remained and deepened as a syndrome of "distance, difference and dependence." Distance from central information will lead to the retention of some sociocultural difference, and will at the same time result in continued dependence upon central decision-making, the standardization of social life, and the central allocation of crucial economic and financial resources (1983: 3-8).

It is this perception of peripherality as an objective condition, of the contradictions of distance and standardization, modernization and dependence, which points to anticentralism as the most important subjective common denominator of regionalist aspirations. The retention or revival of sociocultural identities, the socioeconomic quest for self-sufficiency, and the entrenchment of political resistance are mutually reinforcing factors of this anticentralist dynamic. Depending on which of these factors is the predominant grievance, each of them can be the starting point from where the regionalist drive begins to gain momentum. Under the objective condition of 'quaternary'

peripherality, the efforts of cultural revitalization may well serve as the most natural rallying point and catalyst for political muscle-flexing in order to wrestle a more indigenous opportunity structure from the central national economy.

As a challenge to centrality, regionalism - again like other new social movements - must be seen a a new political perspective. As long as there was hope that the achievements of national economic growth and modernization would finally spill over into the peripheries and lead to nation-wide wealth and prosperity, regions would hardly contest the central administration of regional development. Such development mainly consisted of the injection of central capital into the periphery, typically through the encouragement of peripheral mega-projects or so-called growth-poles, the spin-off effects of which would then lead to the gradual modernization of the peripheral economic structures (Matthews: 1983). Peripheral faith in the growth-pole approach began to fade, however, when its shortcomings or outright failure became evident:

1) Regions learned that the benefits from growth-poles were insufficient and often short-lived. While industrial projects profited from the regional low-wage structure, capital ownership remained outside the region. Profits quickly flowed back to the centre without stimulating the local economy. Often enough local employment remained low as well, because the local labour market was unprepared for the new skill requirements. Consequently

importing skilled labour from the centre, growth-pole projects rather extended the central labour market than created a peripheral one. And when peripheral industrialisation proved insufficiently profitable, external capital would unscrupulously be withdrawn, leaving empty industrial skeletons or entire mothballed communities.

2) Regions also learned that even where modernization occurred, the gap between central and peripheral achievements would not become any narrower. The peripheral standard of living would improve during periods of general growth and affluence, but regional disparity would remain the same or even deepen. Discontent with this situation would be reinforced by the very dynamic of modernization. As regions would become dependent on increasing material wealth, so would also grow their dependence on the continued flow of money and credit. Appetite grows with eating: this is what the late Fred Hirsch called the "hole in the affluent society" and relative scarcity of positional achievements (1976: 102-7).

3) And when economic crisis struck the western industrial societies, regions finally had to learn that they had in part been living on the shaky grounds of central charity and short-lived social conscience, as regional development programs and transfers came under the scrutiny of budget-cutting alongside with the generally administered cuts into the social safety net.

With the dramatic change of policy making from affluence and universal distribution to scarcity and selective redistribution came a new awareness and assertion of centre-periphery polarization. Wall Street economist Melvyn Krauss has dismissed regional policy altogether as nationally inefficient, suggesting that peripheral workers should migrate and "go to the work" instead of expecting that the work would come to them (1984: 82). From the periphery comes a different assessment. As Dennis Kucinich, former mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, summed it up: "There are increasingly two Americas... the America of multinationals dictating decisions in Washington, and the America of neighbourhoods and rural areas, who feel left out" (Carroll, 1982: 348).

When the feeling of being left out sinks in, and peripheries can no longer expect the undisputed continuation of central handouts, the self-perception of regional marginality begins to change. As long as the belief in universal prosperity was unshattered, the aspirations of regional peripheries alongside with other marginal segments of modern societies aimed at acculturation and integration. The unemployed wanted to be reemployed, the American blacks wanted to be part of American mainstream culture, and the European regions wanted to become a modernized part of the whole. Now, some unemployed groups have begun to form alternative cooperative networks, a black elite has

promoted Afrocultural consciousness, and regionalist movements have propagated a new perception of marginality which no longer tries to copy the achievements of the centre, but emphasizes a new anticentralist collective identity.

Only as long as faith in economic growth and universal modernization remains unbroken can this new marginality be interpreted as a backlash to values of the past. Given the growing symptoms of capitalist disorganization (Offe, 1985), it seems that the current neoconservative attempts to promote "economic growth now" and "to provide for redistributive and environmental purposes later" (Wildavsky, 1984: 42) have to be considered as the backlash, while resistance against this myth of centralized efficiency appears to be the more progressive step ahead. When Seymour Martin Lipset wonders, for example, why what he sees as the new 'backlash movements' is so weak in comparison to interwar fascism, (1981: 491) one answer would be that fascism aimed at capturing the centre, while many of the new movements (in contrast to the 'friendly fascism' of the new moral majority) do not (Gross, 1983; Hueglin, 1986). But this seeming weakness may turn out as decisive strength. Should the conservative modernization thrust fail, those who have developed a new sense of marginality may be in a better position to adapt and survive.

If it is correct to assume that the patterns of (centrally regulated) class conflict become increasingly displaced by a new pattern of multifarious centre-periphery conflict within the structural parameters of "late capitalism" (Habermas, 1982: 512-81), the anticentralist thrust of the new regionalist marginality would not only be an authentic manifestation of late capitalist modernity, but might also prove to be the more realistic alternative in dealing with the structural contradictions of late capitalist societies. Caught in a world which continues to be determined by both the power structures of centrality and the dependency structures of centre-periphery relations, regionalist aspirations are faced with the dilemma that they are much too weak and fragmented to be able to contest the system, but that such contestation may be their only chance at the same time. They have to steer a course between the Scylla of regionalist isolation and the Carybdis of nationalist domesticity. In the classical terminology of Albert O. Hirschman, this is the dilemma of 'exit and voice' (1970) in centralized systems of power.

Exit and Voice

Exit describes the constrained choices of the consumer in the market place. He/she can either buy the goods or services offered - or leave them on the shelf. Take-it-or-leave-it is the only kind of freedom which the market allows. What it does not allow is to influence the quality of the goods and services supplied.

Nor can the consumer anticipate how his/her day-to-day decisions and choices will influence the market in the long run. Because of this "tyranny of small decisions" (Hirsch, 1976: 40, 79; Crouch, 1983: 195-201), the market in its pure form offers a very limited choice at best, and at worst eliminates it altogether. The root of the problem is the asymmetry of the market itself: the anarchy of atomised consumer behavior does not stand a chance against the organized sphere of production.

Voice is the only alternative strategy available. As a participatory strategy it requires organization and collective action aiming at the improvement of goods and services produced. The consequence is an increasing public involvement in the productive process. But while this rather legitimizes than rectifies the structural asymmetry of the market system, (Hirsch, 1976: 106-7) it moreover jeopardizes the individual autonomy of choice to an even greater extent. Participatory involvement and public intervention require loyalty (Crouch, 1983: 202) which in fact constrains further the possibilities of collective action: The accomplices of a regulated system of market capitalism can hardly go back to their earlier strategy of exit.

In terms of regionalist aspirations to gain greater control over resources and chances of indigenous development, the exit option obviously covers a wide range of possible action: from a refusal to meet the centrally imposed conditions for certain types of grants, to opting-out strategies with regard to entire

policy fields, and finally to passive and/or active strategies of resistance including the promotion of outright separatism as the most drastic step. Any of these strategies means partial or complete disintermediation from the national market system. In order to free themselves from the unsatisfactory dependency on central (and centrally allocated) capital and resources, regions and communities would have to mobilize local resources, gear production to the demands of local consumption, and develop a local sense of community independent from the achievements, life styles and ambitions elsewhere.

This would not necessarily have to mean the inevitable reduction of the regional standard of living. On the one hand, as regional disparity often results from central exploitation and inadequate central development strategies, a substantial improvement of the peripheral socioeconomic structure through local resources mobilization might more than off-set the loss of transfers and low-wage dependency incomes. On the other hand, the development of a local pride-of-place might lead to a different value system: the supply of a more limited range of local goods and services might become more appreciated than the onslaught of a centralized mass culture. As know-how and means of production travel light and fast in the electronic age, exit from central premises of production no longer have to result in a fallback to premodern life.

However, while small may indeed often mean beautiful, the realization of regional self-sufficiency in a world of global interdependence must almost seem utopian, especially when the starting point comes at the end of a long history of peripheral exploitation, and when regional dependency is already a deeply entrenched fact and experience. This is when voice may appear as the only realistic chance of betterment. As a strategy of defending regional interests within the national system, voice means participation in that system under status-quo conditions. The centralizing premises of capitalist national economies are accepted instead of contested, and in return transfers, development programs and a general commitment to equalization can be demanded. Where political structures such as federalism or regional bodies of government and administration exist, they can be utilized for the formation of collective regionalist pressures. Otherwise the only remaining transmission belt for regional demands is the national electoral system: fearing peripheral defeat, the politicians of the central system will make concessions to the organized voices of regional discontent.

The price to pay is the perpetuation of regional dependency on the centre which will demand loyalty in return for its handouts. Moreover, this <u>transfer dependency</u> will retard or even destroy the chances for the development of indigenous resources and potentials. And when the advocates of national economic efficiency find their interests threatened by a crisis of

economic growth, they may quickly resort to the withdrawal of transfer payments - the peripheral population may then have to practice a new variation of 'exit': starve, or migrate to the centre.

Unless supported by exceptional socioeconomic and/or political opportunity structures, the prospects of indigenous regional development are bleak indeed. While exit strategies can hardly overcome the problems of interdependence and externalities, voice options only deepen the dependency already in existence. The resulting 'transfer dependency' is territorial expression of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system: the need for peripheral transfers grows with the efficiency and success of central accumulation; but the more transfers are successfully allocated in the periphery, the more peripheries will also tend to become dependent on central handouts. As only indigenous development can contain the ongoing process of peripheralization, but peripheral participation and cooperation seem indispensable under the current circumstances of centre-periphery disparity, a shrewd strategy of exit and voice seems to be the only realistic option - not an easy task for those who often are the weakest members in the national community in the first place.

An Extended Conclusion

In the context of advanced industrial societies, the study of regionalism and nationalism has found many explanations. Some have focused on the continued existence of ethnolinguistic minorities and the resurgence of their claims for cultural survival. Others have emphasized the role of socioeconomic deprivation suffered by peripheral societies in centralized territorial states. And others again have pointed out the role of political institutions which, in federal systems as well as in decentralizing unitary states, have given regional elites the tools to pursue greater autonomy. Theoretical explanations have reached from the impact of postmaterialist value change, via the crisis of governability in complex industrial systems, to increasing centre-periphery dependency in late capitalist societies. Liberals have denounced regionalism as an anachronistic obstacle on the road to national economic modernization. Marxists criticise it as a bourgeois deflection of class solidarity. Ideological stances notwithstanding, political parties of all couleurs have exploited peripheral aspirations for electoral purposes when in opposition, and shamelessly abandoned them when in power.

What is urgently needed, then, is a general theory of regionalism which ought to become part of an even more general "theory of political cleavage" (Rogowski, 1985: 384) and fragmentation for the world of disorganized capitalism. Given the

globalisation of the capitalist mode of production in an interdependent world economy, such a theory might well be capable of including ethnic/regional conflict in developing countries as well (Horowitz, 1985). Rather than fashionably 'bringing the state back in', it would have to constitute nothing less than a full-fledged critique of the theory of state, very much in the same sense as class theory constitutes a critique of the theory of liberal democracy. As a matter of fact, it would have to complement class theory in several important ways, pointing out a new type of fundamental societal conflict which cuts across the traditional class structures of capitalist systems.

Capitalism is an essentially centralizing force which is opposed to the participatory goals of democracy. It must therefore be legitimized by perpetual redistributive and equilibrating state intervention. The capitalist state becomes the ubiquitous guarantor=mediator of a largely fictitious market place. It becomes overburdened, unmanageable and delegitimized when its mediating and organizing capacities are exhausted by economic and fiscal constraints. Ironically, its efforts of re-establishing a profitable regime of accumulation in fact require permanent increases in non-market institutions and regulations which in turn undermine the steadfastness of the accumulation process (Offe, 1984). Due to rationalization and centralization, and contrary to the neoclassical market gospel, the efforts of capitalist systems to re-establish a 'healthy' regime of market exchange between capital and labour, in fact

increase the number of those who in Weberian terms appear "removed from economic everyday life" (Alber, 1985: 219). And because of the spatial divisions of labour, this contradictory dynamic results in centre-periphery conflict. In other words, a new conflict consciousness between quaternary centrality and new marginality begins to replace that of traditional class division.

While the Marxian concept of class remains an important analytical tool in order to understand both the economic and power base of capitalist systems, it is no longer the principal agent for the formation of social consciousness. This consciousness is increasingly based on the new division between a core ideology of resuscitated market faith, and the peripheral realization of marginality as an objective condition. Regionalism is nothing but the spatial expression of this realization. And just as the capitalist intervention state paradoxically has to increase its reliance on non-market regulation in order to stabilize the market-regulated process of accumulation, so does the territorial state paradoxically strengthen regionalist aspirations by trying to maintain political centrality. The attempt to stabilize the core project of economic modernization requires the intensified exploitation of the peripheries' natural and human resources. In highly complex societal systems this can only be achieved through administrative decentralization which in turn strengthens peripheral consciousness and maneuvrability

through the transfer of konw-how and expertise. That intensified political centrality in fact produces increased decentralization, can be seen as the spatial dimension of the contradiction and crisis of late capitalist systems.

This leaves room for a last observation as to the 'revolutionary' potential of regionalism saving the world from another holocaust of nation-state politics. As Antonio Gramsci long-since recognized, the Marxian faith in a revolutionary change of the material conditions of life under capitalism underestimated the strength of bourgeois ideological hegemony. While regionalist strategies of exit and voice may primarily be survival strategies within the context of capitalist material reproduction, it is the rise of a peripheral counter-ideology which may yet pose the most serious challenge to the capitalist nation-state system. As the dynamic of late capitalist systems seems to be contracting, there is hope that such a regionalist counter-ideology may eventually (and in solidarity with other social movements) become counter-hegemonic as well. It seems to be a valid observation more than ever, that such a cultural revolution would have to take place before the material conditions of life can be changed: not socialism first, and then wither away of the state, but dissolve political centrality first and then wither away of capitalism in its contemporary destructive form.

Note

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, October 23-25, 1986.

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Biographical Note

THOMAS O. HUEGLIN is Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario. Recent publications include "Yet the Age of Anarchism?" (1985) and "Legitimacy, Democracy and Federalism." (1987) ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5.

H. G. Thorburn

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

11 March, 1988

Dear Jordi,

I just got your letter of Feb 26. I immediately showed it to Prof. Meisel. He undertook to discuss the Ehrlich issue with his co-editor prof. Jean Laponce, whom he will be seeing in Moscow next week at an IPSA meeting. I'll let you know their decision as soon as I get it.

I think it much more important that your paper as convenor of the conference and co-editor of the issue be included, than the one in question.

Sincerely,

PS (Cover)

What about Prof. Bartelds paper? Have he written it yet? And is it O.K.

There is no problem re Prof. Seiler's paper. It can be published in English – if revised & in appropriate length.

J.T.

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, March 25, 1988.

Prof, H,G, Thorburn
Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston,Canada, K7L 3N6

Dear Hugh,

I have just received your letter of 11 March, I agree with your arrangements and I am waiting for further news about the Ehrlich issue, But I want to stress that I shall assume the terms of the final decision taken by you and Prof, Meisel,

I have received news of professors Seiler, Mawhood,Sharpe, Hueglin and Korbonski, They agree with all the terms proposed by us, I think that they are also in full contact with you, If not, let me know, as there is a certain danger of dispersion, Prof, Joan Botella agrees also with our proposal and he is writing down his paper, I have no further news of profs,Vlachos and Calvez, If you have, please let me know,

Sincerely

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

30 March 1988

Dear Jordi,

I consulted John Meisel re the Ehrlich essay, explaining that he was the founder of our group, hence the awkwardness of not including his essay in the published collection. He consulted Jean Laponce the other co-editor, and they agreed on the decision not to accept it. I enclose a copy of his letter. I am undecided as to whether to send a copy to Stanislaw or not. What do you think?

I hope you are receiving the edited copies on schedule. I already have Thomas Hueglin's. The rest I presume will come to you. Do forward them to me as they come in.

I heard from Mawhood who wishes to change his title to "State Formation in Tropical Africa". He is sending the essay here by the end of April.

There is no problem re Seiler's preference to appear in English. Meisel agrees.

I am still wondering about Prof. Botella's paper. Has he prepared a text for us? I would like very much to include it. Could you let me know?

Korbonski says he will have his paper here on time— so I guess things are moving along as they should. Calvez is revising his.

I haven't any news about any of the others. I'll close for now, in the belief that all is well. The matter of the Polish papers is now out of our hands.

Sincerely,

Hugh Thorburn

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES
The Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Political Science

Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 3N6
Tel. 613 545-6227

29 March 1988

Professor Hugh Thorburn
Dept. of Political Studies
Queen's University

Dear Hugh,

I reread the Ehrlich paper and also discused it at length with Jean Laponce, to whom I had given a copy.

We are in complete agreement about the following:

The paper is not suitable for publication in the IPSR. No doubt because of the difficulty Stanislav has experienced in gaining access to the necessary sources, the material is very thin, unsubstantiated by recent research, and in some instances inaccurate. This alone would preclude our accepting it.

But there is another reason for our inability to accept it: Stanislav is without question one of the most distinguished scholars of his generation and has made a substantial contribution to political studies both at home and abroad. It would be quite unfair to him to have this paper appear over his signature, since he was clearly unable in this case to engage in the exhaustive research required by the subject. Our very great respect and affection for S. Ehrlich thus constitutes a second reason for not being able to accept this paper.

Yours sincerely,

JM

John Meisel

JM/md

FAX 613 545-6300

MEISELJ@QUCDN.BITNET

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

7 April 1988

Dear Jordi,

I have your letter of 25 March. I am pleased to see that Joan Botella has agreed to have his paper included. Re Calvez, I think he is revising his paper. He wrote to me from U.S.A. asking for a copy of his paper so he could work on it there. I have no news from Vlachos since you sent me a photocopy of his letter to you of Feb 5. We are considering it as marginal in any case— so I would hesitate to press him.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Hugh Thorburn

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES UCLA

BERKELEY · DAVIS · IRVINE · LOS ANGELES · RIVERSIDE · SAN DIEGO · SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA · SANTA CRUZ

CENTER FOR RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

April 8, 1988

Professor John Meisel
Editor, International Journal of Political Science
c/o Department of Political Science
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario

Dear Professor Meisel:

At the request of Professor H.G. Thorburn, the Chairman of the IPSA Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism, I transmit a copy of the paper on "Nationalism and Pluralism and the Process of Political Development in Eastern Europe," which I presented at a meeting of the Committee in Barcelona last June.

This is a revised and abbreviated version of the paper and I tried as much as possible to adhere to Professor Thorburn's suggestion that the paper's length, including footnotes, be kept below 23 pages.

I am delighted and flattered that the paper will be published in your Journal. If you have any questions regarding the manuscript, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Andrzej Korbonski
Director and Professor
of Political Science

encl.

cc: Professor Thorburn
Professor Sole Tura

April 8, 1988

Dear Professor Solé Tura,

Here is the Barcelona paper.

Best regards

Andrzej Korbonski

Andrzej Korbonski

NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to examine the interaction among three concepts often encountered in social sciences -- nationalism, pluralism and political development -- occurring in Eastern Europe in the 1980s. In order to make the analysis more manageable, nationalism was conceptualized as national political culture and pluralism was identified by the presence of interest groups. Both these concepts do, of course, play a major role in the process of political development. The main question in the paper concerned the ability of individual East European countries to weather the developmental crises that were descending upon the region in the current decade.

The conclusion that emerges is that of the six East European countries considered, only Hungary succeeded reasonably well in its task of crisis management. Furthermore, it was both the national political culture and the groups which were largely responsible for the different outcomes in the process of development of the different countries. Finally, on the strength of the experience in the 1980s, it is assumed that both these variables will play an even more important role in the region in the years to come.

Revised draft

NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Andrzej Korbonski

University of California, Los Angeles

Prepared for Delivery at a Conference on "Pluralism, Regionalism, Nationalism," International Political Association Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism, University of Barcelona, Spain, June 25-28, 1987

NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Concepts and Definitions

A social scientist trying to examine a relationship between two or more concepts or variables is usually faced at the outset with a problem of definitions. At times it is a relatively simply task; on this occasion, however, the two concepts to be discussed - nationalism and pluralism - defy easy generalizations and require a careful definition. It is a truism, of course, that the way concepts are defined determines the breadth and depth of the question to be investigated: the definition not only establishes certain analytical boundaries but also dictates, or at least suggests, an approach or a method to be used in postulating and testing a given hypothesis. The importance of clear and unambiguous definitions is not better illustrated than in this particular case.

The study of nationalism in Eastern Europe, especially in the interwar period, used to be one of the favorite occupations not only of historians and political scientists but also of politicians of all hues, and by now the literature on the subject is not inconsiderable although its quality is uneven.[1] While nationalism in the region in the post-World War II period has received less attention, the box is not entirely empty and it may be speculated that a revival of scholarly interest in this phenomenon is bound to come sooner rather than later.[2] However, thus far, at least, the research on the subject of East European nationalism has focused primarily on either the question of nation-building, economic nationalism, or on purely political process in the various countries, and its results appear to be of limited utility for our purposes.

It is clear that the concept of nationalism shares with many others the dubious distinction of being "an elusive phenomenon that defies exact description."[3] Although, thanks mostly to the works of such scholars as Karl Deutsch, a good deal of the confusion surrounding the meaning of nationalism had been eliminated and the concept itself has not only acquired a definite scholarly respectability but had also become more or less operationalized,[4] for the purpose of this investigation the concept of nationalism is too broad and needs to be narrowed.

As a working hypothesis, I shall assume that the concept of nationalism which I see as synonymous to the concept of national identity, closely approximates that of national political culture. Ordinarily I would argue that equating these two notions would result in a very narrow interpretation of the concept of national identity and, ipso facto, nationalism. However, I am prepared to argue that in the context of our analysis of Communist systems, the above

approximation violates neither the generally accepted definitions nor common sense. In the final analysis, all that happens in Communist societies is essentially political and, regardless of some recent developments in the individual East European countries, there is no basic separation between polity and society. This does not mean, of course, that the political systems have been able to penetrate every corner of East European societies - after all, even Stalin did not succeed in this - but simply that all activity - individual or collective, economic or social - tends to be heavily politicized and to carry significant political implications. To conclude, for the purpose of this discussion, I shall treat nationalism as a form of national political culture or as a set of national "attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior."[5]

The concept of pluralism is no less difficult to define in an unambiguous fashion than that of nationalism. In this context, pluralism will be viewed as referring to both "specific institutional arrangements for distributing and sharing governmental power," and to an "approach to understanding political behavior."[6] To put it differently, I shall view a pluralist society as one composed of various reasonably independent and voluntary associations or groups, each representing a specific interest and each insisting on being consulted, if not formally included, in the decision-making process.

Judging by the amount of discussion it has stimulated, the group approach clearly filled a void in research strategy. Perhaps one of its greatest attractions lay in its responding to an easily observable phenomenon which could not be readily explained by any of the hitherto accepted analytical frameworks. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the approach raised almost as many questions as it answered.[7] It was one thing to study pluralistic tendencies in Communist societies and another to disregard, explicitly or implicitly, the fact that these societies were, after all, Communist and hence non-democratic. So far at least, there has not been any evidence of the complete disappearance of either Marxist-Leninist ideology or the ruling parties, both of which still continue to make Communist systems somewhat different not only from the democratic but also from other authoritarian systems. Thus one has to conclude that while the group approach is highly useful as an analytical tool in studying certain discrete phenomena, it is much less valuable for the examination of total processes or systems. To put it differently, I agree with Gordon Skilling that "the group approach could, and indeed must, be combined with other approaches in the effort to explain the working of the [Communist] system as a whole."[8]

Finally, in examining the process of political development in Eastern Europe I utilized the existing analytical frameworks developed primarily by Gabriel Almond and Samuel Huntington.[9] I did so for two reasons: first, because I found them eminently suitable for the purpose of investigating the process of political development in that part of the world, and second, because to the best of my knowledge, there have been few if any attempts to test the applicability of these frameworks to Communist systems. In other words, I agreed with Huntington that Almond's framework was "precisely designed to deal with the problem of change and it was clearly independent of any particular historical context... It could be applied to a primitive stateless tribe, a classical Greek city-state, or to a modern-nation-state."[10]

The process of political development in the selected East European countries[11] will then be examined with the help of Almond's framework that focuses on five critical areas: identity, penetration, participation, distribution and legitimacy.[12] Each country undergoing a process of socio-political development is likely, sooner or later, to encounter a series of systemic crises or challenges in these five areas. The various crises are not independent of each other and do not arise in any particular sequence; in fact, they are closely correlated. They rarely appear alone but primarily as a combination of two or more. The linkage between the presence of the different developmental crises and challenges in the various countries will be examined with the help of the five systemic components, suggested by Huntington: culture, structure, groups, leadership, and policies. These components are also interrelated, which means that a change in any of them is likely to induce changes in one or more of the others. The process of political development is ultimately strongly influenced by the interplay among those components, their type and rate of change, and the combinations in which they occur.[13] Since, as mentioned at the outset, my interest is in examining the interaction between nationalism conceptualized as national political culture, pluralism identified with the presence of groups, and the process of political development, I shall focus especially on two of the components - culture and groups.

Political Development in Eastern Europe

In discussing the process of political development in Eastern, Europe, I concluded several years ago that "on the eve of the 1980s, all the East European countries, with the exception of Hungary, have been facing a series of developmental crises which, when aggregated, range from a highly intensive one in Poland to moderate ones in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia,"[14] with Romania straddling the middle.

What follows is a brief examination of the changes that have occurred in the individual East European countries in the 1980s and of the impact of these changes on the situation in the various countries with special emphasis on the role played in that process by the respective national political cultures and interest or pressure groups.

(1) Identity

The crisis of identity or national integration, which is related to an incomplete or unsuccessful process of nation-building, has been described as a situation in which significant national groups within a given polity either do not consider themselves as falling within the decision-making domaine of the government, or deny some other group or groups within the system the same rights which they have enjoyed.[15]

There is no doubt that in the post-World War II years Eastern Europe as a whole as well as the individual countries have been experiencing much less of an identity crisis than during the interwar period. At that time, nearly all of the countries were multinational or multi-ethnic states whose political systems had to deal with the presence of several minorities which tended to exhibit powerful nationalist tendencies, threatening to undermine the laborious process of national-building, initiated after World War I, and to destroy the fabric of the respective societies. The result was gradual demise of the embattled democratic governments and their replacement by autocratic regimes of various hues.

In the mid-1980s, the crisis of identity has manifested itself most sharply in Yugoslavia, for reasons that are obvious and need no further elaboration. The example of violent protests by the Albanian minority in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 and thereafter, strongly suggests that the process of nation-building in Yugoslavia is far from a successful completion. This means that the identity crisis, reflected in recurrent waves of ethnic-nationalist dissent, is likely to persist in the foreseeable future.

The situation in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s resembled that in Yugoslavia, reflecting considerable dissatisfaction in Slovakia with the existing state of affairs. Although the latter made considerable progress in the post-World War II period, its economy was still less developed than its Czech counterpart, and Slovakia was hardly able to

satisfy all of its capital investment requirements without help from the Czech lands. Under the centralized economic system, a major effort was made to close the gap between Slovakia and the rest of the country, with the former receiving preferential treatment. For that reason, the economic reforms promulgated in the mid-1960s which aimed at reducing the degree of central planning, were not overwhelmingly supported by the Bratislava nationalists, who were caught on the horns of a dilemma reflecting the conflict between their national aspirations and their desire for the continuation of economic support from Prague.

Another country that has been faced increasingly with the crisis of national integration and identity has been Romania. For a long time, the neo-Stalinist regime in Bucharest has tried to suppress the nationalist dissent and has steadfastly denied the existence of discriminatory treatment of Hungarian and German national minorities. The fact remains, however, that particularly the Hungarian dissent has been growing in recent years and that neither the declining Ersatz charisma of President Ceausescu nor the regular invocations of the Soviet threat has succeeded in either creating a sense of a Romanian national identity or in defusing nationalist centrifugal tendencies.[16] Bulgaria, which until relatively recently appeared to have achieved a sense of nationalist identity, began to some extent to imitate Romania's policy, by exerting strong pressure against its Turkish minority. The reasons behind Sofia's discriminatory policy are not clear but the harshness of anti-Turkish policies took the rest of the region by surprise.[17]

What about East Germany? The evidence here is inconclusive. One could easily argue that, at least until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the country which by that time was formally only twelve years old, was faced with an almost insurmountable task of creating a separate and distinct nation-state, thus destroying all traditional links not only with West Germany but also with the idea of Grossdeutsches Reich. On the basis of purely impressionistic evidence, I would be prepared to argue that the process of East German nation-building has been relatively successful in the past quarter of a century and that it has resulted in the emergence of a significant degree of loyalty and commitment to the notion of a DDR-nationhood.

Neither Hungary or Poland experienced identity crises and because of that their respective governments utilized the existing powerful nationalisms for their own purposes. This was particularly true for the Warsaw regime which mobilized strong anti-German feelings in support of Poland's postwar Western boundaries and, indirectly, in its own support as the guarantor of the status quo. Periodically also, the latent anti-Semitism would also be aroused for specific purposes, as was the case in 1956, 1968 and 1980-81. The official encouragement of nationalist feelings was a double-

edged sword: while it worked reasonably well in some cases, its by-product was, of course, the maintenance of anti-Soviet feelings which continued unabated throughout the period.

The most powerful outburst of Hungarian nationalism occurred during the revolution of October-November 1956 and because of that the Hungarian leadership has tried to downplay it for the next twenty five years or so. However, the recent official attacks on Romania's treatment of Hungarian minority suggest that for reasons that are not entirely clear, Budapest feels no longer constrained to keep a lid on traditional anti-Romanian feelings.

(2) Penetration

The concept of penetration refers to the ability of the government to establish an effective and efficient control over the society. To quote Joseph L Palombara, "in its broadest sense penetration means conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority" and for any political elite "penetration refers to whether they can get what they want from people over whom they seek to exercise power."[18] The crisis of penetration then reflects the inability of the existing regime to make authoritative decisions that are obeyed and followed by the population.

It may be argued that in the past thirty-odd years the East European regimes, with two significant exceptions, seemingly succeeded in achieving a high degree of penetration. For example, despite the presence of a small albeit vocal domestic opposition, the Czechoslovak government has been able to "get what [it wanted] from people over whom [it] sought to exercise power." Space does not permit a fuller discussion of the reasons for the post-1968 government's success in re-establishing and maintaining tight control over its people. In trying to answer this question one would mot likely seek an answer in the Czechoslovak political culture as well as in the pattern of the country's historical development.

If we follow Huntington in defining culture as "the values, attitudes, orientations, myths and beliefs relevant to politics and dominant in society,"[19] we may hypothesize that the dominant national politico-cultural orientation of the great majority of the Czechoslovak people was a participatory-subject culture, which implied that "ordinary citizens must be obedient to their rulers' demands and must also display both enthusiasm and initiative in complying with their leaders' instructions."[20] Were we to eliminate the word "enthusiasm," the preceding appears as an apt description of both elite and mass national political culture in Czechoslovakia and as an explanation of the absence of a penetration crisis.

There is also no evidence of major penetration crises in East Germany, Hungary and Romania. It appears that in the former country, the institutionalization proved remarkably successful, displaying congruence with the traditional German national political culture which, as in Czechoslovakia, could be described as participatory-subject, with the accent on the subject. Hence, except for sporadic manifestations of latent discontent, dissent in East Germany seems to be restricted to a handful of artists and intellectuals without mass following.

The situation in Hungary has been both similar and different. All evidence suggests that the political system since the early 1960s has been performing relatively well in satisfying popular demands, both political and economic, and that the ruling party, recreated after the collapse of its predecessor in 1956, has learned its lesson and has proved highly responsive to popular aspirations, being also able to extract an impressive degree of popular compliance with its decisions. The presence of remarkably little overt dissent in Hungary, probably less than anywhere else in Eastern Europe, is a good testimony to the government's skill in penetrating the Hungarian society and polity.

Romania in the second half of the 1980s is by far the best example of total penetration by the state. While I would hesitate to call Romania totalitarian, it certainly comes close to the traditional Stalinist model with all its ramifications. To be sure, it is a rather unique type of a highly personalistic regime and this raises the question of its ability to survive its creator, but the fact remains that for the time being President Ceausescu succeeded in establishing total control over his people.

The two countries which did not avoid a penetration crisis were Yugoslavia and Poland. Yugoslavia presented a complex case. Among the various institutions that were intended to penetrate the polity, only the army qualified as a truly national organization, committed to the preservation of Yugoslav unity and the maintenance of Communist rule. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia has long been fragmented along republican lines and could not be relied upon as an instrument of control. The same was true for another important institution, the workers' councils, which were primarily concerned with their own particular interests, now and then in outright opposition to the government.

Without a doubt, Poland represented the most flagrant example of an acute penetration crisis. The existing major institutions - the Party, unions, and other "transmission belts" - have proved increasingly impotent in ensuring obedience and fulfillment of governmental objectives. Here the reasons were complex and stemmed from a combination of historical and cultural factors.

The weakness of the Polish regimes was further underscored by the fact that it has had to contend for decades with a powerful competing institution, largely absent elsewhere in the region: the Catholic Church. If anything, the Church proved more successful than the government in penetrating Polish society and if the political system managed to perform at all, it was because of the Church's tacit support.

(3) Participation

As pointed out by Myron Weiner, "one of the most disruptive crises in modern times has been caused by the efforts of those not in power to gain access to power or to influence decisions made by governing elites."21

As pointed out by Myron Weiner, "one of the most disruptive crises in modern times has been caused by the efforts of those not in power to gain access to power or to influence decisions made by governing elites."22 Perhaps the most important one deals with the character and form of participation. For example, the question has to be raised as to what constitutes a political rather than non-political participation. Secondly, participation implies voluntary action on the part of those interested in influencing governmental decisions and thirdly, a conventional definition of participation suggests that citizens have a choice in the way they intend to take part in decision-making.23

In light of the above, is it proper to talk about political participation in Eastern Europe today? My answer is both yes and no. There is evidence that in some countries a genuine effort has been made to ensure a wider access to decision-making on the part of selected groups of individuals which have been, and continue to be, influential in arriving at certain decisions. Although these decisions have been mostly concerned with fairly narrowly defined technical issues, we could talk here about authentic rather than totally manufactured participation. On the opposite side, some East European regimes have so far refused to allow even a modicum of popular participation.

There is little doubt that the crisis of participation in the region has been largely due to the emergence of the classic Huntingtonian syndrome of mass mobilization unaccompanied by institutionalization.24 Having succeeded in the early "revolutionary" period in harnessing the population to accomplish a variety of tasks associated with the process of building the foundations of the socialist order, the Communist regimes failed, by an large, to provide adequate outlets for the mobilized masses to expresses their preferences and articulate their demands.

As in the case of penetration, Poland again provides a good example of the crisis of participation. As mentioned above, the existing formal institutions, and especially the groups, have failed rather dismally in serving as channels of communication and instruments of participation, leaving large segments of the population, especially the

workers and peasants, without adequate voice in governmental decision-making. This failure was particularly striking with regard to specialized interest groups which, in contrast to such countries as Hungary and Yugoslavia, did not manage to make much of an imprint even in highly technical matters as economic or educational reforms. Consequently, social frustration was vented through such otherwise illegitimate institutions as the Church or "Solidarity', or through strikes and riots.

In comparison, Hungary and Yugoslavia have been able to ensure at least some meaningful participation via the existing institutions. In the former case, both the party and pressure groups such as the labor unions, professional organizations and collective farm associations, served as articulators of support and demands, and participated in the formulation of major decisions, such as, for example, the economic reforms. In the case of Yugoslavia, the workers councils and the unions played a similar role at both the local and federal levels.

Not much can be said about the remaining countries in the area. In Czechoslovakia and Romania, the existing oppressive regimes do not provide any meaningful popular access to decision-making which is clearly reserved for selected members of the ruling elite or family, with the existing institutions continuing to perform the traditional function of "transmission belts." Insofar as East Germany is concerned, there is some evidence that the DDR regime has been willing to grant some voice in decision-making to the "experts" but the degree of participation does not appear to be widespread.

(4) Distribution

Of all the critical areas, that of distribution appears to be the easiest to define and measure in an unambiguous fashion. To put it simply, the notion of distribution denotes the ability of the government to allocate material and other benefits among members of society.

The East European governments attempted to improve the process of allocation by embarking on major institutional reforms of their economies which also included an attempt at introducing economic rationalization and modernization, often with Western help. The outcome of these reforms varied from country to country as did their ability to deal with the crisis of distribution.

Clearly, it was Hungary which appeared most successful in dealing with the distribution crisis by reforming its economy and raising the welfare standard of its people through the implementation of the new Economic Mechanism.

Although Hungary's economic growth and progress have been negatively affected in recent years, there is little doubt that on balance the performance of the Hungarian economy and of the Hungarian regime must receive fairly high marks.

Both Czechoslovakia and East Germany actually started reforming their economies ahead of Hungary but their progress was soon halted: in Czechoslovakia by the 1968 Soviet intervention and in East Germany by the regime's unwillingness or inability to make a radical break with past practices. Nevertheless, in neither case were the reforms totally abandoned or abolished and even in their partial form they managed to contribute to the improvement in economic performance.

The situation in Yugoslavia was less clear-cut. In contrast to the other countries, Yugoslavia jettisoned the Stalinist system relatively early and proceeded to reform its economy by decentralizing decision-making, by creating the system of worker councils, by exporting its unemployment, and by opening its economy to foreign influences. The results of this policy turned out to be mixed: on the one hand, there is no doubt that economic well-being has shown signs of major improvement but on the other hand, the liberal policy has also resulted in sharp inflationary pressure, in growing unemployment, and in the opening of a gap between the more and less developed regions which, in turn, added fuel to the already simmering identity crisis.

Poland has been going through a distribution crisis for close to two decades. The crisis, manifested in a long-standing popular dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policy, came to a boil at least three times since 1970, representing a major challenge to the legitimacy of Communist rule. For reasons which cannot be discussed in full here, the Polish leadership has been congenitally unable to solve the problem of distribution despite the fact that the country was the first one in the region to experiment with economic reforms and, in addition, it was better endowed with natural resources than most countries in the area.

In recent years Romania has also began to face a very serious distribution crisis. For various reasons, the country's regime refused to engage in economic reform-making and essentially adhered to the Stalinist policy of emphasizing investment over consumption. Moreover, for reasons that cannot be explained rationally, President Ceausescu decided to repay Romania's large hard currency debt by expanding exports, which in turn reduced the standard of living of the population to subsistence level.

Thus far I discussed only the problem of allocating material values among the citizens. As mentioned earlier, however, the notion of welfare includes also the distribution of non-material benefits such as full employment, free

education and health services, as well as various other emoluments generating psychic income, such as social advancement. Until recently, the horizontal and particularly vertical mobility tended to moderate the distribution crisis (as well as some of the other crises) but there are now clear signs that the era of dynamic economic growth accompanied by rapid social mobility has been coming to an end, accentuating the treat of more intensive and deeper crises.

(5) Legitimacy

The notion of legitimacy is closely related to those of identity, penetration, participation, and distribution. It is also a difficult concept to define unambiguously. A government may be viewed as legitimate if its decisions are accepted by the majority of a population because of its belief in the "correctness" or "goodness" of the way in which these decisions were arrived at, and because they fulfilled popular expectations. The fact remains, however, that a crisis in any of the problem areas mentioned above was bound to raise the specter of a legitimate crisis.

As pointed out by Pye, one should distinguish between two types of legitimacy crises: a "fundamental" legitimacy crisis, caused by such things as conflicting or insufficient bases for claiming authority, faulty ideological and pragmatic claims to authority, and incomplete and inappropriate socialization of the citizenry,[25] and a "derivative" legitimacy crisis, caused by crises in the other problem areas discussed earlier. If we accept the above definitions, it becomes clear that every East European country has experienced a legitimacy crisis to a greater or lesser degree. Since each of the countries has been subjected over the years to one or more of the developmental crises, it follows that at different points in time the legitimacy of their political systems - their basis of authority and their political formula - has been questioned.

It is clear that Poland today represents the most extreme case of both "fundamental" and "derivative" legitimacy crises. Although, to be sure, the Communist government in that country has not collapsed, in the past 17 years there have been four distinct cases of a breakdown or near-breakdown of governmental authority and/or performance: the ouster of Gomulka in December 1970; the surrender of Gierek to worker demands in June 1976; the birth of "Solidarity" in August 1980; and the imposition of martial law in December 1981. This is not the place to analyze each case in detail but all of them did represent a major challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.

The situation in the rest of the region was much less critical. In at least two countries - Romania and Yugoslavia - the presence of an authentic (Yugoslavia) and engineered (Romania) charismatic leadership did go a long way in defusing a possible legitimacy crisis. Although the death of Tito removed a powerful instrument of legitimacy,

the Yugoslav party could lay a claim to genuine legitimacy based on its mode of seizing power after World War II. There are signs that in Romania the pseudo-charismatic leadership of President Ceausescu might be showing signs of wear and tear but, at least for the time being, he has been largely able to cope with challenges to his authority.

One may hypothesize that both East Germany and Hungary have managed to avoid a serious legitimacy crisis. Both regimes succeeded rather impressively in dealing with possible causes of the crisis: they tended to be pragmatic rather than dogmatic in their policies; they avoided possible disruption of their performance by minimizing and controlling the struggle for power at the top; and they were also successful in their socialization endeavors. Moreover, both countries were fortunate in being ruled by skillful leaders who were clearly aware of the complexities of their task and who did not create undue expectations among their respective populations.

A good case can be made for suggesting that the remaining country in the region, Czechoslovakia, has faced a serious legitimacy crisis and was able to overcome it. Here, in contrast to some of the other states, the underlying causes of the crisis were not so much unfulfilled expectations or incomplete socialization as a fundamental change in the character of the government, both resulting from the Soviet intervention in August 1968 and the subsequent demise of the Dubcek government which, according to all indications, enjoyed broad legitimacy. Although Dubcek's successor, Husak, did not prove as skillful as Hungary's Kadar in overcoming the ill-effects of a Soviet invasion, he still managed to re-establish his authority without resorting to extreme measures. Husak's replacement Jakeš has not ruled long enough to form an opinion.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that of the six East European countries considered, only Hungary succeeded reasonably well in its task of crisis management and that it has undergone some degree of political development. While Czechoslovakia and East Germany have been stagnating, Romania and Yugoslavia, but especially Poland, have been undergoing a process of political decay.

At this stage, a question ought to be raised as to what were the causes of uneven political development in the individual East European countries or why was the outcome of the process different in different countries.

One can answer this question in various ways. My own preference is to answer it by focusing on the two variables which were discussed at some length at the beginning of this essay: national political culture and groups.

After years of neglect, the problem of political culture in the Communist context began recently to regain the attention it rightly deserved. In the developmental context its importance cannot be exaggerated as it has affected in one way or another almost all the critical problem areas. National political cultures, whether viewed in terms of national identity or national character, played a major role in the crises of national integration and legitimacy and also contributed to the crises of penetration, participation and even distribution.

The same is largely true for the second systemic variable, the groups. The presence of groups also played a role in generating crises of participation, distribution and penetration, and, by definition, legitimacy. As was the case with the influence of national identity, the impact of pluralistic tendencies varied from country to country, but its critical importance was unmistakable.

What about the future? One of the interesting conclusions emerging from the above discussion is that the various crises do induce important changes in the two variables discussed throughout this paper. For example, Poland, the country that has been undergoing every crisis imaginable, has had a long tradition of powerful nationalism but practically no experience of genuine interest groups. It may be argued that this is no longer true today. As a result of coping with the various crises, the country has witnessed the emergence of truly powerful and genuine institutional interest groups, the Catholic Church and overt or covert "Solidarity" which are likely to remain important components of Polish political landscape for many years to come. More than that: the birth of genuine interest groups forced even the old "transmission belts" to abandon their subservience to the Communist masters and to adopt a more independent policy. As a result, Poland in 1988 is beginning to acquire features of a genuine pluralist society.

While the remaining countries, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, still appear a long way from resembling Poland, there is evidence of a slow movement in that direction, especially in Hungary but also in East Germany and even Czechoslovakia. Only Romania shows no signs of emulating the example of the other countries but what is likely to happen after Ceausescu's death is anybody's guess.

The future of nationalism in Eastern Europe is much harder to predict. I would argue that a good deal will depend on the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies in the region. It is a well known fact that in the past 40 years or so this relationship has oscillated between two extremes - tight control and more-or-less benign neglect. The former was characterized as a rule by suppressing of nationalist tendencies, the latter by resurrecting traditional nationalist feelings, not only vis-à-vis the Soviet hegemony but also with regard to one's neighbors.

While today it is rather difficult to define, more or less accurately, the relationship between the USSR and the East European countries, there are indications that the current leader in the Kremlin has other things on his mind than maintaining tight control over his East European empire. If that is the case then one may anticipate still another revival of nationalism in the region. This time, however, the national antagonism may be directed less at the Soviet Union and more against the traditional enemies in the region. That these antagonism do exist closely under the surface has been amply demonstrated during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 and is currently reflected in the Hungarian-Romanian and Bulgarian-Turkish conflicts. If they are allowed to continue, they may well weaken the fabric of Soviet controls over the region, and that is why I believe that the answer to the question of the future of East European nationalism can be found in the Kremlin.

Andrzej Korbonski is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has written and published on various aspects of Soviet and East European politics and economics. Address: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA.

NOTES

1 For a comprehensive study, see Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969).

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3 Shoup, "Communism, Nationalism...," p. 886.

4 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd. ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: the MIT Press, 1966), passim.

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7 H. Gordon Skilling, "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Straw Men and Red Herrings," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. xiii, no. 1, 1980, pp. 82-88, and "Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited," World Politics, vol. xxxvi, no. 1, 1983, pp. 1-27.

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9 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change," Comparative Politics, vol. 3, no. 3, 1971, p. 320.

10 Huntington, "The Change to Change,", p. 320.

11 The six countries to be considered are Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.

12 Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 63-66.

13 Huntington, "The Change to Change," p. 316.

14 Andrzej Korbonski, "Political Development and Political Decay: The Case of Eastern Europe," (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1980), p. 19.

15 Lucien W. Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in Leonard Binder et al., Crisis and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 114.

16 For recent examples, see New York Times, 4 April and 21 May 1987.

17 New York Times, 20 April 1986 and 15 February 1987.

18 Joseph La Palombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Government Capacity," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, pp. 208-209.

19 Huntington, "Change to Change," p. 316.

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21 Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, p. 159.

22 See, Robert S. Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., ed., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 244-253.

23 Weiner, "Political Participation," pp. 163-164.

24 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 54-55.

25 Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, p. 136.

UNIVERSITÉ DE LAUSANNE
FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES

Institut de science politique

Av. de l'Université 5
1005 LAUSANNE
Tél. (021) 44 42 40

Le 20 avril 1988.

Cher Ami,

Suite à notre coup de téléphone voici l'article pour l'IJPS. J'ai réduit mon papier – avec les blancs et compte-tenu des suppressions – il doit faire 24 pages. Je l'ai également maintenu en Anglais, le traduire en Français aurait signifié le réécrire et je disposais de trop peu de temps pour cela. J'ai envoyé directement un exemplaire à Josh Kaïkel et j'espère que tout marchera sans encombres.

Meilleures amitiés à Rafael Ribó.

Bien cordialement,

PRA 7.85 2000

D.L. SEILER
University of Lausanne

PERIPHERAL NATIONALISM BETWEEN PLURALISM AND MONISM

IPSA Roundtable on Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism, Barcelona, June 25-27, 1987.

Nationalism is a rather ambiguous concept. In the nineteen century it has been the mobilizing factor used as well by the independence movements in the Balkas than by those fighting for the unification of Germany and Italy. It was also utilised by the European and North-American Imperialism in order to legitimize the process of colonization. One of its major outcome was world War I ! During the interwar period Nationalism become a very important compound of the Fascist and Nazi ideologies. Furthermore either in Flanders and in Friesland or in Britanny Peripheral Nationalism shows its closed ties and affinities with Hitler's Germany.

After the fall of the Nazi Empire Nationalism was strongly identified with the hard core of conservatism if not with Autoritarianism. The bad image of this concept was such as the *Union Valdôtaine* - created in 1945 Italy - never claimed to be Nationalist but Federalist.

However since the Bandoeng Conference and the rebellion of Algeria against France, the activities of the ENOKA in Cyprus and, of course, the rise of Colonel Nasser in AEgypt, the mood changed about Nationalism. The process of Third World Decolonization and the struggle of some "New Nations" for independence has given new credits to the word *Nationalism*.

In the sixties, Maurice Duverger himself drawned a sharp line between: "*le nationalisme des dominants et celui des dominés*"[1]. The first one is progressive and linked with the struggle for selfgovernment, democracy and socialism. The latter is conservative and linked with Colonialism, Imperialism and antidemocratic strains.

What is the empirical value of this interesting *distingo* today ? The hypothesis of this paper is that if there is a tremendous difference between Peripheral Nationalism - "*le nationalisme des dominés*" - and Centralist Nationalism - "*le nationalisme des dominants*" - some aspects belong to the essentials of Nationalism as such. We assume Duverger's idea that both brands of Nationalism are opposed and that Peripheral Nationalism is, quite often the result of Centralist Nationalism. Two concepts will help us to locate either Peripheral or Centralist Nationalism in a two-dimensional space: *Pluralism* and its opposite *Monism*.

However to talk about Nationalism involves the use of the concept of *Nation*. This word is rather ambiguous and has to be clarified. Then the focus will be on the relation between Nation and State and the logic of centralism. Finally we shall emphasis on this logic and the rise of Peripheral Nationalism.

I. The vocabulary of Nationalism: the word Nation from France to Germany

For a political scientist, the word *Nation* refers to a rather ambiguous concept. There are lot of definitions for this successful concept and neither has gained a paradigmatic status within the political science. Even Josef Stalin drafted one, but if he became a great Tsar he, on the other hand, was a very poor thinker.

The most common trend among specialists is the link Nation with language? This is certainly not untrue, but if one looks at the places where violence and killings happen through Nationalism in Europe one sees that it has nothing to do with linguistic riots. Those places are Euskadi - both Spanish and French - with ETA and Iparretarrak, Northern-Ireland with the IRA and Corsica with the FNLC. In all those cases the genuine language of the "Nation" has losted its vernacular use. In Euskadi the majority language is Spanish understood by everybody and even the independentist newspaper *Egin* is mostly written in Castillan. In French Corsica and Euskadi, everybody has completely been frenchifyed through the centralized school-system of the Republic. And Gaelic has completely disappeared from Northern-Ireland. Those examples clearly show that it is not necessary to have kept a distinctive language in order to maintain a strong national consciousness.

Rather than to define the Nation, it would be better to look at the several meanings of the word in the political debate through History. This excludes definitions given by political scientists, sociologists or historians and, on the contrary, emphasizes on actors. The approach can be summarize as the following: "Who says what and why ?" This kind of approach is adapted to concepts which are ambiguous in themselves.

One example will reveal the polysemy of the word *Nation* and thus its ambiguity. The most famous international Rugby competition is called *The*

Five Nations Cup. The five Naticnal teams are the following: England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland - who is united for the occasion - and... France. The interesting fact is that the French team has an overwhelming majority of Occitans - mostly coming from the Southwest of the Country - so important that it could be named an Occitanian or Languedocian Team !

In this example one can find three different meanings for the word *Nation*. The first one, still quite familiar in the United Kingdom, is used to distinguish the English, Irish, Welsh and Scottish teams. It is a non-political meaning, with no reference to a sovereign state. The second one, used in the U.S.A. and in France, labels the French team. It is a political meaning, defining a State recognized by the Internationak haw. The third one could be found in my comment when I am dealing with an entity without any legal credentials as Occitania which is neither a State nor a Region as Languedoc-Roussillon, a French administrative unit. Any good French specialist of Public law would see that I am insinuating that there could be a Nation called Occitania and this would be analized like a threat to the Unity of the French Republic, "*une et indivisible*".

The several meanings of the word *Nation* are the results of the conflictual relations between France and Germany and their consequences about both international and internal order are of tremendous importance.

A. The Starting Point: the non political meaning of Nation

The British tradition has, more or less, left unchange the old meaning of *Nation*. The word is used it the way it is by the Bible, it also apply to student societies organized in the Medieval University on the base of Ethnicity. In this sense a Nation is a community larger than a tribe or a *Clann* sharing a common origin expresses through a set of common distinctive features like language - which could have vanished or integrated in a most important one - mythology, law, etc. In this sense the existence of a Nation involves neither the presence of the State nor a definite citizenship. The old concept of Nation is thus not linked at all with a population ruled by a State on a defined Territory.

B. The Politicizing of the concept: the Nation-State

During the Ancient Regime the relation between the Individual and the State was a personal link with the Crown and the person of the Legitimate King. He was the owner of *Sovereignty*, the sovereign. When the Ancient Regime collapsed, early in England, more than a century later in France, the Sovereign was immolated and Sovereignty transferred somewhere else. In England a concrete, definite Institution had been able, through History to achieve a challenging legitimacy progressively equal to the Crown's: the *Parliament* got the Sovereignty. In France no institution was ever able to challenge the King's sovereignty neither the *Etats-généraux* nor the *Parlements*, the latter never unified in a single body. Thus when Louis XVI was eliminated the sovereignty was transferred to some abstraction: the *Nation*.[3] The word became quite successful though in competition with some other neighbouring symbols like *République* and *Patrie*.[4] Perhaps because it was the most acceptable to everybody Nation won, progressively over its competitors. Because it indicates the human substractum of the Polity without any references to the organization of Government. This was especially convenient for a country whose experienced a lot of different constitutions: five republics, three brands of monarchy, two empires, etc.

In this sense, Nation means the population ruled by a definite State, owner of a definite Territory. Nation is the human translation of a State, actually the *identity* corresponding to a State. German lawyers called it *Staatsnation*. This meaning is still expressed in the French Constitution: "*Tous les pouvoirs émanent de la Nation*". Thus the Sovereignty does not belong to the Parliament but to an abstraction which has to be transformed into a community otherwise it would not work.

I would suggest September 1792 and the Battle of Valmy for the symbolic birth of the Nation State. In this village a totally new type of army based on both physical and cognitive mobilization beated the Prussians led by the Duke of Brunswick. Though the Prussian Army was the best in Europe and the most professional and the French casualties were far higher than the Prussians ! Valmy saw the rise of a new type of war and Army where soldiers are willing to die in defense of their beloved Mother: the Nation.[5]

C. The Antithesis: the Cultural Nation

The French Revolution was first of all... a Revolution ! And the wars conducted by the Allies against Revolutionnary France were ideological, a kind of class warfare opposing aristocratic Europe supported by the French nobility to Bourgeois Democratic France carrying the hope of Continental Bourgeoisies. When the victorious armies of the Revolution arrived to Germany they were welkomed as Liberators by the local Bourgeois and *Intelligentsia*.[6] However after having liberated the Germans from tje Feudalistic Rule the French troops forgot to leave the country. Actually the Paris Cabinet decided to set up a network of satellite and devoted States and annexed the West bank of the Rhine which became - divided into *départements* - a part of the French *Nation*. And the mood changed to the former admirers of 1789 France although still committed to the *principles and values* of the French Revolution.

Admitting neither the division within vassal states nor the integration in the French Nation the German Revolutionnary elite had to express his goals in another definition of the Nation-State. *Neither French nor Wurtenbergian or Prussian but German*. This was done with the invention of a new meaning of Nation, *Kulturnation*, the Cultural Nation essentially based on language.[7] The basic principle for this second meaning is that in a Nation-State, a Nation can exist before the organization of the State. However the destiny of a Nation is that it has to be translated into an appropriate state: a State is the institutionnal mold of a Nation.

Opposed to the French meaning of the Nation State, the Cultural Nation fitted the needs of the German Intelligentsia and Bourgeoisies to whom it gave an efficient political tool.

D. The Synthesis: the Elective Nation

In the name of the Cultural Nation, Greece and other Balkanic Countries became independent and Italy reached its unity. Of course it inspired the unification movement in Germany. The *Deutsche Einheit* was achieved against Austria and first of all against France - which provided a very convenient external ennemy. The unification was realised in 1870 with the so called Franco-Prussian war and the German Empire was created or restaured at Versailles in 1871. Two French Provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, were incorporated in the new *Reich*.

The French national pride was not ready to swallow the bitterness of territorial losses which for the first time regarded provinces integrated into France for more than a Century. This was far more than to give back the conquests of the French Revolution. Thus "*la ligne bleue des Vosges*" became just a ceasefire line and the two lost provinces a symbol of a popular quest for revenge. *La "Revanche"* was a popular theme for all patriotic meetings and not only among nationalists: a famous song, extremely mobilizing was "*Ils nous rendront l'Alsace et la Lorraine*" !

But on which ground to justify the return of the lost provinces to the French Nation ? Definitely not on the basis the traditionnal French Republican definition of Nation-State: Alsace and Lorraine had been given to Germany after a due diplomatic treaty. Certainly not with the help of the second definition.: *Kulturnation* was used in order to legitimize their annexion to the *zweite Reich* ! For any competent linguist, folklorist or ethnograph of the time, it looked obvious than neither Alsatians nor Lorrains belonged to Latinity. Furthermore the Germans had left Nancy and its *Département* and Belfort because the dialect spoken there were French.

Thus there was a strong need to define a new meaning of the Nation-State concept. A meaning able to legitimize the French demand to recover Alsace and Lorraine. The gap was filled wich Ernest Renan and his concept of *Elective Nation*: neither *Staatsnation* nor *Kulturnation* but *la volonté de vivre en commun*".[8] Alsatians and Lorrains did not belong to the French State anymore. They were not precisely a part of the French Culture - at least for whatpeasants, craftmen and workers are concerned - but they were French, and indistinctive part of the French nation because they were feeling French and identifying themselves with the Past and Destiny of France. Once upon a time *Alsaciens* and *Lorrains* elected France like before them and after them all the other parts of the Country did. The French Nation was more than just the citizenry of a State, it did not by in the use of a common language, it was the product of History and free choice; the nineteen Century writer and nationalist politician Maurice Barrès spoke about "*La terre et les morts*".

Elective Nation is both a highly emotionnal and a very convenient concept Ir quickly replaced the first concept meaning of Nation in Countries based on the *Staatsnation* principle. In facts this third definition only reshuffles the "State-nation" one and can be successfully opposed to *Kulturnation*.

When in 1980 Canada Mr Trudeau and Mr Lévesque tried to mobilize their followers they both used the word Nation but they did not mean at all the same thing! When in the Spanish Basque Country a member of the ETA kills a policeman, he does it in the name of the Nation - Euskadi - and he is deeply convinced that behaves like an *Abertzale*, a patriot. When in the same conditions, a soldier of the *Guardia Civil* shots an *Etarra*, it is in the name of the Nation, in doing that, he is not just acting on duty but he behaves like a patriot eliminating a dangerous terrorist threatening the Spanish National Unity. Both are fighting for the same National territory. However the same National territory is different if defined with the help of the Cultural Nation or through the binocular of the Elective-State Nation.

One can appreciate the wide range of opportunities the polysemic word Nations is able to offer to a lot of either international conflicts - where State borders are so often artificial - or internal strifes. Both meanings are competing because they claimed to be the sole true definition of *The* Nation and both assume the logical link with the concept of State-*Nation élective* and *Kulturnation* are exclusive definitions given for the modern Nation-State. The choice between the former or the latter depends on the political interests of who is using this ambiguous concept.

II. Nation and the logic of the State

The Nation-State is the terrible - in terms of casualties - legacy of the Franco-German conflictual neighbourhood from 1791 to 1945. European integration is perhaps the inversion of this dialectic.

If some countries, like Greece or Denmark, were Nations towards what the ancient unpolitical meaning of the word is concerned, and then became Nation-States with some continuity, the concept of Nation-State used for quite all the sovereign countries is quite recent: it is a part of the legacy of the French Revolution. One has already discussed the profound ambiguity of the polysemic concept of Nation. This word belongs to the universe of ideology; it is a symbol and, let us say, a myth in the meaning Georges Sorel gave to the word *myth*: a political idea or symbol used to mobilize the political masses. On the contrary the State and especially state's apparatuses are someone very concrete. Of course it is necessary to be precise when talking

about the state. For isntance anthropologists and most of marxist theoreticians are using the word *State* as an equivalent for Political System. I personnally share Max Weber's view, there is a State when in a defined political system an institutionnalized centre of power is capable to implement its will of controling a definite territory with the help of a real monopoly of legitimate use of enforcement and violence. This definition involves that people obey the State because they fear some state's apparatuses - Army, Police - but also because they comply with the rules processed by an institution they perceive as the true rules and norms maker.

A. State-building

This means that Lebanon is not a State anymore, this also means that the Feudal State never existed and that the States appears with the birth of the *Absolutist State*.[9] The State is the result of an historical evolution, the statebuilding Process or Nationbuilding Process if one includes the rise of the Nation as well. It is important to mention two points for the purpose of our analysis.

The rise of the State is not only historically but also geographically located. If one looks at the famous Rokkan's *Conceptual Map of Europe*,[10] the States finally surge in the immediate neighbourhood of the cities network real backbone of Europe which divides the Continent following a North-South Axis. However it cannot fully develope in countries deeply marked by Catholic Counter reformation: it needs either a national Protestant Church or a National Catholicism rather autonomous from Rome like Gallicanism in France.

Secondly the rise of the State is the result of the territorial action of successfull kings who just behaved like wise and cautious peasants. They wanted to get a wealthy territory easy to control and also easy to defend. The ways and means for territorial increments were marriage and war. In order to achieve his purpose of full control of a territory, the Crown had to eliminate the military power of his Vassals and to build up an efficient Civil Service and this means to centralize. For instance in 1789, England who had been once conquerred by the Normans looked more rationnally centralized than the Kingdom of France did: one legal and judicial system, more regular size territorial administrative units, etc.

In order to control efficiently a territory a Political Power has to be recognize as legitimate. During the Statebuilding period, legitimacy was traditional: when crowned the King was the blessed and legitimated owner of the Power.[11] No matter if people felt Provençal or Aragonese rather than French or Spanish the important feature was that they were faithfull to the person of the sovereign. Ruling territories with highly heterogenous populations the Kings were calling for a personal link with the subjects. The King of France got the faith of the Breton because he became, through his wedding, the legitimate Duke of Brittany. The first Sovereign owning the Crown of *Spain* was the Queen Isabel II, before 1833, King of Spain was an officious title for the official King of Castilla, Aragon and Leon, Lord of Vizcaya etc. Today Elizabeth II is not the Queen of Britain but the Queen of England, Scotland and Ireland.

B. Nationbuilding

When the Bourgeoisie took over the government during the English and French Revolutions, it could not rely of the mobilizing system provided by the *traditional legitimacy*.[12] It had to replace the lack of a blessed personal link by something else to impose the *Legal-Rational Legitimacy*.[12] This was a real gap because people often translated their nostalgy of the ancient order in supportinf a charismatic strong chief like Cromwell or Bonaparte.

There was thus a strong need to create, among people, a strong identity with the state, to build up a unique Body Politic to replace the sophisticated and hierarchized network of loyalties supporting the Crown. Otherwise the new ruling elite could not have maintained or atteinted the goal of the Absolutist State: to control and to defend a territory protected by borders strategically efficient. One can see two different ways used by the State to achieve this goal. England and France provide the two ideal typical cases which soon became models for the European States and later for most of the countries of the World.

1° The way of hegemony

Comparing France and Britain on the field of adminsitrative and institutionnal differenciation of political apparatuses, Pierre Birnbaum concludes

than the former is not a real State but only a Political Centre.[13] I do not share this point-de-view far to Francocentrist for me: when using Max Weber's definition of this concept it becomes obvious than Britain is a State. However it is a different kind of State than the French, definitely less differenciated, and Birnbaum is perfectly right to pinpoint this sharp contrast between the two distinct nationbuilding processes.

Using Antonio Gramsci's terminology, I would suggest to call the British way by the word *hegemonic*. The national integration within the State was achieved in a rather smooth process and with a minimum differenciation of the State's Apparatuses.

National Catholicism gave its full pledge of support to the integration of populations. This was helped by the schism of the Anglican Church which cut its ties with Rome and could pull its full weight in the interest of the State. Some linguists and dialectologists have brought into evidence the tremendous influence the translation of the Bible into vernacular languages has played in favour of the cultural homogeneity of a country.

The results are somewhat devicive. Britain bas beaten France in what ethnocide is concerned: Breton and Basque languages are still alive when Cornish has completely vanished. Since Gaston Defferre's bill on regionalisation French *Régions* have more powers and are more democratic than English *Planning Regions*. Bills concerning Scotland or Wales are passed by the Westminster Parliament and the two referenda on devolution were rather tricky.

On the other hand, a lot of symbols which in other countries were immediately under attack and appropriated by the Centre for the sake of National unity are respected: i.e. the Scottisch law, the Privileges of the *Kirk*, the Scottish Banknotes etc.

2° The way of Domination

In France, the Gallican Church was never enforced to the point it had to break with Rome. However it was under State control until the "*Loi de Séparation*" in the beginning the present century. Until the French Revolution, the Church of France was dominated by Gallicanism and a Calvinist strain - which exists in Anglicanism through the Low Church - was present in

the jansenist stream. After the dead of Louis XVI and ironically under the *Concordat* signed with Napoleon, ultramontanes progressively took over the French Catholic Church. Their victory was complete just before World War I and this with the help of secularist politicians of the *radical-socialiste* Cabinets of the Third Republic !

In 1789, the French Monarchy however centralizing was never able to impose all over its territory either a Common Law or a unique adminsitrative organization. There were several regional legal systems ruled by Courts - *Parlements* - using their own jurisprudential approach and the Country was divided in two types of provinces: *Pays d'élections* easy to rule for the State represented by his *intendants* and *Pays d'Etats* with their legislative assembly and their Foral rights, nightmare of the Intendants... If the French Language had seduced - like overall on the Continent - the elites and if French was used by the State, regional languages were alive like Provençal used by the *Parlement* of Aix-en-Provence and by the *Etats provinciaux* together with French. On the other hand no institution was ever able to compete for legitimacy with the King. The sole bodies which ever challenged the Crown were the *Parlements* supported by the high stratus of aristocracy during the Regency of Queen Anne d'Autriche. This attempt, *La Fronde*, completely failed and was smashed by the Prime Minister Mazarin.

The French Revolution got the heritage of an Absolutist State lying in the Person of the King balanced by decentralization. Lacking legitimacy the Political Institutions remained unstable and even volatile. The sovereignty was thus transferred to an artefact[14], the Nation. But the real element of continuity through the changes of regimes is the State's Apparatus. In other words, the Nation is the Platonician pure essence - actually of the State - given to the love of the people and presented as a secular religion where they are the collective idol. The Nation is the legitimization of the State: people believe they are the gods, actually they trust the state.

This means to create a personal identity translating the State within the individual consciousness. Without a Sunday Mass in French and the daily reading of the Bible in the language of Molière this was technically difficult.[15] The systemic response was a strong differenciation of the State's apparatuses and their centralization. It was necessary for the State to

generalize and uniformize the cultures existing all over the french territory in order to obtain an universalistic values system, a single language and an homogeneous legal and judicial frame in local and regional government, language[16] and law. And the only way of doing that is through enforcement. The major apparatus issued by this process of differenciation is the Educational System: the Church had to be dropped out of the school I suggest to use Gramsci's concept of Domination to call this way for the State to achieve his goals through his monopoly of legitimate constraint.

Theoretically there is nothing in the concept of *Staatsnation* which imposes one language. Actually the reality looks quite different: like every *Kulturnation* sees its achievement in becoming a *Staatsnation*, every *Staatsnation* wants to build a *Kulturnation*. In a tale with a strong emotional patriotic stand, the French novelist Alphonse Daudet tells us the story of the little Frantz, a young Alsatian schoolboy attending in 1871 the farewell speech, left in "*La dernière classe*", by the french teacher leaving the classroom to be replaced by a German colleague. The most emotional feature of the teacher's speech is certainly when he said to the pupils: "*N'oubliez jamais votre langue maternelle!*". This tale is better than Barrès or René Bazin novels, perhaps the pasterpiece of nationalist literature and it did a lot in favour the "*Revanche*" mind before the First World War. Now when one wonders about the mother language of a peasant child in Alsace at the fall of the Second Empire it was definitely not French and certainly not German but Alsatian dialect... Never matter!

From the *Rapport Grégoire* during the French Revolution until the mid seventies everything was done to eradicate the rivals of the French language. Everything has been done successfully in order to create from this originally heterogenous France a real cultural Nation where the French language plays a tremendous role.

It is not surprising that French National achievement has provided a model for all the culturally heterogenous countries.

3° The Failure of the French Model

French or English National integrations were possible, like Rokkan pointed out, because of National Control over religion and the absence of a strong

belt of autonomous cities. In both polycentric backbone of Europe, in Southern Europe influenced by Counter-Reformation Catholicism, and in Eastern Europe which remained imperial a late process of national integration failed.

Consequently centralist nationalism took a paroxystic form. The logic of centralism when pushed to its extreme limits could be expressed through the nazi slogan: "*Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*". Fascism and Nazism are a kind of desperate and somewhat mad attempt to realize the impossible absolute synthesis between State and Society. The rise of such a Political Party is the result of the failure of a late statebuilding process based on the french model. This absolute monism is a reaction against a pluralism which is so strong that it prevents the rise of a differentiated state. Pluralistic countries were, for a long time, weak, unable to achieve the goals of the State which are firstly to obtain full control of the territory and to get safe borders. On the contrary they were annexed by powerfull states for the sake of the so called "natural borders" or their size was slightly reduced. The only hope for them to escape was to conclude federative pacts or alliances. For instance Belgian History looks like a set of territorial losses.

C. Nationalism and Statebuilding

Nationalism is thus what Léo Moulin[17] calls a secular religion created by a differenciated State in order to supply a lack of the legitimity needed for the achievement of its territorial goals. The prerequisit is the building of a National Consciousness through political socialisation which creates within each individual a set of attitudes called National Identity.[18] For doing that, the State has to own the educational system and then to impose the national language and to teach a national vision of History.

The result is that the territorial goals of the State are not supported anymore by a blind committment to the person of the legitimate King. Popular support is gained by an ideological mobilization.[19] For instance territorial increments needed for strategical reasons are supported by people through an emotionnal faith in a lot of very convenient myths like "*les frontières naturelles de la France*" or its German counterpart "*die Lebensraum*". Colonialism is a "natural" corollary for the expected space of the State, a follow up of the achievement and the ideological strength of imperialism was

not questionnable during the nineteen century. If one looks at an atlas of the XIXth century, one sees that England was in control of the British Isles, that the United States were going from coast to coast, that France had got her natural borders with the exception ot Belgium and Luxemburg, that Spain had covered the Iverian Peninsula with the Portuguese exception, Sweden was holding Norway, that Italy had pushed the Austrian out of the Peninsula and annexed the Pope's territories and that, for Germany, the "*Drang nach osten*" was on the way.

III. The Countermobilization of the Periphery[20]

Modern Bourgeois States had to achieve and perform the goals assigned by the absolutist States, to follow the logic impulsed by the Kings and some of their Great Ministers. Lacking the legitimity of the monarchs, Bourgeois Democrats had to convinced the masses in order to mobilize them for the National purpose. It was necessary to interiorised in each individual and identity corresponding to the State, to create a National consciousness.

This was properly done through the hegemonic way in Britain and through the domination way in France. The process was efficiently led in Prussia, Denmark and Sweden. However it was not without facing some countermobilization of the Periphery which generated a new brand of Nationalism directed against the Centre.

A. The rise of Peripheral Consciousness

The quest for a territory easy to control internally and strategically convenient for external defense do not drive automatically to an homogeneous population. It sometimes can, like in the case of Greece, but most of the time the so called natural borders if natural are not borders at all. Mountains were refuges where smaller ethnic groups had kept their identity, rivers wers ways of communications before roads were open.

The absolutist State was able to manage diversity because of his legitimation system based on a direct personal link with the King. The sovereign of Spain recognized by the Basques only as Lord of Vizcaya and after his oath to respect the *fueros*. This oath had to be done under the famous tree

of Guernica - *Arbola Guernikako*. The same King was ruling Catalonia because as King of Aragon he was the legitimate heir of the Counts of Barcelona.

It would a mistake to idealize the Absolutist State like a monarchy respectuous of cultural diversity. Not at all: it put the process of administrative and legal centralization on the tracks. It helped the birth of a national market, the primitive accumulation of capital and thus the rise of an economic core[21] with a centralist bourgeoisie. The sharps difference between the Absolutist State and its follower the National Bourgeois State was that the former did not needed cultural centralization to form a National identity: respect and dedication to the Crown were enough to get itproperly functionning.

Like Stein Rokkan pointed out some peripheral provinces or/and some others which used a different language had been left out of the mobilizing process introduced by the National Revolution. Those areas belonging to the Periphery in the economic, geographic and political sense reacted by a countermobilization against the national mobilization of the Centre. In countries deeply influenced by conterreformation and/or strongly pluralistic, or given to another county after 1815, all characterized by late Statebuilding, the relation is a refusal of a new political Centre. Three idealtypes can be suggested: firstly the dialectic of Peripheral Consciousness, secondly the political rise of a countercenter and thirdly the role of the "Periphery of the Periphery".

1° The Dialectic of Peripheral Consciousness[22]

The first reaction of the Periphery is a *Reaction* in the full marxist meaning of the word, then it is denied by the rise of a democratic nationalism within the Periphery and denied again or surpassed in a left-wing neouniversalistic antistate "Creative Utopy".

a) The Legitimist Reaction

The Periphery has been let outside the Bourgeois Revolution and left out the Process of National integration. Furthermore it has not been fully reached by the flow of informations coming from the centre. Concerning Economic Development and Social Stratification it is not mature at all to acknowledge

or even to understand the aims of Bourgeois Revolution. Well then the Revolution expelled or even killed the legitimate King in order to replace him either by a different monarchy or by a totally different Regime like a Republic, the result is the break up of the traditionnal legitimaty. For the Periphery the change which occurs in the mode of Government also means the lost of all its linguistic, fiscal, legal, administrative, symbolic and sometimes religions particularistic privileges replaced by a new uniform and universalistic system.

It is hard or perhaps impossible to say what is prior for mobilizing the Periphery: to support the legitimate Prince or to defend its privileges or foral rights? Both are probably intermixed in this strong emotionnal collective reaction. However it clearly expressed itself it in a definite rejection of the new political order and a strong committment to restore the old customs and legitimacy. Mobilized people are not aware that they fight in order to maintain a distinctive identity but in rising the banner of traditionnal legitimacy they expressed their difference. I suggest to call *Legitimist Reaction* this first unconscious assessment in the defense of the Periphery. This does not involve that all legitimisms belong to movements of territorial defense. Most of the time Peripheral Legitimists were allied to reactionnaries of the Centre, i.e. the upper aristocracy plus rural and urban traditionalists.

Jacobites in Ireland and Scotland, *Chouans* in Britanny and Carlists in the Basque Country are de most salient examples of legitimist reactions.

b) Populist Nationalism[23]

As a reaction legitimism has no future. All restaurations - french or spanish - always looks loke a kind of betrayal. The french *Restauration* restored absolutism but left untouched the all centralized frame imposed by the French Revolution. The restoration of Ferdinand VII maintained the centralist policies, especially under Isabel II and the return of Alphonse XII corresponded to a Constitutionnal and not to a societal change. Louis XVIII kept the Napoleonic orgnaization of the territorial control. Like Pierre Birnbaum, I am deeply convinced that there is a logic of the state autonomous in regard of the socioeconomic structure.[24] The temporary come back of the aristocracy as the ruling class did not affect the development of national centralism.

The first countermobilization of the Periphery, the legitimist reaction was a total wreck, however it prepared the way of a second one combining the defense of the particularistic values and tradition to the modernistic aims of Nationalism. The second mobilization of the Periphery is no more a reaction against political change expressed through an obstinate committment to traditional, legitimacy. It is still a refusal but this time against the process of National integration operated by the Centre. It is the clearcut and well defined expression of the *Bewussein* of the Periphery: the Peripheral consciousness as itself and for itself. The ideological weapons used against the centre are provided by the vocabulary of European Nationalism.[25] And one can say that this *Populist Nationalist* countermobilization of the Periphery is a kind of unexpected by product of the national integration process.

Actually the pressure the centre operates on the Periphery generates the mobilization of the latter. Ironically it developes within the ideological frame imposed by centralism, this means: Nationalism. In the context of European Romanticism the defenders of the Periphery will find on their way the fascinating mythology produced in the conflictual debate among Nation-States. Thus they will rise their, let us say, local society to the status of Nation. It is of course the German meaning of *Kulturnation* which prevails: the Periphery opposes its *Cultural Nation* to the Centre's *State Nation* which if the challenge is serious will reply in using the *Elective Nation*. *In facts the birth of Populist Nationalism is a process where a Periphery returns against a Centre the nationalistic ideology this Centre had generated in order to integrate its peripheries into a sole unified Nation.*[26] The late French Africanist Yves Person spoke about a "*fonction miroir*" of this Peripheral Nationalism. It is a mirror sending back to the centre a reversed image of nationalism.

When dealing with the rise of a Populist Nationalist Consciousness of the Periphery one has to face an interesting theoretical question: does it represents a Nationalism, full stop or does "*le nationalisme des dominés*" belong to something different ? One would like to focus on three major differences which are not the sole: compared to centralist Nationalism, Peripheral Nationalism is Populist, Democratic and, to some extent, left aside the Nation-State Idea.

Peripheral Nationalism is a *Populism*. This means a syncretic mixture of Progressive and Conservative features expressed through an emotional feeling

of class reconciliation in a kind of general - in this case national - brotherhood. Populist Nationalism is strongly traditionalist: it is in this sense the faithfull heir of the legitimist reaction. Traditional values of the Periphery are extremely important including language and religion. Sometimes this committment means to revive dying or even dead traditions. Norwegians, Irish, Flemish[27] and Basques Nationalists worked to recreate an official language. Everybody knows which role Roman Catholicism has played for Irish Nationalism but fundamentalist protestantism played an equal role for the mobilization of the Norwegian Periphery against a centre supporting the Swedish Crown. Catholic rural parish priests were the Basque and Flemish Nationalists real organic intellectuals. And the cultural and ideological influences of Montserrat Abbey over the development and survival - during Franco's era - Catalanism are well known. On the other hand populism is a fight for popular and national emancipation. It rejects the old traditional legitimacy to promote legal-rational-legitimacy: it is a sharp cut with the legitimist reaction. It is also, through a conversion to National emancipation, the acceptation of the human rights and the incorporation of Peripheral Nationalism within the 1789 posterity just like the Cadix or Francfort Parliament. It is important to keep in mind that on this matter *Kulturnation* inspired by Fichte never denied this contribution of the *Staatsnation* concept. The Periphery's acceptance of nationalist weapons and ammunition represents its move from Reactionnary Conservatism to Modernity.

Periphery Nationalism is also *democratic*. Whenever in a Bourgeois State Centralist Nationalism has to take a side in a class conflict, it supports the right. On the other hand and in similar circumstances populist nationalists are fellow travellers of the Democratic Movement. This is easy to observe in Ireland and in Spain. The *Frente Popular* and the Spanish Civil war provides an excellent example with the attitude of the Basque *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, PNV, which is strongly catholic which preferred the alliance with the Anticlerical Republicans[28]. One can opposed the support given to Nazi Germany by some of Peripheral Nationalist Movements, with the Flemish *Vlaamse Nationaal Verbond* as main case. However at the beginings Flemish Nationalism was democratic[29] and the centralist nationalism of some interwar Belgian cabinets were not without influence, together with the German secret services on the perversion of the Flemish Movement.

Finally, Peripheral Nationalism opens the door to a stateless variety of Cultural Nation. In the depth of his hart any Populist Nationalist dreams

at an Independant State. However most but not all of the parties are officially committed to "realistic" solution of the National question. Sometimes this case drives to a kind of *casus belli* among party activists like for the *Parti Quebecois* after 1980. This is also a source of splitts like in Ireland, Corsica or Euskadi. Nonetheless *State* is often define as a member of a Federation or Confederation if not forgotten in favour of some *Home Rule* idea. Populist Nationalism has brought the link between Nation and State from a logical stand of *necessity*, toward a *contingency* one.

b) Nationalitarians and Regionalists

If Populist Nationalism is the ally of the Democratic Movement, Nationalitarians and Regionalists have taken over Socialist principles. This has a real influence on the issues chosen for expressing the demands. For instance if language is still very important, the focus is an economic matters: slogans like "*Volem viure al País*" for the Occitans or "*Fédéralisme et réformes de structures*" for the Walloons in 1961 are revealing of this new *état d'esprit*. However the tremendous ideological difference is about what nationalism is concerned. There stand over the Nation-State question is - theoretically - a postnationalism. Although strongly National their vision of both their land and the world is universalistic and antistate. They want to destroy the state in favour of extreme decentralisation within a context of European integration if not World integration. They are really cautious to express a strong commitment for international cooperation among minorities, peripheries and colonies all over the world. Ideologically it is easy to distinguish two ideological varieties inside the Nationalitarian-Regionalist consciousness.

The first one could be called *Federalist-Regionalist*.[30] Its antistate stand is expressed through a committment to the doctrine of integral federaliqm realised through the *Europe of Regions*. How to get rid of the Nation-State ? In replacing it by a federation of Regions. In the meantime the activists have to work within the political context like it is in order to federalize it and to push for more European Integration. On economic and social matters, Federalist-Regionalist are devoted to a cooperative - thus antistate - and humanist socialism or social-democracy. French autonomists and by and large Francophone Peripheral movement belong to Federalist-regionalism with the *Union Valdôtaine* as being the most active one. In Spain the Galician PNG represents the same tendency.

The second one, far more radical, could be called *Nationalitarian*. It is strongly under the influence of Third World liberation struggles and all its rhetoric is based on neo - sometimes pseudo - marxism. National independence and social Revolution are linked. Those parties are opposed - at least in theory - to the Nation-State concept presented as being bourgeois. However their vision of the institutionnal future putting emphasis on selfmanagement, political an *economic* federalism, integration within a Europe who has to become socialist, is somewhat confuse. Does it represent a radical, maxistic and independentist translation of populist nationalism or is it - like Federalist-Regionalism - something really new ? Are National Emancipation and Social Revolution that concomitant ? The second question involves the problem of alliances: with the "National Bourgeoisie" within a "National Front" or with the centralist working class within a "Social Front" ? To answer this question it is necessary to define what is prior the National fight or the class conflict ? This debare to a schism among the two most active and Radica-Nationalitarian movements, the Irish and the Basque. For the former, the *Workers Party* - has given up violence and made the first choice, the *Provisional Sinn Fein* having decided for the second. For the latter *Euskadiko Ezkerra* ranks Revolution first and *Herri Batasuna* National Emancipation before anything else.

d) The Dialectic

The relation between the three Peripheral Consciousnesses has to be understood as dialectical. This means than on the one hand Nationalitarian-Regionalism is a *negation* of Populist-Nationalism, which represents itself a negation of the Legitimist Reaction. On the other hand there is a strong continuity to what the essential goals are concerned: the defense of the Periphery. This fact is remarkable even on very precise features like the committment to a language or sometimes a continuity in the family background of activists. For instance Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque PNV, belong to a carlist family just like the Provençal poet Frédéric Mistral had been legitimist. And the PNV youth organization generated the ETA. Another revealing example is provided by the importance the highly traditional and legitimist theme of the *Fuêros* represents in the Basque movement: risen by the carlist, taken over by the Arana Brothers and the PNV and used by the marxist and nationalitarian theoretician Pachu Letamendia.[31]

The dialectic is the following: reactionnary antination State prenationalism, denied by democratic nationalism, itself denied by revolutionary anti-nation-state postnationalism.

2° Neocentralism

The classical analysis of Centre-Periphery relations postulates that political centres are also Economical Cores and thus that a well developed and wealthy *Centre* dominates a poor underdeveloped and dependant *Periphery*. Actually this happens most of the time but uneven development is a two ways process and the core could be located in the Periphery when the centre is ruled by a bureaucratic, military or aristocratic elite. The case of a poor underdeveloped Centre dominating a wealthy developed Periphery is typical of Spain for the Basque and Catalan Peripheries when Galicia remains "classical".

A country cas also be economically polycentric because it belongs to the city belt discribed by Rokkan or because its territory is very large and included in a continental economic integration like in Canada. A polycentric economic structure is reflected in a multiplicity of local Bourgeoisie. Actually the Canadian case is more ambiguous: Ontario and Toronto have taken over the other centres and Quebec neocentralism was based on an elite that J.K. Galbraith has called the *Technostructure*.

Nationalism of the neocentralist elites looks more like "classical" nationalism. Its emphasis on national egoïsm is obvious and well translated by the SNP slogan of the late seventies: "Do you wish to be rich Scotts or poor British ?" However if Neocentralists often dreams at Independence for their nation, they practically follow a moderate pragmatic political line. This means that the link between Nation and State is not clearly proclaimed.

3° The Periphery of the Periphery

Sometimes Peripheries have on their territory a distinctive cultural minority. This is often the case in third world countries and the cultural minority most of the time is supporting the centre.

In countries like Catalonia, Euskadi, Quebec or Scotland who are political peripheries owing their specific centre and their local bourgeoisie, the matter is on the relation between the centre of the Periphery and the Periphery

of the Periphery. Usually and like Stein Rokkan has pointed out for Norway, the mobilization of the periphery is the result of an alliance between urban Radicals - belonging to the middle classes - and rural populist. The usual reaction of the autochtone Bourgeoisie is to seek the support of the centre. This is the case even if the Periphery has its own Economic *Core*. However, if there is a Technostructure, like in Quebec, it will take the lead of the Peripheral mobilization.[32] The Basque and Catalan cases look very interesting because the "National Bourgeoisie"[33] had, in a first time, disapointed by the backward and inefficient structure of the Spanish centre they joined the struggle of the urban Radicals and Country Populists.

Thus the case of the "Periphery of the Periphery" is very ambiguous and all types of alliances can be found.

B. Similitudes and Dissimilitudes

When one looks at the several varieties of Peripheral Nationalism, they seem very different in language, means and universal ideological differences

Populist Nationalists are Cultural Conservatives and Social Reformists. For this reason, joined to their religious faith they have for a long time looked at the support of christian Democracy. Broadly spoken, on the stato-national level and on general social issues which do noy regard their Periphery they belong to the Democratic Movement. The case of the Spanish Civil War is very revealing.

Regionalist and Nationalitarians are Cultural Revivalists and Antistate socialists. Compared to the other Peripheral Nationalists they are very keen in proclaiming their specificity among Political Parties and Movements, within the European Community they favoured the *Rainbow Group* organized in the European Parliament. Some Nationalitarians have also contacts with Libyans and Palestinians.[34]

Neocentralists are Cultural Conservatives ans Social Liberals but first of all they are pragmatics. During the "Golden Sixties" and up to the early eighties they claimed to be Social-Democrats looking at the "Swedish Model". Nowadays and especially when they are on power they favour liberalism.

However some external factors could have played like the fundamentalism of the *Socialist International* compared to the ultra oecumenism showed by the *Liberal International*.[35]

In spite of these real dissimilarities they share a lot of features. First of all if they differ on ways and means they have the same aim: emancipation of the Periphery. Secondly their Nationalism avoids the necessity of the link between State and Nation. Having often suffered from Centralist Nationalism they are cautious of Pluralism: the status of the former *Church of England* in the Irish Republic is an example of a high level of tolerance.[36] Populist Nationalists and Regionalists-Nationalitarians are calling for decentralization within the Periphery. On the contrary the Neocentralists are real centralists inside the Periphery: Jodi Pujol's policy for local government is a good example. Thirdly and last but nos least if they can opposed each other, when they have to face the centre they show an intense sense of solidarity. Like a Spanish editor wrote about Basques: "Crimes and outrages committed by the ETA [are] justified for Herri Batasuna, forgivable for Euskadiko Ezkerra and historically understandable for the PNV".[37]

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It is always hard to conclude on Peripheral Nationalism. However the dichotomy Monism/Pluralism provides a good tool to pinpoint the difference between centralist and Peripheral Nationalism.

The former is obviously monist its aim is a total synthesis between State and Civil Society. Centralist Nationalism belongs to the right and is often imperialist. For instance the two Bonaparte, Bismarck and Joseph Chamberlain are good examples of centralists. The latter is obviously pluralist. Its pluralism can be expressed in two ways. The first one is traditionnal and reflects the old catholic corporatism emphasizing the need for *Corps intermédiaires* between the State and the Individual. The second one claims for Integral Federalism and self management.

However it is important to keep in mind that Nationalism was invented by centralism in order to mobilize the people. This fact is not completely innocent. And the temptation or the risk for Peripheral Nationalism is to be trapped by the logic of the Nationalist discurse. When one wants to pass over

the Nation-State the possibility of a Clash reminds always present. The recent bombing committed in Barcelona by *ETA-Militar* provide a sad example of such clashes. About the ETA bombing of a Barcelona Supermarket, the Catalan Lawyer and Philosopher Louis Sala-Molins wrote:

> "Leur projet [ETA] ... consiste-t-il a humilier la Catalogne, lui signifiant, jusqu'à la mort de n'importe qui, qu'ils la considèrent comme un simple champ de manoeuvre dans leur projet de "libération" martiale? Dans ce cas, se rendent-ils compte au moins qu'ils raisonnent en suivant mot à mot les classiques du fascisme, celui de *Viva la muerte*, celui de l'"espace vital"?"[38]

Could Peripheral Nationalism become Monist and Imperialist ?

N O T E S

1. DUVERGER, M., *Introduction à la politique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1964. English translation published by Methuen.

2. Like for instance the Occitan activist and thinker Guy Héraud.

3. Cfr LEFEBVRE, H., *De l'Etat*, Paris, UGE, 1976-78, 4 vol.

4. Every aspects of the French "Nation" can be found in NORA, P., ed., *Les lieux de mémoire, II. La Nation*, Paris, Gallimard, 1986, 2 vol.

5. SOBOUL, A., *Histoire de la Révolution française*, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, 2 vol.

6. The most significant examples were Ludwig van Beethoven, Friedrich Schiller and Fichte himself. They all became dissatisfied. Cfr DROZ, J., *L'Allemagne et la Révolution française*, Paris, P.U.F., 1949.

7. The birth of the Cultural Nation could be symbolically placed in 1807 with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's speach to the German Nation. "Der Deutsche ist zuvörderst ein Stamm der Germanier überhaupt, über welche letztere hier hinreicht, die Bestimmung anzugeben, über welche da waren, die im alten Europa errichtete gesellschaftliche Ordnung mit der im alten Asien ausbewahrten Religion zu vereinigen und so an und aus sich selbst eine neue Zeit, im gegensatzte des untergegangenen Altertums, zu entwickeln." (IV : 56) "... das die ersten [_Germans_] in den ursprünglichen Wohnsitzten des Stammvolks blieben, (...) die ursprüngliche Sprache des Stammvolks behielten und fortbildeten" (Ibid.: 57)
FICHTE, J.G., Reden an die deutsche Nation, Berlin : Deutsche Bibliothek, 1912, pp 56-57.

8. "Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, à vrai dire, n'en font qu'une, constituent cette âme (...). L'une est la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs; l'autre est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis. (...) La nation comme l'individu est l'aboutissement d'un long passé d'efforts, de sacrifices et de dévouement. (...) Un passé héroïque, de grands hommes, de la gloire (...), voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale". E. RENAN, *Œuvres complètes*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1947, vol. 1, 887-907.

9. Cfr ANDERSON, P., *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London, New Left Books, 1974.

10. ROKKAN, S., "Cities, States and Nations: a Dimensional Model for the Study of Contrasts in Development", in S.N. EISENSTADT and S. ROKKAN (eds), *Building States and Nations*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1973, vol. 1. ROKKAN, S., "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-building: a Possible Paradigm for Research on Variation within Europe", in Ch. TILLY (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975.

11. Kings were supposed to be invested by surnatural powers. On the miraculous gifts of the Kings of France and England, see BLOCH, M., *Les rois thaumaturges. Etude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale particulièrement en France et en Angleterre*, Paris, Gallimard, 1983. First published in 1924.

12. WEBER, M., *Economy and Society*, New York, The Free Press, 1964.

13. BIRNBAUM, P., *La logique de l'Etat*, Paris, Fayard, 1982.

14. LEFEBVRE, H., *op. cit.*

15. The French Revolution tried first to organize a schism with the Mass in French. It was a failure. Then the religion of the "Goddess Reason" was introduced. It was a wreck. Robespierre created a cult of the "*Etre Suprême*", based on the deist theories of the Enlightment. It did not survive its introducer. Then the *Directoire* suppressed all Religions but practically gave up the persecution of catholic priests, monks and nuns.

16. On the linguistic policies of the French Revolution, see: de CERTEAU, M. (ed.), *Une politique de la langue. La Révolution française et les patois*, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.

17. MOULIN, L., *Les socialisations*, Gembloux, Duculot, 1975.

18. *Ibid.* and see SEILER, D.L., *Comportement politique comparé*, Paris, Economica, 1985.

19. Cfr TILLY, Ch., *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Boston, Addison Wesley, 1978

20. On the countermobilization of the Periphery, see: ROKKAN, S., *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, Oslo, Universitets for laget, 1970, and ROKKAN, S. (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation*, Bergen, Christian Michelsen Institute, 1962.

21. I use the word *core* in Michael Hechter's meaning. Cfr HECHTER, M., *Internal Colonialism*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

22. SEILER, D.L., *Les partis autonomistes*, Paris, P.U.F., 1982.

D.L. SEILER
University of Lausanne

PERIPHERAL NATIONALISM BETWEEN PLURALISM AND MONISM*

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Nationalism is a rather ambiguous concept. In the nineteenth century it has been the mobilizing factor used as well by the independence movements in the Balkans than by those fighting for the unification of Germany and Italy. It was also utilised by the European and North-American Imperialisms in order to legitimize the process of colonization. One of its major outcome was world War I ! During the interwar period Nationalism became a very important compound of the Fascist and Nazi ideologies. Furthermore either in Flanders and in Friesland or in Britanny, Peripheral Nationalism showed its closed ties and affinities with Hitler's Germany.

After the fall of the Nazi Empire, Nationalism was strongly identified with the hard core of conservatism if not with Autoritarianism. ~~The bad image of this concept was such as the *Union Valdôtaine* - created in 1945 Italy - never claimed to be Nationalist but Federalist.~~

However since the Bandoeng Conference and the rebellion of Algeria against France, the activities of the ENOKA in Cyprus and, of course, the rise of Colonel Nasser in AEgypt, the mood changed about Nationalism. The process of Third World Decolonization and the struggle of some "New Nations" for independence has given new credits to the word *Nationalism*.

In the sixties, Maurice Duverger himself drawned a sharp line between: *le nationalisme des dominés et celui des dominants*. The first one is progressive and linked ~~with~~ to the struggle for selfgovernment, democracy and socialism. The latter is conservative and linked with Colonialism, Imperialism and antidemocratic strains.

What is the empirical value of this interesting *distingo* today? The hypothesis of this paper is that if there is a tremendous difference between Peripheral Nationalism - "*le nationalisme des dominés*" - and Centralist Nationalism - "*le nationalisme des dominants*" - some aspects belong to the essentials of Nationalism as such. We assume Duverger's idea that both brands of Nationalism are opposed and that Peripheral Nationalism is, quite often the product of Centralist Nationalism. Two concepts will help us to locate either Peripheral or Centralist Nationalism in a two-dimensional space: *Pluralism* and its opposite *Monism*.

However to talk about Nationalism involves the use of the concept of *Nation*. This word is even more ambiguous and has to be clarified. Then the focus will be on the relation between Nation and State and the logic of centralism. Finally we shall emphasis on this logic and the rise of Peripheral Nationalism.

I. The vocabulary of Nationalism: the word Nation from France to Germany

For a political scientist, the word *Nation* refers to a rather ambiguous concept. There are lot of definitions for this successful concept and neither has gained a paradigmatic status within the political science community. Even Josef Stalin drafted one, but if he became a great Tsar, he, on the other hand, was a very poor thinker.

The most common trend among specialists is to link Nation with language. This is certainly not untrue, but if one looks at the places where violence and killings happen ~~through~~ because of Nationalism in Europe one sees that it has nothing to do with linguistic riots. Those places are Euskadi - both Spanish and French - with ETA and Iparretarrak, Northern-Ireland with the IRA and Corsica with the FLNC. In all those cases the genuine language of the "Nation" has losted its vernacular use. In Euskadi the majority language in Spanish understood by everybody and even the independentist newspaper *Egin* is mostly written in Castillan. In French Corsica and Euskadi, everybody has turned to French through the centralized school-system of the Republic. And Gaelic has completely ~~disappeared~~ vanished from Northern-Ireland. Those examples clearly show that it is not necessary to ~~have~~ keep a distinctive language in order to maintain a strong national consciousness.

Rather than to define ~~the~~ Nation, it would be better to look at the several meanings the word has taken in the political debate through History. This excludes definitions given by political scientists, sociologists or historians and, on the contrary, emphasizes on actors. The approach can be summarize as the following: "Who says what and why?" This kind of approach is adapted to concepts which are ambiguous as such.

One example will reveal the polysemy of the word *Nation* and thus its ambiguity. The most famous international Rugby competition is called *The*

Five Nations Cup. The five National teams are the following: England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland - who is united for the occasion - and... France. The interesting fact is that the French team has an overwhelming majority of Occitans - mostly coming from the Southwest of the Country - so important that it could be named an Occitanian or Languedocian Team !

The several meanings of the word *Nation* are the results of the conflictual relations between France and Germany and their consequences about both international and internal order are of tremendous importance.

A. The Starting Point: the non political meaning of Nation

The British tradition has, more or less, left unchange the old meaning of *Nation*. The word is used in the way it is in the Bible, it also applies to student societies organized in the Medieval University on the base of Ethnicity. In this sense a Nation is a community larger than a tribe or a *Clann* sharing a common origin expresses through a set of common distinctive features like language - which could have vanished or integrated in a most important one - mythology, law, etc. In this sense the existence of a Nation involves neither the presence of the State nor a definite citizenship. The old concept of Nation is thus not linked at all with a population ruled by a State on a defined Territory.

B. The Politicizing of the concept: the Nation-State

During the Ancient Regime the relation between the Individual and the State was a personal link with the Crown and the person of the Legitimate King. He was the owner of *Sovereignty*, the Sovereign. When the Ancien Regime collapsed, early in England, more than a century later in France, the Sovereign was immolated and Sovereignty transferred somewhere else. In England a concrete, definite Institution had been able, through History to achieve a challenging legitimacy progressively equal to the Crown's: the *Parliament* got the Sovereignty. In France no institution was ever able to challenge the King's sovereignty neither the *Etats-généraux* nor the *Parlements*, the latter never unified in a single body. Thus when Louis XVI was eliminated the sovereignty was transferred to some abstraction: the *Nation*.

The word became quite successful though in contest with some other neighbouring symbols like *République* and *Patrie*. Perhaps because it was the most acceptable to everybody the concept of Nation won, progressively over its competitors. Because it indicates the human substractum of the Polity without any references to the organization of Government. This was especially convenient for a country whose experienced a lot of different constitutions: five republics, three brands of monarchy, two empires, etc. *In this sense, Nation means the population ruled by a definite State, owner of a definite Territory.* Nation is the human translation of a State, actually the *identity* corresponding to a State. German lawyers called it *Staatsnation*. This meaning is still expressed by the French Constitution: "*Tous les pouvoirs émanent de la Nation*". Thus the Sovereignty does not belong to the Parliament but to an abstraction which has to be transformed into a community otherwise it would not work.

I would suggest September 1792 and the Battle of Valmy for the symbolic birth of the Nation State. In this village a totally new type of army based on both physical and cognitive mobilization beated the Prussians led by the Duke of Brunswick. Though the Prussian Army was the best in Europe and the most professional and the French casualties were far higher than the Prussians ! Valmy saw the rise of a new type of war and Army where soldiers are willing to die in defense of their beloved Mother: the Nation.

C. The Antithesis: the Cultural Nation

The French Revolution was first of all... a Revolution ! And the wars conducted by the Allies against Revolutionnary France were ideological, a kind of class warfare opposing aristocratic Europe supported by the French nobility to Bourgeois Democratic France carrying the hope of Continental Bourgeoisies. When the victorious armies of the Revolution ~~arrived~~ went to Germany they were welkomed as Liberators by the local Bourgeois and *Intelligentsia*[1] ! However after having liberated the Germans from the Feudalistic Rule the French troops forgot to leave the country... Actually the Paris Cabinet decided to set up a network of satellite and devoted States and annexed the West bank of the Rhine which became - divided into *départements* - a part of the French *Nation*. And the mood changed among the former admirers of 1789 France although still committed to the *principles and values* of the French Revolution.

Admitting neither the division within vassal states nor the integration in the French Nation, the German Revolutionnary elite had to express ~~his goals~~ its aims in another definition of the Nation-State. *Neither French nor Wurtenbergian or Prussian but German.* This was done with the invention of a new meaning for the word Nation, *Kulturnation*, the Cultural Nation essentially based on language[2]. The basic principle for this second meaning is, that in a Nation-State, a Nation can exist before the organization of the State. However the destiny of a Nation is that it has to be translated into an appropriate State: a State is the institutionnal mold of a Nation.

Opposed to the French meaning of the Nation State, the Cultural Nation fitted the needs of the German Intelligentsia and Bourgeoisies to whom it gave an efficient political tool.

D. The Synthesis: the Elective Nation

In the name of the Cultural Nation, Greece and other Balkanic Countries became independent and Italy reached its unity. Of course it inspired the unification movement in Germany. The *Deutsche Einheit* was achieved against Austria and first of all against France - which provided a very convenient external ennemy. The unification was realised in 1870 with the so called Franco-Prussian war and the German Empire was created or restaured at Versailles in 1871. Two French Provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, were incorporated in the new *Reich*.

The French national pride was not ready to swallow the bitterness of territorial losses which for the first time regarded provinces integrated into France for more than a Century. This was far more than to give back the conquests of the French Revolution. Thus "*la ligne bleue des Vosges*" became just a ceasefire line and the two lost provinces a symbol of a popular quest for revenge. *La "Revanche"* was a popular theme for all patriotic meetings and not only among nationalists: a famous song, extremely mobilizing was *"Ils nous rendront l'Alsace et la Lorraine"* !

But on which ground to justify the return of the lost provinces to the French Nation ? Definitely not on the basis the traditionnal French Republican definition of Nation-State: Alsace and Lorraine had been given to Germany after a due diplomatic treaty. Certainly not with the help of the second definition: *Kulturnation* was used in order to legitimize their annexion to

the *zweite Reich* ! For any competent linguist, folklorist or ethnograph of the time, it looked obvious than neither Alsatians nor Lorrains belonged to Latinity. Furthermore the Germans had left Nancy and its *Département* ~~and~~ plus Belfort because the dialects spoken there were French.

Thus there was a strong need to define a new meaning for the Nation-State concept. A meaning able to legitimize the French demand to recover Alsace and Lorraine. The gap was filled with Ernest Renan and his concept of *Elective Nation*: neither *Staatsnation* nor *Kulturnation* but "*la volonté de vivre en commun*"[3]. Alsatians and Lorrains did not belong to the French State anymore. They were not precisely a part of the French Culture - at least for what peasants, craftmen and workers are concerned - but they were French, and indistinctive part of the French nation because they were feeling French and identifying themselves with the Past and Destiny of France. Once upon a time *Alsaciens* and *Lorrains* elected France like before them and after them all the other parts of the Country did. The French Nation was more than just the citizenty of State, it ~~did~~ was not ~~be in the use~~ the result of a common language, it was the product of History and free choice; the nineteen Century writer and nationalist politician Maurice Barrès spoke about "*La terre et les morts*".

Elective Nation is both a highly emotionnal and a very convenient concept. It quickly replaced the first meaning of Nation in Countries based on the *Staatsnation* principle. In facts this third definition only reshuffles the "State-nation" one and can be successfully opposed to *Kulturnation*.

When in 1980 Canada Mr Trudeau and Mr Lévesque tried to moliblize their followers they both used the word Nation but they did not mean at all the same thing! When in the Spanish Basque Country a member of the ETA kills a policeman, he does it in the name of the Nation - Euskadi - and he is deeply convinced that he behaves like an *abertzale*, a patriot. When in the same conditions, a soldier of the *Guardia Civil* shots an *Etarra*, it is in the name of the Nation, in doing that, he is not just acting on duty but he behaves like a patriot eliminating a dangerous terrorist threatening the Spanish National Unity. Both are fighting for the same National territory. However the same National territory is different if defined with the help of the Cultural Nation or through the binocular of the Elective-State Nation.

One can appreciate the wide range of opportunities the polysemic word Nation is able to offer to a lot of either international conflicts - where State borders are so often artificial - or internal strifes. Both meanings are competing because they claimed to be the sole true definition of *The* Nation and both assume the logical link with the concept of State: *Nation élective* and *Kulturnation* are exclusive definitions given for the modern Nation-State. The choice between the former or the latter depends on the political interests of who is using this ambiguous concept.

II. Nation and the logic of the State

The Nation-State is the terrible - in terms of casualties - legacy of the Franco-German conflictual neighbourhood from 1791 to 1945. European integration is perhaps the inversion of this dialectic.

If some countries, like Greece ~~or Denmark~~, were Nations towards what the ancient unpolitical meaning of the word is concerned, and then became Nation-States ~~with~~ showing some continuity, the concept of Nation-State used for quite all the sovereign countries is quite recent: it is a part of the legacy of the French Revolution. One has already discussed the profound ambiguity of the polysemic concept of Nation. This word belongs to the universe of ideology; it is a symbol and, let us say, a myth in the meaning Georges Sorel gave to the word *myth*: a political idea or symbol used to molilize the popular masses. On the contrary the State and especially state's apparatuses are somewhat very concrete. Of course it is necessary to be precise when talking about the state. For instance anthropologists and most of marxist theoreticians are using the word *State* as an equivalent for Political System. I personnally share Max Weber's view: there is a State when in a defined political system an institutionnalized centre of power is capable to implement its will of controling a definite territory with the help of a real monopoly of legitimate use of enforcement and violence. This definition involves that people obey the State because they fear some state's apparatuses - Army, Police - but also because they comply with the rules processed by an institution they perceive as the true rules and norms maker.

A. State-building

This means that Lebanon is not a State anymore, this also means that the Feudal State never existed and that the States appears with the birth of the *Absolutist State*. The State is the result of an historical evolution, the statebuilding Process or Nationbuilding Process if one includes the rise of the Nation as well. It is important to mention two points for the purpose of our analysis.

The rise of the States is not historically but also geographically located. If one looks at the famous Rokkan's *Conceptual Map of Europe*, the States finally surge in the immediate neighbourhood of the cities network real backbone of Europe which divides the Continent following a North-South Axis. However it cannot fully develope in countries deeply marked by Catholic Counter-reformation: it needs either a national Protestant Church or a National Catholicism rather autonomous from Rome like Gallicanism in France.

Secondly the rise of the State is the result of the territorial action of successfull kings who just behaved like wise and cautious peasants. They wanted to get a wealthy territory easy to control and also easy to defend. The ways and means for territorial increments were marriage and war. In order to achieve his purpose of full control of a territory, the Crown had to eliminate the military power of his Vassals and to build up an efficient Civil Service and this means to centralize. For instance in 1789, England who had been once conquerred by the Normans looked more rationnally centralized than the Kingdom of France did: one legal and judicial system, more regular size territorial administrative units, etc.

In order to control efficiently a territory a Political Power has to be recognize as legitimate. During the Statebuilding period, legitimacy was traditional: when crowned the King was the blessed and legitimated owner of the Power[4]. No matter if people felt Provençal or Aragonese rather than French or Spanish, the important feature was that they were faithfull to the person of the sovereign. Ruling territories with highly heterogenous populations the Kings were calling for a personal link with the subjects. The King of France got the faith of the Breton because he was the legitimate Duke of Brittany. The first Sovereign owning the Crown of *Spain* was Queen Isabel II: before 1833 King of Spain was an officious title for the official King of Castilla, Aragon and Leon, Lord of Vizcaya, etc. Today Elizabeth II is ~~not the Queen of Britain but~~ still the Queen of England, Scotland and Ireland.

B. Nationbuilding

When the Bourgeoisie took over the government during the English and French Revolutions, it could not rely ~~of~~ upon the mobilizing system provided by the *traditional legitimacy*. It had to replace the lack of a blessed personal link by something else to impose the *Legal-Rational Legitimacy*. This was a real gap because people often translated their nostalgy of the ancient order in supporting a charismatic strong chief like Cromwell or Bonaparte.

There was thus a ~~strong~~ real need to create, among people, a solid feeling of identity with the State, to build up a unique Body Politic to replace the sophisticated and hierarchized network of loyalties supporting the Crown. Otherwise the new ruling elite could not have maintained or attainted the goal of the Absolutist State: to control and to defend a territory protected by borders strategically efficient. One can see two different ways used by the State to achieve ~~his~~ its goal. England and France provide the two ideal typical cases which soon became models for the European States and later for most of the countries of the World.

1° The way of hegemony

Comparing France and Britain on the field of administrative and institutional differenciation of political apparatuses. Pierre Birnbaum concludes than the former is not a real State but only a Political Centre. I do not share this point-de-view far to Francocentrist for me: when using Max Weber's definition of this concept it becomes obvious than Britain is a State. However it is a different kind of State than the French, definitely less differenciated, and Birnbaum is perfectly right to pinpoint this sharp contrast between the two distinct nationbuilding processes. Using Antonio Gramsci's terminology, I would suggest to call the British way for nation building by the word *hegemonic*. The national integration within the State was achieved in a rather smooth process and with a minimum differenciation of the State's Apparatuses.

National Catholicism gave its full pledge of support to the integration of populations. This was helped by the schism of the Anglican Church which cut its ties with Rome and could pull its full weight in the interest of the State. Some linguists and dialectologists have brought into evidence

the tremendous influence the translation of the Bible into vernacular languages has played in favour of the cultural homogeneity of a country.

The results are somewhat decisive. Britain has beaten france in what ethnocide is concerned: Breton and Basque languages are still alive when Cornish has completely vanished. Since Gaston Defferre's bill on regionalisation French *Régions* have more powers and are more democratic than English *Planning Regions*. Bills concerning Scotland or Wales are passed by the Westminster Parliament and the Two 1979 referenda on devolution were rather tricky. On the other hand, a lot of symbols which in other countries were immediately under attack and appropriate by the Centre for the sake of National unity are respected: i.e. the Scottish law, the Privileges of the *Kirk*, the Scottish Banknotes, etc.

2° The way of Domination

In France, the Gallican Church was never enforced to the point it had to break with Rome. However it was under State control until the "*Loi de Séparation*" in the beginning the present century. Until the French Revolution, the Church of France was dominated by Gallicanism and a Calvinist strain - which exists in Anglicanism through the Low Church - was present in the Jansenist stream. After the dead of Louis XVI and ironically under the *Concordat* signed with Napoleon, ultramontanes progressively took over the French Catholic Church. Their victory was complete just before World War I and this with the help of secularist politicians of the *radical-socialiste* Cabinets of the Third Republic !

In 1789, the French Monarchy however centralizing was never able to impose all over its territory either a Common Law or a unique administrative organization. There were several regional legal systems ruled by Courts - *Parlements* - using their own jurisprudential approach and the Country was divided in two types of provinces: *Pays d'élections* easy to rule for the State represented by his *intendants* and *Pays d'Etats* with their legislative assembly and their Foral rights, nightmare of the Intendants... If the French language had seduced - like overall on the Continent - the elites and if French was used by the State, regional languages were alive like Provençal used by the *Parlement* of Aix-en-Provence and by the *Etats provinciaux* together

with French. On the other hand no institution was ever able to compete for legitimacy with the King. The sole bodies which ever challenged the Crown were the *Parlements* supported by the upper stratus of aristocracy during the Regency of Queen Anne d'Autriche. This attempt, *La Fronde*, completely failed and was smashed by Prime Minister Mazarin.

The French Revolution got the heritage of an Absolutist State where the power was lying in the Person of the King balanced by decentralization. Lacking legitimacy the new Political Institutions remained unstable and even volatile. The sovereignty was thus transferred to an artefact, the Nation. But the real element of continuity through the changes of regimes is the State's Apparatus. In other words, the Nation is the Platonician pure essence - actually of the State - given to the people in order to be loved and presented as a secular religion where People are the collective idol. The Nation is the legitimization of the State: people believe they are the gods, actually they just trust the state.

This process means to create a personal identity translating the State within the individual consciousness. Without a Sunday Mass in French and the daily reading of the Bible in the language of Molière this was technically difficult[5]. The systemic response was a strong differenciation of the State's apparatuses and their centralization. It was necessary for the Bourgeois State to generalize and uniformize the cultures existing all over the french territory in order to obtain an universalistic values system, a single language and an homogeneous legal and judicial frame in local and regional government, language and law. And the only way of doing that is through enforcement. The major apparatus issued by this process of differenciation is the Educational System: the Church had to be expelled from the school. I suggest to use Gramsci's concept of Domination to call this way for the State to achieve his goals through his monopoly of legitimate constraint.

Theoretically there is nothing ~~in~~ with the concept of *Staatsnation* which imposes one language. Actually the reality looks quite different: like every *Kulturnation* sees its achievement in becoming a *Staatsnation*, every *Staatsnation* wants to build up a *Kulturnation*. In a tale with a strong emotional patriotic stand, the French novelist Alphonse Daudet tells us the story of the little Frantz, a young Alsatian schoolboy attending in 1871 the farewell speech,

left in "*La dernière classe*", by the French teacher leaving the classroom to be replaced by a German colleague. The most emotional feature in the teacher's speech is certainly when he said to the pupils: "*N'oubliez jamais votre langue maternelle!*". This tale is, better than Barrès or René Bazin novels, perhaps the masterpiece of nationalist literature and it did a lot in favour the "*Revanche*" mind before the First World War. Now when one wonders about the mother language of a peasant child in Alsace at the fall of the Second Empire it was definitely not French and certainly not German but Alsatian dialect... Never matter!

From the *Rapport Grégoire* during the French Revolution until the mid seventies everything was done to eradicate the rivals of the French language. Everything has been done successfully in order to create from this originally heterogenous France a real cultural Nation where the French language plays a tremendous role. It is not surprising that French National achievement has provided an attractive model for all ~~[culturally]~~ heterogenous countries.

3° The Failure of the French Model

French or English National integrations were possible, like Rokkan pointed out, because of National Control over religion and the absence of a strong belt of autonomous cities. In both polycentric backbone of Europe, in Southern Europe influenced by Counter-Reformation Catholicism, and in Eastern Europe which remained imperial a late process of national integration failed.

Consequently centralist nationalism took a paroxystic form. The logic of centralism when pushed to its extreme limits could be expressed through the nazi slogan: "*Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*". Fascism and Nazism are a kind of desperate and somewhat mad attempt to realize the impossible absolute synthesis between State and Society. The rise of such a Political Party is the result of the failure of a late statebuilding process based on the french model. This absolute monism is a reaction against a pluralism which is so strong that it prevents the rise of a differentiated state. Pluralistic countries were, for a long time, weak, unable to achieve the goals of the State which are firstly to obtain full control of the territory and to get safe borders. On the contrary they were annexed by powerfull states for

the sake of the so called "natural borders" or, in some cases, their size was slightly reduced. The only hope for them to escape was to conclude federative pacts or alliances. For instance Belgian History looks like a set of territorial losses.

C. Nationalism and Statebuilding

Nationalism is a secular religion created by a differenciated State in order to supply a lack of legitimity needed for the achievement of its territorial goals. The perequisit is the building of a National Consciousness through political socialisation which creates within each individual a pattern of attitudes called National Identity. For doing that, the State has to own the educational system and then to impose the national language and to teach a national ~~vision of~~ view over History.

The result is that the territorial goals of the State are not supported anymore by a blind committment to the person of the legitimate King. Popular support is gained ~~by~~ after an ideological mobilization. For instance territorial increments needed for strategical reasons are supported by people through an emotionnal faith in a lot of very convenient myths like "*les frontières naturelles de la France*" or its German counterpart "*die Lebensraum*". Colonialism is a "natural" corollary for the expected space of the State, a follow up of achievement and the ideological strength of imperialism was not questionnable during the nineteen century. If one looks at a XIXth century atlas, one sees that England was in control of the British Isles, that the United States were going from coast to coast, that France had got her natural borders with the exception of Belgium and Luxemburg, that Spain had covered the Iberian Peninsula with the Portuguese exception, Sweden was holding Norway, that Italy had pushed the Austrian out of the Peninsula and annexed the Pope's territories and that, for Germany, the "*Drang nach Osten*" was on the way.

III. The Countermobilization of the Periphery

Modern Bourgeois States had to achieve and perform the ~~goals~~ aims assigned by the absolutist States, to follow the logic impulsed by the Kings and some

of their Great Ministers. Lacking the legitimity of the monarchs, Bourgeois Democrats had to convince the masses in order to mobilize them for the National purpose. It was necessary to interiorize in each individual an identity corresponding to the State, to create a National consciousness.

This was properly done through the hegemonic way in Britain and through the domination way in France. The process was efficiently led in Prussia, Denmark and Sweden. However it was not without facing some countermobilization of the Periphery which generated a new brand of Nationalism directed against the Centre.

A. The rise of Peripheral Consciousness

The quest for a territory easy to control internally and strategically convenient for external defense does not drive automatically to a homogeneous population. It sometimes can, like in the case of Greece; however most of the time the so called natural borders if natural, are not borders at all. Mountains were refuges where smaller ethnic groups had kept their identity, rivers were ways of communications before roads were open, etc.

The Absolutist State was able to manage diversity because of his legitimation system based on a direct personal link with the King. The sovereign of Spain was recognized by the Basques only as Lord of Vizcaya and after his oath to respect the *fueros*. This oath had to be done under the famous tree of Guernica - *Arbola Guernikako*. The same King was ruling Catalonia because as King of Aragon he was the legitimate heir of the Counts of Barcelona. It would be a mistake to idealize the Absolutist State like a monarchy respectuous of cultural diversity. Not at all. It put the process of administrative and legal centralization on the tracks. It helped to the birth of a national market, the primitive accumulation of capital and thus the rise of an economic core[6] with a centralist bourgeoisie. The sharp difference between the Absolutist State and its follower the National Bourgeois State was that the former did not needed cultural centralization to form a National identity: respect and dedication to the Crown were enough to get it properly functionning.

Like Stein Rokkan pointed out, some peripheral provinces or/and some others which used a different language had been left out of the mobilizing process introduced by the National Revolution. Those areas belonging to the

Periphery in the economic, geographic and political sense reacted by a countermonilization against the national mobilization of the Centre. In countries deeply influenced by Counterreformation and/or strongly pluralistic, or given to another county after 1815, all characterized by late Statebuilding, the reaction is a refusal of a new political Centre. Three ideal types can be suggested: firstly the dialectic of Peripheral Consciousness, secondly the political rise of a countercenter and thirdly the role of the "Periphery of the Periphery".

1° The Dialectic of Peripheral Consciousness

The first reaction of the Periphery is a *Reaction* in the full marxist meaning of the word, then it is denied by the rise of a democratic nationalism within the Periphery and denied again or surpassed in a left-wing neo-universalistic antistate "Creative Utopy".

a) The Legitimist Reaction

The Periphery had been let outside the Bourgeois Revolution and left out the Process of National integration. Furthermore it has not been fully reached by the flow of information coming from the centre. Concerning Economic Development and Social Stratification it is not mature at all to acknowledge or even to understand the aims of Bourgeois Revolution. When then the Revolution expelled or even killed the legitimate King and replaced him either by a different monarchy or by a totally different Regime like a Republic; in any cases the result is the break up of the traditional legitimacy. In the mind of the Periphery's habitants, the change which occurs in the mode of Government also means the lost of all its linguistic, fiscal, legal, administrative, symbolic and sometimes religious particularistic privileges replaced by a new uniform and universalistic system of norms, official beliefs and values.

It is hard or perhaps impossible to say what is prior for mobilizing the Periphery: to support the legitimate Prince or to defend its privileges or foral rights? Both are probably intermixed in this strong emotional collective reaction. However it clearly expressed itself it in a definite rejection of a new political order and a strong committment to restore the old customs and legitimacy. Mobilized people are not aware that they fight in

order to maintain a distinctive identity but in rising the banner of traditional legitimacy they expressed their difference. I suggest to call *Legitimist Reaction* this first unconscious assessment in the defense of the Periphery. This does not involve that all legitimisms belong to movements of territorial defense. Most of the time Peripheral Legitimists were allied to reactionnaries of the Centre, i.e. the upper aristocracy plus rural and urban traditionalists.

Jacobites in Ireland and Scotland, *Chouans* in Britanny and Carlists in the Basque Country are the most salient examples of legitimist reactions in Western Europe.

b) Populist Nationalism

As a "Reaction" legitimism has no future. All Restaurations - either French or Spanish - always looks like a kind of betrayal. The french *Restauration* restaured absolutism but left untouched the all centralized frame imposed by the French Revolution. The restoration of Fernando VII maintained the centralist policies, especially under Isabel II and the come back of Alphonse XII corresponded to a Constitutional and not to a societal change. The French Bourbon King Louis XVIII kept the Napoleonic organization of the territorial control. Like Pierre Birnbaum, I am deeply convinced that there is a logic of the state autonomous in regard of the socioeconomic structure. The temporary victory of the aristocracy for the ruling class position did not affect the development of national centralism at all.

The first countermobilisation of the Periphery, the legitimist reaction was a total wreck, however it prepared the way for a second one, combining the defense of the particularistic values and tradition to the modernistic aims of Nationalism. The second mobilization of the Periphery is no more a reaction against political change expressed through an obstinate committment to traditional legitimacy. It still reveals a refusal, but this time against the process of National integration operated by the Centre. It is the clear-cut and well defined expression of the *Bewussein* of the Periphery: the Peripheral cousciousness as itself and for itself. The ideological weapons used against the centre are provided by the vocabulary of European Nationalism. And one can say that this *Populist Nationalist* countermobilization of the Periphery is a kind of unexpected by product of the national integration process.

Actually the pressure the Centre operates on the Periphery, generates the mobilization of the latter. Ironically it developes within the ideologigal frame imposed by Centralism, this means: Nationalism... In the context of European Romanticism the defenders of the Periphery will find on their way the fascinating mythology produced in the conflictual debate among existing Nation-States. Thus they will rise their, let us say, local society to the attractive status of Nation. It is of course the German meaning of *Kulturnation* which prevails: the Periphery opposes its *Cultural Nation* to the Centre's *State Nation* if the challenge is serious it will reply in using the concept of *Elective Nation. In facts the birth of Populist Nationalism is a process where a Periphery returns against a Centre the nationalistic ideology this Centre had generated in order to integrate its peripheries into a sole unified Nation.* The late French Africanist Yves Person spoke about a "*fonction miroir*" of this Peripheral Nationalism. It is a mirror sending back to the centre a reversed image of nationalism.

When dealing with the rise of a Populist Nationalist Consciousness of the Periphery one has to face an interesting theoretical question: does it represents a Nationalism, full stop or does "*le nationalisme des dominés*" belong to something different? One would like to focus on three major differences which are not the sole: compared to centralist Nationalism Peripheral Nationalism is Populist, Democratic and, to some extent, left aside the Nation-State Idea.

Peripheral Nationalism is a *Populism.* This means a syncretic mixture of Progressive and Conservative features expressed through an emotionnal feeling of class reconciliation in a kind of general - in this case national - brotherhood. Populist Nationalism is strongly traditionalist: it is in this sense the faithfull heir of the legitimist reaction. Traditional values of the Periphery are extremely important including language and religion. Sometimes this committment means to revive dying or even dead traditions. Norwegians, Irish, Flemish[7] and Basques Nationalists worked to recreate an official language. Everybody knows which role Roman Catholicism has played for Irish Nationalism but fundamentalist Protestantism played an equal role for the mobilization of the Norwegian Periphery against a centre supporting the Swedish Crown. Catholic rural parish priests were the Basque and Flemish Nationalists real organic intellectuals. And the cultural and ideological influences of Montserrat Abbey over the development and survival - during

Franco's era of Catalanism are well known. On the other hand populism is a fight for popular and national emancipation. It rejects the old traditional legitimacy to promote legal-rational-legitimacy: it is a sharp cut with the legitimist reaction. On the other hand it is, through a conversion to National emancipation, the acceptation of the human rights and the incorporation of Peripheral Nationalism within the 1789 posterity just like the Cadix of Francfort Parliaments did for centralistic Nationalism. It is important to keep in mind that on this matter, *Kulturnation* inspired by Fichte never denied this contribution of the *Staatsnation* concept. The Periphery's acceptance of nationalist weapons and ammunition represents its move from Reactionnary Conservatism to Modernity.

Periphery Nationalism is also *democratic*. Whenever in a Bourgeois State, Centralist Nationalism has to take a side in a class conflict, it supports the Right. On the other hand and in similar circumstances Populist Nationalists are fellow travellers for the Democratic Movement. This is easy to observe in Ireland and in Spain. The *Frente Popular* and the Spanish Civil war provides an excellent example with the attitude of the Basque *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, PNV, which strongly catholic preferred the alliance with the Anticlerical Republicans[8]. One can opposed the support given to Nazi Germany by some of Peripheral Nationalist Movements, with the Flemish *Vlaamse National Verbond* as main case. However at the beginings Flemish Nationalism was democratic[9] and the centralist nationalism showed by some interwar Belgian Cabinets were not without influence, together with the German secret services on the "perversion" of the Flemish Movement.

Finally, Peripheral Nationalism opens the door to a stateless variety of Cultural Nation. In the depth of his hart any Populist Nationalist dreams at an Independent State. However most but not all of the parties are officially committed to "realistic" solutions for the National question. Sometimes this case drives to a kind of *casus belli* among party activists like for the *Parti Quebecois* after 1980. This is also a source of splitts like in Ireland, Corsica or Euskadi. Nonetheless *State* is often define as a member of a Federation or Confederation if not forgotten in favour of some *Home Rule* idea. Populist Nationalism has brought the link between Nation and State from a logical stand of *necessity*, toward a *contingency* one.

b) Nationalitarians and Regionalists

If Populist Nationalism is the ally of the Bourgeois Democratic Movement, Nationalitarians and Regionalists have taken over Socialist principles. This has a real influence over the issues chosen for expressing Peripheral demands. For instance if language is still very important, the focus is on economic matters: slogans like "*Volem viure al País*" for the Occitans or "*Fédéralisme et réformes de structures*" for the Walloons in 1961 are revealing of this new *état d'esprit*. However the tremendous ideological difference is about what Nationalism is concerned. Their stand over the Nation-State question is - theoretically - a postnationalism. Although strongly National their vision of both their land and the world is universalistic and antistate. Nationalitarians and Regionalists want to destroy the state in favour of extreme decentralisation within a context of European integration if not World integration. They are really cautious to express a strong committment for international cooperation among minorities, peripheries and colonies all over the world. Ideologically it is easy to distinguish two ideological varieties inside the Nationalitarian-Regionalist consciousness.

The first one could be called *Federalist-Regionalist*. Its antistate stand is expressed through a committment to the doctrine of integral federalism realised through the *Europe of Regions*. How to get rid of the Nation-State? In replacing it by a federation of Regions. In the meantime the activists have to work within the political context like it is, in order to federalize it and to push for more European Integration. On economic and social matters, Federalist-Regionalists are devoted to a cooperative - thus antistate - and humanist socialism or social-democracy. French autonomists and by and large Francophone Peripheral movements belong to Federalist-regionalism with the *Union Valdôtaine* as being the most active one. In Spain the Galician PNG represents the same tendency.

The second one, far more radical, could be named *Nationalitarian*. It strongly stays under the influence of Third World liberation struggles and all his rhetoric is based on neo - sometimes pseudo - marxism. National Independence and Social Revolution are linked. Those parties are opposed - at least in theory - to the Nation-State concept presented as being bourgeois. However their vision of the institutional future putting emphasis on selfmanagement, political and *economic* federalism, integration within a Europe who

has to become socialist, is somewhat confuse. Does it represent a radical, maxistic and independentist translation of populist nationalism or is it - like Federalist-Regionalism - something really new? Are National Emancipation and Social Revolution that concomitant? The second question involves the problem of alliances: with the "National Bourgeoisie" within a "National Front" or with the centralist Working Class within a "Social Front"? To answer this question it is necessary to define what is prior: the National fight or the class conflict? This debate went to a schism among the two most active and Radical nationalitarian movements, the Irish and the Basque. For the former, the *Workers Party* - has given up violence and made the first choice, the *Provisionnal Sinn Fein* having decided for the second. For the latter *Euskadiko Ezkerra* ranks Revolution first and *Herri Batasuna* National Emancipation before anything else.

d) The Dialectic

The relation between the three Peripheral Consciousness has to be understood as dialectical. This means than on the one hand Nationalitarian-Regionalism is a *negation* of Populist-Nationalism, which represents itself a negation of the Legitimist Reaction. On the other hand there is a strong continuity to what the essential goals are concerned: the defense of the Periphery. This fact is remarkable even on very precise features like the committment to a language or sometimes a continuity in the family background of activists. For instance Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque PNV, belong to a Carlist family just like the Provençal poet Frédéric Mistral had been legitimist. And the PNV youth organization generated the ETA. Another revealing example is provided by the importance the highly traditional and legitimist theme of the *Fueros* represents for the Basque movement: risen by the Carlists, taken over by the Arana Brothers and the PNV and used by the marxist and nationalitarian theoretician Pachu Letamendia.

The dialectic is the following: reactionnary antination-State prenationalism, denied by democratic nationalism, itself denied by revolutionary antination-State postnationalism.

2° Neocentralism

The classical analysis of Centre-Periphery relations postulates that political centres are also Economical Cores and thus that a well developed and

wealthy *Centre* dominates a poor underdeveloped and dependant *Periphery*. Actually this happens most of the time, but uneven development is a two ways process and the core could be located in the Periphery when the centre is ruled by a bureaucratic, military and/or aristocratic elite. The case of a poor underdeveloped Centre dominating a wealthy developed Periphery is typical of Spain for the Basque and Catalan Peripheries when Galicia remains "classical".

A country can also be economically polycentric because it belongs to the city belt discribed by Rokkan or because its territory is very large and included in a continental economic integration like in Canada. A polycentric economic structure is reflected in a multiplicity of local Bourgeoisies. In fact the Canadian case is more ambiguous: Ontario and Toronto have taken over the other centres and Quebec neocentralism was based on an elite , one can discribe with J.K. Galbraith's concept of *Technostructure*.

Nationalism of neocentralist elites looks more like "classical" Nationalism. Its emphasis on national egoïsm is obvious and well translated by the SNP slogan of the late seventies: "Do you wish to be rich Scotts or poor British?" However if Neocentralists often dreams at Independence for their Nation, they practically follow a moderate pragmatic political line. This means that the link between Nation and State is not always clearly proclaimed.

3° The Periphery of the Periphery

Sometimes Peripheries have on their territory a distinctive cultural minority. This is often the case in third world countries and the cultural minority most of the time is supporting the Centre.

In countries like California, Euskadi, Quebec or Scotland who are political peripheries owing their specific centre and their local bourgeoisie, the matter is on the relation between the centre of the Periphery and the Periphery of the Periphery... Usually and like Stein Rokkan has pointed out for Norway, the mobilization of the Periphery is the result of an alliance between urban Radicals - belonging to the Middle Classes - and rural Populists. The usual reaction of the autochtone Bourgeoisie is to seek the support of the Centre. This is the case even if the Periphery has its own Economic *Core*. However,

if there is a "Technostructure", like in Quebec, it will take the lead of the Peripheral mobilization[10]. The Basque and Catalan cases look very interesting because the "National Bourgeoisie"[11] had, in a first time, supported Madrid, then disapointed by the backward and inefficient structure of the Spanish centre they joined the struggle of the urban Radicals and Country Populists.

Thus the case of the "Periphery of the Periphery" is very ambiguous and all types of alliances can be found.

B. Similitudes and Dissimilitudes

When one looks at the several varieties of Peripheral Nationalism, they seem very different in language, means and universal ideological differences.

Populist Nationalists are Cultural Conservatives and Social Reformists. For this reason, joined to their religious faith they have for a long time looked at the support of Christian Democracy. Broadly spoken, on the stato-national level and on general social issues which do not regard their Periphery, they belong to the Democratic Movement. The case of the Spanish Civil War is very revealing;

Regionalist and Nationalitarians are Cultural Revivalists and Antistate Socialists. Compared to other Peripheral Nationalists they are very keen in proclaiming their specificity among Political Parties and Movements, within the European Community they favoured the *Rainbow Group* organized in the European Parliament. Some Nationalitarians have also contacts with Algerians, Libyans and Palestinians[12].

Neocentralists are Cultural Conservatives and Social Liberals but first of all they are pragmatics. During the "Golden Sixties" and up to the early eighties they claimed to be Social-Democrats looking at the "Swedish Model". Nowadays and especially when they are on government they favour Liberalism. However some external factors could have played some role on their international alignment like the fundamentalism of the *Socialist International* compared to the ultra oecumenism showed by the *Liberal International*[13].

In spite of these real dissimilarities they share a lot of features.

First of all if they differ on ways and means they have the same aim: emancipation of the Periphery. Secondly their Nationalism avoids the necessity of the link between State and Nation. Having often suffered from Centralist Nationalism they are cautious on Pluralism: the status of the former *Church of England* in the Irish Republic is an example of a high level of tolerance[14]. Populist Nationalists and Regionalists-Nationalitarians are calling for decentralization within the Periphery. On the contrary the Neocentralists are real centralists inside the Periphery: Jordi Pujol's policy for local government is a good example. Thirdly and last but not least, if they can opposed each other, when they have to face the centre they show an intense sense of solidarity. Like a Spanish editor wrote about Basques: "Crimes and outrages committed by the ETA [are] justified for Herri Batasuna, forgivable for Eusadiko Ezkerra and historically understandable for the PNV"[15].

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It is always hard to conclude on Peripheral Nationalism. However the dichotomy Monism/Pluralism provides a good tool to pinpoint the differnece between Centralist and Peripheral Nationalism.

The former is obviously monist its aim is a total synthesis between State and Civil Society. Centralist Nationalism belongs to the right and is often imperialist. For instance the two Bonaparte, Bismarck and Joseph Chamberlain are good examples of Centralist politicians. The latter is obviously pluralist. Its pluralism can be expressed in two ways. The first one is traditional and reflects the old Catholic corporatism emphasizing the need for *Corps intermédiaires* between the State and the Individual. The second one claims for Integral Federalism and self management.

However it is important to keep in mind that Nationalism was invented by Centralism in order to mobilize the popular masses. This fact cannot be completely innocent. And the temptation or the risk for Peripheral Nationalism is to be trapped by the logic of the Nationalist discurse. When one wants to pass over the Nation-State, the possibility of a Clash reminds always present. The 1987 bombing committed in Barcelona by *ETA-Militar* provides a sad example of such clashes. About the ETA bombing of a Barcelona Supermarket, the Catalan

Lawyer and Philosopher Louis Sala-Molins wrote:

> "Leur projet [ETA] ... consiste-t-il à humilier la Catalogne, lui signifiant, jusqu'à la mort de n'importe qui, qu'ils la considèrent comme un simple champ de manoeuvre dans leur projet de "libération" martiale? Dans ce cas, se rendent-ils compte au moins qu'ils raisonnent en suivant mot à mot les classiques du fascisme, celui de *Viva la muerte*, celui de l'"espace vital"?"[16]

Could Peripheral Nationalism become Monist and Imperialist?

NOTES

1. The most significant examples were Ludwig van Beethoven, Friedrich Schiller and Fichte himself. They all became dissatisfied. Cfr DROZ, J.
2. The birth of the Cultural Nation could be symbolically placed in 1807 with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's ~~speak~~ lectures to the German Nation. "Der Deutsche ist zuvörderst ein Stamm der Germanier überhaupt, über welche letztere hier hinreicht, die Bestimmung anzugeben, daß sie da waren, die im alten Europa errichtete gesellschafftliche Ordnung mit der im alten Asien ausbewahrten wahren Religion zu vereinigen und so an und aus sich selbst eine neue Zeit, im gegensatzte des untergegangenen Altertums, zu entwicheln" (IV: 56). "... das die ersten [*Germans*] in den ursprünglichen Wohnsitzten des Stammvolls blieben, (...) die ursprüngliche Sprache des Stammvolls behielten und fortbildeten" (*Ibid*: 57).
3. "Une nation est une âme,-un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, à vrai dire, n'en font qu'une, constituent cette âme (...). L'une est la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs; l'autre est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis. (...) La nation comme l'individu est l'aboutissement d'un long passé d'efforts, de sacrifices et de dévouement. (...) Un passé héroïque, de grands hommes, de la gloire (...), voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale". E. RENAN: 887-907.
4. Kings were supposed to be invested by surnatural powers. On the miraculous gifts of the Kings of France and England, see BLOCH, M?
5. The French Revolution tried first to organize a schism with the translation of the Holy Mass in French. It was a failure. Then ~~the religion of~~ the "Goddess Reason" was introduced. It was a wreck. Then Robespierre created a cult of the "*Etre suprême*", based on the deist theories of the Enlightment. It did not survive its introducer. At the end the *Directoire* suppressed all Religions but practically gave up the persecution of Catholic/sm. ~~priests, monks and nuns.~~

6. I use the word *core* in Michael Hechter's meaning.
7. Flemings finally decided to adopt Dutch.
8. The Irish *Fianna Fail* cabinet supported the Spanish Republic and tried to help the Basques when the centralist *Fine Gael* opposition was strongly in favour of Franco's rebellion.
9. The first Flemish populist nationalist party, the *Frontpartij* was democratic.
10. The parties which merged to create the *Parti Québecois* provide a good example: René Lévesque, *Mouvement Souveraineté-association* coming from Lesage's Liberal Party was obviously neocentralist when the *Ralliement national* was populist-nationalist and the *Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance nationale* nationalitarian.
11. During the precivil war period the conflic within the PNV was also opposing neocentralists lead by Ramon de La Sota to the populist-nationalists of Luis Arana.
12. Mostly Irish IRA and Basque ETA, perhaps Corsican FLNC.
13. For Spain it is necessary to mention the activities of the FDP *Friedrich Naumann Stiftung* who has - like the other German political Foundations - an office in Madrid.
14. It is now called Church of Ireland and all the old churches and Cathedrals like Dublin's Christ Church or St Patrick Cathedral - the English had taken over from the Catholic Church are still in its hands.
15. "De los sondeos a las urnas", *El País*, Madrid, February 27th 1979.
16. SALA-MOLINS, L., "L'ETA militaire en Catalogne", *Le Monde*, Paris, June 25th 1987.

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Biographical Note

Daniel-Louis SEILER is Professor of Political Science at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland since 1980. He has tought previously in Belgium, Ireland and Canada. He is the author of several books on comparative Politics, recent titles being *La politique comparée* (1982), *Comportement politique comparé* (1985) and *De la comparaison des partis politiques* (1986). ADDRESS: Institut de Science politique, BFSH 2, CH - 1015 Lausanne.

UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA
DEPARTAMENT DE DRET POLÍTIC
FACULTAT DE DRET

1. Maig. 88

Jordi Solé Tura
Facultat de Dret
Barcelona

Jordi,

T'adjunto la versió final de l'article per la International Political Sciene Review. Espero els teus comentaris.

Fins aviat, salut

J. Botella

ADREÇA POSTAL: Bellaterra (Barcelona) - Telfs. 6921166 - 6920200 - 6922016 — Telex 52040

THE SPANISH "NEW" REGIONS : TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL PLURALISM *

Joan BOTELLA

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

BELLATERRA

ABSTRACT.

One of the central problems which had to be solved by democratic transition in Spain was an old, and often violent, regional conflict. The generalization of a regional system in a country where only a few territories had a strong regional claim, however, raises the question of which are the functions of the new regional institutions. The complexity of the institutional arrangement and the enormous heterogeneity among regions make conflict (both center-regions also region-region) a permanent ~~feature. However, this may help in sustaining political pluralism.~~ possibility. A complex interplay between regional pluralism and political pluralism is suggested.

INTRODUCTION

The creation of a new democratic system in Spain has entailed the creation, between 1979 and 1983, of a general regional system. With only the exception of two minor Spanish cities in the north of the African continent, Ceuta and Melilla, the whole Spanish territory is presently divided in 17 "Comunidades Autónomas", i.e., autonomous regions.

This system is, in the Spanish tradition, a quite original one. In the previous democratic experience, the Second Republic, between 1931 and 1939, the Constitution admitted the possibility of regional governments, but only for those regions which desired it. In fact, only Catalonia had a fully constituted regional system. As for the Basque Country, its Statute was approved only in 1937, during the civil war and with half the region under Franco rule. For Galicia, finally, the required referendum was held in June 1936, three weeks before the war and, being since its first moment under military control, its autonomy was never a fact.

These three regions were generaly admitted to be truly specific regions, because of their expressed will, but also because of their cultural specificities (each of them has a language of its own, with a more or less developed literary tradition), their having nationalist and/or regionalist parties active since the

beginning of the century, etc.

Their case for an autonomous self-government, therefore, was well stated by the time when the 1978 Constitution began being drafted. However, the political mobilization in the months preceding the first democratic elections in June 1977 showed quite clearly that regionalist trends were broadly spread all over the country, and not limited to those three regions. Valencia, Andalucia, the Canary Islands, Asturias, Murcia or Castilla itself experienced some kind of regionalist movements.

However, these new regionalist movements differed from the three more traditional ones, as far as they would not, generally speaking, be expressed by regionalist parties, but would be present in the local or regional branches of general Spanish parties operating in those areas. On the other hand, cultural differences were almost absent from them; instead, they expressed mainly concern for economic and social backwardness. (1)

Thus, the situation was far from clear. So to speak, the "regional map" which had to be drawn was a largely open problem, with very low consensus between the parties, and also among the population at large. Political traditions would also have little to offer for the solution of the problem: while the Spanish Right was essentially centralist and anti-regionalist (with the Civil war being often perceived as a clash between "Spain" and "Separatism"), Left parties - Socialist, Communist and Republicans as

well- included a federal concept in their programs and manifestos, but with very vague definitions on who would be the partners in that Federation; in fact, it was commonly assumed that the three traditional regions - Catalonia, Galicia and Euzkadi- would have only an associate, negatively defined: the rest of the country.

THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Lack of consensus, virtual absence of regionalist traditions and specific parties in those new regions, and low levels of regional consciousness among the mass public led towards the open solution finally approved in the Constitution. As such, the Spanish Constitution does not include a list of the Spanish regions, except for an indirect reference to those territories which had approved in the past, via referendum, autonomy Statutes, i.e., Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia.

An additional problem complicated further the overall situation, namely, the feeling (perhaps unjustified, but undeniably present in some of those regions) that Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia were striving to enjoy a "privileged" situation, with wider powers and more important ressources than other Spanish regions. This prevented the future Constitution of creating a system, such as the Italian one, in which there would be a formal differentiation between "special" and "general" regional statutes. Instead, the Spanish Constitution chose a quite complex system, whose main

features may be summarized as follows:

1) The Constitution does not include a list of Spanish regions.
2) Powers assigned to the regions are not precisely defined; the Constitution only stablishes a minimum "ceeling" and, in a negative way (specifying which functions cannot be transferred to regions, remaining thus necessarily retained by the central State), a maximum of powers which may be held by regions.
3) Formally, the only criterion determining which is the level of powers held by a given region is the procedure of accession to autonomy. This procedure may start either by an "initiative referendum" (followed by the Parliament's approval of the Statute and a second regional referendum), or by the local councils of the majority of towns included in the region (in which case no popular referendum is held, neither at the beginning nor at the end of the procedure). While in the "initiative referendum" case the maximum level of powers may be immediately assigned to the region, in the latter case regions are confined to the minimum "ceeling" for a period of, at least, five years, after which its Statute may be reformed in order to receive wider powers.

4) This latter limitation may be overcome by a formal additional transfert of powers, via a especial bill passed by the central Parliament. This procedure has been used in two cases.

TABLE ONE

AROUND HERE

The resulting situation is a quite complex one. It is possible to distinguish between 6 regions, holding the higher level of autonomy, and the other 11, for which the five-year term is ending in 1988 (as of April 1988, no provisions are being made for the reform of their Statutes). On the other hand, Spanish regions are very heterogeneous in size, population, administrative complexity, etc. Just as an example, it should be noted that the largest region, Andalucia, includes 8 "provinces" (the Spanish equivalent to the French "département"), with a population slightly above 6 millions, while Rioja includes only one province (which is also the case of other six regions) and around 200.000 inhabitants.

A final element of complexity streams from the very timing of the process of institutionalization of the autonomous communities. While the four first Statutes approved (Euzkadi, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalucia) were implemented separately, and, therefore, regional elections in those regions are held separately, the remaining thirteen Statutes wer approved (after the attempted coup of February 1981) in the terms of a general agreement between the then governing Center party (UCD, "Unión de Centro Democrático") and the Socialist opposition (PSOE, "Partido Socialista Obrero Español"). This agreement (faithfully respected even after the collapse of UCD and the coming into office of a Socia-

list government) included provisions in order to have regional elections in those remaining thirteen territories held simultaneously, along with local elections.

PATTERNS OF TERRITORIAL PLURALISM

This general overview of the main structural properties of the regional Spanish system may help us in discussing a central point: to which extent the newly created regional institutions respond to the necessity of expressing a purely territorial-regional pluralism? Or, to put it in other terms, do they constitute a specific political "arena" for party competition and electoral representation , or are they to be thought of as mere extensions of the central political system?

A first approach to the problem would focus on the extent to which the new regional institutions allow for the presence of regional parties, meaning by that parties acting only in a given region and only refering to the regional level.

TABLE TWO

AROUND HERE

As Table 2 shows, the seventeen Spanish regions show several different situations. Although all Spanish parties, regional and national, fight all elections -national or regional- , three broad patterns seem to emerge.

Firstly we find two regions, Catalonia and Euskadi, where regional parties are represented in the Spanish Parliament ("Cortes Generales") and control regional institutions. After 1987, Aragon has joined this group.

A second set of regions, the larger one, includes regional parties with a very small, if any, representation in the "Cortes" and a more important presence at the regional level. In some cases, these regional parties occupy positions in the regional government but, significantly enough, almost always (Aragon is an exception in this respect) in coalition with a national party (we shall return to this point later).

Finally, a third group of five regions has party systems where only national parties are present.

A second factor to be taken into account in this respect concerns what might be termed the dynamics of political regionalization. As previously pointed, most Spanish regions do not have a tradition of regionalist/nationalist movements, and the level of regional mobilization among the population as a whole is very low. Regional institutions might thus seem rather artificial; but however artificial they may be, they must exercise certain functions, decide and implement specifically regional policies, and develop (or, perhaps, create) regional institutions and symbols. Therefore, we may expect to see a certain process of regio-

nalization, both in terms of growth of regional consciousness and possibility of conflicts with the central State institutions.

Unfortunately, Spanish scholarly research has largely neglected these problems, focusing almost exclusively on the formal, legal issues implied in the process. On the other hand, Spanish regional experience is still brief (only two regional elections have been held in most Spanish regions), and thus the number of available observations is much too small as to attempt to more general observations. Therefore, the following statements must be considered as preliminary, and subject to further research. (2)

No attempts have been made in order to measure directly the evolution of Spanish mass public opinion on regional problems. However, an indirect indicator may be relevant in this sense. An official survey research institution, the "Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas", conducts regular "opinion barometers", which systematically include a question on which are the first (second, third, etc.) more important problems in the respondants' opinion. Regional problems rank constantly very low in answers, with less than 4 % of respondants considering regional problems to be the most important among the issues faced by Spanish society. Additionaly, it must be kept in mind that a large part of these answers (often up to a half of them) is expressed by rightist, anti-regionalist respondants, prone to view the problem in terms of nostalgia for a traditional uniformist, centrally-

directed system. (3)

A second indicator may be derived from the variations in parties' and voters' behavior in the different levels of the political system. If individual electoral decision in regional elections is made in the same terms as in general elections, then we may conclude that regionalization is perceived as of little importance. Conversely, if electors take into account only specific regional issues, and decision is made according to the type of election, then the conclusion would be the contrary.

Analogously, we may analyze whether parties' strategies differ between the regional and the national level. Certainly, parties' regional strategies always include a mixture of national and regional orientations, but the relative importance of this differing orientations and their evolution may be very relevant as to assess which is the importance accorded to the regional level and its autonomy from the "center".

Unfortunately, sufficient data for attempting to test these hypotheses still lack. The Spanish regional experience is still too brief, as we pointed earlier. At the electoral level, certainly there are variations in voting behavior (in turnout rates and in party preferences as well), but with only two regional elections held any detailed analysis would rest on very fragile grounds. More precisely, it is not possible to distinguish between level

effects (i.e., variations related to the level of election) and period effects, i.e., general trends of evolution and change in party support, unrespectively of the type of election. In fact, if regional elections were perceived as only mid-term elections, as uncompromising evaluations of how parties are performing at the national level, then of course we should conclude that regional political systems are far from being perceived as important or relevant in the voters' view.

Analyzing party behaviour may perhaps be a useful way of approaching our problem. Regional elections in Spain (just as local ones) are completely politicized, in the sense that national parties are well present in them; on the other hand, regional parties act more as parties than as merely parochial, localist groups. This statement holds also true in the opposite direction, since regional parties also run for general elections and, as Table 2 shows, have usually enjoyed representation in the "Cortes Generales".

However, what is the role played by these regional parties in the central State institutions? With the exception of CiU, the Catalan nationalist coalition, which often played a critical role by its support to the UCD plurality governments in the 1979 - 1982 period, their influence has generally been very low. Holding usually only one or two seats, their contribution could never be essential in order to form a parliamentary majority; Basque

nationalists, which have often had a more relevant fraction, have never in fact been acceptable as coalition partners, partly because of the violence in Euzkadi, and partly also because of doubts being cast on their sincere commitment to Spain's national unity.

This situation has become more acute since 1982, when the Socialist party received a majority of seats in both "Cortes" chambers, confirmed in the 1986 General Election. Under these conditions, the necessity for parliamentary coalitions has virtually vanished; only some appointments (such as members of the Constitutional Court, "Defensor del Pueblo" - Spanish version of ombudsman, etc.) require a qualified majority, and in those cases the partner for the Socialist party has usually been the Conservative CP ("Coalición Popular"), rather than the minor regional parties.

PLURALISM : TERRITORIAL OR POLITICAL ?

Since 1982, the Spanish party system has shown a strong concentration on the two major parties, PSOE and the conservative CP. Although it is arguable whether the Spanish party system can be classified as a two-party system, and in spite of a certain erosion in the 1986 General Election, both parties aggregated still amount to more than 70 % of the popular vote, and around four fifths of parliamentary seats. Therefore, we may safely assume that growing fragmentation in the regional party systems

would suggest a differentiating trend, meaning some growth of regional specificity.

In this analysis, we shall only include thirteen regions, those which can properly be called "new". In fact, the other four (Euzkadi, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalucia) have a more traditional acceptation (except Andalucia), have been assigned wider powers than the rest, and hold their elections separately. As politically different as they may be (no relevant regionalist party is presently active in Andalucia; Euzkadi and Galicia have now coalition governments, including in both cases the PSOE and regionalist center-right groups), these four regions stand clearly apart from the rest. Table 3 presents the situation of regional governments in all Spanish regions, as of December 1986; while the four sometimes called "historical regions" showed a strong predominance of center-right governments, the remaining thirteen (or "new") regions were predominantly governed by the Left (PSOE); only in one case, Balearic Islands, a regional party held government positions (and, it must be added, as the minor partner in a coalition with CP).

TABLE THREE

AROUND HERE

The regional elections of June 1987 (held simultaneously with local elections) showed, as could be expected, differing patterns

in the thirteen regions under examination. As Table 4 shows, the Socialist party experienced a clear retreat in electoral support, with losses which led to changes in some regional governments and, perhaps more important, to a higher fragmentation in regional parliaments. With only three exceptions (Murcia, Extremadura and Castilla/La Mancha), parliamentary majorities have tended to disappear, leaving room for more complex and plural political situations.

TABLE FOUR

AROUND HERE

What emerges from Table 4 may be summarized as follows: the national opposition party to the PSOE government would not benefit from the Socialist electoral losses. It was rather the center opposition party, led by former Prime Minister Suárez, CDS, and some regional center-right parties, which improved their relative situation. Still, their growth was not important enough as to become winning parties, but sufficient as to create a new situation in which no party could by itself secure a majority of seats. Thus the road was open for complex and time-taking negotiations between parties in order to form parliamentary and/or government coalitions.

However, what is perhaps more relevant is that the process of

coalition formation concerned only parties on the right half of the political spectrum. Because of complex ideological and historical traditions, the Spanish right parties are facing serious difficulties in developing party structures at the local and regional levels, and also in being able to avoid dispersion and political fragmentation. Behind both facts there is certainly a common pattern, a certain lack of "party culture"in the Spanish right, itself derived from the general non-democratic Spanish tradition. In a sense (and under the caveat that these processes are very recent, and therefore any generalization is rather hazardous), what recent developments may suggest is that center and right parties feel more free, when acting at the regional level, to take strategic orientations that might be termed "experimental", meaning by that the fact that these strategies are conducted thinking in national terms, i.e., in order to work out political platforms and coalitions which might also be useful in order to compete with the hegemonic PSOE at the national level. The growing diffusion of the term "primaries" in order to refer to regional elections and, more specifically, to the relative balance between the center and right parties, is significative in this respect.

If this were true, it would suggest that the generalization of a regional system in Spain would have several different meanings. In some regions, usually termed "historical", the creation of

regional institutions fulfills (or, at least, attempts to fulfill) deeply rooted nationalist or regionalist feelings. In the "new" regions, where these feelings do not exist, or have a very limited presence, the issue would be political pluralism rather than territorial.

This completely provisory conclusion may seem pessimistical; but it is not. Leaving aside any ironical comment, the fact that regional institutions might become important for the Spanish center and right, even if only out of tactical considerations, is in itself a relevant element in order to reinforce commitment to the regional realities and to the democratic system. However artificial and irrationally complex the Spanish regional system may be, this would certainly be a strong contribution for a democratic Spain.

TABLE ONE.- Seventeen Spanish regions: level of powers transfered.

1.- Regions with higher level of powers:

a) Because of autonomy referenda held in the past:

- Euzkadi
- Catalonia
- Galicia

b) "Initiative referendum":

- Andalucia

c) Special transfer bill:

- Valencia
- Canary Islands

2.- Regions with lower level of powers:

- Aragon
- Asturias
- Balearic Islands
- Cantabria
- Castilla/La Mancha
- Castilla/Leon
- Extremadura
- Madrid
- Murcia
- Navarra
- Rioja
- Valencia

TABLE TWO.- Nationalist and regionalist parties in the Spanish "Comunidades Autónomas". (1)

1.- Parties represented in the "Cortes Generales" for at least three parliamentary terms:

Catalonia:	CiU
	ERC
Euzkadi:	PNV
	HB
	EE
Aragon:	PAR
Navarra:	PNV
	UPN
	HB

2.- Parties represented at the "Cortes Generales" for two or less parliamentary terms, and/or represented at the regional Parliament.

Andalucia:	PSA/PA
Balearic I.:	PSM
	UM
Canary I.:	UPC
	AM
	AIC
	CNC

(../.)

(TABLE TWO CONTINUED)

Cantabria:	PRC
Extremadura:	EU
Euzkadi:	EA
Galicia:	BNPG
	PSG/EG
	CG
Rioja:	PRP
Valencia:	UV

3.- Regions without regional parties present in parliament:

Asturias

Castilla/Leon

Castilla/La Mancha

Madrid

Murcia

Notes: (1) This table is a modified, updated version of the presentation included in Vallès (1987: 113).

TABLE THREE.- Spanish Regional Governments, December 1986: Parties in office.

1.- "Historical" regions.

	Left	Center, right
National parties	1	1
Regional parties	---	2

2.- "New" regions

	Left	Center, right
National parties	12	1
Regional parties	----	1

TABLE FOUR.- Spanish "new" regions: composition of regional Parliaments (Regional Elections, June 1987).

	REGIONAL LEFT	IU/ PCE	PSOE	CDS	CP	REGIONAL RIGHT	OTHERS
Aragon	--	2	27	6	13	19^	---
Asturias	--	4	20^	8	13	---	---
Balearic I.	2	2	21	5	25^	4^	---
Canary I.	3	2	21	13^	6^	13 ()^	2
Cantabria	--	--	13	12	19^	5^	---
Castilla/Leon	--	--	32	18	32^	1	1
Castilla/ /La Mancha	--	--	25^	4	18	---	---
Extremadura	--	2	34^	8	17	4	---
Madrid	--	7	40^	17	32	---	---
Murcia	--	1	25^	3	16	---	---
Navarra	8 ()	--	15^	4	2	21 ()	---
Rioja	--	--	14	4	13^	2^	---
Valencia	--	6	42^	10	25	6	---

Notes: () Figure includes several parties

^ Party in regional government

NOTES.

*.- A first version of this article was presented at the meeting on Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism (Barcelona, June 1987) of the IPSA Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism. I want to thank P. Gourevitch, D.L. Seiler, J. Solé Tura, J. Subirats, H.G. Thorburn, J.M. Vallès and G. Vlachos for their remarks and criticisms in the discussion that followed. Of course, responsability for its contents is only mine.

1.- For an attempt to measure regional consciousness in the transition period, see Del Campo et al. (1977), and also Jiménez Blanco (1977).

2.- Among the immense amount of constitutional litterature, see Aja and Tornos (1985); Cazorla (1984); and the collective volume published by "Dirección General de lo Contencioso" (1984).

For another point of view, see the general analysis in Solé Tura (1985), and, focusing on the electoral aspect, Vallès (1987).

3.- The last of those "barometers" to be published is Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1982). For a more recent estimate, see Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1986).

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Biographical note.

Joan Botella (Barcelona,1951) is Professor of Political Science at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain. His research fields are political behaviour and party systems.

ADDRESS: Department of Political Science.- UAB.- 08193, BELLATERRA (Barcelona).- SPAIN.

POLITICAL PLURALISM OR TERRITORIAL PLURALISM?

"Old" and "New" Regions in Spain

J. Botella
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Institut de Ciències Socials

Meeting on Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism.
IPSA Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism
Barcelona, June 1987

Table 1.- Spanish Regional Governments (December 1985).

"Historical" regions

	Left	Center, Right
'Central' parties	---	1
'Regional' parties	---	2

"New " regions

	Left	Center, Right
'Central' parties	12	2
'Regional' parties	---	---

Table 2.- Regional Elections, June 1987: distribution of seats.

	Reg. Left	IU/PCE	PSOE	CDS	AP	Reg. Right	Others	MAJ?
Asturias	---	4	20	8	13	---	---	-
Castilla/ /Mancha	---	---	25	4	18	---	---	+
Madrid	---	7	40	17	32			-
Extremadura	--	2	34	8	17	4	---	+
Murcia	---	1	25	3	16	---	---	+
Aragón	---	2	27	6	13	19	---	-
Canarias	3	2	21	13	6	11	2	-
Navarra	8	---	16	4	2	14	6	-
Valencia	---	6	41	11	25	6	---	-
Rioja	---	---	14	4	13	--	2	-
Castilla/ /León	---	---	32	18	32	--	2	-
Cantabria	---	---	25	4	18	5	--	-
Baleares	4	---	21	5	25	4	--	-

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Prof. Jordi Sole Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E-Barcelona 34
Spain

May 11, 1988

Dear Jordi:

So far I have only received four papers: Mawhood, Korbonski, Sharpe and Hueglin. Therefore the missing ones are Seiler (to whom I have written today), Botella and yourself.

There were two others that we were considering if space became available: Vlachos and Calvez. I have not either heard from them or received their papers.

The total number of pages taken by the four papers already received is 146, and it looks as if we will have about 190 altogether. Therefore there are 44 pages to be shared between yourself and Botella, and possibly Vlachos and/or Calvez. I am not writing to the latter two at the moment until I see how much space the two Spanish contributions will need. Could you please get back to me as soon as possible, preferably with your paper and that of Botella. Otherwise, give me an indication of the probable number of pages likely to be needed.

Sincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
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Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

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Professor Daniel L. Seiler
Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques
Université de Lausanne
8 SSH2
1010 Lausanne
Switzerland

May 11, 1988

Dear Daniel:

I have not yet received your ~~corrected~~ revised paper for inclusion in the forthcoming issue of the International Political Science Review. Please either get it to me by return mail, or indicate the state of play. As you know, we had to have a deadline of April 30th. However there is still some time if you get things to me very quickly.

Yours sincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

HGT:bg

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
priv. (02) 672 38 89

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, May,17, 1988

Prof. H.G. Thorburn
Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston, Canada,K7L 3N6

Dear Hugh,

I send you the papers by professors Seiler and Botella. Prof.Seiler tells me that he has already send the revised version of his paper to prof. Meisel, but I am not sure that he has send a copy to you, so I am including a copy.

I think that the paper of prof. Joan Botella is a really good development of his intervention in our Barcelona meeting and it seems to me that it fits the scheduled terms for publication.

Prof. Korbonski and prof. Hueglin have send me a copy of their respective papers ,but in their letters they both tell me that they have already send a copy directly to you. I hope that you have received the papers of profs. Mawhood and Sharpe. After their letters agreeing with the terms established by you and prof. Meisel I have not had any further news from them. But both agreed to send a revised version of their papers to you by the end of april. Anymore,I have not further news from profs.Calvez and Vlachos.

The problem it's me. I am fully engaged in the elections to our Parliament,in which I am candidate for the Socialist Party and it's very difficult to me to find time enough to revise and rewrite my paper. The elections are to be held in May 29 and I hope to be a little more free in June, but I don't know if I shall be in due time by June to have my paper included in the publication. Please,let me know about it.

With my best regards

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

24 May 1988

Dear Jordi,

I now have papers by Sharpe, Hueglin, Mawhood, Korbonski, Botella. Prof. Meisel tells me he has Seiler's, although I have not yet seen it. Yours is the only one still to come. It looks as if we won't be able to accommodate any more-- so let's hope that Calvez and Vlachos decide not to submit their papers.

Sincerely,

Hugh Thorburn

carta enviada a membres IPSA i participants (uns amb el llistat

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Decano

Universidad de Barcelona
Facultad de Derecho

25 th, May, 1987

Dear Professor

I apologize for my delay in informing you about the final arrangement of the Barcelona meeting of our IPSA Research Committee on "Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism", but so far I have not received all the confirmations of scheduled paper-givers and discussants.

I confirm you that the meeting will begin on Thursday 25th. June, in the afternoon.

Participants will be accomodated at Hotel Astoria, c. Paris, 203, tel. 209.83.11 and the meeting sessions will be held at Fundació Bofill, c. Provença, 324, tel. 258.87.00.

Participants can arrive by all Wednesday 24 th. afternoon and thursday 25th. morning. Reception will be provided at Hotel Astoria on Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning. Those participants arriving later can go straight to Fundació Bofill.

The scheduled time-table is as follows:
The opening session will be held on Thursday 25 afternoon from 15,30h. to 19,30H.
On friday 26 and saturday 27, sessions will be held from 9h. to 13h. in the morning and from 15,30 to 19,30 h. in the afternoon.

I´m including herewith the general outline of the meeting´s program, with the so far confirmed paper-givers and discussants.

LIST OF CONFIRMED PAPER-GIVERS.

St. Ehrilich (Warszawa)	:	"Regionalism and Autonomies in Western Western Europe."
P.N. Mahwood. (Birmingham)	:	Paper about government and administration in Third World (without tittle).
A. Korbonski (Los Angeles)	:	"Nationalism and pluralism in Eastern Europe"
G. Vlachos. (Athens)	:	"L'Etat-nation, la Societé Plurale et l'Unification Européene".
P.Winczorek (Warszawa)	:	"Regional Problems in the Unitary State: the case of Poland".
Th.O.Hueglin (Waterloo-Ontario)	:	"Nationalism, Regionalism and Late Capitalism".
A.Bibic (Ljublyana)	:	"Self-managment, pluralism and Federalism: Some contradictions of Federalism in Yugoslavia".
D.L.Selier (Lausanne)	:	"Peripheral Nationalism between Pluralism and Monism".
L.J.Sharpe (Oxford)	:	"Fragmentation and Territoriality in the European State System".
J.Y. Calvez. (Paris)	:	"Nations et minorités dans l'enseignement recent de l'Eglise catholique".
José Cazorla (Granada)	:	Non specified.
Joan Botella (Barcelona)	:	Non especified.
Marcos Kaplan (Mèxico)	:	Non specified.

LIST OF CONFIRMED DISCUSSANTS.

Prof. P. Claeys, prof. L. Graziano, prof. R. Eisfeld, prof. A. Donneur, prof. R. García Cotarelo, prof. A. de Blas, prof. J. Subirats, prof.J. Capo, prof. P Vilanova, prof. J M. Vallès, prof. Fred C Bruhns (Univ. of Pittsburg).

Universidad de Barcelona
Facultad de Derecho
Cátedra de Derecho Político

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático

Barcelona, June 20th. 1988

Prof. H.G. Thorburn
Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston,Canada
K7L 3N6

Dear Hugh,

Here is, at last, my paper. I have revised the preliminary remarks, the short conclusions and I have enlarged the bibliographical references. I am not very satisfied with the paper but I don't feel able to rewrite it fully. Please, revise my English. I am not very sure about my vocabulary and syntax.And please, let me know sincerely your opinion about it.

I think that with my paper the volume is completed. I don't have news from Calvez and Vlachos. Have you got in contact with Prof. Ehrlich ? Has he understood the situation ?

I inform you that I have been elected Senator in the Upper House of our Cortes Generales in the list of the Socialist Party. Because of my new parliamentary duties I am not sure that I can go to Washington for the IPSA World Congress. If I can solve the problem, I'll let you know. Some days ago I talk with Graziano and I informed him about the developments of our papers publication , as well as about my new political situation.

I wait for you news

Sincerely

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

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J. TOURNON (Grenoble)
G. VLACHOS (Athenai)
P. WINCZOREK (Warszawa)

June 21, 1983

Dear Jordi,

I hope you realized your objective in the elections. Actually I haven't heard anything about them. I have seen nothing in our newspapers about them.

I seem to have all the essays except for your introduction. I hope you will be able to send it along very soon. Indeed if you are still unable to find the time, why not just send me what you said last year. I am prepared to try to put it in shape as an introduction for the Journal. Of course I would prefer your text.

I hope to see you in Washington in August. We have three round tables ready to go. So it should go well.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Hugh Thorburn, Chairman

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
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L. SYLLA (Abidjan)
J. TOURNON (Grenoble)
G. VLACHOS (Athenai)
P. WINCZOREK (Warszawa)

5 July 1988

Dear Jordi,

I was very pleased to receive your letter of June 20, along with your paper, to-day; and I hasten to get a reply off to you. I set about editing it, trying to change as little as possible in order to preserve your meaning as well as possible. I am enclosing a photocopy of what I have done to give you some idea. If you have objections please let me know. I know that my pencil marks often do not come through at all clearly, but I am sending the copy along anyway.

I am letting John Meisel have the manuscript in a few days, but that does not mean that he will send it to the printer right away. We have to wait our turn; and I do not know when it will appear.

Congratulations on your electoral victory. I guess I shall have to address you as Senator from now on! I take satisfaction from the fact that in Spain the people are prepared to elect academics to Parliament. In North America this is very much less the case.

Too bad that you may not be able to make it to Washington next month. I had looked forward to seeing you there. I do hope that you will be able to make it.

I have finished editing all the essays for our issue of IJPS. In a few cases I found it very difficult. I had trouble finding the meaning in some. I only hope that I succeeded. The copy goes through a literary editor to polish the language anyway, but she is not a political scientist, and does not know our technical terms.

Our three sessions in Washington are all set to go. The third one organized by Thomas Hueglin promises to be very good. The other two you will remember from our Barcelona meetings.

About Ehrlich, he wrote a very gracious letter to John Meisel saying in part "I fully agree with your decision and I am aware that it was made in my own interest, too." Naturally I was pleased that he took it so well. So I guess all our troubles are over, or nearly so.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
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I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The main theoretical issue in the analysis of national and regional problems is whether, from case studies we can reasonably develop general patterns for a theory of nationalism and regionalism, or whether a sequence of case analyses only can give us a heterogenous account of different situations. The issue is especially problematic in the European political tradition, where, notwithstanding the theoretical line opened by Rokkan and Urwin (cfr. 1982 and 1983) and other political scientists, the national problems are mainly political, ~~problems~~ and the main stream of theory runs still through the developments of the traditional "nationalities principle", in which predominate the essentialist approaches to the concept of "nation". One of the consequences is that the sociological or ~~the~~ historical analysis can hardly be isolated from the political implications of every case study; and the social scientists or the historians are often requested to become political opinion makers, and to focus their analysis on a political and ~~or~~ ideological bias led me. My own experience in Spain has ~~brought~~ me to a very strong feeling against essentialism in this field. So I think that no case study is theoretically useful if we don't overcome this essentialist approach ~~and~~ this ideological bias, and if general categories and doctrinal approaches don't give way to historical and empirical approaches.

I don't intend to discuss here all the implications of this well-known theoretical problem, but only to contribute ~~with~~ some developments ~~about~~ the Spanish case, which offers a rich complexity of interactive regional and national elements, both in the ideological and in the political fields. The so-called "national problem" has been one of the

main issues in the Spanish political history in the last two centuries, and one of the keys to the background of the two military dictatorships that Spain has known in this XX century. After ten years of constitutional democracy, the problem has not been fully resolved, and conflicts about national identities and symbols arise periodically, not only as outbursts of peripherical nationalisms but even as political movements linked to terrorism -- as in the well-known case of E.T.A. Nor, it is solved the problem of the Spanish national feeling, as the ancient Spanish nationalism was connected to militarism, clericalism and centralism and the new democracy is challenged by the urgent need to implement, develop, spread and strenghten a new national feeling linked to democracy, to decentralization and to pluralism.

This brings me to a first general point that I should like to stress as a preliminary remark, namely: which is the relationship between pluralism and national and regional diversity ? I am perfectly aware that this problem has different roots and meanings in Western developed countries and in underdeveloped ones, not only because of different historical, social and political backgrounds, but also because the political and constitutional concept of pluralism doesn't have the same meaning in so heterogeneous situations. From this point of view, I think that the problem reveals mostly its complexity in Western developed countries, as here the ancient theory of nationalities -- developed mainly in XIX Century Europe as through abrupt economic and social transformations and through increasingly bloody wars. the Capitalist society, changed once and again the established political frontiers; -- melts with the problems arised by late capitalism, that's to say, with new patterns of economic, social, cultural and political centralization and consequently with new forms of territorial marginality.

This is a process that deeply concerns the actual working of traditional state institutions -- mainly jacobin inspired institutions -- and stresses the quest for new ways of political organization and institutional working. Social and political conflicts rooted in this new realities of late capitalisme often take the form of national and regional conflicts. And they are often theorized in terms of traditional theory of nationalities or even -- as can be seen in Spain's Basque Country -- in terms of the theory of imperialism and underdeveloped countries. I think, mostly important to identify these problems and to see if nationalism and regionalism are an ideological form or even an ideological disguise of other problems, arised by the logic of late capitalism development or if we are really confronted with a revival of non solved traditional problems of nationalities in developed countries.

But it is plainly evident that the problem concerns not only Western developed countries. National and regional conflicts arise and develop also in Eastern European countries, which are supposed to be strongly unified by their political systems. Yugoslavian situation is paradigmatic; But we must consider new developments in the Soviet Union, in Roumania, in Poland. Some of them related to the last redefinition of State frontiers after the II World War. The deep political reforms announced in these countries can reveal very strong contradictions and can open the way to new prospects in political analysis.

To focuse the analysis in Europe and in other developed zones is not only a theoretical option but a challenge. It seems to me that national and regional problems in underdeveloped countries are more thoroughly known by political scientists, and more easy to comprehend in a general view, as their roots are more evident -- the process of colonial emancipation -- and the patterns of their nation

building processes are more uniform, notwithstanding their increasing complexity. By contrast, the explosion of national and regional problems in developed countries is awaiting theoretical explanations, because behind it we can find two great issues to be considered: first, the relationship between new economic developments and regional marginalities; second, the relationship between these new economic developments and the centralization or decentralization of political institutions and of cultural patterns (mass media, languages, cultural values, etc.). This is a complex field because it is difficult to define it and because it is rapidly changing. Things that seemed evident ten or fifteen years ago are not so evident now, as national minorities and regional diversities are counteracted by large integration processes -- like European Economic Community -- and by the strong uniformization of cultural patterns. Explanations based only in one set of factors, economic, political or cultural, are no longer sufficient to cope with overall realities.

That brings me to the first point I mentioned: the relationship between case analysis and general theory. I was myself troubled with this problem when I published recently a book on "Nationalities and Nationalisms in Spain". (1985). As I was deepening my own analysis I found absolutely necessary to avoid two theoretical temptations: First, the temptation of abstract analysis, of mere conceptual discussions about the true meaning of "nation", for example. Second, the temptation to develop a general theory from the Spanish case.

It seems to me that political concepts like "nation", "region", "self-determination", for example, don't have the same meaning in Spain and in Central America, in Europe and in Africa. They don't have the same meaning anymore in XIX century European history and in present-day Europe.

"Selfdetermination", for example, is a general principle established as ~~a~~ such in United Nations declarations. But to understand its real meaning we must descend to concrete cases, because the most important problem is not "selfdetermination" itself as a juridical and politiccal principle, but to identify the specific subjects to be selfdetermined.

~~I want to~~ stress the point with an example. In a meeting held in Managua in june 1986 on the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua "selfdetermination" was a ~~most~~ discussed item, as some participants put forward the concept of "selfdetermination" as the political basis ~~of~~ Atlantic Coast autonomy. The theoretical problem became immediately a political problem, because the consequences of one kind of practical implementation or another were obviously bound to be extremely different, and both deeply significatives from a political point of view. The problem was not to assert the theoretical principle of "selfdetermination" but to identify the juridical subject of this general right. Was it Nicaragua as a whole ? Was it the Atlantic Coast ? According to the juridical and political sense of the concept as defined by United Nation declarations, "selfdetermination" means the enforcement of national sovereignity against foreign pressions. Atlantic Coast autonomy was seen as the way tho strengthen national unity between the two ~~actual~~ parts of Nicaragua, the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts. As selfdetermination is linked with the possibility of political independence and sovereignity, selfdetermination for the Atlantic Coast could lead to the splitting of Nicaragua as a country. So the answer of the Managua meeting was very clear: the juridical subject of selfdetermination was not the Atlantic Coast but Nicaragua as a whole. It was, obviously, a political decision, but this is the key ~~of~~ the issue, as I explained before, the problem is not selfdetermination as a political or a juridical concept, but

to identify its subject, and that means a political decision which can be explained only through a historical and political case analysis.

In Spain is developing also a strenous and rather bitter discussiont about "selfdetermination", and the whole of nationalist parties in the Basque Country and the majority of them in Catalonia put ahead "selfdetermination" as a core principle of their political programs. Even more, ETA terrorism has developed in the name of Basque selfdetermination. Here also the problem is not the theoretical concept nor the abstract discussion but the real meaning of "selfdetermination" in our historical perspective and in our constitutional system. I will insist later in this problem.

Of course I'm not against general theories. What I want to stress is my personal conviction that there is not a single explanation of national and regional realities and conflicts, as, for example, the explanation based on economic marginality and that we need cross examinations of national and regional cases. Economic marginality can explain, perhaps, regional conflicts in France's Bretagne and Corsica, but not in Spain's Catalonia and Basque Country, the latter are the most developed zones of Spain. Economic marginality is undoubtedly one of the causes of regional conflict in North Ireland, but it seems not possible to explain it fully if religious and cultural factors are not taken into account.

Last but not least, historical perspective is absolutely necessary not only to understand the roots of every single national and regional problem, but also to understand the continuity of institutions and of collective feelings. In my opinion this is mostly important. National and regional problems in Spain, for example, can only be explained in all

their complexities from a historical point of view. Only through history, political and economic factors take their full shape. So let me discuss to the problems of nationalities and regions in Spain to explain the full meaning of this preliminary comments.

II. THE SPANISH CASE.

The strongest national and regional conflicts developed in the most economic developed regions of Spain, viz. Catalonia and the Basque Country. Therefore, the roots of the problem were not economic marginality but political and cultural marginality.

The building of the jacobin Spanish state through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not the work of an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, as in France, but of a ruling class made up mainly of great southern landowners, bureaucratic cliques and speculative financial groups. The Catalonian industrial bourgeoisie, based on light industry, never was a dominant part of the state ruling class, but a secondary partner. The Basque bourgeoisie, developed lately in the nineteenth century through the boom in heavy industry (iron, coal, steel, machinery) and through the rapid accumulation of banking capital. This Basque bourgeoisie became the core of financial Spanish capital, but not of the political ruling class. Moreover Catalonia became an economic and cultural area unified by the powerful presence of a great urban center, Barcelona. By contrast, the Basque country lacked such a unifying urban center, and the industrial city of Bilbao became a kind of liberal island in a sea of traditionalist peasant holdings. Finally, the central ruling class, the central oligarchy as we usually say in Spain, was able to build a jacobin state but not to unify the whole

of Spanish civil society, as the French jacobin ruling class was able to do.

To develop a system of light industry like that of Catalonia -- which depended on the internal Spanish market and on a very severe protectionism -- one political condition was needed, which the Catalan bourgeoisie was never able to attain: the control of the central State. This was not exactly the problem of the Basque Country, as the Basque bourgeoisie ~~was~~ already controlled banking capital. Accordingly, Catalan nationalism was the work of an industrial bourgeoisie, powerful enough to create a ~~zone of~~ modern capitalist economy in a mainly agrarian country, but weak enough not to became seize political power. Catalan nationalism developed as a political proposal of reform and decentralization of the Spanish state system. ~~that's to say, of the~~ jacobin ~~state.~~ Basque nationalism, by contrast, was mainly the work of peasantry and intermediate urban groups, and was rooted in traditionalism and catholic integrism. It was not so much interested in leading and reforming the Spanish state, as in becoming a separate part of Spain or even a separated State.

These two different proposals were unified as a single political problem by the brutal answer of the central ruling class, which did not accept compromising, and ordered the Army, ~~an Spanish Army~~ which was recently humiliated in the ~~recent~~ war against the United States for Cuba and the Philipines ~~Islands~~, to fight the nationalists. The Army became then the armed depositary of the integrity of the Spanish nation and the jacobin Monarchy against all ~~sort of~~ internal opposition. Catalonia and the Basque Country were treated as enemies of this State and this unified Nation, their institutions, ~~their~~ cultures, ~~their~~ languages were ~~persecuted~~ suppressed and all the Catalans and ~~all the~~ Basques, regardless of social status, were confronted with the same centralist adversary. Consequently, all

political and social groups, all social classes in Catalonia and the Basque Country clashed with the same external enemy. And this clash became more and more violent and radical as the crisis of Monarchy opened the way to military dictatorships -- generals Primo de Rivera and Franco, which have lasted 50 years of present century. I underline that the ideological basis of both military dictatorships was the same: the fight against the "reds", who wanted to destroy monarchy, and the fight against the "separatists", who wanted to destroy the unity of the Spanish nation.

The clash was specially violent under ~~general~~ Franco ~~'s~~ dictatorship. In Catalonia, underground ~~fight~~ against Franco combined the quest for democracy with the quest for political autonomy, and was the work of all political groups, mainly the work of left-wing parties -- socialists and communists. In the Basque country, the fight against Franco developed in a more radical nationalist way. The different roots of both problems became once again evident. In Catalonia all political groups reached substantial agreements to develop a democratic alternative. In the Basque Country, radical nationalism gave way to political movements like ETA, which developed soon as terrorist groups.

When transition to democracy began to develop after ~~general~~ Franco's death in 1975, the problem of Catalan and Basque autonomy was one of the main issues ~~to solve~~. But the problem was not only an institutional one, that's to say, ~~a problem~~ of political organization, but also an ideological one, as the clash against an external enemy like franchism developed both in Catalonia and the Basque Country a very strong collective feeling of nationality ~~that~~ was very difficult to integrate in the wider collective feeling of the Spanish nation, especially after a ~~so~~ strong phase of

ultrarightist Spanish nationalism under ~~general~~ Franco's regime.

In the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 there is a rather odd article, ~~a~~ article 2, ~~it~~ in which the concept of Spanish nation is defined. It ~~is said~~ that Spain is a true, united and indivisible nation. But it ~~is said~~ also that this united nation is formed by "nationalities" and "regions", that ~~both of them~~ have a right to political autonomy, ~~which is~~ recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution itself, and that the link which ~~maintains~~ this nation united is the rather immaterial link of "solidarity". From a theoretical point of view article ~~2~~ seems to be an odd combination of heterogeneous elements, and the result is something like a "nation of nations". But article ~~2~~ is not a theoretical exercise, but an attempt to find a political solution to one of the most serious and most bloody problems of Spanish political history. Consequently article 2 is the political basis of a new organization of the Spanish traditional jacobin system in a federal-like system of political autonomies.

~~But~~ I ~~want~~ should like to underline here another side of the problem. The Spanish Constitution does not limit itself to open political autonomy ~~to~~ for Catalonia and the Basque Country, but establishes political autonomies as a general system of State organization. Here we find the other dimension of our ~~issue~~ problem, the dimension of pluralism. Political autonomies are not seen in the Spanish Constitution only as a way to pacify the historical conflict between centralism and Catalan and Basque nationalities, but also as a way to open the political system to the plurality of regional realities hidden under the artificial uniformity of jacobin centralism, and as a way to find a new equilibrium between developed and underdeveloped ~~zones~~ regions of Spain. Today we have ~~17~~ seven Autonomous Communities, each with its Parliament and its Governement.

Their developement is unbalanced and the change from jacobin state to decentralized state is revealing itself not only very difficult but threatened even by impredictible backward movements, especially as regards to new conditions imposed by Spain's integration in the European Economic Community. But the challenge is very clear: the Spanish system of autonomies wants to solve the problems posed by national diversities in Spain and, at the same time, to open the way to the full expression of national and regional pluralism.

III. SOME CONCLUSIONS.

This short description of the Spanish case brings me back to my first introductory statements. Economic marginalities are certainly one of the roots --and so one of the theoretical explanations -- of regional and national conflicts in developed countries, but I don't think that they are by themselves, the basis of a general theory of regionalism or of national plurality. Economic factors are of course basic for theoretical explanations, but they are many-sided, and are to be considered in their concrete reality. Historical and political factors are mostly important, but also as concrete elements of an specific historical development and of an specific political system. Cultural factors can develop also many-sidedly, both as a result of political conflicts and of ideological confrontations, I mean (linguistic conflicts for example). But even those are to be considered in their specific realities. In the Spanish case, for example, the clash between a majority language, Spanish, and minorities languages, Catalan, Basque, Galizian, is mainly a political clash which has had a different development following the structure, the background and the strengh of each language and of the national collectivity that supports it. The

situation of the Catalan language is, in this sense, far better than that of the Basque language. The conflict of national symbols, flags, anthems, etc., can be a very strong one, as it has been, and still is, in Spain, due to the specific political and historical conditions of national confrontations. And, at the same time, they can become ideological weapons to nourish increasingly conflictive nationalist movements in a historical and a political context quite different from the original one.

In my opinion, that means that many-sided analysis and cross examination of concrete cases is absolutely necessary to cope with the complexity of national and regional problems. From here we can plausibly expect to reach some general explanations and, going back to my preliminary remarks, I think that this is possibly the nearest approach to general theory in our field.

I. P. S. A. International Political Science Association
A. I. S. P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
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July 8, 1988

Dear Colleague: Jordi :

I have not written to all of you since August 26 of last year when I reported on the Committee's meeting in Barcelona to consider papers on the topic Pluralism, Regionalism, Nationalism. At that meeting it was decided that the two panels assigned to us for the IPSA World Congress would be devoted to the topics Theories of Pluralism and Pluralism as a Paradigm of Social Science?. IPSA announced that there may be time for some extra panels if research committees wished to apply for them. I submitted our application for a third panel and this was granted. In it we shall be discussing the topic Pluralism, Corporatism, What?

My main reason for writing to you now is to inform you of our programme for the Washington World Congress which will be held from August 28 to September 1, inclusive. The meetings of our Research Committee come on the last two days: Panel No.3 at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31st, Panel No.2 at 8:45 a.m. on Thursday, September 1st, and Panel No.1 at 3:30 in the afternoon of the same day. I have asked that our business meeting be scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, the 31st. As you no doubt realize, the IPSA World Congress is being held at this time to permit people to attend the American Political Science Association as well. Its meetings follow directly on those of IPSA.

.../2

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
priv. (02) 672 38 89

Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

The programme for our sessions is as follows:

Panel No.3, 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 31
Topic: Pluralism, Corporatism, What?

Chair: Thomas Hueglin

Papers:
David Cameron: Is There Politics after Corporatism?
Scott Lash: Restructuration or Disorganization?
Hanspeter Kriesi: Pluralism, Corporatism--Or Syndicalism?
Wolfgang Streeck Diversity and Interdependence: the Problematic Stability on Emcompassing Organization and the Search of New Sources of Social Order

Discussants: Donald L. Horowitz, John Manley, Leo Panitch, Alessandro Pizzorno

Panel #2, 8:45 a.m., Thursday, September 1
Topic: Pluralism as a Paradigm of Social Science?

Chair: H.G. Thorburn

Papers:
Stanislaw Ehrlich: Pluralism, a Paradigm of Social Sciences?
Marcel Merle (who will not attend personally,
but whose paper will be presented by André Donneur:
Pluralisme et relations internationales
Daniel Elazar: Pluralism and Federalism: The Case of the United States of America

Discussants: Paul Claeys, Philip Mawhood

Panel #1, 3:00 p.m. Thursday, September 1
Topic: Theories of Pluralism

Co-Chairmen: Luigi Graziano and George Vlachos

Papers:
George Vlachos: Le pluralisme économique et sociale et la notion de "société démocratique"
Adolf Bibic: Civil Society, the State and Socialist Pluralism
Rainer Eisfeld: Liberal and Socialist Pluralism: The Debate between the Two Perspectives

Discussants: Luigi Graziano, Stanislaw Ehrlich, Michael Walzer

.../3

As you can see, we have quite a rich programme: Nos. 1 and 2 dominated by our own members, and No. 3 with distinguished researchers who are working in the field of pluralism, corporatism and the politics of modern industrial states. I am particularly grateful to Thomas Hueglin, our newest member, for his vigour and success in setting up Panel No. 3. I do hope that you will be able to be present in Washington to participate in these sessions, and to contribute to our planning for the future.

Now, let me give you some general news: Professor Léo Hamon has written to me to say that he is no longer able to travel as readily as before his retirement, and he considered that under these circumstances he should resign from the Committee. I regretfully accepted his resignation both as Vice-Chairman and as member of our Committee. We shall miss him greatly for his vigorous and stimulating interventions.

Philip Mawhood has taken over as Treasurer of our group, and no doubt you will have heard from him in connection with the perennial problem of our annual dues. I trust you have been communicating with him as well.

Our colleague, Andrzej Korbonski, regrets that he has not so far been able to arrange for the newsletter to go to our members. We hope that in future he will be able to take this up again.

I am pleased to be able to inform you that the International Political Science Review, the flagship journal of IPSA, will be devoting a number to the publication of some of the papers from our Barcelona conference on Pluralism, Regionalism, Nationalism. I have received all of the papers and I am in the process of editing them. I expect to turn the manuscript over to Professor John Meisel, the co-Editor of the Journal, next week. Professor Jordi Sole Tura, who was our host at the Barcelona meeting, is co-Editor with me on this issue. I am pleased to report also that he has just been elected to the Senate, the upper house of the Spanish Parliament, at the recent parliamentary elections in Spain. I am sure you join me in congratulating him on this victory.

We have some plans for the future which I should like you to know about: we have been invited by the Democratic Party of Poland to hold a meeting in September 1989 at their guest house outside Warsaw. The topic will be: Mixed Economy--East/West. You will, of course, be hearing more about this arrangement at the Washington Congress from Professor Winczorek.

Philip Mawhood has indicated that he believes he can arrange a meeting for the University of Birmingham following our meeting in Poland, probably in 1990. We have not decided on a topic, although we have been considering holding a meeting to discuss Pluralism and Economic Policy, so we can consider whether this is to be followed up at our business meeting in Washington.

.../4

Also, Professor Rainer Eisfeld has been discussing with the administration of the Zentrum für Interdiziplinäre Forschung at the University of Bielefeld, on the possibility of holding a conference on the topic Pluralism and the Armed Forces. No doubt he will be bringing us up to date on that matter in Washington.

We also have a long-term intention to meet in Yugoslavia, whenever that can be arranged. Professor Bibic will tell us about that.

This is about all the news that I have to report to you. Our business meeting in Washington will be considering these questions and we also must give some thought to our future in terms of our intellectual criteria and philosophical thrust. Let me remind you of the discussion of this problem that Professor Tournon prepared for us which was distributed in Barcelona. I hope to see us discuss these themes in Washington. Also, we should give some thought to our own constitution. Specifically, should we adopt terms of office for our office-holders, or exactly what should we do? I did canvass some of the other committees to see what their procedures are, and I shall tell you about them in Washington.

I look forward to seeing you at the Hilton Hotel in Washington next month, and until then you have my best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

HGT:bg

P.S. I have all the papers now — I'll pass them on to Prof. Meisel.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

16 August 1988

Dear Jordi,

There is one urgent matter that I require from you: a biographical sketch for inclusion in our number of IJPS. Could you send it to me immediately.

I have prepared the abstract (in English and French) of your paper, and edited it. However I have no way of preparing the biographical note. With that the number should be complete as far as we are concerned. I am going to give it to Meisel as soon as I receive your bio.

All the best

Hugh Thorburn

Contact 24 - Oct 1988

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático de Derecho Político

Barcelona, 26, 9, 1988

Prof,Rainer Eisfeld
Universität Osnabrück
Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften
D-4500, Osnabrück Postfach 4469
Albrechtstr,28

Dear Professor Eisfeld,

Thank you very much for your mostly interesting ant stimulating paper on "Liberal and Socialist Pluralism; the Debate between two Perspectives", I have read it with the highest interest.

Unfortunately it was impossible for me to travel to Washington . I hope that the IPSA Congress and, specially, the workshops of our Committee were a success.

As you perhaps know, I have been elected Senator some months ago and my new parliamentary duties will be from now my main occupation. But,of course, I hope to follow the works and the next meetings of our Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism.

Sincerely yours

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

Universität Osnabrück

Rainer Eisfeld

Fachbereich
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Universität Osnabrück · Postfach 44 69 · 4500 Osnabrück

Professor Jordi Sole Tura
Cátedra de Derecho Politico
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Avenida Diagonal
E-34 Barcelona

D-4500 OsnabrückPostfach 44 69
Albrechtstraße 28
Telefon (0541) 608-1
Telex 944887 uni os d

Ihr Zeichen	Ihre Nachricht vom	Mein Zeichen	Datum
			July 18, 1988

Dear Professor Sole Tura:

I do not know if you are planning to travel to Washington, but I thought this might interest you, because I have tried to compare not only liberal and socialist pluralism, but also both to classical liberalism and Marxist socialism.

Hoping to meet you at the IPSA Congress,

Sincerely yours,

Rainer Eisfeld

LIBERAL AND SOCIALIST PLURALISM:

THE DEBATE BETWEEN TWO PERSPECTIVES

Rainer Eisfeld
University of Osnabrueck
(FRG)

Prepared for Presentation
at the XIV World Congress
of the
International Political Science Association
August 28 - Sept. 1, 1988
Sheraton-Washington Hotel, Washington D. C.

I. APPLYING DEMOCRATIC NORMS: THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING RANGE

Proclaimed as self-evident in the revolutionary uprisings of 1776 and 1789, the principle that men are free and created equal certainly was meant "to arouse a sentiment of enthusiasm among (the bourgeoisie) and the masses" (MARX 1962: 500). And yet the normative chasm could not have been more profound. Every member of the feudal society's closed social, economic, and political order had held a position rigidly ascribed by his or her birth into one of the three estates. A gradation of privileges had corresponded to the pattern of positions; "political" rights had coincided with "social" status. If the notion of equality had been alien to feudalism, it likewise had known no liberty, but only liberties in the sense of fixed privileges.

The general principles of liberty and equality offered the one concept which might convincingly counter the feudal idea of specific liberties. And only from then on could projects like socialism or democratization, contrasting reality with promise, make any systematic sense.

Politically, acceptance of the norm of fundamental human equality meant that, in decisions on shaping society, citizens' differing preferences henceforth would be weighted equally and not unequally, and that these decisions would be taken according to majority rule (see DAHL/LINDBLOM 1953:41). Such acceptance has also meant, however, that the norm's range of total or even partial application to decisions taken on the various levels of society other than in the realm of political government has remained controversial.

To be subjected, in some specific sector of society, to an authority denying own needs or enforcing others' preferences without being able to adequately comprehend or effectively control it could, obviously, only evolve into a problem after the legitimation of authority in general had fundamentally changed. And only after the principle of democracy (precisely equal weight of preferences and majority rule) had been formulated for society as a whole, the question could be raised if, in the subsystems of society, particular hierarchies have continued to exist which might impair the application of democratic norms to decisions binding society in toto.

The liberal tendency has been to conceptually sever polity from society, like the individual was severed from social, economic, or psychological relations; in practice, liberalism has tended to divert demands for extended participation from the socio-economic to the political realm - by extension of the suffrage, redistribution of seats, introduction of the single-member constituency, secret ballot, more effective local government, initiative and referendum, direct primaries, finally industrial regulation. Political reform and electoral response have been liberalism's keynotes.

In contrast, radical and socialist agendas have been concerned with the democratic control of each of "the various communities of which we are a part" (MASON 1982: IX). Their advocates have insisted that society and polity are interwoven not only through governmental intervention into an increasing number of dimensions of social life, but also because citizens' political perceptions, activities, resources, and influence are linked to the individual's place in socio-economic hierarchies. To the extent that "the political personality of the average citizen is made ineffective" (LASKI 1921: IX) by induced on-the-job compliance

and docility, by the experience of occupational powerlessness and other-directedness, by habitual lack of information, by low income and low socio-economic status, the norm of political equality is violated. To make a society "more receptive" to this, its own, central value would require, according to the radical-democratic argument, "comprehensive activization" (ETZIONI 1968: 6) - making "all societal sectors...more responsive to their members".

II. DEFINING ORGANIZED INTERESTS: THE CRUX OF THE CORPORATION

"The vehicle of change is a social grouping... One man is generally unable to transform collectivities... (Since) the confines of social life are frequently composed of other people in the same predicament...(,) a combination of persons (may) jointly activate their social grouping and thus alter their collective life and their individual selves" (ETZIONI 1968: 2, 4/5). These sentences that precede the above-quoted argument indicate the shift from the liberal to the pluralist mode of reasoning. Liberalism had "atomized" society: Stripping individuals of their different social positions and roles, considering them bound by transcendental rational laws in "pre-established harmony", the liberal model had abhorred "sinister" factional interests and had rejected the organization of such interests into permanent associations. In contrast, pluralism not only accepted the diversity of conflicting social interests, but also the expression of individuals' social needs through associations; centering on the fundamentally associative character of society, it considered society and polity linked by the "constant and complex interactions" of "the individual, the group, the state" (FOLLETT 1920: 10, 61). The more social interests began - and were allowed - to coalesce, the more the pressure exerted by organized groupings on each other no less than on political

parties, legislatures, and administrations became evident - and the subject of study -, the more pluralism emerged as an at once descriptive and normative model.

If both dimensions of the concept are taken into account in an attempt at definition, pluralism

- positively establishes the existence of a diversity of needs, interests (simultaneously meaning - secondary - groups), and centers of power (not least voluntary associations)
- and normatively accepts the transformation of this diversity into public policies shaping society.

Pluralism is thus constructed as a group and a participatory theory - a theory of individual participation by social association in the political process. The concept implies that groups derive their legitimacy from the representation of individual needs and interests. This poses the problems internally of the control of elites acting "on behalf" of groups - common to every form of "government" - and externally of the equality of group power and influence in mutual conflict and bargaining.

Liberal pluralism - the "dominant form" of theoretical approach (APTER 1977: 294) and the prevailing "public philosophy" to which "public men" have grown accustomed both as guideline and justification for their policies (LOWI 1967: passim) - has attempted to eliminate the first problem by definition and to minimize the second. Essentially reducing human conduct to group action, it has postulated that "'the individual' and 'the group' are...merely convenient ways of classifying behavior, ...not different things" (TRUMAN 1951: 48); individual freedom and overarching consent have been judged to be guaranteed by overlapping group memberships and cross-cutting individual solidarities (KORNHAUSER 1961: 80). Regarding the equality of group influence, a "natural self-

balancing factor" - "almost amount(ing) to a law" - was discerned: "Nearly every vigorous push in one direction stimulates an opponent or coalition of opponents to push in the opposite direction" (MILBRATH 1963: 345; see also KORNHAUSER 1961: 130). Countervailing power as a "self-generating force" was not only considered, apart from governmental action, to hold in check private economic power; it was also elevated to the position of "the central ingredient of a stable pluralist democratic system" (APTER 1977: 355/56). These competing "multiple centers of power", resulting from ever-present counter-balancing tendencies, "tam(ing), civiliz(ing), ...and limit(ing power) to decent human purposes", were supposed to solve conflicts "to the mutual benefit of all parties" (DAHL 1967: 24).

For socialist - also termed radical (NISBET 1976: 431 ss.) or structural (GALTUNG 1972: 186 ss.) - pluralism, the development, with regard to sales, assets, and number of employees, of increasingly multinational business corporations (operating, again increasingly, on oligopolistic markets) into social and public (rather than individual and private) institutions has conspicously demonstrated the necessity of including, under the group label, "every organized form of concentrated capital" (EHRLICH 1962: 273). Devoid of effective internal (stockholder) no less than of adequate external (governmental and market) control, but exercising - by its investment, employment, pricing, merger and collusion, facilities transfer and asset-moving policies - power comparable to that of territorial associations, the "corporate leviathan" (DAHL 1970: 115) is seen as the most significant target for structural, participatory reforms aiming, by a drawn-out, difficult process, at diminishing the discretionary exercise and grossly unequal distribution of organizational power. The notions of pluralist socialism have been reinforced by the rediscovery of pluralism as "an inner requirement of socialism" (LOMBARDO-RADICE 1965: 1) by East European reform communists and Western Eurocommunist political parties, cul-

minating in the Yugoslav perspective of arriving at an institutionalized "pluralism of self-management interests in society" (KARDELJ 1979: 107).

Evidently the aim and the problems of democratization, envisaged by the radical and socialist critiques of liberalism, have merely reappeared in new garb. Like the dispute between liberalism and socialism, the debate between liberal and socialist pluralism concerns the fundamental question whether democracy is conceived of as merely an isolated political or as a comprehensive social goal - whether, in the last analysis, political participation and control are feasible without corresponding socio-economic institutional arrangements. The remaining sections of this paper will attempt to summarize and contrast some essential constituent principles on one hand of liberalism and liberal pluralism, on the other of (Marxist) socialism and socialist pluralism - attempting to further clarify the most salient issues of a conceptual and political controversy that may be expected to continue.

III. LIBERALISM: BUSINESS CLASS RULE AND COMPETITIVE LAISSEZ FAIRE-CAPITALISM

Even as liberal connotations became increasingly "detached from any tenable theory of society" (MILLS 1963:189), the work of John Stuart Mill like a seismograph registered the principles that had been central to liberalism, and which now were being called in question, hesitating to finally reject them. "In the long run", Mill admitted as necessary, even as desirable the transition from restricted (privileging the propertied) to universal suffrage; universal, according to his argument, but still "graduated", admitting the more educated to plural voting - and was not the "employer of labor...on the average more intelligent than (the) laborer"? Payment of taxes, moreover, remained decisive: receipt of relief disqualified for

the franchise (MILL 1975a (1861): 280/81, 284/85, 290). Government should intervene socially; it should grant the "assistance of law" to whole "classes of persons", because under present social conditions the principle "that individuals are the best judges of their own interest" cannot always apply. Exemptions from the general norm of laissez faire are so numerous as to disqualify the doctrine; yet verbally the rule is still adhered to: "Letting alone should be the general practice; every departure from it, unless required by some great good, is a certain evil" (MILL 1865: 573 ss., 582 ss.). However, Mill definitely rejected the liberal ban on trade unions; although viewing sceptically their chances of generally improving wages and working conditions, he saw that the individual poor laborer would be exposed to the dictates of a wealthy employer, so that, "far from being a hindrance to a free market of labor", associations of laborers were "the necessary instrumentality of that free market" (ibid.: 563/64, 565).

Mill's hesitant retreat from the maxims of absolute individual autonomy in liberal philosophy, laissez faire for individuals - coupled with curbs on associations - in the liberal economy, and restricted suffrage in the liberal polity once more conspicuously shed light on the theories of classical ("integral") liberalism in the tradition of Locke and Adam Smith. Because the individual was considered to have precedence, chronologically and logically, over civil society and government, he was under no social obligation whatever in decisions concerning his personal capacities and his material possessions - "the Grass (his) horse ha(d) bit; the Turfs (his) Servant ha(d) cut; and the Ore (he) ha(d) digg'd" (LOCKE 1970: 305/306, 307 (§§ 27, 28)); the more as the origins of a propertied and a laboring class were also removed to the state of nature: "out of the bounds of Society" men had "made practicable...an inequality of possessions" by "tacitly agreeing in the use of Money", by "Free-men" selling "for a certain

time (a) Service)...in exchange for Wages" (ibid.: 320, 340 (§§50, 85)). Only in a second step the gap between factual autonomy and transcendental obligation was bridged by assuming a preestablished harmony between the reason of positive law fashioned by subjective human will and objective universal (natural) law, discernible by individual reason (see ibid.: 369, 376 (§§ 124, 135)): "All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty" - of "liberty, not licence", in Locke's famous words from the beginning of the 'Second Treatise' - "establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is perfectly left free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men" (SMITH 1976: 687).

Free, unfettered competition was thus defined as merely another case of objectified "government by law", not arbitrary "government by men". Governmental laissez faire became the essence of economic liberalism (see SCHUMPETER 1954: 394) and, finally, "a copybook maxim" (KEYNES 1972 (1926): 280). Initially a reaction against the regulations of mercantilism, it served to cement the achieved privileges of entrepreneurs - like the liberal ban on "combinations", originally intended to abolish the ascribed prerogatives of guilds, the brunt of whose thrust was soon borne by those associations considered a novel "evil of the first magnitude" (BAGEHOT 1968 (1872): 272) by liberalism: the workers' trade unions. Social philosopers, legislatures, and courts agreed that individual men should be left as free "to dispose of (their) time and of (their) labor in the way and on the terms which (they) may judge most conducive to (their) own interest", as they should be left free "to employ the capital (they) inherit, or (have) acquired" (House of Commons Committee Reports of 1811, cit. in WEBB 1965: 249, 679). It was a nega-

tive idea of freedom (freedom from any governmental interference); the resulting - assumedly - free competition seemed so obvious, precisely because it was so evidently patterned to fit a business class among which the medium-sized, owner-managed firm constituted the typical unit, that not even Mill bothered to define it (see SCHUMPETER 1954: 545). What the concept did not reflect, was that class division which, as explained above, was considered "natural", and not of civil, or political, society.

Thus, the liberal argument's pretense to universal validity; but through that pretense shone, again and again, the articulation of the class position, the restriction of the role of political citoyen to the economic bourgeois. Reduced to "bare subsistence", the workers' conditions of living "never allow that body of men time or opportunity to raise their thoughts above that, or struggle with the richer for theirs" (LOCKE 1963a (1691): 71). This, however, was the state into which, because of the development of the division of labor, "the laboring poor...must necessarily fall": The "great body of the people" would "generally become...stupid and ignorant" and "altogether incapable of judging...the great and extensive interests" of their country (SMITH 1976: 782). Having "not leisure for learning and logic", day-laborers - again, "the greatest part of mankind" - "cannot know: and therefore they must believe" (LOCKE 1963b: 146, 157. C.B. MACPHERSON: 1965 has drawn attention to these passages). Restricting the suffrage to the propertied, establishing a legislature of employers, on these assumptions served two purposes: Protecting "the owner(s) of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labor of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations", from the invasions of the poor (SMITH 1976: 710), it accomplished "the great end of Mens entering into Society, being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety" (LOCKE 1970: 373 (§ 134); see also RICARDO 1971 (1824): 501); at the same time, it prevented

"the supremacy of ignorance over instruction and of numbers over knowledge" (BAGEHOT 1968: 272). If "no part of the people" was represented "but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the publick" (LOCKE 1970: 391 (§ 158), reason and the homogeneity, in the last instance, of the propertied interests would assure that the relative divergences of "the landed, the manufacturing, the mercantile, the moneyed interest" would be resolved by compromise, preventing any "improper or wicked project" like "a rage...for an equal division" (MADISON 1853 (1787):44). The laws enacted by the majority of the representatives could therefore pass as the will of all enfranchised and as the "potential order...of objective reason...translate(d)...into actuality" (HALLOWELL 1946: 7), resolved after public, rational deliberation and discussion had replaced error by truth: "La vérité se répand par l'examen" (CONSTANT 1820: 153; see also MILL 1975b (1859): ch. II). If, however, Locke's day-laborers and Smith's laboring poor were enfranchised, and the social homogeneity of parliament abandoned, the dilemma arose for classical liberal thought which, again, John Stuart Mill sought to solve in the concluding passages of ch. VI of his "Representative Government".

The foregoing may be summarized as follows: Liberalism is a

- theory of the individual
- theory of role dualism (bourgeois/citoyen)
- class theory
- theory of the homogeneity of interests
- theory of confrontation (individual/government)
- theory of restricted political participation (limited suffrage)
- theory of representative (parliamentary) democracy
- theory of best (general) law by insight into objective principles through debate
- theory of negative freedom (freedom "from")
- theory of private control of the means of production
- theory of free competition
- theory of laissez faire.

IV. LIBERAL PLURALISM: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE WORKING STRATA AND INTERVENTIONIST OLIGOPOLY CAPITALISM

The work of John Stuart Mill and the development of the English "living constitution" in the 19th century testify to the fact that, regarding restrictions of suffrage, right of association, and governmental intervention in society, liberal principles in theory and practice proved far from immutable the more, during that century, problems once "amenable to individual solutions became...social problems requiring social solutions", and "more and more individuals turned, of necessity, to organization" (HALLOWELL 1946: 116). No other than Mill's contemporary Alexis de Tocqueville has been credited with having observed "that even at the time, 'La démocracie en Amérique' was a pluralist democracy" (FRAENKEL 1964: B 27). And Tocqueville's references, under the impression of the 'Jacksonian revolution', to "the general equality of condition among the people", to the "irresistible extension" of (white male) suffrage, and to those "extemporaneous assembl(ies)" governed by the members' "reason and free will", the voluntary associations (see TOCQUEVILLE 1953a: 3, 55, 191, 198), have indeed "provided the intellectual springboards from which many contemporary (i. e. liberal-pluralist) thinkers have constructed their own formulations" (CONNOLLY 1969: 4/5, specifically referring to the extensive favorable quotations from Tocqueville's book in DAHL 1967: 57 ss., 184 ss.).

When, however, the associations described by Tocqueville furnished the reason for the first emergence of a new conceptual approach in the theory of society and government, they had - in an era of "large manufacturing establishments" whose decisive contribution to a new "inequality of conditions" the French visitor to America foresaw (TOCQUEVILLE 1953b: 160/61) - turned into, as a rule, much more permanent

and large-scale bodies. The reasons for the increase of these organizations were found in the "many loyalties" of men (FOLLETT 1920: 289), linking each individual "to a variety of associations" (LASKI 1917: 19) through which he might realize his needs, faculties, and aims, and from which, concerning their social performance, the same "standards (as those) exacted from (their) individual member(s)" had to be demanded (id. 1968 (1919): 279). It was even claimed that "the individual stated for himself" was "a fiction", and that, in contrast to referring to individual activity, the study of social group activity was "essential, first, last, and all the time" (BENTLEY 1949 (1908): 215). The political consequences of such activity were diagnosed to the effect that the modern state had developed into a "public service corporation", with its laws the result of the "interplay of (i. e. group) interests" (LASKI 1968: 31; id. 1931: 68) - more drastically, of "pressure", of "the push and resistance between groups" (BENTLEY 1949: 258).

While the two analyses here referred to evidently covered some common ground, they vastly differed in their approach to the same phenomena:
- Pluralism, as developed by Harold Laski (building on F.W. Maitland, J. N. Figgis, William James, and Ernest Barker), offered a "critical political theory" (GETTELL 1924: 470) - critical, initially, of juristic monism ascribing to the state "a unitary and absolute sovereign power" as the sole and direct source of either legal or political authority (HSIAO 1927: 7); discerning, however, that repudiating the state's claim to formal sovereignty would not suffice if individual man, acting through his freely established associations, was to be reinstated as the central political figure capable of influencing a polity at once grown overwhelmingly powerful and largely monopolized by the economically strong. Laski therefore concluded that "no political democracy can be real that is not as well the reflection of an economic democracy"

(LASKI 1968: 38). The resulting normative concept of pluralism, even then classified as "pluralist socialism" (COKER 1921: 204), will be resumed below.

- Group theory strictu senso, as advocated by Arthur F. Bentley, aimed at introducing the group as the central analytical category, rejecting both individualism - men's "joint (i. e. group) activities...are the cloth, so to speak, out of which men in individual patterns are cut" - and institutionalism - "we shall have to get hold of political institutions ...and get them stated as groups, and in terms of other groups" (BENTLEY 1949: 176, 210). Bentley described his effort as "first, last, and all the time strictly empirical...calmly, 'positively'...grasp(ing) social facts just for what they are" (ibid.: 214, 56). The resurrection of Bentley's behaviorist "attempt to fashion a tool" by David B. Truman, for whose thinking the earlier work provided "the principal bench mark" (TRUMAN 1958: (1951): IX), paved the way for the emergence of "analytical pluralism" (LATHAM 1952: 9) as a new paradigm and a new "public philosophy", a mutual "absorption" of capitalism and pluralism (LOWI 1969: 47). The "acceptance of groups as lying at the heart of the process of government" was judged conceptually "unavoidable" (TRUMAN 1958: 46), after a growing body of pressure group studies had drawn attention, between the wars, to the influences exerted by professional, veterans', women's, or even temperance organizations. In addition, the advent of the Cold War confrontation reintroduced a more or less explicitly normative element into the concept: Control of leaders (elites) by means of periodic elections between competing parties and control among leaders (elites) by means of organized bargaining were defined as two significant attributes of (Western representative) democracy, both processes requiring a substantial amount of social pluralism - interdependent, yet largely autonomous social groups (see DAHL/LINDBLOM 1953: 302 ss., 326 ss.). Politics of group leadership-

moderate, rational conflict "among group leaders, socialized into the dominant values and associations of industrial society" - served as the demarcation line domestically against radicalism and mass movements, internationally against totalitarianism (ROGIN 1967: 10, 15; see also NICHOLLS 1974: 25).

Liberal pluralism never evolved into the comprehensive body of thought that liberalism had offered. This was not least due to the extended "gestation period" of the approach between the wars: Liberal pluralism could and did build on the policies which had punctured and finally conquered classical economic and political liberalism during two Great Depressions - the more shallow, but prolonged slump between 1873 and 1896, and the fearful crisis after the Great Crash of 1929. When the early pluralists argued for positive freedom - "the power of adding something to the quality of common life" (LASKI 1968 (1919): 55) - and state intervention - "constructive social policy...for the individual man" (FOLLETT 1920: 182/184) -, a mere generation had passed since, in England and France, virtually universal male suffrage had been adopted, trade unions exempted from criminal conspiracy proceedings, strikes declared lawful acts, and the beginnings of the welfare state demanded by the "Unauthorized Program" of the British Liberal Party's radical wing. Even if, in the United States, Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom asserted that "a free government's program had to be positive, not merely negative" (WILSON 1914: 219), twenty more years would elapse before the New Deal would adopt collective bargaining and some measure of social security, and before J. M. Keynes' 'General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money' would pave the way for governmental - fiscal and monetary - full employment policies. Where the original pluralists took issue normatively with laissez faire and negative freedom, liberal pluralism has concentrated descriptively on the already established (in the United States, largely by the New Deal) interaction between government and social groups, normatively - as "the reformist

theory of the state" (FRAENKEL 1969: 23) - embracing the interventionist policies introduced in the United States and Western Europe during the thirties and after World War II (see id.: 25/26).

A necessary condition of the rise of social associations had been gradual class differentiation - the "almost infinite grading" of workers into separate groups, "each with its own corporate tradition and standard of life, its own specialized faculty and distinctive needs", paralleling, on the entrepreneurial side, the emergence of "a whole hierarchy of specialized professionals...designers, engineers, buyers, managers, foremen, and what not, organized in their own professional associations" (WEBB 1965 (1897): 843). Where both lines met, strata of salaried white-collar employees evolved whose numbers have been increasing, in absolute numbers and in proportion, due to technical development, the grouping of industry into ever larger corporations and combines, the introduction of "scientific" management, "human" and "public" relations, large-scale advertising, the enlarging tertiary and state sector (see figures for the United States in DAHL 1967: 432).

Liberal pluralism proceeded one step further by arguing that other affiliations of the individual are apt to cut across occupational lines, so that claims originating in occupational interests "can be basically affected by interests not derived from the occupation" (TRUMAN 1958: 166) and also by "widely accepted norms cutting across many groups" (DAHL/LINDBLOM 1953: 329). The resulting "'cross pressures' of conflicting group loyalties" may produce political apathy; they may, however, also promote "compromise through bargaining" - and "as everybody knows, in the United States individuals identify with a great diversity of different groups", which "is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the proliferation of bargaining" (DAHL/LINDBLOM: ibid.). In the last instance, "a high

degree of liberty and consent" is advanced, in the liberal-pluralist concept, by overlapping group memberships (KORNHAUSER 1961: 80).

If class differentiation and the spread of associations were not least due to the transition from "competitive" to "trustified" capitalism (for the terms, see SCHUMPETER 1939: 96), liberal pluralism hardly drew any consequences with regard to the research of economic constraints from the insight that the resulting market structures and corporate market conduct of oligopoly and monopolistic competition are "group phenomena" (LATHAM 1965: 5). Instead, it was argued either generally that "organization begets counter-organization" (ibid.: 31) or, more specifically, that "private economic power...begets...the countervailing power of those who are subject to it" and that it "is countervailing power" - if necessary, supported in its development by the state - "which, in the typical American market, regulates the power of private decision" (GALBRAITH 1956: 125, 151, 182). With or without countervailing power, the prevailing tendency has been to accept the "administered" prices and "quasi-agreements" taxing the consumer on oligopolistic markets as "workable" and "effective" competition, emphasizing "dynamic" results such as economic growth and technological innovation (see CLARK 1961).

Liberal pluralists have usually conceded that income, education and status - the positions of group and group leadership in the social structure - determine, to a considerable extent, political activity, control, and access to government (see TRUMAN 1958 (1951): 265; DAHL/LINDBLOM 1953: 315). That these resources are unequally distributed between business and labor, has been noted (see TRUMAN: ibid.); that the system offers "unusual opportunities" for "pyramiding" such resources into structures of social power (DAHL 1963: 227), is an assertion more rarely encountered. However, the prospects for

"citizens weak in resources" to influence government - principally by associating with others - were not seriously questioned, because "probably no resource is uniformly most effective in American politics" (DAHL 1967: 378; see also DAHL 1963: 228). The perspective of liberal pluralism has remained to "extend the liberal theory of the political marketplace", replacing "the notion of individual competition ...by a network of organizational competition, influence, accountability, and information" (APTER 1977: 314/15). This network has been aimed not least at effecting constructive social policies which would promote positive liberty in the sense of new - and hopefully, ever fairer - deals, as Dahl/Lindblom who had, by the mid-seventies, become more sceptical and radical in their assessments, noted in explaining their earlier commitment to the ongoing political system: "The New Deal was not a remote historical episode. It provided grounds for thinking that reform periods would again occur with some frequency" (DAHL/LINDBLOM 1976: XXX).

To sum up this section's argument: Liberal pluralism is a

- theory of the individual
- theory of role differentiation
- group theory
- theory of the heterogeneity of interests
- theory of interaction (individual/society/government)
- theory of general political participation (universal suffrage)
- theory of representative (parliamentary) democracy and group-leadership bargaining
- theory of second best (specific) law by party compromise
- theory of positive freedom (freedom "to")
- theory of private control of the means of production
- theory of monopolistic ("workable") competition
- theory of state interventionism.

V. SOCIALISM: AIMING AT A COMMONWEALTH OF ASSOCIATED PRODUCERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR

Among the first to diagnose, after the joint-stock company had increasingly commenced replacing the privately owned and managed firm, the divorce between the functions of capital owner and entrepreneur - "transformation of the actual functioning capitalist into a mere manager, administrator of other people's capital, and of the owners of capital into...mere money capitalists" - as a salient feature of the future development of capitalism, was Karl Marx in the third volume of 'Capital' (MARX 1953 (1894): 452). He immediately considered this "the transcendence of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself, and hence a self-dissolving contradiction...a necessary transitional phase towards the reconversion of capital into the...property of associated producers, as outright social property" (ibid.: 453/54; emphasis added.). Moreover, he suggested that the corporation, as an instrument of advancing concentration and the establishment of "a monopoly in certain spheres", would "provoke state interference" (ibid.: 454); but his perception did not induce him to systematically envision the extent and possible consequences of such political intervention.

It seems evident that Marx, in his concept of "bourgeois revolution", combined aspects of both the industrial revolution in England and the political revolution in France. (As, however, 1789 was as much a peasant as a bourgeois revolution, the political was not succeeded by a corresponding industrial transformation in France, while in England political evolution accompanied industrial revolution.) The polarized notions of free competition and monopoly Marx took from classical political economy; one was linked to bourgeois self-assertion, the other, inevitable end product of increasing centralization and exploitation, to the anticipated "proletar-

ian revolution"-capitalism's expropriation by a numerically growing, ever more class-conscious proletariat. Marx did not develop an "intermediate theory" adequate to "what is now referred to as...oligolopistic market(s)", in which "a rationalized pursual of mutual interests and profits" leads to the acceptance of governmental regulation - "political capitalism", with "politics and the state...the means of attaining order in the economic sphere and security in the political arena", so that "the resilience of capitalism...cannot be evaluated (any longer) in isolated economic terms" (KOLKO 1963: 290, 302).

Liberalism derived from renaissance and enlightenment its confidence in the recognition, by reason and debate, and in the actualization, by law, of objective truths and values. Marx was indebted to Hegel's view of history for formulating a "vision" of historical development to be pursued to its logical goal according to laws of motion derivable from the historical process and to be realized by the praxis of the proletariat (the "universal class" whose situation had developed into a "paradigm for the human condition"), which would then become "co-eval with the generality of society" (AVINERI 1970: 61, 140). The proletariat had to act politically: universal suffrage, winning "the battle of democracy", was labeled, in the 'Communist Manifesto', "the first step in the revolution of the working class"; three decades later, it was linked by Marx, for England and the United States, to the possibility of the working class, after winning a majority in Parliament or Congress, "legally put(ting) an end to laws and institutions standing in the way of its development, although even here only so far as societal development permitted" (MEW 34 (1878): 498/99, cit. in HUNT 1984: 337). The working class had to associate: Trade unions and other workers' associations, according to the 'Communist Manifesto', helped create an "ever-expanding union of the workers"; the International, in its General Rules drafted by Marx in 1864, laid

down that "the success of the workers' movement in every country can only be secured by the power of union and combination" (MEW 16: 16); its 1871 London Conference resolution, again drawn up by Marx, asserted that the "constitution of the proletariat...as a distinct political party, opposed to all political parties formed by the propertied classes", was indispensable for ensuring the victory of the revolution" (cit. in AVINERI 1970: 146). Still, the final stage would be set economically: deepening crises (like the depression of 1873, to which Marx referred in his postface to the second edition of 'Capital' I) would "drum dialectics" even into the heads of the propertied classes, and centralization of capital and monopoly would set a "constantly decreas(ing) number of capital magnates" against the "constantly increasing", "united and organized" working class (MARX 1979 (1873): 929).

Even allowing for the primacy of the economic foundation of society, universal suffrage, to Marx, signified considerably more than a means to a merely tactical end. Even while property qualifications for voting were being successively abolished, universal suffrage continued to be "abused...for parliamentary sanction of the Holy State Power", because, functionally, "under the (individualistic) doctrine of the separation of powers, parliament's merely legislative powers alienate(d) it from the decision-making executive power". For Marx, however, "universal suffrage <u>per se</u> stands for the end of the political state as previously known and introduces new conditions that do not preserve the alienation between state and civil society... Bound to make the representative assembly represent all society, (it) will also emancipate it from its limitations as a merely legislative body" (AVINERI 1970: 210/11). The political form of human emancipation, therefore, was not representative (though universally elected) democracy, but direct, council democracy - the Commune (MARX 1983 (1871): 17 ss.):

> Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business...The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms...The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time...From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at workmen's wages... (According to) a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop, the rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the mandat impératif (formal instructions) of his constituents...The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the State parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movement of society.

If universal suffrage was to start society on its political way from capitalism to socialism, co-operative factories represented, by internally transcending the contradiction between capital and labor, the economic means of transition to a socialized system of production: "The co-operative factories ...have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behest of modern science, may be carried on..(by) associated labor...To save the industrious masses, co-operative labor ought to be developed to national dimensions, and consequently, to be fostered by national means" (MARX 1974 (1864): 518; see also id. 1953 (1894): 455). Again, it was the Paris Commune that first intended to realize this aim by "transforming the means of production...into mere instruments of free and associated labor", so that "united co-operative societies (might) regulate national production upon a common plan, taking it under their own control" (MARX 1983 (1871): 20).

Industrial production by highly flexible associated labor and political government under conditions of "universal participation and rapid turnover" were expected by Marx to combine into paving the way for a "job rotation that extends beyond

the essembly line...to include kinds of work we would call white-collar, technical, and especially managerial", a life-long education by which manual workers would become intellectually skilled and vice versa, so "that the two would soon become indistinguishable...in terms of...status and power" (HUNT 1984: 221, 366). Socialism as a process would evolve, in Marx' words, "the fully developed individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn" (MARX 1979 (1873). Richard Hunt has aptly termed this aim "deprofessionalization", the individual and social possibility of practicing as many talents and skills as possible (HUNT 1984: 216). In the only (early) instance when he adduced occupational examples, Marx used pre-industrial categories: the individual would "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner", instead of being confined to a life-long existence as "hunter, fisherman, herdsman, or critic " (MARX/ENGELS 1985 (1846): 54. Linking the idea, as mentioned, to life-long education and including, in its perspective, materially productive, political, and leisure activities, it becomes possible, however, to conceive of it "not as a rigid formula", but as a democratization of "the liberal ideal" of property and Bildung - certainly a "tantalizing vision", testimony to Marx' "real radicalism" (HUNT 1984: 227, 230, 367) and a far cry from the revisions of Marxism both by Bernstein and Lenin.

To summarize once more: Socialism is a

- theory of the individual
- theory of role differentiation progressing to deprofessionalization
- class theory
- theory of the homogeneity of interests
- theory of direct (council) democracy progressing to complete self-government
- theory of scientific insight into the objective laws

of historical development
- theory of positive freedom (freedom "to")
- theory of producers' (workers') control of the means of production
- theory of the transcendence of the division of labor
- theory of social (associated) regulation of the economy.

VI. SOCIALIST PLURALISM: AIMING AT A MORE PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND AN EMPLOYEE-CONTROLLED ECONOMY

Political apathy, the exact contrary of the more continuous fusion of "social" with "political" participatory activity desired by socialism, was mentioned by both Dahl/Lindblom and Truman as a possible consequence of cross pressures from overlapping group affiliations affecting the individual; the implications for politics and the polity, however, were not pursued further by either (see DAHL/LINDBLOM 1953: 329; TRUMAN 1958: 162/63). A more detailed examination has inferred from the same empirical findings that apathy, in practice, may mean frustration, the "compartmentalization of simultaneously maintained loyalties" - or, finally, "non-rational adaption"; inertia and/or docility, in other words (see MITCHELL 1963, as quoted by LIJPHART 1968: 11; see also the arguments for 'immobilisme' as a possible result of multiple cleavages in ECKSTEIN 1966: 72 ss.). Linking evaluations of political apathy stemming from cross-cutting affiliations to social divisions, it was pointed out that such apathy must be considered more typical for the "lower" strata, because these are sooner subjected to conflicting value-standards and patterns of societal interpretation than individuals with higher positions and incomes (see LIPSET 1960: 205 ss.).

If, therefore, severe doubt was cast on the proposition that one of liberal pluralism's corner-stones would produce the desired democratic effect, it was additionally demonstrated that the concept of a group theory breaks down if the reasoning is reversed in the last analysis by introducing as the decisive factor "multiple memberships in potential groups based on widely held ...but unorganized interests (which) are what we have previously called the 'rules of the game'" (TRUMAN 1958: 514, 512) - a deus ex machina if there ever was one (see ROTHMAN 1960: 23 ss. What, to Truman, the rules of the game, was already to Bentley the "habit background"; see id. 1949: 218).

A second corner-stone was shaken by an examination of the countervailing-power hypothesis. Even if this discussion concentrated on the specific economic form given to the argument by Galbraith it had something generally applicable to say about the "romantic" approach to ostensibly "proxy-minded" organizational oligopolies (see STIGLER 1954: 9/10) and on the philosophy of "perpetual stalemate" which made such an approach conservative in impact and undemocratic in effect (McCORD WRIGHT 1954: 14; see also LOWI 1967: 20). The critique not only resembled comments bearing on Bentley's, Truman's and Latham's works, reproaching them for their conservatism and status quo-orientation (see HALE 1960: 956, 958 on Bentley; BLUHM 1965: 357/58 on Latham and Truman). It also suggested analyses depicting today's large-scale organizations as "unwieldy", "unresponsive" (to changes in their environments) and "insensitive" (to the need for flexibility) - so cumbersome and immune to internal or external control that they generate alienated, angry and/or apathetic persons who "feed streams of hostility and aggressiveness into both domestic and international affairs" (McCLELLAND 1965: 268).

The emergence of large-scale, hierarchical organizations in lieu of the "extemporaneous assemblies" governed, as witnessed

by Tocqueville, by the "members' reason and free will" symbolizes the problem first of the "notable discontinuities" between "the conditions for an ideal of pluralism formulated a century ago... and their contemporary equivalents" (CONNOLLY 1969: 5), and second of "how to rebuild, extend, and guarantee (pluralism) in another historical era" (EISFELD 1971: 341). One of the most important discontinuities and the enduring bias glossing over the rupture have been specified by DAHL (1970: 119/20; see also DAHL/LINDBLOM 1976: XXVIII):

> A nation of farmers with a sprinkling of merchants became a nation of employees, managers, and owners. The small family enterprise run by its owner became the large enterprise in which operation was separated from ownership. The ideology of the private enterprise of farmer and small merchant was transferred (,however,) more or less intact to the big corporation...(even if) nothing could be less appropriate than to consider the giant firm a private enterprise.

The development, of course, is not particular to the United States. Neither is the fact that, because of the persisting application of the ideology of private ownership to the large corporation, "excessive weight (is given) to the particularistic interests of managers and investors in economic decisions of great importance to ...consumers and employees ...(to name) only the most obvious" (DAHL/LINDBLOM) 1976: XXIX). The resulting "privileged position of business" - and of "corporate executives in particular" - "restrict(s) polyarchical rules and procedures to no more than a part of government and politics, and ...challenge(s) them even there" (LINDBLOM 1977: 172 , 190). Ensuing social inequalities with regard to income, status, wealth, organizational capacity, and influence are translated into political inequality - the assertion of segmental interests at the expense of broader needs, implying a corresponding distortion of public policies plus the power to contract out from under the effects of undesirable measures which might yet be legislated, i. e. to evade control by (representative) majority vote (see DAHL 1982: 40 ss.).

While both the conceptual defects of group theory and the participatory deficits of liberal pluralism under "actually existing" oligopoly capitalism were increasingly diagnosed by the advocates, rather than the adversaries, of the pluralist concept, an analogous development occurred with regard to (Marxist) class theory and the suffocation of the representation of workers' rights by the "etatist" rigidities of actually existing "monopoly socialism" (the first term is used by, e. g., STOJANOVIC 1972; for the second, see KURON/MODZELEWSKI 1969). The orthodox suggestion that a more radically tempered pluralist concept in the vein of Dahl's and Lindblom's statements just referred to should be replaced by (Marxist) class analysis because of the latter's "explanatory superiority" (MANLEY 1983; for brief refutations, see DAHL 1983 and LINDBLOM 1983) contrasted with the assessment that the process of social differentiation outlined earlier has raised the twin questions of the 'boundary' of the working class as to size and composition and of working class "disunity at the level of practical politics": To the extent that a unified working class posited as a relatively homogenous political agent has been largely replaced by "different constituencies" with different aims and interests, "integral" socialism as the teleological antithesis of capitalism had irretrievably been dissolved into a diversity of programmatical socialisms (JOHNSTON 1986: esp. Sections 3/4).

Hence the inference, by Johnston, that the necessary "socialist-pluralist" range of political strategies could not but abandon the notions both of totality - the relations of production determining, in the last instance, every political and ideological level - and of teleology - tendential "laws" of historical motion striving towards a discernible aim. Hence also the contention that socialist-pluralist politics of more egalitarian change should pay regard to those particular spheres of value within which individuals have found meaning, and should draw not least on the experiences of - feminist, cultural, environmental, workers' plans, disarmament - single issue movements and group-

ings (see WALZER 1983; RUSTIN 1985: esp. 35 ss., 83 ss.).

If such propositions have been concerned with programs, assessments have also changed regarding the features of the socialist society and polity to be achieved. By Euro-communist parties (particularly the PCI), by dissenters from the ranks of their more orthodox sister organizations, by Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian communists, pluralism was re-discovered as "an inner requirement of socialism" (LOMBARDO-RADICE 1965: 1). It was acknowledged that pluralist interests continue to exist in socialist societies, that such societies will entail "neither the disappearance of differenced nor the ceasing of strife and dissension", and that, in the relations and contradictions between social interests, "no social power (may) be absolute arbiter ...particularly not on the basis of state authority" (ibid.: 1, 3). Acceptance of organizational autonomy, under socialism, also for, e. g., trade unions and, last but not least, for "those people and groups who do not support socialist options" (INGRAO 1964: 72), came as the logical next step in the "discovery of pluralist socialism" (SLAMA 1968). If the present "rigid" pluralism of capitalist societies - under which civil rights, because of structural limitations, have "dried up" - might be transformed into a "dialogical" and "dialectical" pluralism (LOMBARDO-RADICE, ibid.; INGRAO 1964: 75), the perspective was developed for actually existing socialism of "expropriating political authority" (HORVAT 1979: 5) after economic property by arriving at an institutionalized "pluralism of self-management interests" (KARDELJ 1979: 107).

These positions directly influenced the Czechoslovakian discussion before and during 1968 (see KLOKOCKA 1966: 74, 78; id. 1968: 33). The necessity not only to "reorganize the pluralist structure of socialist society", but to institutionalize "guarantees for the confrontation of interests" (id. 1968: 35, 41), was accepted during the short-lived Czechoslovakian experiment. Before and after its termination by

military force, its projected aims profoundly affected the debate among West European socialists and communists (see LEONHARD 1979: 404 ss., 413 ss.).

The critiques both of liberal pluralism and of "democratic contralism" have thus been merging into a common set of propositions, bridging the East-West schism and centering on socialist pluralism as the "radical alternative to the American and Soviet status quo" of concentrated pseudo-private/pseudo-public economic power (DAHL 1970: 130). The decade-long Yugoslav effort in conceptual debate and institutional change (for an overview see, e. g., EHRLICH 1982: 211 ss.) has certainly demonstrated the difficulties of a process seeking to diminish institutional rigidity, socio-economic inequality, and political apathy by achieving, in the end, "self-management pluralism", yet continually menaced by bureaucratic resistance, individual and group egoism, and corresponding setbacks. Considering these difficulties, it may strike the observer as ironical that, after two generations, the pluralist debate has come full circle: Attempting to arrive at a "structurally" pluralist alternative, it starts again from where early pluralism left off in an attempt to define the socio-political consequences of the rise of business corporations and industrial combines and to work out institutional arrangements for rectifying the unequal distribution of power in society: "No political democracy can be real that is not as well the reflection of an economic democracy... The present system of property does not in the least involve the present technique of industrial direction " (LASKI 1968: 38; id. 1977: 112).

The conceptual focus on control rather than on ownership as a consequence of the separation (referred to earlier) of decision over a corporation's policies from the share in a company's stock, broached at the time by Laski, has now become no less accepted than, under participatory premises, the shift to social control of the means of production as one principal

bench mark of socialist pluralism - "social" referring to the enfranchisement of the citizens (white and blue collar employees) of the political body that is the large corporation (see, e. g., DAHL 1970: 121 ss.; id. 1982: 111 ss.). To achieve this end, a variety of procedural stages and institutional solutions has been proposed. A suitable criterion for the latter might be that control over decisions should include as many tiers (work-place, shop, company level) and types of issues as possible (MASON 1982: 155). This has suggested starting with the general establishment (long proved successful on an experimental basis) of work groups with increasing autonomy in organizing their operations, paralleled by the setting-up of shop assemblies; proceeding (first line of control) to the election of a company council by the work groups and (second line of control) of the board of directors by the delegates of shop assemblies; terminating, finally, by the joint election and control of the management by company council and board of directors. Collective bargaining might then be decided to include wages (salaries) and dividends and might evolve into a trilateral affair between trade unions, stockholders' and management associations (see EISFELD 1972: 104/105).

However, oligopolistic markets would not be removed by employees' self-management; monopolistic competition between participatory corporations might still tax consumers. Among external controls to be reinforced, consumers' associations should be marked out to play a considerably more prominent part in a concept of socialist pluralism: They should receive legislative and governmental support by being assigned media air time and printing space for information directly comparable to industrial advertising on domestic and imported products and prices; by (direct or indirect) subsidy of the resulting expenditure; and, most importantly, by the allocation of collective bargaining power on oligopolistic markets: In contrast to the collective bargaining of wages, corporate pricing policies based on "quasi-agreements" do not penetrate

into public consciousness as the collective demand of a social group. Business corporations, before raising prices, should therefore have to "cancel" their price lists and enter into negotiations with consumers' associations which would have boycott power on conditions paralleling trade unions' strike procedures (see EISFELD 1972: 108/109). The producer/consumer conflict that occupied early pluralism and guild socialism to the extent of constructing a functional division of government into a body of consumers and another of producers is one more problem that will refuse to simply go away.

The preceding argument has not even touched upon the subject of the extent of desirable governmental intervention regarding, e. g., resource planning, employment and redistributive tax policies. The thorny issues of the centralization and decentralization of decisions involved (see, e. g., DAHL 1982: 116 ss.) would be difficult terrain for a brief resumé to tread. Moreover, the present dimensions of environmental spoliation, unemployment paralleled by the development of shadow economies, and growing - instead of decreasing - poverty, common to both capitalist and actually existing socialist societies, suggest that, especially against a background of envisaged more participatory politics, the question of selected "strategic" planning may be regarded as far from settled even after the nothing less than devastating experiences with comprehensive bureaucratic planning of the (neo-) Stalinist variety.

The concept of a participatory economy in the sense of employee self-management has not merely been advocated as instrumental to the equalization of political resources. It has also been linked, both in liberal pluralist societies and by reform communists (for the latter, see BERMBACH/NUSCHELER 1973) to the perspective of a more profound and continuous fusion of everyday "social" with - presently - at best periodical "political" activity - in other words, to the contention that both perceptions and qualifications conducive to more participatory

democracy will be developed, so that institutional and attitudinal changes might interact, spilling over into political life (see MASON 1982: 191). The eventual aim would consist in as much direct democracy as possible, combined with as much representative democracy as necessary. On a more modest scale, this might point to community control - neighbourhood government (see DAHL 1970: 159 ss.) - as a first step. On a decidedly ambitious level, it might mean the Yugoslav attempt of applying one structural principle, the delegate system, to the sectors of associated labor, socio-political affairs, and commune/republic/federation.

While Yugoslavia has broken considerable ground in her attempts at participatory institutional innovation, these attempts continue to hurt themselves primarily (though by no means exclusively) at the "specific position of power" unchangingly conferred on the Yugoslav League of Communists (KARDELJ 1979: 68). Considering the already perilous ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and economic fragmentation of the country which might definitely disintegrate if a multiparty system would form along these same lines, it has been suggested to attack the problem of the limits of "actually existing self-government socialism" from the flank - by leaving intact the (however thoroughly democratized) League of Communist's leading position and establishing, alongside the League, a loosely federated Association of Socialists permitting individuals and groups to feed continuous and energetic participatory impulses into the socio-political system (STOJANOVIĆ 1983).

In a more general search for the normative foundations of a pluralist self-management system that would forego the particular inputs of political parties and hence discard, with representative parliamentarism based on parties, the concepts of opposition and governmental change, six principles have been singled out as indispensable: transformation of the accepted heterogeneity of social interests into political decision-making; autonomy of interest articulation; institutionalized cooperation of groups; legitimacy of dissent and conflict;

general participation on every economic and political level; equal opportunities for exercizing influence (HOEPKEN 1984: 35 ss.). It is this interpretation of socialist pluralism which, of course, bears the most profound resemblance to the socialist ideal of a commonwealth of associated producers; and this is one of the areas where the "essential (though 'softened') tension" between the Marxist and pluralist paradigms may be grasped as a productive challenge (see McLENNAN 1988).

This consideration leads back to the problem at the core of socialist pluralism - to what extent socio-political democratization as a continuing process may be accepted, internalized, and practiced by increasing segments of "consumption-oriented, acquisitive, (and) privatistic" (DAHL 1970: 135) societies. Present evidence is not unambiguous on this point: While work democratization - organizing production around autonomous (self-managing) work groups - indeed seems to generate "educative effects" by advancing a sense of political efficacy and a "propensity" to extend participation to outside matters (see ELDEN 1981), general orientations conducive to societal change in an egalitarian direction do not seem to be promoted to the same extent by isolated "participatory environments" (see GREENBERG 1981). What is warranted is, of course, not merely more research, but more participatory experimentation on a much more massive scale.

From these reflections, socialist pluralism emerges as a

- theory of the individual
- theory of role differentiation
- group theory emphasizing maldistributions of power between groups
- theory of the heterogeneity of interests
- theory of general political participation (progressive democratization of groups and socio-political institutions)
- theory of "mixed" (participatory/representative) government and group (-delegate) bargaining
- theory of second best (specific) law by compromise
- theory of positive freedom (freedom "to")

- theory of social (employee) control of the means of production (self management)
- theory of strengthened "workable" competition through reinforcement of consumer associations and other external controls
- theory of extended "strategic" state interventionism.

VII. CLASS HEGEMONY AND WARFARE OVERACHIEVEMENT: TWO OF MANY REMAINING PROBLEMS

If, in view of gradual but progressive social differentiation, class theory has been rejected in favor of group theory, this is exactly not intended to mean that group society, severed from its historical origins, sprung into existence like Pallas Athene from Jupiter's head. Inequalities have been handed down from feudal to class and, again, from the latter to group society. Like a drug effective over days, they have made themselves felt over generations, defying the norm of formal equality. If group society therefore continues to be compromised by class residues, one of the more salient of these is upper class hegemony, the

> obliteration of cleavage and subculture (by) a historical and continuing narrowing of the range of political belief and attitude through favored class positions in instruments of communication: organized religion, government, media, and face-to-face relations among others (LINDBLOM 1983: 385).

It is not least this "steady and subtle" process which continues to work against the achievement of structural reforms like those required by the concept of socialist pluralism.

Liberal-pluralist reasoning has usually accepted co-existence of a variety of hierarchical institutions and relationships - the tendency of pluralism, in other words, "to function only in certain sectors, whereas others remain highly authoritarian" (BEYME 1980: 97). The conditions specified by Tocqueville for the viable pluralism he observed in the Jacksonian United States included, however, the absence of a standing army and, therefore, of an important impetus for centralizing ever more power in governmen-

tal hands (see the quotes in CONNOLLY 1969: 7). Nowhere has the liberal creed with regard to military affairs been put more succinctly than when U.S. President James K. Polk, in his 1845 Inaugural Address, asserted that there was no reason to fear military ambitions from a government "elected for short terms by the suffrage of those millions who must in their own persons bear all the burdens"; the corresponding socialist expectation was that a workers' militia would suffice for defensive wars, since socialist countries would anyhow not attack one another.

Instead, an ever more sophisticated military build-up has spread through the First and Second and from both to the Third World. The existence of threat (deterrence) systems contributes manifestly, domestically no less than internationally, to socio-political structures, values, perceptions, and policies hardly advantageous to national and international pluralism of any variety. The problem of democratic constraints on nuclear deterrence policies has been referred to by pluralists, as a salient issue, in a few, rather isolated instances (see WALZER 1984; DAHL 1985). Yet although civil-military relations literature seems to accept almost as a truism the close interrelationship between civil and military affairs, texts on democratic theory remain conspicously silent about the question.

This lack becomes even less acceptable if civil society - as it may well be (see EISFELD 1986) - is pictured as moving in the direction of a system in which the distinction between formerly civilian policy and formerly military strategy is being eroded, with the result of the process a continuous technological, manufacturing, and political "warfare overachievement" in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms. That DAHL (1985: 75 ss.) has not hesitated to sketch what he termed a "quasi-utopian solution" to the problem of achieving more democratic control of nuclear weapons should provide an inducement for broader, normative no less than analytical, thinking on cogent pluralist expositions including the armed forces, military doctrines, and ever more "compensating armament" policies.

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November 8, 1988

Dear Jordi,

I just spoke to Piotr Winczorek and he confirms that arrangements are now complete for the holding of the meeting of our Research Committee near Warsaw on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, August 31st, September 1 and 2, 1989 devoted to discussion of papers on the topic The Mixed Economy -- East and West. Professor Winczorek will act as rapporteur-general, and he would like to invite participation from members of the Research Committee. So if you would like to read a paper, could you please write to him giving the proposed content of your paper so that he can prepare a preliminary agenda which can be considered by Messrs. Claeys, Graziano and myself as prescribed in Item 6(b) of the Rules for the Sponsoring of Committee Meetings passed at our Washington meeting (copy enclosed).

The Democratic Party of Poland has undertaken to offer hospitality to all members of our Research Committee (meals, accommodation and entertainment). Therefore if you intend to come to the meetings, they would like to know by 31 December, 1988 -- so please do not delay in making your intentions known to Professor Winczorek (his address is Wydziak Prawa i Administracji, Uniwersytet Warszawaski, Warsaw, Poland).

Professor Winczorek has approached some younger scholars (an economist and a lawyer) from Poland and is waiting to hear from members of the Research Committee. He will be travelling to Moscow and hopes to make arrangements for Soviet participation.

I hope that the programme of the Warsaw meetings will be complete in the near future, but this will depend partly on the response of members of the Committee.

.../2

Addresses : H.G. THORBURN
Political Studies - Queen's University
Kingston, Canada, K7L 3N6
Tel. Univ. (613) 545 62 44
priv. (613) 542 44 37

P. CLAEYS
Université libre de Bruxelles - Institut de Sociologie
Avenue Jeanne, CP 124, 1050 Bruxelles
Tel. Univ. (02) 642 34 26
priv. (02) 672 38 89

Bank account : 210-0080454-93 S.G.B., Montagne du Parc 3 - 1000 Bruxelles

The Committee was quite active at the Washington World Congress, presenting three panels, two regular ones plus a bonus which was awarded to us. I reported to you in my letter of July 8th the topics and paper-givers in each of these. At the business meeting, Philip Mawhood as Secretary recorded the minutes, and they are enclosed along with this letter. Also enclosed are the new rules for the sponsoring of Committee meetings which were passed in Washington. The meeting also accepted the resignation of Professor Léo Hamon both as member and Vice-Chairman. We have confirmed the mandates of the Chairman, the two remaining Vice-Chairmen and the Secretary to run until the 1991 World Congress of IPSA meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Our major concerns now must be directed to our Warsaw meetings. I ask you to communicate as quickly as possible with Professor Winczorek and/or with me.

Yours siincerely,

H.G. Thorburn
Chairman

P.S. If you have not paid your annual subscription, please send the £9 in sterling to Dr. Philip Mawhood, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT, England.

Encls.
HGT:bg

P.S.
Our JPS issue is now "put to bed".
Wiesel says to expect it around July.
Hope to see you in Warsaw, Senator!

Kontakt
10. Februar 1989

Universidad de Barcelona
Facultad de Derecho
Cátedra de Derecho Político

JORDI SOLÉ TURA
Catedrático

Barcelona, January 12, 1989

Prof. John Meisel
Political Studies
Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

Dear colleague,

I apologize for my long delay in answering your letter of November, 2, 1988. In the last two months I have been involved in a lot of parlamentary work and it has been very difficult for me to follow my academic affairs.

But, at the same time, I did not felt urged to answer as I was in full agreement with all the editorial suggestions about my article on the Spanish case.

As to the handwritten notes in pages 1,3 and 8, I specify:

a) By "essentialist approaches" to the concept of nation I mean those approaches made by nationalist authors who consider "nation" as a non-temporal entity, always identical in its essential singularity through social, political and economic changes in the "outside world".

b) In p. 3," jacobin inspired" institutions means, of course, centralized institutions. In Spain, the modern liberal State was build up through XIX century following the French jacobin model.

c) In p. 8, the term "integrism", not quoted in dictionary, can be replaced by "orthodoxy".

I look forward to the page proofs -- with no more delays in my answer !. Thank you very much.

Yours sincerely

El Pedró de la Creu, 21, ático, 1.º - Tel 205 03 44 - BARCELONA - 34

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
K7L 3N6

November 2, 1988

My dear colleague,

Enclosed please find the edited text of your article for the issue of the International Political Science Review exploring the theme "Pluralism, Regionalism, Nationalism."

Please go over the queries, changes and requests made by our editor as quickly as possible and respond to them. I assume that you will agree with all or most of the editorial suggestions, but occasionally the editor may have slightly distorted your meaning. In that case let me know so that we can be sure to honour your intention.

I hope that you will return the enclosed copy of your paper with your comments, if any, BY THE FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER. If I have not heard from you by December 9, I shall assume that all is in order.

In the event that you should wish to consult me about any aspect of the paper, I can be reached by telephone at (613) 545-6227 during the week or at (613) 279-2380 on most week-ends. My FAX number is (613) 545-6300. I can also be reached by electronic mail at MEISELJ@QUCDN.BITNET.

Thank you for your collaboration. In due course (several months from now), you will receive the page proofs from the publishers (Butterworths in Oxford). I shall let you know roughly when to expect this. In the meantime, I look forward to your response to this letter at your very earliest convenience.

Yours sincerely,

John Meisel

Jordi Solé Tura

THE SPANISH CASE: SOME REMARKS ON THE GENERAL THEORIES OF NATIONALISM.

IPSA Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism
Barcelona Meeting
25-27 June 1987

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I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The main theoretical issue in the analysis of national and regional problems is whether, from case studies we can reasonably develop general patterns for a theory of nationalism and regionalism, or whether a sequence of case analyses only can give us a heterogeneous account of different situations. The issue is especially problematic in the European political tradition, where, notwithstanding the theoretical line opened by Rokkan and Urwin (1982 and 1983) and other political scientists, the national problems are mainly political, and the main stream of theory runs still through the developments of the traditional "nationalities principle", in which predominate the essentialist approaches to the concept of "nation". One of the consequences is that the sociological or historical analysis can hardly be isolated from the political implications of every case study; and the social scientists or the historians are often requested to become political opinion makers, and to focus their analysis on a political and ideological bias. My own experience in Spain has led me to a very strong feeling against essentialism in this field. So I think that no case study is theoretically useful if we do not overcome this approach, and this ideological bias, and if general categories and doctrinal approaches do not give way to historical and empirical perceptions.

Author: please explain "essentialist Approaches."

I do not intend to discuss here all the implications of this well-known theoretical problem, but only to invoke some developments of the Spanish case, which offers a rich complexity of interactive regional and national elements, both in the ideological and in the political fields. The so-called "national problem" has been one of the

main issues in ~~the~~ Spanish political history in the last two centuries, and one of the keys to the background of the two military dictatorships that Spain has known in ~~this XX~~ the twentieth century. After ten years of constitutional democracy, the problem has not been fully resolved, and conflicts about national identities and symbols arise periodically, not only as outbursts of peripheral nationalism, but ~~even~~ also as political movements linked to terrorism -- as in the well-known case of (E,T,A). Nor ~~it is~~ has democracy solved the problem of ~~the~~ Spanish national feeling, as the ancient Spanish nationalism was connected to militarism, clericalism and centralism and the new democracy is challenged by the urgent need to implement, develop, spread and strenghten a new national feeling linked to democracy, to decentralization and to pluralism.

the Basque separatist organization, the Euzkadi Ta Azcatasuna

First, we must ask, what

~~This brings me to a first general point that I should like to stress as a preliminary remark, namely which~~ is the relationship between pluralism and national and regional diversity ? ~~I am perfectly aware that~~ This problem, of course, has different roots and meanings in Western developed countries and in underdeveloped ones, not only because of their different historical, social and political backgrounds, but also because the political and constitutional concept of pluralism does not have the same meaning in such heterogeneous situations. From this point of view, ~~I think that~~ the problem reveals mostly its complexity in Western developed countries, as here the ancient theory of nationalities -- developed mainly in ~~XIX~~ nineteenth-century Europe ~~as~~ through abrupt economic and social transformations and through increasingly bloody wars ~~has~~ capitalist society has changed once ~~and~~ again ~~the~~ established political frontiers; AND, in the process, contributed to the ~~the~~ problems ~~raised by~~ of late capitalism, that is, ~~to say, with~~ the new patterns of economic, social, cultural and political centralization and, consequently, ~~with~~ new forms of territorial marginality.

Author: define jacobin institution

This is a process that deeply affects the actual working of traditional state institutions -- mainly jacobin inspired ones -- and stresses the quest for new forms of political organization and institutional functioning. Social and political conflicts rooted in the new realities of late capitalism often take the form of national and regional conflicts. And they are often theorized about in terms of traditional nationalities or even -- as can be seen in Spain's Basque Country -- in terms of imperialism and underdevelopment. I think it is important to identify these problems and to see if nationalism and regionalism are ideological forms or even ideological disguises of other problems that have arisen through the logic of late capitalism development; or if we are really confronted with a revival of unsolved traditional problems of nationalities in developed countries.

It is evident that the problem concerns not only Western developed countries. National and regional conflicts arise and develop also in Eastern Europe, which are supposed to be strongly unified by their political systems. The Yugoslavian situation is paradigmatic; But we must also consider recent developments in the Soviet Union, Roumania and Poland. Some of these are related to the last redefinition of State frontiers after the Second World War. The far-reaching political reforms announced in these countries reveal very strong contradictions and open the way to new prospects in political analysis.

To focus on Europe and other developed areas is not only a theoretical option but a challenge. It seems to me that national and regional problems in underdeveloped countries are better understood by political scientists, easier to comprehend in a general view, as their roots are more evident -- the process of colonial emancipation -- and the patterns of their nation

building processes are more uniform, ~~notwithstanding~~ despite their increasing complexity. By contrast, the explosion of national and regional problems in developed countries is still awaiting an agreed-upon theoretical explanation. ~~because behind it we can find~~ Once that is settled, there are two ~~great~~ major issues to be considered: first, the relationship between new economic developments and regional marginalities; and second, the relationship between these new economic developments and the centralization or decentralization of political institutions and cultural patterns (mass media, languages, cultural values, etc.). This is a complex field because it is difficult to define both and because it is rapidly changing. Things that seemed evident ten or fifteen years ago are not so evident now, as national minorities and regional diversities are ~~counteracted~~ affected by large integration processes -- like the European Economic Community -- and by the strong ~~uniformization~~ homogenization of cultural patterns. Explanations based only in one set of factors, economic, political or cultural, are no longer sufficient to ~~explain~~ the overall realities.

~~That brings~~ This returns me to my first point: ~~I mentioned~~ the relationship between case analysis and general theory. I was myself troubled with this problem when ~~publishing recently~~ writing a book on Nationalities and Nationalisms in Spain (1985). As I was ~~deepening~~ developing my ~~own~~ analysis, I found ~~absolutely~~ it necessary to avoid two theoretical temptations. ~~The first~~ First ~~was~~ the ~~temptation of~~ abstract analysis -- that is the ~~of~~ mere conceptual discussions about for example, the true meaning of "nation". ~~The~~ Second ~~the~~ temptation ~~to develop~~ to avoid was developing a general theory from the Spanish case.

It seems to me that political concepts like "nation", "region", "self-determination", ~~for example,~~ do not have the same meaning in Spain and in Central America, in Europe and in Africa. ~~They don't have the same meaning anymore~~ Nor do the meanings they had in ~~the~~ Nineteenth-century European history apply to present-day Europe.

-- ^ == --

"Self-determination", for example, is a general principle, established as such in United Nations' declarations. But to understand its real meaning we must descend to concrete cases, because the most important problem is not "self-determination" itself as a juridical and political principle, but to identify the specific subjects of self-determination.

Let me provide an example. In a meeting held in Managua in June 1986 on the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, "self-determination" was a widely discussed item, as some participants put forward the concept of "self-determination" as the political basis for Atlantic Coast autonomy. The theoretical problem became immediately a political problem, because the consequences of one kind or another of practical implementation were obviously bound to be extremely different, and both deeply significant from a political point of view. The problem was not to assert the theoretical principle of "self-determination", but to identify the juridical subject of this general right. Was it Nicaragua as a whole ? Was it merely the Atlantic Coast ? According to the United Nations definitions, "self-determination" means the enforcement of national sovereignity against foreign pressure. Atlantic Coast autonomy was seen as the way to strengthen national unity between the two parts of Nicaragua, the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts. However, as self-determination is linked with the possibility of political independence and sovereignity, self-determination for the Atlantic Coast could lead to the splitting up of Nicaragua as a country. Thus, the answer of the Managua meeting was very clear: the juridical subject of self-determination was not the Atlantic Coast, but Nicaragua as a whole. It was, obviously, a political decision, but this is the key to the issue. The problem is not self-determination as a political or a juridical concept, but

it is
to identify its subject and that means a political decision which can be explained only through an historical and political case analysis.

In Spain, is Also developing a strenous and rather bitter discussion about self-determination, and All the nationalist parties in the Basque Country and the majority of those in Catalonia place self-determination as a core principle of their political programs. Also, ETA terrorism has developed in the name of Basque self-determination. Here also the problem is not one of theoretical concept nor abstract discussion, but the real meaning of self-determination in our historical perspective and in our constitutional system. I shall RETURN to later this problem.

Of course I am not opposed to general theories. What I wish to stress is my personal conviction that there is NO single theory to explain of national and regional realities and conflicts, as, for example, the theory based on economic marginality. We need careful examinations of individual national and regional cases. Economic marginality can explain, perhaps, regional conflicts in France's BRITANY and in Corsica, but not those in Spain's Catalonia and the Basque Country, since the latter are the most economically developed regions of Spain. Economic marginality is undoubtedly one of the causes of conflict in North ERN Ireland, but it seems not to be possible to explain it fully if religious and cultural factors are not also taken into account.

Last, but not least, historical perspective is absolutely necessary, not only to understand the roots of every national and regional problem, but also to understand the continuity of institutions and of the feelings of the people involved. In my opinion, this is most important. National and regional problems in Spain, for example, can only be explained in all

their complexities from a historical point of view. Only through history political and economic factors take their full shape. ~~So let me come to~~ Let us look at the problems of nationalities and regions in Spain ~~to explain the full meaning of this preliminary words.~~ in this context.

II. THE SPANISH CASE.

As mentioned above, the strongest national and regional conflicts in Spain have developed in the most economically developed areas ~~zones of Spain, namely~~ Catalonia and the Basque country. Therefore, the roots of the problem ~~were not~~ do not lie in economic marginality, but in political and cultural marginality.

The building of the ~~jacobin~~ Spanish state through the nineteenth and ~~twentieth~~ centuries was not the work of an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, as in France, but of a ruling class ~~made up~~ mainly of great southern landowners, bureaucratic cliques and speculative financial groups. The Catalonian industrial bourgeoisie, based on light industry, never was a dominant part of the state ruling class, but a secondary partner. The Basque bourgeoisie developed late in the nineteenth century, through the boom in heavy industry (iron, coal, steel, machinery) and through the rapid accumulation of banking capital. This Basque bourgeoisie became the core of Spanish financial capital, but not of the political ruling class. Moreover, Catalonia became an economic and cultural area, unified by the powerful presence of a great urban center, Barcelona. By contrast, the Basque country lacked such a unifying urban center, and the industrial city of Bilbao became a kind of liberal island in a sea of traditionalist peasant holdings. Finally, the central ruling class, the "central oligarchy," as we usually say in Spain, was able to build a jacobin state, but was not able to unify the whole

of Spanish civil society, as the French jacobin ruling class had been able to do.

To develop a system of light industry like that of Catalonia -- which depended on the internal Spanish market and on a very severe protectionism -- one political condition was needed, which the Catalan bourgeoisie was never able to attain: the control of the central State. This was not exactly the problem of the Basque Country, as there the bourgeoisie was already controlling banking capital. Accordingly, Catalan nationalism was thus the work of an industrial bourgeoisie, powerful enough to create a modern capitalist economy in a mainly agrarian country, but too weak to seize political power. Catalan nationalism developed as a political proposal for reform and decentralization of the Spanish jacobin state system. Basque nationalism, by contrast, was mainly the work of peasantry and intermediate urban groups, and was rooted in traditionalism and Catholic integrism. It was not so much interested in leading and reforming the Spanish state, as in becoming a separate part of Spain or even a separate State.

MEANING ? (Not in dictionary)

can you suggest another term?

These two different aspirations were identified as a single political problem by the central ruling class, which would not accept compromise, and the Army humiliated recently in the war against the United States for Cuba and the Philipines to fight the nationalists. The Army became then the armed depositary of the integrity of the Spanish nation and of the Monarchy against all internal opposition. Catalonia and the Basque Country were treated as enemies of the State. Their institutions, cultures, and languages were suppressed, and all the Catalans and Basques, regardless of social status, were confronted with the same centralist adversary. Consequently, all

whose brutal response was to order

political and social groups ~~all social~~ and classes in the two regions ~~Catalonia and the Basque Country clashed with~~ faced the same external enemy. And this clash became more and more violent and radical as the crisis of the Monarchy opened the way to the military dictatorships of generals Primo de Rivera and Franco, ~~the~~ which ~~have~~ lasted through fifty years of the present century. I underline that the ideological basis of both military dictatorships was the same: the fight against the "reds", who wanted to destroy the monarchy, and the fight against the "separatists", who wanted to destroy the unity of the Spanish nation.

The clash was # especially violent under ~~general~~ the Franco ~~a~~ dictatorship. In Catalonia, the underground ~~fight~~ struggle against Franco combined the quest for democracy with the quest for political autonomy, and was the work of all political groups, but mainly ~~the work~~ of the left-wing parties -- the socialists and communists. In the Basque country, the fight against Franco ~~developed in~~ took a more radical nationalist ~~way~~ directions. The different roots of ~~both~~ the two problems became once again evident. In Catalonia, all political groups ~~reached~~ achieved substantial ~~agreements~~ consent to develop a democratic alternative. In the Basque country, radical nationalism gave way to political movements like ETA, which ~~developed~~ soon evolved into terrorist groups.

When the transition to democracy began to develop after ~~general~~ Franco's death in 1975, the problem of Catalan and Basque autonomy was one of the main outstanding issues, ~~to solve~~. But the problem was not only ~~an institutional one, that's to say, a~~ ~~problem~~ one of political organization, it ~~but~~ was also ~~an~~ ideological ~~one, as the clash against an external enemy like franchism developed~~ in both Catalonia and the Basque Country a very strong collective feeling of nationality ~~was~~ had developed which was very difficult to integrate in to the wider collective feeling of the Spanish nation, especially after such a ~~so~~ strong phase of

ultrarightist Spanish nationalism as existed during the ~~the~~ ~~underground~~ Franco ~~s~~ regime.

In the new Spanish constitution of 1978 there is a rather odd article -- article ~~2~~ two -- in which the concept of the Spanish nation is defined. It ~~is said~~ states that Spain is a true, united and indivisible nation. But it ~~is said~~ also states that this united nation is formed by "nationalities" and "regions" that ~~both of them~~ have a right to political autonomy, ~~which~~ are recognized and guaranteed by the constitution itself, and that the link which ~~maintains~~ keeps this nation united is the rather immaterial link of "solidarity". From a theoretical point of view, article ~~2~~ two seems to be an odd combination of heterogeneous elements, and the result is something like a "nation of nations". But article ~~2~~ two is not a theoretical exercise, but an attempt to find a political solution to one of the most serious and ~~most~~ bloodiest passages of Spanish political history. Consequently, article ~~2~~ two is the political basis of a new organization of the Spanish traditional jacobin system in a federal-like system of political autonomies.

~~But~~ I ~~should~~ would like to underline here another side of the problem. The Spanish constitution does not limit itself to open political autonomy ~~to~~ for Catalonia and the Basque country, but establishes political autonomies as a general system of state organization. Here we find the other dimension of our ~~issue, the dimension~~ problem that of pluralism. Political autonomies ~~are~~ is not seen in the Spanish constitution only as a way to pacify the historical conflict between centralism and Catalan and Basque nationalisms, but also as a way to open the ~~political~~ system to the plurality of regional realities ~~hidden under the artificial uniformity of jacobin centralism~~ and as a way to find a new equilibrium between the developed and underdeveloped ~~zones~~ regions of Spain. Today ~~we have~~ there are seventeen ~~17~~ autonomous ~~communities~~ regions, each with its own Parliament and ~~the~~ Government.

Their developement is unbalanced and the change from jacobin state to decentralized state is revealing itself not only very difficult, but threatened even by unpredictable backward movements, especially as regards to new conditions imposed by Spain's integration in the European Economic Community. But the challenge is clear: the Spanish system of autonomies wants to solve the problems posed by national diversities in Spain and, at the same time, to open the way to the full expression of national and regional pluralism.

III. SOME CONCLUSIONS.

This short description of the Spanish case brings me back to my first introductory statements. Economic marginalities are certainly one of the roots --and so one of the theoretical explanations -- of regional and national conflicts in developed countries, but I don't think that they are, by themselves, the basis of a general theory of regionalism or of national plurality. Economic factors are, of course, basic for theoretical explanations, but they are many-sided, and are to be considered in their concrete reality. Historical and political factors are most important, but also as concrete elements of a specific historical development and of a specific political system. Cultural factors can develop also many-sidedly, both as a result of political conflicts and of ideological confrontations (I mean linguistic conflicts, for example). But even those are to be considered in their specific realities. In the Spanish case, for example, the clash between majority language, Spanish, and minority languages, such as Catalan, Basque, Galizian, is mainly political, which has had a different development, following the structure, the background and the strengh of each language and of the national collectivity that supports it. The

situation of the Catalan language is, in this sense, far better than that of the Basque ~~language~~. The conflict generated by national symbols, such as flags and anthems, ~~etc.~~ can also be very strong ~~one~~ as ~~it~~ has been, ~~is~~ and still continues in Spain, because of the specific political and historical conditions of the respective national confrontations. And, at the same time, national symbols can become ideological weapons, ~~to nourish increasingly conflictive~~ nourishing nationalist movements in a historical and a political context quite different from the original one.

In my opinion, this means that a many-sided analysis and careful examination of concrete cases is absolutely necessary to cope with the complexity of national and regional problems. From these we can reasonably expect to reach some general explanations and, going back to my preliminary observation, this is possibly the closest we shall get to general theory in our field.

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES
The Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Political Science

Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 3N6
Tel. 613 545-6227

25 January 1989

Professor Jordi Solé Tura
Catedratico de Derecho Politico
El Pedró de la Creu, ático, 1
Barcelona 34
Spain

My dear colleague,

This is just to let you know that I have just put the final touches on the manuscripts for the IPSR issue on "Pluralism, Regionalism, Nationalism."

Thank you very much indeed for having contributed to the issue and for having responded quickly to the editorial revisions. Your comments have enabled us, in almost all cases, to make changes incorporating your views.

In a few months you will receive the page proofs from the publishers. Please correct them at once and remember that at that stage, only typographical errors can be corrected. It is too late to make textual changes.

The issue is expected to appear in July 1989 and promises to be a strong addition to our series.

Thank you again for your help.

Yours sincerely,

John Meisel

JM/md

Thank you also for working so well with Hugh on the overall aspects of the issue.

P.T.O. ⁄.

FAX 613 545-6300

MEISELJ@QUCDN.BITNET

I realize that your political commitments take up a great deal of time but would appreciate it enormously if you could read the page-proofs immediately upon arrival. We have very little "turnaround time." They will not read you for a few months. Actually, the publisher plans to send them to you on March 30th and they must have them back before April 28.

↓

I.P.S.A. International Political Science Association
A.I.S.P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Barcelona, 25, 26, 27 June 1987

INTRODUCTORY REPORT

Jordi Solé Tura

The first question to arise is : why this specific subject of our meeting ? Which is the relationship between pluralism and national and regional diversity? And linked with this first question we find immediately another: Is it possible to identify general patterns leading to a theory of regionalism? And if not , can a sequence of case analysis give us anything more than an hetereogeneous account of different situations ?

As to the first question -- the relationship between pluralism and the national and regional realities --in the first presentation of our meeting I stressed the point of Western developed countries as the main subjects for analysis because I think that here the problem reveals itself as a mostly complex one. The ancient theory of nationalities -- developed mainly in XIX Century Europe as through abrupt economic and social transformations and through increasingly bloody wars the capitalist society changed once and again the established political frontiers -- melts with the problems arised by late capitalism, that's to say, with new patterns of economic, social, cultural and political centralization and consequently with new forms of territorial marginality.

This is a process that deeply concerns the actual working of traditional state institutions -- mainly jacobin inspired institutions -- and stresses the quest for new ways of political organization and institutional working. Social and political conflicts rooted in this new realities of late capitalisme often take the form of national and regional conflicts. And they are often theorized in terms of traditional theory of nationalities or even -- as can be

seen in Spain's Basque Country -- in terms of the theory of imperialism and underdeveloped countries. I think mostly important to identify these problems and to see if nationalism and regionalism are an ideological form or even an ideological disguise of other problems arised by the logic of late capitalism development or if we are really confronted with a revival of non solved traditional problems of nationalities in developed countries.

But it is plainly evident that the problem concerns not only Western developed countries, and so the first stress of our meeting was somewhat modified. National and regional conflicts arise and develop also in Eastern European countries, which are suposed to be strongly unified by their political systems. Yugoslavian situation is paradigmatic. But we must consider new developments in the Soviet Union, in Roumania, in Poland, some of them related to the last redefinition of State frontiers after the II World War.

To focuse our analysis in Europe and in other developed zones is not only a theoretical option but a challenge. It seems to me that national and regional problems in underdeveloped countries are more thoroughly known by political scientists and more easy to comprehend in a general view, as their roots are more evident -- the process of colonial emancipation -- and the patterns of their nation building processes are more uniform, notwithstanding their increasing complexity -- as Prof. Mawhood's paper shows . By contrast, the explosion of national and regional problems in developed countries is awaiting theoretical explanations, because behind it we can find two great items to be considered: first, the relationship between new economic developments and regional marginalities; second, the relationship between these new economic developments and the centralization or descentralization of political institutions and of cultural patterns (mass media,

languages, cultural values, etc.). This is a complex field because it is difficult to define it and because it is rapidly changing. Things that seemed evident ten or fifteen years ago are not so evident by now as national minorities and regional diversities are counteracted by large integration processes -- like European Economic Community -- and by the strong uniformization of cultural patterns. Explanations based only in one set of factors -- economic, political or cultural -- are no longer sufficient to cope with overall realities.

That brings me to the second question I mentioned: the relationship between case analysis and general theory. I was myself troubled with this problem when I published recently a book on "Nationalities and Nationalisms in Spain". As I was deepening my own analysis I found absolutely necessary to avoid two theoretical temptations. First, the temptation of abstract analysis, of mere conceptual discussions about the true meaning of "nation", por example. Second, the temptation to develop a general theory from de Spanish case.

It seems to me that political concepts like "nation", "region" , "selfdetermination", for example, don't have the same meaning in Spain and in Central America, in Europe and in Africa. They don't have the same meaning anymore in XIX century European history and in present Europe. "Selfdetermination", for example, is a general principle established as a such in United Nations declarations. But to understand its real meaning we must descend to concrete cases, because the most important problem is not "selfedetermination" itself as a juridical and politiccal principle but to identify the specific subject to be selfdetermined.

Some months ago I was participating in Managua in a meeting on the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.

"Selfdetermination" was a most discussed item, and when someone arised the concept of "selfdetermination" as the political basis of Atlantic Coast autonomy, the answer was very clear: the subject of selfdetermination as a rightwas Nicaragua as a whole, as the way to national sovereignity against foreign pression.. Atlantic Coast autonomy was seen as the way tho strengthen national unity between the two actual parts of Nicaragua -- the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts --. As selfdetermination is linked with the possibility of political independence and sovereignity, selfdetermination for the Atlantic Coast could lead to the splitting of Nicaragua as a country. The problem is, then, not selfdetermination as a political or a juridical concept, but to identify its subject and that means a political decission which can be explained only through a historical and a political case analysis.

In Spain we are discussing also a lot about "selfdetermination" and the whole of nationalist parties in the Basque Country and the majority of them in Catalonia put ahead selfdetermination as a core principle of their political programs. Even more, ETA terrorism develops in the name of Basque selfdetermination. Here also the problem is not the theoretical concept nor the abstract discussion but the real meaning of selfdetermination in our historical perspective and in our constitutional system. I will insist later in this problem.

Of course I'm not against general theories. What I want to stress is my personal conviction that there is not a single explanation of national and regional realities and conflicts -- as, por example, the explanation based on economic marginality-- and that we need cross examinations of national and regionals cases. Economic marginality can explain, perhaps, regional conflicts in France's Bretagne and Corsica but not in Spain's Catalonia and Basque Country, as

the latter are the most developed zones of Spain. Economic marginality is undoubtedly one ot the causes of regional conflict in North Ireland, but it seems not possible to explain it fully if religious and cultural factors are not taken into account.

Last but not least, historical perspective is absolutely necessary not only to understand the roots of every single national and regional problem but also to understand the continuity of institutions and of collective feelings. In my opinion this is mostly important. National and regional problems in Spain, for example, can only be explained in all their complexities from a historical point of view. Only through history, political and economic factors take their full shape. So let me come to the problems of nationalities and regions in Spain to explain the full meaning of this introductory words.

II.

The strongest national and regionals conflicts developed in the most economic developed zones of Spain, namely Catalonia and the Basque Country. Therefore, the roots of the problem were not economic marginality but political and cultural marginality. The building of the jacobin Spanish state, through XIX and XX centuries was not the work of an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, as in France, but of a ruling class formed mainly by great southern landowners, bureaucratic cliques and speculative financial groups. The Catalonian industrial bourgeoisie, based on light industry, never was a dominant part of the state ruling class, but a secondary partner. The Basque bourgeoisie, developed lately in XIX century through the boom of heavy industry -- iron, coal, steel, machinery - and through fast accumulation of banking capital. This Basque

bourgeoisie became the core of financial Spanish capital, but not of the political ruling class. Moreover Catalonia became an economic and cultural area unified by the powerful presence of a great urban center, Barcelona. By contrast, the Basque country lacked such an unifying urban center and an industrial city like Bilbao became something like a liberal island in a sea of traditionalist peasant land. Finally, the central ruling class -- the central oligarchy as we usually say in Spain -- was able to build a jacobin state but not to unify the whjole of Spanish civil society, as the French jacobin ruling class was able to do.

To develop a system of light industry like that of Catalonia -- which depended of internal Spanish market and on a very harsh protectionism -- one political condition was needed, which the Catalan bourgeoisie was never able to attain: the control of the central State. This was not exactly the problem of the Basque Country, as the Basque bourgeoisie was already controlling banking capital. Catalan nationalism was, then, the work of an industrial bourgeoisie, powerful enough to create a zone of modern capitalist economy in a mainly agrarian country, but weak enough not to seize political power. Catalan nationalism developed as a political proposal of reform and decentralization of the Spanish state system -- that's to say, of the jacobin state. Basque nationalism, by contrast, was mainly the work of peasantry and intermediate urban groups and was rooted on traditionalism and catholic integrism. It was not so much interested in leading and reforming the Spanish state, as in becoming a separate part of Spain or even a separated State.

These two different proposals were unified as a single political problem by the brutal answer of the central ruling class, which did not accept compromising and charged the Army -- an Spanish Army humiliated in the recent war against

United States for Cuba and the Philipine Islands -- to fight nationalists. The Army became then the armed depositary of the integrity of the Spanish nation and the jacobin Monarchy against all sort of internal opposants . Catalonia and the Basque Country were treated as enemies of this State and this unified Nation, their institutions ,their cultures, their languages were persecuted and all the Catalans and all the Basques, regardless of social status, were confronted with the same centralist adversary. Consequently, all political and social groups, all social classes in Catalonia and the Basque Country clashed with the same external enemy. And this clash became more and more violent and radical as the crisis of Monarchy opened the way to military dictatorships -- generals Primo de Rivera and Franco --. which have lasted 50 years of the 87 ones of present Century. I underline that the ideological basis of both military dictatorships was the same: the fight against the "reds" who wanted to destroy monarchy and the fight against the "separatists" who wanted to destroy the unity of the Spanish nation.

The clash was specially violent under general Franco's dictatortship. In Catalonia, underground fight against Franco combined the quest for democracy with the quest for political autonomy and was the work of all political groups, mainly the work of left wing parties -- socialists and communists. In the Basque country, the fight against Franco developed in a more radical nationalist way. The different roots of both problems became once again evident. In Catalonia all political groups reached substantial agreements to develop a democratic alternative. In the Basque Country, radical nationalism gave way to political movements like ETA, which developed soon as terrorist groups.

When transition to democracy began to develop after general Franco's death in 1975, the problem of Catalan and Basque autonomy was one of the main issues to solve. But the problem was not only an institutional one, that's to say, a problem of political organization, but also an ideological one, as the clash against an external enemy like franchism developed both in Catalonia and the Basque Country a very strong collective feeling of nationality that was very difficult to integrate in the wider collective feeling of the Spanish nation, specially after a so strong phase of ultrarightist Spanish nationalism under general Franco's regime.

In the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 you can find a rather odd article -- article 2 -- in which the concept of Spanish nation is defined. It is said that Spain is a true united and indivisible nation. But it is said also that this united nation is formed by "nationalities" and "regions", that both of them have a right to political autonomy which is recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution itself and that the link which maintains this nation united is the rather immaterial link of "solidarity". From a theoretical point of view article 2 seems to be an odd combination of heterogeneous elements and the result is something like a "nation of nations". But article 2 is not a theoretical exercice but an attempt to find a political solution to one of the most serious and most bloody problems of Spanish political history. Consequently article 2 is the political basis of a new organization of the Spanish traditional jacobin system in a federal-like system of political autonomies.

But I want to underline here another side of the problem. The Spanish Constitution does not limit itself to open political autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque Country, but establishes political autonomies as a general system of

State organization. Here we find the other dimension of our issue, the dimension of pluralism. Political autonomies are not seen in the Spanish Constitution only as a way to pacify the historical conflict between centralism and Catalan and Basque nationalities but also as a way to open the political system to the plurality of regional realities hidden under the artificial uniformity of jacobin centralism and as a way to find a new equilibrium between developed and underdeveloped zones of Spain. Today we have 17 Autonomous Communities, each with its Parliament and its Governement. Their developement is unbalanced and the change from jacobin state to decentralized state is revealing itself not only very difficult but threatened even by impredictible backward movements, specially as regards to new conditions imposed by Spain's integration in the European Economic Community. But the challenge is very clear: the Spanish system of autonomies wants to solve the problems posed by national diversities in Spain and, at the same time, to open the way to the full expression of national and regional pluralism.

III.

This short description of the Spanish case brings me back to my first introductory statements. Economic marginalities are certainly one of the roots --and so one of the theoretical explanations -- of regional and national conflicts in developed countries, but I don't think that they are by themselves the basis of a general theory of regionalism or of national plurality. Economic factors are of course basic for theoretical explanations; but they are many-sided and are to be considered in their concrete reality. Historical and political factors are mostly important, but also as concrete elements of an specific historical development and of an specific political system.

Cultural factors can develop also many-sidedly, both as a result of political conflicts and of ideological confrontations. I mean linguistic conflicts for example. But even those are to be considered in their specific realities. In the Spanish case, for example, the clash between a majority language -- Spanish -- and minorities languages -- Catalan, Basque, Galizian -- is mainly a political clash which has had a different development following the structure, the background and the strengh of each language and of the national collectivity that supports it. The situation of the Catalan language is, in this sense, far better than that of the Basque language. The conflict of national symbols -- flags, anthems, etc. -- can be a very strong one, as it has been -- and still is -- in Spain due to the specific political and historical conditions of national confrontations . And, at the same time, they can become ideological weapons to nourish increasingly conflictive nationalist movements in a historical and a political context quite different from the original one.

In my opinion, that means that many-sided analysis and cross examination of concrete cases is absolutely necessary to cope with the complexity of national and regional problems. From here we can plausibly expect to reach some general conclusions through a comparative method. It seems to me that this is possibly the nearest approach to general theory in our present field.

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The first question to arise is : why this specific subject of our meeting ? Which is the relationship between pluralism and national and regional diversity? And linked with this first question we find immediately another: Is it possible to identify general patterns leading to a theory of regionalism? And if not , can a sequence of case analysis give us anything more than an hetereogeneous account of different situations ?

As to the first question -- the relationship between pluralism and the national and regional realities --in the first presentation of our meeting I stressed the point of Western developed countries as the main subjects for analysis because I think that here the problem reveals itself as a mostly complex one. The ancient theory of nationalities -- developed mainly in XIX Century Europe as through abrupt economic and social transformations and through increasingly bloody wars the capitalist society changed once and again the established political frontiers -- melts with the problems arised by late capitalism, that's to say, with new patterns of economic, social, cultural and political centralization and consequently with new forms of territorial marginality.

This is a process that deeply concerns the actual working of traditional state institutions -- mainly jacobin inspired institutions -- and stresses the quest for new ways of political organization and institutional working. Social and political conflicts rooted in this new realities of late capitalisme often take the form of national and regional conflicts. And they are often theorized in terms of traditional theory of nationalities or even -- as can be

seen in Spain's Basque Country -- in terms of the theory of imperialism and underdeveloped countries. I think mostly important to identify these problems and to see if nationalism and regionalism are an ideological form or even an ideological disguise of other problems arised by the logic of late capitalism development or if we are really confronted with a revival of non solved traditional problems of nationalities in developed countries.

But it is plainly evident that the problem concerns not only Western developed countries, and so the first stress of our meeting was somewhat modified. National and regional conflicts arise and develop also in Eastern European countries, which are suposed to be strongly unified by their political systems. Yugoslavian situation is paradigmatic. But we must consider new developments in the Soviet Union, in Roumania, in Poland, some of them related to the last redefinition of State frontiers after the II World War.

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II.

The strongest national and regionals conflicts developed in the most economic developed zones of Spain, namely Catalonia and the Basque Country. Therefore, the roots of the problem were not economic marginality but political and cultural marginality. The building of the jacobin Spanish state, through XIX and XX centuries was not the work of an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, as in France, but of a ruling class formed mainly by great southern landowners, bureaucratic cliques and speculative financial groups. The Catalonian industrial bourgeoisie, based on light industry, never was a dominant part of the state ruling class, but a secondary partner. The Basque bourgeoisie, developed lately in XIX century through the boom of heavy industry -- iron, coal, steel, machinery - and through fast accumulation of banking capital. This Basque

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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
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BETTER SMALL AND BEAUTIFUL THAN BIG AND UGLY?

REGIONALISM, CAPITALISM, AND THE POSTINDUSTRIAL STATE

Thomas O. Hueglin
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The prevalent hope at the end of World War II was that the world emerging from the holocaust of peoples would be a different one. For a split second, there was hope that the result would be the creation of a global family of united nations, thus eliminating war once and for all. Then, with the beginning of a cold war between the superpowers, the hope for peace came to rest on the formation of regionally integrated ideological blocs in the west and east. But considerable success on the path toward European integration notwithstanding, the most obvious and triumphant victor arising from the ashes of unprecedented destruction in the name of national interests - once again was the territorial nation-state. The relative stability of the nation-state system in the industrialized west was facilitated by the fact that a dramatic change of territorial politics had occurred indeed. Externally, policy making between states became more constrained and predictable through global socioeconomic interdependence. And the redrawing of borders as well as the massive migration of entire populations, reduced decisively one of the major internal resources of conflict in the past: multi- and/or transborder ethnicity.(1) It seemed as if the territorial nation-state had finally reached its ideological goal: to be the defender and spokesperson of largely homogenized national societies.

The success of national political consolidation was essentially tied to the expansion of economic growth within the nascent global economy. The experience of unprecedented prosperity muted continuing grievances as to ethnic or regional self-determination. The process of socioeconomic modernization, so it was assumed, would acculturate whatever traces of dissent were left at the nation-states' outer and inner peripheries. Looking back at the exceptional experience of economic growth and political stability, Robert Lane by the mid 1960s could redefine the agenda of the modern territorial nation-state as the "politics of consensus in an age of affluence."(2) Only a few years later this idyllic perception of consensual national harmony was shattered by the bombs thrown in Ulster and the Basque country, by the spectacular rise of aggressive separatist parties in Scotland and Quebec, and by the amazing array of some fifty active regionalist movements in western Europe alone.(3) This outburst of peripheral protest was intitally dismissed as anachronistic nostalgia, or linked to specific historical circumstances to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In the meantime, however, international harmony has deteriorated as well, as national efforts to sustain affluence have become more difficult in the wake of a global economic crisis. The dramatic increase of national economic protectionism under the shield of free trade rhetoric indicates a general decline of consensual politics.

In this context regionalism appears in a different light. Far from being a postmaterialist revival of folklore in the name of small-is-beautiful, it seems to be part of a much wider phenomenon, possibly a rejection of the false consciousness of consensus provided by nation-state politics. In late capitalist societies this consciousness is nurtured by the assumption that the interventionist state seeks and secures wide-spread national prosperity via international competitiveness. Under the conditions of an interdependent world economy with highly saturated markets and new competitors, however, such international competitiveness requires a national agenda of aggressive economic restructuring which in reality aims at national resources mobilization at the expense of wide-spread prosperity. Undermining the domestic consensus of the welfare state and substituting it by a new public philosophy of disciplinarian austerity, nation-state politics gears up to reclaim lost ground in the global economy arena by getting tough with trade partners, ideological enemies, and Third World debtors alike. As all industrialized states try to do the same, the presumption of national pre-eminence via domestic austerity and foreign policy toughness becomes a "dangerous conceit",(4) and the management/governability crises of national/international politics far more than just a dilemma of overload and complexity. No longer capable of providing consensus, the obsolescent nation-state may be gearing up for a final showdown of its destructive powers. As Adolf Hitler said at the end of his sinister career that if Germany was not able to survive with him, she was unworthy of surviving at all, so might the world go under with the nation-state system rather than getting rid of it.

Throughout the postwar period the nation-state's pre-eminence has been challenged from above and from below. While attempts to shatter its mythical strength from above, through systems of regional or even global integration, have mostly failed (the stagnating success of European economic integration notwithstanding), regional protest from below has been successful in challenging the national ideology of political centrality, even though the earlier momentum of peripheral muscle-flexing may have subsided temporarily. Aiming at the federalization of national political centrality, the regionalist politics of territory appears not only as a symptom of the ailing world of centralized statehood, but also as its possible cure. The hypothesis is bold: If the modern nation-state (the Jacobin institutions of which are some two hundred years old) can no longer cope with the political conflicts and challenges of the twenty-first century, and regionalism (which is usually regarded as a fallback to the primordial values of the past) is an authentic political response to that deficiency, then it could be that it is the territorial nation-state which is primordial while regionalism turns out to be the real symptom of modernization. The decentralizing tendencies recorded everywhere in the industrialized world (5) would appear to be the nation-state's last stand, an attempt of dinosaurs to regain flexibility, while

the quest for regional autonomy and self-sufficiency (not as a decentralizing strategy from above, but as a self-organizing demand from below) might prove to be a better or even only road to survival.

This essay will attempt to reassess the substance and options of regionalism within the set of assumptions made above. Given its variegated ethnic, social and institutional components, regionalism will be broadly defined as a general commitment to subnational territorial identity. This will be discussed as Peripheral Mobilization in late capitalist societies. Threatened by an increasing degree of cultural, socioeconomic and political peripheralization (the result of the national process of modernization), regionalist as other new social movements no longer seem to aim at national assimilaton and (re)integration, but at the development of a new sense of identity and autonomy which can no longer be accommodated by the central calculus of administrative decentralization and its transfer hand-outs. Regionalism is therefore characterized by a substantial degree of attitudinal change, the common denominator of which will be identified as Anticentralism and New Marginality. As in other cases of sociopolitical marginality, the options available to regionalist movements are limited: they can fight against dependency by either cutting their ties with the centre, or trying to gain influence over central policy formation. This the classical dilemma of Exit and Voice. An Extended Conclusion will finally return to the potential role of regionalism in the future of territorial politics and suggest a theoretical framework for its analysis.

Peripheral Mobilization

By the end of the 1970s social scientists looked at the transformation of European politics with awe. The stability and predictability of the politics of consensus had become dramatically challenged by "massive politicization and mobilization." New social movements "rejected recourse to the traditional political agents." As a consequence, there had been a "vast new wave of collective activity outside traditional political institutions." (6) The main thrust of this challenge to traditional politics was directed against the state. One reason for this was the enormous expansion of state intervention in the name of 'Keynesianism'. The state had become responsible for the regulation of practically all aspects of socioeconomic life. Supported by the revenues of affluence a new breed of managerial politicians had begun to believe that the contradictions of capitalism and democracy, efficiency and legitimacy (7), could be contained or even dissolved successfully by an all-encompassing web of public policy.

The visibility of the state's regulatory hand naturally made it the focus of critique and continuing discontent, especially when the fiscal limits of such intervention became apparent with the decline of economic growth during the 1970s, and the notion of universality gradually came to be replaced by selectivity. It is important to note, however, that regionalism and other new social movements began to gain momentum before the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s had really set in. The most widely accepted explanation for this phenomenon has been provided by Inglehart's analysis and theory of postmaterialist value change.(8) According to this theory, it was the abundance of means and resources of the affluent years which spawned the desire for a new 'quality of life' aiming at non-materialist values. Regionalism, in this context, came to be interpreted as a fallback to the romantic notions of localism and pride-of-place. It was denounced as an obstacle to necessary further modernization, as the anti-industrial attitude of a new middle-class spoiled and bored by the easy availability of material acquisition in the consumerist age. While the phenomenon of postmaterialism has undeniably played a major role in the formation of protest politics, its monocausal focus on the irrevocability of generational value change neglected another periodicity: political and socioeconomic change which occurred during the same period of time. As a consequence of this negligence, the neoconservative theorists of overload and ungovernability could advocate a policy of belt-tightening and moral reeducation while the incongruence between expectations and the state's fiscal capacities were already beginning to show in the wake of a deepening economic crisis.

In the case of regionalism, three phases ought to be distinguished: During the 1960s the experience of unprecedented economic growth surely fostered postmaterialist attitudes. At the same time, however, peripheral modernization, the spreading of industrialization and the administrative state, brought know-how, expertise and ambition to the regions. During the 1970s, when the tremors of economic crisis began to be felt, regional discontent not only resulted from the persistence of postmaterialist attitudes, but were also a consequence of this existence of a new peripheral elite which possessed the expertise and administrative skills to fight for the retention of the achieved level of material well-being. Regionalism had become an attitudinal and acquisitive issue. In the 1980s, and especially after the traumatic experience of the 1981/82 recession, the regionalist thrust seems to have subsided. The picture is misleading, though. While neoconservative governments succeeded in containing regionalist and other forms of mobilization by proclaiming national economic recovery as a bread-and-butter issue cutting across regional interests, the potential failure of such recovery may well lead to a new and nastier round of regional conflict. The peripheries of postindustrial societies find themselves in a situation which is largely determined by grievance and opportunity.

Sweeping over the attitudes of an entire generation, the postmaterialist paradigm also fails to differentiate between the material achievement levels of centres and peripheries. In the context of modern industrial societies this is a question of uneven economic development. It must be considered standard wisdom by now, that the earlier modernization theories were misleading.(9) While the age of affluence certainly raised the overall level of living standards, the fork of relative regional deprivation rather widened than narrowed. And relative socioeconomic modernization in the peripheries did not automatically lead to national assimilation. Even in cases of 'relative regional overdevelopment' (i.e. the peripheral location of traditional heavy industry as in Scotland, Catalonia, or the Basque country), nationalist and/or ethnolinguistic sentiments survived.

The point to be made here is twofold: On the one hand, as modernization did not spread evenly across the territorial space of advanced industrial societies, regionalist protest and aspirations cannot be seen simply as postmaterialist sentiments of sociocultural (or even 'folkloristic') revival. Retained sociocultural identities rather helped to foment regional protest when it became clear that the promises of modernization remained unfulfilled, when expectations which had been awakened during the affluent years of rapid growth became first frustrated by the continued experience of deprivation and disparity (despite growing prosperity and regional development programs) and later by the experience of economic crisis and the reduction of such programs. On the other hand, however, the objective condition of relative deprivation was not a sufficient cause for the rise of regionalism. As in the case of Quebec, regionalist aspirations remained dormant for almost a century despite the province's socioeconomic underdevelopment, and they became a salient force of political conflict precisely when it seemed least likely, i.e. when socioeconomic living conditions had improved as never before. Why did Quebec's 'Quiet Revolution' occur at that moment?(10) Through partial and relative modernization, the province had become exposed to the promises of industrialization. A new middle-class elite had acquired expertise and ambition. Expertise and general affluence had raised their aspirations and expectations. There was an opportunity as never before. Grievance and opportunity formed a powerful movement. Sociocultural identity, economic ambition and political power became mutually reinforcing.

With some variegation of time and circumstances this picture of regional mobilization also applies to other cases. In Scotland the spectacular rise of nationalism was fostered by the decline of the traditional industries (grievance), and by the discovery of the North Sea oil (opportunity).(11) Similarly, the nationalism of Catalonia could only be preserved through the years of Franco centralism because it was supported by the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and its financial as well as

organizational resources. The strong industrial base of Catalonia was the material base on which regionalism could survive.(12) Where this material and sociopolitical opportunity was lacking, regionalism either remained a sociocultural movement among an intellectual or literary elite (as in Galicia until its movement was propelled forward by the success of other regions in Spain, or as in Occitania, that southern French region which miraculously revived an almost extinct language), or it turned to violent forms of protest (as in the Basque country where nationalism clashed with an industrial bourgeoisie which was Madrid-centred and unsupportive). (13)

There are several explanations for the apparent decline of regionalist activism in the 1980s. Scotland did not get its oil, and the separatism of the Scottish National Party did not find a majority among a population basically seeking improved opportunity structures through home rule. The decline of the Parti Quebecois, on the other hand, may well be explained by the success of its earlier achievements: socioeconomic modernization, sociocultural stabilization and dramatically increased political co-determination. When all this appeared to be possible within the opportunity structure of Canadian federalism, separation no longer seemed desirable. And in the case of post-Franco Spain, political democratization became synonymous with regionalization. The reasons for the current decline of regionalist aspirations then are many. In some cases opportunities did not materialize, or waned under the impact of economic and fiscal constraints. In other cases the nation-state successfully contained regionalism by granting various degrees of decentralization. And in some cases regionalism obviously achieved impressive successes. The question remains, however, why such a massive wave of regionalism would erupt at the same time out of so many different and seemingly unrelated situations. The only obvious common denominator is the existence of the modern industrial nation-state and the regionalist opposition to its centrality.

Anticentralism and New Marginality

It is ironic that those same theorists of postmaterialist overload who advocate a spiritual revival of family- and group-oriented attitudes in order to relieve the burden of overloaded governments, at the same time see the retention of regionalist aspirations as a fallback to anachronistic values and threat to the efficiency of national economic recovery.(14)

On the one hand, they overlook that it is the very business ethic they want to revitalize which is responsible for the deterioration of organic familiy and group life in the first place. As Alan Wolfe pointed out sarcastically, it is symbolic of this contradiction that one of the leading financiers of the new moral revival movement would have been Ray Kroc, who "invented the MacDonald's hamburger chain, which has done more to destroy

the 'natural' functions of the family than a generation of radical feminists."(15) On the other hand, they misunderstand the 'nature' of regionalism. While the naturalism of familiy and group life they seek to rekindle must appear "synthetic" in the context of modern capitalist life, like the baseball turf which Ray Kroc also had developed (16), so regionalism may turn out to be not anachronistic and obstructive, but a creative and promising path to societal revitalization. Indeed, since neigbourhood stores and familiy restaurants are preconditions for natural group life, regionalism may be the answer to the problems of societies which expect everything from the state because they can no longer find anything around the corner.

In this sense regionalism can be conceived as an authentic part of modernization itself, and not its rejection. It is an answer to the complexity of modern life, to the overload of modern government especially under conditions of scarcity, i.e. when the limits of growth, the fiscal capacities of intervention, and the possibilities of expansion in the overcrowded national and global markets, begin to become a permanent symptom of the postindustrial age. Under such conditions the centralized nation-state is losing its capacity of adequate problem-solving. Facing the challenge of global constraints and competition (which would require global institutions of intervention), the capitalist state is forced to neglect such structural problems and conflicts which are subnational by nature. Regionalism is a response to the obsolescence of national political institutions, and to the attempt of sacrificing regional interests on the altar of national resources maximization.

Reaction and action of regionalist aspirations have to be distinguished. Whether asserting a postmaterialist desire of cultural identity, or responding to an objective condition of relative deprivation and alienation, regionalist movements have reacted against the polarizing dynamic of peripheralization inherent in the capitalist system. As long as the capitalist mode of production is based on capital concentration, and the optimal spacial allocation of resources, it is incompatible with regional development. This contradiction of the territorial state corresponds to that of the welfare state: every effort to maximize the efficiency of the system from which the means for legitimizing redistribution have to be derived, at the same time increases the need for such redistribution. During periods of exceptional growth this contradictory dynamic of capitalism can be patched over by the general rise of living standards, but not so in times of scarcity, when painful choices of distribution and the outright allocation of economic losses are on the agenda.(17)

Obviously the authenticity of the regionalist reaction against peripheral deprivation and alienation depends on peripheralization as an objective condition. This is where most critics of the regionalist cause disagree. Either they argue that it was achieved modernization and not continued deprivation which

fomented the formation of cultural and political protest, or they argue that peripheral betterment can only come from centrally induced growth poles which would first require a national strategy of economic recovery, whereas regionalist resistance to such a strategy would be a cure worse than the disease. And indeed the old parameters of industrial centrality and underdeveloped peripheral backwardness seem no longer adequate. Centre-periphery relations in highly industrialised territorial states can no longer be defined simply as a dynamic of centralized industrial production and the peripheral exploitation of resources. The age of mass transportation and electronic communication has allowed a hitherto unknown degree of productive mobility. While the Canadian automotive industry would still remain concentrated close to central markets, for example, this must not necessarily be so in the case of microelectronics, baseballs, or government services.

However, these possibilities of structural flexibility have not changed the basic fact and requirement of capitalist centrality. As Rokkan and Urwin redefined it, centrality is today based on a new 'quaternary' sector of the economy which encompasses "all the agencies responsible for the registration, handling and diffusion of decisions, orders, instructions and information across a wide territory." With regard to this new central sector of information and communication, peripherality has remained and deepened as a syndrome of "distance, difference and dependence." Distance from central information will lead to the retention of some sociocultural difference, and will at the same time result in continued dependence upon central decision-making, the standardization of social life, and the central allocation of crucial economic and financial resources.(18)

It is this perception of peripherality as an objective condition, of the contradictions of distance and standardization, modernization and dependence, which points to anticentralism as the most important subjective common denominator of regionalist aspirations. The retention or revival of sociocultural identities, the socioeconomic quest for self-sufficiency, and the entrenchment of political resistance are mutually reinforcing factors of this anticentralist dynamic. Depending on which of these factors is the predominant grievance, each of them can be the starting point from where the regionalist drive begins to gain momentum. Given the prevalent opportunity structures which are most likely determined economically, regionalism may typically follow the path of 'Buddenbrook dynamics' (in his novel Thomas Mann describes the rise of the Buddenbrook family which seeks money in the first generation, power and influence in the second, and cultural sophistication in the third). However, regionalism may also enfold as a Buddenbrook dynamic in reverse:

cultural aspirations may serve as the catalyst or rallying point for political muscle-flexing in order to wrestle a more indigenous opportunity structure from the central national economy.

As a challenge to centrality, regionalism - again like other new social movements - must be seen a a new political perspective. As long as there was hope that the achievements of national economic growth and modernization would finally spill over into the peripheries and lead to nation-wide wealth and prosperity, regions did not contest the central administration of regional development. Such development mainly consisted of the injection of central capital into the periphery, typically through the encouragement of peripheral mega-projects or so-called growth-poles, the spin-off effects of which would then lead to the gradual modernization of the peripheral economic structures.(19) Peripheral faith in the growth-pole approach began to fade, however, when its shortcomings or outright failure became evident:

1) Regions learned that the benefits from growth-poles were insufficient and often short-lived. While industrial projects profited from the regional low-wage structure, capital ownership remained outside the region. Profits quickly flowed back to the centre without stimulating the local economy. Often enough local employment remained low as well, because the local labour market was unprepared for the new skill requirements. Consequently importing skilled labour from the centre, growth-pole projects rather extended the central labour market than created a peripheral one. And when peripheral industrialisation proved insufficiently profitable, external capital would unscrupulously be withdrawn, leaving empty industrial skeletons or entire mothballed communities.

2) Regions also learned that even where modernization occurred, the gap between central and peripheral achievements would not become any narrower. The peripheral standard of living would improve during periods of general growth and affluence, but regional disparity would remain the same or even deepen. Discontent with this situation would be reinforced by the very dynamic of modernization. As regions would become dependent on increasing material wealth, so would also grow their dependence on the continued flow of money earnings. Appetite grows with eating: this is what the late Fred Hirsch called the "hole in the affluent society" and relative scarcity of positional achievements.(20)

3) And when economic crisis struck the western industrial societies, regions finally had to learn that they had in part been living on the shaky grounds of central charity and short-lived social conscience, as regional development programs and transfers came under the scrutiny of budget-cutting alongside with the generally administered cuts into the social safety net.

With the dramatic change of policy making from affluence and universal distribution to scarcity and selective redistribution came a new awareness and assertion of centre-periphery polarization. Wall Street economist Melvyn Krauss has dismissed regional policy altogether as nationally inefficient, suggesting that peripheral workers should migrate and "go to the work" instead of expecting that the work would come to them (21). From the periphery comes a different assessment. As Dennis Kucinich, former mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, summed it up: "There are increasingly two Americas, ... the America of multinationals dictating decisions in Washington, and the America of neighbourhoods and rural areas, who feel left out."(22)

When the feeling of being left out sinks in, and peripheries can no longer expect the undisputed continuation of central handouts, the self-perception of regional marginality begins to change. As long as the belief in universal prosperity was unshattered, the aspirations of regional peripheries alongside with other marginal segments of modern societies aimed at acculturation and integration. The unemployed wanted to be reemployed, the American blacks wanted to be part of American mainstream culture, and the European regions wanted to become a modernized part of the whole. Now, some unemployed groups have begun to form alternative cooperative networks, a black elite has promoted Afrocultural consciousness, and regionalist movements have propagated a new perception of marginality which no longer tries to copy the achievements of the centre, but emphasizes a new anticentralist collective identity.

Only when the traditional belief in economic growth and universal modernization remains unbroken can this new marginality be interpreted as a conservative backlash to values of the past. Given the incompatibility and contradiction of capitalist modernization and regional development, it seems that the current neoconservative attempts to promote "economic growth now" and "to provide for redistributive and environmental purposes later" (23) have to be considered as the backlash, while resistance against this myth of centralized efficiency appears to be the more progressive step ahead. When Seymour Martin Lipset wonders, for example, why what he sees as the new 'backlash' movements is so weak in comparison to interwar fascism, (24) one answer would be that fascism aimed at capturing the centre, while many of the new movements (in contrast to the 'friendly fascism' of the new moral majority) do not. (25) But this seeming weakness may turn out as decisive strength. Should the conservative modernization thrust fail, those who have developed a new sense of marginality may be in a better position to adapt and survive (if the central forces of socioeconomic and military modernization do not succeed in destroying the world altogether, that is).

If it is correct to assume that the patterns of (centrally regulated) class conflict become increasingly displaced by a new pattern of multifarious centre-periphery conflict within the structural parameters of "late capitalism",(26) the anticentralist thrust of the new regionalist marginality would not only be an authentic manifestation of late capitalist modernity, but might also prove to be the more realistic alternative in dealing with the structural contradictions of late capitalist societies. Caught in a world which continues to be determined by both the power structures of centrality and the dependency structures of centre-periphery relations, regionalist aspirations are faced with the dilemma that they are much too weak and fragmented to be able to contest the system, but that such contestation may be their (and our) only chance at the same time. They have to steer a course between the Scylla of regionalist isolation and the Carybdis of nationalist domesticity. In the classical terminology of Albert O. Hirschman, this is the dilemma of 'exit and voice' (27) in centralized systems of power.

Exit and Voice

Exit describes the behavior and choice of the consumer in the market place. He/she can either buy the goods or services offered - or leave them on the shelf. Take-it-or-leave-it is the only kind of freedom which the market allows. What it does not allow is to influence the quality of the goods and services supplied. Nor can the consumer anticipate how his/her day-to-day decisions and choices will influence the market in the long run. Because of this "tryranny of small decisions" (28) the market in its pure form offers a very limited choice at best, and at worst eliminates it altogether. The root of the problem is the asymmetry of the market itself: the anarchy of atomised consumers' behavior does not stand a chance against the organized sphere of production. Voice is the only alternative strategy available. As a participatory strategy it requires organization and collective action aiming at the improvement of goods and services produced, and some control over the development of production in the long run. One practical consequence of such participatory behavior has been the increasing public involvement in the allocation of resources. But while such involvement by itself rather legitimizes than rectifies the structural asymmetry of the capitalist (or any other growth-oriented) system, (29) it moreover jeopardizes the individual autonomy of choice to an even greater extent. On the one hand, participatory involvement and public intervention as its legitimizing corollary require and demand loyalty (30) which constrains further collective action and/or contestation of the sphere of production. On the other hand, the beneficiaries of public intervention become dependent on its continuing provisions which limits or even eliminates their possibilities to go back to the alternative strategy of exit.

In terms of regionalist aspirations to gain greater control over resources and chances of indigenous development, the exit option obviously covers a wide range of possible action: from a refusal to meet the centrally imposed conditions for certain types of grants, to opting-out strategies with regard to entire policy fields, and finally to passive and/or active strategies of resistance including the promotion of outright separatism as the most drastic step. Any of these strategies means the partial or complete uncoupling from the national 'market'. In order to free themselves from the unsatisfactory dependency on central (and centrally allocated) capital and resources, regions and communities would have to mobilize local resources, gear production to the demands of local consumption, and develop a local sense of community independent from achievements, life styles and ambitions elsewhere. This would not necessarily have to mean the inevitable reduction of the regional standard of living. On the one hand, as regional disparity often results from central exploitation and inadequate central development strategies, a substantial improvement of the peripheral socioeconomic structure through local resources mobilization might more than off-set the loss of transfers and low-wage dependency incomes. On the other hand, the development of a local pride-of-place might lead to a different value system: the supply of a more limited range of local goods and services might become more appreciated than the onslaught of a centralized mass culture. As know-how and means of production travel light and fast in the electronic age, exit from central premises of production no longer have to result in a fallback to premodern life.

However, while small may indeed often mean beautiful, the realization of regional self-sufficiency in a world of global interdependence must almost seem utopian, especially when the starting point comes at the end of a long history of peripheral exploitation, when socioeconomic and political resources are lacking, in other words, when regional dependency is already a deeply entrenched fact and experience. This is when voice may appear as the only realistic chance of betterment. As a strategy of defending regional interests within the national system, voice means participation in that system under status quo conditions. The centralizing premises of capitalist national economies are accepted instead of contested, and in return transfers, development programs and a general commitment to equalization can be demanded. Where political structures such as federalism or regional bodies of government and administration exist, they can be utilized for the formation of collective regionalist pressures. Otherwise the only remaining transmission belt for regional demands is the national electoral system: fearing peripheral defeat, the politicians of the central system will make concessions to the organized voices of regional discontent. However, the price to pay is the perpetuation of regional dependency on the centre which will demand loyalty in return for its handouts. Moreover, this <u>transfer dependency</u> will retard or

even destroy the chances for the development of indigenous resources and potentials. And when the advocates of national economic efficiency find their interests threatened by a crisis of economic growth, they may quickly suggest the withdrawal of transfer payments - in the interest of the peripheral population, of course, which may then have to practice a new variation of 'exit': starve, or migrate to the centre.(31)

Unless supported by exceptional socioeconomic and/or political opportunity structures, the prospects of indigenous regional development are bleak indeed. While exit strategies can hardly overcome the problems of interdependence and externalities, voice options only deepen the dependency already in existence. The resulting 'transfer dependency' is territorial expression of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system: the need for peripheral transfers grows with the efficiency and success of central accumulation; but the more transfers are successfully allocated in the periphery, the more peripheries will also tend to become dependent on central handouts. As only indigenous development can contain the ongoing process of peripheralization, but peripheral participation and cooperation seems indispensable under the current circumstances of centre-periphery disparity, a shrewd strategy of exit and voice seems to be the only realistic option - not an easy task for those who often are the weakest members in the national community in the first place.

An Extended Conclusion

In the context of advanced industrial societies, the study of regionalism and nationalism has found many explanatons. Some have focused on the continued existence of ethnolinguistic minorities and the resurgence of their claims for cultural survival. Others have emphasized the role of socioeconomic deprivation suffered by peripheral societies in centralized territorial states. And others again have pointed out the role of political institutions which, in federal systems as well as in decentralizing unitary states, have given regional elites the tools to pursue greater autonomy. Theoretical explanations have reached from the impact of postmaterialist value change, via the crisis of governability in complex industrial systems, to increasing centre-periphery dependency in late capitalist societies. Liberals have denounced regionalism as an anachronistic obstacle on the road to national economic modernization. Marxists criticise it as a bourgeois deflection of class solidarity. Ideological stances notwithstanding, political parties of all couleurs have exploited peripheral aspirations for electoral purposes when in opposition, and shamelessly abandoned when in power.

General suggestions as to the overal nature of regionalism have been offered only very reluctantly because the phenomenon is so multi-facetted and diverse.(32) However, the same could be said of the 'state' or of 'class' (leave alone neoclassical 'economics'), where a similar degree of reluctance is seldom exercised. In other words, what we urgently need, is a general theory of regionalism. I would suggest that such a theory must be part of an even more general theory of fragmentation (33) in the advanced industrial world. Given the globalization of the capitalist mode of production in an interdependent world economy, such a theory might well be capable of including ethnic/regional conflict in developing countries as well. Rather than fashionably 'bringing the state back in', it would have to constitute nothing less than a full-fledged critique of the theory of state, very much in the same sense as class theory constitutes a critique of the theory of liberal democracy. As a matter of fact, it might replace or at least complement class theory in several important ways, pointing out a new type of fundamental societal conflict which cuts across the traditional class structure and consciousness of capitalist systems.

Capitalism is an essentially centralizing force which is diametrically opposed to the egalitarian and participatory claims of democracy. It must therefore be legitimized by perpetual redistributive and equilibrating state intervention. The capitalist state becomes the ubiquous guarantor=mediator of a largely fictitious market place. It becomes overburdened, unmanageable and delegitimized when its mediating and organizing capacities are exhausted by economic and fiscal constraints. Ironically, its efforts of re-establishing a profitable regime of accumulation (commodification) in fact require permanent increases in non-market institutions and regulations (decommodification). In analogy to the economic law of diminishing returns, these institutions and regulations undermine the steadfastness of the accumulation process. Contrary to the advice of neoclassical economists, however, they cannot simply be nullified (to remain in the picture: the individual farmer can reduce the counterproductive number of farm-hands, but the system as a whole has to take care of them somehow). This is the crisis and contradiction of late capitalism.(34)

The point to be made here is that the conflicts arising from this contradiction are no longer congruent with class conflict. Contrary to the earlier regime of organized growth capitalism, the restructuring process in late capitalist societies is sector- rather than class-specific. The dividing line no longer runs between capitalists and workers, but between sectors of growth and decline, and, according to the spatial division of labour, centres in control of the accumulation process and marginalized peripheries. Class consciousness between the 'left' and 'right' becomes substituted by a new conflict consciousness between 'ins' and 'outs'. This is not to say that class divisions would no longer exist. But they become less relevant for several reasons.

Due to rationalization and centralization, and contrary to the neoclassical market gospel, the efforts of captialist systems to re-establish a 'healthy' and competitive regime of market exchange between capital and labour, in fact increase the number of those who in Weberian terminology appear "removed from economic everyday life".(35) And even more importantly, the all-pervasiveness of the capitalist ideology resulting from unprecedented economic success, capitalist hegemony over education and information, and last not least impressive welfare achievements, has muted class consciousness even where the underlying class relationship remains untouched.

In other words, while the Marxian concept of class remains the most important analytical tool in order to understand both the economic and power base of capitalist systems, it is no longer the principal agent for the formation of social consciousness. This consciousness is increasingly based on the new division between a core ideology of resuscitated market faith, and the peripheral realization of marginality as an objective condition. Regionalism is nothing but the spatial expression of this realization. And just as the capitalist intervention state paradoxically has to increase its reliance on non-market regulation in order to stabilize the market-regulated process of accumulation, so does the territorial state paradoxically strengthen regionalist aspirations by trying to maintain political centrality. The attempt to stabilize the core project of economic modernization requires the intensified exploitation of the peripheries' natural and human resources. In highly complex societal systems this can only be achieved through administrative decentralization which in turn strengthens peripheral consciousness and maneuvrability through the transfer of konw-how and expertise. That intensified political centrality in fact produces increased decentralization, can be seen as the spatial dimension of the contradiction and crisis of late capitalist systems.

This leaves room for a last observation as to the 'revolutionary' potential of regionalism saving the world from another holocaust of nation-state politics. As Antonio Gramsci long-since recognized, the Marxian faith in a revolutionary change of the material conditions of life under capitalism underestimated the strength of bourgeois ideological hegemony. While regionalist strategies of exit and voice may primarily be survival strategies within the context of capitalist material reproduction, it is the rise of a peripheral counter-ideology which may pose the most serious challenge to the capitalist nation-state system. As the dynamic of late capitalist sytems seems to be contracting, there is hope that such a regionalist counter-ideology may eventually (and in solidarity with other social movements) become counter-hegemonic as well. It seems to be a valid observation more than ever, that such a cultural

revolution would have to take place before the material conditions of life can be changed: not socialism first, and then wither away of the state, but dissolve political centrality first and then wither away of capitalism.

FOOTNOTES

1) see Jaroslav Krejci, "Ethnic Problems in Europe", in Salvador Giner and Margaret S. Archer (eds.) Contemporary Europe (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978), 142.

2) Robert Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence", American Political Science Review LIX (1965), 874-95.

3) see Jochen Blaschke (ed.) Handbuch der Westeuropaeischen Regionalbewegungen (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1980).

4) Robert Reich, "Toward a New Public Philosophy", The Atlantic Monthly (May 1985), 68-78.

5) see Laurence J. Sharpe (ed.) Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1979).

6) Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies", Daedalus 108 (1979), 27-38.

7) see Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 130-46.

8) Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies", American Political Science Review LXV (1971), 991-1017; and recently: "The Changing Structures of Political Cleavages in Western Society", in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul A. Beck (eds.) Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 25-69.

9) see Arend Lijphart, "Political Theories and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World: Falsified Predictions and Plausible Postdictions", in Milton J. Esman (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 47-49.

10) a thoughful analysis is: Kenneth McRoberts, "The Sources of Neo-Nationalism in Quebec", Ethnic and Racial Studies 7 (1984), 55-85.

11) see Milton J. Esman, "Scottish Nationalism, North Sea Oil, and the British Response", in Esman, Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, 251-84.

12) see Juan Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State", in Samuel N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Building States and Nations vol. 2 (London: Sage, 1973), 32-116).

13) see Cesar Diaz Lopez, "The Politicization of Galician Cleavages", in Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin (eds.) The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage, 1982),389-424; Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, Economy Territory Identity (London: Sage, 1983), 96-98; and Marianne Heiberg, "Urban Politics and Rural Culture: Basque Nationalism", in Rokkan and Urwin, The Politics of Territorial Identity, 355-87.

14) for example: Amitai Etzioni An Immodest Agenda (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 3-25, 342-71.

15) Alan Wolfe, "Sociology, Liberalism, and the Radical Right", New Left Review 128 (1981), 23.

16) ibid.

17) see Thomas O. Hueglin, "The Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity", Canadian Journal of Political Science 20, 2 (1987).

18) see Rokkan and Urwin, Economy Territory Identity, 3-8.

19) see critically: Ralph Matthews The Creation of Regional Dependency (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

20) Fred Hirsch Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 102-7.

21) Melvyn Krauss, "'Europeanizing' the U.S. Economy: The Enduring Appeal of the Corporatist State", in Chalmers Johnson (ed.) The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), 82.

22) Dennis Kucinich quoted in: Peter N. Carroll It Seems Like Nothing Happened (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 348.

23) Aaron Wildavsky, "Squaring the Political Circle: Industrial Policies and the American Dream", in Johnson The Industrial Policy Debate, 42.

24) Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Revolt Against Modernity", in Per Torsvik (ed.) Mobilization: Centre-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981), 491.

25) see Thomas O. Hueglin, "Regionalism in Western Europe" Comparative Politics July (1986), 439-58.

26) see Juergen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns II (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 512-81.

27) Albert O. Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

28) see Hirsch Social Limits to Growth, 40, 79; and compare: Colin Crouch, "Market Failure: Fred Hirsch and the Case for Social Democracy", in Adrian Ellis and Krishan Kumar (eds.) Dilemmas of Liberal Democracies (London: Tavistock, 1983), 195-201.

29) compare: Hirsch Social Limits to Growth, 106-7.

30) see Crouch, "Market Failure: Fred Hirsch and the Case for Social Democracy", 202.

31) compare: Matthews The Creation of Regional Dependency.

32) see recently: Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (eds.) New Nationalisms of the Developed West (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

33) see above, footnote 17.

34) see above, footnote 6.

35) see: Jens Alber, "Modernisierung, neue Spannungslinien und die politischen Chancen der Gruenen" Politische Vierteljahresschrift 26, 3 (1985), 219.

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L'ETAT-NATION LE PLURALISME ET L'EUROPE

Georges G. Vlachos

L' ETAT-NATION, LE PLURALISME ET L' EUROPE

Par Georges C. VLACHOS
de l'Académie d'Athènes

Il nous a paru utile de centrer, ici, notre attention sur quelques aspects évolutifs du pluralisme, politique et social, tels qu'ils se présentent en particulier dans le cadre de la société européenne et notamment dans cette partie de l'Europe démocratique qui est actuellement engagée dans le procès d'unification que l'on connaît; procès dont on ignore peut-être encore les aboutissements, mais qui engendre déjà des conséquences de plus importantes quant à l'avenir de la démocratie pluraliste dans cette partie du monde.

L'affirmation précédente, jointe au fait que les Etats européens envisagés ont connu par le passé des stades de développement convergents ou parallèles sous le couvert d'une pédagogie historique commune, justifie amplement, à ce qui nous semble, la localisation du problème : "La Nation, le Pluralisme et la Région" dans le cadre géographique et géopolitique ainsi défini.

Afin d' éviter des développements excessifs, nous avons voulu attirer l'intérêt sur certains indices seulement de ce mouvement d' ensemble. Nous avons pensé, en effet, que le caractère synoptique d'une telle démarche aurait probablement l'avantage de nous conduire rapidement à l'essentiel de notre recherche, qui est certainement la discussion d'un problème d'actualité brûlante, quoique l'histoire soit ici, à notre sens, un guide et un conseiller sûr.

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I) La société européenne s'est développée, on le sait, depuis le quinzième siècle, sous le signe de deux concepts dominants : celui d'individu et celui de souveraineté. En apparence opposés mais en fait complémentaires, ces concepts ont servi de base à une politique et à une culture dont on trouve difficilement l'équivalent en d'autres lieux et en d'autres périodes de l'histoire. Jean Bodim en a certainement eu l'intuition profonde. Mais c'est surtout chez Thomas Hobbes et Baruch Spinoza, éclairés par l'évolution générale des sociétés avancées de leur temps, que l'on trouve la formulation scientifique la plus concise et la plus systématique de cette nouvelle expérience humaine.

Nous pouvons faire abstraction, ici, des variantes secondaires de ces systèmes, notamment en ce qui concerne les formes de gouvernement, et ne retenir que ce qui constitue l'idée de derrière la tête qui les domine de toutes parts. Je me permets d'en rappeler, très succintement, l'essentiel.

Aux dires de ces grands penseurs, l'histoire humaine nous dévoile en tout temps le fait d'une légalité naturelle stricte, qui fait rattacher invariablement chaque individu à la conservation de son être(1). Pour expliquer le fait de la société, de la société civile en particulier, on est amené, dès lors, à conclure à la né-

cessité d'une force supérieure et synthétique dont le rôle serait de faire échec à l'anéantissement réciproque des individus, en les englobant, par des voies que trace la Raison, dans une totalité qualifiée de souveraine. L'idée de souveraineté, idée diffuse depuis l'Antiquité la plus reculée (2), mais rattachée le plus souvent à un monarque, à une dynastie ou à une puissance extérieure à la société et à la nature, revêt désormais une signification parfaitement originale. Construite à partir de forces de résistance individuelles, la souveraineté embrasse les individus associés en tant qu'êtres séparés et distincts, établis sur un territoire dégagé de ses propriétés économiques et utilitaires et identifié à l'espace abstrait à l'intérieur duquel la légalité naturelle se convertit en légitimité humaine. Légitimité qui consiste, précisément, à rattacher directement, c'est-à-dire sans l'entremise de pouvoirs sociaux intermédiaires, les individus à la totalité, incarnée par le pouvoir souverain, l'Etat ainsi rendu indivisible.

Le sens profond de cette construction intellectuelle est singulièrement clair : c'est toujours l'individu -et non pas le groupe, ethnique, socio-économique ou culturel, qui figure dorenavent comme l'élément structurel de base à l'institutionnalisation du pouvoir d'Etat. Mieux encore; la légalité légitime dont le pouvoir est le garant y apparaît moins comme ce qui est donné une fois pour toutes dans les faits accomplis de l'histoire événementielle que ce qui naît perpétuellement de l'interaction des unités individuelles mises en valeur dans le cadre de la souveraineté une et indivisible.

Concept dynamique et souple, l'Etat souverain ainsi conçu par le rationalisme géométrique servira à partir de cette date de modèle à toutes les constructions politologiques des dix septième et dix huitième siècles. On lui donnera plus tard le nom d'Etat-nation(3). Ses survivances s'étendront jusqu'à notre siècle, à travers une série de métamorphoses, ainsi que nous pourrons bientôt le constater.

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Ce que nous devons, toutefois, souligner dès à présent, c'est que l'Etat-nation n'est point, dans sa conception première, national ou nationaliste alors même qu'il puisse y aboutir. Son critère, ainsi que nous l'avons noté, est la souveraineté dégagée de toute coloration éthique d'essence historiciste ou idéologique. Dans sa conception géométrique pure, l'Etat-nation est une monade fermée enveloppant une société entièrement atomisée, exclusive de toute idée d'autonomie de groupe, de région ou d'ethnie. Lorsque cet Etat aura plus ou moins été constitué dans les faits de l'histoire, un auteur politique aussi fortement imprégné d'esprit libéral et aussi respectueux de la tradition comme Montesquieu s'abstiendra scrupuleusement de parler d'autonomie au sens sus-indiqué, et n'invoquera que -selon un clivage toutefois bien déterminé- des "pouvoirs subordonnés et dépendants" (4). A son ultime aboutissement, sous la plume de J.-J. Rousseau(5), la technique du contrat social ne trouvera d'autre mode pour s'exprimer que la dialectique de la Volonté de Tous (ut singuli) et de la Volonté Générale, volonté aussi impersonnelle et globale que celle qui avait été déduite, un siècle plus tôt, par Hobbes et par Spinoza.

II) Il en a existé, certes, notamment au cours du dix huitième siècle, des théoriciens de l'Etat et des philosophes enclins à attri-

buer aux phénomènes collectifs une importance complémentaire ou parallèle à celle qui avait été reconnue aux individus par les adeptes du rationalisme. Et l' on parlait déjà à l'époque de "caractères nationaux" (6). John Locke avait donné, par ailleurs, dans l'intervalle, une interprétation bien plus souple de la socialité naturelle, ainsi que des rapports entre la société et le pouvoir d'Etat. Mais en fait, le modèle de l'Etat-nation élaboré au cours du Grand Siècle n'avait pas été entamé de façon substantielle lorsque la Révolution Américaine et la Révolution Française sont venues proposer au monde une nouvelle manière de penser la société politique.

Tout compte fait, les deux Révolutions libérales du dix huitième siècle n'ont visé qu'à un réaménagement, idéologique et institutionnel, de l'Etat-nation plutôt qu'à l'élaboration d'un type d'Etat absolument nouveau et original. En incorporant d'emblée les droits individuels naturels dans le corps de l'institution étatique, en faisant de tels droits les limites objectives de l'action du pouvoir, les révolutions libérales apportaient, certes, des précisions utiles sur un point capital de la doctrine laissé quelque peu obscur dans la tradition du rationalisme (7) et rapidement dévoilé par les libéraux. L'essence de l'Etat n'en demeurait pas moins celle qui avait été présentée par Hobbes et par Spinoza, à savoir une relation directe, par le truchement de la loi-règle générale et impersonnelle, entre l'homme individuel et le pouvoir d'Etat; relation directe et sans référence aucune à des hiérarchies intermédiaires, dont on sait que la Révolution Française en particulier vint interdire formellement l'existence; et ce non seulement pour ce qui était des prérogatives de la noblesse mais aussi au sujet des relations du travail (8). Si bien que, en définitive, quand les hommes de la Révolution voulurent poser les limites institutionnelles au nouveau pouvoir d'Etat, ils songèrent moins ou pas du tout aux composantes, géographiques et sociales, du peuplement et s'attachèrent exclusivement à la séparation des fonctions et des organes du pouvoir lui-même, en suivant, avec plus ou moins de bonheur, le modèle jadis élaboré par Montesquieu au sujet de la Constitution d'Angleterre(9). De fait, ainsi que l'article 16 de la Déclaration des Droits de l' Homme et du Citoyen le rappelle (10), la séparation des pouvoirs figure, aux côtés des droits de l'homme, comme le complément nécessaire de la conception fondamentale selon laquelle le lien étatique s'analyse invariablement en un rapport direct -à présent constitutionnellement garanti- entre le jus suum de l'individu-citoyen et le pouvoir d'Etat. Dans un Pays comme la France où le modèle de l' Etat-nation s'était déjà plus ou moins imposé dans les faits depuis fort longtemps, on pense, en effet, bien moins aux collectivités partielles formées historiquement et on met uniquement en avant les valeurs universelles de l'homme libre et du citoyen. La géographie humaine, sociale, ethnique ou territoriale,se plie à nouveau devant la majesté de la souveraineté une et indivisible. Le centralisme démocratique se succède sans encombre au centralisme monarchique et en parachève les structures, tout en modifiant profondément le contenu idéologique. La nation révolutionnaire ne fait que revigorer et rendre plus conséquent le modèle individualiste de l'Etat-nation forgé par le rationalisme.

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Il est vrai, certes, que, quand on aura à se confronter, durant cette même période de l'histoire, à des situations historiques plus complexes ou plus confuses on s'apercevra qu'il convient de tenir aussi compte de faits et de données objectives qui ne se prêtent que très difficilement aux idées a-historiques ou super-historiques de l'Etat centraliste. On n'en maintiendra pas moins l'idée que l'essence de l'Etat s'analyse en un rapport reliant entr'eux des individus placés sous le même pouvoir souverain. Quand le célèbre révolutionnaire grec Rigas Phéréos rédigera, en 1797 ou 1798 (peu avant son exécution capitale), sa Déclaration des Droits et son Projet de Constitution (11), il fera appel à tous les peuples des Balcans et de l'Asie Mineure : les Bulgares, les Grecs, les Valaques, les Turcs, les Arméniens sont conviés à s'unir, sans perdre par là leur identité, sous la même autorité souveraine, démocratique et laïque; étant admis que l'Etat nouveau s'établira sur la base de lois égales reliant les individus de toutes les catégories du peuplement. Et lorsque, peu d'années plus tard,,J.-G.Fichte, se dressant contre les appels contre-révolutionnaires de l'Ecole Historiciste, en même temps que contre les visées expansionistes de Napoléon, aura invoqué une idée de nation allemande historique, il en déduira lui aussi la substance de ce que cette idée contient de fidélité à l'idéal révolutionnaire de l'homme libre et du citoyen éclairé (12). Pour le philosophe allemand, également, la Nation s'étend aussi loin que fleurit la liberté de l'individu sous l'écran protecteur de la souveraineté une et indivisible (13).

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Les guerres napoléoniennes, suivies des proclamations et des pratiques de la Sainte-Alliance et du Concert Européen, ont conduit cependant à de nouveaux et importants changements de la forme et du contenu de l'Etat-nation. A la conception plus ou moins teintée de cosmopolitisme du "national" pendant la période révolutionnaire, se substitue peu à peu en Europe le nouveau principe des nationalités. Sans cesser d'être, sous un certain clivage, "sociales", les révolutions du dix neuvième siècle, ainsi que du vingtième, deviennent authentiquement"nationales", en ce sens que les individus qui sont appelés désormais à composer les nouveaux Etats-nation sont réputés être liés préalablement par un contrat invisible attesté -ainsi qu'Edmond Burke l'avait suggéré- par les actes de l'histoire, et confirmé par des caractères actuels multiples : communauté des coutumes et des moeurs, de la religion et de la langue aussi, éventuellement. Le "vouloir vivre ensemble" mis en exergue plus tard par Ernest Renan pour caractériser la communauté politique nationale paraît, d'ores et déjà, irréductible à l'hypothèse de rapports inter-individuels de même nature et générateurs de droits et obligations valables pour tous les hommes. Le prius est à présent le "national". L'Etat-nation se convertit en conséquence en authentique Etat National, destiné à mettre en valeur les vertus propres à telle ou telle nation particulière, réputée vraie historiquement et ayant une existence antérieure à l'Etat. Or, du fait que la Nation a une existence indépendante de l'Etat et peut déborder les frontières de celui-ci, il en résulte des conflits et des tensions de plus en plus tenaces entre Etats, conflits et tensions qui rendent encore plus rigoureuses les structures centralistes du pouvoir d'Etat. Sous la poussé des nationalismes et des irrédentismes de toutes sortes, le droit cosmopolitique de l'individu - droit inhérent à l'essence même de l'Etat-nation converti en Etat National- est destiné, dès lors, à s'amenuiser de plus en plus. A partir de la Charte de 1814 et en progression jusqu' à la veille de la première guerre mondiale, les droits individuels naturels se transforment en "droits publics subjectifs" et ils sont réservés, en principe, au "national", en exclusion de l'"étranger"(14)

III) Il n'en demeure pas moins que cet Etat National ethnocentrique continue à fonctionner selon les caractéristiques principales de l'Etat-nation, tel que celui-ci avait été conçu, trois siècles plus tôt, par les adeptes de la philosophie géométrique. Et il trouve encore un appui de plus solides dans cette conception monadologique de la société internationale et du droit international qui avait redoublé, depuis le temps de la Renaissance les ordres juridiques individualistes et centralistes des sociétés étatisées. Or, il est évident que ces sociétés, ainsi que le droit normatif international qui avait assuré leur légitimité externe, se trouvent être aujourd'hui fort éloignés du modèle qui en avait servi de base lors de leur naissance ou dans la suite de leur développement. Et l'on peut parler à présent, pour la première fois au cours de ces trois derniers siècles d'histoire européenne de changement de structure vrai et profond aussi bien au niveau de l'Etat qu'à celui de la société internationale et inter-étatique.

Avant de préciser ce que signifie pour nous un tel changement, il nous semble utile de nous rapporter brièvement aux facteurs principaux qui ont permis à l'Etat-nation de se perpétuer à travers les métamorphoses idéologiques et institutionnelles que nous avons notées précédemment.

Ces facteurs, on les dévine déjà en scrutant un peu plus profondement la philosophie sociale des grands rationalistes(15). Il faudra, toutefois, attendre le dix huitième siècle pour que leur action remonte au grand jour. A ses débuts, on le sait, l'Etat-nation n'a pas été conçu comme un Etat faible. Son avènement a coïncidé avec le mercantilisme et le capitalisme d'Etat, et il a visé surtout à l'essor et à la consolidation de tels régimes socio-économiques. Néanmoins, à partir d'une certaine date, qui coïncide avec la diffusion des idées physiocratiques en économie, l'Etat-nation s'est confondu peu à peu avec la doctrine de l'Etat "veilleur de nuit", c'est-à-dire de l'Etat qui garantit et surveille le fonctionnement correct de la société économique privée, société qui est régie, aux dires de ses adeptes, par des lois naturelles génératrices d'automatismes bienfaisants. A l'idée d'unité conceptuelle de la société politique étatisée postulée au départ par le rationalisme est venu, en effet, se greffer le postulat d'unité et d'autonomie du marché. Superposé à la société économique reconnue autonome, l'Etat-nation -révolutionnaire et cosmopolite ou national au sens traditionaliste et historique- se donne maintenant comme emblème l'abstension de toute immixtion dans les affaires de la société, de la société économique plus particulièrement. L'on ignore, en conséquence, ou on interdit formellement, ainsi que nous l'avons attesté plus haut, toute velléité d'ordre corporatif, régionaliste ou ethnique tendant à fausser le rapport établi entre la collectivité globale incarnée par l'Etat et ses membres individuels. La peur du collectif et du plural, en politique comme en économie, va jusqu' à réserver une existence occulte aux partis politiques, dont on hésite encore jusqu'à une date récente à reconnaître la réalité constitutionnelle. Rien d'étonant, dès lors, si les divisions administratives territoriales se modèlent de plus en plus conformément à des schémas tendant invariablement à l'uniformité à partir de hiérarchies fortement centralisées. Les collectivités historiques locales, créations le plus souvent spontanées de l'histoire s'intègrent elles-mêmes, de façons diverses, dans les divisions

administratives superposées(16). Suivant le sort de la corporation ou de la commune, la Région se perd à son tour et se confond dans l'unité idéologique postulée à partir de l'Etat-nation parvenu à son apogée sous l'empire de l'individualisme libéral et physiocratique.

IV) Ce sont encore des facteurs économiques puissants qui ont contribué, de façon prioritaire, à ébranler au cours de notre siècle les structures sociales et idéologiques correspondantes de l'Etat-nation.

Il ne serait pas nécessaire, certes, d'insister longuement, ici, sur les transformations que la société européenne a subies à partir de la concentration industrielle. Ce qui est certain, c'est que nous vivons actuellement à peu près partout en Europe sous l'empire d'idées, de faits et d'institutions qui ne cadrent réellement ni avec la conception initiale de l'individualisme ni avec ses transformations ultérieures sous la pression des idées physiocratiques et du nationalisme. Il suffirait de rappeler à cet égard, que si l'individu continue encore à figurer sur ce tableau comme le destinataire principal de droits constitutionnellement garantis, il est aussi présentement porteur d'obligations multiples résultant de son insertion nécessaire dans des réseaux de relations groupales complexes, génératrices de droits et de devoirs sociaux et culturels, droits et devoirs dont le seul énoncé se suffit pour bouleverser de fond en comble les rapports négatifs jadis établis entre l'Etat et la société privée. L'Etat "veilleur de nuit" est mort dans les bras de l'Etat administratif et social et aucune force n'est plus capable de le ressusciter.

Rien d'étonant, dès lors, si nous avons été amenés jusqu'à réviser la notion cardinale qui avait servi de base à l'édification de l'Etat-nation : nous parlons aujourd'hui moins d'individu porteur de droits naturels que d'individu-personne, en soulignant par-là que le social précède et accompagne tout rapport établi ou à établir entre l'homme individuel et le collectif des individus réunis sous la même autorité. A dire vrai, la mission fondamentale de ce que l'on peut encore appeler un Etat souverain consiste maintenant moins à faire insérer les individus dans la collectivité globale uniforme que de coordonner des activités émanant de centres de décision divers et multiformes, centres de décision dont le pouvoir d'Etat contrôle imparfaitement l'action, tandis qu'il en subit en permanance la pression. Il est patent que nous ne sommes plus à l'époque de l'abstentionisme ni à celle de l'interventionisme fragmentaire et occasionnel. Plus que jamais, la société, organisée à sa manière selon les possibilités que lui offrent la science et la technologie, remonte sans cesse vers les sommets du pouvoir; et le pouvoir se voit obligé de partager jusqu'aux plus viles besognes de la société. L'Etat-nation individualiste et absentioniste n'existe aujourd'hui nulle part. Encore moins dans notre Europe pluraliste et démocratique.

Cependant il importe de noter, que tous ces changements profonds dans les rapports entre la société et l'Etat sont consécutifs, également, ou parallèles aux modifications de structure intervenues dans le domaine de la société internationale. Ces modifications ne datent, certes, d'hier. Elles ont été préparées par des faits tels

que la mondialisation du commerce, les dépendances coloniales et la décolonisation, les antagonismes économiques et militaires. Joints aux bouleversements consécutifs aux progrès technologiques, ces faits n'ont pas été sans entraîner des conséquences négatives et positives importantes non seulement sur le tracé des frontières, mais aussi et surtout sur les évolutions internes de chaque Etat-nation.

Conséquences négatives, d'abord, puisque les tensions et les conflits internationaux consécutifs à l'émergence des nationalismes ont contribué, ainsi que nous l'avons rappelé plus haut, à rendre, en Europe, plus rigides les structures centralistes de l'Etat-nation. Pis encore; en certains cas(17), l'idée nationale a pu être considérée comme étant incompatible avec tout mélange ou cohabitation, culturelle ou ethnique. Elle a donné lieu à des échanges de populations et à des massacres rappelant les pires moments des empires Babylonien et Assyrien de la Haute Antiquité. Cependant, conséquences positives aussi, par le fait que le commerce international rendait désormais perceptible la nécessité de réformes institutionnelles adéquates, afin de maîtriser une économie et une société de plus en plus dynamique et expansive. A peu près au même moment, les sciences de l'homme, devenant de plus en plus ouvertes et comparatives étaient à même de montrer les faiblesses et les défectuosités d'un système de gouvernement, national et international, qui avait donné tout ce qu'on aurait pu attendre de lui. un système qui attendait déjà depuis plusieurs décennies à être remplacé par quelque chose de nouveau et de meilleur. On parlait déjà, en effet, chez les constitutionalistes des années '20 de "crise de l' Etat" et de "crise du système international", juste à la veille du jour où la crise économique mondiale des années '30 allait donner le signal à des bouleversements encore plus redoutables.

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Les évolutions précédentes ont été particulièrement sensibles, ainsi qu'il a été rappelé plus haut, dans les Pays européens, qui ont, de plus, souffert des massacres et des destructions matérielles pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale; mais dont une partie seulement ont été en mesure d'en tirer jusqu'ici les conclusions qui s'imposent. Des exprériences neuves et originales ont vu le jour depuis lors dans cette partie de notre Continent. Tout nous incite à penser qu'il serait désormais impossible d'affronter, pour ce qui est de l'Europe démocratique et pluraliste, les problèmes relevant du complexe des rapports entre la Nation, le Pluralisme et la Région sans tenir compte de ces expériences.

Ce qui a suscité et soutenu le mouvement européen actuel, n'est pas, certes, uniquement la conscience d'une commune appartenance culturelle ou encore un simple reflexe de défense vis-à-vis de périls extérieurs. C'est aussi et surtout la conscience de plus en plus nette de l' impossibilité à laquelle se sont acculés à peu près tous les Etats du Continent de résoudre dans l'isolement et par leurs propres moyens d'Etats-nation indépendants les problèmes avec lesquels se sont confrontés dans le nouveau clivage des relations économiques, technologiques et militaires. Vu sous cet angle, le mouvement d'unification européenne paraît indubitablement s'insérer dans le contexte des évolutions historiques qui ont débouché, au début de ce siècle, à la crise de l'Etat-nation et aux conflits mondiaux consécutifs.

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Il convient, à cet égard, de tenir également compte du fait que l'Etat-nation, grand ou petit, démocratique, oligarchique ou monarchique, en fondant lors de sa constitution ses espoirs sur l'idée d'unité et d'uniformité des structures de base à partir du schéma initial : individu - pouvoir souverain, avait compté aussi sur un minimum d'autarchie vitale, tantôt fondée sur la puissance, économique et militaire, de son territoire et de son peuplement, et tantôt appuyée sur la vigueur du sentiment national de ses citoyens. Or, une telle autarchie s'est avérée précisément inopérante de nos jours, sous le poids de pressions internes et externes, auxquelles chaque Etat se doit inéluctablement de faire face. Tout compte fait, le passage de la société individualiste à la société solidariste, démocratique et plurale, de l'Etat centralisateur au régionalisme, du droit à l'égalité abstraite et impersonnelle au personnalisme et au droit à la différence, de la quantité du profit, individuel ou collectif, à la qualité de la vie, du productivisme sans bornes au respect de la nature et de l'héritage culturel -, un tel passage constitue visiblement à présent une tâche qui dépasse largement le potentiel de l'Etat-nation européen le mieux pourvu par la nature ou par la culture. L'élaboration d'un cadre de vie plus large, plus complexe assurément, mais aussi mieux adapté aux impératifs du temps présent, serait de nature, de l'avis unanime de tous ceux qui ont oeuvré pour une patrie européenne commune, à modifier profondément le sens et la portée des problèmes qui ont pesé jusqu'ici sur chaque Etat-nation pris séparément.

Il ne nous paraît pas nécessaire d'insister, ici, sur les diverses façons selon lesquelles le fait européen actuel offre déjà toutes faites ou prépare seulement des réponses à ces différents problèmes. Il paraît accomplir plus ou moins automatiquement cette mission quand il affirme la primauté de l'ordre communautaire sur la législation de chaque Etat-membre(18). Ou encore, lorsqu'il donne une nouvelle dimension à l'électorat national, en en faisant le coauteur d'une souveraineté plus large en voie de gestation. Il le fait aussi en établissant des standards dans le domaine des droits et libertés, des libertés collectives en particulier, ainsi qu'en matière de protection des minorités, de sauvegarde de la nature et de l'héritage culturel. Il semble accomplir cette tâche plus concrétement, losqu'il devient générateur de mesures positives tendant à faire disparaître les déséquilibres régionaux ou quand il offre son soutien en vue de la solution de problèmes économiques et sociaux intéressant tel ou tel Pays particulier. Il saute aux yeux, que si cette évolution devait se prolonger encore quelque temps nous serions amenés à des situations irreversibles, susceptibles de modifier de fond en comble, en même temps que le concept de l'Etat-nation, les rapports possibles entre l'idée nationale et le régionalisme.

Il paraît en tout état de cause certain, d'ores et déjà, que des mesures de celles que nous venons de mentionner sont en elles-mêmes de nature à atténuer grandement les tensions rendues inévitables dans le cadre de l'Etat-nation centraliste et individualiste, entre l'idéologie nationale et le pluralisme géographique, culturel ou ethnique.

Atténuer les tensions, faire disparaître les disparités, écarter les antagonismes stériles ne signifie pas, toutefois, enlever à l'Europe Unie sa variété, qui est sa principale richesse. Un tel danger n'existe, d'ailleurs, pas réellement.

Il convient de penser, en premier lieu, que les nations européennes, alors même qu'elles fussent largement façonnées par l'idéologie et les techniques de l'Etat-nation n'en sont pas moins des productions en quelque sorte spontannées de l'histoire; elles sont alimentées par des sources intarissables de mémoire collective aussi bien que par mille motifs d'intérêts actuels bien compris. Il paraît peu probable, d'autre part, que l'atténuation des déséquilibres régionaux à la suite des interventions communautaires soit de nature à faire éclipser automatiquement les idéologies régionalistes, qui sont, le plus souvent, elles aussi, produits authentiques de la géograpnie ou de l'histoire. Et de toutes façons, dans l'un comme dans l'autre des cas précités, les présuppositions socio-économiques, intellectuelles et culturelles qui ont conduit récemment au déclenchement du procès de fédéralisation européenne n'ont rien de comparable avec celles qui avait fait naître, quelques siècles auparavant, l'Etat-nation individualiste et centralisateur. L'Europe n'est une, en fait, que par la qualité des différences qui la composent à plus d'un niveaux, étant admis que ses composantes : entités nationales, groupes d'idées et d'intérêts, partis politiques et régions, individus possèdent néenmoins suffisamment d'éléments convergents ou similaires, susceptibles d'engendrer et de maintenir l'unité sans supprimer la différence. C'est en fait par un jeu complexe, parfois subtile, de la solidarité par similitudes et par la division du travail que les antinomies historiques de l'Etat-nation pourraient finalement être levées.

La mise en oeuvre d'une idéologie européenne de cette envergure suppose, évidemment, en dehors de mesures pratiques diverses (19), la prise de conscience de plus en plus large du commun destin que l'histoire réserve désormais aux nations, aux ethnies, aux régions et aux individus inclus dans l'espace européen. Et il va sans dire qu'une évolution idéologique de cette nature ne saurait vraiment s'accomplir que dans la mesure où l'Europe Unie revêtirait un caractère de plus en plus organique, en se dotant de procédures administratives et juridictionnelles mieux élaborées (20) et en assurant au Parlement Européen à la fois une meilleure représentativité et un pouvoir de décision et de contrôle plus efficace.

Pareille évolution serait, pourtant, encore insuffisante pour forger une authentique identité européenne, si des mesures parallèles n'étaient pas prises en même temps dans chaque Etat particulier pour briser le centralisme hérité de l'Etat-nation et pour assurer la démocratie à tous les niveaux de la vie politique et administrative. C'est dire aussi que le système représentatif, tel qu'il a été conçu et pratiqué dans le cadre historique de l'Etat-nation devrait éventuellement être révisé pour être mis au diapason des exigences d'une Europe authentiquement démocratique et pluraliste.

Bien que ce dernier aspect du problème déborde ostansiblement le cadre assigné à cet exposé, il convient de rappeler, néanmoins, qu'à peu près partout dans l'Europe démocratique actuelle la démocratie représentative se confond, plus ou moins, avec ce qu'on a nommé la "république des partis". Or, les partis politiques ont été modélés généralement dans le cadre de l'Etat-nation, et ont servi à consolider

avec le concours des administrations centrales, son centralisme viscéral; tout en édifiant, souvent, leur organisation interne et leurs méthodes d'action sur une base tout aussi centraliste que l'Etat lui-même. Ils peuvent constituer, en arborant le drapeau d'un nationalisme réinventé aux fins de propagande électorale, un obstacle sérieux aux progrès de la cause européenne. Il devient visible, sous cet angle, que la démocratisation des partis politiques et l'application d'une déontologie républicaine dans les pratiques électorales pourraient constituer des tâches incombant, aussi, aux organes de la Communauté.

Je me permets de conclure par quelques mots seulement.

L'ère de l'Etat-nation paraît être révolue à jamais pour les Pays de l'Europe démocratique; mais les nations européennes ne sont pas prêtes à disparaître, en tant que telles, dans une Europe politiquement, socialement et culturellement unifiée.

Leurs problèmes de structure et d'action majeurs ne sauraient, toutefois, être résolu valablement, que dans la mesure où leur intégration serait de plus en plus poussée dans le cadre institutionnel et idéologique de la patrie européenne commune.

Un tel cadre élargi s'avère aujourd'hui comme l'unique moyen propice pour assurer le fonctionnement effectif du pluralisme, aussi bien horizontal que vertical, en faisant notamment du droit à la différence le complément indispensable de l'identité européenne.

L'accomplissement de ces tâches suppose un effort, conjoint ou parallèle, de réformes instituionnelles tant sur le plan de la Communauté Européenne que sur celui des Pays membres; réformes dont l'accomplissement devrait être effectué avec la célérité qu' exigent les conditions de vie présente des sociétés humaines, mais aussi avec la prudence qu'impose le fait indéniable que l'unification européenne se déroule dans un monde périlleux sinon résolument hostile.

NOTES

1. Voir la Première Partie de l'ouvrage de Hobbes Leviathan. Cf. ib. 2e Partie, Chap.XVII. Pour Spinoza, v. Traité Théologico-politique, Oeuvres, Paris, 1928, t.II, chap.XVI, p.294 et s., Ethique, IV, Sch.2.

2. On en trouve les traces en Chine Impériale, dans les Empires du Moyen Orient, dans la société mycénienne. Pour cette dernière, v. notre ouvrage : Les sociétés politiques homériques, Paris, PUF, 1974.

3. Voir J.-M.Leclercq, La Nation et son idéologie, éd.Anthropos, Paris, 1979.

4. De l'Esprit des Lois, L.XXVIII-XXX.

5. V. Georges Vlachos, "En marge du Contrat Social", in Mélanges Alexandre Svolos, Athènes, 1961, p.161 et s.

6. Voir notre Essai surla Politique de Hume, Paris, Domat-Monchrestien, 1955, p.115 et s.

7. La politique de Spinoza était,pourtant, partiellement du moins, exempte de ce reproche, dans la mesure notamment où elle inclinait fortement vers les idées de la démocratie libérale.

8. L'on sait que la Loi Le Chapellier avait interdit, pendant la Révolution, l'exercice du droit de coalition.

9. De l'Esprit des Lois, L.XI, chap.VI, L.XIX, chap.XXVII.

10. "Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits n'est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs déterminée, n'a point de constitution".

11. Textes inspirés des Constitutions et Déclarations de la Grande Révolution et réadaptés pour servir aux peuples vivant dans l'enceinte de l'Empire Othoman.

12. Voir nos commentaires dans Fédéralisme et Raison d'Etat dans la pensée internationale de Fichte, Paris, Pédone, 1948.

13. Voir notamment ses Discours à la Nation Allemande (1807).

14. Dans la plupart des Constitutions précédant la première guerre mondiale, il n'était plus question de "droits de l'homme" mais de "droits publics" des Français, des Turcs, des Grecs, etc.

15. Aussi bien chez Hobbes que dans les oeuvres de Spinoza, l'économie joue un rôle décisif dans l'aménagement de l'Etat et de ses rapports avec la société.

16. Cette intégration est particulièrement sensible, en Grèce, où, aorès la formation de l'Etat néo-hellénique, en 1830, les communes locales, dont les origines remontaient à l'époque byzantine et qui avaient survecu sous l'Empire Othoman, ont été pratiquement éliminées pendant un siècle environ.

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17. Tel a été le cas, notamment, des populations vivant dans l'Empire Othoman après la Révolution nationaliste des Jeunes Turcs, en 1908 et dans les années suivantes (massacre des Arméniens, des Grecs, etc.).

18. La mise en oeuvre de cette idée est facilitée par l'adoption, dans l'ordre légal intra-étatique, de dispositions comme celles de l'article 28 de la Constitution hellénique du 11 Juin 1975 : § 2 "Afin de servir un intérêt national important et de promouvoir la collaboration avec les autres Etats, il est permis d'attribuer, par voie de traité ou d'accord international, des compétences prévues par la Constitution aux organes d'organisations internationales..."; et, au § 3 : "La Grèce procède librement, par une loi votée à la majorité absolue du nombre total des députés, à des restrictions de l'exercice de la souveraineté nationale, dans la mesure où ces restrictions sont imposées par un intérêt national important, ne lèsent pas les droits de l'homme et les fondements du régime démocratique et sont effectuées sur la base du principe de l'égalité et sous la condition de réciprocité".

19. Institutionalisation de la double nationalité, politique extérieure commune, etc.

20. Il est évident que, sous un certain rapport, l'intégration européenne devrait précéder ou, du moins, être concomitante avec l'institutionalisation du pluralisme ethnique et régional. La révendication de l'autonomie par certains groupes sociaux pourrait, en effet, être fomentée ou exploitée du dehors et susciter, aussi longtemps que l'Europe n'est pas parvenue à son unification politique, des troubles et des conflits, internes et internationaux. Des conséquences de cette nature pourraient être engendrées par les procédures plus ou moins incohérentes selon lesquelles la CEE, en collaboration avec le Conseil de l'Europe, procède actuellement à une enquête en vue de dresser la carte ethnographique et linguistique de l'Europe.

St. Ehrlich :

Hueglin : General theory can't answer from a specific case : the theory if exist theory can help to explain a particular case.

Théorie générale.

Risque de théorie abstraite : elle ne mène à rien.

Théorie générale de l'Etat :

P. Vlachos :

P : la "nation" n'est plus à partir d'idée d'ennemi extérieur.

Nouvelle légitimité.

CEE aussi : le communisme plus nouvelle.

IPSA RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM.

Barcelona Meeting on "Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism". (25-27 June 1987).

PROGRAM.

Thursday 25. 3'30-7'30 pm

Opening Session

-Prof. H.G. Thorburn(Chairman)
-Mr. Jordi Porta, Fundació Bofill Director.
-Prof. Jordi Solé Tura: "Introductory Report".
-Prof. St. Ehrlich: Report on "Regionalism and Autonomies in Western Europe".
-Discussion.

Friday 26. Morning Session. 9 am-1 pm.

-Prof. G. Vlachos: Report on "L'Etat-Nation, la Société Plurale et l'Unification Européene".
-Discussion.

-Prof. Th.O. Hueglin: Report on "Nationalism, Regionalism and Late Capitalism".
-Discussion.

-Prof. D.L. Seiler: Report on "Peripheral Nationalism between Pluralism and Monism"
-Discussion.

Friday 26, Afternoon Session, 3'30-7'30 pm.

-Prof.L.J. Sharpe: Report on "Fragmentation and Territoriality in the European State System".
-Discussion.

Prof. J.-Y. Calvez: Report on"Nations et Minorités dans l'enseignement recent de l'Eglise Catholique".
-Discussion.

-Prof.P.N. Mahwood: Report on "Government and Pluralism in African States".
-Discussion.

Saturday 27, Morning Session, 9 am.-1 pm.

-General Meeting of the Research Committee Members

-Prof. J. Botella: Report on "Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism in Spain".
-Discussion.

Saturday 27, Afternoon Session,3'30-7'30 pm.

--Prof.A. Korbonski: Report on "Nationalism and Pluralism in Eastern Europe".
-Discussion.

-Prof.P. Winczorek: Report on "Regional Problems in the Unitary State: the Case of Poland".
-Discussion.

--Prof.J.Solé Tura: Tentative Conclusions.

REMARKS.

- Coffee breaks will be provided in all sessions.
- Information about suitable places for lunch and dinner will be also provided by organizers.

ALL THE SESSIONS WILL BE HELD AT FUNDACIO BOFILL , c. PROVENCA, 324, Tel. 258.87.00.

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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Barcelona, 25, 26, 27 June 1987

REGIONALISM AND AUTONOMIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

SOME HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

Stanislaw Ehrlich

STANISŁAW EHRLICH

Regionalism and autonomies in Western Europe

Some historical and theoretical reflections

The proliferation of regionalism and autonomous movements and their institutionalization is relatively a new phenomenon. It came to the fore after World War II. But in a broader context of political theory and political practice in Central and Eastern Europe it was an old problem. It had its roots in the famous argument between the Austromarxists and the bolsheviks. The first headed mainly by Otto Bauer put forward the following definition of the nation as "the totality of men bound through a common destiny into a community of character[1]. It is easily to note that in this definition the role of the common territory was played down. This position triggered of the criticism of the bolsheviks /Lenin, followed by Stalin/ which indicated that only territorial institutionalization of ethnic and national interests can be their proper guarantee. This meant that institutionalized territory is the very basis of national sovereignty, which could shield it from inroads of hostile neighbours. Cultural autonomy, the tradition of a common destiny could not create this necessary guarantee. However a serious misunderstanding crept into the criticism of the bolsheviks, because Otto Bauer's thesis was, that in capitalist society nothing more could be offered, whereas "socialism leads necessarily to the realization of the principle of nationality. But while socialist society gradually constructs above the national community a federal state in which the communities of the individual nations are once again incorporated, the principle of nationality changes into that of a national autonomy... Thus the socialist principle of nationality

is able to combine the advantages of both the bourgeois principle of nationality and national autonomy. By organizing the nation as a community it gives it the right to legislate and to administer itself, power to dispose over the means and the product of labour, military power"[2].

But I have to drop this almost forgotten controversy and state simply that the principle of territorial, national sovereignty was succesfully tested in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia /the Kazachstan incident and the Kosovo riots being the very rare exceptions/.

What Otto Bauer did not forsee, however, that this principle of territorial national sovereignty and ethnic autonomy could work also in capitalist states, although under the impact of internal centrifugal tensions, both ethnic and merely decentralist, and also under the influence of Eastern socialist federations.

Different patterns of regionalism and autonomies in Western Europe.

Sketching above a kind of theoretical common denominator I had no intention to minimize the diversity of institutional solutions in Western Europe. In fact their variety is impressing. Each case should be analyzed in its peculiarity.

The first major attempt to overcome centralist uniformity was the Italian constitution passed after World War II. Two principles were in it amalgamated: mega - decentralization /the provinces got their governements with unprecedented broad powers/ combined with the safeguard on the preipheries of distinct ethnical interests of the French- and German-speaking minorities; and on the two big isles, where an acute feeling

of self-identity was an important political and social factor. In this period the Italian constitution was the most progressive in Western Europe.

The political process in Belgium seems to have now a stabilizing tendency giving to both ethnic entitities the chance to remain "separate but equal" under a national roof with Brussels as the common capital. The evolution to a full-blown federation remains open but this alternative is not the matter of the nearest future. The analogy with Canada seems stretched as the preponderence of anglophone provinces in number, population and wealth over Quebec creates a completely different situation. The analogy simply boils down to the abandonment of the idea to split the federation of Canada by the secession of Quebec and in the case of Belgium of the abandonment of the idea to replace Belgium by Flemish and Wallon states...

Let us take a brief look on some other cases.

A "less United Kingdom" emerged the first time when a document was published by the British Government "Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales" /September 1974/ followed by (α) "white book" under the title "Our Changing Democracy, Devolution to Scotland and Wales /November 1975/. These documents were implemented in due constitutional course. Thus a deep-going reconstruction was achieved[3]. The crux of the matter consisted in the acknowledgement of the diversity represented by the tradition of the Scottish kingdom and Welsh history, culture and language: in the acknowledgement of their right to ethnic identity within the framework of the "basic unity". Adequate autonomous institutions were created in order to safeguard the new acquired rights. Two features seem to characterize this development: The failure of the extremist nationalist tendency

represented by the Scottish Nationalist Party which after a brillinat start lost considerably momentum. It turned out that the claim to the "Scottish shelf" was economically and politically not feasible. The Welsh Nationalists did not succeed in reviving a forgotten and very difficult language and had to abandon their ambitions. The second feature of this reform was the strenghtening of the push for decentralization. And this coincidence reminds somewhat the solutions of the Italian constitution. Northern Ireland's problems have to be approached in a different way, because they ceased to be the internal problems of the United Kingdom. Probably in some distant future they will be solved on an international basis in the course of negotiations not only between the local communities but also between the governements of U.K. and Ireland, too.

These two trends: territorial autonomy of ethnic and national minorities linked to global regionalism in a given state structure are to be found also in other countries, what confirms the usefulness of the systemic approach.

A similar pattern of development may be found also in France and Spain. However, the historical antecedents in Spain /like in Italy/ conditionned incomparably deeper going structural changes than in France.

In the latter country it turned out that the drive for ethnic self-identification was rather weak and soon declining. The unrest in Brittany - some years ago - had rather economic roots, and what language and culture concerns, the desire to revive age-old Celtic traditions was not sufficiently widespread. But the Britons - like all other Frenchemen living outside Paris /la province/ - were keenly interested in the overcoming of the age-old bureaucratic centralism embodied

in the stiff prefectoral system. The population of the provinces was interested in a greater say in local matters.

The centrifugal forces were only concentrated in two regions: in the "pays des Basques" and the isle Corsica. In the first case like in other regions of France dissatisfaction of the local population was largely influenced by economic reasons not connected to political ambitions whatsover to join accross the border Great Euzcadi. In Corsica, on the contrary, the minority of the separatist movement were out with the battle-cry: secession, sovereignty. There was even a period when this trend overgrew into open terrorism. But it finally shrinked to rare -although sometimes bloody - incidents, whithout any chance in the foreseeable future to dominate the public life of the isle.

The development in Spain from the Iberian brand of fascism to an authoritarian state /Franco in his last period/ and from the latter through peaceful revolution to a transformation into a Western-type democracy, presents for a foreign social and political analyst tricky problems. For a scholar coming from the East it would be even more risky to elaborate on Spanish institutions in Spain - especially in the presence of one of the Founding Fathers of the Spanish constitution and in the same time the Dega of this Faculty...

So, I'll limit myself to some sketchy reflections. The complex of regional problems in Spain seems extremely diversified. There are regional units which developped an old culture and language and a strong consciousness of selfidentification like Cataluña and the Basque Country, where extremist nationalists striving for secession and sovereignty don't hesitate to use the weapon of terrorism. The element of cultural and national identification plays a lesser role in other provinces but

nevertheless distinct historical destinies, economic and social interests moulded them into entities of their own. The foreign observer who would be inclined to play down these differences to the level of picturesque folklore would be seriously mistaken. In spite of essential differences the provinces of Spain have one interest in common: to limit the power of the decision making center /hence the general interest in decentralization which encompasses these regional special interests/ and to maintain the unity of the country, the strength of the whole.

Some conclusions and new vistas

In this way we approached the conclusion that the interplay of differences and the urge for unity became the universal way of overcoming an uniformist, obsolete centralism. The second conclusion which might be drawn is thus: diverse forms to institutionalize ethnic, national and religious interests are bound to have a territorial basis. It seems obvious that this is the best form to saveguard these interests and to discharge mounting tensions and to prevent a cleavage difficult to bridge The policy of compromise proved true in some countries in other not. From the vista of the decision - center of the state these reforms may be considered as pluralist concessions. But from the point of view of centrifugal extremist tendencies they have to be rejected because they do not satisfy the desire for ethnic self-identification.

The tragic fate of Lebanon is a case in point, it seems to confirm the assumption of the necessity of a "territorial solution". The founders of the Lebaness democracy have brushed aside the already successfully tested principle of territorial delimitation and embraced instead the device of parity of Muslims and Christians with in the political structure. The parity

-principe between these groups was based on an approximative demographic evaluation. Some time the system worked satisfactorily creating the image of an democratic, "Arab Switzerland". However, in the course of the demographic evolution it turned out that parity no more exists, that Muslims outnumbered substantially Christians, and that the existing system lost its justification. As Lebanon was involved in the war with Israel the imbroglio rapidly expanded, new cleavages ethnic and religious - until now hidden - emerged having all a territorial basis. Imposed, artificial uniformity collapsed definitely and degenerated into wild, terrorist anarchy. Finally Lebanese democracy based on the apparently secure principle of parity was blown to pieces.

The disregard of territorial dellimitation of ethnic and religious interests had also the well-known disastrous effects in Sri-Lanca.

Regionalism and autonomies have their ramifications on the higher and more complex level in federalims and on the other side on a lower and less complex level in local self-government. The territorial principle implemented with due consequence works as well in the West as in the East, e.g. India - where the Sikh's bloody rebellion /territorially restricted/ remaines an exception which does not undermine the unity of the federation, and in the federal monarchy on Malaysia.

All these pluralist tendencies which limit the sovereign power of the political decision center are strenghtended by new horizontal links. They play obviously a growing role in the European Economic Community. I have also in mind the new tendency to create direct relations between federal subunits and foreign states, overpassing the federal government; and the

activities of supranationals[4]. The economic reforms in the Socialist East generated joint-ventures; in Soviet-Polish relations spreads a new practice of direct cooperation between plants of the two countries, a cooperation which overpasses the interference of their respective ministres and state combines. All these trends - I suppose - are signs not of a decline of sovereignty but mean its rationalization.

From this viewpoint regionalism and territorial autonomies are only streams within a more powerful river of efforts aiming at the limitation of centralist bureucracies. Ideas and theories are unpredictable tracellers: although the institutions they inspired seem more solidly settled, once received they change after reception, - differing considerably from the original.

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2 Supra, p.116 ff.Comp. R.Schlesinger's comments on this argument: Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe, London 1945, IX, f.g.

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4 Some details in my: Reflections on Federations and Federalism Int. Pol. Science Review, 1984, vol.5, no 4 p.3.

LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS

AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK

EDITED BY

Alan N. Katz



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SPAIN

Thomas D. Lancaster and Micheal W. Giles

Liberalization and political reform of authoritarian regimes institutionally and procedurally alter many aspects of a political system. As an integral part of both authoritarian and liberal democratic political systems, democratic reform undoubtedly affects the judiciary's conduct and operations in many ways. Spain's recent transition from Franco's authoritarian regime to the present constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government is no exception. Franco's death in November 1975 ushered in the beginning of the end of nearly four decades of traditional military dictatorship in Spain. This authoritarian rule followed Spain's previous attempt at liberal democracy during the Second Republic of 1931–1939 and its violent end with Franco's Nationalist victory in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939. Following Franco's demise and the restoration of the monarchy, King Juan Carlos I initially guided and then oversaw the dismantling of many Francoist political and governmental institutions and the creation, under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez and others, of a new system for liberal democratic behavior. The major events of Spain's peaceful transition to democracy such as the Referendum on Political Reform in 1976, the general elections of 1977, 1979, and 1982, the Socialist victory in this last election, and the process of devolution for Spain's many regions have all received a great deal of attention.[1] However, the impact of these democratic reforms on the country's judicial system has largely been neglected. This chapter seeks to address this shortcoming through consideration of contemporary Spain's judicial structures and processes.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The Spanish legal system, like most European legal systems, bears the essential traits and history of a civil law system. While owing a small debt to pre-Roman customary law, Muslim law, and Germanic law, Roman law is the predominant element in the Spanish legal tradition. Between 200 B.C. and A.D. 400, Spain

was part of the Roman Empire and completely within its legal system. Even after the decline of Rome, the Roman legal tradition found expression in Spain through its incorporation in local codes. For example, Alphonsus X of Castile (1252–1282) had drafted a code of laws known as the *Siete Partidas*, which, while incorporating local law and custom, borrowed heavily from Roman law.[2] Ironically, the existence of major compilations like the Siete Partidas actually slowed the advance of the "rediscovered" Roman law during the Renaissance. While, in some areas of Europe, no body of systematic law existed to compete with the Roman law being taught in the Italian universities, this was not true in Spain. The modern period of Spanish law dates from Napoleon's invasion in 1808. Under the French influence, a codification of Spanish law was undertaken that, as the century progressed, saw the introduction of penal and civil codes and codes of commerce and procedure.

While the Spanish legal system falls in the mainstream of the civil tradition, it has two characteristics that somewhat differentiate it from other countries within that tradition. The first is the strong influence of the Catholic church. Perhaps no European country other than Italy has been as openly Catholic as Spain. The Catholic nature of Spain had been recognized in the Papal Concordat of 1753 and 1851 and reestablished with the Concordat of 1953. Spain has been a "confessional" state, with canon law, the law of the Roman Catholic church, being accepted as an area of public law. This influence is most apparent in family law, where the Spanish codes closely parallel the canon law. One example of this influence was the absence of divorce in Spain during the Franco period. The Spanish marriage was exclusive and indissoluble.[3] This influence could also be seen in the existence of "private crimes" such as adultery.[4] The reintroduction of democracy to Spain has altered the position of the Catholic church. First, the democratic Constitution of 1978 is religiously neutral. This has resulted in opposition to its passage by some more conservative elements of the Catholic hierarchy. Second, the Concordat of 1953 was replaced in 1979 by a new set of agreements, which, while recognizing the Roman Catholic church and the inviolability of its places of worship, phases out direct subsidies for the church and makes religious instruction in the schools noncompulsory.[5] In an earlier agreement, King Juan Carlos I gave up his traditional right to appoint bishops, and the Vatican agreed to allow priests and nuns to be tried in civil courts without the requirement of authorization from their superiors. While these changes reduce the formal role of the church, Catholic moralism remains an important force on both the Spanish legal and political systems.

A second differentiating characteristic of the Spanish legal tradition is the impact of regionalism and Spain's strong regional diversity. Several regions of Spain not only have a political history and presence but also distinct legal traditions. The laws unique to these regions are referred to as "foral laws." The existence of foral laws delayed the adoption of a national civil code throughout most of the nineteenth century. A code was only accepted after it made specific provision for the inclusion of appendices of the foral laws of each of the regions.

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There was little initial movement toward the compilation of these laws. By 1926, only the Foral Appendix for Aragon had been completed. The creation of the Commission General de Codificación brought renewed activity in the 1960s. In 1959, the compilation for Vizcaya and Alava was enacted followed by that for Catalunya in 1960, the Baleares Islands in 1961, Galicia in 1963, and a revision of the appendix for Aragon in 1967.[6] The foral laws provide a symbol of regional culture and heritage and an element of diversity not common to highly centralized civil law systems.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT SYSTEM

The Ordinary Courts

While the governmental structure of Spain has shifted since 1800 between monarchy, dictatorship, republicanism, and a parliamentary monarchy, the structure of the "ordinary" courts has remained relatively unchanged. By "ordinary" we refer to courts of general civil and criminal jurisdiction. At the pinnacle of the national court structure is the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was created in its present form in 1812. The Supreme Court sits in Madrid and has appellate jurisdiction throughout the country. The Court is divided into chambers (Salas de Justicia) each of which specializes in an area of litigation. The first chamber hears civil appeals, the second criminal appeals; the third, fourth, and fifth appeals from special administrative tribunals; and the sixth appeals from the labor courts—Magistraturas de Trabajo.

In civil law countries, the courts generally have eschewed the role of creating law. Legal creativity is attributed to the legislature and its code-making power. While Spain follows this tradition, there is also a clear recognition that the Spanish Supreme Court is a source of law. The Spanish Civil Code specifically recognizes "general principles of law" as a suitable subsidiary source of law in the absence of specific provisions of the code.[7] Moreover, judicial practices that are based on several decisions of the Supreme Court assume the character of legal doctrine (doctrina legal) or, more recently, jurisprudencia. The failure of a lower court to follow these "doctrines" is the basis for appeal to the Supreme Court.[8] Quite expectedly, two-thirds of the lower court judges indicate that they give decisive value to previous decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court when deciding similar cases.[9] The Spanish Supreme Court's decisions thus have a value in some ways like "precedent" in the American and British systems.

The Supreme Court resolves the cases it hears on appeal in one of two ways. If the appeal is based on the contention that a lower court has misapplied a precedent of the Supreme Court, then upon finding for the appellant, the Court may resentence the case. However, if the appeal rests on a procedural or formal matter, the Court will "quash" the decision and return the case to the lower court for resentencing.[10]

The Supreme Court may also meet as a combined court or Plenary Tribunal.

In this configuration, it serves as a court of first instance to try persons of high rank such as politicians, judges, and civil servants. It has rarely performed this function.

The Supreme Court receives cases on appeal from Territorial and Provincial Audiencias. Territorial Audiencias serve geographic areas that correspond to the original kingdoms of Spain. They serve one or more provinces and are headed by a president. The Provincial Audiencias serve subdivisions of the original kingdoms structured to maintain population balance among the courts. A National Audiencia was created in 1977. The audiencias are collegial courts with cases heard by three judge panels. Both Territorial and Provincial Audiencias serve as appellate courts in civil matters for cases previously heard in municipal and regional courts and Courts of First Instance and as trial courts in serious criminal cases. Spain's Constitution of 1978 provides for a jury trial in audiencia courts. Territorial Audiencias also have administrative courts that hear charges raised against local governmental authorities and nonministerial national officials.

Each province is divided into smaller areas served by trial courts—Juez de Partido. These are referred to as Courts of First Instance and Instruction. In civil matters, they are presided over by a single judge. Because Spanish civil procedure is essentially adversarial, the burden of activity rests with the parties while the judge plays a relatively passive role. The procedure differs from that of an American court in two principal ways. First, jury trials are not available in civil cases. Second, although there is an opportunity for an oral hearing, proceedings tend to be more written than oral.[11] Appeal of the judge's decision in civil cases lies with the Provincial or Territorial Audiencia. Table 1 reflects the increasing use of Spain's civil court system, particularly following the end of authoritarian rule.

Spanish criminal procedure is more in the Continental accusatorial than the Anglo-American adversarial mode. In criminal cases, the judge of the Court of First Instance and Instruction acts as an examining magistrate or a court of inquiry. In this capacity, the judge directs the police investigation, takes depositions of witnesses, orders tests, and makes decisions about pretrial detention of the defendant. Upon a finding of sufficient evidence to do so, the judge forwards the case and the written record or "Sumario" to the Provincial Audiencia for trial and sentencing.[12]

The Special Courts

In addition to the national courts, the municipal areas are served by district courts and justices of the peace. These courts hear cases involving minor criminal and civil matters. They have a centralized structure so that a judge may advance ultimately to the position of a judge of a municipal court in one of the large cities.

In addition to the ordinary courts, the Spanish legal system has special tribunals with jurisdiction over limited subject areas. The Franco regime heavily used

Table 1
Contested Civil Law Cases in S

Year	District Courts & of the Peace	Courts First Entered
1970	150,184	78,448
1971	156,035	84,960
1972	144,624	78,660
1973	135,092	75,984
1974	140,925	93,510
1975	139,265	107,786
1976	146,350	114,328
1977	148,572	128,530
1978	149,661	145,933
1979	141,859	150,290

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Table 1
Contested Civil Law Cases in Spain

Year	District Courts & of the Peace	Courts of First Instance		Territorial Audiencias		Supreme Court First Sala
		Entered	Resolved	Entered	Resolved	Sentences
1970	150,184	78,448	72,220	6412	6402	726
1971	156,035	84,960	82,499	7342	7099	707
1972	144,624	78,660	78,342	7469	7336	628
1973	135,092	75,984	74,171	7260	7309	624
1974	140,925	93,510	87,030	7308	7017	659
1975	139,265	107,786	99,602	7910	7220	580
1976	146,350	114,328	108,143	9055	7602	580
1977	148,572	128,530	117,440	10,132	8362	506
1978	149,661	145,933	133,907	11,616	8802	538
1979	141,859	150,290	137,022	10,837	9171	512

Source: Estadisticas Judiciales de Espana, 1979. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 1983, pages 19,20,21.

such courts, and, while many have been eliminated since the transition to democracy, others still operate. For example, special tribunals such as the labor courts—magistraturas de trabajo—which hear disputes between employees and management, have become increasingly important, as seen in Tables 2 and 3, following Spain's transition and the greater role played by trade unions and other labor organizations. Other special tribunals in Spain include the Tribunal for the Defense of Commercial Competition, which hears complaints concerning antitrust and monopolistic practices, and the self-descriptive Tribunals for Currency Crimes and Tribunal for Customs and Tariffs Infractions. Of most interest are the special courts to hear administrative complaints and the past use of military and other special tribunals for political purposes. The Constitutional Court, which may be considered a "special court," is of sufficient importance to be discussed separately.

In the United States, complaints against the rules, procedures, or actions of administrative agencies, with some exceptions and restrictions, are within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts either at the trial court or the appellate levels. In civil law countries, special administrative tribunals exist to hear such disputes. In some systems, these administrative tribunals are staffed by civil servants and are subject to the appellate supervision of an administrative body. In France,

Table 2
Labor Court Caseloads in Spain

Year	Provincial Magistrates		Central Court of Labour		Supreme Court 6th Sala	
	Matters presented	Matters decided	Appeals entered	Appeals resolved	Infraction of law	Form of lawbreaking
1971	135,074	129,511	5,036	5,199	745	658
1972	131,518	137,672	6,773	5,853	863	914
1973	126,250	129,538	6,493	6,007	699	1,492
1974	171,250	154,870	6,188	6,133	799	1,336
1975	192,838	183,488	6,643	6,493	653	983
1976	259,306	236,077	8,554	6,720	751	1,306
1977	291,909	256,630	11,104	7,197	876	705
1978	385,219	378,117	0,935	7,857	986	1,947
1979	428,913	419,783	12,604	8,145	999	3,600

Source: Estadisticas Judiciales de Espana, 1979. Madrid: INE, 1983, pages 95, 96.

Table 3
Labor Justice in Spain, Decisions by Provincial Magistrates of Labor

Year	Favorable to to the Worker	Partially Favorable to the Worker	Disfavorable to the Worker
1971	31,311	6,012	19,245
1972	33,712	5,530	24,789
1973	32,792	5,482	22,348
1974	38,802	6,693	22,361
1975	45,796	6,798	25,918
1976	64,115	11,636	35,264
1977	74,996	4,722	38,106
1978	97,261	7,029	43,886
1979	105,469	39,167	10,566

Source: Estadisticas Judiciales de Espana, 1979. Madrid: INE, 1983, page 95.

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for example, appeals in the administrative court system lie ultimately with the Council of State. The French administrative tribunals are staffed by civil servants and graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA). The members of the Council of State are drawn similarly from the elite of the civil service and from the ENA. In Spain, on the other hand, since 1956 the administrative courts have been incorporated as a special chamber of the audiencias with appeals to the Supreme Court. Table 4 shows the increasing work of these administrative courts in Spain. Judges of the courts are career jurists recruited in the same manner as the judges of the ordinary courts, but they specialize in administrative law. Thus, unlike most of its neighbors, Spain's administrative tribunals are integrated with and under the supervision of the ordinary courts.[13]

The military courts constitute a set of special tribunals which have been the focus of controversy in the past. The jurisdiction of military courts is traditionally limited to members of the military. Even under conditions of civil war, the United States Supreme Court refused to extend the jurisdiction of military courts to include civilians, so long as the ordinary courts were open and operative.[14] However, this has not been the history of Spanish military courts. Even prior to the rise of Franco, the jurisdiction of Spanish military courts was extended to offenses such as insulting the military in print, support of separatist ideas, and armed robberies, regardless of whether committed by a member of the military or a civilian. Military jurisdiction was restricted under the short-lived Second Republic but expanded again under Franco.[15] Thus, historically the Spanish military courts have been a tool for oppression of potential civilian political opposition. As might be expected, Spain's democratic Constitution of 1978 limits "the exercise of military jurisdiction strictly within military limits."[16]

In 1963, the Franco government created the Court of Public Order. It was staffed with judges drawn from the ordinary courts and had jurisdiction over cases involving subversion defined broadly, for example, rebellion and illegal propaganda. In its first decade, the court heard an estimated 1,000 cases. It was created with the support of the military, which sought to reduce the highly controversial use of military courts to try civilians. The creation of the Court of Public Order appears to have achieved that effect. Between 1955 and 1958, 40 percent of the defendants in military trials were civilians, but between 1963 and 1966 this figure was only 22 percent. The Court of Public Order, as a patently political court, was a focal point of protest. In 1970, the Spanish bar took the unprecedented step of unanimously approving a statement calling for its dissolution.[17] The Court of Public Order was eliminated with the adoption of Spain's 1978 Constitution.

Constitutional Court

The major judicial innovation of the post-Franco Constitution is the creation of the Constitutional Court. Ordinary civil law courts have always been concerned primarily with private law disputes between private parties and not with issues

Table 4
Administrative Justice in Spain: Classification of Decisions of the Territorial Audiencias

Year	Totally favorable to Administration	Partially favorable to Administration	Disfavorable to the Administration
1970	1698 46.7%	511 14.1%	1428 39.3%
1971	1911 50.8%	505 13.4%	1345 35.8%
1972	2080 54.7%	599 15.7%	1127 29.6%
1973	1795 44.3%	669 16.5%	1592 39.3%
1974	3046 48.6%	790 12.6%	2435 38.8%
1975	2314 47.8%	604 12.5%	1928 39.8%
1976	3857 50.5%	820 10.7%	2966 38.8%
1977	4121 52.0%	1030 13.0%	2775 35.0%
1978	4115 55.5%	1020 13.7%	2288 30.8%
1979	4172 53.2%	1026 13.1%	2650 33.8%
Total	29,109 50.9%	7,574 13.2%	20,534 35.9%

Source: Adapted from Estadisticas Judiciales de Espana, 1979. Madrid : INE, 1983, page 76.

of public law. The constitutionality of a state or federal statute in the United States may be the subject of a case before an ordinary court, while civil law systems' ordinary courts traditionally have not performed this function. Since World War II, several European countries have attempted to deal with the issue of the constitutionality of government statutes and actions by the creation of special "constitutional" courts with the power of some form of judicial review. The creation of the Spanish Constitutional Court follows this trend.

The Constitutional Court has twelve members with each judge serving a nine-year term. This even number of judges makes it more difficult to reach a decision, reflecting the Constituent Cortes' conservative orientation and desire to force judicial "votes of quality." The Court's nomination and selection process pro-

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vides a broad institutional base. The Spanish Cortes (parliament) proposes eight judges, four each from the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. The government proposes two members and the General Council of the Judiciary the other two. Nominations in both parliamentary houses require a three-fifths majority. This selection requirement mandates extensive political or ideological agreement since a three-fifths majority generally requires looking beyond the governmental majority and into the opposition. To be eligible for the Court, an individual must be a jurist of known competence with at least fifteen years of experience. Thus, the nomination process assures the legitimacy and independence of the Constitutional Court by assuring the selection of respected jurists while placing the selection of its members in the hands of politically oriented institutions. The latter slowly adjusts the Court, and its interpretation of the Constitution, to prevalent political and ideological orientations.

The Constitutional Court is an autonomous institution that finances itself through its own budget and administers its own expenditures. The Court also establishes its own internal organization and operations.[18] The president is the Court's highest representative and is elected for a three-year term. The Court hears some appeals of constitutionality and questions of prior control of constitutionality as a twelve judge tribunal or plenum. For cases involving *amparo* appeals, the Court divides into two *salas* with six judges each. The president of the Constitutional Court chairs one sala and the vice-president the other. The Court further divides itself into sections, each with three judges. The sections study the admissibility of appeals and handle the normal office work. The plenum can claim for itself any matter before the Court and not relegate it to one of the smaller, internal subdivisions.

The Constitutional Court hears three types of cases. First, and perhaps most importantly, are cases involving the constitutionality of the statutes, organic laws, and general laws of the General Cortes, the laws of the Autonomous Communities, and executive acts with legal force such as decree-laws. Legislative decrees and the rules of legislative assemblies are also subject to the review of the Court on the issue of constitutionality. The question of constitutionality can reach the Court through three mechanisms. The first mechanism is the *unconstitutionality appeal*. This is a direct petition to the Court to annul a law by declaring it to be contrary to the Constitution. Those able to petition the Court in this manner are the president of the government, the public defender, fifty members of the Congress of Deputies, fifty senators, the executives of the Autonomous Communities, and, when applicable, their assemblies. The unconstitutionality appeal must be made within three months after the law's publication, unlike France where action must be taken prior to promulgation. An unconstitutionality appeal generally does not suspend implementation of a law. The national government, however, may suspend resolutions and laws passed by the Autonomous Communities.[19] The national government in this manner may counter or oppose the Autonomous Communities, legally binding dispositions and resolutions. In such a situation, the Constitutional Court must either ratify or lift

the suspension within five months. This judicial procedure permits greater central governmental control and facilitates legal and political uniformity among the Autonomous Communities. This central government prerogative grants political controls comparable to Italian law concerning its regional government.

A second mechanism through which cases of unconstitutionality reach the Constitutional Court is that of *prior control of constitutionality*. When considering a law or treaty under this procedure, the Constitutional Court performs a function similar to that of the "advisory opinions" offered by some state supreme courts in the United States and the highest courts of countries such as Canada but not by the United States Supreme Court. While an appeal of unconstitutionality is made after a law is promulgated, prior control of constitutionality enables the Constitutional Court to intervene and consider the conformity of an act to the Constitution prior to its enactment. The Constitutional Court exercises prior control over international treaties and organic laws such as the autonomy statutes and other disputes over the state's territorial structure. The Court has precedent over other official bodies through prior control even though an issue or conflict has not been submitted to it for consent. Such prior control fixes responsibility for international treaties with the Court even though the government or either parliamentary house has already fully considered the treaty's text. With regard to organic laws, prior control of unconstitutionality strives to avoid disruption of the Spanish judiciary's regular and consistent application of the law through the introduction of norms that will assuredly produce unconstitutional consequences. Prior control in this area, for example, seeks to avoid a situation of having to declare unconstitutional an autonomy statute already approved in a referendum or an organic law already in force regulating the electoral system.

The third mechanism through which the issue of constitutionality can be brought before the Constitutional Court is by the request of a lower court judge. This is a process analogous to the *certification of questions* in the United States, where a federal court of appeal, when confronted with a particularly difficult constitutional question, can send or certify the question to the U. S. Supreme Court for resolution while retaining the case. In Spain, either party involved in the case may solicit the judge or the judge may decide on his own to forward a question of constitutionality pertinent to a case to the Constitutional Court for resolution. When this occurs, the trial recesses until the higher court rules on the question. This procedure is similar to that employed in Italy, although in the latter country the lower court serves as an institutional "screen" for the higher court, determining if the case contains enough prima facie evidence of unconstitutionality to merit access to the Constitutional Court.[20]

The second type of case that is heard by the Constitutional Court involves appeals in the form of *recurso de amparo*. Hispanic public law generally incorporates the amparo appeal. Spain's Republican Constitution of 1931 and the contemporary Constitution of 1978 contain this judicial procedure. It is also available in Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Mexico, which drew upon Hispanic legal traditions.[21] The amparo appeal provides the means

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for securing relief against an abuse of power or a violation of guaranteed rights. The appeal alleges the argument that an "act or decree authorizing the abuse was contrary to the constitution."[22] The amparo appeal is key to the system of guarantees of constitutionality that established fundamental individual rights and liberties, seeking to protect against the violation of rights recognized in Articles 14 through 29 of the 1978 Constitution and objections of conscience.[23]

The recurso de amparo would appear to be a vehicle for private parties to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. This, however, is not the case. The amparo appeal is "a protection against the application of law, not an action against the law itself."[24] The Court may find that the application of a law is unconstitutional, but its finding is only applicable to the instant case and is not generalizable to other cases. The issue of the constitutionality of a law can only be addressed when raised as an appeal of unconstitutionality by an appropriate government official or body.[25]

The third type of case which is heard by the Constitutional Court involves conflicts of power between the different state institutions and bodies. These include conflicts between the state and one of the Autonomous Communities, between the various Autonomous Communities, and between the institutions of the central state, for example, the government, Congress, Senate, and General Council of the Judiciary. In these cases, the Constitutional Court serves to delimit the scope of the powers of the state and of the Autonomous Communities.[26] This type of case is comparable to the "original jurisdiction" of the United States Supreme Court, which extends inter alia to cases between the states and between the states and the federal government. Like the founding fathers of the United States, the authors of the 1978 Spanish Constitution saw the need for a judicial arbiter for the conflicts that inevitably arise in constitutional systems with multiple components.

THE PERSONNEL OF THE LAW

Legal Practitioners

The legal profession of Spain is divided into three components. One component is the notaries. These have nothing in common but their name with the notary public found in the United States. Notaries are required to possess a university law degree. Virtually all transactions that require forms, for example, contracts and property sales, must be executed by a notary. The notaries are, however, not involved in litigation or case preparation. The second component of the legal profession is the lawyer who is comparable to the solicitor in the British system or an American office lawyer. They perform most tasks attributed to lawyers including case preparation but do not file court cases or plead them. This role is confined to the third component of the profession, the procurator (*procuradores*). Legal practitioners in Spain, both lawyers and procurators, must hold a Bachelor of Laws degree. Such degrees may be earned at any of the university

law schools in Spain. Legal curricula are uniform throughout the country, with the exception of such special subjects as the foral laws. The five-year program includes required courses like constitutional, civil, commercial, procedural, criminal, administrative, labor, and international law as well as subjects such as the philosophy and history of law and Roman law.[27] In 1972–1973, the number of students in law schools was 26,744 or 12.7 percent of all university students.[28] Spanish attorneys must also be members of a local Colegio de Abogados. Such a Bar Association exists in every Spanish city with either a Territorial or Provincial Audiencia. The bars assign their members cases and advances their professional interests and concerns.

Judges

Since the 1800s, the Spanish judiciary has formed a largely self-regulating corps of nonpolitical civil servants. Beginning in 1869, the government's discretion to appoint judges was limited by the introduction of competitive examinations (*oposiciones*) to determie eligibility to serve in the judiciary. The examination is open to all students with a bachelor's degree in law from a Spanish university. Students receiving acceptable scores are admitted to a special Judicial School for training. Upon graduation, they are appointed judges and assigned to Courts of First Instance and Instruction. Those scoring the highest on their exams receive first choice of assignment, which may mean placement in a large city rather than a small town. After the initial assignment, promotion to the position of magistrate and to a higher court is based largely on seniority. Transfers to more desirable locations, such as major cities, are also determined by the seniority of those applying for the position. Principal positions such as president of the Supreme Court and its salas are filled by the General Council of the Judiciary. The Spanish judiciary is thus essentially an independent professional civil service with protections and career patterns similar to those of other civil servants. This is stressed by their official title of *funcionario de la carrera judicial* or official of the judicial career.[29]

While sharing many characteristics with civil servants, judges consider themselves as a separate group. Spanish judges see themselves as having higher prestige, doing more important work, and having better preparation for their role than is the case for top civil servants and the legal profession generally. Surveys of members of the Spanish civil service, however, suggest that the high esteem with which the judges hold themselves is not shared by nonlegal social groups.[30] Moreover, when asked about the prominence of several local officials, respondents to a survey in Andalusia gave the least prominence and visibility to judges. The judiciary fell behind the mayor, president of the local farmers union, and the local priest in involvement and prominence.[31] Thus, while a self-conceived elite within the members of the legal community, the Spanish judiciary is far closer to civil servants or bureaucrats than to the socially prestigious and prominent position attributed to judges in Britain and the United States.

The Public Prosecutor

The Constitution grants the government the power to name the state's public prosecutors following consultation with the General Council of the Judiciary. Prosecutors are selected from among the graduates of the Judicial School. Judges and prosecutors share a common educational background but separate careers. The public prosecutor's organization in the judiciary is hierarchical and dependent on the judiciary.[32] The prosecutor has responsibility to promote "judicial action in the defense of the rule of law, of citizens' rights and of the public interest as safeguarded by law . . . as well as that of protecting the independence of the Courts and securing through them the satisfaction of social interest."[33] The prosecutor's most routine and visible role is in criminal cases. The public prosecutor enters this process at the trial before the Audiencia. Since the evidence is contained in the examining judge's *sumario* and the magistrates of the Audiencia question the witness and control the conduct of the trial, the role of the prosecutor is essentially argument (*calificación*) for the government's case.

Defender of the People

The Constitution of 1978 created for the first time in Spain an ombudsmanlike position.[34] The Defender's raison d'être is the protection of the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed to the people under the new constitution. He protects such rights against intrusions by both administrative and legislative activities, including laws of the Cortes. In its capacity as watchdog of administrative activity, the Defender has open access to public administrative offices at all levels for purposes of obtaining data and other documentation and conducting interviews, with restrictions only in the area of national defense.

The Office of the Defender of the People is a high commission of the Spanish Parliament. The Defender is ultimately accountable to the Cortes in the sense that it selects him and can remove him for failure to fulfill his job. In initiating investigative action, the Defender must act through a parliamentarian, but the Organic Law on the Defender of the People left open the possibility of access to the Defender through interest groups.[35] In other aspects, his position is autonomous. The Defender's office must annually submit a report of its activities to the Cortes.

The Defender possesses several important powers and has several instruments at his disposal. He can recommend changes to administrative authorities and bureaucrats upon completion of his office's investigation. If the administrative authorities ignore such recommendations, the Public Defender can call this to the attention of the appropriate ministry and, if necessary, can ultimately make it known to the General Cortes. In another area, the Defender of the People may place amparo appeals and appeals of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. This power of appeals permits the Defender to respond to the concern of individual citizens, defusing in part criticisms over limitations on individual

initiative. In the initial years of this office's existence, the power of appeal has not been heavily utilized. The major question in the development of the Defender of the People, therefore, is one of access.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

"Judicial independence" refers to the degree to which judges make decisions based on their own judgments and interpretations of the law, unfettered by the wishes or desires of other political and legal actors.[36] When courts have "decisional" independence, they are free to decide cases in ways contrary to the interest of the government without fear of retribution to themselves or to the court system. Related to decisional independence is "structural" independence. Courts are structurally independent to the degree that judges' salaries, promotions, and assignments and court powers and budgets are not subject to control by nonjudicial, that is, political, actors. For example, judges who serve at the pleasure of the government have less structural independence than judges who enjoy life-time appointments. It is presumed that structural independence facilitates decisional independence. That is, judges who are structurally insulated from the control of others are expected to be less influenced by nonjudicial considerations in reaching their decisions.

The presence of judicial independence would appear to be particularly troublesome to an authoritarian regime. However, under Franco, the ordinary courts enjoyed a large measure of both structural and decisional independence. As indicated above, the selection, training, placement, promotion, and discipline of Spanish judges is largely based on professional, nonpolitical criteria. This structural insulation of the ordinary courts from politics predated Franco and was continued during his regime. Only for the post of magistrate of the Supreme Court and presidents of Chambers of the Supreme Court and of Audiencias did the Ministry of Justice under Franco exercise discretionary power in selection. But even in these cases, the procedure was to base the decision on information and recommendations provided by the Judicial Council. The latter was composed of senior members of the judiciary.[37]

Determining whether courts exercise decisional independence is more difficult than determining if they are structurally independent. Two possible indicators of the presence of decisional independence are the presence of a widespread perception that the courts are independent and the willingness of the courts to decide cases against the government.[38] In terms of both indicators, perceptions and action, there is evidence to support the decisional independence of the ordinary courts under Franco. Zaragoza, in a survey of Madrid lawyers during the Franco period, found that over 60 percent consider judges to enjoy "much" or "considerable" independence. Only 16 percent thought that judges had no independence. It is noteworthy that this vision of a largely independent judiciary was held by lawyers of virtually all political persuasions.[39] In a survey of judges conducted in 1973, Toharia found that one-third mentioned an interest in pro-

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tecting the rights and freedoms of citizens as a desirable characteristic of the ideal judge.[40] Toharia also found a great deal of attitudinal diversity concerning social and political issues such as the death penalty, the application of foral laws, and the use of languages other than Castillian in court. Thus, under Franco the Spanish judiciary was perceived to be independent by relevant actors and, in fact, was an attitudinally diverse body that did not mirror the regime's conservative views. The ordinary courts also did not appear to be particularly sympathetic to the central administration. Between 1960 and 1968, an average of 84 percent of appealed sentences in civil cases were confirmed by the Supreme Court, but only about 43 percent of the decisions taken by the central administration during this period were upheld by the Court. And, as previously seen in Table 4, Spain's administrative courts ruled against the central government 35.9 percent of the time in the 1970s. Thus, under Franco one could take the government to court with the expectation of winning.

How was judicial independence maintained within an authoritarian regime? The answer to this apparent anomally lies in the restricted jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Civil law courts deal mainly with disputes between private parties and are not involved in public law disputes that may threaten the power and maintenance of a political regime. Moreover, politically sensitive issues were placed within the jurisdiction of specialized courts whose judges did not enjoy structural independence. As previously indicated, the most volative and threatening cases to the regime were tried by military courts or the Court of Public Order not the ordinary courts. As one Spanish magistrate stated at the time, "they [the courts] are independent *because* they are powerless."[41]

The elimination under the democratic Constitution of 1978 of the civilian jurisdiction of the military courts and the Court of Public Order has resulted in the ordinary courts receiving jurisdiction over politically sensitive cases. Moreover, the new constitution, by authorizing a habeus corpus procedure, has positioned the ordinary courts as a restraint on the arbitrary exercise of police power. Through this procedure, the police can be forced to convince a magistrate of the lawfulness of an arrest or to release the prisoner. The increased power of the ordinary courts under the 1978 Constitution has brought increased concern to insure the structural independence and, hopefully, the decisional independence of the Spanish judiciary. If the courts were independent under Franco because they were powerless, there is concern that an increase in judicial power not necessitate a loss of independence in democratic Spain.

The issue of judicial independence produced a polemical debate during the writing of the Constitution in the Constituent Cortes.[42] In the Congressional Committee's deliberations, for example, the major parties basically agreed on the desire for a relatively independent judiciary. Specification of that desire, however, bred difficulties. The right-of-center parties, the Democratic Center Union (Unioń de Centra Democrático—UCD) and the Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP), pushed, on the one hand, for a complete division between the judiciary and politics. They argued, among other things, that judges should be

required to sever all association with political parties and trade unions and should be ineligible to hold another public office. The political left-of-center, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Española—PSOE) and the Communist party (Partido Communista de España—PCE), and some regional parties argued, on the other hand, that no one is above politics and that all individuals, including judges, should possess the right to associate freely. The political left-of-center couched this argument in the public's right to know a judge's political and ideological orientation. Given their numerical weakness in the Constituent Cortes, the Left lost this political debate.

The principle of judicial independence is reiterated specifically in Article 117 of the 1978 Constitution, stating that judicial members "shall be independent and irremovable during their term in office.[43] Moreover, the Constitution states that members of the judiciary are ineligible to serve as deputies or senators in any elected legislative assembly or deliberative political body, or in "a management role in a political party or trade union."[44] The major alteration in the Constitution designed to enhance judicial independence, however, has been the creation of the General Council of the Judiciary. The General Council is the Spanish judiciary's self-administrative body. The Council has assumed the tasks previously performed by the Judicial Council, the Supreme Court sitting in Sala de Govierno, and by the Ministry of Justice. It manages all matters of selection, education, nomination, promotion, administration, and discipline of the judges, magistrates, and judicial secretaries.[45] The General Council has no precedent in Spain, and its creation appears to have been inspired by Italy's Superior Council of Magistrates and, less so, the French Constitution of 1958. It remains in many aspects, however, similar to Britain's ancient Inns of Court, which admit, organize, discipline, and educate bar members and jealously guard the tradition and independence of the British legal and judicial professions.[46]

The General Council consists of the president of the Supreme Court and twenty appointed members. All serve five-year terms. The president of the Supreme Court serves as president of the Council. He is elected by a majority vote of the plenum of the Council for a five-year term, to which he may be reelected once. The president represents the General Council in the Supreme Court and coordinates the Council's activities. The twenty members formally appointed by the king constitute the plenum of the Council. Twelve come from a national electoral college comprised of all active judges and magistrates from all legal categories. The Congress of Deputies and the Senate each propose four of the remaining eight members from renowned lawyers and judges with more than fifteen years legal experience. The General Council is a fully protected constitutional body and is not subordinate to other bodies. The Council's acts, when signed by the king and the minister of justice, possess the power of a Royal Pronouncement.

The Council participates in several functions central to the judiciary. First, it participates in the selection process for other judicial bodies. For example, it nominates the president of the Supreme Court and the presidents of the various salas of the Supreme Court. It also nominates two judges of the Constitutional

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Court and is consulted in the nomination of the state's Public Prosecutor.[47] Second, it has the last word in choosing other judicial personnel, being responsible for supplying judges, their nominations, promotions, and discipline.[48] Third, the Council generally determines the qualifications for judicial office. Fourth, the Council has authority over the establishment and modification of the judicial staff of judges, magistrates, secretaries, and other personnel, their salary system, and the initiation of laws affecting the functioning of judicial bodies concerned with personnel and services. Fifth, the Council must annually submit to the Cortes and the government a "State of the Judiciary" report concerning the affairs and activities of judicial administration in Spain. Finally, as previously indicated, the General Council may raise questions in the Constitutional Court over conflicts of power between the government and either house of Parliament.[49]

Courts and the Future of Democracy in Spain

The Spanish courts have, in the past, played a minor role in elaborating the law within the interstices of the code. In contrast, the new Constitution relies heavily on the courts to protect individual rights from government oppression and to assure the integrity of the document itself. In these innovations, Spain follows a trend in other European civil law countries to provide mechanisms to protect individual rights and to restrain government. The creation of institutions, however, does not assure the performance of expected functions. In most civil law countries where ordinary courts are given a power comparable to judicial review in the United States, they rarely employ it. This role is simply alien to the bureaucratic nature of the civil law judge. Even where special "constitutional" courts are created, performance varies widely. For example, both Germany and Italy created such courts as they emerged from authoritarianism at the end of World War II. The German Federal Constitutional Court (*bundesverfassungsgericht*) has proven to be an active and assertive court, averaging 1,500 cases a year. Most of the statutes nullified have been minor, but on one occasion the Court has taken a controversial position. For example, in 1975 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a federal law permitting abortions on request during the first three months of pregnancy holding that the law violated the constitutional provision to "the right to life."[50] The Italian Constitutional Court (*Corte Costituzionale*) presents a considerable contrast. The caseload of that court has averaged less than two hundred per year and, while asserting itself on occasion, the Constitutional Court has not been a major force in Italian political life. Its orders have met with spotty compliance and the Court has preferred to exhort rather than to give orders.[51]

What role will the Spanish courts take in the exercise of their newly granted powers? Will they take an assertive role similar to that of the West German courts or will the weight of tradition restrain the exercise of judicial powers as in Italy? It is too early to answer definitively this question, but initial indications

are that the courts will be willing to play their role in assuring the role of law in the new political system.

The Constitutional Court clearly reveals the Spanish court system's independence and its emerging activism. Three examples that have affected public policy merit mention. First, the Constitutional Court ruled in late 1983 with a tie vote that was decided with a vote by the president, that the Socialist government's law appropriating the enormous holding company RUMASA was constitutional. This decision, followed by several others concerning questions of unconstitutionality placed before it by judges of First Instance, helped delineate state appropriation of private companies as a legal economic policy instrument in Spain. Second, on August 10, 1983, the Constitutional Court invalidated, in full or in part, fourteen of the thirty-eight articles of the highly controversial 1982 Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA). The Constitutional Court ruled that certain provisions of LOAPA violated the Constitution, including those which stated that the state's legal norms have automatic precedence over the autonomous regions' and that regional public administrative officials should be nominated by Madrid rather than regionally recruited. Such legal decisions place the Court in the middle of the delicate and difficult devolution process in Spain with its center-peripheral political battles. Third, the Constitutional Court's declaration of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero España) government's "Partial Depenalization of Abortion" law as unconstitutional in April 1985 demonstrated that it is quite willing to rule against the national government no matter which party is in power and that it will directly tackle controversial social policies in addition to economic and political issues.[52]

Several examples also highlight other courts' definition of their role in democratic Spain. First, in a direct break with practices of authoritarian Spain, the 1978 Constitution's Article 17 mandates a habeas corpus procedure and other preventions against unlawful detention. On February 23, 1984, the Parliament's Congress of Deputies passed an Organic Law regulating habeas corpus procedures. The fact that on December 5, 1984, Madrid authorities were forced to release a prisoner under a writ of habeas corpus for illegal detention bodes well for an active use of such guarantees.[53] Second, the reform of the Code of Military Justice in 1980 made possible the Supreme Court's review of sentences of the military officers convicted in the February 23, 1981, coup attempt. After hearing the government's appeal concerning the light sentences, the Supreme Court extended the time to be served in twenty-one of twenty-three of the cases and upheld the thirty-year sentences of the coup's two key leaders. The high court also imposed prison sentences on eight Civil Guard lieutenants who had previously been "acquitted on the grounds of due obedience to superior orders."[54] Such decisions not only signify increased civil control over the military in democratic Spain, but also exemplifies the court system's increasing importance and legitimacy as an adjudicator of system-threatening conflicts and challenges. A third example of the Spanish courts emerging role as protector of democracy concerns the operation of political parties. Herri Batasuna is a radical leftist

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2. R. David and J. E. C.
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3. M. Fraga Iribarne, *Ge*
Españoles, 1967), p. 46; and
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4. Toharia, "The Spanish

5. See L. Boetsch, "The
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6. Toharia, "The Spanish

7. Fraga, "General Introd
Major Legal Systems, p. 141.

8. David and Brierley, *Ma*
to Spanish Law, p. 40.

party closely linked with a Basque terrorist group that seeks independence from Spain. Despite the party's antisystem stance, Courts of First Instance have twice rejected requests to declare Herri Batasuna illegal.[55] Thus, while it is too early to make a definitive judgment, the Spanish judicial system, at many different levels, appears to be willing to assert its new powers to protect the norms of individual freedoms and liberal democracy.

NOTES

The University Research Committee of Emory University provided Thomas D. Lancaster with research support through a 1984 Summer Fellowship. The authors wish to thank Professor Xavier Arbos for his helpful comments on this chapter.

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5. See L. Boetsch, "The Church in Spanish Politics," in T. D. Lancaster and G. Prevost, eds., *Politics and Change in Spain* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

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7. Fraga, "General Introduction to Spanish Law," p. 17; and David and Brierley, *Major Legal Systems*, p. 141.

8. David and Brierley, *Major Legal Systems*, p. 132; and Fraga, *General Introduction to Spanish Law*, p. 40.

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13. David and Brierley, *Major Legal Systems*, p. 125.
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29. Toharia, "The Spanish Judiciary," p. 32.
30. Ibid., pp. 126–28.
31. Ibid., p. 267.
32. Article 124.2 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978.
33. Article 124.
34. Article 54 creates the institution and outlines its function. Article 70 establishes his incompatibility with either being a senator or a deputy. Article 162 gives him legitimacy to place appeals of unconstitutionality and amparo appeals before the Constitutional Court.
35. Organic Law 3/81 of April 6, 1981, passed by the Chamber of Deputies on April 6, 1983.
36. Becker, *Comparative Judicial Politics*, p. 144.
37. Toharia, "The Spanish Judiciary," pp. 32, 381.
38. Becker, *Comparative Judicial Politics*, pp. 145–50.
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45. See Constitution Article
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46. G. C. Moodie, *The Gover*
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47. Article 159.1 of the Cons
48. L.O.C.G.P.J. (Ley Orgar
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49. Conforming with Article
50. H. J. Abraham, *The Judic*
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43. Article 159.5.

44. Article 159.4 and also 70.1. The Constitution is referring here specifically to members of the Constitutional Court, but it is generally extrapolated to mean all judiciary members.

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FRAGMENTATION AND TERRITORIALITY IN THE EUROPEAN STATE SYSTEM

by

L.J. Sharpe

Nuffield College

Oxford

For the IPSA Roundtable on 'Pluralism, Regionalism & Nationalism' Barcelona, June 25-28, 1987

Post-1945 Supra-National Institutions

Any discussion of territoriality and the national state in Western Europe must take cognisance of the remarkable array of inter-state cooperative institutions that have been created since the end of the Second World War. The most important example of such institutions is the European Economic Community (EEC) which is by far the most integrated, elaborate and independently powerful of all the regional nation state groupings in the world. It has its own elected parliament, the capacity to raise taxes in each member state, to impose legislation on them plus a supreme court to back up the supra-state power. Although primarily concerned with maintaining a heavily subsidized, protected market for agriculture which absorbs about 70 per cent of its expenditure, (including administration costs) it also imposes a high industrial tariff, ~~it~~ and has expanded its activities into other policy areas including industrial regeneration, regional aid and certain social policies. The EEC has also abolished passports between those member countries that have personal identity cards, and pursued with varying degrees of vigour the four freedoms: movement of goods, of labour, of services and of capital between member countries. The Community is, in short, a quasi-government with many of the features of a formal federation rather than a conventional regional trade cartel.(1)

It has recently expanded by adding three member states - Spain, Portugal and Greece - so that it now embraces the whole of Western Europe south of the Baltic, save Switzerland and Austria. This expansion makes it the most important trading entity in the world comprising a unified market of 320 million

high income population as compared with the U.S. market of 250 million and Japan's of 100 million. In order to weaken E.F.T.A., its one time rival, free trade agreements in industrial goods ~~it has~~ were also established with all the remaining West European states with the exception of Finland and Austria where commitments to the Eastern bloc preclude such association. Nor are EEC tentacles restricted to Western Europe since it has special trading relationships with East Germany (via West Germany) and with some of third world states, especially in French ex-colonial Africa, and with New Zealand.

The other West European supra-national organizations, some of which extend to other parts of the world, such as NATO, the Council of Europe, OECD, the West European Union and the European Courts of Justice, are individually nowhere near as important as the EEC, but we may say that viewing all of them together with the Community, Western Europe has experienced a degree of integration unparalled since the Holy Roman Empire.

It is important, however, not to confuse these remarkable developments with actual state formation. Joining a supra-national body like NATO or the EEC, despite the latters' quasi-governmental character, is not the same as being absorbed into another nation state. Absorption, even into a federation, has the effect on the absorbed state of exchanging one nationality for another, for it ceases to exist as a separate legal or political entity on the world stage. Once incorporated its' right to secession may be contested by force

of arms. Joining a supra-national body like the EEC or NATO obviously entails loss of sovereignty in some sectors to the joiner, but joining also enhances sovereignty in others. In any case, the right to secede could not be realistically contested since the EEC commands no armed forces. Nor in practice can supra national edicts be enforced if a state persists in ignoring them. Moreover, assessing the cumulative impact of the supra-national organizations of post-war Western Europe on member countries suggests that, far from detracting from individual member states' status quo national states, they have enhanced it. In other words, the integrative process in Western Europe has not been a zero sum game in terms of state autonomy and status but a positive sum game.

The net benefits of membership are most positive for the smaller member states simply because in supra-national organizations and some federal systems the most basic desideratum of representative democracy - the majority principle - has to be transposed to states from persons. Hence the smaller the state in terms of population the greater the gain it makes from joining supra-national organizations. In a more specific sense, small states are also disproportionately benefitted in supra-national organizations like the EEC since they are enabled to play a part on the world stage that would not be conceivable on their own. For example, when one of their representatives is Chairman of the EEC Commission. In the European context some of their most significant gains for the small states are probably in the

realm of defence. NATO certainly enables small states like the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg to enjoy a level of defence that they could not conceivably achieve unaided. If we regard the capacity to defend itself as the ultimate desideratum of the nation state, then such a gain for the small state considerably outweighs the relinquishment of complete control over the deployment of its own armed forces.

The circumstances in which the EEC and NATO were created were exceptional so there were also special gains to be made by some of the larger members of the Community from supra-national cooperation which offset the losses arising from small state gains just noted. Both NATO and the EEC were critical vehicles for the acceleration of the return of the two defeated nations of the Second World War - West Germany and Italy - to international respectability. Joining the EEC also enabled West Germany to return more swiftly as the dominant industrial exporter to its traditional markets in the Benelux countries.It would be extremely difficult to substantiate a claim that either had in any way diminished their resumption to normal nation statehood by having joined either NATO or the EEC. Similarly, the EEC seems to have an important ingredient in the resurgence of France to a status on the world stage higher than it has achieved for a century; not simply from the considerable economic gains to France as a major agriculture exporter derived from the peculiar, not to say bizarre, characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy, but also the psychological boost derived from the fact

that all the major EEC institutions are in francophone areas thus ensuring that French comes second only to the inevitable lingua franca of the Western world, English, as the working language of the EEC. Perhaps the most important symbol of the resurgence of the French state is its withdrawal from NATO and its maintenance of a wholly independent nuclear force. An intriguing possibility which underlnes the extent to which supra national bodies may enhance their members' autonomy; to be, that is, 'handmaidens of national ambition'(2) is the extent to which the gains made by France from the CAP enhanced its capacity to finance its independent deterrent.

The one large state for whom membership of the major West European supra-national organizations may not have been a positive sum game is the United Kingdom which is a member of NATO and is therefore required to deploy some of its armed forces furthest from home of all West European NATO members, but at the same time shoulders the considerable burden of financing a nuclear force of its own despite the fact that its participation in NATO assures it American nuclear protection. In addition, as one of the largest food importers in the world it suffers most from the effects of the CAP, at the latest estimate running at £3 billion in terms of lost manufacturing output and £6 billion in lost service sector output. Only West Germany comes anywhere near such losses,(3) whereas most of its former partners who remain in EFTA, enjoy the advantage of free trade agreements with the EEC for industrial goods, but shoulder none of the onerous burdens of the CAP.

All in all, remarkable and extensive as they are, the integrative institutions created in Western Europe since 1945 have done little to diminish the resilience of the nation

states from which those institutions have been formed; rather almost all of them have flourished since the Rome Treaty was signed in the mid-1950s. Indeed, if it were possible to net the effects of those institutions in terms of the loss or gain not simply in terms of state autonomy but in terms of economic advantage, it seems more than likely that the result would also be positive. The West European nation state, in short, is flourishing and such a conclusion is broadly in harmony with two other highly significant long term trends in the European state system.

The first is the apparently complete ending of individual state aggrandisement since 1945, at least in Western Europe. Every state however small has had its borders respected and the post war status quo has remained inviolate. In Eastern Europe the age-old tradition of the victor taking some of the vanquished's territory has still persisted and both Poland and Russia have made extensive territorial additions following the Second World Wars' end, especially the latter, which has annexed large tracts of Finland, Rumania and Poland as well as the whole of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. East Germany was also created out of what remained of the Eastern provinces of Germany. In Western Europe the story is dramatically different for no state frontier has been breached. France's attempt after the War to follow tradition and annexe the Saar came to nought with the requirement which its allies enforced on it to hold a referendum. The desire of many hungry Schlesswig Holsteiners' at the War's end to re-define themselves as Danes and join Denmark, the so-called 'bacon Danes', was also sat on firmly by the British occupying power.

Other attempts by individual states in Western Europe to extend their boundaries have been equally unsuccessful in the post-war period. Ireland has not so far succeeded in acquiring Northern Ireland, despite such acquisition being an objective laid down in its constitution. French territorial claims to the Channel Islands and the various threats from Paris to Monaco when General de Gaulle was President similarly have come to naught. Moreover, France lost the whole of Algeria in the 1950's despite designating it as an integral part of its national territory. Similarly, Yugoslavia also failed in its claim to Trieste and Greece lost in its bid to absorb Cyprus despite support from many Greek Cypriots who, ironically, then lost their own hegemony in Cyprus as a direct result of their Enosis aspirations. Austria, although making no formal claim, has made no secret of its desire to have the Alto Adige back, but it is safe to predict that this desire is likely to remain a forlorn one, especially since the Proporzpaket of 1972. Finally, Spain has yet to acquire Gibraltar despite making a number of moves, both diplomatic and economic, designed to that end. Territorial aggrandisement, at least for the foreseable future, is now it seems no longer possible for the West European state.

Long-term Fragmentation

The second, but more long term, trend in the European state system demonstrates even more clearly the resilience of the nation state, for Europe, like the world rest of the world, has be fragmenting into new states over the past

century or so. By the third quarter of the nineteenth century (1850-1875) the European nation state was largely set in the modern mould that is broadly recognizable today. This was the period when the foundations for a cohesive national community in each state were evolved. The primary underlying cause of this process was probably industrialization with its need for uniformity and an unencumbered market[4]. The technological binding element of this nation state founding process included the railways, the postal and telegraph systems and cheap newspapers. In addition, compulsory education was often established which re-enforced the consolidation of a uniform culture usually rooted in a single standard language. The growth of universal literacy that compulsory education wrought re-enforced the integrating process. Although limited by present day standards, the extension of the franchise which took place in many European states during this period also had cohesive effects in the sense that it steadily incorporated a increasing proportion of the population into the national political system. In many cases war also replenished the well springs of state patriotism.

However, the 1850-1875 period was not only the foundation building phase of many European states, it also marked the high tide of a lengthy and massive process of state consolidation. If we take 1500 (i.e. just before the onset of the Reformation) as broadly marking the beginning of the modern state formation process, there were at that date some five hundred more-or-less independent political units in

Europe;[5] by 1875 there were less than thirty. Although some fragmentation had occurred earlier in the century when Greece became a sovereign state in 1829 and Belgium followed in 1830, the consolidation of most of the Italian and German speaking areas into two new major states during the 1860's and 1870's meant that there has never been fewer European national states since 1875. Despite widespread assumptions about the inevitability of cross national integration under modern conditions[6] and the undoubted success of the supra-national institutional framework since 1950 in Western Europe, state formation in Europe as a whole over the period since 1875 has been a fairly continuous process of fragmentation. In short, fragmentation is as much one of the historical facts of the European state system over the last century as post Second World War West European integration. This curious duality is neatly symbolized by the fact the head-quarters of the EEC in Brussels is in the front line both geographically and politically of a fierce conflict between the Flemish and Walloons that has already in effect federalized the former unitary state of Belgium. This paper attempts to offer some explanation for the fragmentation aspects of this duality and to assess how far it is likely to continue.

The post-1875 fragmentation process in Europe began in 1878 when both Rumania and Serbia achieved something like independent status as the Ottoman Empire crumbled at its periphery. The whole period up to the present may be divided for convenience into three periods: 1875 to 1919; 1919 to

1945; and 1945 to the present, (see Table 1). In the first period, in addition to Rumania and Serbia, Norway eventually broke away from Sweden in 1905, and Bulgaria (in 1908) and Albania (in 1913) were two further fragments of the Ottoman Empire to achieve independence. In the second period (1919-1945) the new states were all in some sense the products of the First World War, two of them, - Czechoslovakia and Poland - were the direct outcome of the Versailles Treaty and four of the remainder were the result of the peripheral crumbling of the Russian Empire. In the case of Ireland its creation may be seen not so much as a crumbling of the British Empire, but, rather, the imperial homeland itself.

In the third period from 1945 to the present fragmentation has continued, but it has been for the most part of a markedly different character to that which preceded it. In population terms it has been very substantially less significant than in the preceeding periods and, with the exception of the creation of East Germany, it has occurred on the extreme periphery. In effect, seven new states have come into being though not all have yet been granted de jure status as states - Greek Cyprus, Turkish Cyprus, East Germany, the Faroes, Iceland, Malta and Algeria.

It could be argued that Algeria ought not to be included because it is geographically part of Africa. The only reason for its inclusion is that at the time it achieved its independence it was formally part of the national territory of France. The case for including Greenland is stronger still

Table 1: The Fragmentation of the European State System: New States Created Since 1875

States at 1875	Additions between 1875-1919	Additions between 1919-1945	Additions since 1945
Andorra	Albania	Czechoslovakia	Algeria
Austria-Hungary	Bulgaria	Estonia (2)	Greek Cyprus (3)
Belgium	Norway	Finland	Turkish Cyprus (3)
Denmark	Rumania	Hungary	East Germany
France	Serbia (1)	Latvia (2)	Faroes (4)
Germany	Montenegro (1)	Lithuania (2)	Greenland (4)
Greece		Poland	Iceland
Italy		Yugoslavia	Malta
Liechtenstein			
Luxembourg			
Monaco			
Netherlands			
Portugal			
Russia			
San Marino			
Spain			
Sweden			
Switzerland			
United Kingdom			
Vatican			
Net Running Totals			
20	26	30	38

(1) After 1919 absorbed into Yugoslavia

(2) Until 1945, thereafter annexed by Soviet Union

(3) Not yet recognized as separate states de jure

(4) Still retains a link with Denmark for foreign relations purposes

since although not part of the European isthmus, it is neither part of the American nor Arctic continents. Moreover, at the time of its independence in 1984 it was recognized to be part of the Danish state and therefore became part of the EEC. Account must also be taken of the re-absorption of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into Russia in 1945. That process constitutes a clear case of integration, but it was enforced integration: left to choose for themselves there is no reason to believe that they, like Finland, would not be independent states today. Overall, the degree of disintegration in Europe since 1875 may be summarized numerically thus: the 20 states of 1875 have become the 38 states of today. The 1875 total would have more than doubled had the three Baltic states not disappeared back into Russia from which the 1919 war with Poland had released them.

How do we account for this fragmentation process? The massive increase in the number of states outside Europe since 1945 is largely the result of decolonization and in any case has not led to any large increase in the number of separate units; for the most part the only change has been one of status. Why were the great states of Europe in 1875 - the epitomes of the modern national state - unable to manage their most fundamental task of all, namely that of safeguarding their own integrity? One explanation is fairly straightforward; some of the states founded after the First World War were the result of the Western Allies punishing the vanquished Central Powers by breaking them up. In a sense, the same applies to the creation of East Germany after the

Second World War. But this explanation accounts for only three of the 18 new states that have emerged since 1875; four, if we add the incorporation of Serbia and Montenegro to create present-day Yugoslavia. Clearly there must be other explanations and one is certainly the multi-cultural character of many European states in 1875. The potential for break-up, in other words, was quite high. As Gellner has pointed out, on a world view there is probably a ratio of 1 to 5 of actual states to potential states in terms of the number of ethnic and linguistic enclaves within existing states that orginally had just a good a claim to separate statehood as those which actually did become fully-fledged states.(7) Nielsson has provided one fairly rigorous method for estimating what the potential for new state formation is in Europe with his definition of the 'homogenous state'; that is to say one in which all members of an ethnic group reside in one state and form the overwhelming majority of the population of that state. This category Nielsson estimates to be as few as 31 on a world basis, of which only 12 are in Europe(8). The majority of European states (38-12=26) are thus in varying degrees multicultural. It follows that the potential in Western Europe for possibly doubling the present number of European states would not be an over estimate. Even Nielssons' less homogenous category where one group is only in a majority, adds but 8 to the group that may be deemed to be the least susceptible to fragmentation. So we are still left with 18 potential fragmentors.

Another reason for fragmentation is almost certainly geographical. Leaving aside the special case of East Germany, all seven of the new states created since 1945 (the last column of Table 1) are highly peripheral to their former host country. They also tend to be small, so their secession posed a much less serious problem for the integrity of the host state than might normally be the case. Moreover, all seven are really much closer to being colonies of the host state rather than an integral part of them. In short, the post-1945 fragmentation of Europe is very much in line with the post-colonial growth of the micro state generally throughout the world.(9)

Having divested themselves of some of their European based colonies, can we expect the multi-cultural states of Europe to yield any more new states? There remain one or two other possible candidates for secession since they fit the quasi-colony, remote island or enclave model. Gibraltar is one possibility, as are Madeira, the Canary Islands and the Azores. Even more speculatively, Corsica and Northern Ireland and, in a rather different category, the Basque provinces might be added to the list. These seven however, would seem to be the limit of further fragmentation for the foreseable future.

Barriers to Further Fragmentation

Further fragmentation is then, likely to be limited despite the extent of multiculturalism among European states. Such a prospect suggests that the question should not be why

existing states have fragmented over the past ninety years or so, but why they have not fragmented more. Why, that is, some national groups which at one stage had just as strong a claim to become state nations as others that did, remain as, usually diminishing, minorities within larger states? This is hardly a new question and this is not the place to essay a comprehensive answer; rather, we will be to try and pin down some of the more salient reasons for the relative cohesiveness of the modern European multicultural state.

The most immediately obvious reason is that some multicultural states are able to retain their cohesion by force. About half of East European states are clearly multicultural - Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and European Russia, the R.F.S.F.R. There can be little doubt that if these states tolerated the free expression by minorities of their aspirations, as do those of Western Europe, the European State system could look a great deal more fissiparous than it now does. There would therefore be considerably less reason to ask why some groups did not aspire to nation statehood. A second, fairly straightforward, reason why some groups have never managed to have their own state is because the groups' territory overlapped the boundaries of states that became firmly entrenched fairly early. The Basques fall into this category as do the Catalans, the Frisians, the Flemish, the Macedonians and the Slovenes. Perhaps, too do the Lapps and the Welsh. The reason for

placing the Welsh in this category is that the Northern extension of their territory in Strathclyde when eventually cut off from Wales by the English was completely absorbed into the majority culture by the somewhat more stringent assimilatory techniques of the Scottish Crown as compared with its English counterpart.

Doubtless with a longer historical perspective further examples of divided groups can be found among which would probably be the alemannisch - speaking group of Southern Germany who never managed to incorporate themselves into a single jurisdiction so that their distinctive German dialect could have been standardized into as separate a language as, say, modern Dutch thus forming a solid and lasting basis for a separate nation state. Indeed, transformation of the dialect into a written standard would not have been essential as the resilience of the various German Swiss dialects testifies which have flourished happily with hoch deutsch as the written standard. It must also be noted that given the existence of Luxembourg there is no reason why any of the small South German states that survived absorption by Prussia up to 1871 is not today a separate state.

It seems plausible to assume that early absorption into another state is likely to affect the capacity of a territorial group to sustain the capacity to break away and form its own state. But time alone does not account for the comparative smoothness of the absorption of the Nicoise or the Savoyards by France, a process that was as good as complete by 1900; that is to say a mere forty years. The Bretons, by

contrast, have been part of the French state since 1532 and it could not be said that they had yet been fully assimilated. Time alone would certainly not explain Southern Irelands' successful breakaway in 1922 after at least four centuries of being within the British Crown. Nor can time explain Norways' eventual independence in 1905, or Iceland's in 1945.

Any explanation for the relative success of some territorial groups over others would need to cope with the complex interplay of language, geography and historical accident in which almost every generalization would be forced to give way to stubborn sui generis facts. However, if we move to the realm of ideas it seems likely that we can make a little more explanatory progress, for it is ideology as much as objective facts which first seems to set in train the notion that states should embrace a single ethnic, or language, or culture group.

Before the Enlightenment it was allegiance to the monarch or his equivalent that formed the basis of popular allegiance to the state and this form of loyalty was usually buttressed by religion. The American and French revolutions, especially the latter, introduced the entirely new concept of progressive nationalism which combined national consciousness with popular sovereignty. In this way the two most potent political doctrines of the modern era were placed in harness. Equality of man, so the doctrine asserted, is a natural right so popular sovereignty was the only basis of the just state and as such it had priority over any other kind of state. Self

government for a given 'people' was therefore essential and rule on any other group was alien rule. Who the given 'people' were raised difficulties, but not insuperable ones for armed with a moral emblem of egalitarianism the expansion of the progressive nationalist state into the backwaters of religious or monarchical reaction, or peripheral minorities became almost a duty. Linguistic and cultural differences were secondary, the primary task was rescuing the common man from the toils of autocracy and obscurantism.

The rapid integration of Savoy and Nice by France plus its unflagging hostility to its own peripheral minority movements, and the United States' absorption of half a continent, underline the critical importance of progressive nationalism in a state that had fully embraced its tenets if not having actually invented them. The Swedish, Danish and British monarchies, by contrast, despite their transformation into 'constitutional monarchies', had never - could never - embrace fully the notion central to progressive nationalism that the state (in the U.S. the 'Union') has a legitimacy that always overides sectional interests because it is the supreme expression of the popular will. Although Irish independence was not achieved until after a short geurilla war, in terms of the sheer capacity to wage war, there is no reason why the British government did not seek to employ the full panoply of military might to crush the Irish nationalists as Lincoln had crushed the South, or as France attempted to crush the Algerians. Equally, the Danish Crown never attempted to resolve by force

the progressive disintegration of the extended Danish state, first by the secession of Iceland, then the Faroes and finally Greenland. Precisely the same considerations apply to the entirely peaceful transition of Norway into a separate state.

Lurking in the progressive nationalist ideology there was an additional argument for scale that gave added impetus to the expansionary momentum provided by progressive nationalism itself. Smallness as well as monarchy and religion became almost synomous with reaction. Petty principalities with their irrational boundaries and absurd pretentions, so this aspect of progressive nationalism ran, had deliberately entrapped their populations in societies that were increasingly meaningless in a world of increasing literacy, cheap newspapers, all weather roads, canals and, later railways and the postal telegraph.

The argument for scale was given a sharper cutting edge in the United States where the largest polity possible was inherently superior to the smaller because, as Madison had claimed turning orthodox democratic theory on its head, the larger the state the greater the number of factions thereby ensuring that no one faction could gain hegemony and undermine democracy. Seeking the wider union thus became a sacrosanct element in American nationalism and the annexation of half of Mexico could be interpreted, and is still today so interpreted, as a second 'War of Independence'.

The scale aspect of progressive nationalism gave an added rationale to expansion and correspondingly undermined potential political fragmentation, but it had to be refined.

There are, as we have noted, many 'peoples' in Europe all of which could claim, at least to their own satisfaction, an impeccable right to self government. During the second half of the nineteenth century many groups proceeded to assert those rights, but not surprisingly, with much less regard for the inherent progressivity of the larger state than for self determination. Viewed against the oppressive empires in which many of these aspirant groups found themselves - Austrian, Russian and Ottoman - they may have regarded mere self-determination as progressive enough in itself. However, territory is a fixed resource so state formation must always be a zero sum game. If Europe was not to return to a new version of medieval fragmentation, there had to be in the eyes of all good progressive nationalist ideologists and their allies some restriction on the number of players. So a compromise thesis had to be devised which made it possible to draw a distinction between some progressive nationalisms and others. In this way it was possible to specify some national aspirations as being legitimate, and more important, others as being illegimate.

As Gellner points out, the search for a rationale for making such a distinction homed in on high culture. Only nationalism that derived from a recorded culture with international status were qualified to make the progressive nationalist appeal.(10) The claims of other nationalisms which lacked such cultural credentials were therefore illegitimate.(11) Bereft as they were of a Bach, Dürer or

Schiller or a Michaelangelo, Dante or Monteverdi such groups' best hope was to abandon their presumption and remain in a bigger battalion. Mill has stated this superior and inferior nations doctrine best:

> 'Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed by another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its disadvantage. Nobody can suppose it is not more beneficial to a Breton or a Basque of the French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people - to be members of the French nationality, ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander, as members of the British Nation.'(12)

The idea of respectable and unrespectable nationalism was not confined to progressive liberals like Mill. Socialists, including the revolutionary wing, vied with the liberals and radicals in their enthusiasm for progressive nationalism and were just as keen to draw a distinction between national movements that deserved support and those which did not. Marx and Engels, for example, were unstinting pan-Germans who applauded Bismark's crushing of the Danes. According to Engels, this was because Denmark reflected something called 'Scandinavianism' which was merely,

> 'enthusiasm for a brutal, dirty piratical Old-Nordic nationality which is incapable for expressing its profound thoughts and feelings in words but certainly can in deeds, namely, in brutality towards women, perpetual drunkeness and alternate tear-sodden sentimentality and berserk fury'(13)

Both Marx and Engels were also ready to dress up what may have been no more than a conventional Germany bourgeois distaste for Slavs as a rather more palatable abhorence of Czarist Russia. For the left, the inferiority of unrespectable nationalism could be given a tincture of intellectual respectability by two qualifications. There was first that made by Engels, who in addition to his superior-inferior culture prejudice,(14) drew a distinction between 'historic' nations such as the Poles or the Scots who had enjoyed a previous existence running their own states and geschichtlosen völker like the Basques and the Croats who had not. According to Engels,

> 'These debris of a nation crushed by the advance of history ..... rejects of people ..... the fanatical supporters of counter-revolution and will remain so until their complete extermination or denationalization'.(15)

The sheer vehemence of Engels' distaste for some ethnic minorities needs perhaps some explanation for it may be surmised that its cause lies not simply in a preference for the bigger battalions, but also to a somewhat more justifiable disgust for some peripheral nationalist groups some of whom are still active today. That is to say Engels was also rejecting that peculiarly unbridled, amoral and atavistic quality of the extremist wings of such groups which seems to have its origins in a combination of militant post-Reformation Catholicism and a long-standing deeply felt desire for an independent state. It is to be discerned today in the IRA of

Northern Ireland, the Ustashi movement of the Croats, the Basque ETA group and the extremist wing of Flemish nationalism. It also coloured pre-war Polish nationalism.

Another argument that was deployed by the liberals and the left to justify their respectable and unrespectable nationalism claim, especially in relation to the incipient nationalist movements of peripheral Europe, was the argument that, via pan-slavism, all slav national movements were tainted by Russian absolutism thereby rendering them distinctly inferior to both the grossdeutsch and the kleindeutsch movements.(16) Compared with the dark world of Eastern Europe, German and Italian unification movements were progressive struggles, especially the latter. The Poles, as usual, posed a special problem, for their aspirations could not be easily countenanced insofar as they undermined the unification of all German speakers. On the other hand, as enemies of the Russian tyrant, they were also clearly on the side of the angels. But the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Bretons and the Irish were another matter; the left's view was broadly the same as the liberals, such peripheral cultures had a clear choice between joining the forces of light and progressivity by shuffling off their arcane habits, or remaining sulking on their respective rocks.

None of this special pleading could cut much ice east of the Oder-Neisse, for whereas it was possible in the West to resist some national movements by a version of the high culture or the geschichtlosen völk arguments, few comparable distinctions could be claimed in Eastern Europe where there were no internationally recognized high prestige cultures so

that everyone was sulking on their respective rocks, so to speak. And if some sort of cultural one-upmanship was to be invoked, almost all the East European national struggles could claim the cultural emblem of Christianity against the Turkish infidel. Moreover, even if we leave out the special, highly autocratic, case of the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires were singularly inept at learning the minimal lessons of progressive nationalism. So, whereas the French could acculturate the Flemish of Westhoek, the Savoyards, the Nicoise and Alsations with relative success, - the latter case being particularly galling to the Germans who could never quite understand why 50,000 Alsations left Alsace Lorraine after 1871 - the two East European empires set their faces against the key ingredients of progressive nationalism namely, a populist national myth combined with secularization, free education and a wide suffrage. Rather, they relied on the traditional modes for cementing their heterogenous parts; that is to say, monarchical allegiance supplemented by religion.

Fragmentation in Eastern Europe was, then, less restricted than in the West so that as Walker Connor has claimed, by the end of the Second World War, 'all but three of the states of Europe were either the result of ethnic-national aspirations, or had lost substantial territory because of them.'(17) Nevertheless Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have survived as highly heterogenous entitites as, too, have both Bulgaria, with its Turkish, Macedonian and Gypsy minorities, and Romania with its ever smouldering minority of Hungarians. However as we have noted, their survival almost certainly owes

as much to their autocratic forms of government since 1945 as it does to any willingness on the part of the various ethnic minority groups to forgo the right to self-determination. It seems likely that all four countries would have been subject to considerable ethnic minority pressure, especially Yugoslavia, had they joined the Western camp. Even so, given the appeal of progressive nationalism and its adaptation to the needs of all national groups, the decomposition of the multi-cultural states of Western Europe has been less than might be expected.

Are there, therefore, any further reasons why fragmentation has not been more extensive in the multi-cultural West European states? Geography could be one factor for, the special case of East Germany apart, all the post-1945 breakaways have been islands (see Table 1). But other islands, even those that have a separate, or nearly separate, language from the majority mainland culture, have remained within their respective national folds. Examples include Corsica, the Balearics, Sardinia and Sicily, however it is of some significance that all of them, plus the Åland islands of Finland, the Portuguese islands of Madeira and the Azores together the British Channel islands, the Isle of Man and the Shetlands, all enjoy a degree of regional autonomy that is greater than that accorded to mainland sub-national areas. Clearly islands can make a difference and it seems likely that if an island demands some recognition of its separateness, or insists on retaining ancient autonomy rights, the central

state will accede to such demands since to do so does not set the kind of precedent that a similar concession to a part of the mainland would.

One undoubtedly retarding influence on the development of nationalist movements and perhaps even state fragmentation, was the Second World War which was generally interpreted as being largely the product of hyper-nationalism. In the immediate post-war period nationalism was thus very much out of favour. To talk of ethnic differences among the victor states was in a sense to suggest the dark world of facism. The language of post-war democracy, on the other hand, in sharp contrast to the post-First World War period, was concerned with cross-national cooperation and integration. However, it must not be forgotten (but usually is) that although the liberal internationalism that emerged from the ashes of the Second World War may have chosen to interpret Nazism as simply a perverted form of nationalism, it was nonetheless also another form of internationalism, albeit in a negative sense. Nazi and fascist internationalism was derived from its implacable hostility to international Communism, in theory at least, the most internationalist doctrine of all for it explicitly predicts the ultimate demise of all states. Up to the Russian recapture of Stalingrad, or thereabouts, there can be no doubt that international facism was considerably more popular throughout Europe than either of its rivals, so popular indeed that the dominant European religion - Catholicism secured a Concordat with Nazi Germany in 1938

having already signed one with Fascist Italy a decade earlier. France, the European leader of the democratic revolution in the nineteenth century, succombed in 1940 to Petain's version of Fascism not only without a shot but with positive enthusiasm. Comparisons are difficult but some further indication of the relative popularity of international facism can be gained from the sheer size of the volunteer Blue Division which fought alongside the Wehrmacht on the Russian Front. The sheer scale of non-German participation in the war against Russia can to some extent appreciated if the Division is compared with its principle rivals' efforts to wage war on a voluntary basis, the much smaller International Brigades that fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War.

If it be objected that facisms' anti-communism does not qualify it to be a truly internationalist doctrine then it has to be recognized that the post-war popularity of liberal internationalism in Western Europe also owed and still owes a very great deal to antipathy towards international Communism. Millions of Europeans who had spent a life time fighting liberalism, and democracy for that matter, found themselves soon after the war's end re-cast as democratic freedom fighters simply because the old enemy remained the same.

The return to liberal internationalism after 1945 and its concomitant doctrine of the essential progressiveness of the larger unit provided fertile soil for the birth of the EEC. It was not a period that was propitious for the assertion of sub-state nationalism and a decent interval had to elapse

before regional ethnic movements could 'come out'. Some of them, notably the Flemish, the Bretons and the Alsations had the additional handicap of being tainted with war-time collaboration.

Such accusations may not have always ben justified, but the French case the state had a moral edge over its peripheries since it was a victor nation in a war where the vanquished had perpetrated the Jewish holocaust, the slaughter of half a million Gypsies and the wanton murder of millions of Polish and Russian non-combatants. Not only did this morally superior status influence the French state's hegemony over its own minorities after 1944, but it probably influenced Italy - a vanquished nation - in its decision to grant a special autonomous status to the Provençal-speaking minority of the Val d'Aosta in 1946. The adoption of French as an official language of government in Luxembourg was also probably a product of this phenomenon and it further probably breathed new life into the hegemony of the French language and the Walloon minority in Belgium. It is possible that the surprising vehemence of the francophone movement of the Bernese Jura owed at least some of its origins to belief re-enforced by the War that French is a morally superior language to German. It is not entirely inconceivable that France's moral edge just after the War might have enabled it to retain the Saarland had its occupation not been so insensitive and rigid.

It is such considerations which remind us that few national conflicts escape being interpreted in a form which makes it possible to identify one side's interests as being superior to the others. The human spirit perhaps, certainly the modern academic spirit, it seems, baulks at the possibility that national conflicts may be simply assertions of one interest against another without anything more, or less, to commend them and which may be only resolvable by force. Such a dark world is not congenial to modern social science which much prefers to root itself in rational motivation and causality or a moral imperative. National or ethnic conflicts are therefore usually interpreted in terms of some value other than mere self-interest, such as equality, fairness, or historical priority. In the nineteenth century as we saw earlier, the transposed values were high culture, or popular sovereignty.

In the post Second World war period the most popular transposed value has been equality. In this way a conflict between, say, a minority periphery and the majority core becomes 'horizontalized' in a quasi-Marxist form with the peripheral minority cast in the role of the oppressed working class in a 'colonial' relationship with the core.(18) Whether such horizontalization accurately portrays the conflict need not detain us except to question how far a territorial group, however much poorer per capita on average than the majority core, can be treated as a homogenous entity in economic terms, least of all how such inequality can be interpreted in neo-Marxian terms.(19)

The key aspect in this context of the transposition process is that it can make some difference to the success of a group's aspirations. For example, although there have been no state boundary changes in Western Europe since 1945, the possibility of some sort of accommodation being achieved to meet the Irish Republic's aspiration to absorb Northern Ireland is considerably strengthened because that aspiration still tends to be seen as a form of de-colonization whereas the Protestant majority's desire to remain seems to have no supporters outside the U.K. and precious few within it. Similarly, had post-war Yugoslavia opted for its present position of non-alignment earlier, in 1945 say,its chances of absorbing Trieste a few years later would have been immeasurably greater.

To take two non-European examples; only an ex-colonial state like India could have annexed Goa by force, itself still a colony of Portugal, with barely a squeak of international disapproval. Similarly because China remains antogonistic to the Soviet Union no one seems to object to it absorbing both Macao and Hong Hong without even a semblance of consultation of their respective populations. The UK's willingness to support China's claim to Hong Kong irrespective of its inhabitants wishes could not contrast more sharply with its resistance to the claims of Argentina to the Falklands which are always voiced in the name of its inhabitants.

~~There remains one further reason why there may have been less fragmentation among the multicultural states of Europe than might have been expected, and that is the power of what may be called the prevailing 'anti-fragmentation' ideology~~

The Integrative Ideology

There remains one further reason why there may have been less fragmentation amont the multicultural states of Europe than might have been expected to be considered. This is the power of what may be called the prevailing 'anti-fragmentation', or integrative, ideology that underpins the modern democratic state over and above the sense of loyalty and patriotism. This ideology has a number of components not least of which is an all-pervading antipathy to regional ethnic nationalism since it seems to infringe a fundamental assumption of Western democracy, namely, the supremacy of the individual. One of the primal tenets of modern representative democracy is that government is the product of individual choices; choices that are usually based more or less on rational self interest. Government is the instrumentality for giving effect to those interests. Nationalism as a basis for the normal internal politics of the state, by contrast, seems to undermine the concept of the freely choosing individual and the neutral want-satisfying governmental apparatus, by substituting choices based not on natural self interest, or justice, but on prejudice. Regional nationalism poses a threat since it invests government within the state with qualities that transcend its want satisfying role. Green has summarised this objection to peripheral nationalism concisely:

> 'Nationalities put givens into the problems of boundary choice; they elevate substantive and transcendental goals above instrumental rationality; they blur the focus of the individual.'(20)

A version of progressive nationalism is the second ingredient of the integrative ethos of modern democracy. Briefly, it is the popular sovereignty and common citizenship element of progressive nationalism that is influential. Democratic states, so this component argues, ought to command the allegiance of its citizens since the people cannot revolt against themselves. As a working democracy the state is based on consent; if locationally specific groups want changes they have the ballot box at their disposal like everyone else. This assumption may also have strong 'end state' overtones: modern representative democracy has over time ironed out its early imperfections. Above all, the franchise is as universal as it can ever be. When viewed against the world at large and Eastern Europe and the USSR in particular the 'famous 22' advanced Western democracies now stand as probably close to being the best that can be achieved. To want to put all this at risk merely to satisfy some kind of irrational and unmalleable prejudice based on some dubious theory of racial difference is misguided if not malign.

The third element in the anti-fragmentation or integration ideology of the modern democratic state is the doctrine of liberal internationalism itself. This identifies any voluntary consolidation of the existing state system favourably, at least in theory, since it may be seen as a step in the direction of the ultimate ideal of a world state. Such an outcome is rarely ardently sought by the majority, but it is vaguely preferred because it seems to be in harmony with

the times and with technology - the 'ever shrinking world' so beloved by the media. The creation of new states, by contrast, is seen as going against the grain in a world that is being progressively and irrevocably integrated anyway.

Such a world state suitably placed in the future is also a vague but popular ideal because all the worst wars, and certainly the two world wars of the twentieth century, arose from conflicts between nation states. If such states disappeared it follows that the potential for armed conflict would diminish correspondingly, if not disappear altogether. Any fragmentation of the existing state system is therefore a deleterious step since it would be adding to the potential sources of conflict.

The fourth element of the integrative ethos is derived from neo-classical economic theory and is closely akin to the first concerning the primordality of the individual. From the premise that if individual utilities are to be maximized the market must be as wide as possible, it argues that the nation state, indeed, any institution that impedes rational choice, is therefore less preferable to a world market.(21) All nation states are potential constrictions on the free operation of the market, either in terms of their capacity to substitute national prejudice for rationality in individual choice, or in terms of limiting the territorial operation of the market by establishing jurisdictional boundaries, or 'discontinuities'. Given such premises, it is hardly surprising that neo-classical theory has always been strongly associated with free trade and the sworn enemy of

'protectionism' especially sometimes solely, where it manifests itself in the price mechanism. It has also been equally strongly associated with supra-national economic treaties such as GATT.

Neo classical theory is also sympathetic to regional trading cartels like the EEC since they can be interpreted as a stepping stone to a world market system freed from the incubus of the State. This seems to be the explanation for the curious locution whereby EEC tariffs are rarely if ever identified as being 'protectionist' or 'mercantilist', whereas the individual state tariffs they replaced always are. In this way the real problems that the EEC poses for those who seek some sort of world order are greatly glossed over. The abolition of the national state in the name of the even larger and more powerful state is, after all, a somewhat improbable step to world government, or a world free trade system.

The very success of the EEC is curiously enough itself a powerful symbolic re-enforcement of the validity of the integration ethos in Western Europe in all of its elements that we have briefly outlined. This is not to say in the everyday politics of the multi-cultural states that the power of the ethos to resist fissiparious tendencies is spelt out in such formal terms, but it does express itself as a generalized, perhaps necessarily inchoate, belief that the wave of the future lies in the direction of consolidation rather than fragmentation; a belief made all the more attractive by its promise of an end to all wars and the concomitant imagery of being on all fours with technological forces,friendship rather than chauvinism, of persuasion rather

than force; the lion laying down with the lamb, hands across the sea, and so on.

The insistence of neo-classical theory on the primordiality of the market over the state is perhaps the most profoundly influential of the four elements in what we have called the anti-fragmentation ethos because it is in harmony with the dominant mode of modern representative democracy in that it elevates the economic over the political. Such elevation is of supreme importance in the politics of consumption which tend to dominate present day democracies where the pursuit of material self interest has become almost a mass imperative such that every major public policy requires an economic rationale to render it legitimate. If the decentralization of the allocatory process, even more outright secession, can be shown to be economically deleterious, and under the terms of the theory both must be since they create another discontinuity and thus an impediment to rational individual choice, then the case for maintaining the existing state order and resisting change is immensely strengthened. The argument, we may presume, is all the more powerful and its appeal all the wider because it does not in any sense involve merely asserting a nasty big nationalism against a nasty little one but, rather, 'internationalism' and 'rationality' against 'prejudice' and 'chauvinism'.

These are some of the powerful negative qualities of the neo-classical dimension of the anti-fragmentation ethos as it gets transmuted into the real world of practical politics. It likely that the power of the theory is further enhanced in a period of world economic recession that began in the early

1970s. Here lies a likely source of the steady decline in regional nationalism in Western Europe since the mid 1970s, especially in the peripheral regions that are economically poorer and more vulnerable than the core.(22) Although not by any means all separatist in intent, these regional movements constituted the biggest threat to the integrity of the multi-cultural states of Western Europe in the modern era. However, such movements may need to be seen as essentially vulnerable in times of economic recession since the bulk of their support, like the bulk of the general population, are unlikely to favour institutional change that would put the economy at risk. Their interest in regional nationalism is essentially in terms of consumption, that is to say voting for a national movement, singing national songs having the regional language officially recognized, perhaps wearing national costume or insignia. Such activities may have important psychic rewards since they are ways of asserting personal identity in a situation where such identity is under threat, without changing fundamentally the allocatory process:

> 'Ethnicity may be regarded as a search for roots, for identity, for the creation of a Gemeinschaft in the midst of Gesellschaft, for checking social atomisation in a rapidly urbanizing environment. The increasing emphasis on ethnic identity can be interpreted as a self-protective response to the increasing homogeneity of modern life.'(23)

The activists and leaders of ethnic movements, by contrast, are investment nationalists for they do seek to change the allocatory institutions possibly to the point of

separation. No inhibitions are felt about the economic consequences of such change, rather, allocatory institutional change may be seen as leading to the enhancement of the regional economy. In short, the investment nationalists do not believe that the economy is beyond their reach, but that they have the capacity to change it in their favour. Alternatively they may even adhere to the modern heresy that the economy does not matter.(24) In the second case the investment nationalist takes on the role of inconoclast in the modern democratic state, but neither position is in any sense popular since the economy is not only the first consideration for the majority, it is not thought of as being susceptible to fundamental change by the polity, least of all an economically backward periphery. Its condition may be ameliorated but not changed: we are all prisoners, so this argument runs of 'world economic forces'. That is to say, the regions economic backwardness is seen as a necessary consequence of the logic of such forces, and if these forces are in recession the consumption nationalists in the peripheral region will desert the regional investment nationalists and the nationalist cause.

If we return to our starting point which was, why have the multi-cultural states stayed intact, the primordality of the market ideology that pervades the politics of all Western states may be one of the most important elements in the answer. An equally important element may be concessions made by the central state to appease peripheral consumption nationalism by often symbolic changes which recognize the peripheral regions' sense of difference but have no impact on the economic order and certainly do not involve the integrity

of the state. The official recognition of the minority language in the schools, in the courts and in local government is one of the most common symbolic concessions. This technique seems to have gone furthest in the U.K. where in Wales there is even a separate Welsh language T.V.channel. According to Rokkan and Urwin it is more than any other European minority language group has achieved.(25) All Welsh road signs are also bi-lingual and the major units of local government - the counties - now have Welsh names.

In addition, Scotland, Northern Ireland as well as Wales have a disproportinate allocation of seats in the House of Commons as compared with England. All three also compete as separate teams in international sport as if they were separate countries.(26) This last concession, which is unique, is likely to be of immense importance for consumption nationalism since it may provide precisely the psychic rewards of identity assertion for which it yearns. In combination these concessions by the U.K. government may explain why no institutional changes have been felt to be necessary in terms of the devolution of political power to the regions, despite having national parties which actually win seats in the national legislature and at one stage posed a real threat to the traditional parties.

Another possible response by the central state designed to appease consumption nationalism to be considered is the creation of an intermediate or meso level of elected government. In the long term it might turn out to be the most important reason why the multi-cultural states of Western Europe have remained largely quiescent.

Meso Governments

It must be noted at the outset that regional nationalism is not the only reason for the widespread creation of meso governments in Western Europe for there seem to be quite strong administrative-cum-functional imperatives too, especially in those countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and possibly Greece) that have a napoleonic state structure entailing a uniform unit of local government, prefects and centre-to-periphery functional hierarchies of central civil servants for local service delivery within uniform administrative districts. In these states, the post-war modernization of local government itself was never attempted. In the non-napoleonic group (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, U.K. and West Germany), by contrast, extensive re-structuring of local government has been undertaken. The aim was to create larger units to cope with enhanced service loads and with urbanization. The napoleonic group have instead tended to leave the basic local government structure intact and superimposed on it a new level of regional government which can achieve the new functional tasks that the re-structuring of the local government level has achieved in the non-napoleonic states.

It seems likely that the napoleonic group have taken the regional path to local government modernization so consistently because of the power of political and bureaucratic interests to resist change since they have a strong stake in the traditional communal structure. It is

this venerable and outdated structure and its functional incapacity that gives the outstationed central bureaucrats their raison d'etre. Making the system more functionally effective by restructuring on the North European model would therefore undermine their position and possibly their jobs. The Mayor, as the executive and symbolic head of his commune with often quasi-monarchical continuity in office can, when mobilized collectively as a national pressure group, also provide a formidable force opposing local government reorganization. Unhibited as he will be by any requirement that the commune he is defending need be functionally appropriate also strenthens his resistance. In France the commune can further enhance its capacity to defend the status quo by colonising the centre via the cumul des mandats. In Italy a comparable conduit to the centre for the localities is provided by the party.

Given such formidable adversaries, the centre's only recourse is to leave the basic local government structure largely intact, the only exception being Belgium where the communes were reduced in number by a third. Inserting a meso tier thus became a much more attractive option than attacking local government head on. At the same time the new meso government provides other advantages for local elites, not least the multiplication of political offices, whereas local government modernization inevitably reduces them. Like all such structural changes, relatively short-term political considerations will have played a part also. In the Italian case, for example, the final creation of a nationwide meso

system in the early 1970s was precipitated by the need to provide a consolation prize for the P.C.I. in order to cement a national coalition. There is also the likelihood that political symbolism played a part. This seems particularly likely in the French case, where the incoming socialists in 1981 wished to demonstrate their distaste for the centralism of Gaullism and live up to their new-found reputation, when out of power nationally but often in power locally, as the champion of the localities.

The motives for creating a meso tier of government are then mixed, but there can be no doubt that meeting regional aspirations was one of them especially in the cases of Belgium and Spain where the need to appease regional feeling seems to have been paramount. It remains to be seen how successful the new regional governments will be in satisfying peripheral consumption nationalism. For investment nationalists such decentralization of power may feed the aspiration for even more devolution and perhaps in a few cases outright separation.

The precise future of the new meso governments is therefore difficult to predict, but it needs to be re-emphasized that for the list of reasons we have rehearsed the general disposition of unitary state citizens and elites and especially the majority in the core, is to view anything that looks like entailing the decentralization of a sizeable chunk of political power with apprehension as somehow cutting across the grain of what seems to be the weltanschauung of integration. Perhaps there may be other basic popular

predispositions that could limit the ambit of the new meso governments. For example, the unified hierarchy is a powerful model in the popular mind in traditionally unitary states that have no experience of shared sovereignty. Simplicity is probably one of its major assets and when it is surmounted by a strong and highly visible executive, the unitary model comes close to looking like a single will - perhaps the most appealing and comprehensible of all command systems and one that corresponds to the average man's experience in everyday life. In short, in the normal course of events, unitary states have great difficulty in decentralizing themselves without extremely powerful political reasons. The slowness with which Spain has extended regional government after the initial creations in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia offers a possible example of this phenomenon. Anyone who doubts the traumas that the mere contemplation of regional decentralization can have in a unitary state should read the Parliamentary debates over the Devolution Bill in the U.K. and the letter columns of the Times over the period 1977-79.

All in all, any predictions about the future fragmentation of the state system in Western Europe has to recognize that a number of fairly formidable barriers to such a process are still operative, not least of which seems to be the post-oil shock recession. Except among the extremists of Basque nationalism, of Northern Ireland Catholicism and of Corsican nationalism, any resuscitation of regional ethnic nationalism on a wide scale may well, curiously enough, require the return of a world boom.

The other possible exception to this apparently stable future, even for the most hetergenous states, are the special cases of highly peripheral islands which nurture a strong sense of difference from the mainland core and so could decide to 'go it alone' on the Faroes model. Such examples are Madeira, the Azores and Corsica and whose defection might just be tolerable to the core because of their scale and peripherality. Otherwise the European state system in 1986 looks very stable.

FOOTNOTES

1 J. Weiler, 'The Community System: the Dual Character of Supra nationalism', Yearbook of European Law Vol. 1 (1982).

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

June 15, 1987

Dean Jordi Solé Tura
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Barcelona
Av. Diagonal 684
08034 Barcelona

Dear Dean Solé Tura:

I enclose my paper for the conference.

I apologize for the delay but I simply could not do it sooner.

I look forward to seeing you in 10 days.

Sincerely,

Andrzej Korbonski

I.P.S.A. International Political Science Association
A.I.S.P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM
COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Barcelona, 25, 26, 27 June 1987

NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Andrzej Korbonski
University of California, Los Angeles

NATIONALISM AND PLURALISM AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Concepts and Definitions

A social scientist trying to examine a relationship between two or more concepts or variables is usually faced at the outset with a problem of definitions. At times it is a relatively simple task; on this occasion, however, the two concepts to be discussed - nationalism and pluralism - defy easy generalizations and require a careful definition. It is a truism, of course, that the way concepts are defined determines the breadth and depth of the question to be investigated: the definition not only establishes certain analytical boundaries but also dictates or at least suggests an approach or a method to be used in postulating and testing a given hypothesis. The importance of clear and unambiguous definitions is not better illustrated than in this particular case.

The study of nationalism in Eastern Europe, especially in the interwar period, used to be one of the favorite occupations not only of historians and political scientists but also of politicians of all hues, and by now the literature on the subject is not inconsiderable although its quality is uneven.[1] While nationalism in the region in the post-World War II period has received less attention, the box is not entirely empty and it may be speculated that a revival of scholarly interest in this phenomenon is bound to come sooner rather than later.[2] However, thus far, at least, the research on the subject of East European nationalism has focused primarily on either the question of nation-building, economic nationalism, or on purely political process in the various countries, and its results appear to be of limited utility for our purposes.

It is clear that the concept of nationalism shares with many others the dubious distinction of being "an elusive phenomenon that defies exact description."[3] Although, thanks mostly to the works of such scholars as Karl Deutsch, a good deal of the confusion surrounding the meaning of nationalism had been eliminated and the concept itself has not only acquired a definite scholarly respectability but had also become more or less operationalized,[4] for the purpose of this investigation the concept of nationalism is too broad and needs to be narrowed.

Thus, I propose to equate nationalism with the concept of national identity and discuss the latter in the East European context. The ambiguities which still surround the latter term are reflected in the literature dealing with it. One approach is to treat national identity as being akin to the notion of national character, which is said to embrace "the enduring personality characteristics and unique life styles found among the populations of particular national states," and which assumes that "there are elements held in common by members of a particular state that can be traced in some manner to the relatively enduring formative influences of the cultural character of that state on malleable human nature."[5] While this description may be said to come close to defining national identity, one has to agree with Lucian Pye, who argues that "in the past the concept of national character, in becoming a residual category used to 'explain' all the differences that could not be otherwise accounted for by objective analysis, tended to be biased toward emphasizing the importance of the unconscious to the point of discounting almost entirely the place of reason in human affairs."[6]

In his well-known study of political modernization, Dankwart Rustow devoted considerable attention to the problem of national identity which he analyzed in terms of four factors: geography, history, language, and popular will.[7] He concluded that none of them provided unambiguous determinants of a nation's

identity, which in a broader sense could be seen as representing a synthesis of political, cultural and psychological variables. The inclusion of the political factor makes Rustow's concept of national identity clearly relevant for our analysis since it was intended primarily as a tool in his analysis of political development which is also our goal. However, another definition of national identity appears even better suited for the study of political development.

I have in mind here the notion of national identity as developed by Sidney Verba, who views it as one of the dimensions of a nation's political culture or, in other words, as one of the "general political beliefs...[which] are usually mixtures of cognitions about politics as well as standards of evaluation."[8] Verba considers national identity as the "most crucial political belief," whose existence is the necessary condition for the formation of a political culture which he describes in turn as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."[9]

If we accept Pye's view that "a political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system,"[10] then Verba's notion of national identity becomes even more significant. If we think of national identity, again in Verba's terms, as consisting of two forms of identification - <u>vertical</u>, reflecting a sense of an individual's belonging to a particular nation and/or state, and <u>horizontal</u>, signifying some attachment to other members of a given collectivity,[11] then we may perhaps go as far as to suggest that the concept of national identity closely approximates that of national political culture.

Ordinarily I would argue that equating these two notions would result in a very narrow interpretation of the concept of national identity and, <u>ipso facto</u>,

nationalism. However, I am prepared to argue that in the context of our analysis of Communist systems, the above approximation violates neither the generally accepted definitions nor common sense. Thus, I believe that in the final analysis all that happens in Communist societies is essentially political and that regardless of some recent developments in the individual East European countries, there is no basic separation between politics and society. This does not mean, of course, that the political systems has been able to penetrate every corner of East European societies - after all, even Stalin did not succeed in this - but simply that all activity - individual or collective, economic or social - tends to be heavily politicized and to carry significant political implications. To conclude, for the purpose of this discussion, I shall treat nationalism as a form of national political culture or as a wet of national "attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior."[12]

The concept of pluralism is no less difficult to define in an unambiguous fashion than that of nationalism. In this context, pluralism will be viewed as referring to both "specific institutional arrangements for distributing and sharing governmental power," and to an "approach to understanding political behavior."[13] To put it differently, I shall view a pluralist society as one composed of various reasonably independent and voluntary associations or groups, each representing a specific interest and each insisting on being consulted, if not formally included, in the decision-making process. Ideally, the advocates of the so-called "group analysis" approach see the role of the government as basically that of a more or less passive arbiter or broker, trying to achieve a workable compromise by conciliating divergent group interests.

The application of group analysis for the study of Communist societies was the outcome of two parallel developments in the field of Communist political studies:

the growing dissatisfaction with the relevance of the totalitarian paradigm and the increasing awareness of the socio-economic transformation of several Communist societies in the wake of the industrial revolution which has taken place, especially in Eastern Europe, in the forties and fifties.[14] The resulting economic and social differentiation and stratification has been widely discussed in the literature and there is no need to recapitulate it here. Suffice it to say that the emergence of conflicting interests has by now been formally recognized even by the ruling elites in several Communist states which thus acknowledged the bankruptcy of the concept of "solidary society" which has for a long time provided the philosophical underpinning of Communist polities.[15]

Despite the surging popularity of the group approach, the question still remains whether the approach has any validity for the analysis of the East European political systems. As with most of the other analytical frameworks the answer is both yes and no. The arguments in favor of the approach are well known and will not be restated here: there seems to be a significant degree of consensus that pluralistic tendencies are nowadays part and parcel of Communist systems, and the only disagreement concerns the meaning of the term.[16]

The critics of the group theory approach feel that incipient pluralism easily observed in several East European states is largely meaningless as a researchable category, and that the approach, developed as it were, for the study of genuinely pluralistic societies, has little or no validity for the study of Communist political systems.[17] From a rigorous point of view, the critics are undoubtedly right, and in the strictly formal sense pluralism has no place in Communist societies. It can be argued, however, that the above view is too restrictive to be of much value for research purposes and that a compulsive adherence to rigidly defined categories may prevent us from gaining

useful insights into the working of the East European systems. To quote a suggestion, "in order to push on with serious studies of interest group politics in the Soviet Union we must first rid ourselves of the constricting belief that group theory applies only to groups that operate openly and straightforwardly within a political culture which not only tolerates, but celebrates pluralism."[18] What is true for the USSR is obviously even truer for the majority of East European countries. Enough empirical evidence has been accumulated over the years to indicate that there is considerable group activity going on in Communist societies and that interest articulation has become (or is in the process of becoming) legitimized by the ruling party.

Judging by the amount of discussion it has stimulated, the group approach filled a void in research strategy. Perhaps one of its greatest attractions lay in its responding to an easily observable phenomenon which could not be readily explained by any of the hitherto accepted analytical frameworks. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the approach raised almost as many questions as it answered.[19] It was one thing to study pluralistic tendencies in Communist societies and another to disregard, explicitly or implicitly, the fact that these societies were, after all, Communist and hence non-democratic. So far at least, there has not been any evidence of the complete disappearance of either Marxist-Leninist ideology or the ruling parties, both of which still continue to make Communist systems somewhat different not only from the democratic but also from other authoritarian systems. Thus one has to conclude that while the group approach is highly useful as an analytical tool in studying certain <u>discrete</u> phenomena, it is much less valuable for the examination of <u>total</u> processes or systems. To put it differently, I agree with Gordon Skilling that "the group approach could, and indeed must, be combined with other approaches in the effort to explain the working of the [Communist] system as a whole."[20]

Finally, in examining the process of political development in Eastern Europe I utilized the existing analytical frameworks developed primarily by Gabriel Almond and Samuel Huntington.[21] I did so for two reasons: first, because I found them eminently suitable for the purpose of investigating the process of political development in that part of the world, and second, because to the best of my knowledge, there have been few if any attempts to test the applicability of these frameworks to Communist systems. In other words, I agreed with Huntington that Almond's framework was "precisly designed to deal with the problem of change and it was clearly independent of any particular historical context... It could be applied to a primitive stateless tribe, a classical Greek city-state, or to a modern-nation-state."[22]

The framework also avoids another problem faced by some of the other analytical approaches utilized for the study of Communist systems. Thus, the totalitarian and bureaucratic politics models were "invented" by and large exclusively for the study of non-democratic societies. Other approaches, such as the configurative and group conflict, claimed to be of a more generalized nature but that claim has been under considerable criticism by those who felt that Communist systems are different from all other political systems. Similar criticism can be directed against John Kautsky's ideas which, according to some, may have gone too far in their neglect of ideology as a systemic variable.[23] I am prepared to argue that none of these criticisms apply to Almond's approach.

Does it mean that the latter is totally free of drawbacks and disadvantages? Obviously not. The criticism can be essentially divided into two parts: that dealing with the theoretical underpinning of the approach - system theory and structural functionalism - and that concerned specifically with the applicability of the model to the analysis of Communist systems. The former criticism is quite

familiar and needs not be elaborated here; the latter is of greater interest and should be faced squarely. Thus it appears that the various critics castigate the approach for neglecting the importance of personality and leadership and for not paying sufficient attention to the influence of exogenous factors, such as the Soviet Union,[24] for being culture-bound,[25] as well as for generating an "unduly optimistic general theory of political development."[26]

The first two points are well taken. However, as with the number of other factors, the importance of leadership and personality should not be exaggerated. It was obviously greater in the early stages of the East European political development but its role today is not easily ascertained. The same applies to the influence of the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe which was clearly overwhelming and rigid during the Stalinist period and which has become much more flexible and unpredictable under Gorbachev. In the final analysis, the impact of leadership and international environment depends on the perception of the researcher. On the one hand there is always the temptation to explain nearly everything that has been happening in Eastern Europe with reference to either the personality of the current leaders or to the influence of the USSR, or both. As suggested earlier, while actually valid at a certain period of recent East European history, this assumption ignored many interesting internal socio-economic developments occurring spontaneously and autonomously in various countries. Probably the best way out of the dilemma is to focus on those developmental variables that can be empirically tested while suggesting one or more additional variants mirroring change in the two independent variables, those of leadership and international environment.[27]

Is the Almondian framework culture-bound and does it reflect an over-optimistic theory of political development? Here again, the character and value

of a given model lies in the eye of the beholder and whether a theory is optimistic or pessimistic, ethnocentric or value-neutral, depends on one's perception, training and ultimate research objective. Ultimately, it is largely the matter of what one is trying to show and/or prove. If, for example, it can be shown that some of the recent developments in Eastern Europe resemble those that have occurred in Western Europe several generations ago, an optimist may conclude that the former is on the road to establishing a genuine pluralist society, whereas a pessimist is likely to point to the continuing presence of Soviet troops in somce of the countries and to the omnipresent role of the party as a proof that nothing has changed. Hence, while for one observer the glass may be half-full, for another it is half-empty.

The process of political development in the selected East European countries[28] will then be examined with the help of Almond's framework that focuses on five critical areas: identity, penetration, participation, distribution and legitimacy.[29] Each country undergoing a process of socio-political development is likely, sooner or later, to encounter a series of systemic crises or challenges in these five areas. The various crises are not independent of each other and do not arise in any particular sequence; in fact, they are closely correlated. They rarely appear alone but primarily as a combination of two or more. The linkages between the presence of the different developmental crises and challenges in the various countries will be examined with the help of the five systemic components, suggested by Huntington: culture, structure, groups, leadership, and policies. These components are also interrelated, which means that a change in any of them is likely to induce changes in one or more of the others. The process of political development is ultimately strongly influenced by the interplay among those components, their type and rate of change, and the combinations in which they occur.[30]

Since, as mentioned at the outset, my interest is in examining the interaction between nationalism conceptualized as national political culture, pluralism identified with the presence of groups, and the process of political development, I shall focus especially on two of the components - culture and groups.

Political Development in Eastern Europe

In discussing the process of political development in Eastern Europe, I concluded some seven years ago that "on the eve of the 1980s, all the East European countries, with the exception of Hungary, have been facing a series of developmental crises which, when aggregated, range from a highly intensive one in Poland to moderate ones in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia,"[31] with Romania straddling the middle.

What follows is a brief examination of the changes that have occurred in the individual East European countries in the 1980s and of the impact of these changes on the situation in the various countries with special emphasis on the role played in that process by the respective national political cultures and interest or pressure groups.

(1) Identity

The crisis of identity or national integration, which is related to an incomplete or unsuccessful process of nation-building, has been described as a situation in which significant national groups within a given polity either do not consider themselves as falling within the decision-making domaine of the government, or deny some other group or groups within the system the same rights which they have enjoyed.[32]

There is no doubt that in the post-World War II years Eastern Europe as a whole as well as the individual countries have been experiencing much less of an

identity crisis than during the interwar period. At that time, nearly all of the countries were multinational or multi-ethnic states whose political systems had to deal with the presence of several minorities which tended to exhibit powerful nationalist tendencies, threatening to undermine the laborious process of nation-building, initiated after World War I, and to destroy the fabric of the respective societies. The result was a gradual demise of the embattled democratic governments and their replacement by autocratic regimes of various hues.

The downfall of democracy in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, had one additional important consequence. It either destroyed or slowed down the emerging pluralistic tendencies in the various countries. Although the latter were at a lower level of political development than their counterparts in Western Europe, most of them began to experience incipient pluralism based on political, socio-economic and religious differences. Even though relatively few of the existing groups became politically relevant by developing institutional structures capable of articulating their particularistic interests, the process of political development and modernization was making progress despite the presence of governmental systems essentially hostile to the idea of politically meaningful pluralism.

To sum up, during the interwar period the causal chain ran from the growth of nationalist tendencies among the minorities, which were suppressed by increasingly non-democratic regimes which, in turn, were resisting pluralistic tendencies that began to emerge at the same time. The parallel growth of nationalism and pluralism was interrupted first by World War II and subsequently by the Communist takeover of the region: What followed was, in a sense, a reversal of the process of causation outlined above.

The attitude of the new Communist regimes toward nationalism was, to say the

least, ambivalent. To some extent, the task of the new ruling elites was made easier by several developments outside their immediate control such as the destruction of the East European Jewry, the expulsion of ethnic Germans and the population transfers due to boundary changes involving the USSR and some of its neighbors. As a result, at least one multinational state in the area, Poland, became a highly homogenous political entity.

Just as the prewar governments tended sharply to suppress nationalist tendencies exhibited by minorities throughout the region, in contrast, their postwar equivalents assumed initially a rather benign attitude: while they did not, except in unusual circumstances, encourage the resurgence of nationalism among minorities, they did not oppose it either, at least initially, as shown by the experiences of several of the countries in the region.

In the mid-1980s, the crisis of identity has manifested itself most sharply in Yugoslavia, for reasons that are obvious and need no further elaboration. The example of violent protests by the Albanian minority in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 and thereafter, strongly suggests that the process of nation-builidng in Yugoslavia is far from a successful completion. This means that the identity crisis, reflected in recurrent waves of ethnic-nationalist dissent, is likely to persist in the foresseable future.

The rationale for the far-reaching political and economic decentralization introduced in the 1960s was to satisfy the demands of national identity on the part of the various republics. The dilemma faced by the Yugoslav leadership stemmed not only from the multinational character of the country but was also due to the presence of sharp regional differences in the respective levels of socio-economic development. The major problem with decentralization was that it perpetuated, if not increased, the regional economic differentiation by

making the rich republics richer and the poor ones poorer, raising the level of national antagonism and escalating popular discontent articulated by increasingly vocal interest groups representing a variety of concerns. This created demands for greater centralization, thus closing the vicious circle. What appeared as a rational policy to the elites and nonelites of Croatia and Slovenia was clearly seen as irrational and unjust by the rulers and masses of Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. So far it has proved impossible to reconcile both sets of demands: those presented by nationalities and those articulated by groups - and the future seems uncertain.

The situation in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s resembled that in Yugoslavia, reflecting considerable dissatisfaction in Slovakia with the existing state of affairs. Although the latter made considerable progress in the post-World War II period, its economy was still less developed than its Czech counterpart, and Slovakia was hardly able to satisfy all of its capital requirements without help from the Czech lands. Under the centralized economic system, a major effort was made to close the gap between Slovakia and the rest of the country, with the former receiving preferential treatment. For that reason, the economic reforms promulgated in the mid-1960s which aimed at reducing the degree of central planning, were not overwhelmingly supported by the Bratislava nationalists, who were caught on the horns of a dilemma reflecting the conflict between their national aspirations and their desire for the continuation of economic support from Prague.

As is well known, the failure of the Novotny regime to deal in a satisfactory fashion with Slovak nationalist dissent was one of the major causes of the striking political changes in Czechoslovakia beginning in Janurary 1968 and culminating in the "Prague Spring" and its consequences. One of the important results of

that was the creation of a Czechoslovak Federation in January 1969. While it may be assumed that the new constitutional arrangement did not fully satisfy the Slovak nationalist demands, it did go a long way toward defusing Slovak dissent.[33]

Another country that has been faced increasingly with the crisis of national integration and identity has been Romania. The neo-Stalinist regime in Bucharest has tried to suppress the nationalist dissent and has steadfastly denied the existence of discriminatory treatment of Hungarian and German national minorities. The fact remains, however, that particularly the Hungarian dissent has been growing in recent years and that neither the declining Ersatz charisma of President Ceausescu nor the regular invocations of the Soviet threat has succeeded in either creating a sense of a Romanian national identity or in defusing nationalist centrifugal tendencies.[34] Bulgaria, which until relatively recently appeared to have achieved a sense of nationalist identity, began to some extent to imitate Romania's policy, by exerting strong pressure against its Turkish minority. The reasons behind Sofia's discriminatory policy are not clear but the harshness of anti-Turkish policies took the rest of the region by surprise.[35]

What about East Germany? The evidence here is inconclusive. One could easily argue that, at least until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the country which by that time was formally only twelve years old, was faced with an almost insurmountable task of creating a separate and distinct nation-state, thus destroying all traditional links not only with West Germany but also with the idea of Grossdeutsches Reich. On the basis of purely impressionistic evidence, I would be prepared to argue that the process of East German nation-building has been relatively successful and that it has resulted in the emergence of a significant degree of loyalty and commitment to the notion of a DDR-nationhood.

Neither Hungary or Poland experienced identity crises and because of that their respective governments utilized the existing powerful nationalisms for their own purposes. This was particularly true for the Warsaw regime which mobilized strong anti-German feelings in support of Poland's postwar Western boundaries and, indirectly, in its own support as the guarantor of the status quo. Periodically also, the latent anti-Semitism would also be aroused for specific purposes, as was the case in 1956, 1968 and 1980-81. The official encouragement of nationalist feelings had a double-edged sword: while it worked reasonably well in some cases, its by-product was, of course, the maintenance of anti-Soviet feelings which continued unabated throughout the period.

The most powerful outburst of Hungarian nationalism occurred during the revolution of October-November 1956 and because of that the Hungarian leadership has tried to downplay it for the next twenty five years or so. However, the recent official attacks on Romania's treatment of Hungarian minority suggest that for reasons that are not entirely clear, Budapest feels no longer constrained to keep a lid on traditional anti-Romanian feelings.

(2) Penetration

The concept of penetration refers to the ability of the government to establish an effective and efficient control over the society. To quote Joseph La Palombara, "in its broadest sense penetration means conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority" and for any political elite "penetration refers to whether they can get what they want from people over whom they seek to exercise power."[36] The crisis of penetration then reflects the inability of the existing regime to make authoritative decisions that are obeyed and followed by the population.

Until relatively recently, it was a conventional wisdom to assert that while Communist governments in Eastern Europe had to engage in the management of some developmental crises - be it participation or distribution - the one crisis they did not have to face was that of penetration. In contrast to other developing countries around the world, the East European regimes, taking a leaf from Soviet experience, have embarked from their very beginning on a massive institution-building program which was intended to carry the government writ into the farthest corners of the polity. Having destroyed the existing structures, they proceeded, first, to atomize the society and, second, to erect a new institutional edifice that would permit the ruling elite to penetrate and control the society. Next to the conventional institutions of the party (or parties), the secret police network and the military, the new structures included a whole array of the so-called "transmission belts" - unions, youth organizations, professional associations - which provided an impressive pluralistic facade. Following the death of Stalin, some of these instruments of penetration were either downgraded (i.e. the secret police) or transformed. The question is whether the post-Stalinist control network has performed satisfactorily or whether it failed to avoid generating a penetration crisis.

It may be argued that in the past thirty years the East European regimes, with two significant exceptions, seemingly succeeded in achieving a high degree of penetration. For example, despite the presence of a small albeit vocal domestic opposition, the Czechoslovak government has been able to "get what [it wanted] from people over whom [it] sought to exercise power." Space does not permit a fuller discussion of the reasons for the post-1968 government's success in re-establishing and maintaining tight control over its people. In trying to answer this question one would most likely seek an answer in the Czechoslovak political

culture as well as in the pattern of the country's historical development.

If we follow Huntington in defining culture as "the values, attitudes, orientations, myths and beliefs relevant to politics and dominant in society,"[37] we may hypothesize that the dominant national politico-cultural orientation of the great majority of the Czechoslovak people was a participatory-subject culture, which implied that "ordinary citizens must be obedient to their rulers' demands and must also display both enthusiasm and initiative in complying with their leaders' instructions."[38] Were we to eliminate the word "enthusiasm," the preceding appears as an apt description of both elite and mass national political culture in Czechoslovakia and as an explanation of the absence of a penetration crisis.

There is also no evidence of major penetration crises in East Germany, Hungary and Romania. It appears that in the former country, the institutionalization proved remarkably successful, displaying congruence with the traditional German national political culture which, as in Czechoslovakia, could be described as participatory-subject, with the accent on the subject. Hence, except for sporadic manifestations of latent discontent, dissent in East Germany seems to be restricted to a handful of artists and intellectuals without mass following.

The situation in Hungary has been both similar and different. All evidence suggests that the political system since the early 1960s has been performing relatively well in satisfying popular demands, both political and economic, and that the ruling party, recreated after the collapse of its predecessor in 1956, has learned its lesson and has proved highly responsive to popular aspirations, being also able to extract an impressive degree of popular compliance with its decisions. The presence of remarkably little overt dissent in Hungary, probably less than anywhere else in Eastern Europe, is a good testimony to the government's

skill in penetrating the Hungarian society and polity.

Romania in the second half of the 1980s is by far the best example of total penetration by the state. While I would hesitate to call Romania totalitarian, it certainly comes close to the traditional Stalinist model with all its ramifications. To be sure, it is a rather unique type of a highly personalistic regime and this raises the question of its ability to survive its creator, but the fact remains that for the time being President Ceausescu succeeded in establishing total control over his people.

The two countries which did not avoid a penetration crisis were Yugoslavia and Poland. Yugoslavia presented a complex case. Among the various institutions that were intended to penetrate the polity, only the army qualified as a truly national organization, committed to the preservation of Yugoslav unity and the maintenance of Communist rule. The Leage of Communists of Yugoslavia has long been fragmented along republican lines and could not be relied upon as an instrument of control. The same was true for another important institution, the workers' councils, which were primarily concerned with their own particular interests, now and then in outright opposition to the government.

Without a doubt, Poland represented the most flagrant example of an acute penetration crisis. The existing major institutions - the Party, unions, and other "transmission belts" - have proved increasingly impotent in ensuring obedience and fulfillment of governmental objectives. Here the reasons were complex and stemmed from a combination of historical and cultural factors.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the national cultural variable in Poland has been the remarkable persistence of traditional values and attitudes, despite the massive socialization and resocialization campaigns conducted by successive

regimes since the beginning of Communist rule. Moreover, the rather striking changes in the Polish social and political environment, represented, for example, by the gradual narrowing of persistently deep cleavages and the muting of traditional conflicts between various segments of Polish society, have greatly impaired the ability of the regime to exercise its authority and to impose conformity. The long-run implications of this reversal of alliances cannot be exaggerated as witnessed by the events in Poland since July 1980.

The weakness of the Polish regime was further underscored by the fact that it has had to contend for decades with a powerful competing institution, largely absent elsewhere in the region: the Catholic Church. If anything, the Church proved more successful than the government in penetrating Polish society and if the political system managed to perform at all, it was because of the Church's tacit support.

(3) Participation

As pointed out by Myron Weiner, "one of the most disruptive crises in modern times has been caused by the efforts of those not in power to gain access to power or to influence decisions made by governing elites."[39]

Any discussion of political participation in Communist systems has to resolve a number of problems.[40] Perhaps the most important one deals with the character and form of participation. For example, the question has to be raised as to what constitutes a political rather than non-political participation. Secondly, participation implies voluntary action on the part of those interested in influencing governmental decisions and thirdly, a conventional definition of participation suggests that citizens have a choice in the way they intend to take part in decision-making.[41]

In light of the above, is it proper to talk about political participation in Eastern Europe today? My answer is both yes and no. There is evidence that in some countries a genuine effort has been made to ensure a wider access to decision-making on the part of selected groups of individuals which have been, and continue to be, influential in arriving at certain decisions. Although these decisions have been mostly concerned with fairly narrowly defined technical issues, we could talk here about authentic rather than totally manufactured participation. On the opposite side, some East European regimes have so far refused to allow even a modicum of popular participation.

There is little doubt that the crisis of participation in the region has been largely due to the emergence of the classis Huntingtonian syndrome of mass mobilization unaccompanied by institutionalization.[42] Having succeeded in the early "revolutionary" period in harnessing the population to accomplish a variety of tasks associated with the process of building the foundations of the socialist order, the Communist regimes failed, by an large, to provide adequate outlets for the mobilized masses to expresses their preferences and articulate their demands.

Although, as suggested earlier, the Communist rulers have engaged in considerable institution building during the first two decades or so of their rule, there are indications that with few exceptions these institutions - the interest groups of various hues - played a one-sided role of serving as instruments for generating support rather than for articulating their own demands.

As in the case of penetration, Poland again provides a good example of the crisis of participation. As mentioned above, the existing formal institutions, and especially the groups, have failed rather dismally in serving as channels of communication and instruments of participation, leaving large segments of the

population, especially the workers and peasants, without adequate voice in governmental decision-making. This failure was particularly striking with regard to specialized interest groups which, in contrast to such countries as Hungary and Yugoslavia, did not manage to make much of an imprint even in highly technical matters as economic or educational reforms. Consequently, social frustration was vented through such otherwise illegitimate institutions as the Church or "Solidarity", or through strikes and riots.

In comparison, Hungary and Yugoslavia have been able to ensure at least some meaningful participation via the existing institutions. In the former case, both the party and pressure groups such as the labor unions, professional organizations and collective farm associations, served as articulators of support and demands, and participated in the formulation of major decisions, such as, for example, the economic reforms. In the case of Yugoslavia, the workers councils and the unions played a similar role on both the local and federal levels.

Not much can be said about the remaining countries in the area. In Czechoslovakia and Romania, the existing oppressive regimes do not provide any meaningful popular access to decision-making which is clearly reserved for selected members of the ruling elite or family, with the existing institutions continuing to perform the traditional function of "transmission belts." Insofar as East Germany is concerned, there is some evidence that the DDR regime has been willing to grant some voice in decision-making to the "experts" but the degree of participation does not appear to be widespread.

(4) Distribution

Of all the critical areas, that of distribution appears to be the easiest to define and measure in an unambiguous fashion. To put it simply, the notion

of distribution denotes the ability of the government to allocate material and other benefits among members of society.

It can be taken for granted that rapid economic development has been the primary objective of all Communist regimes, including those in Eastern Europe. It is also a truism that in the early stages of their rule, the East European governments tended to emulate the so-called Stalinist model of forced-draft industrialization which emphasized investment at the expense of consumption. It was only since the mi-1960s that some of the individual countries began to adjust their priorities and to allocate a larger share of available resources to public and private consumption. This was due to the emergence of several other developmental crises, mostly those of participation and legitimacy.

The major reason for the crisis of confidence in the existing governments was their inability to deliver the promised material and other benefits. The rapidly growing expectational gap threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the regimes and forced them to close or narrow the gap by reducing investment, expanding consumption and raising the overall standard of living of the population. At the same time, the crisis of participation, reflected in growing popular demand for access to decision-making, focused ultimately on the question of economic welfare that, after all, formed part and parcel of the official ideology.

As a result, the East European governments responded to the crises by embarking on major institutional reforms of their economies which also included an attempt at introducing economic rationalization and modernization, often with Western help. The outcome of these reforms varied from country to country as did their ability to deal with the crisis of distribution.

Clearly, it was Hungary which appeared most successful in dealing with the distribution crisis by reforming its economy and raising the welfare standard of its people through the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism. Although Hungary's economic growth and progress have been negatively affected in recent years , there is little doubt that on balance the performance of the Hungarian economy and of the Hungarian regime must receive fairly high marks.

Both Czechoslovakia and East Germany actually started reforming their economies ahead of Hungary but their progress was soon halted: in Czechoslovakia by the 1968 Soviet intervention and in East Germany by the regime's unwillingness or inability to make a radical break with past practices. Nevertheless, in neither case were the reforms totally abandoned or abolished and even in their partial form they managed to contribute to the improvement in economic performance. Moreover, the persistence of some traditional national values and attitudes in both countries also helped in that process which succeeded, by and large, in alleviating the distribution crisis.

The situation in Yugoslavia was less clearcut. In contrast to the other countries, Yugoslavia jettisoned the Stalinist system relatively early and proceeded to reform its economy by decentralizing decision-making, by creating the system of worker councils, by exporting its unemployment, and by opening its economy to foreign influences. The results of this policy turned out to be mixed: on the one hand, there is no doubt that economic well-being has shown signs of major improvement but on the other hand, the liberal policy has also resulted in sharp inflationary pressure and in the opening of a gap between the more and less developed regions which, in turn, added fuel to the already simmering identity crisis.

Poland has been going through a distribution crisis for close to two decades. The crisis, manifested in a long-standing popular dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policy, came to a boil at least three times since 1970, representing a major challenge to the legitimacy of Communist rule. For reasons which cannot be discussed in full here, the Polish leadership has been congenitally unable to solve the problem of distribution despite the fact that the country was the first one in the region to experiment with economic reforms and, in addition, it was better endowed with natural resources than most countries in the area.

In recent years Romania has also began to face a very serious distribution crisis. For various reasons, the country's regime refused to engage in economic reform-making and essentially adhered to the Stalinist policy of emphasizing investment over consumption. Moreover, for reasons that cannot be explained rationally, President Ceausescu decided to repay Romania's large hard currency debt by expanding exports, which in turn reduced the standard of living of the population to subsistence level.

Thus far I discussed only the problem of allocating material values among the citizens. As mentioned earlier, however, the notion of welfare includes also the distribution of non-material benefits such as full employment, free education and health services, as well as various other emoluments generating psychic income, such as social advancement. Until recently, the horizontal and particularly vertical mobility tended to moderate the distribution crisis (as well as some of the other crises) but there are now clear signs that the era of dynamic economic growth accompanied by rapid social mobility has been coming to an end, accentuating the treat of more intensive and deeper crises.

(5) Legitimacy

The notion of legitimacy is closely related to those of identity, penetration,

participation, and distribution. It is also a difficult concept to define unambiguously. A government may be viewed as legitimate if its decisions are accepted by the majority of a population because of its belief in the "correctness" or "goodness" of the way in which these decisions were arrived at, and because they fulfilled popular expectations. The fact remains, however, that a crisis in any of the problem areas mentioned above was bound to raise the specter of a legitimacy crisis.

As pointed out by Pye, one should distinguish between two types of legitimacy crises: a "fundamental" legitimacy crisis, caused by such things as conflicting or insufficient bases for claiming authority, faulty ideological and pragmatic claims to authority, and incomplete and inappropriate socialization of the citizenry,[43] and a "derivative" legitimacy crisis, caused by crises in the other problem areas discussed earlier. If we accept the above definitions, it becomes clear that every East European country has experienced a legitimacy crisis to a greater or less degree. Since each of the countries has been subjected over the years to one or more of the developmental crises, it follows that at different points in time the legitimacy of their political systems - their basis of authority and their political formula - has been questioned.

It is clear that Poland today represents the most extreme case of both "fundamental" and "derivative" legitimacy crises. Although, to be sure, the Communist government in that country has not collapsed, in the past 17 years there have been four distinct cases of a breakdown or near-breakdown of governmental authority and/or performance: the ouster of Gomulka in December 1970; the surrender of Gierek to worker demands in June 1976; the birth of "Solidarity" in August 1980; and the imposition of martial law in December 1981. This is not the place to analyze each case in detail but all of them did represent a major

challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.

The situation in the rest of the region was much less critical. In at least two countries - Romania and Yugoslavia - the presence of an authentic (Yugoslavia) and engineered (Romania) charismatic leadership did go a long way in defusing a possible legitimacy crisis. Although the death of Tito removed a powerful instrument of legitimacy, the Yugoslav party could lay a claim to genuine legitimacy based on its mode of seizing power after World War II. There are signs that in Romania the pseudo-charismatic leadership of President Ceausescu might be showing signs of wear and tear but, at least for the time being, he has been largely able to cope with challenges to his authority.

One may hypothesize that both East Germany and Hungary have managed to avoid a serious legitimacy crisis. Both regimes succeeded rather impressively in dealing with possible causes of the crisis: they tended to be pragmatic rather than dogmatic in their policies; they avoided possible disruption of their performance by minimizing and controlling the struggle for power at the top; and they were also successful in their socialization endeavors. Moreover, both countries were fortunate in being ruled by skillful leaders who were clearly aware of the complexities of their task and who did not create undue expectations among their respective populations.

A good case can be made for suggesting that the remaining country in the region, Czechoslovakia, has faced a serious legitimacy crisis and was able to overcome it. Here, in contrast to some of the other states, the underlying causes of the crisis were not so much unfulfilled expectations or incomplete socialization as a fundamental change in the character of the government and an equally basic change in the source of authority claimed by the government, both resulting from the Soviet intervention in August 1968 and the subsequent demise of the Dubcek

government which, according to all indications, enjoyed broad legitimacy. Although Dubcek's successor, Husak, did not prove as skillful as Hungary's Kadar in overcoming the ill-effects of a Soviet invasion, he still managed to re-establish his authority without resorting to extreme measures.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that of the six East European countries considered, only Hungary succeeded reasonably well in its task of crisis management and that it has undergone some degree of political development. While Czechoslovakia and East Germany have been stagnating, Romania and Yugoslavia, but especially Poland, have been undergoing a process of political decay.

At this stage, a question ought to be raised as to what were the causes of uneven political development in the individual East European countries or why was the outcome of the process different in different countries.

One can answer this question in various ways. My own preference is to answer it by focusing on the two variables which were discussed at some length at the beginning of this essay: national political culture and groups.

After years of neglect, the problem of political culture in the Communist context began recently to regain the attention it rightly deserved. In the developmental context its importance cannot be exaggerated as it has affected in one way or another almost all the critical problem areas. National political cultures, whether viewed in terms of national identity or national character, played a major role in the crises of national integration and legitimacy and also contributed to the crises of penetration, participation and even distribution.

The same is largely true for the second systemic variable, the groups.

The presence of groups also played a role in generating crises of participation, distribution and penetration, and, by definition, legitimacy. As was the case with the influence of national identity, the impact of pluralistic tendencies varied from country to country, but its critical importance was unmistakable.

What about the future? One of the interesting conclusions emerging from the above discussion is that the various crises do induce important changes in the two variables discussed throughout this paper. For example, Poland, the country that has been undergoing every crisis imaginable, has had a long tradition of powerful nationalism but practically no experience of genuine interest groups. It may be argued that this is no longer true today. As a result of coping with the various crises, the country has witnessed the emergence of truly powerful and genuine institutional interest groups, the Catholic Church and overt or covert "Solidarity" which are likely to remain important components of Polish political landscape for many years to come. More than that: the birth of genuine interest groups forced even the old "transmission belts" to abandon their subservice to the Communist masters and to adopt a more independent policy. As a result, Poland in 1987 is beginning to acquire features of a genuine pluralist society.

While the remaining countries, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, still appear a long way from resembling Poland, there is evidence of a slow movement in that direction, especially in Hungary but also in East Germany and even Czechoslovakia. Only Romania shows no signs of emulating the example of the other countries but what is likely to happen after Ceausescu's death is anybody' guess.

The future of nationalism in Eastern Europe is much harder to predict.

I would argue that a good deal will depend on the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies in the region. It is a well known fact that in the past 40 years or so this relationship has oscillated between two extremes - tight control and more-or-less benign neglect. The former was characterized as a rule by suppression of nationalist tendencies, the latter by resurrecting traditional nationalist feelings, not only vis-à-vis the Soviet hegemon but also with regard to one's neighbors.

While today it is rather difficult to define, more or less accurately, the relationship between the USSR and the East European countries, there are indications that the current leader in the Kremlin has other things on his mind than maintaining tight control over his East European empire. If that is the case then one may anticipate still another revival of nationalism in the region. This time, however, the national antagonisms may be directed less at the Soviet Union and more against the traditional enemies in the region. That these antagonisms do exist closely under the surface has been amply demonstrated during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 and is currently reflected in the Hungarian-Romanian and Bulgarian-Turkish conflicts. If they are allowed to continue, they may well weaken the fabric of Soviet controls over the region, and that is why I believe that the answer to the question of the future of East European nationalism can be found in the Kremlin.

NOTES

1. For a comprehensive study, see Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969).

2. One of the very few scholars interested in the question of nationalism in Eastern Europe after World War II has been Paul Shoup. See his "Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations after World War II," The American Political Science Review, vol. lvi, no. 4, December 1962, pp. 886-898, and "The National Question and the Political Systems of Eastern Europe," in Sylva Sinanian, Istvan Deak and Peter C. Ludz, eds., Eastern Europe in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 121-170.

3. Shoup, "Communism, Nationalism...," p. 886.

4. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966), passim.

5. George A. DeVos, "National Character," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), vol. 11, pp. 14-15.

6. Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Cultura and Political Development," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 10.

7. Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 35-71.

8. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, op. cit., p. 527.

9. Ibid., p. 513.

10. Pye, "Political Culture," p. 8.

11. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," pp. 529-537.

12. Pye, "Political Culture," p. 7.

13. Henry S. Kariel, "Pluralism" in Sills, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12, p. 164.

14. The scholar who first recognized the emergence of pluralistic tendencies in Eastern Europe was, of course, H. Gordon Skilling. See his pathbreaking article, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, vol. xviii, no. 3, 1966, pp. 435-451.

15. The concept of "solidary society" was first discussed by Gregory Grossman in his "The Solidary Society: A Philosophical Issue in Communist Economic Reforms," in Gregory Grossman, ed., Essays in Socialism and Planning in Honor of Carl Landauer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 148-211.

16. See, for example, the discussion "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Is the Emperor Naked?" in Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. xii, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3-38.

17. Probably the most telling criticism of the application of group approach to the analysis of Communist societies is that of Andrew Janos in his "Group Politics in Communist in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York and London: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 437-450.

18. David E. Langsam and David W. Paul, "Soviet Politics and the Group Approach: A Conceptual Note," Slavic Review, vol. xxxi, no. 1, 1972, pp. 136-137.

19. H. Gordon Skilling, "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Straw Men and Red Herrings," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. xiii, no. 1, 1980, pp. 82-88, and "Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited," World Politics, vol. xxxvi, no. 1, 1983, pp. 1-27.

20. Skilling, "Pluralism in Communist Societies," p. 84.

21. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change," Comparative Politics, vol. 3, no. 3, 1971, p. 320.

22. Huntington, "The Change to Change," p. 320.

23. John Kautsky, "Comparative Communism Versus Comparative Politics," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. vi, nos. 1-2, 1973, pp. 135-170.

24. Gabriel A. Almond, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. iv, no. 2, 1971, pp. 76-77.

25. Charles A. Powell, "Structural-Functionalism and the Study of Comparative Communist Systems: Some Caveats," ibid., vol. 4, nos. 3-4, 1971, pp. 58-62.

26. William E. Griffith, "The Pitfalls of the Theory of Modernization," Slavic Review, vol. xxxiii, no. 2, 1974, p. 247.

27. See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 1-42.

28. The six countries to be considered are Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.

29. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 63-66.

30. Huntington, "The Change to Change," p. 316.

31. Andrzej Korbonski, "Political Development and Political Decay: The Case of Eastern Europe," (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1980), p. 19.

32. Lucian W. Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 114.

33. Vladimir V. Kusin, From Dubcek to Charter 77 (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), pp.119-23.

34. For recent examples, see New York Times, 4 April and 21 May 1987.

35. New York Times, 20 April 1986 and 15 February 1987.

36. Joseph La Palombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Government Capacity," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, pp. 208-209.

37. Huntington, "Change to Change," p. 316.

38. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 14.

39. Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, p. 159.

40. See, Robert S. Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., ed., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 244-253.

41. Weiner, "Political Participation," pp. 163-164.

42. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 54-55.

43. Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, p. 136.

Professor Jadesolé Tosa.

With compliments

Philip Raikwood.

29.5.87

Development Administration Group
Institute of Local Government Studies
University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363
Birmingham B15 2TT
Telephone: 021-472 1301
Cables: Inlogov Birmingham
Telex: 338938 Spaphy G

I wrote to you on 22 May, and will wait for your answer to that letter. Best wishes!

PR

INTERNATIONAL POLTICAL
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GOVERNMENTS AND PLURALISM IN AFRICAN STATES

by

Philip Mawhood

University of Birmingham

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Governments and Pluralism in African States

by Philip Mawhood

> "Most of the political problems that exist today are due to regional inequalities and imbalance, for most states were organized out of heterogeneous and smaller units"(1)

State formation is seen, in the model frequently adopted, as a process through which an ecumene(2) develops gradually and organically, until it is able to dominate the less favoured areas around it and establish control over the eventual nation-state. It usually possesses the historical centre of political power, which is extended through the network of physical communications to cover the wider area. Success in external or civil wars tends to speed up the process, but in Europe it has usually been the work of several centuries. In Africa by contrast states have been brought into existence, fully formed as to all their visible characteristics, during a short period of the mid-twentieth century. The independent governments that followed the colonial rulers are faced with the difficult task of shaping political reality until it coincides with the formal picture of statehood.

The common characteristic which distinguishes a typical African state from a European one is, above all, its newness. The area that it now occupies contained, no more than a century ago, a number of societies which differed widely in size and culture,

each with its own political system. The territorial boundary and the structures of government have not evolved gradually over a long history but have been recently and consciously imposed. The state, as a state, has had little history. This fact causes many of the present-day problems facing African governments, though it also brings certain advantages to them.

Political control over an area does not make a nation, and in Africa nation-building is still, almost everywhere, an unfinished task for completion in the future. Apart from the lack of common history, the state seldom enjoys a common language understood by all the people. The cultures, kinship myths, social and political structures of local units, form a patchwork of great variety. The central regime may have the capacity to keep order and prevent civil war, but to impose unity for the achievement of any positive purpose is a far more difficult and expensive task. It is fortunate that the obstacles to government policy are nearly always confined to those internal to the state. External threats are absent, with very few exceptions: the state is not threatened in its very existence by powerful neighbours that can absorb or dismember it. Subversion against the regime in power is another matter (and it may well be supported by outside agencies) but the state frontiers are generally regarded as sacrosanct by all governments, and reinforced by declarations of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.(3) This policy has been successfully maintained with rare exceptions: for example the frontier disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Morocco and Algeria, or Libya and Chad. However, even where

these disputes have resulted in fighting, no major re-drawing of the territorial boundaries has generally resulted. The O.A.U.'s limitations have been twofold: it did not possess an armed force of its own, and it could not control individual member states which (as with Uganda and Tanzania in 1978/79) were determined upon military action.

The difficulties facing African governments are increased because they have accepted an ideological commitment to extensive change, in addition to their problems of control. Since the date of national independence, for the majority which have recently emerged from colonial rule, the leadership has framed its concepts of welfare and economic growth by making comparisons with the industrialized countries, rather than with the less developed neighbour states. This remains true even though Development Plan targets have become more realistic since the ambitious days of the 1960s. Unusually wide and new demands are thus placed on the government, while its resources - in finance and trained personnel - are peculiarly low by world standards. The effect is circular. State revenues cannot be raised and efficiently administered on a large scale without a bureaucracy that maintains professional standards; but such a bureaucracy needs large revenues to pay for its training and renumeration. This however is only the beginning of the problem. Bureaucratic capacity has been improved slowly in many countries, and more rapidly where 'windfall' resources have come under government control such as the oil revenues in Nigeria. But the other obstacles to development have then become more prominent, and these are essentially cultural. Loyalties to the

national unit are still weak, as is seen when it comes to demanding sacrifices from an individual, comparable with the loyalties he gives to his family, clan or wider ethnic group. It is the plural elements in the society that allocate values, rather than the governing regime. This may result in weakening not only political unity in the state, but also bureaucratic effectiveness in the civil services at national and local levels.

A demand for levels of government below the national one presents itself in Africa as it does in Europe, but the problem is operationally a different one. At this stage of history the competition between groups for national power is still so intense that no regime can contemplate the installation of a regional political system within the state unit. Where regional blocs are large and deeply divided, as in Nigeria, a federal constitution becomes the only solution. The same conclusion may, before long, be recognized as the only possible way out for the Sudan. But more frequently we see a central government that is able to maintain - sometimes with evident difficulty - a unitary state. In such cases, any institution which exercises political influence at the regional level becomes an intolerable threat to the centre. The first reaction of a newly independent African government was therefore, in most cases, to centralize all administration and to reduce popular participation in decision-making.(4) But this was, as it soon became clear, a recipe for economic and social decline, since the bureaucracy fell far short of the capacity needed to operate efficient centralized structures. The problem was made worse by the strong urban bias of the educated elites: central rule ultimately meant

rule for the benefit of the towns and to the detriment of the rural producers. The primary market prices of both food and export crops were frequently fixed at a low level, and after a few years the farmers responded with perfect rationality, by marketing a lesser volume of cash crops or smuggling their produce into other countries, and by restricting food production to a level close to that of the farmers' own family needs. Since the 1970s we have seen African governments, their embarrassments increased by the world recession, making new efforts to enlist popular participation and support through decentralized decision-making. These take the form of granting powers to bodies at the district level or lower - and it is at this local level that parallels may be found to the European process of regionalization. While regional autonomy within the state is not currently a practical political issue in Africa, autonomy at the level of local district and town administration is everywhere the subject of debate and experiment.

Historical parallels

It would no doubt be possible to identify comparable stages of state formation between the African countries and various European or non-European counterparts. However the host nation of this conference offers us a particularly favourable comparison, since its own political and administrative history falls into clearly defined stages on the dimensions of centralization and regional decentralization.(5) The following table places together the events occurring in Spain and in the majority of states of tropical Africa. Apart from the

Political stages	Spain	Africa
1 Regional/local units of government, without a dominant central state.	Until early 18th century: territories with extensive self-government linked in a 'confederal' framework.	Until late 19th century: rule by ethnic/kinship units, modern states not yet defined.
2 Central rule imposed over the present national area.	Decrees of Philip V 1712-14, imposed after a period of civil war.	Colonial rule over present area imposed 1880-1914 with military support.
3 Non-traditional areas of field administration replace historical regions.	First half of 19th century: consolidation 1833 of provinces on Napoleonic pattern.	Early 20th century: administrative pattern influenced by Napoleonic or British-Indian style.
4 Concessions to regional/local loyalties, progressively moving towards a condition of strong autonomy.	1900 - late 1930s, concessions culminating in Catalonian and Basque Autonomy Statutes.	1919-1960: some regional organisation; patchy introduction of autonomous local government, more generally in 1950s.
5 Re-centralization of power.	1940s-1960s under Franco: suppression of regionalism.	1960s: newly independent governments committed to centralized action, regions suppressed and local government weakened or abolished.
6 Reversion to limited administrative decentralization	1970s: weak regionalism, influenced by French and Italian models.	1970s: weak autonomy allowed to local units, but under central administrative control.
7 More extensive grant of regional/local autonomy (but still weaker than Stage 4 arrangements).	1977 onwards: creation of Autonomous Communities in some regions.	Late 1970s onwards: creation of autonomous local governments in some states.

difference already indicated (that African decentralization is currently to the local not the regional level) it is striking that the process of African state formation reflects the same stages as that of older states, though telescoped together - and by the end of the story the timing of stages has merged into one.

Stage 1

While European countries experienced a long period that is usually described as feudal, with large and small autonomous kingdoms controlled through a body of royal officials, the greater part of tropical Africa was covered by 'stateless' societies. This condition was not universal: a number of large-area states did occur, such as the mediaeval Ghana, Mali and Songhai in the western Sudan, or the kingdoms of Benin and Ashanti which flowered in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively. There were other examples in southern Africa. But these states rose and declined over time; most had disappeared before the advent of colonial rule in the 19th century, and of the survivors none was able finally to maintain its independence against the colonial power. The permanent occupation of any area in pre-modern times could easily become impossible through war, disease, drought and crop failure, so that there were numerous migrations of societies from one area to another. The typical pattern throughout the tropical belt was a small-area polity (sometimes very small) organized around the family, kinship group or clan. For these peoples, the only wider area that could be recognized was a cultural/linguistic

region, lacking any political unity but significant in that safe travel and communication within it were sometimes possible for the inhabitants. Such regions did not become prominent until the modern age, when the competition for power and economic resources on a national scale first began. Class identification, even today, is weak and patchy, so that competition takes place mainly between these primary groupings which are old-established and easily understood by everyone.

Stage 2

Until the late 19th century the impact of European governments upon tropical Africa was mediated only by missionaries, explorers and traders. The areas of land occupied were small coastal strips associated with trading stations. Only in the 1880s were larger claims of sovereignty first made, but by the outbreak of world war in 1914 nearly the whole of tropical Africa was under effective European occupation. The degree of military action needed for this occupation varied but was generally very small, if only because of the crushing technical superiority of the new rulers. However the colonial states certainly relied, in the last resort, on their power to coerce. This formed the initial legitimacy of their representatives in Africa, followed only later by the legitimacy that came from establishing a stable administration. At this point the present boundaries of the African states were generally laid down. They have been criticized for their artificiality, in that they were imposed by decisions of the colonial powers and often had the effect of dividing people of similar cultures. It is true that they do

not, in general, follow cultural boundaries. Yet this is the way in which most national frontiers have always been created - by political decision from above, as a result either of military conquest or of agreements reached after hard bargaining. There are few frontiers in Europe, for example, that do not divide cultural and linguistic groups; it is a normal and not an abnormal situation.(6) The difference in Africa was that the original governing elite were alien, and a wide cultural gap separated them from the varied communities, large and small, of those who were to be governed within the new boundaries.

Stage 3

The system of regional administration created by Napoleon I in France is perhaps his most lasting memorial; it has been adopted as to its essential features in areas throughout Europe and the world. It serves as the model of local government almost everywhere except for countries falling directly in the Anglo-Saxon tradition - and for the 'deconcentrated' cadre of generalist field officers it prevails even within that tradition. Only the metropolitan United Kingdom, Ireland and U.S.A. manage without such an official. In Africa the role was transmitted directly to French-speaking countries during their period of colonial rule. For English-speaking countries it arrived from British-ruled India, where it had been naturalized during the life of the Indian Civil Service. The Napoleonic prefect has provided the archetype for Commissioners and District Officers, Prefects and District Governors (many different titles are in use) throughout tropical Africa as well

as Latin America, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East.

In Europe the areas of administration were often created artificially and without following the boundaries of older regions. This was done in order to rationalize the size of areas for the sake of efficiency, but also to discourage the habit of popular loyalty to the historical units. The French government, among others, was always sensitive to the damage that might be done to national unity by pluralistic forces. During the colonial period in Africa, the desire for 'national unity' seldom played any part in the mind of government. In early colonial days the contacts between administration and the mass of the people were minimal; it was therefore unavoidable that existing ethnic groups should be treated as the units of organization, except where they were so small or shifting as to make this impracticable. Collaboration between people who acknowledged some kinship links was easier to achieve than between strangers, and this was relevant for the cost of administration. However the colonial administrative district was often the first large area to be defined and recognized, against the background of a traditional society which had always been organized on a far smaller scale. Once in place the district boundary itself began to create a sense of identity for the inhabitants, newly evolving but otherwise similar to earlier forms of cultural identity. Ylvisaker, speaking of American society, says: "As we sometimes too painfully have experienced, loyalty is as much generated by the very creation and symbolism of boundary lines, as it is by whatever elements of alikeness these lines may happen to include".(7) It is the political area

that creates the community, rather than the other way round. Where popular participation in local government is a desired aim, the 'artificial' boundary probably favours it sincelife within the new area stimulates bargaining among numerous different groups.

Stage 4

The latter period of colonial rule in Africa, from 1919 to its end around the year 1960, saw numerous experiments with forms of limited autonomy in local government, both traditional and modern. Their occurrence varied very much with the country and even with the controlling personalities in the shape of the colonial Governors. French governments maintained, with few exceptions, a direct administration of the metropolitan type. Little use was made of traditional African authority, and such municipalities as existed were, until a very late stage, confined to the older towns and strongly controlled from above. British dependencies were sometimes directly administered in a similar way, as in Kenya. Elsewhere and more commonly, there was considerable use of traditional chiefs as the junior partners in local government - the process known as "indirect rule" - and eventually a gradual insertion at the same level of councillors representing the population. The large and rich Emirates of northern Nigeria are well known as the first and most conspicuous example of traditional authority working with the colonial power, but they represent the extreme case. More typical in Africa was a smaller-sized chiefdom or group of chiefdoms, where the traditional leader's own survival depended

more heavily on colonial support. This made it easier for the government to exert pressure on him, as time went on, to share his power with a council - the latter at first often nominated, but to an increasing extent elected as time went on. The "indirect rule" system provided an autonomous local treasury and local courts administering customary law, all of them under the hand of the traditional authority.

These colonial forms of local administration were not created as a response to popular pressures at the local level (though in the Gold Coast at least, the chiefs laid stress on the treaties which had begun their relationship with the colonial power). They were essentially an economical style which eked out the tiny resources of expatriate administrators and yet produced public order, together with the capacity to provide the first modern services such as roads and medical treatment for the local people. This illustrates the significant difference from the European parallel: in Africa, when decision-making was decentralized, it was primarily done to small areas which could not threaten the centre. Very rarely did any pressure for regional-level autonomy arise - indeed it was the colonial government itself that sometimes promoted the formation of larger administrative units such as federations of small traditional chiefs, or the regional governments of Nigeria and Uganda. A late example was the Sukumaland Development Scheme of the 1940s and 1950s in Tanganyika: to bring together all the districts of Sukuma-speaking peoples might well increase the threat of their beginning to act as a political movement, but this was a threat that the government felt it could control

without much difficulty. The real problem of regional pressures upon the centre generally arose only in the following stage of history, after national independence.

Before the advent of independence there was one more change in local government: a network of 'modern' representative councils was established in many African countries, either alongside the traditional leaders' councils or in replacement of them. These local authorities were specifically constructed on Western concepts of popular autonomy, and had a better prospect of survival after independence since they were not linked to the chiefdoms. As town or municipal councils they often provided local services with considerable efficiency; the rural district authorities had a more uneven record, but some of them were well financed and effective bodies.

Stage 5

With the departure of colonial rulers and their replacement by new African regimes, the parameters of the political game were drastically altered, and regional agglomerations of power acquired greater significance. The centre's capacity for control through the administration had been reduced, despite its claims of popular representativeness. The African nationals who formed a new government might expect more easily to reach the ear and gain the sympathy of the population, but by comparison with the homogeneous alien administration that they followed, their action was often weak and divided. Opposition groups, from the Ashanti of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in the 1950s to

Joshua Nkomo's supporters in Zimbabwe today, have usually been based on cultural/ethnic regions within the state. Buganda, a strong traditional kingdom within Uganda, was dealt with in 1966 by removing its leader and dividing up the area into a number of parts for the purpose of civil administration. The Ibo-speaking peoples of Eastern Nigeria raised a civil war in 1967 against the Lagos government. Throughout tropical Africa there were less dramatic crises of an identical kind. It is worth stressing that cultural ties did not by themselves create a powerful pressure group; they had at least to be associated first with a geographical grouping of the people in question. Indeed an ethnic group that became divided between two districts frequently drifted into the assumption of district loyalties rather than ethnic ones. The two parts would then act independently or even come into conflict with each other.

How did the new governments react to these pluralist pressures? In nearly every case they centralized the power, so far as they were able, in the hands of a single party and suppressed regional institutions. (Nigeria here represents the outstanding exception - its cultural regions were too large and too firmly based for this solution - but a federal constitution has allowed the country to survive as a single state, at the cost of repeated governmental crises which continue to the present day). Centralization spread through the administrative apparatus, reinforced by the idea that rapid development required central planning by the government. The relatively autonomous local authorities that existed in many states at the time of independence, weakly established as they were, had lost

most of their autonomy by the end of the 1960s. The elected mayor or chairman of a local council might be replaced by either a government official or a nominated unofficial; in a one-party state he was often the chairman or secretary of the party branch appointed ex officio. Where competitive elections still existed to choose the councillors, the single party would pre-select the candidates. Economic planning had become an important theme of policy statements, but it was done at regional and local level by a separate hierarchy of planning committees under control from the centre, and not by the local authorities.

Stage 6

The centralizing wave of the 1960s brought little satisfaction, even in terms of the nation-building and rapid economic development at which it was officially aimed. Detailed control of the economy would have required a bureaucracy more effective than that possessed by any African country. Centralization of power also stimulated urbanization; the new ruling elite, as already mentioned, were overwhelmingly urban-based and the towns provided the bulk of economic as well as political opportunity. Yet the mass of the population lived in the rural areas and got their living from peasant methods of crop production. With few exceptions they gained little advantage, and in some instances saw a decline in their standard of living, in the first decade of independence. Many governments, with Ghana, Tanzania and Sudan in the forefront, turned as a result to organizing increased participation by people in the rural areas.

The formula adopted was not, however, that of classical local government. The African regimes were conscious of the inefficiency and managerial chaos that had often characterized local government in its period of decline - even though the decline had largely been caused by the central government's own neglect and withdrawal of resources from the local authorities. They set out to find a different solution which should give the benefits of popular participation without paying any substantial cost in political terms. The new local bodies were given a 'mixed' controlling council combining unofficial representatives, government officials, and Party politicians. Their funds were no longer held in a separate treasury, but fell into the government accounting system; their staff, including the chief executive, were members of the national bureaucracy and remained under direct central control. In return for this structural weakening of local autonomy, the functions of the local bodies were widened to include most of government's responsibilities at the local level. They could be given large spending and managing powers precisely because popular control over them had been severely diluted. The generalist field officer or prefect was often placed at the head of the organization, as secretary or executive chairman, and the authority became government's sole multi-purpose representative at the local level.

Considering the high hopes that had been placed in this new formula, it was striking how short a time it lasted. In Ghana, Sudan and Tanzania it had been abandoned or severely modified by 1981, within ten years of its inauguration, and in some respects (as in the Tanzanian towns) much sooner. Zambia and Kenya

installed similar systems in the early 1980s, under the respective titles of 'Decentralization' and 'District Focus', which have both come under criticism for the same reasons. The problem was generally that the mixed council operated as a form of central administration despite the inbuilt provisions for local representation. The unofficial councillors gained little influence over decision-making, because officials and Party men from the national networks possessed the bulk of the information. The local technical officers struggled between themselves for resources, and the council was not strong enough to reconcile these disputes because it had no direct power of discipline over them.(8)

Stage 7

The 1970s in Africa, like the 1960s, had brought wide evidence of popular dissatisfaction arising from the fact that power was centralized and little authority had been allowed to local bodies. Local governments existed in name, but the autonomy granted to them was very weak in practice. Even the greater economic efficiency that might have been hoped for from centralization seldom resulted. Many of the French-speaking governments had never set up autonomous local authorities but remained with a mixed or centralized system throughout - gaining from this at least the advantage of stability, in contrast with the more 'experimental' regimes. Where there was an election to the local council, it was organized on an indirect system or was subject to pre-selection of the approved candidates. A marxist-leninist bias to the national ideology, as in Guinea and Benin,

produced numerous local councils at several levels but with little formal power-sharing to them.

Since the latter part of the 1970s we have seen in Africa, as in Europe at the regional level, a number of movements favouring greater autonomy for the local authorities. Nigeria acted in this sense as early as 1975-76, having the benefit of large oil resources to finance the reforms and a single military command to push through the consultative and legislative procedures. A new single, and specifically political, level of authorities was set up for more than 300 local areas and officially defined as a "third tier of government". The experiment ran into difficulties as soon as military rule was succeeded (in 1979) by a civilian constitution: the federal states felt they were being undermined by the creation of the Local Governments, and a return to active party politics made it impossible, for the time being, to carry on fully representative local decision-making. However the country is now under a new military regime; the Local Governments are operated by appointed management committees, and questions of a more democratic system in the future are being debated.(9) In Tanzania the movement towards local political autonomy was stll more dramatic, since the system inherited from colonial times had been legally abolished and replaced by a network of Development Committees at regional and local levels: an example of the 'mixed' system referred to in Stage 6 above. What was now done - beginning in 1977 for the towns, and in 1982 for the rural areas - was to re-establish essentially the same form of 'modern' style local government that had prevailed in the 1960s. The difficulties now lie, not

in any need to modify the legal structures, but in the task of making them work successfully against a background of severe economic crisis. Sudan came out of its experimental period, which had involved a proliferation of councils at all levels aimed at universal participation, and since 1981 has placed the responsibility for government activities primarily at a single 'district' level. The district has its own representative council and an administration organized on classical local government lines. As with Tanzania however, the Sudan is in economic crisis and is also threatened by a regional civil war.

Other African states have moved in similar though less dramatic ways towards the development of greater local autonomy. The economic and political difficulties mentioned in these countries do not necessarily work against the concept of local autonomy. They may indeed make it a necessary precondition for the supply of local services, since the flow of support from the centre has dwindled almost to nothing. If no money is to be had from the national treasury, the only way of spending on local welfare is to raise revenues locally. The traditional authorities often come into prominence again: when there is no finance for a programme of development and change, their talents in providing order and good administration are the more valued. The writer has suggested elsewhere(10) that successful decentralization occurs when the political weather is good (that is, the regime is strong and unchallenged) but the economic weather is bad (it suffers a painful shortage of resources).

Managing the plural state

African countries have thus generally arrived at juridical statehood through the historically unique experience of a short period of colonial rule, followed by a sudden transition to political independence. They are still, however, struggling with the problem of attaining nationhood. The prevalence and force of cultural pluralism mean that the new state is weak in relation to internal groups which compete for power and economic resources. Such groups are not - or not yet - to any large extent class-based.(11) The expression of pluralist competition is usually in terms of ethnicity or regionalism; there are numerous instances of this, ranging from small local disputes to major events such as the 'Biafran' civil war. More than 20 years ago Zolberg described as a model the party-state of West Africa, which possessed massive authority but only in a narrow sector of governmental activity. Outside that sector there was a broad residual area in which values were allocated through channels and by decisions which the state could not control.(12) It is a picture which still describes much of the reality in tropical Africa generally, and the regimes have far to go in the struggle to assert their authority over regional and ethnic groupings.

Much rhetoric has been directed in Africa to defining an ideology for each state, and the range is wide: from one of mobilization and party domination, owing much to the Soviet model, to one that favours the rule of law and a peaceful climate for economic growth in collaboration with foreign

capital. Beneath these, however, is a political ideology which is common to every state, stressing order and effectiveness as the essential legitimacy of the government in office. This is neither a strange nor a reprehensible fact, since it simply expresses the weakness of all regimes in the face of plural forces. It has the consequence, however, that political opposition is seen by a government as illegitimate, as a rival which must be put down with whatever weapons are available. Even the degree of external collaboration or dependence of the state is little related to whether its declared ideology is more capitalist or more marxist. Both types of regime have asked for and accepted external support, and on the other hand both types have been found to act in ways which were unwelcome to their external backers.(13)

Despite the efforts to achieve greater centralization of authority that have been made since national independence, varying in character with the time and place, political decentralization is an empirical reality in every African state. This may be seen merely as a re-statement of the obvious fact of cultural pluralism, but it carries significance for governments which have to decide how to manage that pluralism. Even in a centralized administration, 'ethnic arithmetic' has been used since the earliest days of independence to share out posts of influence between competing groups. But some form of structural decentralization in government is also a method frequently used to bring the formal pattern of authority into closer conformity with the empirical pattern. Traditional heads exist for many African communities, from the level of a small

village up to the large emirates and chiefdoms. Governments and their field officials repeatedly strike implicit bargains with these traditional authorities, granting them recognition and financial support in return for their assistance. To set up a new administrative headquarters, with newly defined boundaries, may be the means of fragmenting an opposition group, or alternatively of co-opting its allegiance. As in 19th century France or Italy, the political generalist in the field - prefect or district officer - serves as government's agent for manoeuvres of this kind, alongside the local officers of the ruling party. Once again, the ideological colour of the regime makes little difference to the pattern of behaviour.

When ethnic or regional affiliations are handled directly, as questions of policy, there is often the same distinction between ideology and practice. We should set aside Nigeria, where the differences between large regions are so entrenched that only a federal constitution can hold the state together. In most other African states it is customary to treat 'tribalism' in public statements as an unmitigated evil. Concrete reality can be very different. As David Brown has demonstrated, "there have been numerous occasions on which governments, instead of seeking to reduce communal tensions, depoliticise them, and promote social harmony, have apparently gone out of their way to manipulate and exaggerate particular communal rivalries, and to promote distrust of particular groups".(14) Ethnic and regional loyalties are, in practice, used by governments just as by opposition groups when this can bring any advantage to them.

Generally speaking, because of the factors that have been discussed, African regimes are unable to treat cultural pluralism separately from political pluralism. In the United Kingdom or the USSR by contrast, the expression of regional cultures can be permitted or even encouraged officially, because the central state is not ultimately challenged by them. African governments, like those in other parts of the world, can allow themselves a degree of romanticism in their ideologies, because it is combined with tough pragmatism in the application of policy. When questions of political autonomy arise for sub-national regions, however, it is the pragmatism that will dictate the response. Decentralized government there must be since the attempts to administer centrally are ineffective, given the continuing extreme shortages in finance and qualified staff. But it has to be arranged in such a way as to minimize the opportunity for recruiting stronger opposition groups and giving them a platform. This is one important reason why decentralization occurs not to the regions, but to smaller areas in the form of representative and local government bodies. It is, for the national governments, a relatively 'safe' response to increasing political socialization, and Africa is currently in a phase where this response is being increasingly used.

Footnotes

(1) P. Buckholts, Political Geography (New York: Ronald, 1966) 470.

(2) An ecumene is defined as that region "that possesses the most favourable combination of population, resources, technology, transportation, and location". Ibid. 464.

(3) O.A.U. states resolved at their Cairo meeting in 1964 "to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence".

(4) See N. Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena (University of California Press, 1976).

(5) I have relied on the sketch provided by Professor Tamames to supplement my own ignorance of Spanish history - see "Spain: Regional Autonomy and the democratic transition" in M. Hebbert and H. Machin, Regionalisation in France, Italy and Spain (ICERD, London School of Economics, 1984) and the conference paper on which it was based.

(6) I.W. Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies 3.2 (1965) 155-175, argues that the present national boundaries are actually beneficial because of the social and economic diversity contained within each of the new states.

(7) In A. Maass, Area and Power (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959) 37.

(8) The mixed system of local administration has been dealt with in a wider context in P. Mawhood, "Decentralization and the Third World in the 1980s", Planning and Administration 14.1 (Spring 1987) 10-22.

(9) It should not be seen as a paradox when local government in Africa is more democratic under a military regime or one-party government than in a condition of pluralist party politics. National regimes which feel secure and unchallenged in their power are more likely to experiment with decentralized government, and this tends to be the dominant factor.

(10) See P. Mawhood, op.cit. 21-22.

(11) C Chapman, "Comparing African States", Political Studies XXXIV (1986) 649: "The African state itself cannot easily or plausibly be presented as the outcome of class forces or the expression of class interests, except for the interests of that 'class' which controls the state itself". See also R. Charlton and R. May, "State Weakness in Africa: a Critique", Politics 6.2 (October 1986) 25-32.

(12) A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) 131-134.

(13) W. Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1984) 272-275.

(14) D. Brown, "Sieges and Scapegoats: the politics of pluralism in Ghana and Togo", Civilisations XXXIII.2 (1983) 71-109.

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NATIONS ET MINORITÉS DANS L'ENSEIGNEMENT RÉCENT DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE

Jean-Yves Calvez

Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism, Barcelona

Nations et minorités dans l'enseignement récent de l'Eglise catholique

par Jean-Yves Calvez, Paris

Le problème des nations comme celui des minorités ont une longue histoire dans l'enseignement de l'Eglise catholique. Les nationalismes polonais et irlandais par exemple interrogèrent beaucoup l'Eglise catholique au XIXe siècle. L'Eglise s'est alors montrée plutôt réticente devant les nationalismes qui défaisaient les royaumes et les empires plurinationaux...Cette histoire n'est toutefois pas l'objet du présent rapport. Il abordera la seule période récente. Caractérisée tout spécialement par les prises de positions originales de Jean-Paul II depuis son arrivée au Souverain Pontificat en 1978. Il fera état cependant aussi, en guise d'arrière-plan, des positions "classiques" affirmées par Jean XXIII, Paul VI et le Concile Vatican II.

I

Les dangers du nationalisme. Des minorités peuvent abuser de leur situation.

Il faut ainsi d'abord relever la mise en garde contre le nationalisme qu'on trouve sous la plume de Paul VI, pape de 1963 à 1978, dans son encyclique Populorum progressio, sur le Développement des peuples, en 1967. "Il est naturel, disait-il, que des communautés récemment parvenues à leur indépendance politique soient jalouses d'une unité nationale encore fragile et s'efforcent de la protéger. Il est normal aussi que des nations de vieille culture soient fières du patrimoine que leur a livré l'histoire. Mais ces sentiments légitimes doivent être sublimés par la charité universelle qui englobe tous les membres de la famille humaine. Le nationalisme isole les peuples contre leur bien véritable. Il serait particulièrement nuisible là où la faiblesse des économies nationales exige au contraire la mise en commun des efforts, des connaissances et des moyens financiers, pour réaliser les programmes de développement et accroître les échanges commerciaux et culturels" (1) . Si Paul VI fait preuve de compréhension pour le sentiment national, il est sans hésitation sévère pour le nationalisme, il le considère comme particulièrement néfaste par rapport aux besoins de coopération économique du monde moderne.

Au Concile Vatican II ,en 1965, on avait entendu, dans une déclaration plus brève , tout à fait le même ton : de mise en garde contre la fermeture nationaliste, et d'appel pressant à tous ceux qui ont des responsabilités pour qu'ils "renoncent à l'égoisme national" (2).

Quelques années auparavant d'autre part, Jean XXIII, pape de 1958 à 1963, avait abordé, à côté du problème des nations, celui des "minorités". D'une manière à nouveau fort significative.

Le contexte est celui de l'obligation de respect des divers droits dans la communauté internationale. "Il peut arriver, et de fait il arrive, dit Jean XXIII, que les communautés politiques entrent en rivalité d'intérêts; ces connflits ne peuvent pourtant se régler ni par la force des armes, ni par la fraude ou la tromperie, mais comme il convient à des hommes, grâce à la compréhension mutuelle, par une estimation objective des données et moyennant un compromis équitable"(3). Dans ce contexte, la considération des minorités vient comme celle d' un des lieux principaux de litiges épineux au sein des Etats comme entre les nations, litiges qui précisément doivent trouver leur solution par la compréhension mutuelle et l'objectivité.

"Pour divers motifs, il n'est pas toujours possible de faire coincider les frontières géographiques et ethniques; d'où le phénomène des minorités et les problèmes si difficiles qu'elles soulèvent"(4). Jean XXIII commence alors par demander le respect des minorités, et de leurs droits et caractéristiques

propres, de tout ce qui leur assure vitalité. Même au plan économique, il faut avoir égard aux minorités, à leur personnalité. "Nous devons déclarer de la façon la plus explicite, dit-il, que toute politique tendant à contrarier la vitalité et l'expansion des minorités constitue une faute grave contre la justice, plus grave encore quand ces manoeuvres visent à les faire disparaître .Par contre rien de plus conforme à la justice que l'action menée par les pouvoirs publics pour améliorer les conditions de vie des minorités ethniques, notamment en ce qui concerne leur langue, leur culture, leurs coutumes, leurs ressources et leurs entreprises économiques" (5).

La pointe du texte se trouve cependant ailleurs. Dans ce qui suit: "On observera pourtant, dit Jean XXIII,que ces minorités ,soit par réaction contre la situation pénible qui leur est imposée, soit en raison des vicissitudes de leur passé, sont assez souvent portées à exagérer l'importance de leurs particularités, au point même de les faire passer avant les valeurs humaines universelles, comme si le bien de toute la famille humaine devait être subordonné aux intérêts de leur propre nation. Il serait normal, au contraire, que les intéressés prennent également conscience des avantages de leur condition: le contact quotidien avec des hommes dotés d'une culture ou d'une civilisation différente les enrichit spirituellement et intellectuellement et leur offre la possibilité d'assimiler progressivement les valeurs propres au milieu dans lequel ils se trouvent implantés. Cela se réalisera s'ils constituent comme un pont qui facilite la circulation de la

vie, sous ses formes diverses, et non pas une zone de friction, cause de dommages sans nombre et obstacle à tout progrès et à toute évolution" (6).

Le propos a donc pour finalité principale de demander aux minorités une contrepartie au respect revendiqué en leur faveur, et de lutter contre la crispation à laquelle elles sont souvent tentées de céder. Jean XXIII a en effet une vue large de la communauté des nations, et il est très persuadé de la nécessité d'un progrès dans l'organisation de cette communauté, comme du besoin d'une autorité politique mondiale à la mesure des problèmes internationaux, de sécurité et de coopération économique, que les Etats particuliers n'arrivent plus à résoudre par les formes ordinaires de leur coopération.

Dans cette perspective, les nations ne sont nullement appelées à disparaître. Et Jean XXIII spécifie que dans les rapports de l'autorité mondiale avec les gouvernements des Etats, le principe de subsidiarité doit toujours s'appliquer:"Le rôle de cette autorité universelle est d'examiner et de résoudre les problèmes que pose le bien commun universel en matière économique, sociale, politique et culturelle. C'est la complexité, l'ampleur et l'urgence de ces problèmes qui ne permettent pas aux gouvernements nationaux de les résoudre à souhait. Il n'appartiendra pas à l'autorité de la communauté mondiale de limiter l'action que les Etats exercent dans leur sphère propre, ni de se substituer à eux. Elle doit au contraire tâcher de susciter dans tous les pays du monde des conditions qui facilitent non seulement aux gouvernements mais aussi aux

individus et aux corps intermédiaires l'accomplissement de leurs fonctions, l'observation de leurs devoirs et l'usage de leurs droits dans des conditions de plus grande sécurité"(7).

Néanmoins, et très clairement, les nations seront amenées, selon Jean XXIII, à consentir des sacrifices. Jusque de quelque chose de leur souveraineté. A plus forte raison, les minorités doivent-elles en bien des cas savoir consentir des sacrifices pour tirer bénéfice de l'avantage que constituent les plus vastes ensembles politiques.

II

La nation et la culture. Souveraineté de la nation parce que l'homme, qui s'y exprime par la culture, est souverain.

Cette position n'a pas été annulée, elle est cependant ou a pu être bousculée par les prises de position de Jean-Paul II sur la question des nations, et aussi des minorités. Ce sont ces prises de position qu'il convient maintenant d'examiner. Sous leur forme la plus caractéristique, on les trouve au début du pontificat, durant le premier voyage que Jean-Paul II fit en Pologne comme pape, en 1979,puis dans son discours à l'UNESCO en 1980.

D'autres prises de position intéressantes apparaissent cependant aussi depuis, surtout dans la rencontre par le pape des problèmes des populations autochtones ou aborigènes du Canada, de plusieurs pays latino-américains, d'Australie :nous les examinerons égalerment.

Le point essentiel à relever, dans les premières prises de position de Jean-Paul II, c'est qu'il fait grand cas de la nation parce qu'il fait grand cas de la culture. "La culture, déclare-t-il devant des jeunes Polonais à Gniezno le 3 juin 1979, est l'expression de l'homme, c'est la confirmation de l'humanité. L'homme la crée et, par elle, l'homme se crée lui-même. Il se crée lui-même par l'effort intérieur de l'esprit, de la pensée, de la volonté, du coeur. Et, en même temps, il crée la cultue en communion avec les autres. La culture est l'expression de la communication, de la pensée commune et de la collaboration mutuelle des hommes. Elle naît du service du bien commun et devient un bien essentiel des communautés humaines"(8). Deux affirmations surtout sont ici à souligner : la culture est oeuvre et expression de l'homme ; c'est une expression de l'homme en rapport avec l'autre homme - les autres hommes - , c'est une oeuvre commune.

"La culture est un bien commun de la nation", ajoute Jean-Paul II. On voit mieux ce qu'il veut dire en le suivant dans les précisions apportées par lui sur le cas polonais :"La culture polonaise est un bien sur lequel s'appuie la vie spirituelle des Polonais. Elle nous distingue comme nation. Elle décide de nous tout au long de l'histoire, elle est plus décisive encore que la force matérielle. Et même plus encore que les frontières

politiques. On sait que la nation polonaise est passée par la dure épreuve de la perte de l'indépendance pendant plus de cent ans. Et au milieu de cette épreuve, elle est restée toujours elle-même. Elle est restée spirituellement indépendante parce qu'elle a eu sa propre culture" (9).

La culture fait en somme la nation. Elle peut permettre à une nation de persister même quand est annulée son expression politique - comme Etat -. Remarquons en même temps le " elle décide de nous", qui semble donner une priorité à quelque chose de collectif sur le personnel. Il n'est toutefois possible d'interpréter cette formule que dans le contexte général du personnalisme social qui domine toute la pensée de Jean-Paul II.

La culture polonaise, dit-il d'autre part , est marquée d'une manière très forte par le christianisme . "Depuis les débuts", dit-il. Et quelques jours après, il précisait devant les évêques de Pologne réunis à Jasna Gora :"Lorsque les structures de la nation et de l'Etat ont fait défaut; la société, catholique pour sa plus grande partie, a trouvé l'appui de l'organisation hiérarchique de l'Eglise, qui l'a aidée aussi à surmonter les temps de la partition du pays et de l'occupation..." (10). On pouvait , écoutant Jean-Paul II, percevoir ici une allusion à d'autres temps d'éclipse ou presque de l'expression publique de la nation polonaise.

En s'adressant, un peu plus tôt, aux autorités politiques, Jean-Paul II n'avait pas introduit son propos sur la relation entre culture et nation, mais il avait clairement souligné l'importance de la nation elle-même. "De la société, de

la nation, de la patrie", avait-il dit. Il n'avait pas opposé nation et Etat. Cependant il avait clairement présenté le droit de la nation "à être sujet socio-politique". Il avait ajouté qu'elle a "le droit aussi à la formation de sa propre culture et de sa propre civilisation", ce qui veut dire que l'Etat par exemple ne peut pas lui imposer une autre culture que celle qui lui est "propre", sous-entendu peut-on dire, celle qui la constitue.

A l'UNESCO, un an plus tard, l'idée fondamentale que Jean-Paul II met en avant est celle de "souveraineté fondamentale" de la nation "en vertu de sa propre culture". Cette souveraineté de la nation en raison de la culture est souveraineté de l'homme même, qui s'exprime justement par la culture. "Il existe, dit Jean-Paul II, une souveraineté fondamentale de la société qui se manifeste dans la culture de la nation. Il s'agit de la souveraineté par laquelle , en même temps, l'homme est suprêmement souverain" (11).

Jean-Paul II ajoute qu'il s'agit de faire en sorte que "l'homme compte ...comme sujet de sa propre existence humaine". Au lieu d'être un "objet de domination" pour quelque totalitarisme, impérialisme ou hégémonie.

"La nation, a-t-il dit précédemment, est la grande communauté des hommes qui sont unis par des liens divers mais surtout, précisément, par la culture. La nation existe par la culture et pour la culture, et elle est donc la grande éducatrice des hommes pour qu'ils puissent "être davantage" dans la communauté. Elle est cette communauté qui possède une histoire

dépassant l'histoire de l'individu et de la famille"(12). Histoire où l'individu ne s'aliène pourtant pas puisque, comme nous l'avons vu, c'est justement par la culture que l'homme est sujet. A condition certes que la culture elle-même ne soit jamais présupposée aux hommes concrets qui en vivent et qui la renouvellent (aujourd'hui même) .

Dans cette perspective de la nation-culture, Jean-Paul II témoigne ainsi devant l'UNESCO :"La nation polonaise a conservé son identité, et elle a conservé, malgré les partitions et les occupations étrangères, sa souveraineté nationale, non en s'appuyant sur les ressources de la force physique, mais uniquement sur sa culture..."(13).

Ensuite, assurément, Jean-Paul II se défend expressément de faire du "nationalisme" . Il affirme vouloir seulement mettre en relief "un élément stable de l'expérience humaine et des perspectives humanistes du développement de l'homme" (14). Encore une fois, il y va de la souveraineté de l'homme même. Jean-Paul II évoque donc aussi avec sympathie et chaleur les jeunes nations en train de naître, déjà en possession cependant d'une identité, qu'il est question de "maintenir". Il écrit: "Je pense avec admiration aux cultures des nouvelles sociétés, de celles qui s'éveillent à la vie dans la communauté de la propre nation - tout comme ma nation s'est éveillée à la vie il y a dix siècles - et qui luttent pour maintenir leur propre identité et leurs propres valeurs contre les influences et les pressions de modèles proposés de l'extérieur"(15).

La portée du discours pour aujourd'hui est, enfin, surtout dans cette phrase : "N'y a-t-il pas, sur la carte de l'Europe et du monde, des nations qui ont une merveilleuse souveraineté historique provenant de leur culture, et qui sont pourtant en même temps privées de leur pleine souveraineté? N'est-ce pas un point important pour l'avenir de la culture humaine, important surtout à notre époque, quand il est tellement urgent d'éliminer les restes du colonialisme?"(16).

III

Questions suscitées par les prises de position de Jean-Paul II

Jean-Paul II n'a jamais fait à nouveau par la suite un exposé complet de sa conception de la nation et de l'enracinement de celle-ci dans la culture. Il reste cependant, à n'en pas douter, tout à fait fidèle à cette conception. Durant son second voyage comme pape en Pologne en 1983 , il a exalté la signification de Jasna Gora quant à "la liberté de la nation", quant à "la patrie libre qui a recouvré la dignité d'Etat souverain". Il poursuivait: "La nation est vraiment libre quand elle peut prendre la figure d'une communauté déterminée par l'unité de culture, de langue et d'histoire. L'Etat, lui, est affermi dans sa souveraineté lorsqu'il gouverne la société et qu'en même temps il sert le bien commun de la société et permet à la nation de se réaliser dans sa personnalité, dans son identité. Cela comporte entre autres la création de conditions opportunes de développement dans le domaine de la culture, de l'économie, et en d'autres secteurs de vie de la communauté sociale. La

souveraineté de l'Etat est profondément liée à sa capacité de promouvoir la liberté de la nation, c'est-à-dire de développer les conditions qui permettent à celle-ci d'exprimer son identité particulière, sur le plan historique et culturel, autrement dit d'être souveraine par le moyen de l'Etat"(17).

Cette année encore, d'autre part, dans son allocution de début d'année au corps diplomatique accrédité auprès du Saint Siège, Jean-Paul II, qui parlait des droits de l'homme, a ajouté tout aussitôt : "Il ne faut pas oublier non plus les droits des nations à conserver et à défendre leuir indépendance, leur identité culturelle, la possibilité de s'organiser socialement, de gérer leurs affaires et de conduire leur destinée librement, sans être à la merci, directement ou indirectement, de puissances étrangères . Vous connaissez comme moi les cas où ce droit est violé" (18).

On perçoit en fait aisément l'intérêt de cet enseignement. D'abord, de l'affirmation de la souveraineté de l'homme lui-même - équivalemment, de sa qualité de "sujet", d'être qui ne peut jamais être traité comme simple objet. Puis de l'affirmation d'un lien étroit entre l'homme et la culture et, par voie de conséquence, de l'idée de la souveranité des communautés de culture - des nations comme communautés de culture.

Divers commentateurs ne s'en sont pas moins posé aussi certaines questions devant la pensée de Jean-Paul II . Dans un éditorial de la revue Projet en 1980, par exemple, Philippe Laurent écrivait :" Ces vues, fortes et originales, ne

s'appliquent pas aussi facilement aux grandes nations modernes. Certaines ont trouvé leur unité dans une diversité culturelle, parfois avec des heurts. Si les Etats-Unis ont forgé leur unité à partir de peuples aux cultures diverses mais assez proches quand même, il existe en cette nation des minorités raciales - noire, en particulier- d'origines culturelles fort éloignées. A l'intérieur d'une même nation, toute minorité culturelle a droit à une expression propre ; peut-elle pour autant revendiquer une existence nationale distincte? Que l'on songe à la culture berbère en Afrique du nord. Les Kurdes, qui ont une culture propre, se trouvent répartis, contre leur gré, en plusieurs nations différentes; peuvent-ils longtemps exister dans une telle situation? Il y a aussi les Arméniens, et bien d'autres... Par ailleurs, une même culture, islamique par exemple, soutient plusieurs nations qui se veulent distinctes, chacune souveraine. Nation et culture propre ne se recouvrent pas nécessairement" (19).

Seconde question ensuite: Jean-Paul II donnerait l'impression que les cultures nationales, une fois nées, persévèrent nécessairement dans leur être, sans plus se fondre ou se mélanger. "Aujourd'hui, notait Ph. Laurent, à propos de culture on parle à la fois d'identité, de respect de la différence, d'une pluralité légitime. Mais une question majeure demeure : les cultures, même traditionnelles, ont évolué, lentement certes, et évoluent encore, précisément au contact des autres cultures. Ces transformations sont-elles nécessairement mauvaises? Un conservatisme culturel ne serait-il pas lui-même dangereux, sorte d'isolat dans un monde toujours plus intercommunicant, culturellement d'abord?"(20).

En dernier lieu, selon Ph.Laurent, n'y a-t-il pas aujourd'hui des développements culturels entraînant universalisation, plutôt que particularisation . " L'ère des civilisations agraires est en voie de dépassement, avec l'avènement de l'homme technicien et aussi de l'homme urbain. Et la technique ne se juge pas seulement à ses produits et à leur utilisation. Elle représente une démarche de l'esprit, suscite des comportements originaux et donne naissance à une culture dont nous sommes tous plus ou moins imprégnés, ne serait-ce que par l'usage quotodien des objets techniques et par la diffusion des informations par les médias. Elle tend à s'universaliser. Fruit partiel, certes, mais significatif de l'intelligence et de l'agir de l'homme, la technique est une culture particulière, à vocation transnationale. Elle ne se situe pas du simple côté de l'"avoir", elle est une forme d'être, de penser, de travailler, de se relier, de dépasser ses limites. Faut-il s'en défendre alors qu'elle est déjà installée? " (21)

Dans un article , également de Projet, en 1981, sous le titre "Les droits de l'homme selon Jean-Paul II", Paul Valadier croit, quant à lui, pouvoir signaler une caractéristique méfiance de Jean-Paul II envers les Etats, en raison de la multiplication des mises en garde à leur endroit. "En aucun cas le pouvoir ne peut se permettre de violer les droits fondamentaux de l'homme", dit par exemple Jean-Paul II devant le corps diplomatique à Brasilia en 1980 : ne soupçonne-t-il pas spontanément le pouvoir de l'Etat?

De même ,dès sa première encyclique , Redemptor hominis, en 1979, il a dit :" Le sens fondamental de l'Etat comme communauté politique consiste en ce que la société qui le compose, le peuple, est maître de son destin" (22). Et il revient,selon lui, au peuple lui-même, et non pas à " un pouvoir imposé par un groupe déterminé à tous les autres membres de la société" - l'Etat? certains Etats? -, de faire respecter les droits de l'homme. Le numéro 17 de Redemptor hominis où l'on peut lire ce point de vue révélerait , selon Paul Valadier, un changement par rapport à l'enseignement de Paul VI.

Paul Valadier pense certes que le changement peut s'expliquer: "Trop d'Etats totalitaires se sont montrés les ennemis des droits de l'homme pour qu'on puisse attendre d'eux le respect et la mise en oeuvre de ces mêmes droits, ou encore trop d'Etats ne sont que la propriété privée d'un parti pour que le peuple puisse se reconnaître et y forger son destin"(23). Paul Valadier s'interroge, cependant, ainsi : "Ce débordement de la structure étatique par appel direct à la conscience ne va pas sans problème : en effet lorsque les droits de l'homme ne sont pas aussi ceux du citoyen, c'est-à-dire garantis par une constitution et un ensemble de lois ou de mesures sociales sur lesquelles urger, ou faire appel, on ne voit pas bien la portée concrète de ces droits" (24). Assurément, la méfiance de l'Etat est corrélative chez Jean-Paul II de sa confiance dans les nations et dans leur identité culturelle, qui est pour lui la vraie garantie de l'homme. Des problèmes n'en demeurent pas moins sans doute.

Dans le même sens, plus récemment, Marcel Merle a publié une intéressante étude "Droits de l'Etat,droits de l'homme, droits des peuples, droits des nations?"(25), où il exprime son impression d'un certain danger de la multiplication des affirmations sur les droits de l'homme, les droits des peuples, les droits des nations, et, corrélativement, d'un certain mutisme sur les droits des Etats :" Si, dit-il, le contrôle de la situation échappe aux Etats très souvent aujourd'hui, cela tient à de multiples raisons : montée de l'interdépendance et de la compétition économique, apparition sur la scène internationale de nouveaux acteurs internationaux et supranationaux; mais cela tient aussi aux résistances que l'action du pouvoir central rencontre de la part des minorités ethniques, linguistiques, confessionnelles ou idéologiques. Le phénomène touche en premier lieu les jeunes Etats (qui sont aussi les plus nombreux) à la recherche d'une identié souvent problématique; mais il n'épargne pas non plus les vieux Etats, comme le prouve la poussée des micronationalismes et la multiplication des actes de terrorisme. Rares sont aujourd'hui les pays à l'abri des menées séparatistes ou irrédentistes... Dans ces conditions, l'accent mis sur les "droits des nations" ou sur le "droit des peuples" ne risque-t-il pas d'aggraver l'aspect chaotique de la société internationale?" (26).

Marcel Merle constate certes ensuite que fort heureusement l'Eglise hiérarchise peuples, nations, Etats et organisations internationales. Il s'inquiète neanmoins du fait que l'anthropologie chrétienne sous-jacente n'est pas forcément ni facilement partagée par les non-chrétiens (27). Ce qui est dit risque donc d'être mal compris . Le discours de l'Eglise, de

plus, " sous-estime le caractère conflictuel de la société internationale". Alors, dit-il, " entre la défense et l'illustration du status quo, qui couvre parfois beaucoup d'injustices, et l'encouragement donné aux forces de "libération", dont l'action risque d'entraîner une série incontrôlable d'explosions en chaîne, l'hésitation est permise" (28).

Je dirais, pour ma part, qu'au total il n' y a pas de véritable contradiction entre l'enseignement de Jean-Paul II et celui de ses prédécesseurs. Jean-Paul II est sensible comme ils l'étaient au besoin d'institutionnalisation de la société internationale et au besoin d'une vraie autorité dans cette société . Ecrivant, par exemple, récemment : "Les valeurs de solidarité et de dialogue demandent à prendre une dimension institutionnelle sous la forme d'organismes spécialisés de la communauté mondiale veillant au bien commun de tous les peuples" (29).

Avec Jean-Paul II cependant la dimension respect des nations a repris de l'importance. Ce qu'il faut bien remarquer - est-ce toujours perçu? - , c'est que sa pensée n'est pas une valorisation de la particularité et de l'intérêt propre pour eux-mêmes, c'est une valorisation de ce qui est libre expression de l'hommme, ou d'un groupe d'hommes, donc de la culture . De cela seulement. Entre la nation dont il parle et le nationalisme il y a donc loin, très loin même.

Reste assurément qu'entre la nation à laquelle doit correspondre un Etat et les minorités, les peuples auxquels ne doit pas nécessairement correspondre un Etat, il est souvent difficile de discriminer. C'est la question délicate, inéluctablement posée pourtant,, que le propos de Jean-Paul II laisse derrière lui. En fait la société internationale doit avoir un rôle pour en décider. Ce n'est toutefois pas explicité.

IV

Le droit des peuples autochtones

Quoi qu'il en soit de ce problème laissé pendant, il est clair qu'au sein d'une doctrine catholique complexe, qui insiste fortement sur la réalité de la communauté mondiale et le besoin , en elle, d'autorités neuves à la mesure des problèmes qui s'y rencontrent désormais, mais qui connaît aussi le droit des personnes, des cultures, des nations, le pôle du respect dû aux entités qui sourdent de la création culturelle des hommes est particulièrement en vue pour l'instant. Un dernier trait intéressant est d'ailleurs propre à corroborer cette notation : c'est le fait de l'intérêt très grand que Jean-Paul II démontre depuis quelque temps pour les droits et les revendications des peuples autochotones. En prenant leur parti, en épousant leur cause, il ne veut pas donner l'impression que les gouvernements seraient insensibles, il manifeste au contraire qu'il s'appuie sur leur bonne volonté. Il s'engage cependant, en termes exprès, dans l'affirmation de la nécessité de redresser les torts qui ont

été faits à ces peuples, devenus souvent les plus pauvres parmi les peuples pauvres. Relevons quelques exemples de cet engagement.

En 1984,d'abord, à Sainte Anne de Beaupré au Canada, Jean-Paul II rencontre des Indiens et des Inuit. Il leur déclare : "Avec raison vous voulez contrôler votre avenir, préserver vos caractéristiques essentielles, mettre en place un sytème scolaire qui respecte vos langues propres". Il poursuit, assurément, en invitant en même temps à la réconciliation, à l'apaisement, et à la " recherche d'une bonne compréhension entre les habitants de ce pays" (30) .

Quelques jours plus tard, dans un discours pour des autochotones du Nord-ouest canadien qu'il ne peut prononcer mais néanmoins publie, Jean-Paul II rappelle les siècles d'injustice, il se réjouit ensuite qu'"heureusement la situation a changé dans une très large mesure", puis neanmoins il ajoute: "Aujourd'hui, je veux proclamer cette liberté qui est requise pour une juste et véritable mesure d'autodétermination dans votre vie de peuples autochtones. Avec l'appui de toute l'Eglise, je proclame vos droits et les obligations qui en découlent. Et aussi je condamne l'oppression physique, culturelle et religieuse, et tout ce qui vous priverait, vous ou tout autre peuple, de ce qui lui appartient en droit".

Il poursuit - non sans l'aveu du gouvernement canadien, on peut le supposer, mais ce n'est pas moins significatif - :" Pour vous , une base territoriale dotée de ressources suffisantes

est nécessaire, afin de développer une économie viable pour les générations présentes et futures... Je sais que des pourparlers sont en cours et que les parties en cause ont fait preuve de beaucoup de bonne volonté. C'est mon espoir et ma prière que des résultats satisfaisants puissent être obtenus" (31). A ces autochtones Jean-Paul II a dit aussi auparavant :" Lorsqu'ils vous prêchent l'Evangile, les missionnaires veulent rester à vos côtés dans vos épreuves et vos problèmes, et dans votre juste combat".

Jean-Paul II a usé du même ton, ensuite, auprès des Indiens, en Equateur et au Pérou , en 1985. A Latacunga (Equateur), au Cuzco (Pérou). Mais surtout à Iquitos, en Amazonie péruvienne. Il y a quelque 250.000 Indiens dans cette région. "Je sais, leur a déclaré Jean-Paul II, que vous avez des occasions de souffrir parce que, alors que vous êtes les possesseurs pacifiques depuis un temps immémorial de ces forêts et de ces pampas, vous voyez très souvent s'éveiller la cupidité de ceux qui y sont arrivés récemment, qui menacent vos réserves, sachant que, pour beaucoup d'entre vous, vous n'avez pas de titres de propriété écrits en faveur de vos communautés, qui garantisse légalement vos terres".

Puis d'ajouter : "Conformément aux lois du Pérou et à vos droits ancestraux, je fais mien, moi aussi, l'appel de vos évêques de la Selva pour que l'on vous octroie - sans charges ni délais injustifiés - les titres qui vous reviennent". En même temps, certes : " Vous ne pouvez pas vous fermer aux autres. Ouvrez les portes à ceux qui viennent à vous avec un message de pâix et les mains disposées à vous aider" (32).

Le contexte est semblable, enfin, en Australie, où le pape s'est rendu en 1986. Et devant les aborigènes rencontrés par lui, sa réaction est la même . Il prend leur parti. "Beaucoup d'entre vous, dit-il, ont été dépossédés de leurs territoires et séparés de leurs coutumes tribales... La discrimination causée par le racisme est une expérience quotidienne".

Jean-Paul II rappelle ensuite ce trait de l'histoire de l'Eglise catholique en Australie: " Dès le début, des hommes commme Monseigneur Polding , (le premier) archevêque de Sydney, s'opposa à la fiction légale adoptée par les colons européens, selon laquelle cette terre était terra nullius, le pays de personne". Il s'engage alors lui-même, ainsi : " L'Eglise, aujourd'hui encore, continue de vous soutenir".

On ne récrit certes pas l'histoire, de l'avis de Jean-Paul II : "A coup sûr, dit-il, ce qui a été fait ne peut être défait". Cependant, poursuit-il, " ce qui peut être fait maintenant pour remédier aux actes du passé, ne peut être remis à demain" (33).

Quelle insistance au total! Non pas dans une volonté de provoquer des revendications désordonnées. Encore moins, de déstabiliser des Etats. D'encourager à la fragmentation des grandes entités politiques. Mais dans la conviction qu'il y a urgence de mieux respecter les droits de ces populations autochtones. Dans la conviction ,aussi, qu'on a trop tergiversé et qu'on s'est trop facilement trouvé des excuses pour retarder

le redressement des injustices . Bref, dans le cadre d' une doctrine de la nation et des minorités dont l'ensemble est inchangé, il y a un déplacement aujourd'hui en direction du respect scrupuleux des droits des nations, minorités et peuples particuliers. Et ceci en vue de toujours et partout respecter la culture , cette réalité en laquelle s'exprime si caractéristiquement l'homme.

Notes

(1) Populorum progressio, n. 62

(2) Gaudium et spes, n. 82, 2.

(3) Pacem in terris, n.93

(4) Pacem in terris, n.94

(5) Pacem in terris, n. 95-96.

(6) Pacem in terris, n. 97.

(7) Pacem in terris, n. 140-141 ;

(8) Documentation catholique, 1979, p. 613

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Documentation catholique, 1980, p. 606.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibid.

(15) Documentation catholique, 1980, p. 607.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Documentation catholique, 1983, p. 789.

(18) Documentation catholique, 1987, p. 187.

(19) Projet, 1980, p. 775.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Redemptor hominis (1979), n. 17.

(23) Projet, 1981, p. 76.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Pro fide et iustitia, Festschrift für Agostino Kardinal Casaroli zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg von Herbert Schambeck, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1984.

(26) opcit., p. 774.

(27) opcit: p. 779.

(28) op.cit. , p. 780.

(29) Documentation catholique, 1986, p. 3.

(30) Documentation catholique, 1984, p. 942.

(31) Documentation catholique, 1984, p. 969.

(32) Documentation catholique, 1885, p. 352.

I.P.S.A. International Political Science Association
A.I.S.P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

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REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE UNITARY STATE:

THE CASE OF POLAND

Piotr Winczorek

Piotr Winczorek

/Warsaw/

Regional problems and the unitary state: the case of Poland

The origins of the Polish state date back to over one thousand years ago. It was then, in the middle of the 10th century, following the rise of a powerful line of princes ruling over the basin of the River Warta, and able to unite the dispersed West Slavonic peoples living in the area bounded by the rivers Bug and Odra, the Baltic Sea coast and the range of the Western Carpathians, that Poland first entered the stage of European history as an organized political entity.

The major factors contributing to the unification and consolidation of that conglomeration of tribes, which varied strongly in the degree of their civilizational advancement, were Christianity /from 966/ and a centralized monarchy, with King /from 1025/ Boleslaus of the Piast Family as the most outstanding of its early founders. Christianity, in its Latin version, was to link Poland with Western civilization. Only the Eastern margins of the newly formed state were in the orbit of the Byzantine-Orthodox civilization.

The first centuries of Polish statehood were marked by a relatively high degree of political and cultural centralization. However, like many other European states of that period, Poland did not manage to avoid the feudal division. This came along with the death of King Casimir II /1138/, when the country was split up between his sons. The origin of this division lay not only in dynastic disputes, but also in the still existing differences between the various regions, differences which grew even more conspicuous in the following centuries,

as, for instance, in the disputes between the provinces of Wielkopolska /Western Poland/ and Małopolska /Southern Poland/.

One of the most serious consequences of the division was that Poland's position in international relations was greatly weakened, and her lands along the River Odra and the coast of the Baltic Sea were being broken up into ever smaller pieces. These lands, ruled over for a long time to come by descendants of the Polish Piast dynasty, were also coming more and more deeply within the sphere of influence of the neighbouring powers. As they lost their independence, the Polish population was forced into the loss of its national identity. This process continued until the middle of the present, twentieth, century.

The Polish state reappeared as united kingdom at the beginning of the 14th century, and covered some of the ethnic Polish lands in the basins of the Warta, Upper and Middle Vistula and the Bug. Until the middle of the 20th century, almost all of Silesia and Western Pomerania, and, for a period of time /until 1525/, also the province of Mazovia /Mazowsze/, remained outside the territory of the Polish state.

The 14th century also the beginning of Poland's expansion beyond its ethnic boundaries. The Kingdom came to include some Ruthenian lands with their capital at Lwów. However, the really great increase in Polish political influence in the East followed the accession to the throne of Cracow of the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Ladislaus Jagiełło. From 1385 Poland and Lithuania were bound by personal union, and the Jagiełło dynasty /1386-1572/ became one of the finest ruling families in Europe.

The union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania survived the death in 1572 of the last member of the last member of the Jagiełło dynasty, as in 1569 it was transformed

from a personal into a permanent real union by the Union of Lublin act. The state constituted by Poland and Lithuania, as well as Ruthenia, which was an area of Polish-Lithuanian rivalry, was one of the largest in Europe at that time.

There was a great deal of diversity within that state. It was inhabited by peoples of different ethnic origins, of different languages, cultures and religions. The levels of economic development varied greatly from one region to another. On the one hand, there were the aristocratic latifundia in the East with primitive agriculture based on the exploitation of peasants who did not belong to the Polish stock, and on the other, there were the prosperous towns of western Poland, some of which belonged to the Hanseatic League of northern Europe.

The Poland of the 16th and 17th centuries was thus a country of significant internal differentiation, mainly along the regional lines: the distinctive ethnic, religious, cultural and economic, and to a certain extent also political, characteristics tended to occur jointly in definite, though not infrequently extensive, geographical areas. In the 16th and at the beginning of the 17th century, this internal diversity was reflected in and accompanied by a multiplicity of well-functioning institutions of the state system. The multinational and multidenominational Polish state was therefore able to avoid the religious wars which at that time were ravaging the countries of Western Europe, and especially Germany.

From the middle of the 17th century and throughout the 18th century, the strength and integrity of the Polish-Lithuanian state was gradually eroding. This was due not so much to ethno-cultural or regional irredenta, but rather the result of deep economic stagnation, political anarchization, and the decline in the authority of public

institutions - the monarchy, the Sejm /which was the chief legislature/, and the law. An infamous role in weakening the Polish state was played by the by then already assimilated, aristocratic families of Lithuania and Ruthenia.

The internal decline of the state was exploited by Poland's ascendant and ever more powerful neighbours - Prussia, Russia and Austria. In 1772 and 1793 they annexed vast areas of adjoining Polish lands, and in 1795 they partitioned Poland altogether. Thus Poland lost its independent statehood for a period of 123 years.

The Polish lands annexed by the partitioning powers were, from their point of view, of peripheral nature. The main concern of Berlin, St.Petersburg and Vienna was to integrate the annexed lands with their own states and to preserve the continuing ownership of those lands. Hence, the policies conducted for many years, especially by the Prussian and Russian governments, of ridding the Polish lands of their original ethnic character, and of consolidating the economic, political and cultural domination of the German and Great Russian ethnic elements. Only the authorities in Vienna pursued /from the middle of the 19th century/ a more liberal policy in this respect.

The partition of Poland into three parts belonging to various states imprinted a strong mark in many areas of public life. By the end of foreign rule, the three parts had come to differ in levels of economic development, in models of political life, and also in the mental attitudes of their Polish inhabitants. The forces that bound the Polish people of the three partition zones together were the unshaken unity of their culture, the basic unity of their language, the sharing of a fervent Catholic faith, a sense of historical tradition and the awareness of national humiliation. These were also the stimuli that kindled Polish aspirations of

regaining national independence.

Meanwhile, in the 19th and 20th centuries, some new factors emerged in Poland's former eastern lands which precluded the return of an independent Polish state to its original, pre-partition borders when the chance to reconstruct such a state materialized in 1918. These factors included the national rebirth of the Lithuanians, and the emergence of the two modern nations of Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Those nations also wanted to establish or re-establish their own statehood and these aspirations came into conflict with the Polish plans for independence. On the other hand, the western part of the country /Silesia, Pomerania, Wielkopolska/ saw a continuous struggle between the Poles and the pressures of German colonization.

Faced with a new balance of national power in Central and Eastern Europe, Polish politicians put forward two conceptions for the reconstruction of the Polish state. The National camp /with its leader Roman Dmowski/ proposed a unitary state based on the Polish ethnic element, which would pursue an active policy of integrating non-Polish ethnic minorities. The grouping known as the Independence camp /under Józef Piłsudski/ opted for the creation in Central and Eastern Europe of a federation of nation-states /including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and the Ukraine/ to be headed by Poles. In the final count, the conception actually implemented in the years between 1918 and 1939 was tnat of Dmowski, although for the most part of that period /since 1926/ it was the supporters of Piłsudski who held the power.

The interwar Republic of Poland was a unitary multinational state. The rural areas east of the River Bug were populated mainly by Ukrainians Byelorussians and Lithuanians. The cities and towns were inhabited by

Poles or Jews. The Jewish population was also dispersed throughout central and south-eastern Poland. Silesia and Pomerania had economically powerful concentrations of German population. In all, about one third of the country's population was made up by ethnic /national/ minorities.

However, none of the regions with a non-Polish majority had any regional autonomy. The only region to enjoy such autonomy was the province of Silesia /voivodship of Silesia/ with its capital at Katowice. The reason for the autonomy of Upper Silesia was not to be found in the considerable, one must admit, cultural and economic distinctiveness of the region, but rather in Poland's international obligations stemming from the Treaty of Versailles and the new European order it had introduced. Autonomy was a compromise solution which the Polish state had to accept in order to safeguard national interests and satisfy the desires of the Polish majority in Upper Silesia in settling the violent dispute /1918-1921/ between Poland and Germany for the control of that richly endowed region.

The Poland of the interwar years was a country in which civilizational development varied greatly from one region to another; and the regional differences were compounded by strong and not fully resolved ethnic tensions. Despite this the Polish state did manage to achieve an advanced degree of unification of the former partition areas. Public administration was unified, and much progress was made in making uniform the legal and economic systems; the differences in mentality and custom were also gradually disappearing.

The years of the Second World War /1939-1945/ and the period of revolution which followed immediately afterwards, resulted in enormous political and social transformations. These involved above all:

- the reconstruction of the state according to the ideological principles of communism,
- major territorial shifts, which meant that the centre of the state moved to the area bounded by the Odra and Vistula rivers, and the Baltic Sea, whereas for centuries it had been east of the River Vistula,
- the ethno-cultural unification of the population inhabiting the Polish state due to large-scale territorial shifts, emigration and resettlement, as well as, in the case of the Jewish population, due to extermination by the Nazi occupiers.

Within a relatively short period the lands of Silesia, Pomerania and the former Ost-Preussen were closely integrated with the rest of Poland. Today, not only are they not an area of ethno-culturally or economically based irredentism, but they exhibit a particularly strong commitment to Poland and Polishness, to national culture, tradition and custom. Ethnic minorities /Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Jews, Germans, Greeks and Gypsies/ amount together to no more than 2-3 per cent of the whole population. They are, apart from a few enclaves, distributed all over the country.

The remarks about the past, which I have made above, though of necessity presenting a simplified picture of actual reality, stem from the conviction that regionalism in present-day Europe is largely a legacy of the past. It would thus be appropriate to ask whether such historical considerations play any part in the case of Poland, especially if we bear in mind that for many centuries Poland was a country of great diversity and of contrasting or conflicting cultures, religions and customs, and that historical elements are deeply rooted in Polish political thinking of the present day?

The geographical and economic basis for regionalism in Poland is not too strongly developed. Although a number of regions of distinct topography, settlement pattern, and economy can be discerned within the country, the cohesion of the territory and the lack of major natural divides have caused the separate regions to form a closely interlinked geographical system.

The main centres of industrial activity are situated in the belt of southern provinces /especially in Silesia/, but important manufacturing centres are to be found in central and northern Poland as well. The level of economic development measured by the value of manufactured production per capita oscillated in 1985 from 1 in the poorest region to 6-7 in the wealthiest ones. This is a significant difference. The wealthiest regions would be able to prosper on their own, but the poorer ones, in case of the autarkic tendencies strengthening, would be forced into permanent civilizational backwardness. This situation acts to prevent regional separatisms, which usually meet with public criticism in the spirit of egalitarianism and national solidarity.

Cultural and everyday-life differences, contributing at one time to the existence of distinct regional identity and folklore, have now largely withered away. The pluralism of local cultures has been undermined by the after-war industrialization and urbanization, the development of a uniform educational system, the vast waves of internal migration, and the influence of mass culture based on Western models. The unification of culture at the national level is also aided by the almost complete ethnic and religious uniformity of society. Attempts to liven up regional and local cultural initiatives which make use of the native set of aesthetic and cultural values usually fail to arouse wider public interest. The few remaining enclaves of local culture include the working-class urban culture of Upper Silesia, the folk culture of the Opole and

and Cieszyn regions of Central and Upper Silesia, the folklore of the Kaszuby and Warmia regions in northern Poland, the Tatra highlanders' folklore in southern Poland.

The homogenization of Polish culture is viewed by many people involved with the humanities as a process detrimental to its value and development. It is often stressed in this connection that it is thanks to its diversity and the contrasting influences that Polish culture has been able to reach its high level of development and to become a factor favouring the assimilation of alien immigrants.

The system of territorial and economic administration that developed in Poland after the war, as well as the actual practice of management, were directed towards implementing a model of strictly centralized and concentrated decision-making. This was basically in line with the étatiste model of bureaucratic centralism, which only in recent years has begun to show some signs of erosion as a result of reforms of the system embarked on in Poland. Centralized structures formed the framework for the activities of local and regional pressure groups, most often linked with new enterprises and new industries. Those groups were able to adjust to the rules of the game and to use them for their own ends thus undermining the coherence of the system.

In the middle of the 1970s a major reform of territorial administration and of the administrative division of the country was introduced. The reform was planned as a deliberate attempt to centralize power and to reduce the strength of local power elites. The reform consisted in reducing from 3 to 2 the number of levels of territorial administration, and in increasing the number of provincial /voivodship/ administrative units from 22 to 49. We are now witnessing a reemergence of local power elites within the new administrative units.

Unlike in many countries of Western Europe, the idea of regionalization has not been very popular in Polish political thought in the last two centuries. A unitary nation-state is generally regarded as the basic point of reference in seeking cultural identity. In the opinion of most Poles the hierarchy of symbols of identification is as follows: nation or state, often treated as one, fatherland, family, Catholic faith. It is only lower down on the scale that the notions of region, city or neighbourhood appear.

Irrespective of ideological orientation and the attitude towards the existing system, no social force in Poland rejects the idea of statehood. The idea of Europe as a federation of regions does not find much favourable reception in Poland. It is highly probable that the Poles' commitment to a sovereign and indivisible nation-state stems from the fact that long periods in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries their state was either nonexistent or very weak.

On the other hand, the disadvantages of state centralization are seen with more and more clarity, and it is more and more often that one hears voices demanding territorial decentralization and local self-government. Local self-government is seen as a means of dynamizing social forces and of liberating the nation's energy. Perhaps it is only in the more distant future that one should expect the emergence in Poland of a more lively interest in the region as a substitute for the nation-state and a link in the chain of European structures of economic and political integration.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM

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EHRLICH, Stanislaw		ul.J. Dabrowskiego 75m.208, 02-586 Warszawa, Pologne.	F-A
Président - Chairman			
THORBURN, Hugh G.	Dept of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada K7L 3N6.	194 Johnson Street, Kingston, Ont.K7L 3N6.	A
Vice-Présidents - Vice-chairmen			
CLAEYS, Paul	Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie, 44 avenue Jeanne, CP.124, B-1050 Bruxelles, Belgique.	36 avenue des Martinets, B-1160 Bruxelles, Belgique.	F
GRAZIANO, Luigi	Università degli Studi di Torino, Facolta di Scienze Politiche, Via San Ottavio 20, I-10124 Torino, Italie.	Via Procaccini 41, I-20154 Milano, Italie. Tel.02/31.82.489.	A
HAMON, Léo	Université de Paris I 17 rue de la Sorbonne, F-75231 Paris Cedex 05, France.	12 rue de la Glacière, F-75013 Paris, France.	F
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von BEYME, K.	Institut für Politische Wissenschaft an der Universität Heidelberg, Martsallstrasse 6, G-6900 Heidelberg 1, BR Deutschland.	Sitzbuchweg 40, G-69 Heidelberg, BR Deutschland.	A
BIBIC, Adolf	Fakulteta za sociologijo, politicne vede in novinarstvo,	Glavarjeva 12, Yu-Ljubljana,	

	Titova 102, Yu-61000 Ljubljana, Yougoslavie.	Yougoslavie.	
BOURLATSKY, F.M.	Institute of Social Sciences, Leninskii Prospekt, Moscow A 468, USSR.		A
CALVEZ, Jean-Yves R.P.	CERAS, 14 rue d'Assas, 75006 Paris, France.		F
DAHL, R.	Yale University, Dept of Political Science, New Haven, Conn.06520, USA.		A
DONNEUR, André	Université de Québec, C.P. 8888, Montréal, P.Q. H3C 3P8 Canada.		F
EISFELD, Rainer	Universität Osnabrück, Postfach 4469, Neuer Graben/Schloss, G-4500 Osnabrück, BR Deutschland.		A
HIRSCH-WEBER, Wolfgang	Lehrstuhl für Politische Wissenschaft II der Universität Mannheim, A 5,6 Postfach 2428, G-6800 Mannheim 1, BR Deutschland.	Am Grossen Wald, G-6901 Gailberg, BR Deutschland.	A
KORBONSKI, A.	University of California, Dept of Political Science, Los Angeles, Ca.90024, USA.		A
LOWI, Theodore	Dept of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA.		A
MARIN, B.	Institut Universitaire Européen, Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccetteni 9, I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (Firenze), Italie.		A
MAWHOOD, Philip N.	Development Administration Group,	26 Whetstone Close, Farquhar Road,	A

	Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, P.O.Box 363, GB-Birmingham B15 2TT, Grande-Bretagne.	GB-Birmingham B15 2NQ Grande-Bretagne.	
ROBBINS, John R.	Senior Lecturer, Dept of Politics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia.		A
SHARPE, L.J.	Nuffield College, Wellington Square, Oxford, OX1 1NF, Grande-Bretagne		A
SOLE TURA, Jordi	Cátedra de Derecho Político, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona, Avenida Diagonal, E-Barcelona 34, Espagne.	El Pedró de la Creu 21 ático 1a, E-Barcelona 34, Espagne.	F
SUZUKI, T.		Baricho, 3 Chome 6-15-801, Takamatsu, Japan 760.	A
SYLLA, Lancine	Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l'Université Nationale de Côte d'Ivoire, 01 BP V 34, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire.		F
TOURNON, Jean	Institut d'Etudes Politiques-CERAT, Domaine Universitaire, B.P. 45, F-38402 St-Martin d'Hères, France.	Rue Madeleine 5, F-38000 Grenoble,	F
VLACHOS, G.	Académie d'Athènes Athènes, Grèce.	68 rue Argolidos, Athènes 605, Grèce.	F
WINCZOREK, Piotr	Wyolziat Prawa i Administracji, Universytet Warszawski, ul.Krakowskie Pizcolmiescie 26/28, Warszawa, Pologne.		A

AGENDA

Business Meeting of Research Committee
on Socio-Political Pluralism

June 1987

Barcelona, Spain

1. Minutes of previous meeting (Paris, 1985)

2. Paper on Future Research Areas and Prospects of the Research Committee (Professor Jean Tournon)

3. Topics for two sessions of Washington IPSA World Congress, Aug-Sept. 1988

4. Proposals for future meetings

   Suggested Topics:
   Pluralism and State Autonomy
   Pluralism and Economic Policy-Making
   Theories of Pluralism
   Pluralism and the Armed Forces
   Pluralism and the Free Market
   Pluralism of Normative Systems

5. Prospective host institutions

6. Report of progress to International Political Science Association (IPSA)

7. Other Business

Outine of Round Table
on Pluralism and Economic Policy-Making

A. Papers from/about differing systems:

1. Unitary western states (France, Italy, Britain)
2. Federal western states (Germany, Canada, U.S.A,)
3. Federal socialist states (Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R.)
4. Unitary socialist states (Poland, D.D.R.)

B. Problem Papers

1. Balancing legitimation and capital accumulation
2. The multi-national corporation and state sovereignty
3. Competing regional pressures and economic policy-making
4. Supra-national pressures and economic policy-making
5. Business pressures and economic policy-making
6. Planning for economic policy-making
7. The role of the market in economic policy

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IPSA Research Committee on Socio-political Pluralism
Barcelona 25,26,27 June 1987

Form to be completed and handed in on 25 June
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Barcelona June 1987

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IPSA RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM.

Barcelona Meeting on "Pluralism, Regionalism and Nationalism" (25-27 June 1987).

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS.

Prof. St. Ehrlich (Warszawa).
Prof. H.G. Thorburn (Kingston, Can.)
Prof. P. Claeys (Bruxelles)
Prof. L. Graziano (Milano)
Prof. J.-Y. Calvez (CERAS, Paris)
Prof. A. Donneur (Montréal)
Prof. R. Eisfeld (Osnabrück)
Prof. A. Korbonski (Univ. of California)
Prof. P. Mawhood (Birmingham)
Prof. L.J. Sharpe (Oxford)
Prof. J. Solé Tura (Barcelona)
Prof. G. Vlachos (Athenai)
Prof. P. Winczorek (Warszawa)
Prof. Th.O. Hueglin (Wilfrid Laurier University)
Prof. D.L. Seiler (Lausanne)
Prof. J. Botella (Barcelona)
Prof. M. Kaplan (Mexico)
Prof. F.C. Bruhns (Pittsburg)
Prof. R. García Cotarelo (Madrid)
Prof. A. de Blas (Madrid).
Prof. J.M. Vallés (Barcelona)
Prof. J. Subirats (Barcelona)
Prof. J. Capo (Barcelona)
Prof. P. Vilanova (Barcelona)
Prof. Tarantini (Perugia)
Prof. Kukawka (Grenoble)
Prof. J. Molins (Barcelona)
Prof. C. Rodríguez Aguilera.

B. bis

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PROGRAM.

Thursday 25. 3'30-7'30 pm

Opening Session

-Prof. H.G. Thorburn(Chairman)
-Mr. Jordi Porta,Fundació Bofill Director.
-Prof. Jordi Solé Tura: "Introductory Report".
-Prof. St. Ehrlich: Report on "Regionalism and Autonomies in Western Europe".
-Discussion.

Friday 26. Morning Session. 9 am-1 pm.

-Prof. G. Vlachos:Report on "L'Etat-Nation, la Société Plurale et l'Unification Européene".
-Discussion.

-Prof.Th.O. Hueglin:Report on"Nationalism, Regionalism and Late Capitalism".
-Discussion.

-Prof.D.L. Seiler:Report on "Peripheral Nationalism between Pluralism and Monism"
-Discussion.

Friday 26, Afternoon Session, 3'30-7'30 pm.

-Prof.L.J. Sharpe: Report on "Fragmentation and Territoriality in the European State System".
-Discussion.

Prof. J.-Y. Calvez: Report on"Nations et Minorités dans l'enseignement recent de l'Eglise Catholique".
-Discussion.

-Prof.P.N. Mahwood: Report on "Government and Pluralism in African States".
-Discussion.

Saturday 27, Morning Session, 9 am.-1 pm.

-Prof. J. Botella: Report on "Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism in Spain".
-Discussion.

-General meeting of the Research Committee formal members.

Saturday 27, Afternoon Session,3'30-7'30 pm.

-Prof.A. Korbonski: Report on "Nationalism and Pluralism in Eastern Europe".
-Discussion.

-Prof.P. Winczorek: Report on "Regional Problems in the Unitary State: the Case of Poland".
-Discussion.

-

-Prof.J.Solé Tura: Tentative Conclusions.

-End of the meeting.

REMARKS.

- Coffee breaks will be provided in all sessions.
- Information about suitable places for lunch and dinner will be also provided by organizers.

ALL THE SESSIONS WILL BE HELD AT FUNDACIO BOFILL , c. PROVENCA, 324, Tel. 258.87.00.

IPSA R. Com. Cenon

22. VI. 87

Situation financière : en caisse
110.000. = 7.200 dollars.
Pas de rentrées nouvelles
(~~Koweït~~ Koweït belge)
Peut-être accélérer travaux
et diriger sur Koweït belge
ainsi on économise 1 prestataire
pour Dollars.
- Cet-Tracey.
- P. Clays réunion
ce w.e. secrétariat.

How to solve
financial problem ?

Je ne savais pas
que Clays devait
avoir 1 rôle central.

Cautery: "tentative" conclusions.
First conclusion: no conclusions

~~No general conclusions~~

It seems to me that the topic in perhaps to wide.

A meeting to ~~study~~ ~~in~~ ~~Western~~ Europe centers.

Problems of definitions and of general theories. (history, related areas, law, etc.)

But discussions have been rich.

Ed. to African States.

Perhaps we have made a first step into an approach that

Ed. Latin America.

must be our ~~task~~, in next meetings.

~~To~~ To look to publication of proceedings and papers.

Jordi Porta

237 5363

Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer.

Mr. J.M. Socias Humbert

Ronda Sant Pere, 42

Seile: Nationalisme périphérique → Etat central



Ambiguïté du mot national.
La force du mot nation vient de son caractère polysémique, de son indétermination. Le caractère est défini par la lutte politique : ce qui est défini perd sa force

Discours national. périphérique.
" La nation existe depuis toujours, etc. "



Nationalisme et ethnicité sont construits et construits. Faire défendre l'Etat (l'image des Peuples.")

Protéger
de l'ennemi
extérieur.

Shape: Why Alpenia as a new European State?

Cluez: Journal II polonais. Son insistance sur le pouvoir de la nation ne vient pas des dérives de certains discours nationalistes (Pologne catholique, opposition communiste) et l'Etat

Protéger l'Etat contre comme ennemi. Discours de Shape.

Terrorism and the State: not only
Conservative governments take advantage
of terrorism to reduce democracy.

IPSR: Guide for Issue Editors

Here are the constraints under which we have to operate.

Length: A total of no more than 175 double-spaced letter-size pages (no more than 30 lines per page) for the whole issue. This means typically five to seven articles. When counting the pages of the MS, count all the pages (tables, figures, photocopies) as one page even if the text or table or graph takes only 1/4 or 1/2 of a page. In other words, the 175 total includes pages that are not complete. Since authors typically take a few more pages than they are given as a limit, you may wish to set a maximum slightly below the target (say 25 for 30 pages).

Double Spacing: All text (notes and references included) must be double-spaced. The publisher does not accept single-spaced manuscripts.

Footnotes and References: Butterworth uses the so-called "scientific style" of quoting, with references at the end of the article. Please send a photocopy of the enclosed example on the back of this page as a guide to each author.

Introduction: The issue should be introduced by a brief (two- or three-page) introduction or by a full-length article by the issue editor(s).

Abstract: Ask each author to supply an abstract of 150 words maximum; 100 words is the preferred length.

Biographical Note: Each article ends with a short biographical note (three to four printed lines). Ask each author to supply such a note giving the author's permanent address.

Authors' addresses: Supply on a separate page the names of authors with the addresses to which correspondence regarding their articles should be sent. (These may differ from the addresses listed in the biographical notes.)

Contents: Provide, on a separate page, a table of contents, listing the order in which you want the articles to appear.

Publishing Date: We normally publish one year after reception of the complete MS.

Proofs: The authors will have a chance to check the copyedited version of their articles as well as the page proofs.

Tables and Art Work: The tables are set by the publisher. The art work (maps, graphs) must be submitted by the author in camera-ready form. We need originals; photocopies will not do. Figure labelling should be of reproducible quality--typeset or stencilled. If you can't achieve this standard, use an overlay sheet for labelling your figures. When labelling graphs, do not obscure the curves of the graph itself. Captions, keys, etc. will be typeset by the publisher.

In Short: 175 pages, double spacing, introduction, table of contents, biographical notes and Abstracts for all papers, list of author's addresses.

Examples of Abstract, References in the text, end-notes, end-references and biographical note.

Abstract. Italian political science has grown remarkably in the last two decades both in quantity and quality. Such a growth, however, came much later than in other European countries due to a number of cultural and institutional obstacles. The development of the discipline and the timing of such development are seen as the result of interaction of four broad sets of factors. They are: (1) the effort by scholars in the 1960s to establish political science as a distinct field of study; (2) the social and economic development of Italian society, which called for reform and political modernization; (3) the push from the outside, especially the impact of American political science and behaviouralism; and (4) changes in the Italian university system. The structure and degree of institutionalization of the profession in today's Italy are briefly reviewed in the final section.

Introduction

The present mood in Italian political science may be best described as one of measured satisfaction. Not that there is a lack of awareness of persistent shortcomings or of the need – felt by practitioners in a number of countries – for new directions and paradigms. Despite this awareness, there is a recognition, as one authoritative observer put it, that "Italian political science has accomplished remarkable steps" (Von Beyme, 1986: 97) and that the road travelled in the last 20 to 30 years has been "very great and fruitful" (Sartori, 1986: 108).

The signs of this growth and the grounds for such qualified optimism are many. For one thing, the discipline which, in the 1960s and early 1970s, was barely present in academe, had few positions and hardly any chair, is now firmly grounded in the Italian university structure. The organization of the profession has been put on firmer ground with the foundation in 1981 of the Società italiana di scienza politica, a much more professional body than the previous association.[1] Also, the scientific output, as we see in greater detail later on, has grown immensely over the last 20 years, both in quantity and quality. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the discipline has achieved cultural recognition, and there is a distinct feeling that the contributions of its practitioners may help politicians and other social actors in their efforts to cope with major problems in state and society – from institutional reform to labor relations and other problems of the welfare state.

Notes

1. Before 1981 political scientists were part of a much broader and loosely organized association – Associazione italiana di scienze politiche e sociali (AISPS) – which included, besides, political scientists, historians, students of political thought, etc.
2. For a more extensive discussion of these developments, see Graziano (1986, Introduction: 13–43).
3. One exception is Maranini (1983), whose important study on the structure of power in Italy, first published in 1967, was explicitly inspired by Mosca.
4. Because of their association with the Fascist regime, the Facoltà di scienze politiche were looked upon with suspicion after the fall of the regime and long afterward.
5. The following section draws heavily on LaPalombara (1986).
6. A summary in English by the two directors of the Cattaneo study is Galli and Prandi (1970).
7. Two earlier important research projects benefitted from American support: Sartori et al. (1963); Spreafico and LaPalombara (1963).
8. Spreafico's (1964) survey covered works published between 1961 and 1963. To my knowledge no other systematic review was conducted before the Feltrinelli surveys in 1983–1985.

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Biographical Note

Dag Anckar is Professor of Political Science at Åbo Academy, Finland, and president of the Nordic Political Science Association. He is the author, co-author and editor of several books on political science, recent titles being *Consultation and Political Culture* (1983; co-author), *Essays on Democratic Theory* (1984; co-editor) and *The People and the President* (1984; author, in Swedish). Address: Department of Political Science, Åbo Academy, Gezeliusgatan, 2, 20500 Åbo, Finland.

I.P.S.A. International Political Science Association

A.I.S.P. Association Internationale de Science Politique

RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIO-POLITICAL PLURALISM

COMITE DE RECHERCHE: PLURALISME SOCIO-POLITIQUE

Rules for the sponsoring of Committee meetings

The Committee has found it necessary, from experience over a number of years, to lay down the conditions which should apply to the 'hosting' of its meetings. The financial burden falling upon the host institution must be clearly defined in advance, at the same time we have to meet the proper expectations of paper-givers, officers and members of the Committee.

Organizational questions

1. Although the Committee's decision on its programme of work is final, the host institution holds a special place when the subject of a meeting is being chosen. It will also normally decide upon the timetable of work, in consultation with the Chairman.

2. Experience has shown that 6 to 7 working hours per day, divided into two sessions, are the maximum desirable. One half day should be provided for an excursion, whether this is organized by the host or left free.

3. One hour is generally enough to allocate for the presentation and discussion of each paper. In special cases, at the host's discretion, this may be increased to 1½ hours, but should not be longer.

4. Every effort should be made by the host, well in advance of the meeting, to ensure that copies of submitted papers are posted to all Committee members. This can be done by the host's own action, or alternatively by the host sending a list of Committee names and addresses to the paper-givers so that they can post the papers out direct. (Up-dated address lists are obtainable at any time from the Secretary).

5. A host institution usually provides a folder of maps, street plans and tourist information to each participant on arrival, but this is a matter for local discretion.

Questions carrying financial implications

6. Invitations are addressed to officers and members of the Committee individually; if they cannot attend, they hold no right to nominate 'substitutes'.

7. As a minimum requirement the host institution is expected to invite and to provide 'local costs' for the following:

(a) Officers of the Committee -
Chairman
Vice-Chairmen (at present 3)
Secretary

(b) Paper-givers proposed by the rapporteur-général, and accepted by the host institution in agreement with the Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen.

8. All other Committee members (and other persons showing a legitimate interest in the meeting) should be sent an invitation, but it is at the host's discretion whether to offer 'local costs' to them. It will avoid embarrassment if the terms of the offer are made clear in the invitation. A host will usually offer to make additional reservations for persons accompanying the participants, but of course at their own expense.

9. 'Local costs' are taken by the Committee to include a reasonable provision of board and lodging during the whole stay, but not any element of travel costs. It is for the host to choose whether any part of this provision should be handed over in cash.

10. Finally, it cannot be over-emphasized how important it is for all participants to receive early and regular information from the host institution. A specially written paper, if it is to be of high quality, may take a year or more to prepare. The information will often go out in stages -

(i) Firm invitations to participate, as soon as it is known that the host institution can assume the responsibiilty. (Dates of the meeting to be given as accurately as possible).

(ii) Confirmation of exact dates, suggestions of the most convenient and economical flights or surface travel routes for arrival and departure. Any advice on national visa and currency regulations. Addresses and telephone numbers of the conference centre and hotel (or other lodging) that has been reserved.

(iii) Programme of the meeting, with times and places in detail, together with a list of participants and the titles of papers. Final advice on travel (including airport-to-town etc.) and any arrangements for meeting participants on arrival.

(iv) The convenors of sessions at IPSA Congresses shall be agreed at a previous meeting of the Committee.

Business meeting of the Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism (IPSA) Washington, 31 August 1988

Present: S Ehrlich, Honorary Chairman
H Thorburn, Chairman
P Claeys } Vice-chairmen
L Graziano }
P Mawhood Secretary

A. Bibic, R Eisfeld, J Robbins, J Tournon

1. Minutes of previous meeting

A summary of the proceedings at Barcelona in June 1987 had been issued in the Chairman's letter of 26 August 1987. This was adopted without amendment.

2. Chairman's statement

The Chairman mentioned that Professor Leo Hamon had resigned as Vice-Chairman and from the Committee. His resignation was accepted with regret, but no new appointment of Vice-chairman was made. The Chairman also reported that papers submitted to the Barcelona meeting would be published as a number of the International Political Science Review in July 1989.

3. Finances

The Secretary spoke to the report on "Accounts" which he had circulated (report attached). Professor Claeys mentioned that approximately $ 2200 was still held in Brussels; since this was specifically reserved for costs of publications, it could not be paid into the Committee's general account. The annual subscription was maintained at £ 9 sterling, given the need to provide for numerous minor expenses in the future.

4. Rules for the sponsoring of committee meetings

A set of rules which had been drafted by the Secretary were approved after amendments to paragraph 7. (The approved Rules are attached).
It was proposed by Professor Eisfeld, seconded by Professor Graziano and agreed unanimously that:

> The convenors of sessions at IPSA Congresses shall be agreed at a previous meeting of the Committee.

5. Publication of proceedings

The Chairman reported on the past publications of the Committee, to be brought up to date by the IPSR number in July 1989.

Professor Claeys asked about the Committee's responsibility for authorizing any publication of its proceedings, in view of No. 1-1988 of the International Review of Sociology (Rome) "Pluralism: a paradigm of social science?" ed S. Ehrlich. He referred to the Committee's earlier rule that copyright over papers submitted for a meeting should be held by the Committee for one year after the meeting. It was agreed that, while the Committee had no ultimate control over the publication of papers, every effort should be made to require approval by the Committee's officers to the form of publication before this took place.

6. Membership

The Chairman recalled the rule, in force since the Paris Congress of 1985, that no new member should be accepted until he had made a material contribution to the Committee's work. On this basis an invitation to take up membership was proposed by Professor Graziano and seconded by Professor Claeys, to:

Joan Botella (Barcelona)
Daniel Seiler (Lausanne)

Professor Tournon suggested the possibility of moving to a two-level membership: an open list of persons who could join the Committee at their own wish, and a small 'board' elected by them. Both categories should pay the subscription. He was asked to put a proposal on paper for the executive to consider.

7. Election and mandate of officers

The Chairman mentioned that little guidance could be found in the practice of other Committees. After considering a memorandum circulated by the Secretary, the Committee unanimously adopted the following brief rules:

(1) The office holders of the Committee (other than purely honorary posts) shall consist of a Chairman, up to three Vice Chairmen and a Secretary.

(2) The term of office shall be six years (unless a casual vacancy arises) renewable for a single period of three years.

(3) Nomination, secondment and election shall be done at a general meeting, held during a World Congress of IPSA, by members in good standing who are present at the meeting; provided that the filling of a vacancy may be done at any meeting of the Committee.

(4) The nomination, secondment and election of a Committee member, other than an office holder, may be done at any meeting of the Committee, and the term of office shall be indefinite as long as the member remains active and in good standing.

It was further agreed that a procedure should be worked out for the prior circulation of candidatures and for proxy or postal voting where necessary. The Secretary was asked to make a written proposal to the next meeting of the Committee. The agenda for a meeting at Congress time should in any case be issued by post well in advance.

8. Information for members

The Chairman said that Professor Korbonski had not yet been able to give the time to produce a Newsletter. It was agreed to continue as at present, with the Chairman's issue of circular letters as the situation required.

9. Future meetings

The following meetings were agreed:

1989 (Warsaw) "The mixed economy - East and West"

Probably at end of August/beginning of September. The Chairman would write to Professor Winczorek with the approved "rules for sponsors". It was expected that he would supply members with fuller details of the subject areas to be covered in papers.

1990 (Bielefeld) "Pluralism and the armed forces"

Professor Eisfeld mentioned the support that had been promised by Foundations, and spoke of some of the subject areas to be covered: the tension between pluralism and hierarchy in a society; the civilianization of the military and the spread of military values in the civilian society; normative aspects of the defence debate.

On the Secretary's proposal it was hoped that the door would be left open to include some of the rich Third World material on this subject.

The 1991 World Congress would be at Buenos Aires. Other topics that the Committee had in mind were:

Pluralism and Economic Policy-Making (perhaps in Canada).
Pluralism and Self-Management (perhaps in Yugoslavia).
Pluralism and Voluntary Associations.
Pluralism and Normative Systems.

I.P.S.A. Research Committee 16 on Socio-Political Pluralism

Accounts

The finances, since I was appointed Secretary at our Barcelona meeting in 1987, take a very simple form. There has been no expenditure since my University currently pays for postage, typing and stationery. An account, No. 0914200, has been maintained at Lloyds Bank, University of Birmingham branch, and bank charges are unlikely to be raised while we have a large credit balance.

The only complication is that payments into the account must be in sterling. Sterling bank drafts, or "Eurocheques" made out for sterling amounts, are paid in without charge - unfortunately no other type of cheque will do. Where subscriptions have arrived in other forms I have been obliged to debit the heavy bank charges against the sender.

During the Washington Congress, from our business meeting onwards, I shall be willing to accept subscriptions in U.S. dollars, in cash, to help any member who prefers this. The rate is $15 (£9 sterling) for the past year 1987/88, but the Committee may of course decide to vary it for the future.

Our bank balance is now £462.33, made up of £222.84 transferred as the residue from Brussels, and the rest in subscriptions from 18 out of our 25 members. (Some members have, as invited, paid for 2 or 3 years in advance).

Dr P N Mawhood
Secretary to the Research Committee

18.8.88


YOUNG GUARDIAN

IN JANUARY, 1987, the government launched its campaign to make the general public more aware of Aids. Now six months later how much more do we really know?

After all the publicity can we say we are informed? Esther Carter believes that Aids is now real for her but not larger than life

Safety first

How much more do we really know?



Are we on the right lines with our publicity ?

THE POSTERS started to appear in early January. They goggled out from every billboard in the country: Don't Die of Ignorance; Aids Isn't Prejudiced It Kills Anyone; Aids: How Big Does It Have to Get Before You Take Notice. At the bottom of every poster were the facts. At First you didn't see them they were the small print, but then they got inside your head and the words male or female, gay or straight toiled inside your head every time someone mentioned the word Aids.

At first they were effective, no one could miss them, but they carried on and some people regarded them as a waste of money

TV was an obvious place. The young people to whom the information had to be delivered were likely to be watching at peak viewing times. I can remember waiting with another 28.8 million viewers for Tuesday's dose of Eastenders, when a huge gravestone filled my screen. It was a public information announcement costing I don't know how much and telling me nothing that I did not already know, apart from the fact that everyone should read some leaflet when it came through their door.

As more and more gravestones and icebergs filled our screens both at home and at the cinema the government was criticised. The public claimed that money which could have been spent on research, treatment, and hospices was being wasted on the announcements which told us nothing we did not already know.

Then one of the uninformative announcements was put on during Children's BBC in the afternoon.

Parents were outraged: should it not be their own decision to tell their children about sex and Aids when and how they want to? So, after this, the announcements which had angered so many were phased slowly out of our lives.

The leaflet told you who was at risk, how you could catch Aids and how not to, but people felt if did not answer all their questions, their private fears and rumours began to spread.

The press did not help. The Sun and The Star and other papers reported stories of "innocent" children contracting the fatal disease. These stories which put ideas into the minds of the young, and terrifying scenes into the minds of their parents were not stopped by the campaign

The Government did at last realise that the adults of tomorrow; the teenagers of today, at whom a lot of the campaign had been aimed, could believe every work that the sensational press printed and would be led to believe untruths.

First Aids was their answer; DJs, popstars, editors, politicians, actors and a live studio audience (teenagers from all over the country), produced a revolutionary programme, one which openly discussed criticism. There were people who thought that the buying and pitting on of a condom were hirdly matters for family viewing. Others thought that the humour should have been cut out all together and a more serious approach taken. Yet for all its criticisms one could not question its power to inform. The audience asked the question which had been nagging at the back of our minds, and the panel answered in a free unembarassed manner.

At last I felt that I could control Aids for myself. It was a feeling of safety that I liked, one which the posters had never managed to create. Aids had become real, yet not larger than life.

Esther Carter is thirteen, and comes from North London.

It's funny peculiar

INPUT

Melanie McFadyean

WHY DO people laugh when they ask me about the advice colum I write in Just Seventeen? Questions are regularly accompanied at first by a politely resrained smile, which becomes irrepressible and ends in hysterical laughter. And they're not laughing at the really funny ones either.

I get about 300 letters a week. Most are about romance. Many are about family life. Lots are about careers. Too many are about incest, rape and sexual abuse. Some are about school. Others are about health, despair over self-image and confusion over sexual identity. But what they are really about is a national crisis in self confidence, a lack of power and independence and fear of the future. They are up against a hostile abult world prejudice, narrow mindedness, authority imposing its will and preserving the status quo against the vivid hopes and dreams of youth.

In romance it still seems to be the boys who have the power and hold onto it. Romance hasn't changed. Hearts swell with love and adoration, love goes off, hearts break. Hearts mend. Boys seldom write to me, and happy girls never do. My take on romance is probably jaundiced and my view of teenage girls' boyfriends not very glamorous, but then I only hear about the bums and jerks. Boys occasionally write, some expressing the vulnerability they daren't show anyone. Others write detailed description of the unprintable bits of their anatomy, and I suppose that's meant to shock me.

How do you spot a hoax, I'm often asked. Aren't most of the letters made up? I'm sure some are. I don't mind a prank ... they're easy to spot. They go something like this: "My granny ate the budgy, feathers and all. My dad's an alcoholic, my mum's a junkie, my brother's a fire eater and he set the house alight last week." At the end she wonders what her question should be and invariably says, "Am I normal?" A name is printed very clearly ... probably someone else's ... and she insists it's used.

If only others were made up. Hundreds of doors are opened for a few seconds giving me a momentary glimpse into distress, danger and exploitation. I'm shown episodes of family life which describe emotional and physical cruelty nobody should be subjected to. They are usually anonymous. They write to a stranger who can do nothing ... except print information about where to go for help. Passing on information is an essential part of an advice columnist's work. Advice columns shouldn't be forums for the exercise of moralism and the worn out platitude. They should generate debate, push the limits.

The girls that write to me meet limits all too soon. From 13 on they write about careers. Schools are under funded, careers teachers over worked and under paid. Opportunities are shrinking all the time. At 13, whatever your grasp of reality, you still aspire to fulfilling your ambitions, you believe in your dreams. Why was a 16-year-old put on four YTS placements in supermarkets when she wanted to be a photographer?

Why was someone who wanted to work in construction told to find something more suitable for a girl when she went to the careers office? A girl wrote asking what the chances of being an astronaut were? Probably nil, but someone will be the first woman in orbit ... it could have been her.

Next week Input will be written by Jan Heale.

WHAT'S GOING ON

Compiled by Stephanie Nettell


● Throughout the summer there are going to be more than 150 "Wild Side of Town Safaris" in towns and cities ... guided walks through wild corners and paths we probably never knew existed ... and anyone is welcome. A list of phone contacts for the walks in each town appears in the June and July issues of BBC Wildlife Magazine (£1.20), together with details of a competition (and help on how to do it) on making a wildlife map of your own area ... closing date July 31. You can also get both by sending a large sae (18p stamp) to Wild Side of Town, BBC TV, London W12 8QT.

● World Story Time brings folk tales and myths from all over the world to East London in a show for under-11s with music, mime, puppets and masks and a multi-cultural cast. Theatre Royal, Stratford East, Gerry Raffles Square, London E15, tel. 01-534 0310, until July 3; all seats £1.50.

● A week's working holiday in July, August and September can help bring back life to our waterways: a Canal Camp lets you meet 20 other people also working themselves to death and loving it, and gives you a good time in the evenings. Cost, £18 plus pocket money; age, over 16. Applications to Neil Edwards, 17 Reynolds Gate, South Woodham Ferrers, Essex CM3 5FA, as soon as possible. Information on the voluntary work done by the Waterway Recovery Group and on Waterways for Youth from: John Gagg, Shootacre House, Princes Risborough, Aylesbury, Bucks HP17 9NN.

● A 20-foot inflatable peach stars in James and the Giant Peach, a musical fantasy by Herbert Chappell from Roald Dahl's novel, at the Opera House, Quay Street, Manchester M3 3HP, tel. 061-831 7766, June 30-July 23.

● July at the Barbican Cinema Club: The Twelve Tasks of Asterix (4th), The Railway Children (11th), Labyrinth (18th), the Never Ending Story (25th), 11 am, 2 30 pm. Membership £2 a year (includes two guests), tickets £1.50, adults £2. Tel 01-638 8891.



A cut above the rest

BOOKSHOP

Blade of the Poisoner, by Douglas Hill (Gollancz, £6,95).

THE thousands of fans of Douglas Hill know he'll deliver fast action, foul conspirators and tough heroes and heroines exactly as they like it, with a passing swipe at the nature of oppression and the way the world is going that comes with best SF.

Now he's giving us the first of a two-part fantasy adventure, where good and evil forces battle it out with magic and scorcery and the uncontrollable power of the elements. Believe me, its all there.

Twelve-year-old Jarral is the only survivor when the Poisoner, Prince Mephtik, destroys his village, but his luck seems to run out when he is captured and scored with the fatal M on his chest ... dooming him to death at the next full moon. But neither Mephtik nor Jarral himself knows who he really is, nor how weird and violent and dangerous the contest is about to become.

Newsline

SCHOOLCHILDREN in London last week used giant postcards to help defend thousands of children who have been detained or attacked in South Africa. On South Africa Youth Day third and fourth form boys from London's East End took cards saying Free All The Children to 10 Downing Street, the House of Commons and the South African Embassy.

Many accounts have emerged of children as young as eight being tortured in detention, and in the last year church sources say as many as 10,000 children may have been picked up, and held without charge or accused of "intimidation" and "subversion".

Just before the boys' postcard protest the South African government said it had released hundreds of children from gaol, but up to 1,000 are still being held, and many of those freed have already complained of persistent police harassment. Meanwhile, social workers and others face the formidable task of counselling children bady traumatised by their experiences.

It seems likely that young children will continue to bear the brunt of South Africa's crackdown. Churches, parents' groups and other bodies in South Africa have called for a worldwide campaign of sending letters and postcards to keep up pressure on the government not to destroy children.

For more details of the campaign contact Christian Aid (local address in the telephone book) or write to Free The Children Campaign, Christian Aid, PO Box 1, London SW9 8BH.

Young Guardian Editor Tim Madge



The Hit List

TOP TWENTY SINGLES


1 (1)	Star Trekkin	The Firm
2 (2)	I Wanna Dance With Somebody (Who Loves Me)	Whitney Houston
3 (6)	Under The Boardwalk	Bruce Willis
4 (3)	I Want Your Sex	George Michael
5 (—)	It's A Sin	Pet Shop Boys
6 (4)	Hold Me Now	Johnny Logan
7 (9)	You're The Voice	John Farnham
8 (8)	Nothing's Gonna Stop Me Now	Samantha Fox
9 (21)	Misfit	Curiosity Killed The Cat
10 (5)	Nothing's Gonna Stop Us Now	Starship
11 (16)	Is This Love	Whitesnake
12 (14)	When Smokey Sings	ABC
13 (7)	I Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking For	U2
14 (31)	Wishing Well	Terence Trent D'Arby
15 (10)	Victim Of Love	Erasure
16 (13)	Looking For A New Love	Jody Watley
17 (20)	It's Not Unusual	Tom Jones
18 (25)	Let's Dance	Chris Rea
19 (12)	Goodbye Stranger	Pepsi & Shirlie
20 (11)	Jack Mix II/III	Mirage/Various

TOP TWENTY ALBUMS

1 (1)	Whitney	Whitney Houston
2 (3)	The Joshua Tree	U2
3 (2)	Live In The City Of Light	Simple Minds
4 (5)	Keep Your Distance	Curiosity Killed The Cat
5 (4)	Solitude Standing	Suzanne Vega
6 (18)	The Return Of Bruno	Bruce Willis
7 (6)	Sgt Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band	The Beatles
8 (8)	It's Better To Travel	Swing Out Sister
9 (13)	Invisible Touch	Genesis
10 (9)	Raindancing	Alison Moyet
11 (12)	Atlantic Soul Classics	Various
12 (7)	Licensed To Ill	Beastie Boys
13 (10)	Friends And Lovers	Various
14 (11)	The Circus	Erasure
15 (24)	His Finest Collection	Roger Whitaker
16 (21)	The Greatest Hits	Tom Jones
17 (14)	Tango In The Night	Fleetwood Mac
18 (15)	Men And Women	Simply Red
19 (17)	Now, That's What I Call Music/9	Various
20 (23)	Graceland	Paul Simon

Compiled for Gallup by the BBC, BPI and Music Week

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Offer applies to all 15-19 year olds and students in full-time further education.

Mr Fowler's searching questions

The Government, in a welcome attack of post electoral nerves, is thinking of modifying its manifesto pledge to remove benefits from young people under 18 who "deliberately choose to remain unemployed." The idea of youngsters "deliberately choosing" unemployment, as if there were plenty of jobs out there for the asking, has always been a bit difficult to swallow; especially coming from an administration which has presided over a record rise in unemployment, and refused to spend money on infrastructural developments which could generate real jobs for people of all ages. But the fact that the situation is worse here than it need be is not to deny there is a worldwide problem, not yet solved, of how to provide school leavers with jobs, relevant training or the motivation to seek jobs. In Britain the problem is partly regional. It is far easier for school leavers to find jobs in London and the South east where so much of the recovery, particularly in the service industries, is located. But to expect a jobless teenager in Liverpool or the North-east to find an instant job or head south is living in a dream world. Apart from anything else, how on earth would they find accommodation after the big bang of property prices and the evaporation of the rented market?

Mr Norman Fowler's proposal is to introduce a job search allowance which would replace supplementary benefit, but would only be paid to those who can prove they are actively looking for a job. It is estimated that there are about 30,000 teenagers who leave school each year without a job who refuse to join the Youth Training Scheme and another 70,000 who leave the two-year scheme for what are considered to be negative reasons. No figure is being mentioned for the job search allowance, but it is likely to be less than the supplementary benefit level (£18.50 a week) and, if the Australian model on which it is based is any guide, a lot less. The YTS pays £28.50 for the first year. There is clearly a need for reform. It doesn't make sense for youngsters approaching school leaving age to have a financial incentive to opt for the dole rather than go into training or higher education. (This has led to a suggestion that some sort of job search allowance should be paid to youngsters staying on at school.) Nor is it self evident why compulsory schooling is "good" while compulsory training an infringement of rights. What must be avoided at all costs is any further nurturing of a permanent unemployment culture in which children fresh from school become psychologically hooked into the dole queue (and maybe a life in crime or the black economy) as the natural next step.

Far from stopping that, Mr Fowler's scheme could accelerate the unacceptable trend towards a new class of itinerant youngsters — particularly among ethnic minorities — who are off the unemployment queue, off the training schemes, off the benefit books, very nearly off the human race; defined not to exist even as a government statistic. The prospect of a community charge on each household resident to replace the rating system could give a fresh twist to this trend by making it more expensive for poor parents to give a roof to their unemployed children (thereby attracting the charge). Reform, surely, must balance compassion against incentives, actual jobs against cosmetic schemes, and the real world against politicians' delusions. That balancing act is an essential part of the third term. We desperately need a motivated young work force, willing to be trained. But the unemployed won't go away merely by being priced out of the statistics.

The doctor isn't Tory

Dr David Owen is not a Tory. It suits a lot of different people and interests to pretend that he is. It would perhaps be more convenient for them if he were. But he is not. It is, though, an easily made charge (which some would see as a compliment). It has been the instinctive view of most Labour politicians ever since 1981. It is widely believed in the Tory Party itself. Since June 11, too, it has become something which Liberals say more readily. One can see why they all say it. Dr Owen has embraced Thatcherism more enthusiastically than any prominent non-Tory politician in the land (and more readily than many Whiggish Tories). He is the most important and consistent opposition supporter — though not an uncritical one — of Conservative foreign and defence policy. And during the recent election he made absolutely clear his personal preference, given the chance, for working with a minority Tory Government rather than with a minority Labour one.

Nevertheless, this hardly makes an open and shut case that Dr Owen is himself a Tory. All opposition parties have had to come to terms with Thatcherism in their different ways. All parties contain politicians who, like Dr Owen, favour a nuclear defence policy. Dr Owen was not alone in the Alliance in contemplating as necessary the possibility of a relationship with the Conservatives. Meanwhile, most important of all, many of the things to which the SDP leader has been unerringly committed — a universal health service, state education, constitutional reform, a redistributive tax system, internationalism, to name but five — are anathema to the Tory leadership and, in any case, are not subjects on which his critics have spotless records either.

But those who cast Dr Owen as a Tory have their own reasons, too. For Labour, it is much easier to denounce Dr Owen than to think about what he represents. His perceived treachery remains the perfect Labour excuse for inertia masquerading as a stand on principle. For the intelligent Tories, like Mr Douglas Hurd in his Dulwich suitably feline speech on Monday evening, he provides an ideal weapon with which to torture the Alliance (an Alliance which remains, never forget, the Tories' most formidable heartlands challenger, not least in local government). For the more simple-minded Tories, he is simply another Leader figure in the Thatcher mould. For the more sectarian Pemine Liberals, he is a very convenient, but just too convenient, excuse for the poor electoral performance this month of an Alliance which they never much liked anyway.

The truth about Dr Owen is more matter-of-fact. There never was any law which said that political opinion needs must and can only ever be organised on the basis of (1) a bourgeois class party, (2) a labour movement class party and (3) a dissenting anti-state party. There are spaces in British politics for more focuses of political opinion and voting behaviour than that. One of those is the pragmatic, rather self-regarding, managerial reformism represented by Dr Owen. It is intellectually preposterous to conflate that automatically with the Tory Party — least of all in its current ascendant form. That doesn't mean, either, that the Owenite SDP vision reconciles neatly with either labourism or liberalism. But it has got at least as much in common with each of them as it has with Thatcherite Toryism. The difficulty for Dr Owen is not that he is a Tory. He isn't. It is that he is not as powerful as he wants to be. The choice he faces now is whether he can bring himself to play a crucial but more modest role than he would ideally like in the evolving and democratic realignment of an opposition to which he naturally belongs.

Homage in Catalonia

From the Birmingham pub-bombing to the Bologna station massacre the political map of Western Europe is stained with atrocities which will always stand out, even in a chronicle of two decades of home-grown terrorist movements. To these we must now add the car-bomb which went off under a supermarket in Barcelona. It is the worst incident in 19 years of violence by ETA, the Basque separatist movement, with 18 dead so far and more than 30 injured. The wave of revulsion which followed evoked an unprecedented denunciation from herri Batasuna, which is to ETA roughly as Sinn Fein is to the IRA, and an unparalleled apology from ETA itself for what it described as a "serious error." And above all it prompted a unique display of civic hostility by 750,000 people, equivalent to about half the adult population of Barcelona. A heartening and moving spectacle: stretching throngs united in a single, emotional, human purpose.

It was not spontaneous in the sense that the demonstration was called by the political and social leaders of Catalonia, of which the city is the capital. It may also have been a case of the Catalans, as proud in their separate cultural identity as the Basques, objecting to the imposition upon them of a campaign which derives from the other side of Spain. But the sheer vastness of the response proved that it was an idea whose time had come, and the overpowering dignity of a mostly silent manifestation of "people-power" against political violence is something all Spaniards can be proud of.

There have been several disturbing indications in recent months that ETA was moving away from its original character as a movement fighting in its own ruthless way for a clearly identifiable cause and limiting its attacks to police, military and politically symbolic targets. The accidental death in exile of Domingo Iturbe, the military leader of ETA, is reported to have been followed by a struggle for power between two factions, one favouring traditional tactics and the other indiscriminate killing. The former appears to have felt it necessary to apologise for the action of the latter. The arrests by Spanish police in April of an Italian and a Frenchman are said to have pointed to ETA connections with the Red Brigades and Action Directe, two more pieces in a shadowy jigsaw puzzle of international terrorist links.

The supermarket bombing not only horrifies the world at large but also undermines the twisted logic of ETA terrorism. The usual strategy of bodies like ETA is to shock the state into granting specific demands. Indiscriminate atrocities tend to be committed by groups like the Red Brigades and Action Directe, which seek to provoke democracies into such repressive measures that they overthrow themselves and open the way to an authoritarian revolution. In Barcelona ETA got its wires crossed, and instead of delivering a message about its cause it engendered a massive demonstration against itself, the like of which has never been seen and for which the authorities ought to be grateful. There never was a cause which justified the bombing of crowds, but a decade of restored democracy and a new constitution which granted large measures of regional autonomy in 1978 have removed any excuse there might have been in the Franco era for any degree of extremism. And an apology which in effect promises "only" smaller and more precisely aimed massacres in future is simply grotesque. There can hardly ever have been a more appropriate moment for moderate Basques to demand that reason be given a chance to settle the differences between their region and Madrid. And hardly ever, either, such a display of revulsion at botched, mindless atrocity. Spain, a decade and more into democracy, continues to be plagued by regionalism past and regionalism present. It is a country that has to devolve power from the centre: but a country, then, which lacks — especially in its scattered opposition forces — the ability to create clear choices for all the nation. But don't worry too much. There is always the thunderous voice of the people to be heard. And it was loud and clear in Barcelona.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

How the great share bonanza is a Treasury giveaway

Sir, — Your Leader of June 19 makes valid points about privatisation and profits for which many of us in the North will thank you; but you stop short of specifics.

Monopoly profits may "swell the coffers of the Treasury," but that sounds as though this is not to be desired. When a Treasury run by sensible politicians finds that its coffers are swollen, it looks for ways to spend the money for the benefit of everyone.

What British Gas is trying to present as a great bonanza is in fact the firmest evidence yet of the devastating effect that privatisation is having on the vital lifelines of this country.

The "giveaway" it is trumpeting will amount to slightly more than £1 a month for the average gas-user. Perhaps the chairman of British Gas thinks that is going to solve the problems of the poor and the unemployed.

Put all those pounds a month together, though, and there is a potential sum of more than £300 million. Before the curse of privatisation, this was spent on hospitals, tests for cancer, schools, and job creation; now it is lost to the nation as a whole, and doled out in niggardly sums to people who will se no benefit in it.

And there is more to this scandal than meets the eye: the money will be handed out on a basis of "highest spender gets most back" the classic Conservative way.

But the £300 million is only a small part of the story: millions and millions more privatised pounds, which should be going to help the most needy in our society, will be lining the pockets of the wealthy.

The sharp fall in world oil prices has been a big factor in gas price reductions. But how long will it be before Nigel Lawson rushes in a set of emergency measures, which will cost us all much more than £1 a month.

British Telecom is, if anything, even worse. It is not even trying to give anything back, but smuggles up to its profits using coy phrases like: "Our customers would not have understood."

We understand only too well. BT's refusal to carry through its commitment to a profit-sharing scheme is symptomatic.

This is no way to run a country. Yours faithfully,
(Cllr) **T. Geraghty.**
(Leader, Humberside County Council),
Beverley, N. Humberside.

Equinoxious

Sir,—Your staff reporter who asks (June 20) "How can Sunday be Midsummer's Day when the summer has yet to begin?" seems to be as confused about the four seasons as most Britons.

In a culture as myth-ridden as this one, the confusion isn't just a case of trying to square the weather with the calendar—the point of your story—but a confusion seminally induced by Druid lore and memorialised by William Shakespeare. The fact that we go on *Summer* Time as early as late March probably contributes to the confusion for the literal-minded. Let me try to disabuse them.

With June 21, approximately, arrives the astronomically determined summer solstice. It's not just the longest day of the year but the start of summer as well, not the middle. They even know this Down Under, where the seasons are topsy-turvy.

Everyone, repeat after me: March 21 is the start of spring (the vernal equinox); June 21 the start of summer; September 21 the start of autumn (the autumnal equinox), and December 21 the start of winter (winter solstice); no matter what the weather is like outdoors.—Yours,
Jack Pitman.
21, Southwood Avenue,
London N6.

Sir, — Please will someone invent a game that can be played only when it's raining, and then arrange for its most prestigious tournament to be held in England in June every year. — Yours faithfully,
Stephen Harvey.
Chandler's Ford, Hants.

Riveting!

Sir, — In view of your correspondent (June 13, 20) about the function of the new studs in the roads, I feel duty-bound to inform you of two disturbing hypothesis circulating in Huddersfield.

The first suggests that these studs are a covert attempt to prevent continental drift, thus exacerbating the North-South divide. In an attempt to save Britain from being ripped apart entirely, the Government has recently nailed the country together. The studs are the heads of the nails used.

The second hypothesis states that the studs are a national system of emergency power-supply points for use by cruise missile convoys which have broken down while on manoeuvres.

No matter which is true, the effects are plain: the new stud are creating considerable civil unrest. I therefore urge the Government to come clean before we have a riot on our hands. — Yours worriedly,
Brent Wilson.
Huddersfield, W. Yorkshire.

Mishandled

Sir, — I inquire as to the identities of any contributors to Stephen Cook's People Diary (June 16, 17) who may have originated, in such mirthful vein, references to Messrs Jelinek-Fink, Carefull, and Sheepshanks.

Maybe it was Pick, Large, Naughtie, or Kettle whose byelines I note at random glance through issues of the Guardian.— Yours sincerely,
D. K. R. Phillips.
Willaston, Cheshire.

Society Tomorrow letters—page 13

On a sticky wicket

Sir, — In the writings of cricket correspondents about the West Indies proposal to bar from international cricket those who play in South Africa after the end of this year, several key points have been obscured.

The proposal in no way seeks to interfere with team selection by individual countries. The disqualification would apply across the board, to all countries

It is surely the right — indeed, the duty — of those in charge of any international sport to establish criteria by which eligibility to compete must be measured: a right acknowledged in the English courts last year in the context of the Commonwealth Games. Clearly such criteria cannot distiguish arbitrarily between one country and another, and the West Indies proposal does not seek to do so.

To equate it with South Africa's cynical attempt behind the scenes to have Basil D'Olivera excluded from an MCC team is to abandon reason in favour of prejudice.

The proposal leaves individual players free to pursue their careers in South Africa should they choose to do so; it is very moderate in this regard.

It is surely the duty of sports administrators to take decisions which are in the best interests of the game they administer: this New Zealand courts had to point out to the rugby authorities there when contemplating a domestically divisive tour of South Africa by the All Blacks in 1985.

But the issue here is much more grave: rather than simply threaten the domestic popularity of the game, this week's ICC decision puts at stake the very survival of international cricket as we know it. Should Australia and New Zealand back England's support of continued cricket contact with South Africa, which incidentally is not even a member of the ICC, the other major cricketing countries will be forced to consider establishing their own world body.

In the longer term this may be no bad thing: it would mark the end of England's and Australia's wholly undemocratic domination of the game's administration. But in the short term it would spell the end of the highly lucrative tours to England by India, Pakistan, and the West Indies; these provide the basis for the livelihoods which English cricketers in particularly seek to enhance by playing in South Africa during the winter months.

None of this, of course, addresses the fundamental principle involved: apartheid is simply not cricket.
Sam Ramsamy.
South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee,
London NW3.

Well Red

Sir, — What is more (see Letters, June 22) I've been reading the Guardian since the war and still vote socialist. — Yours faithfully,
John Myers.
Chalfont St Giles.

The only road to European unity

Sir,—Your leading article, "If the CAP doesn't fit why not scrap it" (June 20), arguing for a switch from agricultural price support to direct income support and the repatriation of the CAP to EEC member states, summarises more or less exactly the agricultural policy which the Labour Party has proposed.

The CAP as originally conceived is dead; but the death throes are proving to be long, drawn-out, and expensive. We are told ad nauseam that the CAP must somehow continue because without it the Community will fall apart. This ignores the simple fact that the CAP is now a major factor in European disunity.

Does anyone really believe that the European cause is served by heads of government arguing over an oils and fat tax when there are so many other pressing world problems for them to consider?

The CAP has not worked for British farmers. There has been a greater decline in the purchasing power of farm income in the UK in the past 10 years than in any other member state (40 per cent compared with a Community average of 25 per cent). It certainly has not worked for consumers and taxpayers.

It must now be recognised that a detailed Community-wide agricultural policy is totally unworkable. We must move towards a combination of import levies, deficiency payments, and direct income support for farmers, administered and largely paid for by individual countries.

This policy may offend Community purists, but it is the only way to maintain a semblance of European unity.—Yours faithfully,
(Lord) **Carter.**
House of Lords.

Sir, — David Martin's article (June 22) correctly draws attention to the massive problems facing the people of Britain as a result of membership of the Common Market:

The obscene agricultural policy with its artificially high food prices, estimated by the director of the Consumer Association to be costing the average family in Britain £11.50 a week extra for their food;

The destruction of millions of tons of food every year;

The massive deficit on our balance of trade in manufactured goods, growing annually and now running up £10,000 million a year;

The loss of at least one million jobs due to the unstoppable flood of Common Market imports;

The inability to do anything about the outflow of valuable capital investment to other Common Market countries;

Budget spending priorities, with 70 per cent on the agricultural policy, and next to nothing on socially useful developments.

Where David Martin and I part company is in our assessment of the future: he believes all that can be changed; I do not.

I at least have history on my side because — despite 30 years of the Common Market, 14 of them with Britain a member, and the vigorous attempts of many socialists to change things — it still remains the same capitalist bastion.

Of course, there have been some changes, but as David acknowledges with his attack on the Single European Act, these have been mainly for the worse.

The crucial question is: how long will Labour's Common Market reformists go on saying that the answer is not in withdrawal, but in reforming it from within? If 30 years' attempts at reform have totally failed, when will they face the reality that the Common Market is not going to change in any fundamental way?

In the meantime they bear a heavy responsibility for the suffering that millions of people, especially our pensioners and unemployed, have to endure as a result of our membership.

Labour's policy of retaining withdrawal as an option may well become a live issue long before the next general election. — Yours faithfully,
Alf Lomas, MEP.
(Lab, London N-E),
London E15.

Miscellany at large

Sir, — With reference to David Steel's new Commons nickname: shouldn't it be "Tweeddaledum"? — Yours sincerely,
George McLean.
Rusholme, Manchester.

Sir,—Whatever the merits are of the Mansion House proposal designed by Stirling Wilford Associates, L. A. L. Rolland, president of the Royal Institute of British Architects (Letters, June 20) has no mandate to make pronouncements on behalf of the membership on such subjective matters as architectural aesthetics.—Yours faithfully,
Peter Moro.
London W1.

Sir,—In my constituency where I once asked for a Listener in a bookshop and received the answer, "Sorry dear, but we're rather busy at the moment"; where there is no theatre or cinema for 35,000 people; David Madel, the Conservative MP was returned with the biggest Tory majority in the land.

Will the fine intellects now poring over Martin Taylor's and Eric Partin's posers (Letters, June 13, 20) please let me know when they have found an answer?—Yours sincerely,
San Cassinally.
Dunstable,
Bedfordshire.

Sir, — It was no surprise to pupils of Cockermouth school that two military aircraft crashed within a mile of Keswick town centre on June 17.

For many years military planes have flown from the Lorton Valley along the edge of Cockermouth, passing directly over three schools and two major housing estates. They frequently fly so low that you can see the pilots, faces as they terrify children and disrupt exams.

For the past fortnight our school playing field has been the site of an impromptu aerobatic display reminiscent of the Red Arrows. Will it be necessary for for a plane to crash on to a school before proper control is exercised over irresponsible pilots who continually disregard safe practice? — Yours faithfully,
Rebekah Pritchard, Fiona Orr, Petra Heine, Charlotte Bevan, Alyson Denwood.
Cockermouth School,
Cumbria.

Sir, — I can assure David Butler (Letters, June 18) that "round-the-corner" rugby goal-kicking was practised in Rugby League before 1948. My recollection is of Willie Horne, Barrow's international stand-off half, whose career began during the war, probably in 1942. — Yours faithfully,
H. Lawton.
Seascale, Cumbria.

Sir, — Campbell Page "Blocks and hackles," Guardian (June 17) should not be astonished by the high turn out (89 per cent) in the Italian general election: voting in Italy is compulsory.—Yours faithfully,
V. Nilolitch.
London N6.

Spain's New Contemptibles



Sir,—How sick-making and contemptible the hypocrisy of the Basque ETA separatist terrorists, who apologised for their supermarket bomb! *Apologise* —for blasting innocent women and children to pieces? Only when their action provoked mass solemn mourning, did they realise that — oops! — they had miscalculated; only then did the uncomfortable thought strike them that perhaps this was not quite the effect they had hoped for.

This muddle-headedness reveals how grotesque are the psychopathological rationalisations of terrorists, who justify their own sick fantasies as "politics." Who could seriously consider putting the conduct of national affairs into blood-soaked hands like these?

Possibly our media report these atrocities in too cool a manner, talking of outfits of lunatics "claiming responsibility," holding "press conferences" and "apologising," as if they were fit to be accepted as human, when expressions of outrage would indicate how far below any acceptable modes of behaviour they fall.

It was, after all, the fascists who made brutality, torture, and extermination seem an acceptable part of normal political life.—Yours, etc,
David Holbrook.
Brunswick Gardens,
Cambridge.

A COUNTRY DIARY

OXFORDSHIRE: The rule-of-thumb method for the calculation of the age of a hedge is to count the number of tree or shrub species in a 30-yard stretch, repeating the procedure as often as possible to arrive at an average figure, and then to assume that the figure obtained represents the age of the hedge in centuries. This is a rough adaptation of a slightly more complicated formula based on research which successfully correlated its method of dating from hedges which, from documentary evidence, were known to be of Saxon, Tudor or Parliamentary Enclosure origin. Using this formula, the hedge of sweet briar and *Rosa rugosa* separating my vegetable garden from the flower-borders and lawn, should be around 600 years old, for now, in a mere 15 yards, it has acquired six additional species—sycamore, lime, ash, dogwood. hawthorn and elder; but I know for a fact that the hedge is still a teenager of around 16 years old, for I planted it myself. In the field just above my house there is a hedge, which, by the same yardstick, should be 500 or 600 years old, but I know for a fact that about 50 years ago, this present field boundary was a bare dry-stone wall, and that the resulting hawthorn, blackthorn, crab-apple, elderfield maple, sycamore, and ash, together with briars, brambles, old man's beard and bryonies, have all come from perching berry-eating birds or wind action. To be fair to the propounders of this hedge-ageing theory (especially the Nature Conservancy reserchers Pollard, Hooper and Moore, who wrote the fascinating New Naturalist book on Hedges) it should be stressed that such aberrations from the norm are recognised, but that the general formula holds good.

W.D. CAMPBELL.

Frankly speaking

Sir, — If Frank Keating had met a young Ilie Nastase (rather than Gabriella Sabatini, Weekend Sport, June 20) would the interview have gone something like this:

"... He looks twice as good as that. With the brooding intensity of a Delon he pouts momentarily, tosses his cascade of sunsilk-ad hair and mutters darkly to himself after squandering a point with an occasional schoolboy swipe.

"He is very beautiful, especially in the virgin-white that used to be de rigeur at Wimbers; he has a hairyish forearm — though nothing as hirsute as Hendren's — a very fast swinging, slicing service accompanied always by a half-stifled, erotic little grunt..."

Perhaps you should employ one woman sports writer who could give us an equally fresh view of Pat Cash's tennis.
V. F. Hodge.
London W1.

Sir, — In decades of sports reporting Frank Keating has probably earned a bucketful — and he looks like one. Hunched over his notepad and salivating ceaselessly at the sight of tenderloin, he scratches his thatch and mutters moronically after meandering through another sentence.

He is very ugly, especially in the Bri-nylon which used to be de riguer at Farringdon Road. Keating's cross-court comments keep you at the very back of your seat as volley after sexist volley flows from his pen.

What does Frank want to do when he grows up? Be a journalist? — Sincerely,
Andy Dobson.
Paul Bonaventura.
Oxford.

Strip show

Sir, — You report (June 19) that the Secretary of State for the Environment, Nicholas Ridley, is critical of town planning in the inner-cities, and intends to strip local democratically elected councillors of their powers.

You go on to say that one of the problems he perceives is the lack of executive houses for American directors, etc. He does not want to have these built near council estates; but where does he expect them to be sited?

By his logic they are unlikely to be in the inner-city; so is he suggesting a reduction of the powers of local district planning authorities on the edge of the cities?

Does this mean yet another change of policy by a Government circular which has not been approved by Parliament? Are these houses to be permitted in the countryside? Is the green belt really safe?

I think we should be told. — Yours faithfully,
Michael Ray.
District Planning Officers' Society,
Hove, East Sussex.