MM.	RUFFY	Suisse
	SCHEIBNER	Autriche
	TANIK	Turquie
	URBANCZYK	Pologne
Mme	VEIDEMANN	Estonie

Egalement présents:

M.	ALLONCLE	France
Earl of	DUNDEE	Royaume-Uni
Mme	DURRIEU	France
Mme	GUIRADO	Espagne
MM.	HEGYI	Hongrie
	JASKIERNIA	Pologne
	LAAKSO	Finlande
	RAMIREZ-PERY	Espagne

Invités spéciaux:

MM.	IGITIAN	Arménie
	KALAYAKIN	Bélarus
	KHARATIAN	Arménie
	KRAUCHANKA	Bélarus
	LAZARIAN	Arménie
	MALUMAU	Bélarus
Mme	SAROUKHANIAN	Arménie
M.	SHARSHUNOU	Bélarus

M. Seitlinger, Président, ouvre la réunion à 14 h 00 en souhaitant la bienvenue aux participants, en particulier à la délégation d'invités spéciaux d'Arménie, qui participe pour la première fois à une session de l'Assemblée Parlementaire.

1. ORDRE DU JOUR <AS/NM (1996) OJ 3>

Le projet d'ordre du jour est adopté.

2. **PROCES-VERBAL** <AS/NM (1996) PV 2>

Le projet de procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le 29 février 1996 à Paris est approuvé.

3. **DEMANDE D'ADHESION DU BÉLARUS**
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Seitlinger)

Le Président signale que les "éminent juristes" se rendront en Bélarus du 5 au 9 mai 1996.

M. Malumau signale que l'Accord d'association conclu le 2 avril 1996 entre le Bélarus et la Fédération de Russie prévoit dans plusieurs de ses dispositions que la souveraineté de chaque partie est sauvegardée ainsi que son indépendance et son intégrité territoriale. La République de Bélarus maintient sa candidature au Conseil de l'Europe. Elle a adopté une nouvelle constitution et tient à ce qu'elle soit traitée comme un pays indépendant.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, le 29 avril 1996
S:\NM\pvs\fanpv3.96

confidentiel
AS/NM (1996) PV 3

COMMISSION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES PAYS EUROPÉENS NON MEMBRES

PROJET DE PROCES-VERBAL

des réunions tenues les 23 et 25 avril 1996 à Strasbourg

Présents:

MM.	SEITLINGER, Président	France
	SOLE TURA, Vice-Président	Espagne
	ATKINSON	Royaume-Uni
	BENVENUTI	Italie
M^me^	BRASSEUR	Luxembourg
MM.	BÜCHEL	Liechtenstein
	FENECH	Malte
	GABRIELESCU	Roumanie
M^me^	GELDERBLOM-LANKHOUT	Pays-Bas
MM.	JESZENSZKY	Hongrie
	KNAZKO (pour M. Figel)	Slovaquie
	KEZBERS	Lettonie
	LANDSBERGIS	Lituanie
	LEKBERG	Suède
	DE LIPKOWSKI	France
	MARMAZOV	Ukraine
	MITCHELL	Irlande
	MOTA AMARAL	Portugal
	PAASILINNA	Finlande
M^me^	POPTODOROVA	Bulgarie
M^me^	RINGSTAD	Norvège

4. ADHESION DE LA CROATIE

(Rapporteur pour avis: Lord Dundee) <AS/NM (1996) 8>

Le Président rappelle que le débat en Assemblée se tiendra le 24 avril.

Lord Dundee présente son projet d'avis et se déclare favorable à l'adhésion de la Croatie sous réserve d'un certain nombre d'engagements, concernant notamment l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire et de la presse, et l'organisation de l'administration locale.

M. Sole Tura déclare qu'il est favorable à l'adhésion de la Croatie. Toutefois, sur le plan politique, l'admission de la Croatie lui paraît prématurée, dans la mesure où il faut attendre la mise en oeuvre des Accords de Dayton.

M. Hegyi se demande si le fait que les différentes parties aux Accords de Dayton ont des statuts différents au sein du Conseil de l'Europe ne constituera pas un obstacle à la mise en oeuvre de ces Accords.

M^me^ Veidemann et M. Jeszenszky se déclarent favorables à l'adhésion de la Croatie dès que possible.

M^me^ Poptodorova souhaite une approche plus générale qui englobe les différentes parties aux Accords de Dayton.

M^me^ Durrieu est, elle aussi, favorable à l'adhésion de la Croatie au Conseil de l'Europe, mais celle-ci devrait intervenir à un stade ultérieur.

M. Ruffy souhaite pouvoir disposer de plus de temps pour l'examen de l'avis de Lord Dundee. L'évolution de la démocratie, surtout locale, en Croatie ne lui paraît pas satisfaisante. Dans le contexte politique actuel, réserver des traitements différents à la Croatie, la Serbie et la Bosnie lui paraît dénué de bon sens.

M. Landsbergis rappelle que la Russie a été acceptée au sein du Conseil de l'Europe malgré le conflit en Tchétchénie; il n'y a donc pas de raison de refuser l'entrée de la Croatie.

Lord Dundee considère que l'adhésion de la Croatie au Conseil de l'Europe est aujourd'hui la meilleure manière de l'encourager à participer à la mise en oeuvre des Accords de Dayton.

Finalement, la commission adopte le projet d'avis de Lord Dundee, par 15 voix pour, 3 contre et 6 abstentions.

5. SITUATION EN TCHÉTCHÉNIE

Le Président rappelle qu'un débat d'urgence sur la question est prévu pour le 24 avril et que la commission des questions politiques a adopté un projet de résolution et de directive sur la question.

La commission désigne M. Atkinson comme rapporteur pour avis.

M. Atkinson présente un amendement au projet de directive visant à organiser une audition parlementaire.

M. Landsbergis considère que le Gouvernement tchétchène n'est absolument pas représentatif.

Mme Gelderblom et M. Sole Tura sont favorables à l'amendement de M. Atkinson.

Celui-ci est approuvé par la commission (une voix contre, 2 abstentions).

6. MISE EN OEUVRE DES ACCORDS DE DAYTON

(porte-parole: Mme Durrieu)

Le Président signale que la contribution écrite de Mme Durrieu figure dans les dossiers.

7. COMMUNAUTÉ AROUMAINE

(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Gabrielescu) <Doc. 7091>

M. Gabrielescu, rapporteur pour avis, signale qu'il a rencontré avec M. de Puig, rapporteur de la Commission de la culture et de l'éducation, les Ambassadeurs de plusieurs pays où vivent des communautés aroumaines. La Commission de la culture et de l'éducation examinera le projet de rapport de M. de Puig au mois de juin.

8. PREPARATION DE LA REUNION EN UKRAINE (6 - 10 mai 1996)

Le Président rappelle que la commission tiendra sa réunion à Kiev et à Sébastopol du 6 au 10 mai 1996.

M. Marmazov donne un certain nombre de précisions sur la programme de la réunion.

9. QUESTIONS DIVERSES

Néant.

10. PROCHAINES REUNIONS

La commission décide de tenir ses prochaines réunions:

. en Ukraine du 6 au 10 mai 1996;
. à Strasbourg pendant la partie de session du 24 au 28 juin 1996.

La séance est levée le 25 avril à 15 h 00.

LISTE DES DECISIONS

La commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, réunie les 23 et 25 avril 1996 sous la présidence de M. Seitlinger:

- a eu un échange de vues avec le Président du Parlement de Bélarus sur la demande d'adhésion du Bélarus au Conseil de l'Europe;

- a adopté un projet d'avis sur la demande d'adhésion de la Croatie au Conseil de l'Europe par 15 voix pour, 3 contre et 6 abstentions (rapporteur: Earl of Dundee, Royaume-Uni, GDE);

- a adopté un amendement présenté par M. Atkinson (Royaume-Uni, GDE), rapporteur pour avis, au projet de directive sur les faits nouveaux dans la Fédération de Russie en rapport avec la situation en Tchétchénie;

- a examiné une contribution écrite de M^{me} Durrieu (France, SOC), porte-parole de la commission, sur la mise en oeuvre des Accords de Dayton;

- a eu un échange de vues sur la situation de la communauté aroumaine (rapporteur pour avis: M. Gabrielescu (Roumanie, PPE));

- a décidé de tenir sa prochaine réunion du 6 au 10 mai 1996 en Ukraine.

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1994 SESSION

RECOMMENDATION 1251 (1994)[1]

on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

1. The Assembly notes that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict broke out in 1988 and that it has already resulted in almost 20 000 deaths and more than one million refugees.

2. Its Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries has organised a series of hearings since 1992 which delegations from the Armenian and Azerbaijani Parliaments, the "leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh" and the "Azeri interested party of Nagorno-Karabakh" attended.

3. The Assembly notes with satisfaction that the ceasefire which came into force on 12 May 1994 has been relatively well complied with, and hopes that it will be followed up as soon as possible with a peace agreement signed by all the interested parties.

4. It welcomes the efforts of the CSCE's Minsk Group, the United Nations Security Council, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS to encourage the warring parties to sign a peace agreement, as well as the agreement signed on 26 July 1994 by the Ministers of Defence of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which they affirm their commitment to observe the ceasefire and their eagerness to accelerate the signing of a political agreement.

5. The Assembly consequently recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

i. call on the governments of Council of Europe member states to make the necessary resources available to the CSCE's Minsk Group so that it can achieve its objectives, particularly the deployment of international observers in the war zone;

ii. renew political dialogue with the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan;

1. *Text adopted by the Standing Committee*, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 10 November 1994.

See Doc. 7182, report of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, rapporteurs: MM. Pfuhl and Solé Tura.

ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE
DU
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

SESSION DE 1994

RECOMMANDATION 1251 (1994)[1]

relative au conflit du Haut-Karabakh

1. L'Assemblée constate que le conflit du Haut-Karabakh se poursuit depuis 1988 et qu'il a déjà provoqué près de 20 000 morts et plus d'un million de réfugiés.

2. Sa commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres a organisé depuis 1992 une série d'auditions auxquelles ont participé des délégations du Parlement d'Arménie, du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan, de la «direction du Haut-Karabakh» et de la «partie intéressée azérie du Haut-Karabakh».

3. L'Assemblée note avec satisfaction que le cessez-le-feu entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994 est relativement bien respecté et souhaite qu'il soit aussi rapidement que possible assorti d'un accord de paix signé par toutes les parties intéressées.

4. Elle se réjouit des efforts déployés par le Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie et l'Assemblée interparlementaire de la CEI pour amener les parties au conflit à signer un accord de paix, ainsi que de l'accord signé le 26 juillet 1994 par les ministres de la Défense d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan et le commandant de l'armée du Haut-Karabakh, dans lequel ils affirment leur engagement à respecter le cessez-le-feu et leur volonté d'accélérer la signature d'un accord politique.

5. L'Assemblée recommande par conséquent au Comité des Ministres:

i. d'encourager les gouvernements des Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe à mettre à la disposition du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE les moyens nécessaires pour qu'il puisse atteindre ses objectifs, notamment le déploiement d'observateurs internationaux dans la zone du conflit;

ii. de relancer le dialogue politique avec les autorités d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan;

1. *Texte adopté par la Commission Permanente*, agissant au nom de l'Assemblée, le 10 novembre 1994.

Voir Doc. 7182, rapport de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, rapporteurs: MM. Pfuhl et Solé Tura.

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1994 SESSION

RESOLUTION 1047 (1994)[1]

on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

1. The Assembly notes with satisfaction that the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, which came into force on 12 May 1994, has been relatively well complied with and hopes that it will be followed up as soon as possible by a peace agreement between the warring parties.

2. This conflict, which broke out in 1988, has already resulted in almost 20 000 deaths and more than one million refugees.

3. The Assembly notes with satisfaction the efforts of the CSCE's Minsk Group, the Government of the Russian Federation, the United Nations Security Council, the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS and its own Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries to encourage the warring parties to sign a peace agreement.

4. It welcomes the agreement signed on 26 July 1994 by the Ministers of Defence of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which they affirm their commitment to observe the ceasefire and their eagerness to accelerate the signing of a political agreement, and calls urgently on all the warring parties to refrain from any hostile act which might jeopardise the fragile ceasefire that has been in force since 12 May 1994.

5. It declares its readiness to help promote the conclusion of a peace agreement to the best of its abilities, particularly by encouraging dialogue between parliamentarians from the parties concerned.

6. Finally, it calls on the warring parties to organise the return home of refugees on an urgent basis and to respect minority rights as advocated in its Recommendation 1201, and urgently calls on Azerbaijan and Turkey to immediately end the blockade of their means of communication with Armenia.

1. *Text adopted by the Standing Committee*, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 10 November 1994.

See Doc. 7182, report of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, Rapporteurs: Mr Pfuhl and Mr Solé Tura.

ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

SESSION DE 1994

RÉSOLUTION 1047 (1994)[1]

sur le conflit du Haut-Karabakh

1. L'Assemblée constate avec satisfaction que le cessez-le-feu dans le conflit du Haut-Karabakh entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994 est relativement bien respecté et souhaite qu'il soit aussi rapidement que possible assorti d'un accord de paix entre les parties au conflit.

2. Ce conflit qui a éclaté en 1988 a déjà entraîné près de 20 000 morts et plus d'un million de réfugiés.

3. L'Assemblée note avec satisfaction les efforts déployés par le Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, l'Assemblée interparlementaire de la CEI et sa propre commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres pour amener les parties au conflit à conclure un accord de paix.

4. Elle se réjouit de l'accord signé le 26 juillet 1994 par les ministres de la Défense d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan et le commandant de l'armée du Haut-Karabakh, dans lequel ils affirment leur engagement à respecter le cessez-le-feu et leur volonté d'accélérer la signature d'un accord politique, et lance un appel pressant à toutes les parties au conflit pour qu'elles s'abstiennent de tout acte hostile qui pourrait mettre en danger le fragile cessez-le-feu en vigueur depuis le 12 mai 1994.

5. Elle se déclare disposée à contribuer, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à favoriser la conclusion d'un accord de paix, notamment en encourageant le dialogue entre les parlementaires des parties concernées.

6. Elle lance enfin un appel aux parties au conflit pour qu'elles organisent de manière urgente le retour des réfugiés et le respect des droits des minorités dans l'esprit de sa Recommandation 1201, et lance un appel urgent à l'Azerbaïdjan et à la Turquie pour que ceux-ci mettent immédiatement fin au blocus de leurs voies de communication avec l'Arménie.

1. *Texte adopté par la Commission Permanente*, agissant au nom de l'Assemblée, le 10 novembre 1994.

Voir Doc. 7182, rapport de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, rapporteurs: MM. Pfuhl et Solé Tura.

5. PREPARATION D'EVENTUELS DEBATS D'ACTUALITE OU DEBATS D'URGENCE (sous réserve de renvoi par le Bureau)

- Désignation de rapporteurs

6. RESPECT DES OBLIGATIONS ET ENGAGEMENTS CONTRACTÉS PAR LES ETATS MEMBRES DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE
<Directive n° 508 (1995)>

a. Bulgarie
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Seitlinger)

b. République tchèque
(Rapporteur pour avis: Mme Poptodorova)

c. Estonie
(Rapporteur pour avis: Mme Poptodorova)

d. Lettonie
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Sole Tura)

e. Lituanie
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. ~~Caputo~~)

f. Moldova
(Rapporteur pour avis: Mme Durrieu)

g. Roumanie
(Rapporteur pour avis: Mme Durrieu)

h. Russie
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Atkinson)

i. Slovaquie
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Cummings)

j. Slovénie
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Gabrielescu)

k. Ukraine

- Désignation d'un rapporteur pour avis

7. COMMUNAUTÉ AROUMAINE
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Gabrielescu) <Doc. 7091>

- Echange de vues

8. COMMUNAUTÉ D'ETATS INDÉPENDANTS <Doc. 7345>
(Rapporteur pour avis: Mme Poptodorova)

- Echange de vues

9. PREPARATION DE LA REUNION DE LA COMMISSION EN CROATIE DU 9 AU 13 SEPTEMBRE 1996 (sous réserve de l'autorisation du Bureau)

- Examen d'un projet de programme

10. QUESTIONS DIVERSES

11. PROCHAINE REUNION

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, le 18 juin 1996
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restricted
AS/NM (1996) OJ 5

COMMISSION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES PAYS EUROPÉENS NON MEMBRES

PROJET D'ORDRE DU JOUR

des réunions qui se tiendront à Strasbourg:
- mardi 25 juin 1996, à 14 h 00 (Salle 11)
- jeudi 27 juin à 14 h 00 (Salle 11)

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1. ORDRE DU JOUR <AS/NM (1996) OJ 5>

Adoption du projet d'ordre du jour

2. PROCES-VERBAL <AS/NM (1996) PV 3 et 4>

Approbation des projets de procès-verbaux des réunions tenues les 23 et 25 avril 1996 à Strasbourg et du 7 au 10 mai 1996 en Ukraine.

3. DEMANDE DE STATUT D'INVITÉ SPÉCIAL

a. Azerbaïdjan <AS/NM (1996) 12>
(Rapporteur: M. Sole Tura)

- Examen et adoption d'un projet de rapport.

4. DEMANDES D'ADHESION

a) Arménie

- Désignation d'un rapporteur pour avis

b) Bélarus
(Rapporteur pour avis: M. Seitlinger)

c) Bosnie-Herzégovine
(Rapporteur pour avis: Mme Durrieu)

N.B. Cet ordre du jour tient lieu de lettre de convocation

However, their funding is far from adequate to meet the needs of the situation.

7. In addition, United Nations agencies are advising and assisting both governments on the transition to market economies, decentralisation, and the provision of databases for health and education programmes. However, these services, currently conducted from separate headquarters in the countries concerned, including Georgia, are hampered by certain obstacles to co-operation, and their provision may not represent the most efficient deployment of expertise, management, and resources over the long term.

8. The Assembly recalls its Recommendation 1251 (1994) welcoming the ceasefire which came into force on 12 May 1994, calling on all sides to refrain from any hostile act which might prejudice it, and offering to help promote a peace agreement to the best of its abilities, particularly by encouraging dialogue between the parliamentarians from the parties concerned.

9. The Assembly reiterates its calls on the warring parties to organise the earliest possible return home of those refugees who wish to do so, with compensation for those who wish to resettle elsewhere; to respect minority rights; and for an immediate end to the blockades of all means of transport and communication between them and those imposed by Russia and Turkey.

10. The Assembly urges:

i. the Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian Governments to co-operate to the fullest extent with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations in the provision of emergency relief and longer term programmes for health, education, rehabilitation, and development;

ii. the Georgian Government to accept the return and resettlement of the Meskhetian Turks, with United Nations assistance, and calls on the United Nations to give special emphasis to the situation of this particularly vulnerable group;

iii. the European Union, through its Humanitarian Office, to step up its aid to the vulnerable populations of the southern Caucasus.

11. Finally, the Assembly calls for greater international efforts to help re-establish peace and to improve the humanitarian situation in the Caucasus, and, to this end, encourages the governments and parliaments of member states to offer their assistance, expertise and co-operation to the region as it emerges from seventy years of isolation.

leur financement est loin d'être suffisant pour répondre aux besoins qu'exige la situation.

7. En outre, les agences des Nations Unies conseillent et assistent les deux gouvernements dans la transition vers l'économie de marché, la décentralisation et la création de bases de données pour des programmes de santé et d'éducation. Toutefois, ces services, pour l'instant dirigés à partir de sièges distincts dans les pays concernés, y compris ceux dont bénéficie la Géorgie, sont gênés par des obstacles à la coopération et leur prestation pourrait ne pas représenter le déploiement le plus efficace de connaissances spécialisées, de cadres et de ressources pendant une si longue période.

8. L'Assemblée rappelle sa Recommandation 1251 (1994) dans laquelle elle se félicite du cessez-le-feu entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994, renouvelle les appels à toutes les parties pour qu'elles s'abstiennent de tout acte hostile qui pourrait le remettre en cause et se propose de contribuer à promouvoir un accord de paix au mieux de ses possibilités, notamment en encourageant le dialogue entre les parlementaires des Etats intéressés.

9. L'Assemblée réitère son appel aux parties en conflit pour qu'elles organisent au plus tôt le retour chez eux des réfugiés qui le souhaitent, avec des compensations à ceux qui désirent se réinstaller ailleurs, pour qu'elles respectent les droits des minorités, pour qu'elles mettent fin immédiatement au blocus de tous les moyens de transport et de communication entre elles, et pour que cesse également celui imposé par la Russie et la Turquie.

10. L'Assemblée demande avec vigueur:

i. aux Gouvernements arménien, azéri et géorgien de coopérer le plus possible avec les institutions des Nations Unies et les organisations non gouvernementales pour la fourniture de secours d'urgence et les programmes à plus long terme de santé, d'éducation, de réhabilitation et de développement;

ii. au Gouvernement géorgien d'accepter le retour et le rétablissement des Turcs meskhs, avec l'aide des Nations Unies, et invite les Nations Unies à accorder une attention spéciale à la situation de ce groupe particulièrement vulnérable;

iii. à l'Union européenne, par l'intermédiaire de son Office humanitaire, d'intensifier son assistance aux populations vulnérables du Caucase du Sud.

11. Enfin, l'Assemblée en appelle à un effort international plus important contribuant à la réinstauration de la paix et à l'amélioration de la situation humanitaire dans le Caucase et, à ces fins, encourage les gouvernements et les parlements des Etats membres à offrir leurs assistance, expérience et coopération à la région qui sort de soixante-dix ans d'isolement.

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1995 SESSION

RESOLUTION 1059 (1995)[1]

on the humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan

1. The Assembly deplores that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which broke out in 1988, has resulted in untold human suffering, leaving thousands dead, tens of thousands wounded and more than one million refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

2. The last figure includes hundreds of thousands who were compelled to leave their homes following threats, reports of atrocities committed, or orders issued by the Soviet authorities before 1991.

3. Following the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991, their economies have seriously deteriorated. The situation is aggravated by the effects of the conflict and of the economic blockades by neighbouring countries.

4. As a result, the populations of both countries have experienced a serious decrease in living standards, and are facing increasing hardships, including rising unemployment and severe shortages of water, fuel and energy. The United Nations estimates that over one million people in both countries are now living below poverty level.

5. The refugees in particular, and especially those living in inadequate tents in Azerbaijan, are facing extreme hardships through a lack of basic warmth, food and medical support.

6. United Nations programmes have been established in both countries since December 1992.

1. *Text adopted by the Standing Committee*, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 15 March 1995.

See Doc. 7250, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, rapporteur: Mr Atkinson; and Doc. 7266, opinion of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, rapporteur: Mr Jeszenszky.

ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE
DU
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

SESSION DE 1995

RÉSOLUTION 1059 (1995)[1]

relative à la situation humanitaire des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées en Arménie et en Azerbaïdjan

1. L'Assemblée regrette profondément que le conflit du Haut-Karabakh, qui a éclaté en 1988, ait causé d'énormes souffrances humaines, entraînant des milliers de morts, des dizaines de milliers de blessés et plus d'un million de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées en Arménie et en Azerbaïdjan.

2. On trouve parmi ces derniers des centaines de milliers de personnes qui ont été contraintes de quitter leur domicile à la suite de menaces, d'informations sur les atrocités commises ou sur l'ordre des autorités soviétiques avant 1991.

3. Depuis que l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan sont devenus indépendants en 1991, leurs économies se sont sérieusement détériorées. Cette situation est aggravée par les conséquences du conflit et des blocus économiques par les pays voisins.

4. Les populations des deux pays connaissent en conséquence une baisse considérable de leur niveau de vie, et se trouvent confrontées à des difficultés croissantes, y compris un chômage en hausse et de graves pénuries d'eau, de combustible et d'énergie. Les Nations Unies estiment que plus d'un million de personnes dans les deux pays vivent aujourd'hui au-dessous du seuil de pauvreté.

5. Les réfugiés en particulier, surtout ceux d'Azerbaïdjan hébergés sous des tentes inadéquates, se trouvent dans des conditions extrêmement pénibles car ils manquent de chauffage, de nourriture et d'une aide médicale de base.

6. Des programmes des Nations Unies sont établis dans les deux pays depuis décembre 1992. Toutefois,

1. *Texte adopté par la Commission Permanente*, agissant au nom de l'Assemblée, le 15 mars 1995.

Voir Doc. 7250, rapport de la commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la démographie, rapporteur: M. Atkinson; et Doc. 7266, avis de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, rapporteur: M. Jeszenszky.

UNRWA in Palestine and the establishment of a regional headquarters in Tbilisi, or of a similar co-ordinating mechanism;

d. to set up political dialogue with the authorities of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia by confirming the offers of Council of Europe assistance, expertise and co-operation particularly in the areas of human rights, the introduction of parliamentary democracy, and, where appropriate, protection of minority rights and cultural identity.

l'UNRWA en Palestine, et l'établissement d'un siège régional à Tbilissi, ou d'un mécanisme de coordination similaire;

d. à activer le dialogue politique avec les autorités d'Arménie, d'Azerbaïdjan et de Géorgie en confirmant les offres d'aide, de fourniture de connaissances spécialisées et de coopération du Conseil de l'Europe, en particulier dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, de l'introduction d'une démocratie parlementaire et, le cas échéant, de la protection des droits des minorités et de l'identité culturelle.

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1995 SESSION

RECOMMENDATION 1263 (1995)[1]

on the humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan

1. The Assembly, referring to its Resolution 1059 (1995) on the humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan, recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

i. consider as a matter of urgency the critical situation arising from the sheer inadequacy of international assistance to the victims of the cruel conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and in particular to those driven from their homes;

ii. following its Recommendation 1247 (1994) on enlargement of the Council of Europe, invite the Council of Europe's Social Development Fund and its member states to enable refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to benefit from financing by the fund, through its emergency account, possibly in co-ordination with United Nations and other international institutions involved;

iii. invite the governments of all member states:

a. to accept that international assistance through United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and non-governmental organisations will be required in the Caucasus for many years to come, and as a result to respond generously to their future appeals;

b. to offer the required expertise and manpower for de-mining the area in and around Karabakh;

c. to consider the creation of a unified United Nations agency for the Caucasus along the lines of

1. *Text adopted by the Standing Committee*, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 15 March 1995.

See Doc. 7250, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, rapporteur: Mr Atkinson; and Doc. 7266, opinion of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, rapporteur: Mr Jeszenszky.

ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

SESSION DE 1995

RECOMMANDATION 1263 (1995)[1]

relative à la situation humanitaire des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées en Arménie et en Azerbaïdjan

1. L'Assemblée, se référant à sa Résolution 1059 (1995) sur la situation humanitaire des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées en Arménie et en Azerbaïdjan, recommande au Comité des Ministres:

i. de considérer comme une préoccupation urgente la situation critique qui résulte de l'inadaptation totale de l'aide internationale aux victimes du conflit cruel du Haut-Karabakh et, en particulier, à ceux qui ont été chassés de leurs foyers;

ii. conformément à sa Recommandation 1247 (1994) relative à l'élargissement du Conseil de l'Europe, d'inviter le Fonds de développement social du Conseil de l'Europe et ses Etats membres à permettre aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées en Arménie, en Azerbaïdjan et en Géorgie de bénéficier du financement du fonds, par l'intermédiaire de son compte d'urgence, éventuellement en coordination avec l'ONU et d'autres institutions internationales concernées;

iii. d'inviter les gouvernements des Etats membres:

a. à admettre qu'une assistance internationale par le canal des institutions de l'ONU, du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, de la Fédération internationale des sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, et des organisations non gouvernementales sera nécessaire dans le Caucase pendant de nombreuses années encore, et en conséquence à répondre généreusement à leurs appels futurs;

b. à offrir les connaissances spécialisées et la main-d'œuvre voulues pour déminer le Karabakh et ses environs;

c. à envisager la création d'une institution unifiée des Nations Unies pour le Caucase, sur le modèle de

1. *Texte adopté par la Commission Permanente*, agissant au nom de l'Assemblée, le 15 mars 1995.

Voir Doc. 7250, rapport de la commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la démographie, rapporteur: M. Atkinson; et Doc. 7266, avis de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, rapporteur: M. Jeszenszky.

III. Exposé des mofits par MM. PFUHL et SOLE TURA

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II. Projet de résolution

1. L'Assemblée constate avec satisfaction que le cessez-le-feu dans le conflit du Haut-Karabakh entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994 est relativement bien respecté et souhaite qu'il soit aussi rapidement que possible assorti d'un accord de paix entre les parties au conflit.

2. Ce conflit qui a éclaté en 1988 a déjà entraîné près de 20.000 morts et plus d'un million de réfugiés.

3. L'Assemblée note avec satisfaction les efforts déployés par le Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, l'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI et sa propre commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres pour amener les parties au conflit à conclure un accord de paix.

4. Elle se réjouit de l'accord signé le 26 juillet 1994 par les ministres de la Défense d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan et le Commandant de l'armée du Haut-Karabakh, dans lequel ils affirment leur engagement à respecter le cessez-le-feu et leur volonté d'accélérer la signature d'un accord politique, et lance un appel pressant à toutes les parties au conflit pour qu'elles s'abstiennent de tout acte hostile qui pourrait mettre en danger le fragile cessez-le-feu en vigueur depuis le 12 mai 1994.

5. Elle se déclare disposée à contribuer, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à favoriser la conclusion d'un accord de paix, notamment en encourageant le dialogue entre les parlementaires des parties concernées.

6. Elle lance enfin un appel aux parties au conflit pour qu'elles organisent de manière urgente le retour des réfugiés et le respect des droits des minorités dans l'esprit de sa Recommandation 1201, et lance un appel urgent à l'Azerbaïdjan et à la Turquie pour qu'ils mettent immédiatement fin au blocus de leurs voies de communication avec l'Arménie.

Haut-Karabakh a été décidée le 2 septembre 1991; au référendum du 10 décembre de la même année, 99 % de la population se sont prononcés en faveur de l'indépendance du Haut-Karabakh. Le 28 décembre se sont déroulées les élections au Parlement du Haut-Karabakh et la proclamation de l'indépendance de la République a eu lieu le 18 janvier 1992.

Du point de vue des autorités du Haut-Karabakh, la légitimité de la nouvelle République se fondait, d'une part, sur le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination (conformément à la constitution de l'URSS en vigueur à l'époque et aux lois qui permettaient aux populations des régions autonomes de décider elles-mêmes de leur organisation étatique au cas où la République dont elles faisaient partie quittait l'URSS)[1] et, d'autre part, sur la volonté exprimée par le peuple au référendum du 10 décembre 1991.

S'agissant des autorités azéries, elles refusent absolument de reconnaître toute légitimité à la République du Haut-Karabakh et le Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan a même aboli le statut d'autonomie de cette région le 26 novembre 1991. Tous les dirigeants politiques d'Azerbaïdjan défendent le principe de l'intangibilité des frontières existantes et estiment que la question du Haut-Karabakh est liée aux revendications territoriales de l'Arménie. A ce jour, la République du Haut-Karabakh n'a été reconnue par aucun pays.

1. L'évolution du conflit

Le conflit entre l'Azerbaïdjan et le Haut-Karabakh s'est progressivement transformé depuis 1989 en véritable guerre, surtout à partir du début de 1992, au moment où l'armée soviétique quittait la région.

En janvier et février 1992, les forces armées azéries ont lancé une offensive massive contre le Haut-Karabakh accompagnée de bombardements aériens, notamment de la capitale Stépanakert.

A partir du printemps 1992, les troupes du Haut-Karabakh ont contre-attaqué et sont parvenues à ouvrir le "couloir de Latchine" entre le Haut-Karabakh et l'Arménie. Attaques et contre-attaques se sont succédées tout au long de l'année 1992. A partir du printemps 1993, les troupes du Haut-Karabakh ont multiplié les succès militaires.


C'est ainsi qu'en septembre 1993, le bulletin d'information du ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République d'Azerbaïdjan indiquait que "à la suite de la guerre de conquête menée par les forces armées de la République d'Arménie avec l'aide des formations séparatistes des Arméniens du Haut-Karabakh, près de 20 % du territoire de la République d'Azerbaïdjan ont été envahis".

Quelques semaines plus tard a eu lieu une rencontre entre représentants de l'Azerbaïdjan et du Haut-Karabakh, au cours de laquelle ils ont conclu un accord de cessez-le-feu jusqu'au 5 novembre.


Toutefois, à partir de la mi-décembre 1993, les forces azéries ont procédé à une contre-attaque et, selon les Izvestia, à partir de ce moment-là "au nord du Haut-Karabakh

1. Voir article 3 de la loi n° 1409-1 du 3 avril 1990 relative aux questions liées à la sortie d'une République fédérée du cadre de l'URSS.

INTRODUCTION



Frontières de la région autonome du Haut-Karabakh jusqu'en 1988.



Territoires d'Azerbaïdjan occupés par les forces du Haut-Karabakh en 1993.

Territoires repris par l'Azerbaïdjan à la suite des combats de 1994.

En 1989 la superficie du Haut-Karabakh s'élevait à 4400 km^2 et sa population à 188.000 habitants (dont environ 145.000 Arméniens, 40.000 Azéris et 3000 Russes).

Le Haut-Karabakh est devenu une région autonome en 1921; de nouvelles frontières ont été fixées pour la région en 1923, qui excluaient le couloir de Latchine reliant le Haut-Karabakh à l'Arménie, ainsi qu'un certain nombre de régions situées au nord.

Le 20 février 1988, les députés du Haut-Karabakh ont demandé au Conseil Suprême de l'URSS de transférer à l'Arménie la tutelle exercée sur le Haut-Karabakh par l'Azerbaïdjan; toutefois le 23 mars le Conseil Suprême a décidé de ne pas donner suite à cette demande.

Le 20 juillet 1988 le Soviet régional du Haut-Karabakh a décidé son détachement de l'Azerbaïdjan et son rattachement à l'Arménie sous le nom de Artsakh.

Le 1er décembre 1989 le Conseil Suprême d'Arménie et le Conseil de l'Artsakh ont voté ensemble en faveur du rattachement de l'Artsakh à l'Arménie et, le 20 mai 1990, les habitants du Haut-Karabakh ont participé aux premières élections libres du Parlement arménien.

Alors que le processus de décomposition de l'URSS s'accélérait, notamment à la suite de la tentative de coup d'Etat d'août 1991 à Moscou, la création de la République du

se sont poursuivies des batailles de tanks comparables par leur ampleur aux combats d'importance moyenne de la deuxième guerre mondiale. En même temps se déroulait une guerre de position à proximité de la frontière entre l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Iran".

Le 12 mai 1994 est enfin entré en vigueur un cessez-le-feu qui est plus ou moins respecté depuis lors.

2. Le rôle de la Russie

La Transcaucasie est considérée par le gouvernement de la Russie comme faisant partie du concept géopolitique de "l'étranger proche". A ce sujet, il faut rappeler que l'Azerbaïdjan, tout comme l'Arménie en 1991 et la Géorgie en 1993, a rejoint la CEI le 24 septembre 1993.

Le 8 octobre 1993 a eu lieu à Moscou une rencontre entre les Présidents de Russie (Boris Eltsine), d'Arménie (Lévon Ter-Petrossian), d'Azerbaïdjan (Gaïdar Aliev) et de Géorgie (Edouard Chevardnadze). Boris Eltsine y a soumis aux trois dirigeants de Transcaucasie un projet de communiqué commun qui prévoyait l'installation de bases militaires russes en Transcaucasie et l'élaboration de mesures visant à la protection commune des frontières de la Géorgie, l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan avec les pays voisins, la Turquie et l'Iran. Selon ce projet, chacune des parties devait s'engager à prendre des mesures immédiates pour débloquer les voies de communication.

Les dirigeants d'Arménie et de Géorgie ont approuvé ce document, mais le Président Gaïdar Aliev ne l'a pas soutenu, estimant que l'adoption d'une telle déclaration ne pouvait intervenir qu'après le retrait des forces arméniennes des territoires azéris occupés.

Par ailleurs, d'autres pays marquent leur désaccord avec les initiatives de Moscou dans la région, notamment les Etats-Unis et la Turquie.

Néanmoins, le 18 février 1994 a été signé à Moscou par les parties intéressées le "protocole de Moscou". Il prévoit le cessez-le-feu, la séparation des parties au conflit et la mise en place de zones de sécurité avec la présence d'observateurs internationaux.

Pour le gouvernement de la Russie, le règlement du conflit ne peut s'effectuer que par étapes:

a) entrée en vigueur d'un cessez-le-feu et déploiement de forces d'interposition

b) retrait des troupes des territoires occupés, rétablissement des voies de communication, retour des réfugiés

c) négociations sur le statut du Haut-Karabakh.

3. Le rôle de la Turquie

Pour la Turquie, la Transcaucasie est aussi une zone d'intérêt stratégique. Aujourd'hui, il est évident qu'il y a des signes de tension dans les relations entre la Turquie et l'Arménie. Jusqu'à maintenant le gouvernement de la Turquie a refusé d'établir des relations diplomatiques avec l'Arménie et on peut parler d'une participation turque au blocus des voies de communication arméniennes.

Mais, en septembre 1993, la nouvelle chef du gouvernement de la Turquie, Mme Tansu Çiller, a rencontré le Président Boris Eltsine à Moscou. A l'issue de la rencontre, elle a déclaré que "désormais la Turquie et la Russie ne sont plus des rivaux pour accroître leur influence dans la région, mais des partenaires œuvrant au rétablissement de la sécurité". Cependant, selon d'autres sources, on assiste à un certain nombre de divergences entre les deux pays en ce qui concerne la Transcaucasie. En particulier, Moscou insiste pour que seules des forces russes puissent être déployées au Haut-Karabakh en tant que forces de maintien de la paix, alors qu'Ankara préfère une composition mixte de ces forces.

4. Le rôle de la CSCE et de l'ONU

La CSCE et l'ONU représentent depuis longtemps d'importants médiateurs dans le conflit du Haut-Karabakh.

a) CSCE

En mars 1992, la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe a décidé de convoquer à Minsk une conférence internationale avec la participation des parties au conflit. Comme l'Azerbaïdjan refusait de participer à la conférence tant que ne seraient pas restitués les territoires occupés, la CSCE a organisé des réunions préparatoires du "Groupe de Minsk". Sa mission consiste à régler les problèmes empêchant la tenue de la conférence proprement dite. Le Groupe de Minsk comprend onze pays: Allemagne, Arménie, Azerbaïdjan, Bélarus, Etats-Unis, France, Hongrie, Italie, Russie, Suède et Turquie.

Début octobre 1993, le Président du Groupe de Minsk, M. Mario Raffaelli, a proposé un plan de règlement pacifique du conflit du Haut-Karabakh. Il prévoyait qu'en l'espace d'un mois le Haut-Karabakh devait progressivement retirer ses forces armées des différents territoires occupés. En réponse à chaque pas accompli, l'Azerbaïdjan devait de son côté prendre un certain nombre de mesures : la levée du blocus d'abord du pipe-line gazier, ensuite de la voie ferrée Idjevan-Kazakh, et enfin de toutes les voies de communication. Toutes ces étapes devaient être contrôlées par des groupes d'experts de la CSCE.

L'Arménie a donné son accord à ce plan, alors que l'Azerbaïdjan lui a réservé une réaction négative, dans la mesure où dans le plan il n'était question ni de la levée du blocus de la République du Nakhitchévan, ni du sort réservé à Latchine. Quant au Haut-Karabakh, il n'a pas donné de réponse positive, bien que pour la première fois il ait été reconnu comme partie au conflit.

Le 8 novembre 1993, à l'issue d'une session ordinaire du Groupe de Minsk à Vienne, un nouveau plan de règlement pacifique du conflit a été présenté. Plusieurs exigences azéries ont été retenues dans ce plan, en particulier le retrait des troupes des territoires occupés et la création des conditions nécessaires au retour des réfugiés dans leurs zones d'habitation. De plus il disposait que la question du statut du Haut-Karabakh ne pourrait faire l'objet de discussions avant l'ouverture de la Conférence de Minsk. L'Arménie et le Haut-Karabakh ont approuvé ce plan, mais non pas l'Azerbaïdjan.

Le nouveau Président du Groupe de Minsk, M. Jan Eliasson, multiplie actuellement ses efforts pour parvenir à la convergence des plans de paix proposés par la

CSCE et la Russie, dont la différence majeure réside dans la composition des forces d'interposition. Pour l'essentiel toutefois les deux plans poursuivent le même objectif.

b) ONU

En 1993, le Conseil de Sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies a adopté quatre Résolutions sur le règlement du conflit du Haut-Karabakh, dans lesquelles il réaffirme la souveraineté et l'intégrité territoriale de la République azerbaïdjanaise et de tous les autres Etats de la région.

Dans sa Résolution 822 du 30 avril 1993 le Conseil de Sécurité exige l'arrêt immédiat de toute action armée, ainsi que le retrait immédiat de toutes les forces d'occupation. De plus il lance un appel pressant aux parties intéressées pour qu'elles reprennent immédiatement les négociations en vue de la solution du conflit dans le cadre du processus de paix du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE.

Dans sa Résolution 853 du 29 juillet 1993 le Conseil de Sécurité condamne la prise d'Agdam et de tous les autres territoires de la République d'Azerbaïdjan récemment occupés. Par ailleurs, il lance un appel urgent aux parties intéressées pour qu'elles s'abstiennent de toute action qui pourrait faire obstacle au règlement pacifique du conflit et pour qu'elles poursuivent leurs négociations dans le cadre de la Conférence de Minsk de la CSCE ou grâce à des contacts directs entre elles en vue d'aboutir à une solution définitive.

La Résolution 874 du 14 octobre 1993 engage les parties au conflit à accepter le plan de paix établi par la CSCE le 28 septembre 1993.

Dans sa Résolution 884 du 12 novembre 1993 le Conseil de Sécurité "prie instamment les parties concernées de remettre promptement en vigueur de manière effective et permanente le cessez-le-feu intervenu à la suite de contacts directs pris avec le concours du Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie pour appuyer le Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, et de continuer à rechercher un règlement négocié du conflit dans le cadre du processus de Minsk de la CSCE et du "calendrier modifié", tel qu'il a été modifié lors de la réunion du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE tenue à Vienne du 2 au 8 novembre 1993".

5. Le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe

L'Assemblée Parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, et notamment sa Commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, se sont intéressées depuis plusieurs années déjà au conflit du Haut-Karabakh. Il faut noter à ce propos que l'Arménie a demandé le statut d'invité spécial le 22 décembre 1991 et l'Azerbaïdjan le 24 janvier 1992.

Ainsi la commission a organisé un certain nombre d'auditions auxquelles ont été invitées des délégations parlementaires d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan. Si le Parlement arménien a toujours donné suite à ces invitations (février 1992 à Strasbourg, mai 1992 à Minsk, octobre 1992 à Strasbourg et janvier/juin 1994 à Strasbourg), le Parlement azéri n'a participé qu'à l'audition d'octobre 1992 et à la deuxième partie de celle de janvier/juin 1994.

Le Président de la commission, M. Atkinson, a soumis le 5 octobre 1992 aux deux délégations un plan de paix. Seul le Parlement arménien a réagi à cette initiative.

S'agissant de la dernière audition en date, elle s'est déroulée en deux parties. Pour la première partie, qui a eu lieu le 24 janvier 1994, des invitations ont été adressées à des délégations d'Azerbaïdjan, d'Arménie et du Haut-Karabakh. Seules les deux dernières ont participé à l'audition. La raison du refus de l'Azerbaïdjan semble être liée au fait que, du côté du Haut-Karabakh, n'ait été invitée qu'une délégation représentant la communauté arménienne et non la communauté azérie. Le compte rendu de cette audition figure en annexe I.

C'est pourquoi la commission a organisé le 29 juin 1994 à Strasbourg une deuxième partie de cette audition, à laquelle ont participé des délégations du Parlement azéri, de la "direction du Haut-Karabakh" et de la "partie intéressée azérie du Haut-Karabakh". Le compte rendu de cette audition figure en annexe II.

Il faut ajouter ici que la demande de statut d'invité spécial de l'Arménie et de l'Azerbaïdjan étaient liées non seulement au règlement du conflit du Haut-Karabakh, mais également à une nouvelle controverse qui s'est déclarée au sein de l'Assemblée en janvier 1994: la Transcaucasie fait-elle partie de l'Europe? En adoptant la Recommandation 1247 relative à l'élargissement du Conseil de l'Europe le 4 octobre 1994, l'Assemblée a finalement décidé que l'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie font partie de l'espace du Conseil de l'Europe.

6. Le point de vue des parties au conflit

Leurs avis diffèrent en ce qui concerne les causes du conflit et les conditions de son règlement.

a) Azerbaïdjan

Le gouvernement de l'Azerbaïdjan présente officiellement ce conflit comme une guerre que mène l'Arménie pour la conquête de territoires convoités.

L'Azerbaïdjan exige la libération sans condition de tous les territoires occupés et met l'accent sur le problème des réfugiés et sur la nécessité de leur retour immédiat et en toute sécurité dans leur zone d'habitation. Le gouvernement de l'Azerbaïdjan n'est pas très favorable à l'initiative de médiation russe et n'a encore fait aucune proposition sur le statut juridique du Haut-Karabakh.

b) Haut-Karabakh

Pour ses dirigeants la solution du conflit passe par la reconnaissance internationale de l'indépendance du Haut-Karabakh. Ils considèrent la reconnaissance officielle du Haut-Karabakh en tant que partie au conflit comme l'une des conditions principales de sa participation à part entière au processus de négociation, dans le cadre duquel il est indispensable d'aborder également la question du statut politique du Haut-Karabakh.

La restitution des territoires occupés, à l'exception du couloir de Latchine, dépendra des garanties obtenues pour sa sécurité, voire pour la reconnaissance de son autonomie.

c) Arménie

Le gouvernement arménien exige non seulement le cessez-le-feu, mais également l'arrêt des actions hostiles, c'est-à-dire le blocus des voies de communications. De plus il insiste sur l'intégration de Stépanakert dans les négociations en tant que partie indépendante et met également l'accent sur les garanties de sécurité à apporter à la population du Haut-Karabakh.

*
* *

CONCLUSION

A partir du printemps 1994, pour la première fois depuis 1988, on assiste à un certain nombre de signes positifs :

- le 12 mars dernier, les Présidents des Parlements d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan ont conclu un accord provisoire sur le retrait des troupes situées autour du Haut-Karabakh et la création d'une "zone tampon";

- du 11 au 15 avril, au cours d'une réunion du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, a été adopté un document en 23 points sur le renforcement des mesures de confiance entre les parties au conflit;

- le 5 mai s'est tenue à Bichkek une réunion des délégations parlementaires de l'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI, à laquelle ont notamment participé des représentants d'Arménie, d'Azerbaïdjan et du Haut-Karabakh. Ces derniers ont adopté un protocole d'accord sur un cessez-le-feu et l'élaboration d'un instrument juridique sur le règlement du conflit. Ce protocole a été signé le 5 mai par les représentants de l'Arménie et du Haut-Karabakh et, le 8 mai, par M. Guliev, Président du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan;

- le 12 mai a vu l'entrée en vigueur d'un cessez-le-feu qui semble assez bien respecté jusqu'à présent;

- le 26 juillet 1994, les ministres de la Défense de l'Arménie et de l'Azerbaïdjan et le Commandant de l'armée du Haut-Karabakh ont signé un accord dans lequel ils affirment leur engagement à respecter le cessez-le-feu et leur volonté d'accélérer la signature d'un accord politique.

On est toutefois encore loin d'un règlement politique du conflit du Haut-Karabakh qui met aux prises des intérêts politiques et stratégiques vitaux, non seulement des pays de la région, mais aussi de leurs voisins, la Russie et la Turquie.

Nous sommes aujourd'hui en présence de deux plans de paix: celui de la CSCE et celui de la Russie. Bien qu'ils soient convergents dans leurs objectifs, leur différence essentielle réside dans la composition des forces d'interposition. Le plan russe préconise l'envoi dans la région de troupes des Etats de la CEI, donc essentiellement russes comme c'est déjà le cas en Géorgie, alors que la CSCE insiste sur une composition plus large de telles forces ou d'un groupe d'observateurs, tout en hésitant à s'engager sur le terrain.

Quel rôle le Conseil de l'Europe peut-il jouer à cet égard?

Il convient de noter tout d'abord que, parmi les parties les plus directement concernées par le conflit, la Turquie est membre du Conseil de l'Europe, la Russie a le statut d'invité spécial et l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan ont demandé l'attribution de ce statut. De plus, les différentes parties au conflit ont participé à plusieurs auditions organisées par l'Assemblée Parlementaire à Strasbourg, ce qui montre que le dialogue n'est pas entièrement rompu.

A présent le Conseil de l'Europe devrait soutenir les efforts déployés à la fois par le Président du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, M. Jan Eliasson, et l'Ambassadeur spécial du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Russie, M. Vladimir Kazimirov, afin de rendre compatibles les plans de paix soumis par la Russie et la CSCE.

Il devrait également lancer un appel à ses Etats membres pour qu'ils participent à la force d'interposition ou au groupe d'observateurs internationaux préconisés par la CSCE.

Le moment est également venu de renforcer le dialogue politique entre le Conseil de l'Europe et l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan, qui en ont tous deux exprimé le souhait. Ce dialogue devrait permettre à ces deux pays de bénéficier des programmes d'assistance du Conseil de l'Europe, en vue de promouvoir leurs réformes démocratiques et, le cas échéant, d'élaborer un nouveau statut pour le Haut-Karabakh.

Quant à l'Assemblée, elle devrait encourager et multiplier les contacts avec les parlementaires de ces pays, dans la mesure où le dialogue interparlementaire constitue un complément utile et nécessaire des négociations intergouvernementales; il a déjà fait ses preuves au cours des auditions organisées par la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres ainsi que dans les rencontres tenues dans le cadre de l'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI.

ANNEXE I

COMPTE RENDU DE L'AUDITION SUR LA SITUATION AU HAUT-KARABAKH

(Strasbourg, 24 janvier 1994)

M. Atkinson, Président de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, rappelle que cette audition est organisée en coopération avec la Commission des questions politiques, conformément à la décision du Bureau, et qu'elle se situe dans le cadre de la demande de statut d'invité spécial de l'Arménie et de l'Azerbaïdjan. La commission a déjà organisé plusieurs auditions sur la question mais n'a jamais été autorisée à effectuer une mission sur place. Conformément aux décisions de la commission, ont été invitées à la présente audition des délégations parlementaires d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan, ainsi que des représentants du Haut-Karabakh. Le parlement d'Azerbaïdjan a été invité à se faire accompagner de représentants de la communauté azérie du Haut-Karabakh, mais il n'a pas répondu à l'invitation.

Mr Alexanian, chef de la délégation du Haut-Karabakh, remercie la commission de son invitation. En 1991 l'Azerbaïdjan a supprimé le statut de république autonome du Haut-Karabakh. Depuis cinq ans, le conflit a causé des milliers de morts. Les autorités du Haut-Karabakh ont toujours prôné une solution politique du conflit. Les efforts de la CSCE en vue du retour à la paix n'ont pas connu de succès depuis deux ans. En juin 1993, l'Azerbaïdjan a rompu les négociations de cessez-le-feu. Dernièrement les Azéris ont intensifié leurs attaques militaires contre le Haut-Karabakh; celles-ci se sont soldées par des centaines de morts de part et d'autre. L'Azerbaïdjan a refusé le plan de paix de la CSCE. Des efforts doivent être entrepris pour poursuivre les négociations dans le respect de deux principes fondamentaux du droit international: le respect de l'intégrité territoriale et le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.

M. Balayan membre de la délégation du Haut-Karabakh, relate sa récente visite sur le front. Il y a vu huit bataillons de troupes azéries comprenant des moudjahidines d'Afghanistan, des soldats chinois et turcs. Un bataillon entier était composé de prisonniers de droit commun. La guerre n'est nécessaire ni à l'Arménie ni à l'Azerbaïdjan. Le cessez-le-feu doit être accepté sans aucune condition. La Turquie a acheté des armes à la Russie et les a fait passer par le Nachitchévan pour qu'elles puissent être utilisées sur le front du Haut-Karabakh.

M. Voskanian, chef de la délégation parlementaire d'Arménie, remercie lui aussi la commission pour son invitation. C'est la quatrième fois qu'il participe à une réunion de la commission. L'Arménie n'a aucune prétention territoriale sur l'Azerbaïdjan. La seule possibilité de mettre fin au conflit réside dans les négociations sous l'égide d'organisations internationales, notamment la CSCE et l'ONU, et dans le respect du principe de l'intégrité territoriale. Les Azéris n'ont pas seulement refusé les propositions de cessez-le-feu, mais en ont profité pour lancer des offensives massives. Ce conflit n'est ni ethnique, ni religieux. Il faut qu'intervienne un cessez-le-feu avant que ne commencent les négociations. C'est à ce moment-là que pourra être discutée la question du statut du Haut-Karabakh. L'Arménie souffre depuis bien longtemps du blocus de ses voies de communication et d'approvisionnement en produits énergétiques; elles s'efforce pourtant de poursuivre les réformes démocratiques et son rapprochement avec le Conseil de l'Europe. A ce propos, les propositions contenues dans le projet de rapport sur l'élargissement du Conseil de l'Europe visant à exclure la Transcaucasie de l'Europe ne

correspondent pas à la réalité culturelle et historique de la région. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Arménie a écrit au Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe à ce sujet et sa propre délégation a soumis un mémorandum sur la question qui a été distribué aux membres de la commission.

M. Kotcharian, membre de la délégation parlementaire d'Arménie, déclare que tous les partis d'Arménie estiment que la solution au conflit doit passer par des négociations entre l'Azerbaïdjan et le Haut-Karabakh. Il faut que la paix soit garantie et non interrompue par des attaques incessantes. Ce n'est que si le droit à l'autodétermination du peuple du Haut-Karabakh est respecté que le processus de paix pourra être garanti.

M^me^ Severinsen s'enquiert des chances de réussite des initiatives du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE.

Pour M. Alexanian, la CSCE ne dispose malheureusement pas des mécanismes nécessaires pour garantir la sécurité de la population du Haut-Karabakh. Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU a déjà pris position sur ce conflit, car il dépasse les limites du Haut-Karabakh. Les organisations internationales doivent faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour arrêter l'effusion de sang. Il y a déjà eu de nombreuses tentatives de médiation. Le fond du conflit est lié au droit du peuple du Haut-Karabakh à défendre ses aspirations.

M. Ruffy s'étonne que, bien qu'ayant été invités, le Président de la commission des questions politiques et la délégation turque ne soient pas présents à l'audition. Cette situation ne nous concerne-t-elle pas ? Est-il opportun, par ailleurs, que des troupes d'interposition soient envoyées dans la région ?

Selon M. Alexanian, pour arrêter la guerre, il faut que la communauté internationale tout entière intervienne. Bien sûr, l'intervention de troupes de maintien de la paix serait utile.

M. Mirzoyan, membre de la délégation du Haut-Karabakh, estime que l'envoi de troupes de l'ONU comprenant des militaires russes serait le bienvenu. La paix ne sera pas établie sans négociations politiques et sans forces de maintien de la paix.

M. Balayan, membre de la délégation du Haut-Karabakh, considère que le combat est inégal entre l'Azerbaïdjan et le Haut-Karabakh. Un mécanisme comprenant des troupes d'interposition serait le plus efficace. L'Arménie, qui souffre elle-même du blocus économique, ne peut venir en aide au Haut-Karabakh.

M. Pfuhl, rapporteur sur l'Arménie, regrette que la délégation turque soit absente. Pour lui, la clé du problème est en fait à Moscou.

M. Voskanian réitère son invitation à M. Pfuhl à se rendre en Arménie. L'Arménie est le pays le plus stable et le plus sûr du Caucase. Le monde entier devrait contribuer à trouver une solution au conflit du Haut-Karabakh.

M. Ferrarini estime que la situation au Haut-Karabakh devrait être un sujet de préoccupation majeur pour le Conseil de l'Europe, d'autant plus que certains pays directement impliqués sont membres de l'organisation et que d'autres sont invités spéciaux.

M. Agnelli marque son accord avec les thèses de M. Kotcharian; il faudrait que le Conseil de l'Europe puisse prendre une initiative visant à concilier les principes à priori contradictoires du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et de l'intangibilité des frontières.

M. Fabra, rapporteur de la commission des questions politiques, signale que sa commission est d'avis que le statut d'invité spécial ne peut être attribué aux pays impliqués dans une guerre.

M. Ambartsoumov marque son accord avec ceux qui considèrent que la Transcaucasie fait partie de l'Europe. On a reconnu le principe de l'autodétermination des peuples dans le cas de la Bosnie et de la Croatie, pourquoi pas dans celui du Haut-Karabakh ? Il est certainement regrettable que la Russie ait envoyé des armes en Azerbaïdjan et au Haut-Karabakh. S'agissant de l'envoi possible de forces d'interposition russes dans la région, le Parlement russe y est en principe opposé; mais, en cas de demande du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU ou du Conseil de l'Europe, les autorités russes pourraient revoir leur position. S'agissant de la déclaration d'indépendance de la République du Haut-Karabakh, elle est basée sur la constitution de l'URSS en vigueur à l'époque. Ce qu'il faut avant tout c'est arrêter la guerre, mais avec des garanties; pour le moment, seules des forces d'interposition peuvent fournir de telles garanties.

Pour M. Balayan, le facteur "temps" contribuera certainement à apaiser les passions comme cela a été le cas pour d'autres peuples après la deuxième guerre mondiale.

Le Président remercie les intervenants et espère que la commission pourra prochainement soumettre un rapport à l'Assemblée sur la situation au Haut-Karabakh.

ANNEXE II

COMPTE RENDU DE L'AUDITION SUR LA SITUATION AU HAUT-KARABAKH
(Strasbourg, 29 juin 1994)

M. Atkinson, Président de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, souhaite la bienvenue aux délégations du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan, de la "Direction du Haut-Karabakh" et de la "Partie intéressée azérie du Haut-Karabakh", qui ont été invitées conformément aux décisions du Bureau et de la sous-commission ad hoc chargée de la préparation de l'audition. Il s'agit de la deuxième partie de l'audition, la première partie s'étant tenue le 24 janvier 1994; avaient participé à la première partie de l'audition des délégations du Parlement arménien et du Haut-Karabakh. La commission des questions politiques a été invitée à participer aux deux parties de l'audition. Après avoir précisé que la sous-commission ad hoc chargée de l'organisation de l'audition tirera les enseignements de celle-ci à la réunion prévue pour le lendemain, il donne la parole aux chefs des trois délégations invitées.

a) Délégation du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan

Celle-ci est composée de:

MM. - Hüseyinaga Haniyev, Membre du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan
- Ilgar Farzaliyev, Chef de section adjoint des Affaires Etrangères au Parlement
- Elçin Emirbekov, ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

M. Hüseyinaga Haniyev, membre du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan, remercie la commission d'avoir invité sa délégation et de l'intérêt qu'elle manifeste pour le règlement du conflit du Haut-Karabakh. Il regrette toutefois l'absence d'une délégation de la République d'Arménie.

Le conflit entre l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan dure déjà depuis six ans; il a causé des souffrances terribles aux peuples de la région et constitue un obstacle majeur au développement économique, social, politique et démocratique de l'Azerbaïdjan.

Malgré toutes ces difficultés les autorités azéries font tout leur possible pour créer une société démocratique respectueuse des droits de tous les citoyens, quelles que soient leurs nationalité, confession et conditions sociales.

L'agression de l'Arménie contre l'Azerbaïdjan a déjà provoqué la mort de 19.000 personnes; il y a plus de 50.000 blessés et plus d'un million de réfugiés azéris dans leur propre pays.

Le conflit revêt depuis son origine un caractère interétatique. A ce moment-là, des Azéris vivaient en Arménie et des Arméniens en Azerbaïdjan. En principe chacune de ces minorités possédait des droits égaux, conformes aux normes du droit international et dans le respect de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de chacun des deux Etats. Toutefois, la purification ethnique entreprise par les autorités arméniennes à l'encontre de la minorité azérie a été passée sous silence par les organisations internationales, qui ne se préoccupent que des droits des Arméniens au Haut-Karabakh. L'Azerbaïdjan considère cette situation comme une violation des principes généraux du droit

Cette guerre provoquée par les revendications territoriales de l'Arménie a entraîné des tragédies pour les deux peuples.

Quelle est la raison qui a poussé les dirigeants du Haut-Karabakh à cette politique sanguinaire et à soulever la question de la séparation du Haut-Karabakh et de son union avec l'Arménie? Les autorités azéries avaient pourtant tout fait pour élever le niveau de vie de la communauté arménienne dans tous les domaines. En tout cas, il faut bien savoir que l'Azerbaïdjan ne cèdera à l'Arménie pas le moindre pouce de terrain. Un jour, le monde comprendra le caractère agressif de la politique arménienne. Pourquoi les Arméniens refusent-ils de reconnaître la souveraineté et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Azerbaïdjan?

Les réfugiés azéris vivent dans des conditions catastrophiques. Aujourd'hui il existe une véritable chance de mettre fin à cette guerre et de faire revenir les réfugiés. Le cessez-le-feu est enfin respecté et on assiste à une intensification de l'action du groupe de Minsk de la CSCE et des efforts de médiation de la Russie. Beaucoup est aussi attendu du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI.

c) **Délégation de la "direction du Haut-Karabakh"**

Celle-ci est composée de:

MM. - Karen Babourian, Président par intérim du "Parlement"
- Vassili Atadjanian, Député et Conseiller du Président Babourian
- Arsène Melik-Chanazarian, Conseiller du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
- Jean Krikorian, "Représentant du Haut-Karabakh en France et auprès des Institutions Européennes".

M. Vassili Atadjanian précise tout d'abord que M. Babourian, chef de la délégation de la "direction du Haut-Karabakh", ne participera pas à l'audition proprement dite, mais qu'il est prêt à s'entretenir avec les différents membres de la commission.

Il remercie le Conseil de l'Europe pour son invitation ainsi que pour les efforts mis en oeuvre par l'Assemblée Parlementaire en vue de parvenir à un règlement de ce conflit. Ces efforts unis à ceux de tous les parlements d'Europe et du monde devraient pouvoir favoriser un accord de paix. Comme le conflit dure depuis plus de six ans, il est urgent de trouver les voies pour mettre fin aux souffrances d'une population civile particulièrement éprouvée, car c'est là, parmi les femmes, les vieillards et les enfants, que se compte le plus grand nombre de victimes des pilonnements d'artillerie et des bombardements aériens.

Sur le plan juridique, il faut savoir que les textes constitutionnels prévoyaient le droit pour les Républiques de se retirer de l'URSS, auquel cas il était laissé aux entités autonomes la permission de décider de leur statut juridique et politique. C'est la démarche qu'a entreprise le Haut-Karabakh lors de la désintégration de l'URSS. Et c'est cette possibilité légale que l'Azerbaïdjan a refusée en y répondant par l'invasion du territoire du Haut-Karabakh et par une guerre sans merci contre le peuple du Haut-Karabakh.

Le peuple du Haut-Karabakh aspire à vivre en paix sur sa terre. La situation créée au Haut-Karabakh a entraîné un exode de réfugiés. Réfugiés azéris, certes; mais aussi réfugiés arméniens. Victimes, depuis 1921, de discriminations - que personne ne conteste - des centaines de milliers d'Arméniens ont dû quitter le Haut-Karabakh: c'est là la raison pour laquelle le nombre des habitants arméniens du Haut-Karabakh n'a pas augmenté

international. Au moment où sont occupés plus de 20 % du territoire de la République d'Azerbaïdjan, sur lesquels se pratique la purification ethnique des Azéris sur leur propre territoire, on peut se demander si l'ignorance des droits des Azéris en Arménie par la communauté mondiale n'a pas été la cause de l'évolution tragique des événements.

Il est clair aujourd'hui que le conflit du Haut-Karabakh trouve sa source, non pas dans un imaginaire antagonisme national, mais dans de réelles revendications territoriales de la République d'Arménie à l'égard de l'Azerbaïdjan; celles-ci se sont notamment concrétisées par:

- une campagne de propagande et l'envoi d'activistes prônant le séparatisme;
- l'envoi de formations armées;
- la livraison d'armes et de munitions;
- la violation de l'espace aérien;
- l'utilisation du territoire national pour la formation de terroristes;
- la participation directe de formations armées d'Arménie aux actions de guerre dans la République d'Azerbaïdjan et l'occupation de territoires d'un Etat voisin.

C'est pourquoi on peut constater que le conflit a aujourd'hui pris le caractère d'une guerre en bonne et due forme entre deux Etats membres de l'ONU et de la CSCE.

b) **Délégation de la "partie intéressée azérie du Haut-Karabakh"**

Celle-ci est représentée par M. Vagif Huseïnov.

M. Vagif Huseïnov, représentant de la "partie intéressée azérie du Haut-Karabakh", remercie également la commission de l'avoir invité à cet échange de vues.

Au cours de ce siècle, le peuple azéri a déjà traversé plusieurs crises dues à l'action de l'Arménie dans le soi-disant Haut-Karabakh. Le concept de "Haut-Karabakh" est apparu après 1923, au moment de la formation du Bureau caucasien du Parti russe des bolcheviks. C'est ainsi que le concept du Karabakh indivisible a été artificiellement séparé en Haut-Karabakh et Bas-Karabakh.

Au cours du recensement de 1979, les Arméniens ne représentaient que 120.000 personnes dans la population du Karabakh qui dépassait le million. Cette communauté arménienne composée surtout de réfugiés de Turquie et d'Iran a été sauvée d'une mort certaine par les Azéris en 1828 et, à présent, elle est devenue un instrument aux mains des Arméniens pour satisfaire leurs revendications territoriales.

Aujourd'hui, les forces armées arméniennes occupent plus de 20 % du territoire azéri, soit tout le Haut-Karabakh et six districts supplémentaires, y compris la ville de Choucha. L'agression arménienne a été d'une violence inouïe et a eu des conséquences terribles: plus de 18.000 morts, 50.000 blessés, 4.000 prisonniers et otages. Dans les territoires qu'ils occupent, les Arméniens pratiquent la politique de la "terre brûlée". On assiste à un véritable génocide des Azéris dans leur propre pays. Et ceci au moment où la communauté internationale pourrait mettre fin à cette guerre non déclarée contre le peuple azéri, en imposant des sanctions à l'agresseur, c'est-à-dire l'Arménie. Au contraire, l'Arménie bénéficie du soutien financier et militaire de toute une série d'Etats et poursuit sa politique d'annexion de territoires azéris.

entre 1921 et 1989. Ces exilés, auxquels il convient d'ajouter les 252.000 Arméniens chassés de Bakou par les pogromes récents, doivent être pris en compte dans la question des réfugiés. Pour ce qui concerne ce problème des réfugiés, la "République du Haut-Karabakh" est prête à organiser le retour de tous les réfugiés dans leur lieu de résidence dès que la paix et la sécurité sera garantie à l'ensemble des habitants.

Le Haut-Karabakh n'a jamais refusé les propositions de médiation en vue de rétablir la paix. Le "Parlement" du Haut-Karabakh est un partisan résolu de la recherche d'une solution pacifique et place beaucoup d'espoir dans l'avancée que manifeste sur cette voie l'accord qui vient d'être signé à Bichkek. C'est aussi là, dans la recherche de la paix négociée, qu'il faut comprendre le sens de la venue à Strasbourg d'une délégation de très haut niveau de la "République".

La délégation du "Parlement" de Stépanakert note avec satisfaction que c'est la première fois que des représentants de l'Azerbaïdjan ont accepté de participer à une réunion commune, au Conseil de l'Europe, à Strasbourg.

Elle regrette cependant que la partie azerbaïdjanaise n'ait donné aucun début de réponse à des questions aussi fondamentales - aussi vitales - que le statut politique futur d'un Haut-Karabakh à majorité arménienne, où la population azérie sera minoritaire.

Elle espère que le cessez-le-feu en vigueur actuellement sera respecté et pourra durer pour pouvoir constituer une première étape vers une paix qui permettrait à tous, hommes, femmes et enfants de mener une existence dans des conditions de sécurité et de dignité indispensables.

Elle renouvelle enfin ses remerciements au Conseil de l'Europe, qui contribue, grâce à ses auditions, à tous les efforts entrepris au niveau international en faveur de la paix au Haut-Karabakh.

M. Krotov, Secrétaire Général de l'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI, rappelle que les parlements d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan sont membres de l'Assemblée Interparlementaire. En décembre dernier, celle-ci a organisé une réunion dans les îles d'Aland à laquelle ont participé des délégations parlementaires d'Arménie, d'Azerbaïdjan et du Haut-Karabakh. Au cours de la rencontre du mois de mai à Bichkek, a été signé un accord sur le conflit du Haut-Karabakh par les trois délégations. L'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI est prête à coopérer avec toutes les organisations internationales pour que le cessez-le-feu actuellement en vigueur soit maintenu.

M^me^ Severinsen demande dans quelle mesure les réfugiés azéris peuvent retourner au Haut-Karabakh et récupérer leurs biens.

M. Atadjanian se prononce en faveur du retour de tous les réfugiés, et non seulement des réfugiés azéris, à condition que la sécurité de tous les habitants du Haut-Karabakh soit garantie par l'Azerbaïdjan et par des autorités internationales.

En réponse à une question de M^me^ Severinsen sur le statut futur du Haut-Karabakh et la question de la sécurité des Arméniens qui retourneraient à Bakou, M. Haniyev déclare que l'Azerbaïdjan est en train de mettre en place un Etat démocratique où seront garantis les droits des minorités. La paix est la priorité absolue. Les autorités azéries sont déterminées à régler la question du statut du Haut-Karabakh

dans le respect des normes internationales, mais il faut qu'avant tout soient restitués les territoires occupés.

En réponse à une question de M^me^ Severinsen, M. Hüseyinov répond qu'il ne comprend pas que M. Babourian ne participe pas à la réunion, sous prétexte que le Président du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan n'est pas présent. Il faut bien se rappeler qu'à ce jour, aucun Etat n'a reconnu la "République du Haut-Karabakh".

Pour M. Atadjanian, le Haut-Karabakh n'est peut-être pas encore reconnu, mais il ne faut pas oublier que la signature de son représentant figure au bas du document adopté à Bichkek à côté des signatures des représentants de la Russie, de l'Arménie de l'Azerbaïdjan.

Répondant à M. Pfuhl, M. Atadjanian reconnaît que la formule retenue pour l'autonomie des îles d'Aland, situées en Finlande, constituerait un modèle intéressant pour le Haut-Karabakh, mais elle supposerait la démilitarisation de toute la région. Il ne faut pas oublier qu'au référendum de 1991, l'immense majorité des habitants du Haut-Karabakh s'est prononcée pour l'indépendance. Des cessez-le-feu ont été signés à de nombreuses reprises; pour que le dernier en date soit tenu, il faudrait la présence d'observateurs internationaux, par exemple de la CEI ou de l'ONU, ainsi que des forces de paix. Le conflit dure déjà depuis six ans et les quantités d'armes dans la région sont énormes. En plus, l'Azerbaïdjan reçoit des armes d'Iran et de Turquie sans qu'aucun contrôle ne soit possible.

M. Haniyev déclare que l'Azerbaïdjan est un Etat souverain contrairement au Haut-Karabakh. Il n'y a en Azerbaïdjan aucune arme en provenance de Turquie ou d'Iran.

M. Dzasokhov (délégation des invités spéciaux russes) considère que le plus important c'est que le cessez-le-feu tienne. La Russie a un rôle stabilisateur important à jouer sur le territoire de l'ex-URSS. Ce qu'il faut c'est que les mesures de confiance soient améliorées et que les différents plans de paix soient harmonisés.

Le Président remercie les participants.

Commission chargée du rapport: commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres.

Implications budgétaires pour l'Assemblée: néant.

Renvoi en commission: Doc. 6643 et renvoi n° 1797 du 30 juin 1992.

Projets de recommandation et de résolution adoptés le 9 septembre 1994 par la commission.

Membres de la commission: *M. Atkinson (Président), MM. Pfuhl, Seitlinger (Vice-Présidents),* M^me^ Astgeirsdottir, M. Benvenuti (*Remplaçant: Lauricella*), M^me^ Bjerregaard, M. Borg, M^me^ Brasseur (*Remplaçant: M. Theis)*, MM. Brito, Büchel, *Bugli*, Figel, *Gabrielescu*, Galanos, *M^me^ Gelderblom-Lankhout*, MM. Ghesquière, *Hint*, Holmberg, Kapsis, *Kitt*, Kovacs, *Landsbergis*, de Lipkowski (*Remplaçant: Alloncle*), Pahor, Redmond (*Remplaçant: Cummings*), *M^me^ Riess*, M^me^ Ringstad, M. *Ruffy*, M^me^ Scopelliti, MM. *Sole Tura*, Sprung, *Talay, Toivonen, Toshev*, Urbanczyk (*Remplaçant: Jaskiernia*), *Vyvadil.*

N.B. Les noms des membres qui étaient présents à la réunion sont indiqués en italique.

Secrétaire de commission: M. Dufour.

I. Projet de recommandation

1. L'Assemblée constate que le conflit du Haut-Karabakh se poursuit depuis 1988 et qu'il a déjà provoqué près de 20.000 morts et plus d'un million de réfugiés.

2. Sa commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres a organisé depuis 1992 une série d'auditions auxquelles ont participé des délégations du Parlement d'Arménie, du Parlement d'Azerbaïdjan, de la "direction du Haut-Karabakh" et de la "partie intéressée azérie du Haut-Karabakh".

3. L'Assemblée note avec satisfaction que le cessez-le-feu entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994 est relativement bien respecté et souhaite qu'il soit aussi rapidement que possible assorti d'un accord de paix signé par toutes les parties intéressées.

4. Elle se réjouit des efforts déployés par le Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie et l'Assemblée Interparlementaire de la CEI pour amener les parties au conflit à signer un accord de paix, ainsi que de l'accord signé le 26 juillet 1994 par les ministres de la Défense d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan et le Commandant de l'armée du Haut-Karabakh, dans lequel ils affirment leur engagement à respecter le cessez-le-feu et leur volonté d'accélérer la signature d'un accord politique.

5. L'Assemblée recommande par conséquent au Comité des Ministres:

i. d'encourager les gouvernements des Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe à mettre à la disposition du Groupe de Minsk de la CSCE les moyens nécessaires pour qu'il puisse atteindre ses objectifs, notamment le déploiement d'observateurs internationaux dans la zone du conflit;

ii. de relancer le dialogue politique avec les autorités d'Arménie et d'Azerbaïdjan;

iii. d'ouvrir, dès que les conditions seront réunies, ses programmes de coopération à l'Arménie et à l'Azerbaïdjan et, en cas de demande de leur part, de mettre à leur disposition des experts qui pourraient contribuer à l'élaboration d'un statut politique du Haut-Karabakh.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

17 octobre 1994
FDOC7182

Doc. 7182

RAPPORT

sur le conflit du Haut-Karabakh

(Rapporteurs: M. PFUHL, Allemagne, Groupe socialiste et M. SOLE TURA, Espagne, Groupe socialiste)

Résumé

Le conflit du Haut-Karabakh se poursuit depuis 1988 et a déjà provoqué près de 20.000 morts et plus d'un million de réfugiés. Un cessez-le-feu est entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994 et semble être respecté depuis lors.

Si l'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et le Haut-Karabakh sont les parties directement impliquées dans le conflit, celui-ci met en jeu les intérêts stratégiques d'autres pays, notamment la Russie et la Turquie.

L'Assemblée, qui a organisé une série d'auditions auxquelles ont participé toutes les parties au conflit, se déclare disposée à contribuer, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à favoriser la conclusion d'un accord de paix et le renforcement de la démocratie dans la région.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

21 mai 1996
FDOC7563

Doc. 7563

**DEMANDE D'AVIS
DU COMITÉ DES MINISTRES À L'ASSEMBLÉE**

**sur l'adhésion de l'Arménie
au Conseil de l'Europe**

**Résolution (96) 21
sur l'Arménie**

*(adoptée par le Comité des Ministres le 15 mai 1996,
lors de la 566e réunion des Délégués des Ministres)*

Le Comité des Ministres,

Rappelant sa décision, exprimée lors de sa 8e Session en mai 1951, de consulter l'Assemblée parlementaire avant d'inviter un Etat à devenir membre ou membre associé du Conseil de l'Europe conformément aux dispositions du Statut;

Considérant que le Gouvernement de la République d'Arménie dans sa lettre du 7 mars 1996 adressée au Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe, a exprimé le souhait d'être invité à devenir membre du Conseil de l'Europe et s'est déclaré prêt à respecter les principes énoncés à l'article 3 du Statut;

Ayant pris note avec satisfaction de l'intérêt manifesté par la République d'Arménie d'adhérer à l'Organisation;

Invite l'Assemblée parlementaire à exprimer son avis en la matière, et lui fait part à ce stade des observations suivantes:

En premier lieu, le Comité des Ministres souhaite informer l'Assemblée qu'il existe parmi ses membres un consensus pour que l'Arménie adhère à l'Organisation dès que les conditions requises par le Statut seront satisfaites, à savoir la mise en oeuvre des principes de démocratie parlementaire pluraliste, de respect des droits de l'homme et de prééminence du droit. Ceci implique que le système législatif et judiciaire du pays devrait répondre aux principes de l'Etat de droit.

Le Comité des Ministres souhaite également rappeler les termes de sa réponse à la Recommandation 1247 (1994) de l'Assemblée parlementaire relative à l'élargissement du Conseil de l'Europe, dans laquelle il déclarait entre autres:

> "De futures candidatures seront examinées selon leurs propres mérites et sur les mêmes bases que celles des Etats mentionnés dans le paragraphe précédent. En particulier, les trois pays du Transcaucase (Arménie, Azerbaïdjan et Géorgie) ont fait savoir qu'ils recherchent des liens plus proches avec le Conseil de l'Europe. Le Comité des Ministres rappelle les conclusions de la présidence suite à la réunion spéciale à Istanbul en septembre 1992 selon lesquelles un rapprochement significatif exigerait non seulement la mise en oeuvre de réformes démocratiques substantielles, mais aussi leur engagement de résoudre les situations conflictuelles par des voies pacifiques".

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Arménie, dans sa lettre du 7 mars 1996, a indiqué que l'Arménie serait prête à devenir Partie à la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme, à l'instar de tout autre Etat membre. Le Comité des Ministres a pris note avec satisfaction de cette intention. Il s'attend à ce que le Gouvernement d'Arménie exprime son intention de reconnaître le droit de recours individuel et la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme. La République d'Arménie devrait donc mettre en oeuvre dans la pratique les obligations découlant de la Convention sur l'ensemble du territoire, aux différents niveaux de l'Administration.

Le Comité des Ministres affirme sa disponibilité pour approfondir le dialogue avec les autorités de l'Arménie et pour intensifier son concours par le biais de ses programmes de coopération et d'assistance, afin de faciliter et d'accélérer autant que possible la transition démocratique et de permettre à l'Arménie d'adhérer au Conseil de l'Europe dans les meilleurs délais.

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1995 SESSION

ORDER No. 508 (1995)[1]

on the honouring of obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe

1. The Assembly, in Order No. 488 (1993), instructed its Political Affairs Committee and Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights "to monitor closely the honouring of commitments entered into by the authorities of new member states and to report to the Bureau at regular six-monthly intervals until all undertakings have been honoured".

2. In Order No. 485 (1993) the Assembly instructed its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights "to report to it when problems arise on the situation of human rights in member states, including their compliance with judgments by the European Court of Human Rights".

3. In Resolution 1031 (1994) the Assembly observed "that all member states of the Council of Europe are required to respect their obligations under the Statute, the European Convention on Human Rights and all other conventions to which they are parties. In addition to these obligations, the authorities of certain states which have become members since the adoption in May 1989 of Resolution 917 (1989) on a special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly freely entered into specific commitments on issues related to the basic principles of the Council of Europe during the examination of their request for membership by the Assembly. The main commitments concerned are explicitly referred to in the relevant opinions adopted by the Assembly."

4. The Assembly considered in the same resolution that "persistent failure to honour commitments freely entered into will have consequences [...]. For this purpose, the Assembly could use the relevant provisions of the Council of Europe's Statute and of its own Rules of Procedure".

1. *Assembly debate* on 26 April 1995 (12th Sitting) (see Doc. 7277, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Columberg; Doc. 7292, opinion of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, rapporteur: Mr Seitlinger; and Doc. 7294, opinion of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, rapporteur: Lord Finsberg).
Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 April 1995 (12th Sitting).

ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

SESSION DE 1995

DIRECTIVE N° 508 (1995)[1]

relative au respect des obligations et engagements contractés par les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe

1. L'Assemblée, dans sa Directive n° 488 (1993), a chargé sa commission des questions politiques et sa commission des questions juridiques et des droits de l'homme «de veiller de près au respect des engagements pris par les autorités des nouveaux Etats membres et de faire rapport à intervalles de six mois au Bureau jusqu'à ce que tous les engagements aient été respectés».

2. Dans sa Directive n° 485 (1993), l'Assemblée a chargé sa commission des questions juridiques et des droits de l'homme de «lui faire rapport, lorsque des problèmes se présentent, sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans les Etats membres, y compris la mise en application des arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme».

3. Dans sa Résolution 1031 (1994), l'Assemblée a fait observer «que tous les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe sont tenus de respecter les obligations qu'ils ont souscrites aux termes du Statut, de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme et de toutes les autres conventions auxquelles ils sont parties. Outre ces obligations, les autorités de certains Etats, devenus membres après l'adoption en mai 1989 de la Résolution 917 (1989) relative à un statut d'invité spécial auprès de l'Assemblée parlementaire, ont pris en toute liberté, au cours de l'examen par l'Assemblée de leur demande d'adhésion, des engagements particuliers sur des points concernant les principes fondamentaux du Conseil de l'Europe. Les principaux engagements sont expressément mentionnés dans les avis correspondants, adoptés par l'Assemblée».

4. Dans la même résolution, l'Assemblée a estimé que «tout manquement aux engagements librement consentis, s'il perdure, aura des conséquences (...). A cette fin, l'Assemblée pourra utiliser les dispositions pertinentes du Statut du Conseil de l'Europe et de son propre Règlement».

1. *Discussion par l'Assemblée* le 26 avril 1995 (12e séance) (voir Doc. 7277, rapport de la commission des questions juridiques et des droits de l'homme, rapporteur: M. Columberg; Doc. 7292, avis de la commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres, rapporteur: M. Seitlinger; et Doc. 7294, avis de la commission du Règlement, rapporteur: Lord Finsberg).
Texte adopté par l'Assemblée le 26 avril 1995 (12e séance).

5. Taking also into account the declaration on compliance with commitments accepted by member states of the Council of Europe, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 November 1994, the Assembly seeks to strengthen its own monitoring procedure, established in 1993.

6. The Assembly therefore instructs its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (for report) and its Political Affairs Committee (for opinion) to continue monitoring closely the honouring of obligations and commitments in all member states concerned. The Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries will also be asked for an opinion with regard to the member states which previously enjoyed special guest status. To start the procedure, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights must take such a decision, in accordance with normal committee procedure.

7. Countries which are members should honour Recommendation 1201 (1993); candidates for full membership should, on their accession, commit themselves to do likewise. The honouring of this recommendation will also be followed as part of the monitoring process.

8. The committees should work in close co-operation. They may report direct to the Assembly. Their reports should concern one single country and include a draft resolution in which clear proposals are made for the improvement of the situation in the country under consideration.

9. The Assembly may sanction persistent failure to honour commitments, and lack of co-operation in its monitoring process, by the non-ratification of the credentials of a national parliamentary delegation at the beginning of its next ordinary session, in accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure.

10. Should the country continue not to respect its commitments, the Assembly may address a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers requesting it to take the appropriate action provided for in Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

11. This order supersedes Order No. 488 (1993) and Resolution 1031 (1994).

5. Compte tenu également de la déclaration sur le respect des engagements pris par les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe, adoptée par le Comité des Ministres le 10 novembre 1994, l'Assemblée cherche à renforcer ses propres procédures de suivi, établies en 1993.

6. L'Assemblée charge donc sa commission des questions juridiques et des droits de l'homme (pour rapport) et sa commission des questions politiques (pour avis) de continuer à veiller de près au respect des obligations et engagements dans tous les Etats membres concernés. La commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres sera également saisie pour avis en ce qui concerne les Etats membres qui ont bénéficié du statut d'invité spécial. Afin d'engager la procédure, la commission des questions juridiques et des droits de l'homme doit prendre une décision dans ce sens, conformément à la procédure habituelle en commission.

7. Les pays qui sont membres doivent se conformer à la Recommandation 1201 (1993); les candidats à l'adhésion doivent, au moment de leur adhésion, s'engager à faire de même. Le respect de cette recommandation sera également visé par le processus de surveillance.

8. Les commissions devront agir en étroite coopération. Elles peuvent faire directement rapport à l'Assemblée. Les rapports ne concerneront qu'un seul pays à la fois et comprendront un projet de résolution présentant des propositions claires pour l'amélioration de la situation dans le pays concerné.

9. L'Assemblée pourrait sanctionner toute rupture persistante de ces engagements, et manque de coopération au processus de suivi, par la non-ratification des pouvoirs d'une délégation parlementaire nationale, au début de sa prochaine session ordinaire, conformément à l'article 6 du Règlement.

10. Si le pays continue à ne pas respecter ses engagements, l'Assemblée pourrait adresser une recommandation au Comité des Ministres, lui demandant d'engager l'action appropriée prévue par l'article 8 du Statut du Conseil de l'Europe.

11. Cette directive remplace la Directive n° 488 (1993) et la Résolution 1031 (1994).

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

30 mai 1994
FDOC7091

Doc. 7091

PROPOSITION DE DIRECTIVE

sur la communauté aroumaine

présentée par M. FERRARINI et plusieurs de ses collègues [1]

L'Assemblée,

1. Consciente des problèmes que rencontre la communauté aroumaine pour préserver ses droits notamment sur le plan ethnique, culturel et linguistique;

2. Rappellant que cette communauté réside dans plusieurs Etats des Balkans, dont certains sont membres du Conseil de l'Europe et partie à la Convention culturelle,

3. Demande que les droits fondamentaux de la population aroumaine à être reconnue comme une minorité ethnique et à s'exprimer dans sa langue millénaire soient sauvegardés;

4. Souhaite qu'un rapport lui soit présenté en temps utile sur la situation particulière de la communauté aroumaine.

signé:

Ferrarini, Visibelli, Liberatori, Caldoro, Foschi,
Severin, Radulescu Botica, Ferrari, Roseta, de Puig,
P. Caccia, Bernardini, Masseret

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1. Ce texte n'engage que les signataires. Il ne reflète pas une position adoptée par l'Assemblée parlementaire.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

29 juin 1995
FDOC7345

Doc. 7345

PROPOSITION DE DIRECTIVE

sur la Communauté des Etats indépendants (CEI) et son assemblée parlementaire

présentée par M. ATKINSON et plusieurs de ses collègues

La présente proposition n'a pas été examinée par l'Assemblée et n'engage que ses signataires

1. L'Assemblée parlementaire se félicite de l'adhésion de la Moldova. Elle observe que c'est le premier Etat membre de la Communauté des Etats indépendants (CEI) à devenir membre à part entière du Conseil de l'Europe, et que six autres membres de la CEI ont posé leur candidature à l'adhésion, à titre de membre à part entière, ou sont en passe de le faire.

2. Le débat sur l'adhésion de la Moldova a mis en lumière des similarités entre la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme et la Convention des droits de l'homme de la CEI s'agissant de la protection assurée aux citoyens des Etats membres.

3. L'Assemblée estime qu'il serait bon, à présent, de mieux connaître les travaux et le rôle de la CEI, son assemblée parlementaire et ses conventions; elle invite sa commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres à lui soumettre un rapport.

signé:

Atkinson, Royaume-Uni, GDE
Durant, Royaume-Uni, GDE
Albrink, Danemark, GDE
Billing, Suède, GDE
Hagard, Suède, GDE
Telgmaa, Estonie, GDE
Newall, Royaume-Uni, GDE
Kelam, Estonie, GDE
Landsbergis, Lituanie, GDE
Machaira, Grèce, GDE

* GDE : Groupe des démocrates européens

Briefing

from the

Documentary Information Section

Armenia

French press articles

23 June 1995

Source : Européenne des données

Enquiries to : Tim Lisney 25.73

NO 1995.
DA 22 Juin 1995 (19950622 - 199506).
SO LE MONDE. 2-004-73. 21. INT. Document court.

TI ARMENIE : manifestation pour la participation des partis d'opposition aux elections legislatives.
(MARDI 20 JUIN 1995, ELECTIONS PREVUES LE 5 JUILLET 1995).

DE ETRANGER. ARMENIE, MANIFESTATION, PROJET, ELECTION-LEGISLATIVE, 1995, PARTI, POLITIQUE, OPPOSITION-POLITIQUE.
NOM-PROPRE. DACHAKTSOUTIOUN.

TX Une manifestation a rassemble 40 000 personnes mardi 20 juin dans la capitale, Erevan, pour obtenir le droit des partis d'opposition a participer aux elections legislatives prevues le 5 juillet. La commission electorale avait refuse d'enregistrer plusieurs partis notamment la principale formation d'opposition, Dachaktsoutioun qui avaient pourtant recueilli le nombre de signatures necessaires. Les partis recales ont constitue une coalition, a laquelle se sont jointes en signe de solidarite des formations dument enregistrees, comme les partis communiste et democrate. (AFP.).

DA AFP 20 Juin 1995(19950620 - 199506) 21:03 GMT.

TI Armenie politique - Manifestation de 40.000 opposants a Erevan - MOSCOU, 21 juin (100 MOTS).

CH Une manifestation de l'opposition a rassemble 40.000 personnes mardi sur une place centrale de Erevan pour obtenir le droit des partis d'opposition a participer aux elections legislatives prevues le 5 juillet en Armenie.

TX 15.000 opposants etaient encore regroupes en fin de soiree devant la residence du president Levon Ter-Petrossian, a precise l'agence Echos de Moscou.

La commission electorale avait refuse d'enregistrer plusieurs partis -notamment la principale formation d'opposition, Dachaktsoutioun- qui avaient recueilli le nombre de signatures necessaires, estimant que certaines d'entre elles etaient fausses.

Les partis dont l'enregistrement a ete refuse ont recemment constitue une coalition, a laquelle se sont jointes en signe de solidarite des formations dument enregistrees comme les partis communiste et democrate.

jr/sp.

DA AFP 16 Juin 1995(19950616 - 199506) 10:51 GMT.

TI Armenie Azerbaidjan - Negociations discretes sur le Nagorny Karabakh a Helsinki - HELSINKI, 16 juin (200 MOTS).

CH Des negociations a huis clos sur le Nagorny Karabakh, territoire azerbaidjanais peuple en majorite d'Armeniens, se poursuivaient dans la plus grande discretion vendredi a Helsinki, a-t-on appris aupres du ministere finlandais des Affaires etrangeres.

TX Depuis jeudi, Azerbaidjanais, Armeniens d'Erevan et independantistes armeniens du Nagorny Karabakh tentent a nouveau de faire avancer un reglement politique du conflit vieux de sept ans, alors qu'un cessez-le-feu entre en vigueur en mai 1994 est globalement respecte.
"A cause de la nature des negociations, aucune information ne sera donnee aux medias avant la publication d'un communique de presse lundi ou mardi", a indique un responsable du ministere, qui a demande a ne pas etre identifie.
Les belligerants seront rejoints a partir de mardi par les membres du groupe de Minsk, charge par l'Organisation pour la securite et la cooperation en Europe (CSCE) du reglement du conflit qui a deja fait plus de 20.000 morts.
Les trois parties en presence sont reunies, jusqu'a mercredi prochain, dans un hotel d'Helsinki en presence des co-presidents de ce groupe, le Finlandais Rene Nyberg et le Russe Vladimir Kazimirov.
ajb/bm/cc.

DA AFP 12 Mai 1995(19950512 - 199505) 12:59 GMT.

TI Armenie Politique - Referendum sur le projet de constitution le 5 juillet - EREVAN, 12 mai (150 MOTS).

CH Le Parlement armenien a approuve vendredi, a la demande du president Levon Ter-Petrossian, la tenue d'un referendum le 5 juillet sur un projet de constitution, le meme jour que les elections legislatives.

TX L'Armenie vit pour l'instant toujours sous son ancienne constitution de republique sovietique.

Le projet de constitution, mis au point au bout d'un an de travaux d'une commission parlementaire dirigee par le president, prevoit le droit de former associations et partis politiques a condition qu'ils ne presentent pas de menace pour la securite nationale.

Les activites d'un des principaux partis d'opposition, le Dachnaktsoutioun, sont suspendues depuis decembre dernier par le president Ter-Petrossian, qui accuse notamment le parti de crime commandite, trafic de drogue et de fausse monnaie.

La constitution prevoit egalement un mandat presidentiel de 5 ans renouvelable une fois, et un mandat de 4 ans pour les deputes, au nombre de 190.

Le Parlement a repousse la demande des deputes de l'opposition, qui voulait presenter un projet de constitution alternatif aux electeurs.

ga-cat/mfo.

DA AFP 05 Avril 1995(19950405 - 199504) 06:44 GMT.

TI Armenie Religion - Gareguine II du Liban elu nouveau catholicos de l'Eglise armenienne - MOSCOU, 5 avr (150 MOTS).

CH Gareguine II, le catholicos de la branche secessionniste de l'Eglise armenienne installee au Liban, a ete elu mercredi catholicos supreme de l'Eglise armenienne, selon l'agence Itar-Tass.

TX Gareguine II, 63 ans, a remporte l'adhesion du plus grand nombre de delegues des paroisses armeniennes du monde entier, reunis depuis lundi a Etchmiadzine, en Armenie.

Le precedent chef de l'Eglise armenienne, Vazguen I, decede le 18 aout dernier, s'etait vu critique pour son attitude complaisante a l'egard des autorites sovietiques, et ses relations avec la diaspora armenienne avaient ete conflictuelles.

En 1956, une scission etait intervenue au sein de l'Eglise armenienne, et la branche secessioniste de la region historique de Kilikia est depuis installee a Beyrouth.

Pour reunir les deux branches, le president armenien Levon Ter-Petrossian s'etait prononce pour l'election de Gareguine II.

Gareguine II a devance les deux autres principaux candidats, l'archeveque Gareguine Nersesian du diocese d'Ararat (Turquie orientale), et l'archeveque Pargev, du diocese d'Artsakh, dans la region du Nagorny Karabakh.

cat/jag.

DA AFP 28 Mars 1995(19950328 - 199503) 16:59 GMT.

TI Presid Waechter - Antoine Waechter en campagne sur le site nucleaire de Brennilis (300 MOTS).

CH BRENNILIS, 28 mars (AFP)- Antoine Waechter, candidat a l'election presidentielle, s'est rendu symboliquement mardi sur le site de l'ancienne centrale nucleaire de Brennilis (Finistere) dont le demantelement constitue, selon lui, "une premiere en France", permettant de "visualiser le programme electro-nucleaire" de ce pays.

TX "C'est un premier pas qui concerne un petit reacteur (70 MW), a estime le president du Mouvement ecologiste independant. Il en ira autrement pour les gros reacteurs de 1.200 MW qui tournent aujourd'hui". "Il y a beaucoup de centrales qui meriteraient d'etre demantelees, a ajoute Antoine Waechter, notamment dans les pays de l'Est et a Erevan, en Armenie ou le reacteur est installe sur la principale faille armenienne.".

A propos du demantelement de la centrale de Brennilis, qui entrera dans sa seconde phase en septembre prochain, M. Michel Noraz, chef du site, a annonce devant M. Waechter qu'une etude sur un demantelement plus rapide (demande par les collectivites locales et de nombreuses associations) avait commence en octobre dernier. "En 1998, nous pourrons dire avec precision quand le +retour a l'herbe+ du site sera possible, un delai de 20 a 30 ans, au lieu des 40 a 50 ans prevus aujourd'hui, n'est pas exclu", a precise M. Noraz.

Interroge sur la qualite de l'eau en Bretagne, menacee par la presence du lisier de porc, Antoine Waechter s'est dit favorable a une "evolution des methodes d'elevage, avec stabulation libre par exemple et a une disparition des elevages concentrationaires, tout en permettant de valoriser la production animale sur place".

Le candidat ecologiste a enfin lance un appel a d'eventuels parrainages supplementaires pour sa candidature, precisant qu'il avait rassemble a ce jour 527 promesses de signatures.

amc/mc.

DA AFP 29 Decembre 1994(19941229 - 199412) 00:09 GMT.

TI Armenie politique - Le president armenien suspend un des principaux partis d'opposition - EREVAN, 29 dec (250 MOTS).

CH Le president armenien Levon Ter-Petrossian a suspendu mercredi les activites d'un des principaux partis d'opposition, le Dachnaktsoutioun, en l'accusant d'etre implique dans des assassinats politiques et un trafic de drogue.

TX M. Ter-Petrossian a annonce dans une allocution televisee "la suspension provisoire des activites" du parti d'opposition, en l'accusant d'abriter une organisation terroriste specialisee dans "le trafic de drogue, la fausse monnaie, le crime commandite, le racket et le renseignement".
Le president armenien a accuse cette organisation d'etre responsable des meurtres de l'ancien maire d'Erevan Ambartsoum Gualstian, le 17 decembre dernier, et de l'ancien chef du KGB armenien Marius Uzbachian en 1993.
L'organisation secrete preparait egalement des attentats contre le ministre de l'Interieur Vano Siradeguian et contre le depute Albert Bagdassarian, selon le chef de l'Etat.
Le Dachnaktsoutioun, ou Federation revolutionnaire armenienne, est le plus vieux parti armenien. Fonde en 1890 en Georgie, il avait exerce le pouvoir de 1918 a 1920, puis ses responsables avaient emigre pendant toute la periode sovietique. Le parti a ete relance en 1990, et il forme aujourd'hui avec l'Union nationale democrate l'opposition au president Ter-Petrossian.
Levon Ter-Petrossian a decide la suspension du Dachnaktsoutioun alors que des elections legislatives sont prevues en mai prochain, et qu'il est confronte aux critiques de plus en plus virulentes de l'opposition.
Dix au moins des 243 deputes armeniens ont ainsi demissionne la semaine derniere en signe de protestation, en reprochant au pouvoir armenien de ne pas prendre les mesures necessaires pour retrouver l'assassin d'Ambartsoum Gualstian.

Western commentators see the situation simplistically as a contest between 'reformers' who give absolute priority to containing government spending, and agricultural and military-industrial lobbies demanding further subsidies.

Of course, it is necessary to reduce the state deficit if the economy is ever to get even. But this involves more than an arcane contest between 'conservative' and 'reformist' economists. Caught in the middle are tens of millions of people reduced to poverty by Western pressure for instant transformation - witness a demonstration by workers in Yekaterinburg, who have not been paid since February. (What would be the effect of such pay arrears in a Western city?.)

The hard fact is that, if there is not to be a political backlash, more time will needed for adjustment. With patience there will be a Russian recovery; but not a fulfilment of the rashly agreed IMF target for inflation by the end of the year.

Finally, it is time to take note of a new skeleton in the cupboard of Russian-Western, and particularly Russian-American, relations. This is the question of oil extraction rights in the Caspian Sea, to which we refer on pages 5 and 13. At issue is Azerbaijan's grant to a Western consortium of drilling rights in an area subject to claims by other littoral states, including Russia.

A subsidiary theme is the attempt of the US state department to stop American companies from negotiating a possible pipeline route with Iran.

On 6 June the Russian foreign ministry spokesman said that Russia reserved the right to take any necessary measures to 'restore the breached constitutional order and eliminate the consequences of unilateral actions'. Those who took unilateral steps to extend someone's sovereignty over this or that area of the Caspian sea, and demarcate state borders there, would 'bear all responsibility, including possible material damage'.

Any adjustment of the existing legal regime must involve all the Caspian states, and 'attempts by some non-Caspian states to intervene and dictate to the Caspian states how to solve the issue are at least inappropriate and improper.'

On 24 May, US energy secretary Hazel O'Leary, in Baku for a conference on Caspian oil and gas reserves, said that funding for the international project in what she called the 'Azerbaijani sector' could be jeopardized without an understanding on the sea's status. More ominously she added that the free flow of oil from the Azerbaijani fields to the market was a 'vital US interest'.

AN ARMENIAN 'LEBANON'

Elections in Armenia on 5 July are being held in a fevered climate unlike anything in the CIS since its inception. Seven years after uniting to demand independence and liberate Nagorno-Karabakh, voters are deafened by cross-accusations of dictatorship, terrorism, murder and external manipulation.

There can still be no certainty of the result. It is clear, however, that President Ter-Petrossian, who in 1991 was elected to power amid popular acclamation, is caught in a crisis from which the fervour (and violence) of his opponents - especially the ultra-nationalist Dashnak movement - gives him only two exits: resignation or repression.

The election is contested by 20 parties organised in two blocs, plus the go-it-alone Communists. The first or 'Republic' bloc is led by the ruling Armenia Pan-National Movement with the backing of the Republican party, the Christian Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Party, and the Council of Armenian Intellectuals.

The second, 'National Consent', bloc is headed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, better know as the Dashnaks, supported by the Constitutional Rights Union, the *Union* of Armenian Intellectuals (not to be confused with the Council of

Intellectuals, above), the Artsakh-Armenia organisation and the Zharan (Heir) West Armenian Club. The election of 190 parliamentary deputies will be accompanied by a referendum as to whether the President should be given stronger powers. Hoping to make sure that the vote goes his way, Ter-Petrosian has appointed his own supporters to preside over 120 of the 150 electoral districts.

Till recently the feeling was that the President had it sewn up, but visitors in the past few weeks have been impressed by the meetings organised by the opposition in Yerevan. As in the heady days of 1991, crowds have gathered in front of the Opera House - though usually of the order of two or three thousand, compared with the tens of thousands previously.

The most violent elections speeches come from the Dashnaks, whose party was given a six-month presidential suspension (later reduced) for its alleged implication in the murder, on 27 December, of Yerevan's mayor, Gumbartsun Galstian.

The Dashnaks accuse the President of betraying the nation by his quest for peace with Azerbaijan and a working relationship with Turkey. In February the government accused them of spreading false rumours on the subject, and closed 14 opposition newspapers.

When, on 27 May, a gunman shot and wounded Paruir Ayvikan, leader of the National Self-Determination opposition group. Ayvikan accused the authorities of involvement. But others suspected the armed branch of the Dashnaks, known as the DRO, of carrying out an attempt at destabilization.

The status and organisation of 'DRO' is shadowy, and deliberately kept so.

The day before the shooting, Ashot Manucharian, a former presidential adviser, now head of the opposition Scientific Industrial and Civil Union, told a Yerevan crowd of 15,000 that DRO had nothing to do with the Dashnaks but was 'under the patronage of the special services of a foreign state engaged in terrorism and the drugs trade.' Its goal, he said, was to discredit forces wanting a union with Russia.

The official verdict on the Dashnaks has been passed by the Armenian Supreme Council, which has accused them of carrying out a series of political murders and attempting to turn Armenia into another Lebanon. [1]

Ter-Petrosian himself is meanwhile the target of violent criticism in connection with the death of an alleged DRO activitst, Artavadz Manukian. Arrested with 19 others and charged with complicity in terrorist acts, Manukian died in custody on 16 May in Yerevan central hospital. His death, seemingly caused by lack of medical treatment when he fell ill, is described by the opposition as 'murder'.

Numerically small in relation to their influence, the Dashnaks are heavily supported by the Armenian diaspora, which suggests a comparison with Ireland's Sinn Fein. They gained much kudos for their early role in the Karabakh war and in helping to seize the Lachin corridor. With their uncompromising Turcophobia, they believe they guard the ark of the Armenian nation.

The radicalism of their members, especially from abroad, explains Ter-Petrosian's purge of numerous officials from posts awarded to newcomers at independence. The only foreign nationals now remaining in government are two US citizens (a chief adviser to the president and a deputy foreign minister) and a French deputy minister or agriculture. The purge included the former foreign minister, Raffi Govanisian, barred from the next presidential election because he is American.

Although it might seem understandable to exclude foreign citizens, the severity of the President's actions against the opposition in general has caused dismay among many of his former admirers. As a recent visitor put it, people no longer know whom to believe; the person they trust today could turn

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out to be the inquisitor of tomorrow.

Another cause of political disenchantment is the harshness of daily life, which, together with fear of sons being called to serve in Karabakh, has caused the emigration of a quarter of the population. Added to which, nearly every second person in Yerevan has lost savings in a spectacular bank failure.

The mood benefits the oppositon, which has been quick to draw public attention to ministers and officials driving through the capital in expensive Western cars, and to the arrest on 30 May in Paris of Artem Ataliants, the president's financial adviser and leader of the Democratic Party, on charges of corruption and the possession of arms.

On the other hand, Ter-Petrosian can count in his campaign on widespread popular disillusionment with the war in Karabakh and beyond. (After a one-year cease-fire, achieved through the efforts of Russia, the CIS, OSCE and the UN, Armenia continues to occupy one-fifth of Azerbaijan, at the cost of enduring a crippling blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey.)

The war has never been as popular as Armenians abroad have pretended, and the Dashnaks have frequently resorted to intimidation and tricks to make young men enlist. (See our Bulletin of December 1993.)

Ter-Petrosian may also judge rightly that Armenians as a whole are less dedicated than the Dashnaks and the diaspora to perpetuating the memory of 1915, when 1.5 million Armenians died at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. On 24 April, at the 80th annual commemoration, he delivered a speech containing the essentials of his policy.

Genocide, he said, was not to be explained by ethnic, religious or racial antagonism, or social and economic rivalry between the Armenian and Turkish peoples: it was a purely political programme devised in the interests of the Ottoman empire and aimed at the physical extermination of Armenians living on its territory. Today the goal should be to establish mutually beneficial trade and economic relations with Turkey; 'to overcome historical difficulties and restore mutual confidence.'

NEW CASPIAN OIL ROW

Competition for Caspian oil wealth, hitherto centred on the 'war' over pipeline routes (for more, see below) is about to enter a new phase - over rights in Caspian Sea itself.

20 June will see the first meeting of the diplomatic working group set up by deputy foreign ministers of the five Caspian littoral states - Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan - at a meeting in Almaty on 15-16 May. A full foreign ministers' meeting will follow 'in the near future'

Their task is to remedy the legal vacuum left by the demise of the Soviet Union. *Faute de mieux* the legal regime of the Caspian continues to be regulated by agreements reached between the USSR and Iran in 1921 and 1940. Russia, acting as the USSR's successor, proposes that until the two original and three new littoral states can agree on new collective conventions, the old agreements should stay in force.

The view of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is that, because of changing geopolitical conditions, the old agreements have lost their force and no longer serve any legal function. Turkmenistan prefers not to declare its position openly, and gives priority to bilateral, rather than collective, action.

Russia is in favour of a solution based on a system of regional collaboration, and in 1992 supported an Iranian proposal for creating a regional body responsible for the settlement of all questions relating to the Caspian and its resources.

However, an agreement to this effect was blocked at a meeting in Moscow last year, when Azerbaijan, without prejudice to possible forms of regional collaboration, proposed that the five states' rights in the sea and its resources should be delimited geographically.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, 1 June 1995
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AS/NM (1995) 16

COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES

Armenia:

The Law on Political Organisations

THE LAW ON POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

The law of the Republic of Armenia on "Public-Political Organisations" was passed by the Parliament on 26 February 1991 [N-0266-I]. It effectively introduced the multi-party system in Armenia.

The law is composed of 8 articles.

Article 1

A public-political organisation is an association of citizens on a voluntary basis that has a constitution and by-laws, participates in the formation and activities of state institutions through elections, as well as in the public-political, social-economic and cultural life of the republic.

Article 2

Citizens working in the justice and interior ministries, the national security agency, the prosecutor's office, customs service, state mediation agencies and citizens serving in the army and called upon to work in these institutions cannot be members of any public-political organisation.

Article 3

Political parties function according to their own by-laws and constitution within the limits of the laws of the Republic of Armenia.

Political parties registered in the Republic of Armenia are equal under the law.

The leadership of political parties must reside on the territory of Armenia.

Political parties are not permitted:

- to be directed by organisations, state agencies functioning outside the territory of Armenia or to become part of their organisational structures;

- to undertake activities for the purpose of forcibly changing the governmental and political system of the Republic of Armenia, to undertake violent actions against citizens and organisations, to come forth with appeals supporting such acts, or to collaborate with organisations that support violence;

- to forment enmity among ethnic, racist, religious or social groups;

- to receive financial and material assistance from sources outside the territory of the Republic of Armenia as well as from state agencies and institutions except as defined by law;

- to establish organisational structures within state agencies or workplaces, businesses, organisations and educational institutions;

- to own financial business activities except those allowed by law;

- to undertake activities which otherwise contravene the law.

Article 4

Registration of public-political organisations

Public-political organisations are registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia.

If the provisions of the present act are to be met, registration must take place within one month of the submission to the Ministry of Justice of the application, the organisation's constitution and the record of its constituent conference or assembly.

Registration is refused if another public-political organisation has already been registered under the same name.

If registration is refused, the founders of the public-political organisation concerned receive written notification thereof and of the reasons therefor within three days of the date set for registration.

Changes in constitutions are registered in accordance with the provisions of this article.

Upon registration, public-political organisations and the organs set out in their constitutions become legal entities.

Appeals against refusals to register public-political organisations may be lodged with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 5

Liability of public-political organisations

Any public-political organisation which engages in illegal activities that cause material or non-material damage to the Republic of Armenia, or its businesses, institutions, organisations or citizens, or which breaches the laws of the Republic of Armenia in any other way shall be liable to prosecution under the established procedures.

Article 6

Property and resources of public-political organisations

Public-political organisations have the right to own real estate, financial resources, transport facilities and other resources which they need to perform the tasks set out in their programmes and constitutions.

They may use real estate and property belonging to public firms, public organisations and private individuals on the basis of credit arrangements or specific agreements.

Public-political organisations' resources are derived from membership contributions, advertising, donations from non-public sources, legacies and cultural activities.

The profits of public-political organisations are taxable under the established procedures.

There is public financial scrutiny of the lawfulness of their profits and of the sources thereof, as well as their expenditure and property.

Public-political organisations must provide the financial authorities with declarations of their annual financial transactions, which will be published in the press.

Article 7

Suspension and banning of the activities of public-political organisations

The activity of any public-political organisation which breaches the laws of the Republic of Armenia may be suspended or banned by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia, acting on the recommendation of the Principal State Prosecutor or the Ministry of Justice.

In the event of suspension, the governing body of the public-political organisation concerned is informed in writing of the decision and of the relevant breaches of the law, as well as the date by which the situation must be remedied.

Once the situation has been remedied, the public-political organisation notifies the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia, which, within one month of the date indicated by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia, authorises it to resume its activities.

Appeals against decisions to suspend the activity of public-political organisations may be lodged with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia on the recommendation of the Ministry of Justice.

The rights conferred upon public-political organisations under the present act are withdrawn during any period of suspension.

The activity of public-political organisations may be suspended for six months.

If, following the suspension of its activity, a public-political organisation fails to remedy the breaches of the law in question or violates other provisions during the year following suspension, its activity will be suspended for one year in accordance with the provisions laid down in the first section of this article.

If the public-political organisation concerned again breaches the law in the year following the second suspension, its activity may be banned in accordance with the provisions laid down in the first section of this article.

Article 8

Supervision of the lawfulness of the activities of public-political organisations

The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia supervises the lawfulness of the activities of public-political organisations. Citizens of the Republic of Armenia, public-political organisations, public institutions and other legal entities may lodge complaints with the Ministry of Justice regarding the lawfulness of the activities of public-political organisations.

President of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia: L TER-PETROSSIAN
Secretary of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia: A SAHAKIAN

26 February 1991
Yerevan

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, 22 June 1995

AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) OJ 2

BUREAU OF THE ASSEMBLY

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA

DRAFT AGENDA

of the meeting to be held in Strasbourg on Tuesday 27 June 1995 at 1.45 pm (Room 6)

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1. **AGENDA**

<AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) OJ 2>

Adoption of the agenda.

2. **MINUTES**

<AS/Bur/Armenia ...>

Approval of the minutes of the meeting held on 29 May 1995 in Paris.

3. **VISIT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO ARMENIA TO MONITOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS**

<AS/Bur/ Armenia (1995) 1,
AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) 2, AS/Bur/Armenia ...>

Exchange of views on the electoral laws. Consideration of a revised draft programme.

To Members of the Ad Hoc Committee
cc: Secretaries of National Delegations

THIS DOCUMENT IS ALSO THE CONVOCATION TO THE MEETING

4. **ANY OTHER BUSINESS**

5. **DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF THE NEXT MEETING**

- in Yerevan, 1-8 July 1995

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, 26 June 1995

AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) 1 rev

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA

Draft Programme of the visit to Armenia (2-8 July 1995)

Saturday, 1 July 1995

evening — Arrival of the Committee

Sunday, 2 July 1995

10.00 am — Working meeting of the Committee

12.30 pm — Meeting with experts of the Supreme Council (Parliament) of Armenia. Information about the draft constitution and the election laws.

4.00 pm — Meeting with representatives of the OSCE, UN Election Unit and other international organisations observing the elections in Armenia (Hotel "Armenia")

6.30 pm — Meeting with ambassadors of Council of Europe Member States to Armenia hosted by Mme France de Hartingh, Ambassador of France to Armenia (Hotel "Hrazdan", 9 floor)

8.00 pm — Dinner offered by the Ambassador of France to Armenia

Monday, 3 July 1995

10.00 am Meeting with Mr Babken ARARKTSIAN, Chairman of the Supreme Council (or Mr A. SAHAKIAN, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council)

Meeting with Mr H. BAGRATIAN, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

Meeting with President, Levon TER PETROSJAN

1.30 pm Meeting with representatives of mass media

4.00 pm Meeting at the Central Electoral Commission (organised by the OSCE/UN co-ordination unit)

6.15 pm Meeting with representatives of national minorities

7.00 pm Meeting with NGO representatives

Tuesday, 4 July

9.00 am Meeting with representatives of political parties

3.30 pm Meeting with Mr V. PAPAZIAN, Minister of Foreign Affairs

4.15 pm Meeting with Mr V. STEPANIAN, Minister of Justice

5.00 pm Departure for Echmiadzin, Meeting with GAREGIN I, Catholicos and Supreme Patriarch of all Armenians

Return to Yerevan

Wednesday, 5 July 1995 (election day)

Visit to a number of polling stations in and outside Yerevan

Thursday, 6 July 1995

9.00 am Meeting of the Committee in camera

10.15 am Meeting for exchange of views with representatives of other international organisations observing the election

12.00 noon Meeting with ambassadors of Council of Europe member States (joint meeting together with observers from European Parliament)

1.00 pm Press Conference

7.00 pm Official reception

Friday, 7 July 1995

10.00 am Meeting with representatives of the Central Electoral Commission: information about the participation rate and election results

afternoon cultural programme

Saturday, 8 July 1995

Departure of the Committee

e) B4-0685, 0703 et 0714/95

Résolution sur la situation des droits de l'homme en Arménie et l'interdiction du parti Fra Dachnaktsoutioun

Le Parlement européen,

A. considérant que l'Arménie est engagée, depuis son accession à l'indépendance le 21 septembre 1991, dans la construction d'un État doté de libertés et d'institutions démocratiques,

B. considérant l'interdiction faite aux partis par la loi d'avoir leurs instances dirigeantes établies à l'étranger ou composées de citoyens étrangers, fussent-ils d'origine arménienne, ainsi que l'interdiction faite aux partis arméniens de se faire financer par des sources étrangères,

C. considérant la décision de la Cour suprême d'Arménie du 13 janvier 1995 de suspendre le parti d'opposition Fra Dachnaktsoutioun pour une durée de 6 mois, alors que les élections législatives auront lieu en juillet 1995, décision qui confirme le décret présidentiel du 28 décembre 1994 interdisant ce parti d'opposition accusé d'avoir violé la loi de la République sur les organisations civiles et politiques,

D. considérant les atteintes qui ont été portées à la liberté d'expression du fait de l'interdiction décidée, d'une douzaine de titres, interdiction qui a frappé la presse affiliée au parti Fra Dachnaktsoutioun et son agence de presse, ainsi que des journaux "indépendants", mais, selon les autorités, liés audit parti,

E. considérant le compte rendu de la mission effectuée, du 20 au 26 janvier 1995, en République d'Arménie par les "Avocats des droits de l'homme", qui fait état de l'arrestation, depuis décembre 1994, de vingt et un membres de la Fra Dachnaktsoutioun suspectés d'être membres du "présumé" groupe terroriste clandestin à l'intérieur de la Fra Dachnaktsoutioun;

1. estime que l'interdiction de partis d'opposition constitue une atteinte aux principes élémentaires de la démocratie; estime toutefois que tout parti démocratique doit se conformer aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans son pays;

2. invite dès lors le parti Fra Dachnaktsoutioun à prendre les dispositions nécessaires, comme l'ont par ailleurs fait les autres partis d'opposition, afin de se mettre en situation légale, de permettre ainsi la levée immédiate de la suspension qui le frappe et d'écarter de la sorte toute possibilité de recours du gouvernement arménien à la loi existante pour empêcher sa participation au processus électoral;

3. souligne que la censure appliquée à la presse liée au parti suspendu et à la presse indépendante constitue une violation de la liberté d'expression, liberté qui est à la base de tout système démocratique;

4. demande aux autorités arméniennes de reconsidérer leur décision d'interdire certains journaux et de permettre à l'ensemble des forces politiques du pays de participer en toute liberté aux prochaines élections, dans le respect des lois qui régissent le pays;

5. demande que les vingt-et-un inculpés fassent l'objet, dans les plus brefs délais, d'un procès équitable dans le respect des droits de la défense et en présence d'observateurs internationaux;

6. salue la décision de sa Conférence des présidents d'envoyer, avant les élections de juillet 1995, une mission d'observation examiner les conditions de la préparation du scrutin;

7. charge son Président de transmettre la présente résolution au Conseil, à la Commission ainsi qu'au gouvernement arménien.

Conseil de l'Europe

Le Greffier de l'Assemblée Parlementaire

AT-C 95/5

Strasbourg, le 24 mai 1995

Madame / Monsieur,

J'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer que la troisième partie de la Session de 1995 de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe se tiendra du ***lundi 26 au vendredi 30 juin 1995***.

Vous voudrez bien trouver ci-joint l'ordre du jour adopté par la Commission Permanente le 22 mai 1995, ainsi que le projet de calendrier établi par le Bureau et approuvé par la Commission Permanente le même jour.

Prière de porter votre badge ou de vous munir d'une pièce d'identité ainsi que de la présente lettre d'invitation, ces documents seront exigés à l'entrée des bâtiments du Conseil de l'Europe.

Veuillez agréer, Madame / Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Heiner Klebes

Annexes : Ordre du jour
Projet de calendrier

Aux membres de l'Assemblée,
aux Invités spéciaux à l'Assemblée,
aux observateurs à l'Assemblée

cc. Représentants Permanents
Secrétaires des délégations nationales
Secrétaires des délégations d'invités spéciaux
Secrétaire de la délégation d'observateurs

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STATEMENT
BY HIS EXCELLENCY **VAHAN PAPAZIAN**
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA,

It is a great honour for me to be here and use this opportunity to speak to you on Armenia's foreign policy issues.

Armenia is a small, landlocked, newly independent country of 3.5 million people. The Republic is under a complete blockade, with no energy resources. It has also not recovered yet from the devastating earthquake of 1988. It is flooded by hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the conflict between Nagorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan, and is under constant provocation by Azerbaijan which is attempting to draw Armenia into the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.

At the same time, Armenia is a democratic country, an island of stability in a sea of political chaos and turmoil. There are close to 30 registered political parties, a free press, freedom of conscience and religion, and with laws guaranteeing civil and political rights and freedoms. The Government of Armenia has also made headway towards establishing a market economy, and has taken several significant steps toward integration in the global economy. Armenia has moved swiftly in many areas of reform. Most agricultural land, homes and many small enterprises have already been privatised, and a tax program, a pricing policy and legislative reform to create the legal framework for a free market economy are effectively under way. Nevertheless, substantial work will need to be done in order for these advances to contribute effectively toward a successful transition.

Armenia's foreign policy since the first days of its independence has been based on the principle of normalising relations with all neighbours and basing relations with all countries on the principles of international law. With regard to its immediate neighbours, it must be noted that Armenia has no political problems with Georgia and Iran. The latter has been circumspect, neutral and constructive in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.

There are, though, difficulties with two other neighbours - Azerbaijan and Turkey. The relations with Azerbaijan are tense because of the conflict of

Nagorno Karabagh . Turkey has been actively backing Azerbaijan, whereas being a member of the CSCE Minsk Group, it could have had a more constructive role in the peaceful solution of the problem.

Another active player in the region is Russia. Trying to redefine its role after the collapse of the USSR, it is quite natural that the Russian Federation would articulate political and strategic concerns in relation to the former Soviet Republics. Currently Russia has come forward with its own peace plan for the solution of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict. Armenia has maintained traditionally good relations with Russia and has welcomed Russian efforts for the establishment of peace in the region.

The Nagorno Karabagh conflict has claimed the lives of more than twenty thousand people and has caused close to a million innocent people to be uprooted from their homes during the past five years. This conflict continues to threaten the security and stability of the whole region. The international community has yet to come to grips with the root cause of the conflict and devise appropriate measures to find a peaceful solution.

Armenia is concerned with the right to existence and to security of the people of Nagorno Karabagh and has paid a heavy price for this action. We have suffered through four unusually harsh winters with severe energy and food shortages, due to the total blockade that Azerbaijan and Turkey have imposed on rail, road and pipelines into Armenia. As we are a landlocked country that depends largely on imports for its food and fuel requirements, the blockade has incapacitated huge segments of our population, work force, and industrial production.

Armenia's position on the Nagorno Karabagh conflict has been clear and consistent since day one. The conflict is between the people of Nagorno Karabagh, who are striving for their self-determination, and the Azerbaijani government which is refusing to address the rights and security concerns of the people of Nagorno Karabagh. However, recently Nagorno Karabagh has at long last been recognised as a party to the conflict, which itself, is a promising development.

Armenia, as an interested party, and Nagorno Karabagh have both given their accord to the UN Security Council Resolutions, CSCE and Russian peace initiatives and cease-fire proposals, whereas Azerbaijan has

rejected them. The government of Armenia sees no alternative to the peaceful settlement of the Karabagh conflict. Therefore, the convocation of the CSCE Minsk Conference must not be delayed. We view the establishment of a durable cease-fire coupled with the lifting of all blockades and the withdrawal of Nagorno Karabagh forces from occupied areas, as a first phase leading to the opening of the Minsk Conference, during which, the legal questions, and first and foremost, the issue on the status of Nagorno Karabagh, can be negotiated. It is the clear position of the Government of Armenia that we will accept any solution agreed upon between Nagorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan at the Minsk Conference.

The existence of two peace plans, proposed by the CSCE and Russia, makes the establishment of peace in the region a more difficult task. And in this situation the ideal option would be, for the international community to come forward with one joint peace plan, which would combine both the CSCE and the Russian proposals. The recent visit to the region by Mr. Ian Eliasson, the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Group, adds hopes towards the revival of the activities of the Group and the establishment of peace in the region.

Armenia attaches great importance to its participation in the CIS. The Republic of Armenia was the first to join the CIS and considers it as an important forum for the realisation of multilateral relations between the former Soviet Republics.

As the first signator of the Belovezhian Agreement, Armenia's decision to join CIS was based on our assessment of the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, and the necessity to minimise the danger of its uncontrolled collapse. I believe that the CIS has accomplished that task. We did not allow the repetition of the "Yugoslav option".

The second important factor that the former Soviet republics had to take into consideration was that they could have been left out of the international system, and more importantly, from security arrangements. The mere fact of independence did not provide the newly-independent states with any real political or economic alternative. Under these circumstances, the CIS served and continues to serve as the only guarantor of the security of the former Soviet republics.

And the third consideration was the economic one. We think that while the search for new economic links, new markets, and international and regional economic structures continues, it is beneficial to all states to preserve the economic links and markets that existed during the Soviet period. In the decades to come, that factor will have a significant impact on the position of all states.

Without undermining the importance of good relations with Russia, other CIS states and its immediate neighbours, Armenia continues to pursue the goal of full integration in the international and European structures.

In fact, we dedicate a lot of attention to the development of our relations with the European Community.

After gaining independence, Armenia established strong relations with various institutions of the European Community.

Subsequent to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and the European Community in June 1992, relief to Armenia from the Community has increased considerably.


I do not wish to elaborate on the different aspects of this continuing aid, but would like to note that the technical, medical and food supply help, as well as the long-term credits extended to Armenia by the European Community has allowed us to assess the real value of these aid projects in the building of democracy in our country. This invaluable aid has helped the Government to solve certain problems that have become a part of the routine governing of the country.

The present near-fatal situation of the economy in Armenia, particularly in the energy sphere, is making it difficult to reform the economical structures of the country, something that is absolutely essential for the country's smooth transition to a modern market economy. However, as I mentioned before, our Government has done and is doing everything possible to realize the policy of restructuring of the economy. This is where we need the help of the European Community most.
In this regard, establishment of the agreement between Armenia and the European Union, can help to reaffirm the democratic process of our country.

We do understand that the situation prevalent in the region today, and especially the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, to a certain extent contradicts the development of normal relations. Regrettably so, because Armenia has always stated its willingness to start the negotiations.
Today, we are convinced that soon there will be positive signs of improvements and all existing obstacles will be cleared.
I wish to reiterate our will to continue to seek a negotiated political solution to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.

Armenia has also established good working relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. We have established our permanent representative at the NACC. And we are looking forward to new prospects in our relations.

Thank you


ARMÉNIE
GÉORGIE
AZERBAÏDJAN
TURQUIE
IRAN
Capitale d'Etat (plus de 1 200 000 hab.)
Plus de 100 000 hab.
Plus de 50 000 hab.
Plus de 30 000 hab.
Plus de 10 000 hab.
Autre ville ou localité
Limite de district
Chef-lieu de district
Autoroute
Route principale
Autre route
Voie ferrée
Aéroport, Aérodrome
Site historique
Limite du Parc national de Sevan
Réserve
0 10 20 30 40 km
RUSSIE
Mer Noire
Mer Caspienne
SYRIE
IRAK
Gumri (ex Leninakan)
Vanadzor (ex Kirovakan)
EREVAN
Hrazdan
Sevan
Abovian
Etchmiadzin
Hoktemberian
Artik
Akhourian
Maralik
Spitak
Stepanavan
Tachir
Alaverdi
Idjevan
Dilidjan
Martouni
Vardenis
Kamo
Achtarak
Ararat
Artachat
Massis
Baghramian
Armavir
Talin
Aparan
Tchambarak
Gyandja (ex Kirovabad)
Kapan
Goris
Sissian
Meghri
Ordoubad
Djoulfa
Nakhitchevan
Lac Sevan
Lac Balik
Lac de Çildir
Lac Aygir
Lac de Van
Réservoir d'Arpi
Réservoir d'Akhourian
Réservoir d'Aparan
Réserve de Dilidjan
Réserve de Khosrov
Réservoir de Spendarian
Réservoir de Tolors
Réservoir de Chamb
Chaîne du Bazoum
Chaîne du Pambak
Monts Sevan
Mts Vardenis
Chaîne du Zangezour
Plateau du Karabagh
HAUT-KARABAGH
NAKHITCHEVAN (AZERBAÏDJAN)
Grand Ararat (Büyük Ağrı) 5165
Petit Ararat (Küçük Ağrı) 3896
Kars
Koura
Araxe
Arpa
Akhourian
Debed
Aghstev
Zangehmâr
Vorotan
Akera
Qotur
Aq
Tendürek 3542
Yağlica 2969
Kisir 3192
Akbaba 3043
Aşağı 3276
Kassagh
Hrazdan
Gueghan
Azat
Gyandja
Chamkhor
Dzegam
Aksafa
Akstafa
Khrami
Alazani
Ijevan
Tavouch
Aghstev
Sarisu
Zangehmâr
Qotur
Araxe
Akera
Vorotan
Khodâ Âfarin
Âlâ Djoudjeh
Kaleybar
Evli
Elemdar
Djolfâ
Qareh Ziyâ'eddin
Siyâhtchechmeh
Margan
Chot
Çaldiran
Muradiye
Bazargan
Mâkou
Poldacht
Arab Dizadj
Chahbouz
Kyarki
Ilitchevsk
Sadarak
Bour Âlân
Aralik
Iğdir
Doğubayazit
Diyadin
Cumaçay
Gazilер
Tuzluca
Kağizman
Selim
Digor
Anipemza
Susuz
Arpaçay
Ardahan
Çildir
Doğruyol
Gorelovka
Bogdanovka
Dmanissi
Bagratachen
Airoum
Noyemberian
Achadjour
Sofoulou
Azatamout
Akstafa
Kazakh
Taouz
Poylou
Patara Siraki
Chamkhor
Berd
Gyandja
Artzvachen
Guetabek
Dachkessan
Khanlar
Chorja
Djil (Charadagh)
Aregouni
Metz Mazrik
Sodk
Tzovinar
Guetachen
Chorja
Kelbadjar
Istissou
Aghndjadzor
Hermon
Djermouk
Zangakatoun
Areni
Eghegnadzor
Saravan
Vaïk
Noravank
Angueghakot
Gogui
Dastakert
Tatev
Kadjaran
Chichkert
Tachtaun
Meghri
Ordoubad
Agarak
Evli
Kaleybar
Chahoumian
Leninavan
Mir Bachir
Barda
Mardakert
Hatherk
Gyamich (Mrrav)
Thurthar
Khatchen
Aghdjabedi
Aghdam
Karkar
Stepanakert
Chouchi
Martouni
Latchin
Fizouli
Hadrout
Horadiz
Djebraïl
Koubatly
Soltanly
Vers Imichli
Vers Pârsâbad
Vers Evlakh
Vers Erzurum
Vers Ağri
Vers Erciş
Vers Van
Vers Khoy
Vers Tabriz
Vers Ahar
Vers Tbilissi
Vers Atchalkalaki
Vers Evlakh
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ARMENIE

La République de l'Arménie est située dans le sud-ouest de la Transcaucase, au Nord Est de la frontière avec la Turquie. Elle est la plus petite des quinze républiques de la ex-U.R.S.S.mais c'est une des plus densément peuplées.

L'histoire plus récente de l'Arménie ne peut pas être comprise sans analyser avant son processus d'indépendance et ses relations avec les autres pays du Caucase, et surtout le conflit dans le Haut Karabakh.

Le processus d'indépendance de l'Arménie commence au début de les années 90. En Février 1988, les premières grandes manifestations nationalistes de l'Arménie font découvrir l'ampleur de la question nationale en U.R.S.S. Avec l'économie elle deviendra très vite l'une des deux premières préoccupations de l'équipe Gorbatchev et la moins maîtrisable de ses difficultés.

Le gouvernement Arménien a repoussé de négocier avec les républiques soviétiques le nouveau traité de l'Union, qui eut lieu à la fin de 90 et les premiers mois du 91, et de plus il a fait boycott dans le référendum sur le renouvellement de l'Union.

Le coup d'Etat à Moscou en Août 91 a forcé l'accélération du processus d'indépendance. Le référendum à ce propos a eut lieu le 21 Septembre 91. Selon les autorités le 94,4% de l'électorat participa et 99,3% se déclara en faveur de l'indépendance de l'Arménie.

La déclaration d'indépendance a été suivie des élections pour le poste du président de la république, étant élu Ter Pétrosyan. Cette même année l'Arménie n'a pas pris part de la C0munauté d'Etats Indépendants (C.E.I.), formée par 7 républiques de la ex U.R.S.S

C'est après la sommet de Alma Ata le 21 decembre 1991 que l'Armenie fait parti de la C.E.I.

Au début de 1992 l'Arménie est admise dans la conférence de Sécurité et Coopération en Europe (C.S.C.E.). L'Arménie a demandé le statuts d'invité spécial le 22 Décembre 91 au Conseil de l'Europe.

Le conflit du Haut Karabakh est devenu si grave pendant les dernières années qui se présente maintenant comme un des principaux problèmes du gouvernement Arménien. La région du Haut Karabakh se trouve en territoire d'Azerbaïdjan peuplée en grande majorité par des arméniens qui considèrent le Haut Karabakh comme le bastion irréductible de l'Arménie, montagne sacrée de la conscience politique et culturelle arménienne.

La question du Haut Karabakh resurgit de manière brutale avec la Perestroïka. Le 20 Février 1988, le Soviet du haut Karabakh adopte une résolution qui au nom du droit à l'autodétermination demande le rattachement de cette région à l'Arménie.

Le 26 Novembre 91 le Soviet suprême d'Azerbaïdjan suspend l'autonomie du Haut Karabakh, mais il est répondu par l'organisation le 10 Décembre 91 d'un référendum sur l'indépendance de la république de Nagorny Karaback qui obtient 99% de OUI parmi la population de la région.

Le conflit du Haut Karabakh a pour conséquence de centaines de milliers de réfugiés et de milliers de morts. La poursuite de la guère à Haut Karabakh a placé aux autorités d'Erévan dans une situation difficile: alors que le président Ter Petrosyan ne manquait pas de souligner sa volonté de privilégier une solution négociée, les autorités et les combattants du Haut Karabakh ont continué à faire preuve d'intransigeance.

Le cessez-le-feu accordé en mai 1994 n'a pas abouti une solution au conflit,la existance d'une mediation parallèle de la Russie consacre l'impuissance du groupe de Minsk.
L'image internationale d l'Arménie est restée bonne, en grande partie grâce à l'action de son président. Mais tant que durera le conflit du Haut Karabakh, l'Arménie ne pourra réellement

capter le fruit d'une politique qui accorde une grande importance aux relations de bon voisinage.

Les dernières événements politiques ont mis en question cet image.Le 29 décembre 94 le décret présidentiel a suspendu l'activité du parti de l'opposition Dashnaktsutyun.Ce parti a été accusé d'éffectuer des acts terroristes,crimes politiques,traffic de drogues et autres violations de la loi.

Le parti Dashnak qui avait été établi à Tiblissi en1890 était le premir parti qui gouvernait en Arménie de 1918-1920.Une fois restauré le pouvoir soviétique,le parti Dashnak a dû émigré et n'a reapparu qu'en 1990.La cour suprême D'armenie avait suspendu le Dashnaktsutyun en se basant à la loi sur les organisations civiles et politiquesqu'interdis aux partis politiques d'avoir leurs organes directives à l'étranger ou composé d'arméniens vivant à l'étrangére.Considerant cette deus conditons le parti Dashnak ne respecte pas la loi.Certains dirigeants du parti semblent ne pas être citoyen de l'Armenie.

Selon le parti Dashnaktsutyun les accusations du président Ter- Petroyan étaient fausses.Plusieurs observateurs locaux croient que la suspension de Dashnaktsutyun était dû au souhait du Erevan d'éviter la participation de parti opposé aux élections parlamentaires le prochaine 4 julliet.Cependant le Parlamen arménien a decidé une réforme parlamentaire qui verra l'institution d'une Assemblée Nationale avec un nonbre de députés reduit(de 260 actuellement à 190),150 députés seront élus au scrutin majoritaire de circonscription et 40 au scrutin potionnel sur de listes présentées par les partis.Avec cette nouvelle reforme le parti Dashnak ne pourrait pas présenter de liste pour siéges élus à la proportionnelle mais que ses membres pourraint se présenter en leur nom propre au scrutin majoritaire.

D'allieurs la liberté d'expression est ménacée,des atteintes intolerables ont été comises par les Autorités arméniennes;une douzaine de journaux ou moyens d'information ont été fermés par les forces de police ou de le Securité nationale.Ces fermetures de Journaux de la presse de l'opposition se sont effectuées ne seulement en violation de L'art 19 du Pacte International des Droits Civils et Politiques ,et de la Declaration Universelle des droits de l'Homme de l'Onu(l'Arménie a oficiellement adheré en91) mais aussi à la loi de la République d'Arménie sur la presse et les autres medias,qui stipule que la presse ne peut être suspendu

pour 3 mois que à la suite d'une violation concernant la publications de secrets d'états,d'articles promouvant la guerre,la violence,la haine religieuse et nationale,le crime,la prostitution...

Dans ce context politique où les libertés fondamentaux ont été vulneré meten peril l'établissement d'un Etat democratique.De plus en avril 94 L'Assamblée Nationale a ouvert un débat pour l'adoption de la nouvelle constitution.Deux projets alternative ont été preparé.Le Partie au pouvoir propose un système presidential cependant les parts de l'opposition son à faveur d'une république parlamantaire.

Par rapport au Haut Karabakh,au début 95 les médiateurs de l'OSCEessaient de chercher une solution au conflit entre L'Azerbaidjan et l4Arménie.Les conversations ont été soutenus par le répresentant de l'Arménie,Azerbaidjan,et Karabakh,et par deux co-présidents(un russe et un suedois du groupe de Minsk de l'OSCE.

Le brouillon de l'accord prévoit l'arrêt des hostilités,la separation des troupes,le deploiment d'un Securité et d'observateurs internatinals;le reculdes groupes armés des territoires occupés,l'enlévement des blocages,le retour des refugies

Dans la sommet de l'OSCE à Vienne le 6 decembre94Ils ont exprimé leur volonté politique de fournir une force multinationale de maintien de la paix,mais les difficultés pour determiner les limites de la zone de securité font impossible arriver à un accord.

AZERBAIDJAN

La république d'Azerbaïdjan est située dans l"est de la Transcaucase;dans la côte ouest de la Mer caspienne.Azerbaïdjan comprend la République autonome de Nagorny Karabakh;74% de cette population revendiquent l'union avec l'Armenie et les Azéries;Par allieurs;Nagorny Karabakh a été en 1988 le théâtre d'un dur affrontement nationaliste entre les arméniens.

La grande richesse de l'Azerbaïdjan est le pétrole.Il existe d'inmenses gisements sur les rives de la Mer Caspienne à Bakou et dans les fonds marins.

Les differents gouvernements ont adopté mesures differentes par rapport à cette question;En 92 le gouvernement du Elchibey a ouvert des negotiations avec un consortium international.D'aprés un projet d'accord,les trois puits petrolaire dans la mer Caspienne doivent être exploités dont 80% des revenus vont à Azerbaidjan et le 20% au consortium.De plus un oleoduc,qui transporterait le petrole d'Azerbaidjan à travers le sud-est de l'Anatolie jusqu'à la Mediterranean.

Des la prise de pouvoir du successeur,Aliyev a rejeté l'accord.Mais les azerbaidjanes ont deseperement besoin d'investissement de l'ouest et technologie pour accroître la productivitéde son industrie de petrol

Aliev s'est declaré favorable à la construction d'un oleoduc qui traversarait la turquie jusqu'à ses côtes occidentales depuis la mer Caspienne.Ce projet contraire à la Russie pour qui la meilleure option serait de le voir déboucher sur son part de Novorosiik,sur la mer Noire.

Actuellement,differents intérêts économiques mais avec beaucoup d'implications politiques sont présents.Les companies americaines ont menacé de se retirer du consortium si l'Iran devrat pendre part dans le dévéloppement des dèpôts de petrole de la mer Caspienne(les Etats Unies refusent de négotier avec ce pay,même si celà implique de nombreux profits.Cependant Azerbaidjan ne peut pas oublier l'importance de l'investissement americain et sur tout le support politique obtenu avec beaucoup de difficultés par les Etats unis et d'autres etats de l'ouest.D'un autre côté,le blockade iranien est capable de ruiner le république tout entiere,depuis que les hostilités Chechenies ont coupé la communication au nord

d4azerbaidjan.De plus,l'incertitude du porcentege de participation de la Turquie laissen ouvert la probématique du petrole

Au contraire que les autres Républiques du Caucase;Azerbaïdjan déclare son désir se signer le nouveau Traité de l'Union.Son indépendance est formellement déclaré le 18 Octobre 1991.Le 20 septembre 1993 Azerbaïdjan signa l'adhesion à C.E.I.

En autum les élections ont lieu et le résultat est la victoire par 94.4% de Mutalilov.

Tout au long de 92 le gouvernement doit faire face à une forte détérioration économique,résultat du conflit continu dans Nagorny Karabakh

Dans les élections suivantes c'est Aliev,qui avait renversé à l'anterieur president Eltchibey,qui gagne au nom de l'opposition.

L'etape suivante est la signature de l'adhésion du Azerbaïdjan à la Confédération d'Etats Indepéndants.

Le 24 Janvier 92 a demandé le statut d'invité spécial au Conseil de L'Europe.

L'instabilité politique règnent en Azerbaïdjan a encore accentué l'incapacité de Bakou d'organiser des forces Armées capables de combattre les offensives arméniennes.

Le conflit du Haut Karabakh est marqué par une série de victoires arméniennes,en particulier avec l'ouverture du coluoir de Latchine,qui a permis à la République du Haut karabakh d'avoir un accès direct sur l'Arménie.

Malgré l'épuisement physique;matériel et Psychologique de deux parties;la guérre a continué à provoquer de nombreuses victimes.Le président Aliev appelle le peuple pour se preparer pour faire plus de sacrifice pour defendre l'indépendance de la république.

L'internationalisation du conflit n a pas accéléré pour autant son réglement.Saisi de la Gestion de Karabakh;à la suite de la rencontre entre les présidents G.Bush et Eltsine, le Conseil de Sécurité de Nations Unis n'a pu pas respecter une des quatre resolutions(822;)votée à la suite de la prise de Kelbadjar(ville situé au Nord-ouest du Karabakh ayant été entièrement évacué à fin d'éviter la répétition de la massacre de Khodjali).

Le 14 Août 1993 une mission de la Conference De Sécurité et Coopération en Europe a dû reconnaître son échec après neuf jours de transaction le refus de la partie arménienne d'évacuer Kelbadjar.

Grâce à la mediation de la fedération de la Russie et le groupe de Minsk de l'OSCE le cessez-le-feu devient déjà une réelité.les etats participants,selon la décision de budapest de6 décembre94 ont exprimé leus volonté politique de fournir une force multinationala de maintien de la paix aprés un accord entre les partis pour la cessation du conflit armé.

En avril 95 un assaut lancé par les militaires a mis en question a nouveau le régime politique d'Azerbaidjan.

GEORGIA

C'est une République fédéré depuis 1936.Auparavant elle formait avec l4Azerbaïdjan et l'Armenie la République Féderal Socialist de la Transcausienne.Elle comprend les territoires suivantes:La République Socialist d'Abkhazje

La République Socialiste d'Adjarie

La Region Autonome d'Ossetie du Sud

La situation politique et écomique de Georgia dans les dernieres années a devenue insoutenable , sa déclaration d'indépendance, le 9 avril 1991 n'a fait qu'agraver la crise extérieure ainsi comme l'intérieure.

La semaine suivante à la déclaration de son indépendance, Gamsakhourdia est élu président de la République de Georgie. Quelques symboles d'indépendance ont été rapidement adoptés, le territoire on l'appelerait maintenant la République de Georgie.

Ce même année la Georgie rompt ses rélations officielles avec une Union Soviétique que refuse de reconnaître son indépendance et Gamsakhourdia instaure l'état d'urgence. Le problème avec l'Ossétie du Sud provoque l'apparition d'une situation critique.

Un conseil a pris le pouvoir et a chassé Gansakhourdia, à sa tête E. Chevardnadze. Le retour de Chevardnadze, ancien ministre d'affaires extérieures de Gorbachev avait pourtant représenté un espoir pour beaucoup de georgien. Plébiscité à la présidence au Parlement par le sufrage universel, il devait pouvoir, fort d'une rénommée internationale, apporter à la Georgie l'aide indispensable à son entrée dans la Communauté Internationale. Mais Chevardnadze a rapidement dû abandonner cette ambition à fin de se concentrer sur la gestion quotidienne de la crise.

En fin, le président georgien a dû accepter l'adhésion de son pays à la Communauté d'Etat Indépendante, et Eltsine et Chevardnadze ont signé un traité d'amitié et de coopération.

Chevardnadze a agit aussi en essayant de rapprocher la Communauté Internationale et pendant l'année 92 Georgie s'attachait aux Nations Unies et à la Conférence de Sécurité et Coopération en Europe.

Mais ceci ne permet pas au président de mettre en terme à la guèrre civile. L'entrée de troupes georgiennes en Abkhazie (République Autonome réclamant la séparation de la Georgie) le 14 août 1992 à mis fin au modus vivendi, qui avait instauré entre Tbilissi et Soukhoumi, malgré la proclamation de souverainité de l'Abkhazie, en juillet 90. La guèrre en Abkhazie a achevé de desorganiser une société en miettes et une économie coupée de sources d'approvissionnement par le combat, victimed'une grave penurie energétique et confronté au douloureux problème de refugiés.

Par ailleurs, le Nord-Caucase a été la zone la plus instable de la fédération russe dans cette période. A l'automme 1992 les heurts entre Ossétes et Ingauches près de la capitale ont provoqué une grande nombre de victimes.

En raison d'une situation critique caracterisée par la simultaneité d'une periode d'istabilité provoquée par les effets des luttes en frontiére,et d'une guerre civile,en1993 l'Etat georgien n'est pas parvenu à imposer la réalité de son existance, la Mingrélie (Georgie Occidentale) est resté largement contrôlée par les partisants de Gansankhourdia; la république autonome d'Adjarie (à la frontière turque) s'est ménagée une très large autonomie; l'Ossiéte du Sud dans un contexte de précaire, a annoncé sa reunification avec l'Osséte du Nord.

Actuellement,les problémes de la Géorgie inquiétent le gouvernement.L'essor de violence,d'attentats,de crimes et de pillages,est accompagne d'un renforcement législatif qui commence avec une operation a grande échelle contre le monde du crime;de la mafia et des trafficants de drogues.Ceci a même lieu pour la premiere fois en cinq ans à l'établissement de la peine de mort.Sept criminels ont été condammés à mort par assassinat et vol avec violence.De plus,Géorgie est en train de proposer l'introduction de la peine capital pour les trafficants de drogues.

Par ailleurs la situation économique devient problématique:un rapport du journal d'Information Socioéconomique de la Géorgie a declaré que le nombre de personnes qui ont emigré dans les derniers années atteint les 700000.Les pricipales causes de ce phenoméne sont

l'instabilité sociale et le manque d'oppurtunités de trouver un travail qui puisse maintenir une famille.

Selon le président les probèmes budgetaires ont apparu en raison des difficultés financières des débiteurs,de dettes croissantes des enterprises et des organisations,puis de l'inefficacité du système bancaire.Chevardnadze a determiné comme une des mesures anticrise du programme de stabilisation économique,l'implantation d'une reforme économique radicale,qui consiste en une mise en place des conditions necessaires pour une privatisation,une libéralisation du prix,une amélioration des politiques monnétaire,fiscale et de credit.

En ce qui concerne le domaine de la politique,le president Cheverdnadze signale qu'il y aura aussi de réformes.Il semble que tout est sous révision:le rôle du Gabinet ministériel,celui du premier ministre et d'autres ministres.

En même temps la mise en place de l'avant projet d'une constitution est en marche.En mars 94la commission constitutionnelle a annoncé que le projet constitutionel se base sur la formation d'un Etat unitaire et autonome.Mais,de nombreux desaccords existent comme cosequence des differents droits que l'on veut octroyer au péesident;Ainsi,il n'est pas du tout probable que lors des prochaînes electios cette constitution soit déjà approuvé.

De nos jours la situations des partis politiques devient critique.L'assassinat du chef du Parti National Democratique,Giorgi Chanturia le 3 décmbre 94 a soulevé la problématique de la politique de l'assassinat.La crroissance de la popularité de Chanturia et de son parti,du fait des sevères critiques sur les principales figures du pay,est consideré comme les raisons de sa mort.L'union desCitoyens de Géorgie;dont le leader est Chevernadze,definit L'assassinat comme étant un act de terrorisme dirigé contre l'Etat.

les autres partis de l'opposition ont demandé que le Ministre de la Defense demisione.Actuellement les principales partis politiques de l'opposition sont:

L'Union Democratique Chretienne

L'Union desGéorgiens Traditionalistes

Le Parti Républicain Uni (le seul parti ayant déclaré l'action de la Russie en Chechenie)

Le parti Liberal Democratique

Le Frent National de Liberation(un des ses leaders,Kakubava,est maintenant poursuivi pour ses acts subversifs contre la Russie,qui mettent en danger les relations entre la Russie et la Georgie)

Par allieurs,Géorgie a confirmé sa disponibilité pour continuer la recherche de méthodes qui permettent établir la paix dans le conflit de L'Abkhazie et permettre le retour des refugies.Elle est prêt à considerer le status d'Abkhazie à n'importe quel niveau,mais uniquement dans un Etat géorgien singulière.

L'attitude russe envers le conflit d'Abkhaz est en train de changer en faveur de l'autorité géorgien,qui a choisi le chemin pacifique pour mettre fin à cette dispute.Le 6 décembre 94 la sommet à Budapest a adopté une resolution par laquellea reaffirmé l'integralité de la Géorgie,a donne beaucoup d'importance à la deportation de population géorgienne d'Abkhazie.

La dernière réunion qui a traité le sujet du statut politique d'Abkhazie et des refugies (dirigée par des assistants russes et des officiels de l'OSCE) eut lieu à Géneve du 7 à 9 fevrier.La principal contradiction est apparu en raison des differentes opinios autour du futur statut D'Abkhazie,celle-ci deviendra-t elle autonome,une partie d'un conféderation ou une république indepéndante?

La recherche d'une formule spécifique est en marche mais elle doit faire face à des nombreuses difficultés à cause de la méfiance mutuelle,qui a été accumulée le long des années de conflit.

ABKHAZIE a dit que la clause la plus importante c'est l'appel à la creation d'une union dans laquelle Géorgie et Abkhazieauront des parts équitatives.La delegation de l'Abkhazie maintiendra son indepéndance de la Géorgie.Aucun féderation entre ces deux républiques ne peut aboutir.Les deux doivent être égaux,formé une confédération et devraient obtenir un compromis pour éviter la guerre.

GEORGIE insiste sur son integrité territoriale à l'interieur des frontièeres internationales

Les NATIONS UNIS et la RUSSIE ont confirmé formelment à Géneve la reconnîssance de l'integralité territoriale de Géorgie.

La frontière de la Russie et de la Géorgie a été temporalement fermé,de même que les autres moyens de transport.La Russie a declaré le 6 mars 95 vouloir réouvrir les frontières(pour les enfants,les femmes et les retraités).La Géorgie a refusé cette déclaration.elle affirme réouvrir le chemin de fer que si les refugies géorgiens rentre à Abkhazie.Les autorités séparatistes sont contre la réouverture du chemin de fer jusqu'à ce que statut politique d'Abkhazie soit defini.

Pour conclure,l'état présent de la Géorgie est une des principales conséquences de L'élatement de l'Union Soviétique.Depuis que l4indépendance a été déclarée,et jusqu'à nos jours,la caractéristique essentielle c'est l4insecurité et la situation de Guerre civile dans le territoire.L'arrivé au pouvoir de Cheverdnadze n4a fait qu'agraver la crise politique qu'était en train de se dévélopper depuis quelque temps.Pour mantenir la présidence de la République Cheverdnadze a dû s'aider de la mafia,sa credibilitéest nule sur tout à l'interieur.De l'autre côté on a trouvé les separatist abkhazies qui jour à jour demontrent son intransigence et atrocité.ils considerent comme enemie voire traîtres au abkhazies qui refusent de mener à but des actions de vandalisme et violence contre les géorgiens.

Face à cette situation la problématique c'est: existe-t-elle une démocratie en Géorgie?

La Trascaucasie a tojours été considerée comme une région de grande importance stratégie.L'Arménie,l'Azerbaïdjan,et la Géorgie constituent la frontiére entre l'Europe et l'Asie,le lien entre l'Islam et la chrétienté,une zone traditionnellement d'affrontements entre les grands empires russe,ottoman et perse,un carrefour des differents interêts politiques.

Mais l'importance de cette zone n'est que politique.L'histoire de l'Europe et même de l'Asie ne peut être comprise s'elle n'est pas replacé dans le cadre de la Transcaucasie.Par allieurs une approche économique nous aidera à comprendre sa situation actuelle.Le liberalisme qui a succedé au dirigisme étatique de l'ancien regime a creussé un fossé sans cesse grandissant entre una minorité de riches que ne manquent de rien et une mayorité de pauvres face àune inflaction galopante.

Les Pays de la Transcaucasie tentent d'assurer la stabilité politique pour la stabilité des frontières.Par rapport à la russie,les trois pays on été soumises à son domination depuis le debult du XIX siècle.La Transcaucasie a été utilisé par l'union Sovietique comme avamt-porte par rapport au Proche et au moyen-Orient.Un telle politique se fixe pour objetif de gagner le monde musulman.

Transcaucasie est donc consideré par la Russie à la fois comme un sujet de politique intèrieur et un sujet de politique étrangère.C'est pourquoi elle a utilisé de nombreux moyens notament militaires en stimulant des conflits interétatiques pour forcer plusiuers pays du caucase à rejoindre la C.E.I.Ce en raison de ce-là l'intérêt de la russie de l'instalation de bases militaires russes dans les trois pays et l'aaboration de mesures visant à la protectioncommune des frontiéres de la Géorgie,de l'Armenie et de l'Azerbaîdjan avec la Turquie et l'Iran.D'autre part,durant la periode soviètique les frontières dela region furent redessinés plus de 30fois;depuis de la chute de l'U.R.S.S.,33 demandes de modification territoriales ont été formulés.Par consequence toute déstabilisation de la Transcaucasie ne peut que se répercuter sur les républiques du Caucase nord.(Ossetie du Nordd,Ingouchie,Tchetchenie).
Aprés le démantelement de l'U.R.S.S.,elle n'a pu pas acomplir ses promises d'une stabilisation dans la zone transcaucasien consideré comme le proche étranger.

Mais aussi les problèmes du les trois pays de la Transcaucasie sont de Nature interne.La cause de la perturbation en europe est la delisquescence de l'identité nationale.La louyaté au groupe s'estampesi une minorité a le sentiment d'être exploitée.Si l'association au group cesse d'entraîner des avantages mutuels.Pour qu'une identité nationale se maintienne il faut que l'emsemble des citoyens accepte un projet d'avenir.L'essentiel est le maintien du pouvoir de L'Etat sur le territoire.

existants.Sur le première,le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux mêmes qui remonte à la Révolution Française,il est consacré dans la Charte de Nations Unis mais n'a trouvé son expression juridique que dans l'autodermination.Cependant on doit L'èvacuer quand il s'agit de l'appliquer à des minorités regionales y a predominance regionale c'est le cas du Haut-Karabakh,de L'Abkhazie ou de l'Ossietie du sud.Sur le deuxième principe,le principe de l'intangibilité de s frontieres existants le dilemme principal qu'on trouve c'est celui-là de la securité.En se reconnaissant souverains les uns par rapport aux autres les Etats se sont affirmés comme des unités independantes.Un etat est tenté d'adcquerir plus puissance,ce qui rend autres etats inquiets d'où une quête de puissance,une competition de pouvoir entre Etats.

Ce qui concern aux conflits armées de la Transcaucasie,il faut chercher une solution,elle viendra pour la voie de la negotiation.Mais pour parvenir à un accord il faut reconnaître à un acteur la qualité de parti a la negotiation,c'est admettre que cet acteur ait un intérêt dans le conflit,en claire reconnaître son existence et ici on trouve le problèbe avec la representation du Haut-Karabakh ou de l'Abkhazie.

Par allieurs le recour à tiers soulève d'inmenses difficultés.Il est necessaire que les partis à un conflit acceptent de s'en remettre à un tiers;il faut qu'elles aient la confiance en ces tiers,et aussi ces tiers doivent être impartielle.

Le conflit dans Haut-karabakh;Est-ce que la Russie est impartielle dans le groupe de Minsk?

A nos jours la vie cotidienne dans le Caucasie a devenu un peu mois dure qu'avant,mais la situation d'imasse politique,d'effondement économique et de violence ethnique chronique faisent que la democratie doit payer un haut prix.

ANA MARIA JUAREZ HERNANDEZ

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NOTA INFORMATIVA

ASUNTO: **CEI: EVOLUCION DE LA SITUACION INTERNA EN GEORGIA. RELACIONES BILATERALES CON LA FEDERACION RUSA.**

0. INTRODUCCION

Durante la reciente visita del Ministro de Defensa ruso, PAVEL GRACHEV a GEORGIA (22.03.95) se acordó iniciar los trámites para la entrada en vigor del Acuerdo para el establecimiento de cuatro bases militares rusas en las poblaciones georgianas de VAZIANI, AJALKALAKI, BATUMI y GUDAUTA, por un plazo de 25 años.

Las mencionadas bases militares rusas ya se encuentran estacionadas en dichos emplazamientos, por lo que el Acuerdo supone en la práctica la legalización de la presencia militar rusa en GEORGIA.

El Acuerdo no entrará en vigor hasta que haya sido ratificado por los respectivos Parlamentos y firmado por los Presidentes, ELTSIN y SHEVARDNAZDE. A ello hay que añadir las dos condiciones impuestas por el Presidente georgiano.

La primera de ellas, contenida en el ANEXO I del Acuerdo, impide la entrada en vigor del mismo sin que con anterioridad se haya recuperado la jurisdicción georgiana sobre la totalidad de su territorio, lo que afecta directamente a las regiones separatistas de ABJAZIA y OSETIA del Sur.

La segunda condición se refiere a la eliminación y destrucción de todo aquel material militar no perteneciente a GEORGIA o a la FEDERACION RUSA, lo que de nuevo hace referencia a las fuerzas separatistas de ABJAZIA y OSETIA del Sur.

En este sentido y aunque el Acuerdo se refiere principalmente a temas de cooperación militar, su aspecto más destacable es la dimensión política del mismo, ya que supone la culminación de un proceso de negociaciones bilaterales en todos los ámbitos, en el que GEORGIA ha ido acercando posiciones con RUSIA y dejando a un lado sus aspiraciones nacionalistas y de integración en la Comunidad Internacional como un país plenamente independiente, a cambio del apoyo de MOSCU en los problemas internos de la República.

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1. ANTECEDENTES

Precisamente si analizamos la reciente historia de GEORGIA como nación independiente, tras la disolución de la UNION SOVIETICA, las continuas crisis políticas y golpes de Estado y el sucesivo estallido de conflictos interétnicos han contado con un factor común referido a la constante intervención de MOSCU en todos estos asuntos.

En octubre de 1993, GEORGIA se vio obligada a ingresar en la CEI, tras la derrota sufrida por sus Fuerzas Armadas en la guerra de ABJAZIA y tras haber obtenido el apoyo del Ejército ruso para luchar contra las fuerzas partidarias del ex-Presidente GAMSAJURDIA que se habían sublevado en el oeste del país.

Con su ingreso en la CEI, GEORGIA inicia el camino de la reconciliación con RUSIA como única forma de intentar salvar su ya precaria integridad territorial y la grave crisis política y económica que había sumido a grandes capas de la población en la pobreza.

Sin embargo, las autoridades rusas exigieron un paso más al Gobierno georgiano que consistía en la sustitución del Ministro de Defensa por un oficial ruso; condición que se cumplió el 31 de enero de 1994 tras la dimisión provocada del General KARKARASHVILI, héroe de la guerra de ABJAZIA y partidario de la vía militar para solucionar el contencioso con ese territorio, y el posterior (abril de 1994) nombramiento del Teniente General V. NADIBAIDZE, perteneciente al Ejército ruso aunque de origen georgiano, como nuevo responsable de ese Ministerio.

La misión principal que le fue encargada al nuevo Ministro de Defensa fue la de reestructurar el maltrecho Ejército georgiano y crear unas nuevas Fuerzas Armadas de carácter profesional, contando en todo momento con el apoyo y, por supuesto, la supervisión de RUSIA.

Previamente a estas decisiones, el Ministro de Defensa ruso, PAVEL GRACHEV había visitado oficialmente GEORGIA en septiembre de 1993 para firmar el denominado Acuerdo sobre los Principios del despliegue de fuerzas rusas en GEORGIA, que puede ser considerado como el antecedente más cercano del Acuerdo firmado el pasado día 22.03.95.

El Acuerdo de septiembre de 1993 fue posteriormente completado con la firma de siete Acuerdos sobre materias concretas que incluían la cooperación en los campos económico, financiero, cultural, militar, comunicaciones y de servicios de inteligencia. Todos estos documentos fueron finalmente ratificados durante la visita oficial del Presidente ELTSIN a GEORGIA en febrero de 1994.

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Finalmente, en julio de 1994 el Gobierno ruso tomó la decisión y la DUMA ratificó el envío de un contingente de 2.300 hombres como fuerza de pacificación a la frontera entre ABJAZIA y GEORGIA, que desde entonces han conseguido mantener el alto el fuego en la zona.

2. REPERCUSIONES DEL ACUERDO

El Acuerdo firmado el pasado 22 de marzo supondrá un importante impulso al prolongado proceso de formación de unas nuevas Fuerzas Armadas georgianas iniciado tras la llegada de E. SHEVARDNAZDE al poder en marzo de 1992 y a la pacificación del conflicto de ABJAZIA.

En este sentido, tanto el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso, ANDREI KOZIREV como el propio Presidente ELTSIN han manifestado recientemente su decisión de colaborar en la resolución del conflicto de ABJAZIA desde la óptica georgiana de respeto a su integridad territorial.

Desde el punto de vista georgiano la firma de este Acuerdo, que completa los alcanzados con anterioridad, supone la única posibilidad real de recuperar su integridad territorial y la pacificación definitiva de los conflictos interétnicos de ABJAZIA y OSETIA del Sur, con el apoyo de RUSIA.

Asimismo, la actitud de RUSIA hacia los conflictos interétnicos que tienen lugar en el CAUCASO ex-soviético ha cambiado sustancialmente tras el estallido de la crisis chechena en diciembre de 1994. En la actualidad el KREMLIN trata de conseguir la estabilización de estas regiones conflictivas imponiendo el respeto hacia las actuales fronteras, para evitar el surgimiento de nuevos conflictos que pongan en peligro su influencia sobre la zona, desarrollada en base a la firma de Acuerdos bilaterales de cooperación con cada una de las Repúblicas, como ha hecho con GEORGIA.

Sin embargo, no cabe duda de que el desarrollo de vínculos tan estrechos con RUSIA supone un "arma de doble filo" para GEORGIA que tan pronto puede actuar como un elemento decisivo en la recuperación de su integridad territorial y estabilidad interna, como pueden ser utilizados por RUSIA para controlar la situación en caso de que se produzca un resurgimiento de los sentimientos nacionalistas georgianos que afectasen a sus intereses estratégicos en la zona.

3. VALORACION Y CONCLUSIONES

Según declaraciones públicas del Presidente georgiano, E. SHEVARDNAZDE, el Acuerdo firmado entre los Ministros de Defensa de GEORGIA y de RUSIA supone la clave para la recuperación de los territorios perdidos y el restablecimiento de la integridad

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territorial de la República. Tras el "parón" sufrido en las negociaciones pacíficas para la búsqueda de una solución definitiva al conflicto de ABJAZIA, el estrechamiento de las relaciones bilaterales con RUSIA en todos los ámbitos supone la única posibilidad real de GEORGIA para tratar de recuperar su anhelada soberanía nacional.

De acuerdo con estas previsiones la intransigente postura de las autoridades abjazas deberá cambiar a corto plazo, ya que no podrán contar con el apoyo político ni militar de RUSIA, que incluso podría llegar a retirar unilateralmente el contingente de pacificación desplegado en la zona, con lo que se podría producir un resurgimiento de los enfrentamientos armados con el Ejército georgiano, para lo cual no se encuentran preparados en estos momentos.

Sin embargo, las autoridades abjazas podrían tratar de utilizar en beneficio propio a las fuerzas políticas rusas y georgianas que se han manifestado en contra de la firma del Acuerdo por entender que afecta a los intereses nacionales respectivos, las cuales, a su vez, podrían hacer del conflicto de ABJAZIA un tema recurrente de cara a las elecciones legislativas que tendrán lugar tanto en RUSIA como en GEORGIA después del próximo verano.

Teniendo en cuenta este último factor es probable que el Gobierno ruso utilice todos los medios a su alcance para desbloquear las actuales negociaciones políticas y alcanzar una solución definitiva a este contencioso en los próximos meses.


En definitiva, una vez que el actual liderazgo ruso ha conseguido establecer las bases de sus futuras relaciones bilaterales con GEORGIA que permiten una amplia defensa de sus intereses estratégicos en esa zona, todo indica que desde su punto de vista parece haber llegado el momento de pacificar los conflictos interétnicos que tienen lugar en GEORGIA para dar paso a una etapa de estabilidad que permita la consolidación de las relaciones y el desarrollo político y económico de esta República y evite la posible instrumentalización política de esta situación por parte de la oposición nacional conservadora rusa.

Fecha de redacción: 18.04.95

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BASES MILITARES RUSAS EN EL TRANSCAUCASO



BASES RUSAS

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NOTA INFORMATIVA

ASUNTO: CEI: RECRUDECIMIENTO DEL CONFLICTO DE TADYIKISTAN.

0. INTRODUCCION

El pasado día 8 de abril se recrudecieron los combates en la frontera tadyiko-afgana, entre las fuerzas de pacificación de la CEI, partidarias del actual gobierno de DUSHANBE y las fuerzas de oposición que se encuentran en territorio afgano.

Esta intensificación de los combates venía anunciándose desde que el pasado 20 de marzo las tropas de fronteras rusas dieron muerte a un grupo de 35 rebeldes que intentaban pasar a TADYIKISTAN. Ya en esa fecha, el Coronel General NIKOLAYEV, Jefe del Servicio de Tropas de Frontera de la FEDERACION RUSA, advirtió sobre el peligro de una ofensiva de primavera por parte de la oposición.

Con estos nuevos ataques se rompe definitivamente el alto el fuego conseguido bajo los auspicios de la ONU el 17 de septiembre de 1994 y que fue extendido por ambas partes hasta el 26 de abril. Esto supone la imposibilidad de llevar a cabo la cuarta ronda de negociaciones entre el Gobierno y la oposición tadyikas que debería celebrarse en MOSCU a mediados de abril.

1. ULTIMOS ACONTECIMIENTOS

La respuesta de las tropas de pacificación de la CEI formadas por tropas rusas, la 201 División de Infantería Mecanizada, más las unidades de KIRGUIZTAN, UZBEKISTAN y KAZAJSTAN, no se ha hecho esperar produciéndose una serie de enfrentamientos que han dado lugar a un elevado número de víctimas. Entre los choques más importantes hay que destacar el ataque de helicópteros rusos el pasado 11 de abril que obligó a un contingente de la oposición tadyika a replegarse al otro lado de la frontera.

Más importante aún es el hecho del bombardeo ruso el día 11 sobre posiciones de los rebeldes tadyikos en territorio afgano, aspecto que fue negado por las autoridades militares rusas, pero que según distintas fuentes ha causado numerosas víctimas mortales.

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El recrudecimiento de los combates coincide con el estancamiento sufrido por el proceso pacificador que hasta ahora había dado lugar a tres rondas negociadoras, desde el pasado mes de junio, celebradas en MOSCU, TEHERAN e ISLAMABAD respectivamente. A pesar de los escasos resultados concretos, estos encuentros habían permitido abrir la primera vía de negociación directa entre los dos bandos tadyikos desde que se iniciara el conflicto en 1992.

La Cuarta Ronda debería haberse celebrado en MOSCU y se ha estado posponiendo desde finales del año pasado, a ello ha contribuido principalmente la actitud del líder tadyiko, E. RAJMANOV, quien ha venido violando sistemáticamente las exigencias de la oposición en lo relativo a la solución política del conflicto.

En este sentido, ni en las elecciones presidenciales y el referéndum constitucional celebrado el 6 de noviembre del pasado año, ni en los comicios legislativos del 26 de febrero, se ha permitido la participación de la oposición en lo que debería haber sido el comienzo de la reconciliación nacional.

RAJMANOV que se convirtió en Presidente del país en los comicios mencionados no permitió, tal y como se aprobó en TEHERAN, la vuelta de los más de 800.000 refugiados que fueron privados de su derecho al voto. Esta situación se repitió en las elecciones legislativas con el agravante de la prohibición de todos los partidos de oposición y las numerosas ilegalidades detectadas durante los comicios que llevaron a los observadores internacionales a declararlas nulas.

2. CONCLUSIONES

La situación en estos momentos se ha modificado sustancialmente con respecto a junio de 1994, fecha en la que RAJMANOV, líder de la coalición comunista gubernamental apoyada por MOSCU, no lograba hacerse con el control del país. En este momento ante la imposibilidad de una victoria clara por parte de este sector, el KREMLIN decidió apoyar la solución negociada para evitar la ruptura definitiva del país.

Desde esa fecha, RAJMANOV ha consolidado su poder en dos planos, el primero dentro de la Coalición gubernamental, al dar ventaja a su clan, el de KULIAB, frente a los de JOJAND y LELINABAD. El segundo ha sido en el plano del conflicto donde ha conseguido estabilizar la situación en el frente, gracias al apoyo de las tropas rusas, evitando ofensivas importantes por parte de la oposición.

La reciente recuperación del poder combativo de la oposición vuelve a situar a MOSCU, sin duda la clave para la solución del conflicto, ante el dilema de mantener la vía armada como fórmula

idónea para pacificar el conflicto o apoyar claramente la negociación. Esta segunda alternativa es defendida por los Organismos Internacionales, en concreto la ONU y por los otros países que participan en las tropas de pacificación, en concreto KIRGUIZTAN Y KAZAJSTAN, particularmente afectados por las últimas ofensivas.

Sin embargo la vía de la negociación no acaba de convencer a los líderes rusos que parecen considerar que hasta ahora, en las tres rondas celebradas, han tenido un excesivo protagonismo terceros actores como IRAN, en el caso de la ronda celebrada en TEHERAN, y sobre todo la ONU, artífice del alto el fuego.

Como ya viene siendo tradicional en la postura rusa hacia los diferentes conflictos que tienen lugar en el territorio de la CEI, el KREMLIN no admite interferencias y considera que las decisiones deben ser adoptadas atendiendo a sus intereses al considerar estos países como zonas de influencia de RUSIA. En el caso de TADYIKISTAN esta actitud se agudiza si tenemos en cuenta que el liderazgo ruso defiende la idea de que la frontera de este país con AFGANISTAN es la frontera sur de RUSIA encargada de evitar la penetración a través de los países centroasiáticos del integrismo islámico en EUROPA.

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NOTA INFORMATIVA

ASUNTO: LITUANIA: ELECCIONES MUNICIPALES. RESULTADOS Y PERSPECTIVAS.

0. INTRODUCCION

Las elecciones municipales celebradas en LITUANIA el 25 del pasado mes de marzo dieron la victoria a las fuerzas políticas de la derecha -Partido Conservador (PC)- ante un partido gobernante -Partido Democrático del Trabajo (PDT)- muy desgastado por el ejercicio del poder.

En estas elecciones, las primeras celebradas por el sistema proporcional después de la independencia del país, se elegían las autoridades de las diversas divisiones administrativas locales, que comprenden 12 ciudades y 44 distritos. La participación fue escasa, no alcanzando el 43% del total del censo electoral, es decir, unos 1.760.000 votantes.

1. LA CONSULTA ELECTORAL

La Comisión Electoral, presidida por ZENONAS VAIGAUSKAS, cerró la admisión de inscripciones el día 18 de marzo, presentándose un total de 7.327 candidatos de 17 partidos políticos para disputarse los 1.488 puestos en ciudades y distritos.

Las agrupaciones que cuentan con un mayor apoyo popular son el PDT, partido gobernante presidido por el Jefe del Estado, ALGIRDAS BRAZAUSKAS, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), el Partido Conservador (PC), ganador de los comicios, la Unión de Centro (UC), el Partido Socialdemócrata (PSD), la Unión Liberal (UL) y la Unión Nacional (UN).

Estas elecciones se presentaban como un pulso entre las fuerzas de izquierda, dirigidas por el PDT, y las de la derecha, encabezadas por el PC y el PDL, partido este último que superó en las expectativas de voto al PDT en los días anteriores a los comicios.

Previamente, la Iglesia Católica solicitó, a través de la Conferencia Episcopal Lituana, la participación popular y el apoyo a las fuerzas de derecha y centro. Los medios de comunicación católicos rechazaron la política del Gobierno, según ellos, contraria a los principios religiosos, temeroso de que la Iglesia tome mayor protagonismo en la escena política del país, hecho que parece estar produciéndose.

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Los diferentes partidos políticos que concurrieron a estas elecciones figuran relacionados en el ANEXO I.

Los resultados en las principales ciudades son los mostrados en el ANEXO II. En él se observa cómo la formación conservadora ha obtenido una amplia mayoría en las localidades más importantes del país.

Los protagonistas de la contienda electoral resultaron ser los líderes políticos, en detrimento de las formaciones, quienes han destacado por encima de los propios partidos y sus programas, por lo que el carisma personal y el desgaste del ejercicio del poder han sido las claves de los resultados obtenidos.

El Partido Conservador fue fundado el 1 de mayo de 1989. Es un partido que busca la unidad de todas las fuerzas de derecha, incluyendo las opciones nacionalistas. Cuenta con 18.000 afiliados y en el Parlamento lituano tienen una representación de 18 diputados. Apoya la transformación democrática del país y el establecimiento de un sistema de libre mercado. Su líder es VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS.

Las raíces del Partido Democrático del Trabajo se encuentran en el Partido Comunista de la era soviética, desaparecido en 1989 y reorganizado a partir de 1990 con la denominación actual; es de orientación socialdemócrata. De los 139 escaños parlamentarios, 70 corresponden al PDT, que cuenta con 10.00 miembros, aproximadamente.

LA MINORIA POLACA

El Partido Acción Electoral Polaca en LITUANIA (AEPL) encontró una fuerte oposición en la campaña por parte del Departamento de Justicia, dirigido por el Ministro JONAS PRAPIESTIS, quien llegó a rechazar el programa del AEPL ante una supuesta inconstitucionalidad denunciada en el Parlamento.

A este hecho hay que unir que la fundación de AEPL el 28 de agosto del pasado año, no ha puesto fin al desacuerdo existente en el seno de la organización que aglutina y representa los intereses de la minoría polaca en el país, denominada Unión de los Polacos de LITUANIA (UPL). En especial, para la minoría polaca no resulta nada beneficiosa la antigua enemistad existente entre el Presidente de UPL y diputado del Parlamento lituano, RYSZARD MACEIKIANEC, y el Presidente de AEPL, JAN SIENKIEWICZ.

Los problemas entre ambos surgieron cuando MACEIKIANEC criticó el nombramiento de SIENKIEWICZ como líder del partido, ya que, en realidad, perseguía que la presidencia recayera en TOMASZEVSKI, persona de su total confianza.

SIENKIEWICZ mantiene estrechos vínculos con el Embajador polaco en LITUANIA, WIDACKI, y con el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores a través de él.

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Parece que MACEIKIANEC intenta controlar el apoyo financiero proveniente de POLONIA con destino la minoría polaca en el país, el cual fluye normalmente a través de UPL. SIENKIEWICZ, por su parte, intenta alejar a los partidarios de MACEIKIANEC de los centros de decisión de AEPL.

MACEIKIANEC es de orientación claramente nacionalista y aliado del Partido Campesino Polaco (PSL), coaligado actualmente con la Alianza de Izquierdas Democrática (SLD) en el Gobierno de POLONIA, y del partido también polaco Unión Cristiana Nacional (ZChN).

La integración de la minoría polaca en LITUANIA, 260.000 personas, aproximadamente, lo que supone un 7% de la población total del país, es un aspecto importante de la política interior lituana, ya que es un proceso dificultado por el carácter acusadamente nacionalista de los polacos, de los que temen los lituanos una reclamación territorial en el sureste del país.

Para LITUANIA, el Estado polaco proporciona un gran apoyo financiero a la UPL de MACEIKIANEC, que cuenta también con el respaldo de la Iglesia Católica; asimismo, SIENKIEWICZ es observado con recelo ante su manifiesta intención de fusionar AEPL con organizaciones de la minoría rusa en el país para constituir un grupo de presión que defienda los intereses de estas minorías.

2. VALORACION

Las elecciones han estado caracterizadas por una escasa participación electoral, lo cual no es sino reflejo de una cierta inmadurez del sistema democrático y de un escaso compromiso político de los ciudadanos, de los que solamente un 1% están afiliados a un partido político.

La adopción del sistema proporcional debiera facilitar, de forma progresiva, el asentamiento de la cultura democrática y el afianzamiento de los partidos en el juego político lituano caracterizado, como en el resto de los Países Bálticos, por una excesiva fragmentación del espectro político, lo que genera Gobiernos de coalición débiles que difícilmente pueden llevar a buen puerto sus proyectos.

La diferente presencia de las dos formaciones más importantes en la vida pública de LITUANIA en los distintos niveles de la acción política es significativa: los partidos de centro derecha representan el 26% del Parlamento actual y el 24% a nivel local, mientras que la cuota del partido gobernante (PDT) es del 32% en el Parlamento y de un 9%, aproximadamente, en los órganos de administración local.

Las rivalidades entre las organizaciones polacas no han frustrado las esperanzas que esta minoría depositó en sus formaciones políticas, a la vista de los resultados electorales

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en las ciudades con mayor presencia polaca (VILNIUS y SALCININKAI).

A pesar de que ninguna fuerza política obtuvo la mayoría absoluta, la derecha se ha asegurado un claro dominio en las principales ciudades: VILNIUS, la capital, KAUNAS y KLAIPEDA. No obstante, parece que el Gobierno local está fuertemente mediatizado por una financiación dependiente del presupuesto estatal, por lo que el partido gobernante no encontrará ninguna resistencia sólida en el acontecer político interno.

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ANEXO I

PARTIDOS POLITICOS CONCURRENTES A LAS ELECCIONES MUNICIPALES

1. Partido Democrático del Trabajo (PDT)
2. Partido Demócrata Lituano (PDL)
3. Unión Nacional (UN)
4. Partido Verde (PV)
5. Partido Socialdemócrata (PSD)
6. Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)
7. Partido de la Independencia Lituana (PIL)
8. Liga para la Libertad de LITUANIA (LLL)
9. Partido Republicano (PR)
10. Unión de Prisioneros y Exiliados Políticos (UPEP)
11. Partido Conservador (PC)
12. Unión de Centro (UC)
13. Partido Progresista Nacional (PPN)
14. Partido Nacional de la Joven LITUANIA (PNJL)
15. Unión Liberal (UL)
16. Partido de los Agricultores Lituanos (PAL)
17. Partido de la Acción Electoral Polaca en LITUANIA (AEPL)
18. Partido Humanista (PH)
19. Partido Renacimiento Lituano (PRL)

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ANEXO II

ELECCIONES MUNICIPALES EN LITUANIA
RESULTADO EN LAS PRINCIPALES CIUDADES

	VILNIUS	KAUNAS	KLAIPEDA	SIAULIAI	PANEVEZYS
PC	19	20 (1)	10 (2)	14	14
PDT	8	4	5	5	4
AEPL	11		4		
UC	4	2	5 (3)	7 (5)	4
PDC	4	4	4	3	3
PSD	3				2
PRL	2				
LLL		6			
PNJL		5	2		2
UL		2			4
PDL				2 (6)	
UPEP			1 (4)		2 (7)
TOTAL	51	43	31	31	35

(1) En alianza con UPEP.
(2) En alianza con PDL y PIL.
(3) En alianza con PSD y UL.
(4) En alianza con UN.
(5) En alianza con UL y PSD.
(6) En alianza con PIL y UPEP.

ELECCIONES MUNICIPALES EN LITUANIA (25 DE MARZO DE 1995)	
DISTRIBUCION DE LOS VOTOS	
PC	29,0%
PDT	20,0%
PDC	17,0%
PAL	7,0%
UC	5,5%
PSD	5,0%
RESTO	16,5%

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ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ԱՐՏԱՔԻՆ ԳՈՐԾԵՐԻ
ՆԱԽԱՐԱՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

MEMORANDUM : L'ARMENIE et LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Il est aujourd'hui difficile de déterminer quels critères précis fondent l'appartenance d'un pays à l'Europe; il est cependant admis que la prise en compte d'un ensemble d'éléments, tout ou en partie, tels les critères géographique, culturel et historique ainsi que les valeurs politiques et morales qui ont façonné l'Europe, suffise à satisfaire une telle définition.

1) L'APPARTENANCE DE L'ARMENIE A L'EUROPE

1) Comme l'affirme le rapport d'information du Conseil de l'Europe daté du 16 juin 1992, l'Europe n'a pas, à ce jour, de frontière orientale formellement fixée en droit international.
Sur le plan géographique, la délimitation d'une frontière orientale de l'Europe pose problème dans la mesure ou l'opinion des géographes, en la matière, est extrêmement partagée.
Ainsi, si l'Encyclopaedia Britannica (édition 1984), en définissant les limites orientales de l'Europe, assigne le Caucase à l'Asie, J. Delvert dans l'Encyclopaedia Universalis, variante francophone de l'Encyclopaedia Britannica, énonce un jugement beaucoup plus nuancée: "L'Asie n'a pas de vraie limite à l'ouest : l'Europe n'est qu'une péninsule asiatique; la ligne Oural-Caspienne n'a pas de signification géographique; l'attribution du Caucase à l'Europe ou à l'Asie est incertaine".
Une même opinion est exprimée dans la Grande Encyclopédie Larousse.
C'est dire si la question demeure ouverte.
Il apparaît donc que toute délimitation précise de la frontière orientale de l'Europe reste sujette à des incertitudes.
Dès lors, l'affectation de l'Arménie qui fait partie du Caucase à une zone géographique qui l'excluerait de l'Europe ne peut être clairement établie.

Plutôt que de vouloir asseoir un jugement sur des données géographiques discutées, il serait préférable, pour l'Arménie, de faire prévaloir les critères culturel et historique.

L'approche consistant à privilégier l'appartenance à l'Europe sur la base de critères culturel et historique a déjà été retenue dans le cas de Chypre, située géographiquement en Asie.

2) L'existence d'un fonds culturel commun à l'Europe et à l'Arménie se fonde sur le fait qu'aux différentes étapes de son histoire, l'Arménie a toujours adhéré aux valeurs morales et intellectuelles qui ont forgé l'identité européenne.

Par ses choix, par l'orientation de ses échanges, l'Arménie a une histoire dont les rythmes et les grandes périodes coïncident avec ceux de l'Europe dans son ensemble ou de l'Europe orientale en particulier: choix de l'hellenisme dans la période postalexandrine, du christianisme à l'époque constantinienne, des liens avec la latinité à l'époque des croisades, de la redécouverte culturelle de son patrimoine au XVIIIe siècle, du réveil national et démocratique au XIXe siècle, des souffrances de la guerre de 14-18 (portées, pour les Arméniens à l'extrême du génocide), du rejet du totalitarisme à la fin du XXe siècle.
(A propos de l'identité européenne de l'Arménie - Voir Annexe 1)

2) L'ARMENIE ET LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

a) Une adhésion aux valeurs

La démocratie est une réalité profondément ancrée dans la société arménienne. Après avoir vécu 70 ans de dictature communiste, l'Arménie voit se développer, à partir de 1988, un mouvement démocratique qui sera l'un des artisans de la contestation de l'ordre totalitaire.
Ce mouvement qui apparaît dans un contexte de crise aigue du système soviétique, revêt un caractère massif, novateur et responsable.

- Massif car ce fut un mouvement de la société toute entière; chacun se souviendra des manifestations imposantes (1 million de personnes) qui se sont déroulées en Arménie à une époque ou l'Etat soviétique disposait encore de sa capacité d'utiliser tout son arsenal répressif. Cette politique représsive sera, de fait, mise en oeuvre puisque, immédiatement après le terrible séisme qui endeuille l'Arménie en décembre 1988, le pouvoir central instaure en Arménie l'Etat de siège pendant une période de six mois; les leaders de l'opposition démocratique, dirigeants actuels de l'Arménie, furent emprisonnés durant six mois, figurant ainsi dans la liste des rares prisonniers politiques de l'ère gorbatchévienne.

- Novateur car le mouvement démocratique sut conjuguer les revendications à caractère national (soutien aux demandes du Haut-Karabagh, culturel...), politique (exigence de libertés et de démocratie) et écologique (fermeture d'usines polluantes...). Il est, du reste, indispensable de préciser que le soutien aux demandes du Haut-Karabagh fut avant tout l'expression d'une exigence de justice à l'égard de la décision

arbitraire de Staline d'attribuer la région du Haut-Karabagh peuplée à 90% d'Arméniens à l'Azerbaidjan.
Les Arméniens avaient placé leurs espoirs dans la perestroika de M. Gorbatchev pour réparer cette injustice, pensant que la volonté de la majorité de la population du Haut-Karabagh de bâtir un avenir commun avec l'Arménie serait enfin prise en compte.
Depuis, le Haut-Karabagh a , sans doute par réalisme politique, changé la nature de sa revendication puisque, à l'issue d'un référendum organisée en décembre 1991, il a proclamé son indépendance.
(A propos du conflit du Haut-Karabagh - Voir Annexe 2)

- Responsable car le mouvement démocratique en Arménie, écartant les solutions extrêmes d'affrontement avec le pouvoir central, a su emprunté une voie graduelle et légale de passage à l'indépendance et à la démocratie.
C'est ainsi qu'en mai 1990, alors que le régime communiste existe toujours, l'Arménie se dote d'un Parlement ou l'opposition démocratique devient majoritaire; en août 1990, l'Arménie est l'une des toutes premières républiques de l'Union soviétique qui voit le Parti communiste perdre le pouvoir.
Le nouveau Parlement adopte alors un programme qui prévoit la création d'un Etat démocratique indépendant et la libéralisation du système politique et économique.
Différents accords internationaux portant sur les Droits de l'homme sont signés et le Parlement adopte une loi sur le multipartisme ainsi qu'une réforme des anciens Soviets basée sur la séparation des pouvoirs.
En mars 1991, le Parlement arménien rejette le référendum de M. Gorbatchev sur la préservation de l'U.R.S.S. . A l'issue d'un référendum organisé dans les normes démocratiques et conformément à la Constitution et aux lois soviétiques alors en vigueur, l'Arménie proclame son indépendance le 21 septembre 1991.

Comme on peut le constater, le mot démocratie en Arménie ne se réduit pas à un slogan; contrairement à d'autres républiques de l'ex-Union soviétique, l'Arménie ne s'est pas convertie du jour au lendemain à la démocratie par le simple fait d'une mutation des dirigeants communistes en démocrates sincères.
Ce n'est sans doute pas un hasard si l'Arménie reste, avec l'Estonie, les deux seuls pays de l'ancienne Union soviétique à avoir à la tête de l'Etat un Président n'ayant jamais appartenu au Parti communiste.

A propos de la situation politique actuelle, il importe d'insister sur le fait qu'en dépit de la situation de crise économique d'une extrême gravité, l'Arménie connaît une stabilité politique interne. Depuis l'accession à son indépendance, les institutions étatiques fonctionnent normalement.
La vie démocratique a pu être préservée.
Les libertés d'opinion et de presse ainsi que les droits de l'homme y sont garanties; ainsi, pouvons nous noter l'existence de publications, journaux ou autres revues, indépendantes ou appartenant à des partis politiques. Trente partis politiques peuvent exercer librement leurs activités en Arménie, et onze d'entre eux sont représentés au Parlement.

Un débat sur la nouvelle constitution est actuellement en cours au sein du Parlement; différents projets ont été élaborés avec le concours d'experts internationaux en droit constitutionnel, notamment américains, français et russes; l'adoption d'une constitution, par voie référendaire, en 1994 devrait contribuer à asseoir durablement la stabilité politique dans le pays; de même, la mise en chantier d'une reforme du système judiciaire, ayant déjà introduit une séparation des pouvoirs ainsi que le droit de recours, devrait permettre de faire avancer l'Arménie dans la voie de l'instauration d'un Etat de droit.

Au plan économique, le blocus énergétique et économique perpétré par l'Azerbaidjan engendre souffrances et privations pour les populations civiles; il a aussi pour conséquence d'entraîner une asphyxie de l'économie du pays.

Malgré ces difficultés économiques, l'Arménie poursuit sa politique de réformes économiques qui s'inscrit dans le cadre de la transition vers une économie de marché. Une réforme agraire a été mise en oeuvre et a abouti à une privatisation des terres. Le fonds de logement a été privatisé ainsi que le petit commerce; des actes législatifs ont été préparés pour une large privatisation de l'industrie. des projets prévoyant la privatisation du secteur financier et bancaire devraient être adoptés en 1994.

Deux ans et demi après la proclamation de son indépendance, l'Arménie s'est donc engagée à promouvoir une société démocratique, moderne, ouverte sur le monde et fondée sur la libre entreprise; les bases d'une telle société ont été posées et tout indique que ce processus de réformes se poursuivra.
En ce sens, l'Arménie remplit les conditions exigées par le Conseil de l'Europe qui lui permettraient de devenir membre de cette organisation.

2) Une volonté politique clairement exprimée de devenir membre du Conseil de l'Europe.

Dès son accession à l'indépendance, l'Arménie a exprimé sa volonté d'intégration dans la nouvelle architecture européenne.
Le Président de la République d'Arménie, Monsieur L. TER PETROSSIAN, dans une lettre adressée au mois d'octobre 1991 au Secrétaire général du Conseil de l'Europe, Madame C. LALUMIERE, affirmait le choix de l'Arménie en faveur d'un engagement européen et faisait part de son souhait de voir l'Arménie devenir membre du Conseil de l'Europe.

Après avoir été admis à la C.S.C.E. en janvier 1992, cet engagement s'est également concrétisé par l'établissement de relations diplomatiques, en juin 1992, avec la Communauté européenne; l'Arménie a pu ainsi bénéficier d'un programme d'assistance technique destiné aux républiques de l'ex-Union soviétique; cette coopération pourrait déboucher à terme sur la conclusion d'un Accord de partenariat entre l'Arménie et l'Union européenne.

Les relations avec le Conseil de l'Europe se sont développées à un rythme plus lent, sans commune mesure avec ce que l'Arménie était en droit d'attendre d'une institution qui s'était donnée pour objectif d'aider les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale à réussir le processus de transformation politique, économique et sociale.
Au plan parlementaire, la demande du statut d'invité spécial déposée par l'Arménie n'a toujours pas été examinée.

Les démarches entreprises par l'Arménie mériteraient d'être examinées par le Conseil de l'Europe à la lumière des évolutions internes qui se produisent dans ce pays.

La politique courageuse de réformes mise en oeuvre par le gouvernement arménien risque de ne pas aboutir si l'Europe ne lui apporte pas, dès aujourd'hui, une assistance technique et économique.
Le Conseil de l'Europe devrait se mettre à l'écoute des aspirations des peuples ayant acquis nouvellement leur indépendance et répondre aux espoirs que l'Arménie place dans cette institution prestigieuse.

En réaffirmant, dans une lettre récente adressée à Madame C. LALUMIERE, la volonté de l'Arménie de " tisser des liens étroits avec le Conseil de l'Europe et de rejoindre, à terme, la famille européenne réunie, par sa communauté de valeurs et de culture, au sein de votre institution", le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République d'Arménie, Monsieur V. PAPAZIAN, exprimait un sentiment partagé par tous les Arméniens. Il importe que cette attente ne soit pas déçue.

ANNEXE 1

A PROPOS DE L'IDENTITE EUROPEENNE DE L'ARMENIE

1) En effectuant, au IIIè siècle avant J.C, le choix de l'hellenisme, l'Arménie devient une zone de rayonnement et de propagation de la culture hellenique.
Ainsi, découvrira-t-on au début de ce siècle des inscriptions grecques du IIIè siècle avant J.C. contenant des vers d'Euripide et d'Hésiode dans la ville royale arménienne d'Armavir (près de l'actuelle capitale religieuse de l'Arménie, Etchmiadzine). Au Ier siècle, le roi Tigrane le Grand fera écrire en grec l'histoire de son règne; et les Arméniens représenteront leurs divinités par des statues de style grec.

Au début du IVè siècle, la conversion de l'Arménie au christianisme (traduction de la Bible dans leur langue le siècle suivant), presque en même temps que les empereurs romains, constitue un tournant dans son histoire.

La culture arménienne va alors s'ouvrir aux courants de la pensée européenne et s'imprégner de son influence.

- Ceci va, tout d'abord, se manifester, au cours des siècles, par une activité intense de traductions d'oeuvres occidentales.

Ainsi, du Ve au VIIe siècle, les Arméniens traduisent la patristique grecque ou judéo-hellénistique, puis la grammaire, la rhétorique, la philosophie et la science grecques. Ces traductions ont préservé, pour la culture mondiale, des oeuvres aussi importantes que *Les Questions sur la Genèse* de Philon, le savant juif d'Alexandrie, *La Démonstration* de saint Irénée de Lyon, premier évêque des Gaules, et la *Chronique universelle* d'Eusèbe de Césarée.
Sans l'intérêt des Arméniens pour la littérature européenne, ces chefs-d'oeuvre, dont le texte original n'existe plus, auraient totalement disparu.

Cette action de publications d'oeuvres occidentales en arménien se poursuivra au cours des temps; les grands écrivains européens du XIXe siecle verront leurs oeuvres paraître en arménien.

- Cela se traduira également par l'intégration de valeurs morales et intellectuelles européennes dans la culture arménienne.

Ainsi, après les Croisades , au XIVe siècle, sous l'impulsion des Frères Uniteurs Dominicains, les Arméniens étudient activement dans leur propre langue les oeuvres

de Thomas d'Aquin, de Bonaventure, de l'Ecole théologique de Chartres et d'un grand nombre de scolastiques européens. Cette étude provoque un changement radical des méthodes de raisonnement, de recherche et d'enseignement universitaire.

- Cette relation culturelle va, enfin, se trouver renforcée par l'implantation d'institutions culturelles arméniennes en Europe.
C'est ainsi que le moine arménien Mékhithar de Sébaste installe, en 1717, à San Lazzaro de Venise, une académie et une imprimerie arméniennes, aujourd'hui encore en activité. Ses disciples, qui créent d'autres centres de culture à Trieste puis à Vienne, en Autriche, publient toute la littérature arménienne ancienne et traduisent systématiquement, à l'usage de leurs élèves, la littérature classique grecque et latine, ainsi que la littérature française, qui constitue l'une des références de l'Europe cultivée du XVIIIe siècle.

L'ensemble de ces données nous permet de comprendre comment l'identité européenne de l'Arménie s'est forgée, mais aussi d'appréhender l'importance et la richesse de l'apport culturel arménien à la civilisation européenne.

C'est dans le domaine de l'art religieux que la contribution arménienne se fit la plus remarquable. La conversion de l'Arménie au christianisme eut pour effet la création d'une nouvelle architecture religieuse dont les chefs-d'oeuvre rayonnèrent à travers le monde et marquèrent de leur empreinte l'architecture religieuse d'Occident et notamment les arts roman et gothique.

Dans le domaine de l'art de la miniature, les Arméniens léguèrent également au patrimoine européen une production d'un extrême raffinement; c'est dans l'Arménie cilicienne, entre le XIe et le XIVe siècle, que fut atteinte la plus haute perfection de style de l'enluminure, grâce notamment au peintre Thoros Roslin.

La littérature constitue enfin un autre domaine de création dans lequel l'apport arménien revêt une grande valeur; le grand linguiste français A. Meillet note ainsi : "En des temps où la langue française ne se distinguait pas encore du latin et où les plus anciennes littératures de la majorité des peuples européens n'existaient pas, il y avait déjà une importante littérature arménienne". On insistera notamment sur la production littéraire arménienne du Moyen-âge; l'oeuvre poétique de Grégoire de Narek demeure, à cet égard, une référence pour la littérature mystique universelle.

2) Il est des périodes de l'histoire qui ont été marquées par l'instauration de liens politiques et économiques étroits entre l'Arménie et l'Europe.

Dès le premier siècle avant J.C., une relation politique forte s'établit entre Rome et l'Arménie. Pompée et Tigrane II scellent l'alliance entre les peuples arménien et romain lors de la signature du traité de 66 avant J.C.
Malgré les vicissitudes dues à l'affaiblissement de l'Empire à partir du IIIe siècle après J.C., cette alliance se maintient jusqu'à la fin du VIIe siècle, quand Byzance recule définitivement devant le Califat.

Recouvrant leur indépendance à la fin du IXe siècle, les Arméniens cherchent aussitôt l'alliance byzantine. Ils participent largement à la reconquête de la Cilicie, de la Syrie et de la Mésopotamie, voire à la défense des Balkans ou de l'Italie du Sud.

La création de l'Etat arménien de Cilicie (1073 à 1375), allié aux Etats latins fondés par les Croisés, symbolise une époque ou le destin de l'Arménie et de l'Europe se confonde. Les seigneurs arméniens passent des alliances matrimoniales avec la noblesse européenne; les rois d'Arménie, eux-mêmes, se lient aux princesses de Lusignan, d'Anjou et d'Aragon.
La Cilicie sera, ainsi, gouvernée, à la fin du XIVe siècle par les Lusignan, famille de l'aristocratie française qui régnait déjà sur le royaume de Chypre; le dernier roi de l'Arménie cilicienne, Léon VI de Lusignan, repose à la basilique royale de Saint-Denis, avec les rois de France.

Après la chute de l'Empire byzantin, les Arméniens continuent à jouer un rôle primordial dans les échanges commerciaux entre l'Europe et l'Extrême-Orient; grâce à l'esprit d'entreprise de leurs marchands qui fondent des établissements permanents dans les ports français, italiens et néerlandais, aux Indes, en Insulinde, ils fournissent une aide décisive aux Européens sur la route des Indes et de l'Extrême-Orient, contribuant ainsi au dévéloppement de la vie économique de ces pays.

A la fin du XVIIIe siècle et au XIXe Siècle, les idées d'émancipation des peuples et de réforme qui s'imposent progressivement en Europe vont exercer une influence dans le réveil de la conscience arménienne.

Le mouvement de renaissance de la nation arménienne du XIXe siècle, s'il s'explique essentiellement par des facteurs internes à la société arménienne, doit beaucoup aux liens multiples qui se sont tissés avec l'Europe.
Les centres de culture arménienne en Europe, et notamment, nous l'avons vu, les Mekhitaristes, l'élite intellectuelle arménienne formée en partie dans les universités allemandes, françaises, italiennes et suisses, et les missions religieuses, catholiques et protestantes, agissant dans l'Empire ottoman, ont été autant de vecteurs de propagation des idées de progrès dans la société arménienne.

Des progrès éducatifs très larges sont enregistrés, notamment par le fait que l'accès aux écoles arméniennes se trouve facilitée.

Durant la même période, l'intelligentsia arménienne s'ouvre aux courants philosophiques et esthétiques tels le Rationalisme, le Positivisme, le Romantisme, le Symbolisme.. .

Dès lors, il n'est pas étonnant de constater que les partis politiques arméniens (parti Hintchak -social-démocrate- en 1887, Parti Daschnak -socialiste révolutionaire- en 1890, parti Verakazmial -libéral- en 1896) se créent à la fin du XIXe siècle sur le modèle européen en reprenant la ligne de partage qui sépare le libéralisme du

socialisme. Si la question de l'émancipation du peuple arménien constitue le thème de réflexion principal, les intellectuels arméniens participent activement, en cette fin de siècle, aux débats qui agitent la société européenne (exemple: A la fin du XIXe siècle, la participation du parti Daschnak aux travaux des congrès de la deuxième Internationale)

La période contemporaine a vu la constitution d'une diaspora arménienne, issue du génocide de 1915; les pays européens, et notamment la France, la Grèce, l'Allemagne, la Belgique et l'Italie, ont constitué une terre d'accueil pour les rescapés de cette tragédie. Depuis leur installation dans ces pays dans les années 1920, les Arméniens, tout en ayant préservé leur spécificité culturelle, ont parfaitement réussi leur intégration au plan politique, économique, social ou culturel, dans la société de ces pays. La présence active de ces communautés diasporiques en Europe a renforcé l'identité européenne de l'Arménie et contribue à favoriser le développement des relations de ces pays avec l'Arménie dans les domaines politique, économique et culturel.

ANNEXE 2

A PROPOS DU CONFLIT DU HAUT-KARABAGH

L'Arménie estime que la question du Haut-Karabagh doit être résolue conformément aux principes de la C.S.C.E., et notamment ceux concernant le respect de l'intégrité territoriale des Etats, le règlement pacifique des différends et le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination.
L'Arménie n'a pas de revendications territoriales à l'égard de l'Azerbaidjan; pour elle, ce problème concerne au premier chef le peuple du Haut-Karabagh et son droit à l'autodétermination.

En tant que tierce partie intéressée, l'Arménie déploie tous ses efforts pour qu'un règlement politique négocié intervienne entre les deux parties au conflit: l'Azerbaidjan et le Haut-Karabagh.
Elle continue à soutenir le processus de paix de la C.S.C.E. et se déclare favorable à toute initiative qui prenne en compte la réalité du conflit et préconise l'ouverture de négociations directes entre l'Azerbaidjan et le Haut-Karabagh.
Elle a ainsi accepté le dernier plan de paix présenté par les neufs membres du groupe de Minsk qui prévoit la mise en oeuvre des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.
L'Arménie insiste cependant sur la nécessité de garanties internationales pour assurer un règlement durable de ce conflit.

L'Arménie a, de tout temps, fait preuve de retenue et éviter de répondre aux agressions armées que perpétue l'Azerbaidjan aux frontières de l'Arménie; et ce, précisément, dans le but inavoué, d'entraîner l'Arménie dans un conflit armé généralisé.
Cette attitude a été celle de toutes les autorités qui se sont succédées au pouvoir à Bakou; elle vise à démontrer que, pour les dirigeants d'Azerbaidjan, la question du Haut-Karabagh se réduit à un conflit entre l'Arménie et l'Azerbaidjan.
Cette volonté de négation du Haut-Karabagh explique l'intransigeance de l'Azerbaidjan dans les négociations de paix, son refus de dialogue avec les autorités du Haut-Karabagh et son recours permanent à la solution militaire pour régler le problème.

L'Arménie, quant à elle, ne pouvait rester indifférent au sort des Arméniens du Haut-Karabagh et se devait d'apporter au Karabagh une aide matérielle et humanitaire indispensable pour sa survie.

L'Arménie a accepté toutes les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies relatives au conflit du Haut-Karabagh et adopté une attitude constructive lors des négociations de paix tenues dans le cadre du groupe de Minsk de la C.S.C.E.;
elle a ainsi donné son accord au plan des neufs membres du groupe de Minsk de mise en application des résolutions des Nations Unies; elle est également intervenue auprès

des autorités du Haut-Karabagh pour que celles-ci acceptent le contenu de cette proposition prévoyant notamment un retrait des territoires azerbaidjanais récemment occupés par les forces du Haut-Karabagh, la reconnaissance du Haut-Karabagh en tant que partie au conflit, un calendrier aboutissant à la cessation des hostilités et l'ouverture de la Conférence de Minsk.

Les membres du groupe de Minsk, à l'exception notoire de l'Azerbaidjan , ont , finalement, partagé l'approche de l'Arménie qui a toujours consisté à donner la priorité à l'établissement d'un cessez-le-feu global. Ceux-ci ont dans un même temps admis que le règlement politique du problème, et notamment la détermination du statut futur du Haut-Karabagh, interviendrait dans le cadre de la Conférence de Minsk

Le refus de l'Azerbaidjan d'un plan ayant l'aval des institutions internationales a porté un coup très grave au processus de paix; l'Azerbaidjan en porte l'énorme responsabilité; ce rejet de même que son refus d'inscrire toute référence au conflit du Haut-Karabagh lors de la dernière réunion ministérielle de la C.S.C.E. à Rome, nous permettent de mieux comprendre l'escalade du conflit armé dans la région.

Cette attitude prouve une nouvelle fois que l'Azerbaidjan n'a pas renoncé à résoudre ce problème par la force. Cette politique belliciste comporte, de plus, des risques d'internationalisation du conflit.

En donnant une réponse positive à la proposition de la C.S.C.E. et en coopérant à toutes les initiatives de paix qui peuvent conduire à une solution politique de ce problème, l'Arménie et le Haut-Karabagh ont tout fait pour créer les conditions d'un retour à la paix dans la région.

Erevan, le 21 janvier 1994

POUR INFORMATION AUX MEMBRES DE L'ASSEMBLEE

Greffe de l'Assemblée

Carnet de Bord N°1995/61

31 mai 1995

La commission ad hoc pour les élections en Arménie, qui s'est tenue le 29 mai 1995 à Paris sous la Présidence de Mme Gelderblom-Lankhout,

- a élu par acclamation M. Solé-Tura (Espagne, SOC) et M. Columberg (Suisse, PPE) respectivement Président et Vice-Président de la Commission;

- a nommé Mme Gelderblom-Lankhout Rapporteuse pour les élections en Arménie;

- a pris connaissance d'un rapport d'informations sur l'Arménie préparé par Mme Gelderblom-Lankhout, en sa qualité de Rapporteuse de la Commission des Relations avec les pays européens non membres et concernant la demande de l'Arménie du statut d'invité spécial;

- a tenu un échange de vues sur certains aspects de la situation politique actuelle en Arménie et ayant un impact sur les élections prochaines;

- a examiné et amendé un avant-projet de programme pour la visite en Arménie;

- a décidé de tenir ses prochaines réunions comme suit:
. A Strasbourg, le mercredi 28 juin 1995 à 14H00 pendant la partie de session de l'Assemblée (à confirmer);
. A Erevan, du 1er au 8 juillet 1995.

Antonina Bakardjieva

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cc: Greffier de l'Assemblée
Greffier Adjoint
Directeurs
Directeur du Cabinet du Secrétaire Général
Secrétariat du Comité des Ministres
Mission d'Etudes et de Programmation
Bureaux de Paris et de Bruxelles
Tous les agents du greffe

Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée Parlementaire

Strasbourg, France

Fax n° (33) 88 41 27 02

F A X T E L E C O P I E

COMMISSION AD HOC SUR LES ÉLECTIONS EN ARMENIE

ARRIVEE à YEREVAN le ..... à ..... heures par le vol .....
DEPART de YEREVAN le ..... à ..... heures par le vol .....
Fait à ..... le ..... Signature:

Prière de retourner ce formulaire à:

Antonine BAKARDJIEVA, secrétaire de la Commission Ad hoc
Greffe de l'Assemblée
Assemblée Parlementaire
FAX: (33)88.41.27.02

23.5.95

Commission électorale centrale pour les élections des députés de l'Assemblée nationale de la République d'Arménie

REGLEMENT

relatif au statut des observateurs étrangers pendant les élections des députés à l'Assemblée nationale de la République d'Arménie qui auront lieu en 1995.

1. Procédure d'accréditation des observateurs étrangers

1.1 Les observateurs étrangers seront accrédités par la Commission électorale centrale pour la période du 1er juin 1995 au 1er juillet 1995.

1.2 La Commission électorale centrale prendra, pendant sa réunion, la décision d'accréditer ou non un observateur étranger; les organisations internationales, les organisations nationales gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales, ainsi que les personnes privées faisant autorité dans le domaine de la défense des droits de l'homme peuvent adresser des candidatures à la Commission électorale centrale en vue d'une accréditation.

1.3 La Commission électorale centrale remettra aux observateurs étrangers des attestations d'accréditation en arménien selon un format pré-établi.

1.4 La durée de l'accréditation des observateurs étrangers sera fixée par la Commission électorale centrale; elle figurera sur leur attestation.

2. Droits des observateurs étrangers

Chaque observateur étranger aura le droit :

2.1 d'être présent dans les bureaux de vote pendant le scrutin, de prendre des photographies, d'utiliser des caméras vidéo et des camescopes (à condition d'en informer le président de la commission électorale et de ne pas utiliser de source de lumière trop vive);

2.2 d'assister aux réunions des commissions électorales;

2.3 de consulter les listes électorales, d'examiner des échantillons des bulletins de vote, d'avoir accès aux documents relatifs à la période pré-électorale et aux documents financiers (concernant la campagne électorale) des organisations politiques, des groupements qu'elles ont formé ou des candidats à la députation, et de photocopier tous ces documents à ses frais;

2.4 de présenter des suggestions aux commissions électorales, d'exprimer ses opinions sur le déroulement du scrutin et ses résultats;

2.5 d'assister aux réunions publiques des organisations politiques, des groupements qu'elles ont formé et des candidats à la députation;

2.6 de tenir des conférences de presse et d'apparaître dans les média, à condition de ne pas contrevenir aux lois en vigueur dans la République d'Arménie;

2.7 de constituer des groupes de travail temporaires dans le but de suivre le déroulement du scrutin, sous réserve de se mettre d'accord avec la Commission électorale centrale.

3. Garanties concernant les activités des observateurs étrangers

3.1 Pendant toute la durée de leur séjour en République d'Arménie, les observateurs étrangers seront placés sous la protection de l'Etat.

3.2 Les dépenses et les frais entraînés par les activités des observateurs étrangers seront à la charge des organisations qui les auront envoyés ou des observateurs eux-mêmes.

3.3 Le Ministère arménien des Affaires étrangères et les commissions électorales concernées prêteront leur concours aux observateurs pendant le déroulement de la mission de ces derniers telle que décrite à l'article 2 du présent Règlement.

3.4 Conformément au présent Règlement, les observateurs étrangers suivront le déroulement du scrutin en toute autonomie et indépendance.

3.5 Il ne pourra pas être demandé des comptes aux observateurs étrangers pour avoir exprimé leur opinion, porté un jugement sur la campagne électorale et ses résultats et résumé ces derniers.

4. Responsabilités des observateurs étrangers

4.1 Les observateurs étrangers n'auront pas le droit de faire usage de leur statut dans des activités n'ayant aucun lien avec la campagne électorale.

4.2 Si un observateur étranger enfreint les lois de la République d'Arménie, des normes de droit international généralement reconnues ou le présent Règlement, la Commission électorale centrale sera en droit d'annuler son accréditation en lui retirant son attestation.

**1109 18MAY Arménie-politique ->Un membre de l'opposition mort des suites de **
**1109 18MAY Arménie-politique ->Un membre de l'opposition mort des suites de **

1109 18MAY Arménie-politique ->Un membre de l'opposition mort des suites de tortures, selon le parti Dachnak

EREVAN, 18 mai (AFP) - Un membre du parti d'opposition Dachnaktsoutioun (surnommé Dachnak - fédération révolutionnaire arménienne) est mort en prison des suites de tortures, a affirmé jeudi la direction du Dachnak devant le parlement arménien.

''C'est un assassinat politique'', a lancé Rubik Akopian, du comité central du Dachnak, avant de sortir de l'hémicycle suivi des 11 autres députés de sa fraction (sur 244).

Le président Levon Ter-Petrossian a pour sa part déclaré devant la chambre que, selon les conclusion préliminaires du parquet, l'opposant, Artavazd Manoukian, était mort mardi des suites d'inflammation hémorroïdale.

Manoukian, 40 ans, avait été arrêté en décembre dernier à Moscou à la demande de l'Arménie sur accusation de terrorisme et de trafic de drogue. 14 autres membres du Dachnak sont détenus à la prison du ministère de l'Intérieur à Erevan.

M. Ter-Petrossian a ajouté qu'une commission de médecins avait été mise en place pour enquêter sur la mort de l'opposant.

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**1109 18MAY Arménie-politique ->Un membre de l'opposition mort des suites de **
**1109 18MAY Arménie-politique ->Un membre de l'opposition mort des suites de **

Le Dachnaktsoutioun avait été suspendu le 29 décembre dernier par le président arménien, l'accusant d'être une ''organisation terroriste'' spécialisée ''dans le trafic de drogue, la fausse monnaie, le crime organisé, le racket et l'espionnage''.

''Le Dachnak est une organisation fasciste et terroriste qui assume la responsabilité de plusieurs assassinats politiques'', a déclaré M. Ter-Petrossian jeudi.

''Son but est le chaos. Nous ne permettrons pas que l'Arménie devienne un deuxième Liban'', a-t-il dit.

Fondé en 1890 en Géorgie, le Dachaktsoutioun, plus vieux parti arménien interdit à l'époque soviétique puis réhabilité en 1991, forme l'opposition avec l'Union nationale démocratique et l'Union nationale d'autodétermination.

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1259 12MAY Arménie-Politique ->Référendum sur le projet de constitution le 5

1259 12MAY Arménie-Politique ->Référendum sur le projet de constitution le 5 juillet

EREVAN, 12 mai (AFP) - Le Parlement arménien a approuvé vendredi, à la demande du président Levon Ter-Petrossian, la tenue d'un référendum le 5 juillet sur un projet de constitution, le même jour que les élections législatives.

L'Arménie vit pour l'instant toujours sous son ancienne constitution de république soviétique.

Le projet de constitution, mis au point au bout d'un an de travaux d'une commission parlementaire dirigée par le président, prévoit le droit de former associations et partis politiques à condition qu'ils ne présentent pas de menace pour la sécurité nationale.

Les activités d'un des principaux partis d'opposition, le Dachnaktsoutioun, sont suspendues depuis décembre dernier par le président Ter-Petrossian, qui accuse notamment le parti de crime commandité, trafic de drogue et de fausse monnaie.

La constitution prévoit également un mandat présidentiel de 5 ans renouvelable une fois, et un mandat de 4 ans pour les députés, au nombre de

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Le Parlement a repoussé la demande des députés de l'opposition, qui voulait présenter un projet de constitution alternatif aux électeurs.

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CAUC - CRACKDOWN IN YEREVAN F-522

Munich, January 25 - (NCA/TL) - Following commentary appeared in the European edition of the WALL STREET JOURNAL of January 24, 1995:

By Felix Corley

On Dec. 28—while the rest of the world was distracted by the Russian assault on Chechnya—Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrossian launched the biggest political crackdown in his country since Mikhail Gorbachev ordered the arrest of the 11 members of the Karabakh Committee (including Mr. Ter-Petrossian) in December 1988. With a single decree, the Armenian president "temporarily suspended" the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation—the Dashnak party—and closed a range of Dashnak-related independent newspapers, press agencies, women's organizations and even sports clubs.

In a televised address, Mr. Ter-Petrossian justified the crackdown with allegations that the ARF was engaged in drug-running and political assassination, and that it harbored within its ranks a 50-member terrorist organization named Dro, which he alleged had been answerable to the party's top leadership. Dro had, the president continued, also been spying on the country's armed forces and posed a threat to the security of the state.

In the wake of the crackdown, Armenian security forces were out in force on the streets of the capital, Yerevan, guarding key installations and patrolling the city center. Politicians and editors were detained and quizzed. At the same time, apparently without the proper legal authorization, government agents were seizing files, computer records and equipment (including fax machines) from a range of opposition and independent news outlets.

The ARF predictably rejected the president's allegations. There was outrage in many parts of the Armenian diaspora, where the ARF has powerful support. The U.S. embassy in Yerevan (one of the few foreign embassies on the spot in Armenia) and the State Department in Washington immediately communicated their concerns to the Armenian government, declaring that it was unacceptable to condemn a whole party on the basis of the alleged activity of some of its members. The U.S. embassy called for a free, fair and open trial of all those accused of any crime. It protested in particular at the closure of a number of newspapers and agencies and restrictions on a number of U.S.-Armenian joint business ventures.

How true are Mr. Ter-Petrossian's charges against the Dashnaks? Nothing is certain in the murky world of Armenian politics, but the accusation that some individuals may have participated in drug-running is possible (though they would be far from being the only Armenians mixed up in such an activity). With regard to accusations of maintaining a secret terrorist organization, the ARF does have a secretive, conspiratorial side to it in the diaspora, but it is most unlikely that it could have built up anything more than an embryonic secretive network within Armenia.

The most serious specific charges made by the president are that the ARF was involved in political assassinations, especially those of ex-KGB chief Marius Yuzbashyan in 1992 and former Karabakh Committee member (and mayor of Yerevan) Ambartsum Galstyan last month. It is hard to see why the ARF might be involved, especially in the case of Galstyan, who had parted company with Mr. Ter-Petrossian and joined the growing ranks of former associates who have become strong critics of his rule.

The real reason behind the crackdown appears to be Mr. Ter-Petrossian's growing nervousness about forthcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for May. With the popularity of his Armenian National Movement at an all-time low, the president fears the opposition. As he has thus far failed to push through constitutional changes that would make the presidency all-powerful, Mr. Ter-Petrossian has extra reason to fear a strengthened parliamentary opposition.

In addition, Mr. Ter-Petrossian has been waging a long-running campaign against the Dashnaks. In June 1992 he expelled the party leader, Hrair Marukhian, a diaspora Armenian, back to Greece. But the party most likely to be the largest in any new parliament is the Communist Party, currently standing at about 15% in the polls. The ARF closely trails the Communists.

The fragmentation of the electorate reflects the dismal state of Armenian politics. More than half the population are dissatisfied with the president, and nearly three-quarters are dissatisfied with his powerful interior minister, Maj. Gen. Vano Siradegyan. With living standards at a miserable level, popular anger has been directed at what is seen as abuse of power and corruption in the government, and the failure to improve standards of living. However, the Dashnaks within Armenia seem an unlikely bunch to govern the country, even if they are allowed to compete in the May elections.

Mr. Ter-Petrossian's assault on the opposition did not come out of the blue. It came at the end of a year that saw increasing harassment of opposition activists, political assassinations and government vendettas through the courts against those who had fallen out of favor. There were also mysterious attacks on media outlets, which included the beating up of journalists, denial of accreditation to journalists from opposition papers and several mysterious fires in newspaper offices. In December, the gov-

Much of the optimism of 1991—the first time Armenians had had their own state

records and equipment (including fax machines) from a range of opposition and independent news outlets.

The ARF predictably rejected the president's allegations. There was outrage in many parts of the Armenian diaspora, where ARF might be involved, especially in the case of Galstyan, who had parted company with Mr. Ter-Petrossian and joined the growing ranks of former associates who have become strong critics of his rule.

The real reason behind the crackdown [illegible] came at the end of a year that saw increasing harassment of opposition activists, political assassinations and government vendettas through the courts against those who had fallen out of favor. There were also mysterious attacks on media outlets, which included the beating up of journalists, denial of accreditation to journalists from opposition papers and several mysterious fires in newspaper offices. In December, the government—under various pretexts—suspended the transmission within Armenia of broadcasts provided by the Armenian-language services of Radio Liberty and Voice of America.

As the government took an increasingly dictatorial turn, antigovernment street demonstration with tens of thousands of participants continued in Yerevan. More than 40 deputies resigned from parliament or boycotted its proceedings. Last October, five opposition parties (including the ARF) formed an opposition alliance.

Before their country's lurch towards dictatorship, Armenians could be proud that—despite war and poverty—they had avoided the political upheavals of their neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Of all the presidents in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Mr. Ter-Petrossian remains the only noncommunist selected at the end of the communist era to remain in office. But his determination to do so has led to his increased use of methods familiar to the old communist system.

Much of the optimism of 1991—the first time Armenians had had their own state since the precarious independent republic of 1918-1920—has dissipated. Most of the diaspora Armenians who arrived in the "homeland" with such high hopes of using their skills and experience for the benefit of the nation have left disillusioned.

One of the biggest casualties of the president's crackdown on the opposition will be relations between the Armenians in the republic and the diaspora. An even greater casualty is likely to be democracy and human rights within Armenia. This is no small matter, as the link between democracy and economic progress is becoming increasingly transparent around the world. With Armenia desperately in need of economic growth (average incomes in 1993 were an estimated $680), stifling the country's political freedoms is likely to be a costly move.

Mr. Corley is a specialist on the former Soviet Union and a frequent visitor to Armenia.

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NATIONALITIES - CONFLICTS & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CAUCASUS

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SUMMARY NOTES

Russian offensive meets resistance in Chechnya - Russian troops continued the relentless offensive and bombardment against rebel strongholds in smaller towns and villages in southern Chechnya, pressing the rebels further into the mountains. Near Chechnya's western border with Ingushetia, Chechen fighters forced the Russian troops to retreat from Bamut after seizing the town and holding it for only one day. As the WWII VE-Day celebrations in Moscow approached and several hundred western dignitaries were scheduled to arrive, Moscow was under pressure to bring the fighting in Chechnya to a conclusion. Western capitals were hard pressed to cancel participation in the celebrations in Moscow while fighting continued in Chechnya. However, unable to crush the Chechen rebellion before the celebrations, Moscow offered to cease all military operations in Chechnya from April 27 through May 15 (Defense Minister Grachev announced a cessation of hostilities for 10 days starting from May 1). Observers believed there was little chance of Chechen fighters observing the cease-fire. While these face-saving measures were contemplated, human rights organizations, including Memorial and Human Rights Watch, appealed to Western governments to use their May visits to Moscow to protest the war in Chechnya. Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalyev said "Western leaders can be partially blamed for the bloodshed" because of their refusal to act." Moscow estimated 9,000-9,500 Chechen fighters had been killed since the campaign started in early December. In addition, more than 1,500 Russian combatants were killed and 5,000 wounded. Civilian casualties were estimated at 24,000 in Grozny alone. The OSCE announced that its Assistance Group, a team of six diplomats, started operating in Grozny on April 26. In a new development, the first Western journalist, Steve Levine of the Washington Post, Newsweek and the Financial Times, was declared a *persona non grata*, his multi-entry visa to Russia was revoked, and he was expelled from Russia, presumably for having reported on the Chechen conflict. [OMRI, 4/12/95, 4/14/95, 4/21/95; Reuter, 4/12/95, 4/13/95, 4/14/95, 4/16/95, 4/17/95, 4/18/95, 4/19/95, 4/20/95, 4/21/95, 4/25/95, 4/26/95; OSCE press release, 4/26/95]

Armenia's "authoritarian way to democracy" - In a vain but telling attempt to explain the Armenian Government's ban on the leading opposition political party the ARF and 11 news media, President Ter-Petrossian's principal political advisor Jirair Libaridian acknowledged to the Guardian, "Better to trample on the rights of the few temporarily, so that the republic has stability and continuity to have a change of power in a legitimate manner. I'm perfectly willing to see Armenia a little less democratic now - if that's what this means - as long as it's democratic for the next 50 years." Libaridian's statement was a confirmation of what many observers had been saying - the ARF was banned for political expediency with the full knowledge that the government's action was contrary to accepted international norms. The Guardian also concluded that the government banned the ARF to prevent its participation in the parliamentary elections, as polls in Armenia suggested that the ruling Armenian National Movement would have lost to both the ARF and the communists. The Guardian also concluded that, under the circumstances, the election results in Armenia will be compromised and there was a general swing towards authoritarianism in Armenia. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission approved 22 organizations which will be able to compete for the 40 National Assembly seats reserved for party tickets. The ARF was not on the list. However, Interfax reported that the ARF will be able to present its candidates under the name of another organization, *Artsakh-Ayastan*. The report was not confirmed. In another development, the Armenian Foreign Ministry confirmed the existence of a list of Diaspora Armenians who have been declared *persona non grata* and will be denied entry to Armenia, allegedly for links with narco-business, but presumably for having exposed human rights violations committed by the Armenian government. The editor of this Bulletin is also on the list. [*Golos Armenii*, 4/11/95, 4/18/95; *Noyan Tapan*, 4/12/95, 4/20/95, 4/21/95, 4/24/95; *Asbarez*, 4/13/95; Itar-Tass, 4/14/95; The Guardian, 4/19/95; OMRI, 4/20/95; Interfax, 4/21/95; *Lragir*, 4/22/95; Reuter, 4/24/95

Azerbaijan continues repression against the opposition - Despite a finding by the country's Prosecutor's Office that none of the political parties had taken part in the March uprising of the OPON, authorities in Azerbaijan continued the pressure on the opposition, including a ban on the Azerbaijan Popular Front's annual congress, the arrest of opposition party leaders, and a strict censorship on the press. Observers charged that, seeking to establish a dictatorship, Azerbaijani authorities had seized upon the OPON uprising as a pretext for a large-scale repression. The charge is all

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the more serious taken into consideration that the country will hold parliamentary elections and will submit a new constitution to a referendum in October. In another continuing endeavor, Iran denounced Azerbaijan's decision to renounce on the sale of part of its oil exploitation consortium interest to Iran and, instead, to sell the shares to Turkey and Exxon. Iran accused the Azerbaijani authorities of giving in to political pressure from the US. Iran also claimed that any exploitation of natural resources in the Caspian seabed, including oil, must be shared equally among the littoral states and that Azerbaijan could not do so unilaterally. Russia concurred with Iran. While Azerbaijan expressed dismay at the Iranian reaction, the controversy threatened to grow into a major conflict between Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and Iran and Russia on the other. [*Turan*, 4/10/95, 4/11/95, 4/12/95, 4/13/95, 4/14/95, 4/17/95, 4/18/95; Reuter, 4/12/95, 4/17/95, 4/26/95; OMRI, 4/14/95, 4/18/95; AP, 4/21/95, 4/23/95]

One year anniversary of Nagorno-Karabagh cease-fire approaches - As the first anniversary of the Nagorno-Karabagh (NK) cease-fire approached and a durable political solution to the conflict seemed still unreachable, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair passed from Sweden to Finland. The other co-chair remains Russia. While the cease-fire in and around NK continued to hold, minor but persistent violations continued on the Armenian borders, with Azerbaijani forces shelling Armenian defensive positions. Meanwhile, NK prepared for parliamentary elections to be held on April 30 and invited once more international organizations to observe the balloting. [*Asbarez*, 4/12/95, 4/13/95; *Azg*, 4/12/95; *Lragir*, 4/12/95; *Turan*, 4/13/95; *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun*, 4/14/95, 4/15/95, 4/18/95, 4/25/95; *Noyan Tapan*, 4/18/95; Reuter, 4/20/95, 4/24/95; OMRI, 4/24/95; Itar-Tass, 4/25/95]

DEVELOPING EVENTS

4/10/95 - Azerbaijani opposition denounces restrictions on freedom of expression; Iran denounces Azerbaijani decision to renounce oil agreement - *Turan* New Agency, Baku: # In a statement issued on April 8, the Azerbaijani opposition Round Table denounced restrictions on the freedom of expression. The opposition is deprived of the opportunity to use radio and television, while authorities use the mass media to campaign against the opposition, the statement said. The statement denounced the illegal political censorship as well as the monopoly granted to the Government controlled Azerbaijan Publishing House, which "suppresses independent and opposition publications economically." # The Embassy of Iran in Baku issued a statement quoting Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vilayati stating that "the liquidation of an agreement between Azerbaijan and Iran concerning the [oil] consortium will not be helpful to Baku and contradicts commitments adopted earlier." Vilayati was reported stating that, "until the legal status of the Caspian Sea is defined, the Azerbaijani oil consortium contract will not be legal, nor can it be unilaterally implemented."

4/11/95 - ARF is most popular political party in Armenia - *Golos Armenii* Daily, Yerevan: # According to a telephone survey conducted by the Sociological Center of the *Azdarar* newspaper of the Democratic Party of Armenia, the most popular political party in Armenia is the banned ARF-Dashnaktsutyun with an approval rating of 15 percent, The Communist Party was 0.8 percent behind, and the ruling Armenian national Movement (ANM) had an approval rating of only 5.5 percent.

4/11/95 - Milli Mejlis annuls state of emergency in Gyanja - *Turan* New Agency, Baku: # The Milli Mejlis refused to extend the state of emergency in Gyanja, which had expired on April 10. The state of emergency was imposed in Gyanja on 10 October 1994 following a coup attempt by supporters of ex-premier Suret Huseinov. In another development, Milli Mejlis Deputy Mirmahmud Fattayev announced that, on April 10, the Popular Front received a letter from Baku Commandant Maharram Aliyev, prohibiting the party of holding its Congress despite assurance to the contrary from Speaker Rasul Guliyev.

4/12/95 - Russia insists on commanding NK peace-keepers - Asbarez-on-Line: # During a hearing at the Russian Duma (lower house) on the NK conflict on Tuesday, Special Envoy Vladimir Kazimirov stated that the Russian government believed the head of any peace-keeping mission in the NK conflict zone should be a Russian general. The hearing was attended by NK President Robert Kocharian and Foreign Minister Arkady Ghukassian. Kazimirov added that there was no need to discuss the deployment of international peace-keeping forces in NK since "that is not feasible within the realm of the OSCE, because they do not view this positively." Kazimirov did not foresee the deployment of any peace-keeping force until August of this year. "When the idea [of peace-keeping forces] is discussed, all sides are in agreement, when the practical aspects are addressed -- specifically the financing of this venture -- everyone takes a different position," added Kazimirov. According to Kazimirov, many States support the dispatch of international observers to the region rather than peace-keeping forces. The hearing also focused on the effects of the Azerbaijani oil development agreement on the NK conflict. The Duma issued a statement following the hearings, urging the parties to continue the cease-fire and calling on the parties to free all prisoners without any preconditions. "Indeed it would be a significant and positive step in the defense of human rights and reestablishing trust between the two sides. It is essential that the first anniversary of the cease-fire spur stability and peace in the region in its efforts to rebuild," the statement concluded.

4/12/95 - NK Parliamentary elections - *Azg* Daily, Yerevan: # Chairman of the NK Central Election Committee Mushegh Ohanjanian reported that 72 candidates have been registered for the 33-seat NK Parliament to be elected at the end of the month. To be elected, candidates must garner at least 50% of the votes cast.

4/12/95 - Armenia ready to free another three Azerbaijanis - *Lragir* Daily, Yerevan: # Larisa Alaverdian, Chairperson of the organization Against Legal Arbitrariness, informed that Armenia was prepared to free three Azerbaijanis prisoners, arrested for violating Armenian state borders. One of those to be freed is sentenced to death. Alaverdian appealed to the Azerbaijani state commission on prisoners of war and hostages and public organizations to reciprocate and free Armenian held in Azerbaijan since 1991.

4/12/95 - Armenian Green Party opposes reopening of nuclear power plant - *Noyan Tapan* News agency, Yerevan (Asbarez-on-Line): # Chairman of Armenia's Green Society Hakob Sanasarian said "Reactivation of the Armenian nuclear power plant is currently unacceptable, and as long as there are no government resolutions on this matter, it is still not too late to stop the process." Sanasarian added that effective regulations and protocols for Nuclear Plants did not exist in the Soviet Union at the time the Armenian nuclear power plant was built. Guidelines were developed after plant construction was already underway, adding to existing speculation and evidence that the Armenian plant did not meet a number of safety requirements, including the plant's location directly adjacent to a densely populated area. During any given emergency, the area population will have to be evacuated within four hours, which is practically impossible under current conditions. In addition, the nuclear complex is located within the agricultural hub of Armenia, the Ararat valley, and in proximity to industrial sites, an airport, rail routes and one of Armenia's main highways. All these enterprises of vital and strategic importance to the republic are located well within the danger zone during a nuclear accident. According to Sanasarian, the Armenian nuclear plant should at least have a dome-like protective structural shield to significantly lessen possible damage in case of an accident. Yet, he said, it would be impossible to build one now, since the estimations from the Moscow Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics showed (in 1986) that the land in this area could not withstand the type of heavy construction entailed in such an endeavor.

4/12/95 - Russian military denies gratuitous cruelty in Chechnya. - OMRI Daily Digest: # On 11 April, a spokesman for the Russian Interior Ministry in Moscow rejected charges that the Russian assault on Samashki on 8 April caused heavy civilian casualties, Itar-Tass reported. He claimed artillery attacks were directed only against resistance strongholds in forest areas west of the town. Also on 11 April, the Chechen defense council chaired by President Dzhokhar Dudayev issued a statement accusing Russia of gratuitous brutality and affirming its commitment to a peaceful solution, Reuters reported. Umar Avturkhanov, head of the Committee for National Accord, told Interfax he believes federal troops will succeed in neutralizing Dudayev's forces by mid-May. On 12 April, the Los Angeles Times quoted Grozny Mayor Beslan Gantemirov, as charging that virtually all Russian troops in the city are guilty of looting and added that the Chechens "had exchanged one fascism for another." Moscow News reported that he has fallen out with his former opposition colleague Avturkhanov. On 11 April, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets said the Chechen government of national revival is "very ineffective" and that federal authorities will have to teach its members--including Prime Minister Salambek Khadzhiev--many skills, Interfax reported.

4/12/95 - Russia's Kozyrev snubs ban on force in Chechnya - Reuter: # Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on Wednesday dismissed a parliamentary resolution to ban the use of military force in Chechnya as an emotional decision that he would have opposed. "Emotions sometimes run high in parliaments and unfortunately the Russian parliament is no exception," said Kozyrev when asked about the motion passed by the State Duma, the Russian lower house, earlier on Wednesday. The resolution, which will go to the upper chamber for more discussion and a vote, comes amid mounting criticism from the West over Russia's brutal four-month military clampdown in the separatist Caucasus region. Kozyrev, who is on a two-day official visit to Italy, spoke at a news conference after meeting Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli. "I would have voted against this decision if I had been there," he said. "What's important ... is that the motion has shown, although somewhat negatively, the level of democratic debate going on in Russia over Chechnya."

4/12/95 - Russia backs Iran on Caspian Sea; Turkey signs oil deal, gets Azerbaijani pipeline backing - Reuter: # Iran said on Wednesday Russia supported its stand in which it has questioned Azerbaijan's right to explore Caspian oilfields after Baku canceled Tehran's share in the project. The official Iranian news agency IRNA quoted Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev as saying Iran and Russia "believe that littoral states should divide proportionally the resources in the Caspian Sea without interference of others and in the absence of any discrimination." Tehran radio, meanwhile, repeated the charge that Baku bowed to US pressure when it canceled Tehran's stake in the huge multi-national accord to develop Azerbaijani Caspian Sea oilfields. The United States had strongly objected to Iran's role in the $7.4 billion project. Azerbaijan, which has a 20 percent share in the consortium, had offered Iran a quarter of its stake. Iran lost its bid for a sake in the deal because US partners objected to its participation, an Azerbaijani oil official said. Tehran replied to the cancellation by questioning the legality of the project in the absence of an agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Iran and Russia have several times called for negotiations to decide the legal status of the oil-rich Caspian Sea, saying the sea's resources should be shared among littoral states. The consortium, set up last year, is led by an alliance of British Petroleum Co Plc and Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap A/S (Statoil). It also includes Amoco Corp, McDermott International Inc, Pennzoil Co, Unocal Corp, Rameo Energy Plc, Saudi Arabia's Delta Nimir, Turkish Petroleum Corp and Russia's Lukoil. # Turkey signed a deal with neighboring Azerbaijan on Wednesday to increase its stake in the ex-Soviet state's Caspian Sea oilfields, and got verbal Azerbaijani backing for the export pipeline route it prefers. The oilfields, to be developed by an international consortium, have estimated recoverable reserves of 520 million tons of light crude and 155 billion cubic meters of natural gas. A pipeline to export the oil still has to be built. Turkey's choice is for a pipeline through either Georgia or Armenia. It would carry 25 million tons of Azerbaijani oil a year and 20 million tons of oil from another ex-Soviet oil producer, Kazakhstan, to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev said he backed this plan. "We think a pipeline to export (Azerbaijani) oil across Turkey will be superior to everything," Aliyev told a signing ceremony for the Turkish oil deal. The deal signed with Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller raised Turkey's stake in the consortium to 6.75 percent from 1.75. Oil sources in Baku said TPAO was expected to pay Azerbaijan more than $70 million for the extra share. Ciller said the United States supported Turkey's choice of pipeline route. She said Turkey would find US financing for the project, which officials

say will cost about $2.5 billion. Instability in Georgia and Armenia has raised doubts about sending the oil along Turkey's route. Armenia has been unofficially in conflict with Azerbaijan since 1988 over the disputed territory of NK. Other possible pipeline routes would run through Iran, a choice frowned on by Western partners, or southern Russia. Russia, the leading opponent of Turkey's pipeline ambitions, wants the oil to flow to Russian's Novorossiisk port where it would be shipped through the Bosphorus straits to export west. But Turkey has repeatedly said the already congested straits cannot handle extra oil traffic. Turkish pipeline officials are now seeking to soften Moscow up with promises of a compromise. "Our project is not an alternative to Novorossiisk but a complementary system," Hayrettin Uzun, chief of Turkey's Botas pipeline company, told Reuters earlier this week. He said some of the oil would still be shipped through Novorossiisk.

4/12/95 - More restrictions on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan; *Turan* excluded from UN press conference - *Turan* News agency, Baku: # The Committee for the Protection of Iskender Gamidov's Rights issued a statement informing that, early during the preceding day, the Ministry of National Security searched the editorial office of *Boz Gurd* party and seized 4 issues of a bulletin published by the Committee, founded after the March 20 arrest of Iskender Gamidov, People's Deputy and leader of *Boz Gurd*. The bulletin was published by the party after its newspaper was banned. # On April 10, the UN representative in Azerbaijan, Mahmud El-Said, invited a press-conference to inform about the activities of different UN agencies in Azerbaijan. *Turan* News Agency was not invited to the press-conference nor did it receive the press-release summarizing the press conference. Other independent mass media representatives were also not invited to the press-conference. Thus, El-Said violated a basic principle of the UN, which he represents.

4/13/95 - Armenian foreign ministry comments on *persona non grata list* - *Asbarez* Daily, Los Angeles: # At a press conference on April 11, commenting on the publication of a list of Diaspora Armenians declared *persona non grata* by the Armenian foreign ministry [see Covcas Bulletin No. 8], Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Eduard Zuloyan confirmed the authenticity of the list and linked it to the banning of the ARF, to criminal investigation underway, and to narco-business. The list included leaders of Diaspora ARF branches, editors of Diaspora ARF publications, and human rights activists who have exposed violations in Armenia, including the editor of this Bulletin.

4/13/95 - German Bundestag issues statement on NK - Asbarez-on-Line: # The German Bundestag addressed the issue of the NK conflict during its March 30 session and unanimously accepted a joint declaration entitled An Initiative on the NK Conflict. Bundestag chairman R. Zusmuth then sent a telegram to NK parliament chairman Karen Baburian. The declaration emphasized the German parliament's interest in a peaceful resolution of the NK conflict, expressed satisfaction that the cease-fire in the conflict zone had lasted for more than 10 months, and appealed to its colleagues in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and to the population of NK, to do their best in creating trust between all conflicting parties. The document also urged that, the 12 May one-year anniversary of the cease-fire, be marked by an exchange of POWs and hostages, as a sign of good faith.

4/13/95 - Russians attack rebel stronghold in Chechnya - Reuter: # Russian military said on Thursday they had launched an all-out assault on the last rebel bastion in western Chechnya amid evidence of increasing cruelty in Moscow's action against the breakaway region. Itar-Tass news agency said Russian troops attacked the village of Bamut, the last stronghold on Chechen plains still held by separatist rebels after the fall of the towns of Samashki and Achkhoi-Martan last week. The defense ministry's press office could not immediately confirm the report. But reporters, allowed into Samashki for the first time since it fell, heard fierce artillery bombardment from the direction of Bamut, some 20 km away. We saw decomposing bodies and spent hypodermic syringes littering Samashki's streets. The town of low brick houses lining unpaved streets was sealed off after Moscow's troops moved in last weekend. People in Samashki say as many as 3,000 Russian soldiers, backed by more than 100 armored vehicles, stormed the once quiet farming town of 15,000. Some say most of the Russians appeared to be drugged. Journalists saw small plastic syringes in several places around the town, but there was no way to test the needles for traces of narcotics. "The Russians came in at about 4 a.m. on April 9. We could hear them laughing and swearing outside, then they started shooting at the gate," said 44-year-old Elsa Akhmedova. "There were five people hiding here," she said pointing to a building which once probably housed livestock. "First they dragged my mother out. They made her put up her arms and then they shot her in the chest. Then they splashed gasoline onto my brother Abbi and set him on fire." Six fresh graves had been hastily dug behind the rubble of the house, which Akhmedova said had been burned down by the soldiers as they left. Like all such reports from Chechnya, her story could not be independently confirmed. Townspeople accused the Russians of looting what they could before killing or wounding men, women and children. The Russian interior ministry has denied the reports its troops massacred civilians in the town. The ICRC said on Wednesday Russian troops had killed at least 250 people, mostly civilians, while taking Samashki. Jean-Marc Bornet, head of ICRC operations in Europe, described the operation as an "indiscriminate attack against civilians." Anatoly Shabad, a member of the Russian parliament who visited Samashki earlier this week, told a news conference on Thursday there was no organized resistance in the town. "It was surely planned with the idea to kill as many as possible, in order to achieve a threatening effect," he said. Thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands have been forced to flee since Russia launched a large-scale military campaign last December to quell Chechnya's bid for independence. The fall of Bamut would bring central and northern parts of the north Caucasus territory under effective Russian control, leaving only the remote mountainous south in rebel hands.

4/13/95 - Azerbaijan protests against Russian Duma discussion of NK conflict; Milli Mejlis adopts law on Social Protection of the Handicapped - *Turan*: News Agency, Baku: # Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament Rasul Guliev and Deputy Speaker Yashar Aliyev sent a telegram addressed to the Russian Duma Chairman Ivan Ribkin and Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Russia for the CIS countries Konstantin Zatulin protesting

against a hearing held at the Duma about the NK conflict. The message characterized the hearing as a "brutal interference into the domestic affairs of sovereign Azerbaijan." The message especially took exception at the invitation to such a hearing of NK representatives. The message also stated that, despite pressure from some circles, the Azerbaijani Milli Mejlis had declined to address the Chechen conflict, adding that "That would not have been useful for Azerbaijani-Russian relation.... Russia and Azerbaijan are two sovereign independent states and they have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of each other." # The Milli Mejlis adopted the law On Social Protection of the Handicapped, providing for medicines, wheelchairs and employment opportunities for the handicapped. The Chairman of the Society of the Handicapped, Teimur Guliyev, said that employment is the most serious problem for the handicapped. Chairman of the Milli Mejlis Commission for Social Policy Sultan Mamedov said that, out of 51,500 handicapped able to work, only 25,000 are employed. Mamedov informed that there were more than 250,000 handicapped in the country - 19,623 of I degree, 159,423 of II degree, 48,559 of III degree. Of those, 2,047 are handicapped as a result of WWII injuries, 5,224 as a result of the NK war, 165 as a result of the Afghanistan war, 4,227 as a result of the Chernobyl accident, 280 as a result of the January 20 events of 1990, and 150,996 due to other reasons.

4/14/95 - Armenian border shelled again - *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun* Daily, Yerevan: # The press service of Armenia's Defense Ministry reported that, on April 12, Azerbaijani units shelled border defense positions at the Karayali settlement in the north-eastern Ijevan district of Armenia and the village of Chinari in the nearby Tavush region. No casualties were reported. In both cases, Armenian border troops returned the fire.

4/14/95 - Russia Duma condemns Armenian Genocide - Itar-Tass (Asbarez-on-Line): # The Russian Duma (lower house of parliament) unanimously adopted a resolution on Friday condemning the Armenian Genocide of 1915 to 1922. The Duma stressed in its statement that it "condemns the organizers of the mass killings of Armenians, expresses its compassion with the Armenian people and regards April 24 as a day of remembrance commemorating the victims of the Genocide."

4/14/95 - Azerbaijan rejects Iranian criticism over oil deal; Kurds killed trying to enter Nakhitchevan - OMRI Daily Digest: # Azerbaijan Parliament chairman Rasul Guliev has rejected as "totally incomprehensible" Iran's angry reaction to his government's decision to cancel an agreement giving Iran a 5% share in the consortium to develop three Caspian oil fields, Interfax reported on 13 April. Instead, Azerbaijan has given a 5% stake to Exxon and another 5% to the Turkish company TPAO. Also on 13 April, a spokesman for Azerbaijan's State Oil Company SOCAR said Iran would be offered a share in the development of the Shakh Deniz oil and gas deposits as compensation. Meanwhile, an Azerbaijani government delegation traveled to Moscow on 13 April for talks on lifting the transport blockade imposed on Azerbaijan late last year. # Azerbaijani border guards have in recent days repelled numerous attempts by groups of Kurds to cross the border from Iran into the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhitchevan, AFP reported on 13 April, quoting a security ministry official in Baku. Several Kurds have been killed in the attempt. Iran has closed its border with Turkey to prevent the PKK from launching cross-border attacks.

4/14/95 - Dudayev escapes assassination attempt; Federation Council appeals to Constitutional Court over Chechnya decrees; Rights groups call on Western governments to speak out - OMRI Daily Digest: # Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev is in a military camp in the mountains near Bamut, in southern Chechnya, according to reports on Russian TV. Earlier statements by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev that Dudayev had been killed or wounded are not true, according to Ruslan Movsayev, commander of a Chechen fighting unit, AFP reported. On 12 April, artillery destroyed the house that Dudayev had occupied only hours earlier. The exact location of the house is unclear. # The Federation Council challenged the legality of secret decrees on restoring law and order in Chechnya, Russian Public Television reported on 13 April. By a vote of 97 to one, with two abstentions, the Council decided to ask the Constitutional Court to rule on Yeltsin's decrees of 30 November and 9 December, as well as the government's 9 December resolution. Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai said Russia's armed forces were sent to Chechnya in accordance with the constitution, Interfax reported. He praised the draft law on settling the Chechen conflict, which the Duma passed on 12 April, as an example of cooperation between the legislative and executive branches. Shakhrai said a conference on reaching a peaceful settlement would be held in Grozny later this month, but he ruled out direct talks with Dudayev. Yelena Mizulina, deputy chairman of the Federation Council's Committee for Constitutional Law and Legal Matters, said Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeiko should share the blame for the escalation of violence in Chechnya, NTV reported. She said Shumeiko, who is a permanent member of Yeltsin's Security Council, failed to express the views of the upper house of parliament adequately to the president. Deputies also criticized Shumeiko and Defense and Security Committee Chairman Petr Shirshov for concealing the contents of Yeltsin's secret decrees on Chechnya from the rest of the Federation Council. Shumeiko defended the Security Council as a constitutional body and said he was obliged not to reveal state secrets. He also threatened to sue deputy Viktor Kurochkin for calling the Security Council a "gang" and accusing "the Politburo" of starting a war in Chechnya. # Memorial and Human Rights Watch have appealed to Western governments to use their May visits to Moscow to protest the war in Chechnya, AFP reported. Sergei Kovalyev said "Western leaders can be partially blamed for the bloodshed" because of their refusal to act. Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin, however, denounced the activists, saying "I suggest that those activists stand in the trenches with the soldiers and officers who are carrying out the special operations, walk together with them, and then give their evaluations," NTV reported.

4/14/95 - Russia replaces commander in Chechen operation - Reuter: # Russia has removed the commander of its joint operations in breakaway Chechnya, and brought in a new commanding officer, Itar-Tass news agency said on Friday. The agency gave no reason for the changeover, which replaced Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov with Colonel General Mikhail Yegorov. Kulikov, like Yegorov a deputy interior

minister, had headed Moscow's operations in Chechnya since early February.

4/14/95 - Elchibey denies APF armed groups; Political parties did not participate in March coup attempt; Azerbaijani youth organizations urge dialogue - *Turan* News Agency, Baku: # Ex-President and Chairman of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) Abulfaz Elchibey denied allegations that the APF had supported the OPON March 17 uprising in Baku. Elchibey added, "having issued groundless accusations against the opposition, the current regime is attempting to neutralize it on the eve of the Parliamentary elections. The statement of the Minister of National Security, Namig Abbasov, that the Turkish Embassy [implicated] is ridiculous.... The information of Namig Abbasov shows disrespect to Turkey and its President. Namig Abbasov is wrong saying that the PFA has arms. We do not have arms and armed groups. The authorities are just seeking a pretext to put an end to the PFA." Elchibey also denied allegations that the APF was selling arms to Kurdish groups in Nakhitchevan. # At a press-conference to discuss the March coup attempt in Baku, Deputy Prosecutor Nazim Allahverdiyev informed that 45 people died during the events (25 military, 7 civilians, and 11 members of OPON) and 117 were wounded (62 military, 5 policemen, and 47 civilians). In addition, 322 people are under investigation (88 members of OPON, 11 unofficial employees of OPON, 142 deserters, 16 employees of police, and 65 other citizens), and arrest warrants have been issued for 23 others. Head of the investigation group for the events in Baku Layig Mehtiyev reported that the investigation had shown that political parties had not participated in the coup, "and the participation of any [individual] members of a party does not mean the participation of the whole organization in the coup." Citizens of several states, including Turkey, have been arrested as well, "but that does not mean Turkey's participation in the coup." Former Foreign Minister Tofig Gasimov was also implicated in the coup. Mehtiyev added that an investigation was underway regarding the government troops continuing to fire on the OPON after they had raised a white flag. # Nine Azerbaijani youth organizations issued a statement urging President Aliyev to change political course and engage in dialogue with political organizations. The statement said that the leadership of the republic and President Aliyev ignore proposals from political parties to cooperate, which results in military and political conflicts in Azerbaijan. The statement expressed concern that, on the threshold of forthcoming elections, the Government will strengthen political censorship.

4/15/95 - NK appeals for election observers; Armenian border shelled - *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun* Daily, Yerevan: # Chairman of the NK Supreme Council Karen Baburian appealed to the United Nations, parliaments of CIS and other countries, urging them to send observers for the parliamentary elections to be held on April 30. # The Press service of Armenia's Defense Ministry reported that, on April 13, Azerbaijani units again shelled border defense positions at the village of Vazashen in the north-eastern Ijevan district of Armenia, as well as Chinari in the nearby Tavush district. No casualties were reported in both cases. Armenian border troops returned the fire.

4/16/95 - Russians pound rebel Chechen rebel stronghold - Reuter: # Russian forces kept up heavy shelling of the Chechen town of Bamut on Sunday but did not attempt to storm the last rebel bastion in the region's lowlands, Interfax news agency reported. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, in a statement likely to further sour ties with the West, said Moscow could not stick to all the terms of a crucial conventional arms reduction treaty until the Chechen war was over. Russian forces fighting to end Chechnya's separatist drive pounded Bamut with artillery and mortar shells for most of the day, said Interfax, reporting from the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Itar-Tass news agency said many buildings in Bamut, site of a former missile base, were on fire. Russian troops tried to seize Bamut on Friday but the rebels hid among the nuclear-proof bunkers at the base to beat off the attack and killed several soldiers. Talks between Russian commanders and Bamut leaders about the town's capitulation had failed, Interfax said. If Bamut is captured, the rebels will be reduced to fighting a guerrilla war from the mountains of southern Chechnya where they have already set up bases. Russia, which has lost more than 2,000 soldiers and large amounts of armor in the four-month conflict, wants to alter the cornerstone 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to allow it to maintain more forces in Chechnya. Grachev, in the clearest sign yet of the Kremlin's desire to change the treaty, said Moscow could not stick to the limits on the number of troops it could station in the volatile southern Caucasus region. "Only when conditions are stable can Russia fulfill all the conditions in the CFE treaty," he said. "After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the successor state, cannot accept all (CFE's) limitations on its flanks." Grachev said there were several ways in which Moscow could circumvent the decree, for example by reallocating parts of its armor to interior ministry forces. "But we will try to persuade our Western partners that the leaders of the former Soviet Union made a mistake when they agreed to sign this document," he said. Grachev's comments were likely to provoke yet more gloom among Western countries which have seen their once-cordial relations with Moscow take a heavy battering since the Chechen war started last December. The CFE treaty, which includes 30 nations and covers an area from the Atlantic to the Urals, provides for the biggest cuts of conventional weapons in arms control history and fixes the distribution of troops and armor. Rebel Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who has been in hiding since Russian troops captured the regional capital Grozny in early February, told Ukrainian journalists the Chechens would never give in. "The opportunity for resolving the conflict peacefully will end. Everything is ruined. Everything is destroyed," Dudayev said in an interview filmed last week and made available on Sunday. "A satanic force unheard of in the history of man has cynically, demonstratively, and with a smile, destroyed everything. We can no longer tolerate being annihilated like laboratory rabbits."

4/17/95 - Azerbaijan could compensate Iran for oil deal - Reuter: # Azerbaijan plans to offer Iran a stake in Caspian Sea oilfields that are not covered by an existing contract with an international consortium, Interfax news agency reported on Monday. It quoted an Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry source as saying "a very favorable proposal" would be made during a visit to Tehran in mid-May by Azerbaijani parliament chairman Rasul Guliyev. "Baku will propose bilateral cooperation in development of rich oil areas in the Caspian that are not covered by the consortium,"

the source was quoted as saying. Earlier this month Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said that Baku had rejected a bid by Iran to take a five percent stake in the international consortium, set up last year to develop the Azeri, Chirag and deepwater Guneshli fields. Instead, it offered US oil group Exxon five percent and agreed to increase the state-run Turkish Petroleum Corp's stake by five percent. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry source said the decision to exclude Tehran from the $7.4 billion deal had not been taken under pressure from the United States. Azerbaijan simply received better offers, he said. Other members of the consortium have still to approve the transfer of part of Azerbaijan's original 20 percent stake to Exxon and the Turkish Petroleum Corp.

4/17/95 - Russians prepare new assault on Chechen rebel bastion - Reuter: # Russia is preparing a fresh assault on the last rebel bastion in lowland Chechnya after at least 10 servicemen were killed in earlier abortive attacks, Itar-Tass news agency said on Monday. It quoted military sources in the breakaway region as saying that the assault on the stronghold of Bamut in western Chechnya had been stopped on Sunday to avoid further losses among Russian troops but that a decisive assault would be attempted soon. Tass said the rebels -- who have consistently pledged to resist to the last fighter -- had rejected a new ultimatum by Russian troops to lay down their arms and surrender. Russia is keen to put down organized resistance in Chechnya as fast as possible. Key world leaders, many of them deeply critical of Moscow's bloody Chechen campaign, are due to arrive on May 9 for celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of allied victory in World War Two. With the fall of Bamut, Russia would effectively gain control over the fertile and industrially developed areas in northern and central Chechnya, squeezing the rebels out to remote mountainous areas in the south of the region.

4/17/95 - Azerbaijan rejects treaty on joint protection of borders - *Turan* News Agency, Baku: # Commander of the Azerbaijani border troops Abbasali Novruzov told *Turan*, that Azerbaijan once again refused to sign a treaty on the joint protection of the southern borders of the CIS. Novruzov said that, on April 13-14, another meeting of Deputy Commanders of border troops and Deputy Foreign Ministers of the CIS-member States took place. Ukraine and Turkmenistan also refused to sign the treaty. The treaty provides for the participation of Russian border troops in protecting the external borders of the CIS.

4/17/95 - More on censorship in Azerbaijan; Helsinki Civil Assembly of Azerbaijan protests - *Turan* News Agency, Baku: # The Saturday issue of the leading opposition newspaper *Azadlig* was suspended by order of the Commander of Baku garrison. The Commander ordered the newspaper not to be published until he had read the issue first. However, he failed to do so. Editor of *Azadlig* Gyunduz Tahirli said that authorities were punishing the newspaper for a critical satire published in the preceding issue. The author of the satire, Zohrab Amirhanly, was summoned by the police for interrogation. Amirhanly declined the invitation and is hiding. A police officer looking for Amirhanly at the editorial office threatened to "give him a lesson" when he was apprehended. Amirhanly's wife also received threatening messages from unidentified persons. # Head of the Azerbaijan National Committee of the Helsinki Civil Assembly Arzu Abdulayeva appealed to General Prosecutor Eldar Hassanov and Minister of National Security Namig Abasov to provide a list of people detained after the March OPON uprising. The appeal notes that the Committee continued to receive information from relatives of the detainees alleging that authorities had detained innocent people.

4/18/95 - IAEA relies on Armenian experts for reopening of nuclear power plant - *Golos Armenii* Daily, Yerevan: # Head of a delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Morris Rosen said he was satisfied with the security provisions at the Armenian nuclear power plant due to be recommissioned next month. The plant was closed after an earthquake devastated the northern third of Armenia in 1988. "Your experts believe there are no reasons for not resuming operation of the plant, and we agree with them", Rosen concluded.

4/18/95 - Cease-fire violations at Armenian border - *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun* Daily, Yerevan: # According to the Armenian Defense Ministry press service, on April 16, Azerbaijani units shelled border defense positions at the village of Berkaber in the north-eastern Ijevan district of Armenia. An Armenian border guard was injured. Armenian border troops returned the fire.

4/18/95 - Finland to assume OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship - *Noyan Tapan* News Agency, Yerevan (Asbarez-on-Line): # Finland will assume the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship on April 21. The current co-chair are Sweden and the Russian Federation. "Before taking over the Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship, we wished to visit the region and study the situation on the spot. We went to Baku, on April 14. We met with Robert Kocharian in Yerevan on the next day we met with Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian, his aides and Armenian Foreign Ministry officials," Finland's Deputy Secretary of State Ambassador Heikki Talvitie said during a recent news conference in the Armenian capital. High-ranking Finnish officials reported their delegation will fly to Moscow next week, to discuss the results of this working visit with their Russian counterparts. Ambassador Talvitie highly valued the roles of both Italy and Sweden, former Chairs of the Minsk Conference, on the settlement of the NK conflict. However, Talvitie pointed out that there had not been any tangible progress in the matter. "The situation has become quite complex, at a time when Finland is taking over the co-chair position," according to Talvitie, "the main thing is to provide for the dynamics of the process." Speaking on the status of NK, Talvitie stated the situation was under study and the issue will be considered at a later date, "It is very important not to hurry with a resolution to such problems which could curtail the possibility of continuing the peace process."

4/18/95 - Azerbaijan to hold elections in October - OMRI Daily Digest: # A new election law is to be submitted to the Azerbaijan People's Assembly shortly and then subjected to a nationwide referendum in preparation for parliamentary elections scheduled for October 1995, according to President Heidar Aliyev as quoted by Interfax on 16 April. A new constitution will also be adopted this year after nationwide discussion. On 17 April, the head of the opposition Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, Leila Yunusova, told a press conference in Baku that the current Azerbaijani leadership is seeking to impose a dictatorship, and therefore seized upon the police rebellion last month as a

pretext for large-scale repression even though none of the existing political parties in Azerbaijan had supported the revolt, Interfax reported.

4/18/95 - Azerbaijan seeks closer EU ties - Reuter: # Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev said on Tuesday the conflict in NK should not prove a stumbling block to closer relations between his country and the European Union. He told journalists there was "no doubt" Azerbaijan and the EU could negotiate a cooperation accord before the resolution of the conflict. "We are trying to settle the NK conflict the peaceful way," he added. He said Azerbaijan hoped the conflict could be resolved through the current initiative of the OSCE. The OSCE agreed last October to try and send a multi-national peace-keeping force to the troubled enclave, but progress has been held by Russian demands for a free hand. A Commission spokesman said Aliyev had requested EU balance of payments aid in a meeting with EU Commission President Jacques Santer and was told this would be considered.

4/18/95 - Russia says its forces take part of Chechen base - Reuter: # A Russian news agency said on Tuesday that the Kremlin's forces had captured part of Bamut, the last rebel stronghold in the lowlands of Chechnya. Interfax, in a report which could not be independently confirmed, quoted a Russian military spokesman as saying Russian troops seized the northern part of the village on the lowlands of the breakaway region on Tuesday. The spokesman said northern Bamut had been captured with no loss of civilian life. Western reporters recently in Chechnya say the local population has already fled the tiny mountainside village. There was no word from the Chechen side. Bamut, near Chechnya's western border with Ingushetia, was being defended by a small group of diehard Chechens holed up in nuclear bomb-proof bunkers in a heavily-fortified old Soviet missile base. The capture of Bamut would put the fertile and industrially developed areas in northern and central Chechnya under the control of Russian troops, who have been fighting for more than four months to end the rebel region's independence drive. Interfax earlier quoted a Russian interior ministry spokesman as saying that Bamut had been sealed off completely by Russian troops and that its fall was imminent. "The seizure of Bamut is only a matter of time," it quoted Vasily Panchenko as saying. Panchenko said some 7,000 Chechen rebels -- who are clearly outgunned and outmanned by the Russians -- were still active in the north Caucasus region. He said Russia now controlled 80 percent of Chechnya. Russian forces stepped up their attacks near Bamut on Tuesday and 10 rebels were killed in clashes, Interfax said. It quoted a Russian military spokesman as saying that the Kremlin's forces hunted for Chechen rebels around the village and rained artillery shells in a nearby wooded area. The report could not be independently confirmed. In another unconfirmed report denied by the Russian air force, Interfax said three people were killed when Russian fighter planes bombed a village southwest of Bamut.

4/18/95 - Turkmenistan resumes gas supplies to Transcaucasus - Reuter: # Turkmenistan has resumed natural gas supplies to the Transcaucasus region after a five-day break caused by a dispute over transit tariffs with Uzbekistan, Russia's Itar-Tass news agency said on Tuesday. It quoted the head of Armenia's state-owned gas company, Ronald Adonts, as saying gas was already being received in Georgia and would reach Armenia soon. Armenia had been forced to reduce electricity supplies in some areas to only one hour a day. It was not clear how the dispute over tariffs had been resolved.

4/18/95 - Pressure on journalists continues - *Turan* News Agency, Baku: # On April 17, editor of *Tazadlar* newspaper Sultan Ismailov was interrogated for nine hours in the Prosecutor's Office for alleged connections with the March 17 OPON uprising. Other journalists have also been interrogated for alleged connections to the March uprising, including journalists of *Turan*, ANS, and *Khabar-Service*.

4/19/95 - The authoritarian route to democracy - The Guardian: # Cracks in Armenia's democratic facade are beginning to show. Doubts are growing over the legitimacy of parliamentary elections in July following the closure of 11 opposition publications and a six-month suspension of the main political party they had ties with, the ARF-Dashnaktsutiune, known as the Dashnaks. Relays of the American-funded Radio Liberty and radio Free Europe by local medium wave transmitters were also halted. In all, 300 journalists and media workers found themselves out on the street. The government is unrepenting, saying it had to act when it did, and forthcoming public trials of 19 people accused of murder and drug-trafficking would reveal all. "That party was leading the republic to instability ... the people would have lost faith in the government and the rest of the opposition," said a presidential aide, Jirair Libaridian, a United States citizen and a Dashnak member until 1988. "The Dashnaks would have presented themselves as the only party disciplined and powerful enough to restore law and order. This president will never allow Armenia to become a Weimar republic." "Better to trample on the rights of the few temporarily, so that the republic has stability and continuity to have a change of power in a legitimate manner. I'm perfectly willing to see Armenia a little less democratic now - if that's what this means - as long as it's democratic for the next 50 years." As to why an entire party is banned for the alleged misdeeds of a few individuals when the President acknowledges that 90% of the party membership were unaware of any misdeeds, the article goes on to suggest that polls suggest the ruling Armenian National Movement (ANM). led by Ter-Petrossian, would have lost out at the elections to both the Dashnaks and the communists. Under the terms of the ban, the Dashnaks will be able to stand only as non-party individuals. The article concludes with concerns about a compromised election and a general swing towards authoritarianism in Armenia.

4/19/95 - Russians leave freshly seized Chechen stronghold - Reuter: # Heavy rebel shelling from nearby hills forced Russian troops to abandon the captured Chechen separatist bastion of Bamut after holding it for just one day, Interfax news agency said on Wednesday. The agency quoted Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov, acting commander of Moscow's operations in the breakaway region, as saying the Russian troops had forced out rebel fighters on Tuesday but later come under fire from the hills. "Russian troops were later forced to leave the village to avoid casualties," Yegorov, who is temporarily standing in for Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov as head of the joint army and interior ministry operation, told Interfax. Kulikov told a news conference earlier on Wednesday that 15 Russian soldiers and about 400 rebels were killed in the latest series of attacks on Bamut, which

began last Friday. The retreat appeared to deal a blow to Russian efforts to take complete control of all the fertile and industrially developed areas of northern and central Chechnya. Bamut, 50 km southwest of regional capital of Grozny, is the key rebel stronghold in western Chechnya. It is also the gateway to southern mountainous areas where most of the rebels, fighting for independence from Moscow, have rebased. Yegorov said Russian troops were also involved in heavy fighting in the village of Serzhen-Yurt, 40 km southeast of Grozny. The troops suffered losses trying to seize the village, gateway to the mountains from the east. Yegorov did not say how many people were killed. Yegorov also said Russians could expect strong resistance in the villages of Orekhovo and Valerik near Bamut. He estimated about 500 fighters were holed up in each of the two villages. The failure in Bamut and the growing number of new points of rebel resistance contrasted with Kulikov's statement on Wednesday that Russia had achieved most of its aims in the Chechen campaign. "Today, Dudayev has no social or economic grounds for continuing the armed struggle," Kulikov said. "More than 80 percent of Chechen territory, where more than 90 per cent of the population lives, has been freed from the illegal fighters." Kulikov said 1,518 Russian servicemen had been killed and almost 5,000 wounded achieving those goals, and that Moscow estimated 9,000 to 9,500 Chechen fighters had been killed. He did not say how many civilians had been killed, although Russia's human rights commission has said more than 24,000 died in the battle for Grozny alone. Kulikov said 7,000 rebels were thought to be continuing the fight for independence and had set up about 40 mountain bases from which they were expected to launch guerrilla assaults. Kulikov said Moscow was keeping from 12,000 to 15,000 army troops in Chechnya, 8,000 to 10,000 interior ministry troops and 2,000 other servicemen, considerably fewer than at the peak of the fighting.

4/19/95 - Turkey says Russia must not tamper with arms treaty - Reuter: # Turkey said on Wednesday Russia would endanger Europe's security structure if it disregarded the terms of a sweeping arms treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). "The CFE treaty is the keystone of the European security structure," Foreign Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman said. "Less-than-total observance of its terms and principles will damage its delicate balance based on mutual sacrifice and upset the stability it aims for," he told a news briefing. Ataman was responding to Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's remarks on April 16 that his country could not comply with all CFE terms while it was fighting in Chechnya. The amount of men and equipment allowed to Russia in the Caucasian region was not sufficient considering the war in the breakaway Chechen region, Grachev said. "Such a development...will create additional problems in the international relations of countries which cause it," Ataman said, referring to Moscow's efforts to develop Western ties. Defense Minister Mehmet Golhan said on Monday Turkey had the backing of its NATO allies that CFE should neither be violated nor tampered with before a review conference met in May 1996. Ataman said non-compliance with the CFE would damage prospects of the review conference, which could adapt the treaty to changed conditions but must preserve its essential make-up and terms. The East-West arms treaty, which includes 30 nations and covers an area from the Atlantic to the Urals, limits the number of arms and men Russia can have in the Caucasus region. In return, Turkey has agreed to reduce its arms under CFE but as a NATO flank country bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria on its southeast, its forces in the southeast region have been excluded from the arms cut.

4/19/95 - Iranian leader visits Georgia - UPI: # Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani arrived in Georgia Wednesday on a three-day visit aimed at boosting trade ties with the cash-starved former Soviet republic. Rafsanjani accepted a bunch of flowers from a veiled Georgian girl as he arrived in Tbilisi with his wife and four children, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velyati and a delegation of 120 officials. "I hope my visit will promote our future cooperation and mutual understanding," Rafsanjani said in a brief statement. During a 1992 visit to Tehran, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze signed agreements that called for economic cooperation. The centerpiece of Rafsanjani's trip will be a jaunt Thursday to two Black Sea ports Iran wants to use as outlets for its products to Europe and other world markets. "Iran is quite interested in the use of Georgian transport facilities, in particular Black Sea ports, to ship its goods to Europe and other countries," Rafsanjani said in an interview aired on Georgian state television this week. The Iranian delegation will scrutinize shipping capacity of Georgia's largest port at Poti, 200 miles west of Tbilisi, and a smaller port at Batumi in the Adjaria region. In addition to profits for handling Iranian cargoes, Georgia is eyeing the possibility of natural gas shipments from Iran. Wars in neighboring Chechnya and the ethnic Armenian enclave of NK have chronically cut off supplies of gas and consumer goods from Russia and other former Soviet republics to Georgia. Shevardnadze has said recently these problems have forced Georgia to look south to Iran as a source of energy and other supplies. Rafsanjani's visit is also slated to include a visit to a Georgian facility that produces Russian-designed Su-25 and Su-27 military aircraft. Sources close to the Shevardnadze's government said Georgia was hoping to sell warplanes to Iran.

4/20/95 - Armenian electoral commission registers 22 organizations - *Noyan Tapan* News Agency, Yerevan: # The Armenian Central Electoral Commission approved 22 organizations which will be able to compete for the 40 seats in the National Assembly reserved for party tickets. The ARF-Dashnaktsutyun was not on the list. The parliamentary elections will be held on July 5.

4/20/95 - Armenian bill between Turkey and Russia - OMRI Daily Digest: # Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman registered Ankara's displeasure with the Russian State Duma's passage of a bill that establishes 24 April as the day marking the massacre of Armenians by Turks, international media reported on 19 April. Ataman called the bill, passed on 14 April, an "extreme move" and criticized Russia for indirectly threatening Turkey's territorial integrity by making reference to the "historical Armenian homeland." He said it would affect not only Turko-Russian relations but would hamper recent efforts to improve ties with Armenia. The 18 April opening in Moscow of a two-day international conference under the title "Genocide: a Crime Against Mankind" suggests Turko-Russian relations will remain chilly. In a welcoming speech to the conference, Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the State Duma Committee for

CIS Affairs and Contacts with Compatriots, noted that Russians "have become better aware of the problem of genocide" since the breakup of the USSR.

4/20/95 - Kozyrev reaffirms comments on military force in near abroad - OMRI Daily Digest: # Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev reaffirmed his opinion that Russia could intervene militarily to protect ethnic Russians in the "near abroad," Itar-Tass reported on 19 April. Speaking in the Kremlin, Kozyrev said his comments were "neither a slip of the tongue, nor a pre-election ruse." On 20 April, *Izvestiya* called Kozyrev's comments "sensational," recalling his notorious 1992 Stockholm speech when he portrayed himself as a nationalist only to say it was a joke within an hour. Both Vladimir Lukin, head of the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, and Sergei Yushenkov, head of the Defense Committee, criticized Kozyrev's remarks while Lt.-Gen. Alexander Lebed applauded them.

4/20/95 - Russia struggles to control two Chechen villages - Reuter: # Russian military sources admitted setbacks in the battle for Chechnya on Thursday and the leader of the administration Moscow has installed in the region said it could take a week to seize a key rebel bastion. Umar Avturkhanov told RIA news agency that Russia's troops were handicapped by local agreements preventing them using air strikes against Bamut, where fighters loyal to rebel leader Dzhokhar Dudayev are holed up in a disused Soviet missile site. "Federal troops' complete liberation of Bamut from Dudayev's fighters could drag on for five or seven days," he said. NTV independent television quoted military sources as saying that a fresh attempt to take Bamut could not be made until the mountains surrounding it were cleared of rebel fighters. The latest delay in seizing Bamut contrasted strongly with an official statement on Wednesday that Russia had achieved most of its aims in Chechnya. Military experts have said that a last push on several pockets of resistance showed Russia hoped to wrap the fighting up before world leaders arrive in Moscow for May 9 celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War Two. But these hopes took a battering on Wednesday when heavy Chechen shelling forced Russian troops to quit Bamut, just one day after capturing it. "They have made themselves look total idiots. Something was obviously going badly wrong," said a military attaché at a Western embassy. "Why they should pull all their forces out rather than using helicopters to destroy the Chechen artillery positions one by one is a good question." Itar-Tass news agency had earlier reported that the Kremlin had told its troops in rebel Chechnya to stop fighting, linking the move to the arrival of world leaders for the Victory Day celebrations. The interior ministry denied the report. "We never received such an order from the Russian leadership," a ministry spokeswoman said, reading from a prepared statement. "Interior Ministry troops participating in the disarmament of armed formations in Chechnya are continuing to fulfill their tasks." Foreign leaders have been extremely critical of the Chechen operation and human rights groups accuse Russia of using excessive force to crush resistance in the region. US President Bill Clinton, under strong domestic pressure not to go, hesitated for months before announcing he would fly to Moscow for the celebrations and a summit with Yeltsin. "The thing the Russians are looking closely for is any sign people could be losing heart about coming here. Some of the NATO nations are starting to get pretty itchy about it," said the military attaché.

4/20/95 - Turkey to reopen air corridor to Armenia - Reuter: # Turkey has decided to reopen an air corridor to neighboring Armenia which it closed in 1993, the Turkish foreign ministry said in a statement on Thursday. Civil aviation delegations from the two countries met in Ankara on Thursday for talks on the reopening, it said. Ankara closed the corridor which allows flights to Armenia over Turkish territory in protest at an Armenian military drive which seized about 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. Azerbaijan, which has close ethnic and cultural links to Turkey, had asked Ankara to reopen the corridor.

4/21/95 - Caspian oil pipeline studied - AP: # A U'S official said Friday barriers remained before private companies were ready to take part in a Caspian Sea oil pipeline. "The support of this pipeline by the governments of the United States and Turkey does not ensure that it will be built," US Deputy Secretary of Energy Bill White told a news conference here. White said the price of the pipeline and its route through regions with past instabilities would have an effect on the decision-making of investors. "We obviously pointed out what should be obvious to all people in this region, that war, conflict, bombings of pipelines ... limit economic opportunity," White added. Turkey favors a pipeline to transfer oil from the Caspian Sea to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean sea. The United States also supports the project. Two possible parties in the project, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are caught in a war, Turkey's southeastern region is gripped by Kurdish violence. White said Washington was engaged in intense efforts to promote the project by encouraging oil companies to develop the Caspian Sea fields and was keeping in touch with the countries whose cooperation was essential.

4/21/95 - Parliamentary elections in Armenia - Interfax: # 19 civic-political organizations and 3 party blocks will participate in party ticket elections to Armenia's new parliament, the National Assembly, scheduled for July 5, the Central Electoral Commission has said. The application deadline expired on April 20. One of the most influential opposition parties - Dashnaktsutun, suspended in January for six months, will take part in the elections under the new title, *Artsakh-Ayastan*. It has joined the left-wing alliance alongside the Union of Constitutional Law and *Zharang* (Heritage) Party. The ruling Armenian National Movement (ANM), too will take part in the elections in alliance with other parties. That association called Republic also incorporates the Christian-Democratic Union, the Republicans, the Social-Democrats and the Liberal Democratic Party *Ramkavar Azatakan*. The Communist Party of Armenia, the Democrats and the National0Self-Determination association will run in elections on their own. Observers in Yerevan believe that the ANM, the Communists and the Dashnaks are the most likely winners. A total of 190 deputies are to be elected to the National Assembly, including 150 in single-mandate constituencies and 40 on party tickets. Armenia's current parliament has 243 lawmakers.

4/21/95 - New ARF publication in Armenia - *Noyan Tapan* News Agency, Yerevan: # The second issue of *Teghabah* paper has been recently published in the Armenian capital. It is not known yet what structure of the ARF this paper represents, but it is evident that the *Teghabah* took the place of mass media establishments of the ARF pro-

hibited in Armenia. The information of the paper is signed by the name of a prohibited new agency *Hailour*. It concerns the ARF and issues related to it. The paper features articles headed "We follow our way," "On human rights in Armenia and prohibition of the ARF," "Shadow election campaign," and several others.

4/21/95 - Confusion over Chechnya cease-fire - OMRI Daily Digest: # Sporadic fighting continued between federal troops and Chechen forces around the south-western village of Bamut, Interfax reported on 20 April. An aide to Russian President Boris Yeltsin subsequently denied an unconfirmed Itar-Tass report on 20 April that Yeltsin had ordered an unconditional cease-fire in Chechnya, according to AFP.

4/21/95 - Georgia denies plans to sell fighter aircraft to Iran - OMRI Daily Digest: # Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia has denied rumors that the visit by Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani to a Tbilisi aircraft factory during his three-day official visit to Georgia (his first to a CIS member state) is linked to plans for the purchase of SU-25 fighter aircraft, Western agencies reported. A similar denial was issued at the time of Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze's official visit to Tehran in January 1993. No details were released of Rafsanjani's 45-minute talk with Shevardnadze. Rafsanjani had stated before traveling to Georgia on 19 April that Iran is interested in using Georgia's transportation facilities--including the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi which he will visit--to export Iranian goods to Europe.

4/21/95 - Lukin warns that Russia may take the "Central Asian" path. - OMRI Daily Digest: # Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, said his country may take the "Central Asian" path of using perfunctory referenda to extend presidential terms, deferring parliamentary elections, and restricting civil rights, if the West abandons Russia after the 9 May V-E Day celebrations, Interfax reported on 20 April. Lukin said the West has failed to appreciate President Yeltsin's commitment to constitutional democracy, which is expressed by his willingness to hold parliamentary and presidential elections on schedule. He said Russia faces enormous geopolitical difficulties that could be compounded if it departed from its voluntary transition to democracy. Lukin added, "constitutional issues are primarily our internal affair. However, the situation is such that this also concerns our national security."

4/21/95 - Uniform constitution planned for CIS member states? - OMRI Daily Digest: # A uniform constitution for adoption by all CIS member states is currently being drafted, according to unconfirmed information circulated at a meeting of the National Democratic Party of Georgia in early March and published in *Iveria-Ekspresi* on 10-13 March. The report claims that Kartlos Gharibashvili, the Georgian chairman of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Legal Commission, has initiated plans for a "super-parliament" for CIS member states.

4/21/95 - Russian premier offers Chechen truce talks - Reuter: # Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Friday offered to start talks with Chechen separatists on an unconditional cease-fire as Moscow's troops were reported to advance further into rebel-held areas. "I confirm the will of the government to start talks without any pre-conditions with the commanders of armed formations confronting federal troops in the Chechen republic aimed at reaching a cease-fire," Chernomyrdin said in a statement. His statement, which also offered an amnesty "for those who were deceived into joining the armed volunteers," was read out at a conference in the Chechen capital Grozny. There was no immediate reaction from the Chechen side. Chernomyrdin has consistently taken a moderate line on finding a solution to the conflict. The conference, attended by 350 local officials, elders and religious leaders, was aimed at finding ways to stop the war in which thousands of people had died and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes. Several attempts to introduce a truce have failed. The Russian military who run the operation in Chechnya have said that they are ready to negotiate with the separatists on only one issue -- the conditions and order of rebel surrender. Interfax news agency quoted the Russian military command in Chechnya as saying government troops on Friday advanced into mountainous southern areas still held by the rebels. Interfax said that in a single day the troops took under control at least 15 villages near the border with Russia's North Caucasus region of Daghestan, Chechnya's eastern neighbor. "The operation goes smoothly, without major clashes and casualties," Interfax quoted military press office as saying. The agency's report could not be independently confirmed. The military also said heavy fighting continued in western and central parts of Chechnya, where several rebel bastions were still holding out. Interfax quoted them as saying two servicemen were killed and two others wounded on Friday in fighting for the village of Bamut in western Chechnya. Russians lost 19 servicemen killed in two weeks of clashes with rebels holed up in Bamut, Interfax said. It said Russian artillery heavily shelled another rebel stronghold of Serzhen-Yurt some 40 km southwest of Grozny. Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai predicted a natural end to the war towards the end of April, saying that the main pockets of resistance in the region had been crushed. "It is pointless to carry out military action in the mountains, where the remaining forces of the illegal armed formation are being pushed by the regular army," he told Interfax.

4/22/95 - World Bank provides $200mln credits to Armenia - *Lragir* Daily, Yerevan: # World Bank representative to Armenia Vahram Nersissian said that the Bank has allocated a total of $200 mln. credits for Armenia. Some of the credit has already been approved, the rest is in the process of approval.

4/23/95 - Azerbaijan considers oil route - AP: # Azerbaijan would consider routing a lucrative oil pipeline through Armenia if its western neighbor would halt a seven-year territorial war and pursue a less pro-Russian policy. The routing of the pipeline, which will carry crude oil from vast fields under the landlocked Caspian Sea to market, is the subject of intense negotiations between partners in the oil consortium. Western partners favor a pipeline through Armenia and Turkey, while some regional participants argue for routes passing through Georgia, Russia or Iran. The consortium expects the fields will produce 700,000 barrels a day by 2000. Vafa Guluzade, a senior adviser to Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev, said Saturday that Armenia would have to decide on Azerbaijan's offer quickly as pumping should start by mid-1996. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been fighting over the NK region since 1988. Armenians now control the area, which is located entirely within Azerbaijan. Armenia has pursued an active pro-

Russian policy with its historical ally since the Soviet collapse in 1991.

4/24/95 - Armenian Parliament adopts statement on Genocide - *Noyan Tapan* News Agency, Yerevan (Asbarez-on-Line): # The Armenian Parliament unanimously adopted on Friday a resolution calling for international recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide. The resolution expressed its deep gratitude to all State and public organizations which have to date registered their protest and condemned the Armenian Genocide, in particular the European Parliament and the Russian Duma. The statement concluded by stating that, "being lead by the concern of preventing such crimes, [Parliament] vows to achieve international recognition and condemnation of the 1915 Armenian Genocide."

4/24/95 - Armenia denies reports of troop withdrawal offer - OMRI Daily Digest: # On 21 April, the Armenian Foreign Ministry reiterated its denial of reports by Western media that President Levon Ter-Petrossian had offered to withdraw Armenian troops from Azerbaijan in exchange for a lifting of the Azerbaijani blockade on his country, Interfax reported. According to the statement, there are no troops of the Republic of Armenia in NK. Presidential spokesman Levon Zurabyan told Interfax that Armenia is ready to exchange hostages and prisoners at any time.

4/24/95 - Armenians mark 80th anniversary of "genocide" - Reuter: # Thousands of Armenians marched through their capital on Monday to mark the deaths of their compatriots killed by the Turks 80 years ago. Dressed in black, many of them bearing candles under the bright sun, they marched up to Tsitsenakabert Hill five km from the center, site of a flower-shaped monument to the victims of what Armenia describes as the genocide. "The genocide was a purely political program worked out in the interests of the Ottoman Empire and aimed at the physical extermination of Armenians living on its territory," President Levon Ter-Petrossian said in an address. He blamed the great powers of the day -- Britain, France, Germany and Russia -- for failing to create "elementary guarantees for the existence of the Armenian people." Now he said it was incumbent on Armenia and Turkey to arrange mutually-advantageous trade and economic links and overcome their historic stand-off. Armenia says 1.5 million of its people were killed in the 1915 massacre by Turks, while Turkey says this version is grossly distorted and exaggerated. Relations between the two countries have worsened in the past two years since Armenian forces from the disputed NK enclave seized large areas of Azerbaijan, prompting harsh condemnation from Turkey.

4/24/95 - Baku wants Armenian pull-out as Turks open airspace - Reuter: # Azerbaijan, seeking to regain lands seized by Armenians, said on Monday Armenian forces must withdraw in return for Turkey's move to open a vital air corridor to Armenia. "If Armenia announces a withdrawal from territory it occupies and begins peace talks, it will have returned Turkey's gesture," Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov told Turkey's Anatolian news agency in Baku. Without Armenian withdrawal, a westward oil pipeline from the Caspian would not be built across Armenia, he added. The corridor, designated H-50, was likely to open for international flights in 10 days at the most, after Ankara and Yerevan set up a communication link, a senior civil aviation official told Reuters. Turkey shut the corridor over its airspace, the most viable air route from the west to Yerevan, in 1993 when Armenian forces overran 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. Turkey said it would open the corridor to lessen tensions in the region and facilitate peace moves between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.

4/25/95 - Armenian border shelled - *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun* Daily, Yerevan: # The Press service of Armenia's Defense Ministry reported that, on April 23 and 24, Azerbaijani units shelled border defense positions at the village of Chinari in the north-eastern Tavush district of Armenia and the village of Kirants in the nearby Ijevan district. No casualties were reported. Armenian border troops returned the fire.

4/25/95 - Yeltsin seen suspending Chechen campaign April 27 - Reuter: # Russian President Boris Yeltsin appeared poised on Tuesday to suspend combat operations in Chechnya on April 27 ahead of next month's World War Two victory ceremonies when world leaders will descend on Moscow. Itar-Tass news agency quoted Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai as saying a presidential decree had been prepared to halt Moscow's Chechen campaign from April 27 to May 15. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said earlier that Yeltsin would impose a moratorium on operations in Chechnya, but did not say how long Russia's forces would keep their guns silent. "There will be a document, probably a decree of President Yeltsin imposing a moratorium on military action in Chechnya for the period of the celebrations," Chernomyrdin told reporters, adding that the decree would be signed by Wednesday. Chernomyrdin was clearly referring to events on May 8 and 9, when US President Bill Clinton and other Western leaders are due to hail Russia's contribution to the Allied victory at events in Moscow, and the period of a Russian-US summit meeting afterwards. Although the Clinton administration initially described Moscow's problems with Chechnya as an internal Russian matter, it has become increasingly critical of the military operation in the breakaway region. Clinton agreed only after lengthy consideration to visit Moscow for the 50th anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. He is anxious to avoid any embarrassment over Chechnya during his visit. Thousands of Chechen fighters and civilians have been killed since the Kremlin sent forces into the Caucasus region last December to crush its three-year independence bid. Chernomyrdin offered last Friday to start talks on a cease-fire without preconditions. But the Russian military has said there has been no sign of a response from Chechen fighters. A total of 27 Chechen fighters have been killed in the past few days in fighting around several localities in the northeast, southeast and west of the region, Interfax news agency quoted an unnamed Russian military official as saying. Tass said that Shakhrai, who took part in the preparation of the presidential decree, said the moratorium could help promote peace in the region. "A peace-keeping initiative by Viktor Chernomyrdin could ... put an end to the Chechen crisis," Shakhrai said. Chernomyrdin, who was speaking during a visit to a war museum linked to the forthcoming World War Two celebrations, said his offer of talks without preconditions remained open. "We want, through this decree (of Yeltsin's), to appeal to everyone to stop military actions during this sacred period and we would very much like everyone to respond," he said. Yeltsin's orders appear to have gone unheeded before over Chechnya.

He ordered a halt to bombing that would endanger civilians in the capital, Grozny, last December but witnesses said bombing raids continued. It is also not clear if rebels loyal to Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev would stop fighting if the Russians did. Battles in Chechnya appeared to take a more violent turn earlier this month when Russian troops captured the small town of Samashki. Several reports described the attack as a massacre of civilians. Tass quoted a government press release on Tuesday as saying a commission would be set up to examine illegal acts by Russian troops against Chechen civilians. It said the decision was taken during talks between Russian and Chechen officials in Grozny which discussed "instances of looting, burglaries and atrocities committed by (Russian) servicemen against the peaceful population."

4/25/95 - Aliyev says only Russia will settle NK issue - Itar-Tass (Asbarez-on-Line): # Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev said that Russia, as a great state, could and should play a more constructive role in the settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the long-disputed area of NK. The key to the solution is in Moscow, Aliyev said Monday, before a group of Russian lawmakers, in Russia. A group of Russian lawmakers, headed by Sergei Baburin, leader of the Russian Popular Union, arrived in Baku Sunday. The group had already been in Armenia and NK studying the situation in the conflict zone. "No other state, no matter how much political weight it has, will be able to carry this convoluted task except Russia," Aliyev said. He believed that Russia was interested in "stamping out the fire both in the region and its southern [Russian] frontiers, and stabilizing the overall situation in the Caucasus." This would be in Russia's military interest. Describing his vision of the settlement process, Aliyev said, "It goes without saying the rights and security of Armenians in NK must be ensured." Furthermore, he stressed, "Azerbaijan will never agree to losing 20-percent of its lands." "Azerbaijan considers the liberation of NK, the return of more than a million refugees, as well restoring territorial integrity and inviolability of the Republic's frontiers as it's legal right," Aliyev added and claimed "We want to achieve it by peaceful means." "The war between the two Transcaucasian republics which has been raging for over seven years is pointless, as it has not brought anything except suffering to the two peoples." At the same time, Aliyev said he would like to see more significant results in the talks which have already led to an 11-month-long cease-fire in the conflict area, significant results such as a broader political agreement and a peace treaty to be signed by both sides. Aliyev also said he was concerned over the strengthening of the Russian-Armenian military alliance. In his view, joint military exercises to be held on Armenian territory will not help stabilize the situation in the region. "What is it all for, if we are members of the CIS and parties in the treaty on collective security?" Aliyev said, referring to demonstrations of military strength in close vicinity of Azerbaijani borders.

4/26/95 - OSCE Assistance Group for Chechnya Starts Work in Grozny - OSCE Press Release No. 25/95: # The OSCE Assistance Group for the Chechen Republic begins work in Grozny, the Chechen capital, today. The team of six diplomats led by Ambassador Sandor Meszaros of Hungary, will work from their base in central Grozny. The Group plans to open branch offices in the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia soon. The OSCE Assistance Group was established by the OSCE Permanent Council on 11 April to perform the following tasks: - promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and establishment of facts concerning their violation; help foster the development of democratic institutions and processes, including the restoration of the local organs of authority; assist in the preparation of possible new constitutional agreements and in the holding and monitoring of elections; - facilitate the delivery of the region by international and non-governmental organizations of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis, wherever they may by located; - provide assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and to international organizations in ensuring the speediest possible return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the crisis region; - Promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles and pursue dialogue and negotiations, as appropriate, through participation of "round tables", with a view to establishing a cease-fire and eliminating sources of tension; - support the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law, public safety and law and order.

4/26/95 - Russia offers last-chance truce to Chechen rebels; Russia to create Caucasus army, violating CFE pact; US journalist refused entry to Russia - Reuter: # Russia offered a truce to Chechen rebels on Wednesday to coincide with VE-Day celebrations but announced plans to boost forces in the volatile North Caucasus region, foreseeing new troubles there. Interfax news agency said Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had ordered his forces in breakaway Chechnya to stop military operations for 10 days from midnight on May 1. But he said the future of the truce would depend on goodwill from the Chechens. "If illegal armed formations continue firing at the federal troops we will have to take adequate measures," he said. "In that case military operations will resume and continue until the bandits have been completely exterminated. There will be no mercy." It was not clear whether Grachev, who is commanding Moscow's biggest military operation since the 10-year Afghan war, was in a position to order his troops to stop shooting in Chechnya without formal agreement from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai said on Tuesday that Yeltsin was about to sign a decree introducing a unilateral cease-fire from April 27 until May 15. But Interfax quoted a Yeltsin spokesman as saying on Wednesday that the Russian leader had not yet considered any decree on a Chechen cease-fire. Interfax said Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev backed the idea of talks, but the agency also quoted Grachev as ruling out any negotiations with Dudayev, declared as a state criminal in Russia. # Russia will create a new army for the volatile North Caucasus region in a move which will breach limits laid down in a key disarmament pact, Interfax news agency quoted a military leader as saying on Wednesday. The agency quoted Russian ground forces commander Colonel-General Vladimir Semyonov as saying the new 58th Army should be in place by June 1. Troops currently based in the district report to several different ministries and are part of different army groups. Semyonov said the deployment of a new army in the region would exceed limits in the

Ministry has noted our concerns ... that someone traveling with valid documents for Russia was not allowed to transit Russia," he said. Nobody was immediately available to comment at the US embassy. Levine reported on Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Caucasus for more than two years from Tbilisi and the Uzbek capital Tashkent until last October, when he was forced to move his Tashkent office to Kazakhstan.

4/26/95 - <u>Turkish foreign minister to visit Azerbaijan</u> - Reuter: # Turkish Foreign Minister Erdal Inonu will visit Azerbaijan officially on May 3-4, his ministry said on Wednesday. The visit will follow Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's trip to Baku on April 12 to sign with Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev an oil deal raising Turkey's stakes in a Caspian oil consortium. "The visit will be part of a process of close political consultations with Azerbaijan and is planned to give momentum to the ties," ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman said. Turkey, which backs ethnically-related Azerbaijan in Baku's eight-year-old conflict with Yerevan, wants Armenian forces to evacuate one fifth of Azerbaijani lands they occupied in 1992. It is part of the nine-member Minsk group effort for an international settlement to the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over the enclave of NK.

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ARMENIA

VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Government shuts down largest opposition organization, independent newspapers and news agencies.
Assassinations, harassment, detention and interrogation of political opponents increase.
Freedom of expression and information restricted.
The rule of law at risk in Armenia.

31 December 1994

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I. SELECTED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS VIOLATED

1. The Law of the Republic of Armenia - On Civic-Political Organizations - *Teghekagir*, No 4 (984), 26 February 1991, Article 73 7
2. The Law of the Republic of Armenia - On the President of the Republic of Armenia - *Teghekagir*, No 15 (995), § 316 ([1 August] 1991) 7
3. Resolution of the Supreme Council [Parliament] of the Republic of Armenia - On Joining the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to that Covenant - *Teghekagir*, No 7 (987), 15 April 1991, Article 122 7
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966 8

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President has clearly overstepped the authority granted to him by law. The ARF statements accused the Government of engaging in an increasingly virulent campaign to discredit the organization on the eve of parliamentary elections and while the alliance of opposition political organizations, including the ARF, was gaining increasing popular support. The ARF statements also called upon its members numbering in the thousands to remain calm during such a critical uncture and "not resort to any steps that may endanger the people of Armenia."

On December 31, another opposition political party issued a statement condemning the government's actions against the ARF, characterizing it as politically motivated, and demanding that the government's extra-judicial allegations which are without foundation be brought to an open court where the accused should have the right to respond. Members of a coalition of opposition organizations have also voiced their outrage against the Government actions and their support for the ARF's right to continue its political activities.

Officials of the US Embassy in Yerevan and the State Department in Washington have communicated their concerns to the Armenian government regarding the banning of the country's leading opposition party, the arrest of opposition leaders, and the closing of independent media outlets. A senior Department of State source reported that the US government has serious reservations about President Levon Ter-Petrossian's recent crack-down against the political opposition, and the independent media. The Department of State voiced concern that the December 28 decree may represent an unfair effort to find an entire party guilty for the alleged crimes of individual members. The Armenian government, he said, has assumed the guilt of the ARF prior to presenting any evidence to support its claims in an open and impartial court of law. The Department of State official, who asked not to be named, said that if the individuals accused of crimes by the President are not openly charged, and given a free and fair trial, it will lead many to the conclusion that the Armenian government has acted against its political opposition based primarily on partisan considerations and the growing unification of the opposition on the eve of forthcoming parliamentary elections in the Spring. The Department of State source also confirmed that the US Embassy in Yerevan has specifically voiced its concerns about the closing of nearly a dozen newspapers, and the confiscation of files, computers, printing equipment, telephones, fax machines, and other property. Of particular importance to the Department of State was the closure of a number of Armenian businesses which are joint ventures with foreign investors, including several US and Canadian firms. The US Embassy in Yerevan has called upon the Armenian government to ensure that all legal proceedings against those accused meet accepted international standards for due process, that all charges be made publicly, and that each defendant be afforded a free, fair, and open trial.

3. Government crisis, accusations of government wrongdoing, restrictions of the freedom of expression and other civil and political rights in Armenia: a chronology

The following chronology sheds further light on the current developments in Armenia, showing a pattern of political crisis at least dating back to early 1994, a decline in the approval rate of the government, a growing government intolerance against opponents, unresolved political assassinations other forms of intimidation, former government officials accusing the government of political violence and corruption, and an increasing repression of the right to free expression. The following chronology summarizes press reports reprinted in the next section of this paper.

1/5/94 - Parliament has lost its credibility and has become a "paper tiger ... from whom nobody expects anything." Government ministers no longer bother to report to the parliament and the President considers below his dignity to address the parliament more than two or three time year.

1/31/94 - The President's former National Security Advisor Ashot Manucharian criticizes the government for having lost control over the internal ministry which has become increasingly powerful.

1/31/94 - An opposition party reports that one of its candidates for supplementary parliamentary elections was arrested.

2/1/94 - In its annual report to Congress, the US Department of State reported that, while Armenia respected human rights in general, nonetheless "there were several reports of police brutality during the year [1993]."

2/3/94 - The Internal Minister accuses Ashot Manucharian and a number of his former associates, including former mayor of Yerevan Ambartsum Galstian, of corruption and creating a "criminal circle" which was involved in illegally exporting the country's wealth.

2/8/94 - The state department of television and radio announced that, henceforth it will charge the equivalent of two US dollars per minute (a prohibitive amount in Armenia) for political organizations to broadcast their radio messages.

2/10/94 - The largest opposition political party in Armenia, ARF-Dashnaktsutiun, proposes the formation of a temporary government of national consent to lead the country out of the political crisis, to convene a constitutional assembly in order to draft the a constitution, and to organize new parliamentary and presidential elections.

2/14/94 - The Armenian Parliament creates a commission to investigate allegations of abuse of power by senior government officials, allegations made by Ashot Manucharian, former national security advisor of the President, and counter-allegations against Manucharian by the Minister of Interior.

3/11/94 - An independent poll indicates that only 3% of Yerevan residents supported the ruling political party, the Armenian National Movement, and that Communist party and the opposition ARF-Dashnaktsutiun enjoyed an approval rate of 13.7% and 11.3% respectively.

4/14/94 - Former Mayor of Yerevan Ambartsum Galstian testifies before the parliamentary commission on Governmental Abuse and Corruption. Galstian complained about police and internal ministry interference in his business activities, accused the Internal Minister of criminal activities, and said he had reported about those activities to the President but the President was too "weak and tired" to take action against the Internal Minister. Galstian also warned that the forthcoming parliamentary elections well be dominated by the police and cited the example of a recent election when the police chief of one district "provided" 90% of the voter turnout.

/16/94 - Noted Armenian writer and a member of parliament Vartkes Petrossian is assassinated in Yerevan.

/29/94 - A survey commissioned by the US Embassy Information Service of Yerevan showed that 57.1% of respondents had a negative view of the President and 73.2% gave a negative vote to the Minister of Interior. The same poll showed that the most popular political organizations in Armenia were the ARF-Dashnaktsutiun and the Communist Party, with 15.9% and 12.7% approvals respectively.

5/25/94 - The ministry of foreign affairs revokes the accreditation of a correspondent of a Russian newspaper for violating a "journalist's ethical norms" and publishing incorrect information.

5/30/94 - The Minister of Interior and the acting chief of national security refuse to testify before the parliamentary commission on Governmental Abuse and Corruption.

6/1/94 - Further testimony at the parliamentary commission on Governmental Abuse and Corruption provided evidence of court officials taking bribes, and the Internal Minister collecting illegal taxes allegedly for the benefit of the defense ministry. The former defense minister testified that he was not aware of any funds transfer from the internal ministry and that, in any event, the illegal taxes collected by the internal ministry exceeded the entire budget of the defense ministry.

6/3/94 - Unidentified gunmen open fire on the car of Vladimir Grigorian, a state prosecutor in charge of investigating state officials suspected of abuse of power and corruption. His driver is seriously wounded.

6/8/94 - During a parliament session, Prosecutor-General Ardavast Gevorkian named the four gunmen who on 6/3/94 had attempted to assassinate Vladimir Grigorian, a state prosecutor in charge of investigating state officials suspected of abuse of power and corruption. Two of the identified gunmen were employees of the interior ministry.

6/9/94 - The parliamentary commission on Governmental Abuse and Corruption issued a report confirming Ashot Manucharian's accusations against the Interior Ministry, including embezzlement of funds and the wire-tapping of phones, and recommended that the President temporarily suspend Interior Minister Vano Siradeghian. The commission also stated that Siradeghian's accusations against Manucharian were slanderous.

6/14/94 - Two officials of the interior ministry who were in charge of the team investigating the 6/3/94 assassination attempt against Vladimir Grigorian, a state prosecutor in charge of investigating state officials suspected of abuse of power and corruption, were dismissed by Interior Minister Vano Siradeghian. One of the officials dismissed had also participated in an investigation leading to the arrest of the Minister of Trade for taking bribes.

6/15/94 - The Communist Party of Armenia criticized the draft constitution prepared by the government, which will vest broad powers in the President, making him accountable to no one. This would lead to the establishment of a totalitarian regime in Armenia, said the Communist Party.

6/15/94 - The Armenian Sakharov Fund accused officials of the Interior Ministry with human rights violations, citing arbitrary arrests and detentions, and public disclosures of suspects' names and alleged crimes committed before culpability was established in a court of law.

5/15/94 - The President defended in parliament the draft constitution prepared by parliamentary commission which he chairs, proposing a strong presidential system. He said, the joint draft prepared by a group of six opposition parties and proposing a parliamentary system will not function in Armenia.

5/29/94 - Intolerance grows in the parliament during the continuing debate on two draft constitutions proposed by the President and a group of opposition political organizations.

6/10/94 - During a parliamentary debate considering the report of the commission on Governmental Abuse and Corruption, MPs accused Interior Minister Vano Siradeghian of exceeding the limits of his authority and neglecting the laws of the republic. President Levon Ter-Petrossian was also accused of creating the "grounds for arbitrary rule and violations of law in the republic" by appointing ministers without the consideration by appropriate parliamentary commissions.

6/30/94 - Former mayor of Yerevan Ambartsum Galstian accused the President of responsibility for the illegal actions of the Interior Minister Vano Siradeghian. He said the Interior Minister was a thief and a criminal and must be tried. Galstian said he had evidence to prove that the Interior Minister was involved in organizing more than 30 murders, including the murders of former chief of the rail system Ambartsum Kandilian and former KGB Chief Marius Yuzbashyan. Galstian accused the Interior Ministry of falsifying the forensic evidence relating to these murders, including cartridges found at the scene of the murders. Galstian also accused the interior ministry of racketeering activities, extorting large sums from Armenian businessmen working in Moscow. Finally, Galstian warned that the government was preparing a policy of mass terror against the opposition.

7/5/94 - More than 20,000 people participated in a protest rally in Yerevan. Addressing the rally, Ashot Manucharian said the President and Interior Minister were condoning political persecutions.

7/15/94 - During another opposition rally with 50,000 participants, Ashot Manucharian accused the President of being behind a string of political slayings. Manucharian accused the President of ordering the murder of former KGB Chief Marius Yuzbashyan and former chief of the rail system Ambartsum Kandilian. Manucharian also accused the President of being behind the recent (6/3/94) assassination attempt against Vladimir Grigorian, a state prosecutor in charge of investigating state officials suspected of abuse of power and corruption.

7/18/94 - Opposition group claims government agents attempted to provoke a riot during the 7/15/94 protest rally.

7/19/94 - Ashot Manucharian, former advisor of the President on national security, said during a press conference that the consolidation of mafia structure were complete in the republic and police intimidation was on the rise. Manucharian also said special units were working within the same structures under the umbrella of the ministry of interior, the State Department of National Security and the President's guards, committing terrorist acts on order from the President.

7/21/94 - The General Prosecutor of Armenia initiated proceedings against Ashot Manucharian for slandering government officials.

7/21/94 - Parliament refused to extend the term of the commission on Governmental Abuse and Corruption. The commission chairman said a large number of members of parliament are also government officials, they are not independent and are not interested in extending the work of the commission.

7/22/94 - The Prosecutor General instituted criminal proceedings against Ashot Manucharian who said that he would corroborate his accusations with evidence and testify in his defense but only in an open court.

7/23/94 - The Armenian Democratic Party stated that the government's inadequate and evasive responses to accusations of corruption and wrongdoing leaves the impression that "the leaders of Armenia have nothing to say to defend their honor and merits, [and] that they fear an investigation."

8/4/94 - An article in *Pravda* points to a Watergate-type scandal in Armenia. Opposition party leader informs of bugging devices found in the organization's offices.

8/6/94 - President Levon Ter-Petrossian restricts the authority of the Interior Minister in two spheres - finances and cadre selection.

8/9/94 - Another independent poll shows that the government's rating was still declining and the opposition ARF-Dashnaktsutiun's increasing.

8/9/94 - A group of reporters issue a joint statement protesting against threats on the exercise of their freedom of expression.

/11/94 - The National Democratic Union (NDU), an opposition organization headed by former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Vasken Manukain, withdrew from the parliamentary commission charged with drafting the new constitution. NDU said the commission was under extreme pressure to adopt resolutions which were in agreement with the President and the press was excluded from the deliberations of the commission.

/13/94 - A regional official of the internal ministry was killed in his office.

/. ./94 - Another protest rally organized by NDU drew some 70,000 people in Yerevan. Ashot Manucharian warned that a police state was in the process of being established in Armenia.

/26/94 - Independent newspapers in Armenia issue an ultimatum to the ministry of communications for the ministry's failure to repair the telephone service in their offices.

/31/94 - Independent newspapers publish white spaces in their newspapers as a protest against the ministry of communications who had failed to repair their telephone lines. They said, without proper telephone service, the quality of their newspapers were affected.

/1/94 - During another protest rally in Yerevan, opposition NDU leaders warned that, although an actual dictatorship had not yet been established in Armenia, but the republic was headed in that direction. NDU urged more people to become involved in order to "check against dictatorship."

/19/94 - Another NDU organized rally drew 25,000 people in Yerevan. Speakers warned that, if the political situation in the country remained the same, the future parliament will be composed of police and military men.

9/23/94 - The trial of Vahan Avakian, a former deputy of Ashot Manucharian, began in Yerevan. Avakian is accused of the illegal possession of weapons and divulging state secrets. Manucharian maintain that Avakian is innocent and the charges against him are unfounded.

10/3/94 - Another mass protest rally was organized in Yerevan where the formation of an opposition alliance was announced - the National Coalition Alliance, joining the forces of the main opposition organizations, including the NDU, ARF-Dashnaktsutiun, and six others. Four goals were announced: (1) the acceptance of territorial compromise in exchange for the recognition of Nagorno-Karabagh's status; (2) the safeguarding of a modicum of social security and quality of life for the population; (3) the establishment of human rights and democratic guarantees in the republic; and (4) securing the legitimate conduct of forthcoming parliamentary elections.

10/5/94 - A Moscow Armenian businessman Jilalian accuses Armenia's ministry of interior of attempting to assassinate him.

10/6/94 - The National Coalition Alliance issues a statement reiterating its four purposes announced the previous day at a rally and warned against "power structures" establishing control over all spheres of life in the republic and creating a state within the state, the judiciary's lack of independence, and harassment, political persecution and violations of human rights in general. The statement further warned that a dictatorship was underway in the republic.

10/10/94 - A protest rally organized by the opposition National Coalition Alliance drew some 50,000 in Yerevan.

101/10/94 - The defense attorney of Vahan Avakian, a former deputy of Ashot Manucharian, accused the judge trying the case of bias and committing numerous violations of law during the trial.

10/14/94 - A Russian newspaper article reveals a pattern of curtailment of the freedom of the press in Armenia.

10/21/94 - Opposition members of parliament are assaulted by city officials in the second largest city of Armenia, Gyumri, while attending a political rally.

10/22/94 - The Armenian parliament condemns the incident in Gyumri where opposition MPs were assaulted with impunity.

10/24/94 - Another protest rally in Yerevan organized by the National Coalition Alliance draws some 40,000 people.

10/25/94 - The editorial offices of *Azg* newspaper in Yerevan is firebombed for the second time.

10/26/94 - The President's spokesman said, the opposition, having lost its political ratings and the population's support, was exacerbating the pre-election political atmosphere by taking its struggle to the streets and destabalizing the situation in the republic.

10/26/94 - The Gyumri regional offices of *Hailour* news agency were ransacked by persons believed to be connected with the 10/21/94 assault in the same city against opposition members of parliament.

0/31/94 - Representatives of some 20 newspapers and news agencies, including opposition and independent newspapers and agencies, issued a statement protesting against and condemning the recent attacks and intimidation on the press in the republic.

0/31/94 - Another protest rally was held in Yerevan.

1/2/94 - A parliament leader characterized the privatization program advanced by the government as theft, because the cost set for the privatization was artificially low.

1/29/94 - Speaking at an opposition rally in Yerevan, former presidential advisor on national security Ashot Manucharian warned that the government had already passed in the hands of the mafia and that the mafia will attempt to solidify its position in government during the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Manucharian also said that credits provided to the country by international financial organizations will become a new target for theft.

2/4/94 - The foreign ministry strips the accreditation of reporters from three opposition newspapers and one news agency.

2/6/94 - The opposition ARF-Dashnaktsutiun warned that authorities had stepped up their campaign to discredit the organization, and were using new methods to discredit the organization by accusing it with involvement in illegal activities. The ARF warned that more accusations, harassment, and blows against the party were expected.

2/9/94 - The Chairman of the parliament's judiciary commission accused the government of committing human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and false accusations against individuals, and tending towards despotic rule.

12/19/94 - Opposition MP and a member of the ARF-Dashnaktsutiun, Garnig Isagulian reported that two attempts were made to kidnap him

12/19/94 - Former mayor of Yerevan and opposition MP Ambartsum Galstian was assassinated in Yerevan. On 6/30/94, Galstian had accused the President and the Interior Minister of criminal wrongdoing, including political assassinations, and abuses of power.

12/20/94 - Two prominent MPs, including a former Prime Minister, resigned from parliament in protest over the murder of Ambartsum Galstian the government's refusal to address the issue in parliament.

12/21/94 - Some 40 MPs, including members of the ARF-Dashnaktsutiun and NDU, resigned from parliament or suspended their participation in parliament session in protest over the murder of their colleague Ambartsum Galstian.

12/21/94 - Another disgruntled former associate of the President and MP Albert Baghdassarian accused the leadership of the republic of carrying out a program of assassinations designed to incite a reign of terror in the country.

12/23/94 - MPs who resigned or suspended their participation in the activities of the parliament founded the Representative Council to serve as an alternative to the parliament in an effort to revitalize the country's legislative.

12/23/94 - The defense attorney of an ARF leader, Hrant Markarian, detained by authorities without charge since December 4 released detailed information about the case to the press. Markarian was arrested without a warrant and his house searched for five hours. Markarian was first interrogated as a suspect in drug trafficking charges, and later charged with the illegal possession of a handgun and ammunition.

12/27/94 - The Representative Council held another session and set its goals as (1) the establishment of supervisory and legislative functions, the separation of powers, and checks and balances, (2) to put an end to the unlimited tolerance of crime, corruption and irresponsibility, and (3) the creation of a moral atmosphere and legal safeguards for the holding of parliamentary elections next Spring.

12/27/94 - The government accuses an ARF member for the murder of Ambartsum Galstian. The suspect surrenders to authorities after hearing in a television broadcast that he was being accused of the crime.

12/27/94 - The ARF-Dashnaktsutiun issued a statement protesting against the violations of democracy and human rights in Armenia and expressing hope that "the international community will give the correct assessment to the events [in the country] and draw appropriate conclusions." The ARF statement then discussed the government's campaign to discredit the party, and the latest attempt to ascribe the murder of Ambartsum Galstian on a member of the party, and by inference on the party.

1. The Law of the Republic of Armenia - On Civic-Political Organizations - *Teghekagir*, No 4 (984), 26 February 1991, Article 73

...]

Article 7. Suspension and Prohibition of Civic-Political Organizations

In the event of a violation of the legislation of the Republic of Armenia, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia suspends or prohibits the activities of a civic-political organization based upon a motion by the Prosecutor-General or the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia.

In the event of a suspension of the activities of a civic-political organization, written information about the decision and the violations of laws committed by the civic-political organization is provided to the leadership body of that organization and a deadline is set for the elimination of the said violations.

After the elimination of the violations of the laws, the civic-political organization informs about it the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia, which gives permission for the resumption of the civic-political organization's activities within one month after the expiration of the deadline set by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia.

]

It is possible to suspend the activities of a civic-political organization for a duration of six months.

]

Article 8. Supervision of the Lawfulness of the Activities of a Civic-Political Organization

The lawfulness of the activities of a civic-political organization is supervised by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia....

2. The Law of the Republic of Armenia - On the President of the Republic of Armenia - *Yerkrapah*, No 15 (2), 15 August 1991

[...]

The President of the Republic of Armenia may issue decrees and orders within the limits of his/her power, based on the Republic of Armenia Constitution, the Laws of the Republic of Armenia, and the Acts of the Supreme Council.

[...]

The decrees of the President of the Republic of Armenia may not contradict the Constitution or Laws of the Republic of Armenia, shall be respected by the Supreme Council [Parliament] of the Republic of Armenia, shall be executed on the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

[...]

3. The Law of the Republic of Armenia - On the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to that Covenant - *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun*, No 7 (9), 15 April 1993, Article 122

Guided by the principles of Armenia's Declaration on Independence;

Striving to reinforce the principles of democracy and internationally recognized norms of human rights;

Affirming that the harmonization of the interests of the state and the individual is the fundamental assurance of Armenia's future progress;

Convinced that the existence of any [illegible] through the security of [illegible] and national-[illegible] liberties of each citizen of that [illegible];

Desiring for the Republic of Armenia to be [illegible] among the ranks of the international community as a state which recognizes that community's legal and moral norms and is guided by them;

Declaring its fidelity to the precepts of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

The Supreme Council of the Republic of [illegible]

[illegible] International Covenant on Civil and Political [illegible]

2. To join the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on [illegible] Rights,

3. To [illegible] legislative actions of the Republic of Armenia conform to the United Nations' Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

4. Until [illegible] conformity is achieved, to recognize the supremacy of these provisions [illegible] Republic,

5. To send the text of this resolution to the General Secretary of the United Nations and all the members of the United Nations.

1 April 1991, Yerevan

I. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966

...]

Article 7. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment....

...]

Article 9. (1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention....

(2) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.

(3) Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release....

(4) Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

(5) Anyone who has been victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

Article 10. (1) All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

...]

Article 12. (1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law....

[...]

Article 14. ...

(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

[...]

(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;

[...]

(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

[...]

Article 15. (1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed....

[...]

Article 17. (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, not to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

[...]

Article 19. (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.


(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

[...]

Article 21. The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law....

[...]

THE ARMENIANS



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THE ARMENIANS

by David Marshall Lang
and Christopher J. Walker

From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948:

Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

INTRODUCTION

Between 1895 and 1920, the Armenian problem was constantly in the news headlines. The massacres perpetrated by Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1894-1896, and then by the Young Turk regime between 1915 and 1918, aroused horror comparable with later world reaction to Hitler's treatment of the Jews. Adolf Hitler himself was publicly to extol the genocide of the Armenians, and ordered his troops invading Poland in 1939 to behave as the Ottoman Turks had done in 1915. The Führer declared: 'I have given orders to my Death Units to exterminate without mercy or pity men, women and children of the Polish-speaking race. It is only in this way that we can acquire the living room we need. After all, who today remembers the extermination of the Armenians?'

The victorious Allies in 1919 made grandiose declarations about the establishment of a free and independent Armenia, which was to rise upon the ruins of the ancient homeland in eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasia. None of their promises was fulfilled. Why was this? Among the reasons may be cited the complete extermination of the original Armenian population over some three quarters of the affected territory; the war-weariness of the Allied powers; the eclipse of President Woodrow Wilson and the growth of American isolationism; and above all, the agreement concluded in 1920 by two political 'outcasts', Kemal Atatürk and V.I.Lenin, to carve up Armenia's traditional homeland between them, to the exclusion of the Western 'Imperialist' powers.

For nearly half a century after the First World War, the Armenian Question was relegated into the background. The dynamic personality of Kemal Atatürk (d.1938) dominated the Turkish scene. Many foreign observers welcomed the prospect of a regenerated Turkey, and were happy to bury gloomy memories of past racial discord. Turkey was neutral in the Second World War, for which the Western Allies were profoundly grateful.

Stalin the Georgian, with his Armenian lieutenant A.I. Mikoyan, was content for the time being to build up a national home for the Armenians within the cramped frontiers of the Armenian S.S.R. During the past half century, the Soviet government has been very cautious about encouraging revanchist or irredentist tendencies, either within Soviet Armenia, or among the émigré communities. The main exception to this policy was Stalin's 1945 campaign to annex Kars and Ardahan, in conjunction with a parallel drive to take over most of Persian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. When Armenians demonstrated in Erevan in 1965, during the 50th anniversary of the 1915 genocide, many were rounded up by the Soviet police and sent to labour camps for a few months. In 1976, Mr. Kosygin reaffirmed that the Soviet Union has no territorial claim on Turkey.

The importance of Turkey in NATO and CENTO means that the 'Balkanization' of this country through the detachment or local autonomy of its Armenian and Kurdish areas is viewed without sympathy by the USA and its allies. Since the Second World War it has suited Western interests to keep Turkey's eastern provinces empty and desolate as a 'buffer zone', rather than see them repopulated with Armenians on friendly terms with their brethren in the Armenian S.S.R.

Talaat Pasha, Turkey's Minister of the Interior during most of the First World War, and chief architect of the 1915 massacres, expressed the hope that his solution of the Armenian problem, if not permanent, would last for at least half a century. This proved quite a good estimate. Outside Istanbul itself, none of the descendants of the million and a half Armenian victims has been resettled in present-day Turkey. Symbolically, one of the main thoroughfares in Ankara today is named Talât Paşa Bulvar. After the cataclysm of 1915-1918, it was bound to take at least two generations before the scattered Armenians of the diaspora recovered their poise and their sense of national unity. During the past two decades, we have seen a revival of Armenian self-confidence in many areas of the world. Several political events have provoked the now resurgent Armenians to a revived sense of protest and grievance. Among these events we may cite the occasional murderous attacks on Christian minorities in the streets of Istanbul (notably on 6 September 1955), and Turkish excesses committed against Armenians in Cyprus in 1963, and again during the invasion of 1974.

* * * *

In this Report, the joint authors have tried to put this serious and as yet unresolved minority problem of the Armenians into some kind of perspective. Neither of us has any axe to grind; nor has either of us any Armenian blood or family connection. Both of us have travelled extensively in various parts of Armenia. Lang was in Tabriz (Persian Azerbaijan) from 1944 to 1946, and visited the Iranian foothills of Mount Ararat; he explored Soviet Armenia in 1966 and 1968. Walker visited Turkish Armenia, including Van, Aghtamar, Kars and Ani in 1971, also Soviet Armenia in the same year. We have attempted to be strictly factual and objective in our approach to this tragic and important minority question. It may be that our approach will seem too cold-blooded to some readers, while our Turkish friends may find it too pro-Armenian. Some of the other Reports in this MRG series concern themselves almost entirely with contemporary or recent events of the last ten years or so. We have felt it necessary in this one to dwell also on more ancient events and issues. This is partly because the Ottoman 'final solution' to the Armenian problem was put into effect more than sixty years ago, and partly because Turkish propagandists have constructed elaborate and quite fanciful, theories to prove that the Turks (who, of course, settled in Turkey from Central Asia some ten centuries ago) are really the descendants of the original inhabitants of Armenia and Asia Minor. Many people have been taken in by these Turkish claims, and we feel it necessary to re-state some of the facts, based on historical and archaeological research.

Part One:
THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE

Armenia

The Armenian homeland, known historically as Great Armenia, comprises a very large area of mountainous country including most of eastern Anatolia. If we take the western boundary as situated between Kharput and Malatya in Turkey, and the eastern boundary between Khoi in Persian Azerbaijan, and the Soviet Karabagh, this makes a distance of over 450 miles 'as the crow flies'. From Armenia's northern border between Ardahan and Lake Sevan, southwards to the traditional frontier with Kurdistan, below Lake Van, measures some 250 miles. Allowing for the country's irregular shape, we arrive at an area of not less than 100,000 square miles.

The revised *Encyclopaedia of Islam* includes within 'historical Armenia' – the Arminiyya of the Arab Abbasid geographers – much of present-day Kurdistan, including the Hakkiari country. According to that authority, Great Armenia takes in all land between longitudes 37° and 49° East, and latitudes 37.5° and 41.5° North. This Encyclopaedia estimates a total area for Arminiyya of about 300,000 square kilometres, or 115,000 square miles. Lesser Armenia during the Middle Ages was a district of north-western Armenia, adjoining what is now the strategic Turkish city of Erzinjan. During the Crusades, there existed an important Armenian kingdom in Cilicia, around the Gulf of Alexandretta, and including St.Paul's birthplace of Tarsus. This kingdom was ruled by the Armenian dynasty of the Rupenids, and then by the French Lusignans. It fell to the Mamluks of Egypt in 1375. Cilicia is also known as 'Little Armenia'; it included the modern city of Adana.

Soviet Armenia today takes in only 10% of the territory of ancient Great Armenia, comprising 29,800 square kilometres. Within the Soviet Union, several Armenian ethnic areas are enclosed as enclaves within the Azerbaijan SSR, the most important one being the mountainous Karabagh, which has traditionally been 85% Armenian.

Modern maps of Turkey exclude all mention of Armenia. The area once known as Turkish Armenia is divided up into Turkish administrative districts, and old Armenian place names are replaced by Turkish forms. All mention of 'Turkish Armenia' is strictly prohibited.

Parts of Armenia, notably the River Araxes valley, and the Van district, are incredibly fertile and beautiful. This gives some encouragement to the view that Armenia was the site of the Biblical Garden of Eden. However, this description applies to less than a quarter of Armenia's overall territory. Far from being a 'land of milk and honey', the larger part of Armenia is virtually uninhabitable. The landscape is cut up by enormous mountains, many being extinct volcanoes over 10,000 feet high. Armenia's highest peak, Mount Ararat, rises to 17,000 feet. The average height of the Armenian plateau is over 5,000 feet. This windswept region has a harsh climate, winter continuing for seven months, and the short, dry summer being only three months long. A typical Armenian town, such as Leninakan, on the Soviet/Turkish border, stands 5,078 feet above sea level, and has an average winter temperature of 12°F, (−11°C). Armenia is often shaken by destructive earthquakes. The Varto area and adjoining regions west of Lake Van have been severely affected during the 1960s and 1970s. Transport is poor throughout much of the area. There are few navigable rivers, though boats can sail on Lakes Van and Sevan. During the past decade, a rail link between Istanbul and Tehran has been established, via Lake Van, and the trunk road between Tabriz and Erzerum has been improved for heavy lorries and bus traffic. The transport situation is best in Soviet Armenia. Direct air service by Aeroflot links Erevan with Moscow every few hours, and there is also direct contact with Tbilisi, Leningrad and even Beirut. Mainline railway services operate between Erevan and Baku, and Erevan and Tbilisi, and thence to Russia. A new branch was built from Erevan up to Lake Sevan some ten years ago, and modern electric trains run at frequent intervals.

Armenia is quite rich in precious and semi-precious metals and minerals. However, there is little or no oil. In Soviet Armenia, great strides have been made in harnessing the waters of the River Razdan (or Hrazdan) for hydro-electric schemes.

A particularly hard fact of geography is Great Armenia's lack of access to the sea. Being cut off from Russia by the main Caucasus Range, Armenia's nearest maritime outlets are such ports as Trebizond in Turkey, Batumi in Georgia, and Baku in Azerbaijan. From 1080 to 1375 A.D., the Cilician kingdom of Armenia had direct access to the eastern Mediterranean through several excellent ports, but this was only temporary. Otherwise Armenia is entirely landlocked, and has always suffered from this fact both economically and politically.

Who are the Armenians?

Although they speak an Indo-European language, the Armenians are descended from ancient tribes who inhabited their traditional homeland in Eastern Anatolia since pre-historic times. There is a remarkable archaeological record of continuous human occupation of the region around Mount Ararat, since the Old Stone Age. To this extent, the Biblical legend of Noah's Ark reflects historical reality, especially as a number of animals and birds, and useful plants, have developed from prototypes still extant in Transcaucasia. Anthropologists distinguish a special 'Armenoid' physical type – rather short and compact, often with a flat back to the head, and a prominent, bulbous nose.

Over a thousand years B.C., Armenia became dominated by a people known as the Urartians. 'Urartu' is actually the same name as Ararat, in the Assyrian language. The Urartians founded an important kingdom, based on the city of Van, where their ruined palaces and castles exist even today. Around 600 B.C., Urartu was overrun by various invaders, among whom were the Scythians, the Medes (ancestors of the present-day Kurds), and some people calling themselves 'Hayasa', who came from Central Anatolia, close to the old Hittite state. The Armenians of today call their land Hayastan, and their legendary ancestor, Haik. The ancient inhabitants of Armenia/Urartu did not die out, but became mingled with these invading elements. Though retaining much of their old ethnic identity, they adopted a new language, which is a distinctive member of the Indo-European group.

Persian and Greek sources begin to speak of 'Armina' and 'Armenians' from about 500 B.C. They were known under these names to the Great Kings Darius and Xerxes of Persia, and to the Father of History, Herodotus. We can thus attest continuous occupation by the Armenian nation of the land known as 'Great Armenia' and adjoining districts, from well before 500 B.C. until the annihilation of virtually all the community living in eastern Turkey

in 1915. This amounts to an uninterrupted period of two and a half millennia.

Today the scattered Armenians number at least six million, spread virtually all over the world. They consistently exhibit a high intelligence and are successful in business and professional life. They are renowned as scientists, mathematicians, doctors and dentists. They excel in the arts and in literature. Armenians are numbered among orchestral conductors and soloists, film directors, sculptors and book illustrators. They are noted for their humour, in spite of their tragic history, and most political jokes in the USSR are ascribed to a mythical Radio Erevan. Armenians are excellent cooks and famed for their hospitality. They are faithful friends, and have produced many military leaders. Their detractors accuse them of being secretive, self-willed and acquisitive.

Armenia a Great Power

Armenians are understandably proud of the fact that their country was once a great power – though only for a couple of generations, in the time of Pompey and Julius Caesar. The greatest Armenian king was called Tigranes II, and he ruled from 95 to 55 B.C. His realm extended from the Caspian Sea right across the Middle East to Syria and the Mediterranean Sea. However, Tigranes was conquered by the Roman general Lucullus – inventor of the Lucullan banquet, financed by Armenian gold! Further defeats were inflicted on the Armenians by Pompey. It is worth noting that Tigranes' son, King Artavazd II, was a man of outstanding literary culture, who composed plays in Greek, and founded a Greek theatre at his court in Armenia. Artavazd fell foul of Antony and Cleopatra (of Shakespearian fame), who kidnapped Artavazd and his family and put them to death.

If we except the now vanished Christian realm of King Abgar of Edessa, Armenia is the oldest Christian nation in the world. The introduction of Christianity is ascribed to St.Gregory the Illuminator. After enduring cruel tortures, Gregory converted the pagan Armenian sovereign Tiridates III, probably in the year 301 A.D. Christianity developed in Armenia independently of Rome and Constantinople. There are therefore certain doctrinal and liturgical differences. But this does not affect the Armenian church's claim to represent an authentic apostolic tradition in the Near East.

The distinctive Armenian alphabet was invented early in the fifth century A.D., by St.Mesrop Mashtots. Previously, all literature and official documents had been written down in Greek or in Middle Iranian. This invention of a national script enabled the Bible and most of the important works of early Christian literature to be translated into Armenian.

The Carve-Up: Armenia Falls to Pieces

The establishment of a national Church proved of vital importance in preserving Armenian national unity. Such were the political pressures that without their Church the Armenians would long ago have been assimilated by their neighbours. A fateful political decision was taken in 387 A.D., when the Romans and Persians carved up Armenia between them. In 428, the last king of the Armeno-Parthian dynasty of the Arsacids died, and was not replaced. Feudal barons or 'nakharars' vied for supreme power. The Persian Zoroastrian Great King Yezdegird did everything possible to suppress Christianity, invading Armenia in 451 with an enormous army, including squadrons of elephants. Persian domination was later followed by that of the Arab caliphs, who sent their generals (including one named Bogha the Turk) to ravage the land.

The Byzantine emperors also found Armenia a thorny problem. They deported thousands of Armenians into Thrace and Macedonia. However, several Byzantine emperors were themselves Armenians. These included remarkable Basil I (867-886) and the able but unpopular Leo the Armenian (813–820), of whom a Greek historian wrote: 'He came from the country of the Armenians, whence, according to some, his obstinacy and his bad disposition.' Another Armenian emperor was John Tzimiskes (969–976), one of the most brilliant conquerors ever to sit on the throne in Constantinople. During the ninth century, the Armenian monarchy was restored under the dynasty of the Bagratids, whose capital (now in ruins) can still be seen at Ani, on the frontier between Turkey and Soviet Armenia. Another Armenian dynasty existed in the province of Vaspurakan, further south. One of its rulers, King Gagik, built the famous church of Aghtamar, on an island in Lake Van. The revival of the Armenian independent monarchy proved short-lived. In 1045 the Greeks annexed Ani and abolished the monarchy of the Bagratids. However, the Seljuq Turks soon swept in from Central Asia and Iran, and overran Ani and much of Anatolia in 1064.

The Great Dispersion

Armenian emigration from the homeland grew into a flood. The Armenians were successful in founding a new kingdom in Cilicia (ca.1080–1375), with their capital at Sis. There they became valued allies of the Crusaders, and the last king of Cilician Armenia, Levon V Lusignan, died in exile in Paris in 1393. A number of Armenians crossed the Black Sea to found trading colonies in the Crimea. Thence they spread into Russia, Romania and Poland. Armenians played an important role in building up the Moldavian state of Prince Alexander the Good (1401–1435), while the ruler John the Brave of Moldavia (1572–1574) was himself an Armenian. In Poland, Armenians were prominent in the commercial and intellectual life of Cracow and Lvov; in the latter city, they founded an Armenian Catholic cathedral.

The fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 was followed by a fresh carve-up of Great Armenia, this time between the Ottoman Sultans and the Safavi Shahs of Persia. Like the Greeks, the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were organized into their own semi-autonomous community or *Millet*. The head of the Armenian community was the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was responsible directly to the Turkish Sultan and Grand Vizier. The office of Patriarch was occasionally sold to the highest bidder. The Armenian community was dominated during most of the Ottoman period by an elite consisting of merchants and high officials. Elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions, the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem which was technically of a higher ecclesiastical order, was demoralized by corrupt Ottoman politics, leading a modern historian, Professor A. Sanjian, to declare that the very name of Armenian became a term of opprobrium in the Holy City. However, the Ottoman government benefited greatly from the talent of the Armenians as bankers and administrators. Until the fatal troubles of the nineteenth century, the Armenian community was known as the 'loyal Millet'.

Early in the seventeenth century, Shah Abbas the Great of Persia deported thousands of Armenians, mostly from the plain of Ararat, to his capital at Isfahan. There they founded a colony at New Julfa, with a cathedral and several fine churches. From Persia, the Armenians spread into India, Singapore, Java, and more recently, into Australia.

Part Two:
THE ERA OF MASSACRES

In the course of a quarter of a century – between 1895 and 1920 – the Armenian race lost a million and a half persons by the gun or the bayonet, by deliberate starvation, and by privation and pestilence. About a third of all Armenians in the world died a gruesome, painful death. This national catastrophe is comparable to that suffered by the Jews under the Hitler regime. No Armenian household today, in 1981, is free of memories of this holocaust. It is referred to constantly in the Armenian press, and threatens to become more and more of a live issue in years to come.

The Nineteenth Century: Armenians in Ottoman Turkey

Within the Ottoman Empire, Armenians formed four broad classes. The first consisted of the rich and influential men in the government and civil service. The second was the mercantile and trading class of Istanbul and the cities of Anatolia; this was the class with which Western travellers came into contact most. The third class was the peasantry – much the largest of the four and the least regarded, except by a few knowledgeable travellers such as H.F.B. Lynch. The fourth was the warrior class of the mountaineers – men living a tough, independent existence in remote mountain fastnesses like Zeitun. In addition, there was a numerous priesthood and higher clergy.

How many Armenians were there in Turkey? There were no reliable population statistics. Ubicini (1854) put the figure at 2,400,000, and held that they constituted a majority in the provinces of Erzerum (which then included Kars, Bayazid and Childer) and Kurdistan (Van, Moush, Hakkiari and Diyarbakir). In 1882 the Armenian patriarchate in Constantinople produced figures estimating Armenians in the Empire at 2,660,000, of whom 1,630,000 lived in the 'six [Armenian] vilayets' – the provinces of Sivas, Mamuret el-Aziz, Erzerum, Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Van. Later statistics from the patriarchate in 1912 put the total at only 2,100,000; the decrease was due to the massacres of the 1890s, and the continual shift of the Armenian population across the frontier into the Russian Caucasus.

The Ottoman Turkish government had exercised little direct authority over the majority of its Armenian citizens until the second half of the nineteenth century. Up to that date, the majority in the country areas were beholden to local Kurdish feudal lords. When central government encroached, the result was almost always bad: it meant extra taxes for the peasantry, and a hardening of oppressive, anti-peasantry structures within the system. The Armenians in 'Turkish Armenia' (that is, eastern Turkey of today) had an additional problem to cope with. They were heavily intermixed with a large Kurdish population. (See MRG Report No.23: *The Kurds*.) These Kurds, originally from more southerly regions, had been settled there by Sultan Selim in the sixteenth century, on condition that they guard the frontier with Persia. The Kurds are mostly orthodox Muslims. Though not fanatical, their instincts for pillaging, and for stealing Armenian girls, were strong. Moreover the Kurds were armed, whereas the Armenians, as a Christian subject race, were forbidden to bear arms.

Bit by bit the Armenians were squeezed out. In 1839, Consul Brant had reported that 'in the whole plain of Moush there are not any Mohammedan peasants intermingled with the Armenians', but within a few decades, they were a minority in their own land. Strangely enough, the Armenians were sometimes heavily indebted to the Kurds, who acted as money-lenders, and charged a rate of interest of between 3% and 4% per month.

The reform movements of the nineteenth century in Ottoman Turkey, known as the 'Tanzimat' or reorganization, hardly benefited the Armenians at all, the main reason being that the civil administration of the empire was not reorganized. And it is arguable that the 'Tanzimat' was little but a piece of window dressing, designed to pacify European diplomats pressing the 'sick man of Europe' towards some semblance of reform.

Armenia and the Great Powers

The Armenians watched with sympathetic interest the liberation of Greece in the 1820s. Like the Balkan Slavs, the Armenians hoped that the Orthodox Emperor of Russia would deliver them from the Infidel. They held a naive and altogether exaggerated concept both of Russian power, and of Russian benevolence. In 1801, the Russians had crossed the Caucasus and annexed Georgia; in 1827, they conquered Persian Armenia, and invaded Turkish Armenia as far as Erzerum; during the Crimean War, they captured Kars. By 1864, the Russians had subjugated the largely Muslim Circassians, 600,000 of whom preferred to emigrate as 'Muhajirs' to Turkey, rather than remain under Russian autocracy. Moving into Central Asia, the Russians subjugated Khiva, Kokand, Samarkand, Bukhara and Tashkent, slaughtering thousands of Turcomans in the process.

If we recall that the Ottoman Sultan was recognized as Caliph and Commander of the Faithful, and that the Central Asian Turks were blood brothers of the Ottomans, we can see why these events caused such shock and indignation in Istanbul. Christian minorities, such as the Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians, who prayed for Russian victory, were obvious targets for Turkish reprisals, especially as these Christians were often richer and more successful than the mass of the Muslim population. (This applies largely to the urban population: the Armenian peasantry was mostly poor.) In 1877-78, the Russians liberated Bulgaria, and almost captured Constantinople itself. The Armenians had high hopes of freedom, or at least of local autonomy within the Ottoman state. They sent a delegation to the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

It remained unheard, as the world statesmen discussed their spheres of influence and strategic interest.

The hopes of the Armenians were frustrated, largely by the British Prime Minister, Disraeli. For the Conservative statesmen of 1878, the Russian advance into the Balkans and the Near East was as unacceptable as more recent advances of Russian power to their modern equivalents. Disraeli forced the Russians to evacuate Erzerum, though they retained Kars and Ardahan. An unworkable but fine-sounding clause

was introduced into the Berlin treaty, laying the Western powers under an obscure obligation to protect the Armenians from Turkish misrule. Half a dozen British consuls were left with the impossible task of policing an area as big as England and Wales, without any means of enforcing their dubious and undefined authority. Armenia remained partitioned and helpless, divided between Russia and Turkey. Disraeli, however, cleverly wrested Cyprus from Sultan Abdul Hamid (1876–1909) as the price of a defence treaty with Britain. Britain's guilt in this 'deal' was later recognized by Lloyd George. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the British Premier recalled with regret that the Tory government of 1878 had 'insisted upon placing the emancipated Armenians once more under Turkish rule, after they had been liberated by the Russian arms.'

The ambiguous provisions of the Berlin settlement led to endless recriminations on all sides. Successive British ambassadors were given the impossible task of 'reforming' the Sultan's administration, as if the proud Ottoman monarch had been some Indian Rajah under the rule of the British 'Pukkah Sahibs'. A *Punch* cartoon of November 1879 shows the British envoy, Sir Henry Layard, shouting at Sultan Abdul Hamid: 'Your Majesty *must* reform!' The Sultan replies: 'MUST!? Is there, then, a new Grand Vizier in England?' British Ambassador: 'No. But there's going to be a GENERAL ELECTION.'

The tactless and hectoring behaviour of British and other European diplomats of those days helped to aggravate Abdul Hamid's morbid and paranoiac character. The Sultan and his viziers looked on the Armenian question as a mere pretext for British and Russian interference in internal Ottoman affairs, and this strengthened their resolve to impose a solution to it, in order to avoid a break-up of the empire. It is no coincidence also that the Turkish court gravitated more and more towards the German capital at Berlin where Bismarck and later Kaiser Wilhelm II were proclaiming that 'Might is Right'.

The Armenian Revolutionary Movement

Though life continued to be tolerable, even enviable, for the wealthy Armenians of the great cities of the Ottoman empire, the situation in the eastern provinces went from bad to worse. Instead of the administration being reformed, oppression by local officials grew more intense. Abdul Hamid armed the Kurds, and encouraged them to attack the Armenian villagers. This culminated in 1891 in the formation of the notorious Hamidiye regiments, which terrorized the civilian population, just as Cossack troops in Russia did during the final years of Tsarism. In despair, the Armenians began to form underground defence groups and armed revolutionary societies. The first of these were the Armenakans of Van (1885), followed by the Hunchaks (1887, founded in Geneva) and the Dashnaks (1890, Tiflis). The last two were revolutionary socialist groups, drawing their inspiration from Russian committees like the 'Narodnaya Volya'. The Dashnaks often used armed threats against rich and conservative Armenians who refused to support the cause: they claimed, with some justification, that the regimes they opposed were more brutal and terroristic than their own intimidation.

During the early 1890s, these groups carried out a few acts of armed defiance of the Turkish authorities, and put up seditious placards calling on the people to revolt. But the first really significant action was the attempt by Hunchaks in 1894 to incite the Armenians of Sasun in Turkish Armenia to defy both the Ottoman government, and their local Kurdish overlords. The two leading revolutionaries, Mihran Damadian and Hampartzum Boyadjian, were respectively a teacher and a doctor.

Sultan Abdul Hamid and the 1894-96 Massacres

The Sasun rising was suppressed with considerable ferocit by Ottoman regulars, which led to an international outcry Foreign pressure forced the sultan to appoint a commissi with delegates from Britain, France and Russia as observe Abdul Hamid promised reforms, but there followed in October–December 1895 a series of massacres throughou Turkish Armenia, in almost every one of which impartial observers, including British consuls, noted official complicity. Just before these killings took place, the Hunchaks had organized a large and violent demonstration in Istanb which served as an additional pretext for the authorities to slaughter the Armenian populace.

In these massacres, up to 300,000 Armenians perished. Perhaps the grimmest was the second massacre at Urfa on 28-29 December 1895. About 3,000 Armenian men, women and children had taken refuge in their cathedral, t troops soon broke in. After shooting down many unarme victims, the Turks collected straw bedding, poured kerose on it, and set it alight. Consul Fitzmaurice later wrote: 'The gallery beams and wooden framework soon caught fire, whe upon, blocking up the staircase leading to the gallery with similar inflammable materials, they left the mass of struggling human bei to become the prey of the flames. During several hours the sicken odour of roasting flesh pervaded the town, and even today, two months and a half after the massacre, the smell of putrescent and charred remains in the church is unbearable.'

In despair, the Armenian revolutionaries resolved to force intervention by the European powers who had signed the Berlin treaty of 1878. In August, 1896, a group of armed Dashnaks seized the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople, an threatened to blow it up unless their political demands were met. But they gave in after holding the Bank for thi teen hours; all they obtained was free passage out of the country. However, they were the lucky ones; as they left. the sultan organized another massacre of Armenians on the streets of the capital, right under the noses of the foreign ambassadors. Most of those killed were Armenian of the poorest class – migrant workers, porters, dockers and caretakers.

Pressed by Gladstone and others to intervene, Lord Salisbury commented that unfortunately, British battleships could not operate over the Taurus mountains. The European powers discussed the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire, or even the forcible deposition of the bloodthirsty sultan. But their mutual rivalries and mistru and the enormous sums invested by some of them in the economy of the Ottoman Empire, prevented any effectiv action being taken.

Armenians in Tsarist Russia

Armenians had in general prospered from the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. A thrifty and industrious Arm nian middle-class grew up in the big cities such as Tiflis in Georgia, and Baku in Azerbaijan. Before the Soviet perio

Erevan in Armenia remained a neglected backwater. However, at the close of the nineteenth century, the Armenian population of Caucasia was still largely rural (65%) as against urban (35%). Of the urban population, the majority were humble, working-class folk.

In 1836, the Tsarist government issued a regulating statute or *polozhenie*, permitting the Armenian Church to retain its lands, and Armenian schools to keep their autonomy. But during the 1880s, the favour shown to the Armenians began to evaporate. Among the reasons for this was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, and the consequent dismissal of his liberal Chief Minister, the Armenian Count Loris-Melikov. In 1884, the Russian authorities closed the senior grades of the Armenian schools; in 1897, when Prince Golitsyn was appointed Governor-General of the Caucasus, he closed the schools altogether. This officious functionary also reduced the number of Armenians in the civil service. Then Golitsyn struck at the focal point of the Armenian nation: the Apostolic (Gregorian) Church. By a decree of June 1903, the Tsarist authorities nationalized all Armenian Church property. When the clergy resisted, the Russian police occupied Holy Echmiadzin. The Armenian revolutionaries were now supported by the hitherto hostile bourgeoisie. Cossack terror led to Armenian bombings and shootings.

During the 1905 Revolution, the governor of Baku encouraged the local Tatars in a four-day slaughter of Armenians. Similar excesses took place in several regions of Transcaucasia. In September 1905, mob violence led to serious fires in the Baku oilfields. Later on, the Armenians gained the upper hand, and worsted the Tatars. These Armeno-Tatar clashes raised the esteem of the Dashnak Revolutionary party in the eyes of the peasantry; the Dashnaks were seen to be the only effective armed group prepared to protect the peasants; and the armed power of the party had reversed the anti-Armenian policies of tsarism. However, the vicious clashes left a legacy of hatred between Armenians and Tatars. Right up to the eve of the First World War, Tsar Nicholas II continued to combat Armenian nationalism. In 1912, a number of Armenian nationalists were sent to Siberia. Others joined Lenin's Bolsheviks. Among these we must name Stepan Shahumian, one of the ill-fated Baku Commissars; Kamo (Ter-Petrossian), a celebrated revolutionary bank-robber; and A.I. Mikoyan, later a Soviet elder statesman.

A False Dawn: Armenia and the Young Turk Revolution

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 removed the autocratic powers of Sultan Abdul Hamid and reintroduced the Constitution of 1876. Initially there was a tremendous sense of liberty and fraternity among the nationalities within the Empire; Armenian Dashnaks had collaborated closely with the Young Turks in staging the revolution, and maintained an alliance with them for a few years thereafter.

Yet even within one year, relations turned rather sour. In 1909 there was a furious massacre of Armenians in Adana, claiming about 30,000 victims. It is not clear whether the Young Turks, or partisans of the deposed Abdul Hamid, were behind this bloodthirsty episode. Soon the Young Turk revolution was degenerating into mere dictatorship, and the policy of the ruling junta became one of 'the Turks above all the other nationalities'. The British Ambassador described their policy in September 1910 as 'pounding the non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar' – a remark which applies equally well to the Turkish government of 1981.

At the same time, a Turkish nationalist ideology was taking shape which was to have grave and far-reaching implications for the Armenians. This was pan-Turkism or pan-Turanianism – a doctrine which continues even today to have many powerful adepts in Turkish ruling circles. Serge Zenkovsky describes the ideology thus: 'First, the Ottoman Turks had to consolidate their grip over their empire and Turkicize its minorities. In the second, "pan-Turkic", phase, the closest relatives of the Ottoman Turks – the Azerbaijanis of Russia and Persia (the south-eastern group of Turkic peoples) – were to be taken into the Turkic state. The third step would be the uniting of all the Turanian peoples of Asia around the Turkish core.'

A biographer of one of the chief pan-Turkists, Zia Gökalp, comments: 'Gökalp, Halide Edib and their associates dreamt of a union of all the Turks under a single ruler who would renew the days of Attila, Jengiz Khan or Timur-leng.' The implications of pan-Turkism for the Armenians were extremely grave. They were among the least willing of the minorities within the empire to be Turkicized, clinging to their ancient Church as a symbol of that defiance. Moreover, their fellow Armenians in the Russian Caucasus stood in the way of the 'second stage' of pan-Turkism – the expansion to Baku, the oil city on the Caspian.

This theorizing was far from being harmless intellectual speculation – any more than the Aryan myth was under the regime of Adolf Hitler. By 1914 Ottoman Turkey was ruled by a triumvirate of Young Turk dictators, and pan-Turkism was the personal ideology of the most powerful of the three, Enver Pasha. The second of the trio, Talaat, was less of a theoretician, but had an abundance of bureaucratic cruelty in his makeup. The third, Jemal, was of a more affable disposition, but was also capable of extreme cruelty.

The First World War and the 'Final Solution' of the Armenian Question

It is often stated by Turkish historians that the mass deportation of the Armenians was forced on the Young Turk government of that time, because the entire Armenian population constituted a dangerous 'Fifth Column', sympathetic to the Western Allies and to Russia. This claim is less than the whole truth. There were a number of professions of Armenian loyalty to the Ottoman empire (notably the enlistment of Armenians in the Ottoman army); however, the last forty years had taught the Armenians to be wary of any Turkish government, none of which had shown evidence of being *their* government.

Shortly before the First World War broke out in 1914, the Dashnak party held its eighth party conference in Erzerum. During the conference, Young Turk representatives approached the Dashnaks and suggested that they should foment a rebellion across the frontier, in the Russian Caucasus. In return, Turkey would set up an autonomous Armenia under her own protection. The Dashnaks turned down the plan, proposing instead that Turkey should stay neutral in the impending conflict;

but in the event of Turkey joining the war, Armenians everywhere would be advised to do their duty as Ottoman citizens.

When war broke out, most Turkish Armenians behaved as loyal Ottoman citizens. An estimated 250,000 were conscripted into the Ottoman armies. When Enver Pasha was defeated by the Russians at Sarikamish, it was Armenian soldiers who saved him from being killed or captured by the Tsarist forces. However, some Armenians fled from Turkey into Russia, and joined volunteer regiments which the Tsarist authorities were encouraging. In Cilicia, Armenian leaders instigated a revolt against the Ottoman government, but this came to nothing.

Soon events took a tragic turn. Turkish Armenians in the Ottoman army were disarmed and herded into labour battalions, where they were starved, beaten or machine-gunned. On 24 April 1915, two hundred and fifty-four Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul were arrested and deported to the provinces of Ayash and Chankiri, where nearly all of them were murdered by the authorities.

Having lost *both* its able-bodied male population (from the army) and now its intellectual élite, the Armenian community was now almost leaderless, and the authorities turned upon it with fury. In every town and village of Turkish Armenia and Asia Minor, the entire Armenian population was ordered out. The men were usually led away and shot down just outside their villages. A far worse fate awaited the women and children: they were forced to walk southwards in huge convoys to the burning deserts of northern Syria. Few survived the privations of these terrible death marches; for months afterwards, the roads and tracks of Anatolia were littered with corpses and skeletons picked clean by the vultures. There were variations on this pattern. In Trebizond, the local Armenians were embarked in boats, and thrown overboard when well out into the Black Sea. A number were despatched by being hurled down the Kemakh Gorge, near Erzinjan.

Those who survived the long journey south were herded into huge open-air concentration camps, the grimmest of which was that at Deir ez-Zor, in Syria, where they were starved and killed by sadistic guards. A small number were able to escape through the secret protection of friendly Arabs in villages in northern Syria. Otherwise, the only refugee routes were to far-off Russia or the Balkans, apart from the remarkable escapes of two thousand besieged villagers from Musa Dagh, near Antioch, rescued by a French warship. This Musa Dagh episode forms the subject of a novel by Franz Werfel.

This systematic and ably executed genocide resulted from decisions taken at the highest government level. The Interior Minister Talaat Pasha boasted to Morgenthau, the American ambassador, that the Armenian question was dead for fifty years. The government itself was but an instrument of the Young Turk party, the 'Committee of Union and Progress', whose dominant ideology was pan-Turkism. The mass-murder was not just a matter of 'isolated incidents': it was carefully thought out and planned months, if not years, in advance. Nor did it result from religious intolerance, though the Young Turks mobilized the innate fanaticism of the village Mullahs, and the greed of Turkish have-nots. There were in fact Muslim leaders who were shocked by the measures taken, and protested against them.

Who did the killing? In some cases it was ordinary gendarmes. The government also recruited a 'Special Organization' (*Teshkilat-i Makhsusiye*), mostly composed of common criminals released from prison in Western Anatolia, on condition that they engage in the slaughter of the Armenians.

How many Armenians died? Viscount Bryce, speaking in the House of Lords on 6 October 1915, put the figure then at 'around 800,000'. The slaughter continued well into 1916, and later still. The Turkish offensive into the Russian Caucasus in the summer of 1918 claimed many thousands of victims. The Turks then used Armenian refugees as targets for bayonet practice. When the Ottoman army captured Baku in the autumn of 1918, 15,000 Armenians were butchered. Scores of thousands died of famine and pestilence after the October Revolution. As late as 1921, a British colonel in Erzerum found the Kemalists beating and starving Armenian captives to death.

Before 1914, we know that over two million Armenians lived in Turkey; since the First World War this figure has hardly exceeded 100,000. Thus the number of Armenian dead may safely be put at around 1,500,000. Another half-million became homeless refugees, whose descendants, with their tragic memories, can be found in a score of countries today.

Part Three:
THE CURRENT SCENE: RESURRECTION OF A PEOPLE

Independent Armenia, 1918–1920

The recovery of the Armenian nation dates at least symbolically from the declaration of independence of the Armenian Republic on 28 May 1918. The background to this declaration, however, is one of tragedy and remarkable heroism.

After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Russia withdrew from the First World War. Lenin and Trotsky signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which left the Caucasian peoples to the mercies of the Turks and their German allies. The Armenians began by forming a federation with the Georgians and the Azerbaijanis (Tatars, Azeris), but soon found themselves stabbed in the back. The Georgians even did a secret deal with the Turks, handing over the strategic fortress of Kars to the enemy. Led by such heroic generals and partisan commanders as Nazarbekov, Dro and Silikov, the Armenians repulsed the Turks at Sardarabad on 22-24 May 1918. The Turks then by-passed the Erevan district, and captured Baku a few weeks before the Ottoman Empire surrendered to the Allies at the Armistice of Mudros, 30 October 1918.

Thanks to initial British support, the territory of independent Armenia was considerably larger than the present-day Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, since it came to include Kars and Ardahan and areas of what is now Eastern Turkey. But economic conditions were catastrophic. The scenes of famine and privation in the winter of 1918-19 were as bad as the horrors of 1915. Half-a-million refugees, dressed in filthy rags or sacking, roamed the land, or shivered in caves and dugouts; they were reduced to eating grass or gnawing human bones, before death released them from their misery. The British High Commissioner in Tbilisi, Sir Harry Luke, gives in his autobiography, *Cities and Men*, a vivid account of his

three visits to Armenia during that critical period. In October 1919, he found in Erevan only forty officers and soldiers with uniforms to cover their nakedness; an army band in rags bravely attempted a rendering of 'God save the King'. Luke continues: 'The town, ruinous and untidy, was full of starving refugees from Turkish Armenia; on each day of our stay we saw some of these luckless people sink on to the pavements of the streets and die where they fell of sheer weakness, anaemia and lack of food. The unhappy Government did their best for these miserable wretches, but they had neither the personnel nor the resources in money and supplies to cope with more than a negligible fraction of the distressed.'

For over two years, the Armenians hung on to their independence – literally, 'like grim death'. They had some justification for their 'great expectations'. On 20 December 1917, Lloyd George had made a speech in Parliament, describing Armenia as a land soaked in the blood of innocents, and declaring that it would never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk. In summer 1918, Lloyd George again declared that Britain would not forget its responsibilities to the Armenians; French leaders made similar promises. The American President Woodrow Wilson had a deep personal sympathy for the Armenian cause. In the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, he stated that 'the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'.

Relying on these promises, the Armenian leaders came to the Paris Peace Conference with grandiose ideas for an Armenia stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. These dreams were later considerably modified, and given international legal recognition in President Wilson's delineation of the Armeno-Turkish frontier (22 November 1920). The 40,000 square miles that the American President awarded Armenia constituted, with the exception of the coastline province of Trebizond, areas which had had a substantial Armenian population prior to the genocide, and in some places an overall majority. His map was, however, doomed, since none of the great powers was prepared to guarantee it by force of arms; and also there were scarcely 100,000 Armenians still living in the Turkish part of the region.

During 1920, the world situation changed so dramatically as to make nonsense of the promises made to Armenia by the Allied powers. The British, war-weary and over-extended, evacuated Caucasia, and the Soviets liquidated the White Russian army of General Wrangel in the Crimea. President Wilson, broken in health, faced a hostile Congress, bent on Isolationism. The Turks under Kemal Atatürk amazed the world with their dramatic national recovery, culminating in 1922 with the reoccupation of Smyrna (Izmir), and the liquidation of the British-backed Greek intervention.

The Turks quickly reached an understanding with Lenin in the Kremlin. In September 1920, the Turkish warlord Kiazim Karabekir Pasha crossed the old 1914 Russo-Turkish frontier, and overran the Kars district. The Bolsheviks closed in from Azerbaijan, and proclaimed a Soviet republic in Erevan (29 November – 2 December 1920). After discussions deep into the night of 30 November, the Dashnak government decided to hand over power peacefully to the Bolsheviks; in more recent parlance, they preferred to be 'better Red than dead'.

The cession of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey was finally confirmed by the Treaty of Kars (13 October 1921). Curiously enough, this treaty also stipulated that the Nakhchevan district, once an integral part of mediaeval Armenia but later extensively peopled by Tatar Azeris, should be attached to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, based on Baku. The Nakhchevan ASSR is entirely cut off from Soviet Azerbaijan by Armenian territory, and today, over half a century later, forms a much-resented enclave situated between Soviet Armenia and Turkey. Similarly Karabagh, a patriotic Armenian region, was cut off from Armenia, and left as an enclave within Soviet Azerbaijan.

Soviet Armenia – a National Home

The Soviet Republic of Armenia set up at the end of 1920 began its life in conditions scarcely less grim than those prevailing when independent Armenia was established less than three years previously. The economic situation had improved little since 1917. Heavy snow blocked the roads, isolating Armenia from the outside world. The Revkom or Revolutionary Committee resolved to 'requisition and confiscate food from private individuals in the cities, and grain from the peasants'. Parties of soldiers, armed to the teeth, proceeded to every house, rich or poor, and forcibly removed all rice, wheat and oats, tinned or condensed milk. Sheep and cattle were taken away from the peasants. Personal property, such as carpets, jewellery, even overcoats, were taken as well, and barber's shop appliances, beehives and musical instruments were 'expropriated' by the Communists.

These excesses, and the general despair of the starving population, soon provoked an uprising headed by the surviving leaders of the Dashnak party, who attacked Erevan and deposed the local Soviet regime. But the Armenian Dashnak triumph was short-lived. In neighbouring Georgia, the Red Army conquered the local Menshevik government in February 1921. The Soviet forces then turned on Armenia, and Erevan was retaken from the Dashnaks on 2 April 1921. In the mountainous region of Zangezur, several thousand Dashnaks continued their desperate resistance until, exhausted, they fled across the border into Persia in July.

Soviet Armenia is even smaller than independent Armenia had been, and embodies only a tenth of historical 'Great Armenia'. Kars, Ardahan and Igdir were by 1921 already firmly in Turkish hands. The region of Surmalu, on the northern slopes of Mount Ararat, in which Igdir is situated, became part of Turkey, even though it had never been an integral part of the Ottoman empire; in 1827 Russia had captured it from Persia. Thus the Turkish republic could claim no historical right to it. To wipe out local patriotism in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Stalin merged several territories into a single Transcaucasian federation. This arrangement continued until the local leadership had been thoroughly purged by firing squad and Siberian exile. The republics did not emerge as separate entities until after the promulgation of the Stalin constitution in 1936.

The Soviet leadership under Stalin set out to make Transcaucasia, particularly Georgia and Armenia, a showplace. They rebuilt Armenia so that it would be a mecca for the Armenian diaspora all over the world. Although the Dashnak leadership of independent Armenia had

resisted the Soviet takeover, a number of eminent Armenian revolutionaries had worked in the true Leninist tradition – Stepan Shahumian, one of the 26 Baku Commissars murdered by British-backed elements in 1918; Kamo (Ter-Petrossian), whose daring exploits enriched the Bolshevik party funds; and A.I. Mikoyan, one of the few Old Bolsheviks to survive the Stalin purges.

Foreign relief organizations, organized by high-minded individuals such as Herbert Hoover, accorded Armenia special attention. The dreaded Cheka (OGPU) at least ensured public security of a kind – in that the Armenian peasant was no longer murdered by Turkish soldiers and Kurdish tribesmen. The Leninist New Economic Policy provided a flexible framework within which the small shopkeeper and craftsman could make a modest living – until the clampdown which attended the Five-Year plan campaign from 1928 onwards.

Symptomatic of the resurgence of Armenian cultural life in the Soviet orbit was the foundation of Erevan University in 1921. Two years later, in 1923, the distinguished Armenian architect Alexander Tamanian, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Fine Arts, was sent from Moscow to Erevan to plan the rebuilding of Erevan on modern lines, but with due regard for Armenian national traditions in building and sculpture.

An important element in the resurgence of Armenia under Soviet rule is the fact that Armenian is the first official language of the republic, along with Russian. Soviet Armenia is the only region of the world where official business is conducted primarily in the Armenian vernacular. Soviet Armenia also has a first-rate public education system. An Armenian branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences was founded in 1935, and promoted in 1943 to the status of an independent Academy. Associated with the Academy is the Byurakan Observatory, directed by Academician Viktor Hambartsumian, well known in international astronomical circles. Armenians of ability enjoy exceptional opportunities for promotion in the USSR, since they can compete freely for jobs in a vast labour and economic market of some 250,000,000 people. The late Academician I.A. Orbeli became Director of the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad, and his brother Levon was Director of the Institute of Physiology named after Pavlov. The names of Academicians Arzumanian, Knunyants, Sisakyan and Alikhanov also won international renown. In music, we have only to think of the fame and popularity of the eminent composer Aram Khatchaturian.

The economic and cultural resurgence of Soviet Armenia provoked acute dissension among the Armenian diaspora, especially between World War I and World War II. Many old Dashnaks regarded the Soviet Union as an arch-enemy, surpassed in wickedness only by the Turks. Others came to see that the fostering of a national home in Soviet Armenia is the only hope for preserving the national ethos in the harsh and competitive circumstances of the twentieth century. Sometimes this spiritual schizophrenia took tragic forms, as when a leading Armenian cleric suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies was murdered during a service in a New York church. Today, however, the Armenian Dashnak press in Boston follows Soviet Armenian affairs with sympathetic and alert interest.

Immediately after World War II, Stalin embarked on a forward policy in Transcaucasia, with a view to annexing Persian Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and parts of Turkish Armenia. From 1945 onwards, Armenians from abroad were encouraged to return home with promises of special concessions and privileges. An election to the vacant Supreme Pontificate of Holy Echmiadzin (in Soviet Armenia) was held with participation of Armenian delegates from all over the world. The growth of Armenian industry was deliberately fostered by building scores of modern factories and the completion of hydro-electric schemes harnessing Armenia's fast-flowing rivers. (Full particulars are given in the article on the Armenian SSR in the latest *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, written by a Soviet scholar, Dr. A.A. Mints.)

Immediately after 1945, conditions were harsh. Many immigrants regretted their decision to return home. But during the 1950s, Soviet Armenia really 'took off' in terms of economic growth and social improvement. In addition to natural increase through a healthy birth-rate and improved medical care, Armenians streamed home from Turkey, Persia and the Lebanon – even a few from the United States. The following figures from the Russian-language *'Bulletin of Statistics'* (Moscow, 1980) speak for themselves:

Population of Soviet Armenia

1940	1,320.000
1959	1,763,000
1966	2,239,000
1970	2,492,000
1979	3,031,000

The Armenian ethnic majority in the population is as high as 88%, significant minorities being Azerbaijan or Azeri Tatars (6%) and Russians (3%).

In the Armenian SSR, the Armenians themselves therefore now number approximately two and a half millions. This is in addition to substantial Armenian groups in other regions of the Soviet Union. For example, the communities in Georgia and Azerbaijan alone number over half a million in each case. The population density of the controversial Tatar-governed Nakhchevan ASSR is only about half that for the Armenian SSR. (The population density of the Armenian SSR averages 102 per square kilometre.) For a territory of 5,500 square kilometres, we have the following population figures:

Population of Nakhchevan ASSR

1940	131,000
1970	202,000
1979	239,000

Thus the population explosion in Soviet Armenia is bound to lead to renewed pressure for annexation of the Nakhchevan ASSR, as it has in respect of the predominantly Armenian Mountainous Karabagh *oblast*. In the latter, Armeno-Azeri inter-communal clashes and riots are not uncommon. The Armenian majority complain bitterly and quite openly about discrimination against them exercised by the Azerbaijan Tatar government in Baku. In 1977, a senior Armenian communist named Sero Khanzatian, member of the executive committee of the Soviet Writers' Union, addressed a strongly worded open letter to Mr. Brezhnev, urging the reunification of the Karabagh region with Soviet Armenia. Particularly instructive is the rapid growth of the Soviet Armenian

capital, Erevan, which began life over 2,750 years ago as the fortress of Erebuni, a citadel of the Urartian kings.

Population of Erevan

1917	34,000
1926	65,000
1939	204,000
1970	767,000
1979	1,019,000

From this, it can be seen that Erevan now contains almost a third of the entire population of the Armenian SSR. This rapid urban growth reflects the world-wide drift of rural farmers into big cities, resulting from industrialization and the search for town comforts and amenities. This somewhat artificial situation in Armenia also results from deliberate concentration of industry in the capital, and from the stony, inhospitable character of much of the countryside. Armenian industry would not be viable without substantial investment made by Moscow, in pursuance of the Kremlin policy of building up Soviet Armenia as a national home, a mecca for Armenians all over the world. The products of Armenian factories could not be sold without access to the vast Soviet market; both the urban and the rural population would starve without imports of wheat from the Ukraine.

Soviet Armenia is, of course, a one-party Communist state, dependent politically on the dictates of the Kremlin – which Armenians can sometimes influence in one direction or another. Armenians are somewhat privileged compared with other Soviet nationalities, enjoying a reasonable standard of living, a health service highly acceptable by Near Eastern standards, and excellent educational facilities. Armenians travel extensively abroad, and there is usually a direct Erevan-Beirut air service in operation. The writers of this Report have met a number of Armenians with dual nationality, e.g. holding both British and Soviet passports.

The *per capita* income of Soviet Armenia at about $500 (Nove and Newth, 1967) compares favourably with comparable figures for Turkey ($149), Spain ($276) or Greece ($292).

The fact that the hallowed peak of Mount Ararat, now in Turkish territory, is visible from many parts of Soviet Armenia provides a standing grievance, and sometimes provokes violent demonstrations. The Soviet authorities suppress these, and periodically assure the Turks of their peaceful intentions. Demands for the return of Nakhchevan the Karabagh, and parts of southern Georgia, also erupt from time to time. However, most Armenians know that without Russia, they would be politically and economically lost, and their underlying loyalty to and dependence on the Soviet Union is beyond doubt.

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Strasbourg, 11 May 1995

AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) 2

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE BUREAU

FOR MONITORING THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

IN ARMENIA

(5 July 1995)

Draft Electoral Law

THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA ON THE ELECTION OF THE DEPUTIES TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Traduction non-officielle

CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. The principles of the election of the deputies to the National Assembly and its composition.

The deputies to the National Assembly are elected in a secret ballot by the citizens of the Republic of Armenia entitled to vote, based on the free implementation of the right for general equal direct elections.

The National Assembly comprises 190 deputies.

Members of the government can not be elected to the National Assembly. Judges, employees of the Prosecution Office and the State Directorate of National Security, servicemen of the Interior Ministry and the Armed Forces can not be deputies or be nominated for election.

Article 2. The electoral system.

The elections to the National Assembly are carried out based on the majoritarian and proportional representation systems.

150 deputies of the National Assembly are elected by the majoritarian system, one National Assembly deputy from each voting district.

40 deputies of the National Assembly are elected by the proportional representation system in a single multiballot district comprising the whole territory of the republic from among deputy candidates nominated through lists.

Article 3. The right to vote.

The citizens of the Republic of Armenia who became 18 years of age prior to the day of the elections and have resided in the Republic of Armenia for at least one year prior to the day of the elections have the right to vote.

The citizens of the Republic of Armenia who became 25 years of age prior to the day of the elections and have permanently resided in the Republic of Armenia for at least three years prior to the day of the elections have the right to be elected.

Persons recognized as incompetent by a court of law, citizens in confinement by a legal court verdict and citizens wanted in a criminal investigation do not take part in the elections. Neither do persons detained under criminal charges, who were denied registration by a decision of the Central electoral committee or the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed by this law.

Each elector has a right of one vote in a single ballot district and a right of one vote in the multiballot district comprising the whole territory of the republic.

Each citizen entitled to be elected can run in only one majoritarian district and only one list.

Any restriction of the right of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia to vote is forbidden, except in cases provided by law.

Article 4. The right to nominate candidates for deputies to the National Assembly.

The right to nominate candidates for deputies to the National Assembly belongs to the voters in constituent districts and to public-political organizations or coalitions of these registered prior to the nomination-submitting deadline defined by this law.

Each public-political organization or a coalition of them has the right to propose only one list of candidates for deputies to the National Assembly.

CHAPTER II. THE BASES OF PREPARING AND CARRYING OUT THE ELECTIONS

Article 5. The the bases of preparing and carrying out the elections

The preparation and implementation of the elections is ensured by the central and district electoral committees in accordance with this law.

The organizational expenses of the elections are covered from a united fund created under the management of the Central electoral committee. The fund is formed by state allocations as well as voluntary contributions of enterprises, public organizations and individual citizens. The amount of the state allocation towards the organization of the elections is authorized by the National Assembly.

Candidates for deputies to the National Assembly participating in the elections by the majoritarian system and public-political organizations participating in the elections by the proportional system have the right to use their own funds as well as funds generated through donations and fundraisers in their pre-election publicity campaigns.

The funds used in the campaign of each candidate can not exceed the minimum [monthly] salary in the republic by a factor of more than five hundred. Candidates and public-political organizations submit disclosures of their campaign expenses to the Central electoral committee in a manner prescribed by the latter.

The enterprises, establishments and organizations, state and public entities shall provide to the electoral committees the necessary office space and furniture for the preparation and implementation of the elections and are obliged to lend practical assistance within their means to the process of preparation and implementation of the elections.

The decisions of the electoral committees adopted within their jurisdiction are subject to mandatory implementation by all state bodies, enterprises, establishments, organizations and individual citizens.

Article 6. The procedure of forming electoral districts and electoral precincts.

For the purpose of organizing and implementing the elections the territory of the Republic of Armenia shall be divided into 150 electoral districts.

The number of voters in each district shall not exceed or be less than 15 percent of the average number of voters in an electoral district.

Each electoral district shall be formed in such a way as to contain districts with common borders.

Each settlement within an electoral district shall be divided into electoral precincts. The number of voters in an electoral precinct shall not be less than 100 or exceed 3000, except for the precincts formed in certain cases with the permission of the Central electoral committee.

The precincts shall to be formed in such a way as to contain buildings and houses closest to the election site.

Article 7. Public information dissemination during the preparation and implementation of the National Assembly deputies elections

The electoral committees inform the public on their activities, the formation of electoral districts and precincts, the membership, location, working hours and the lists of constituent voters of respective electoral committees.

The electoral committees inform the citizens on the of nomination and registration status of the candidates for deputies, their biographical data, the main provisions of the pre-election programs of the candidates and public-political organizations and the summary votes and election results for each candidate.

The representatives of the public-political organizations, the press, the television and the radio, observers and the proxies of the candidates for deputies of the respective electoral districts have the right to be present at the registration of the candidates for deputies, the sealing of the ballot-boxes, the opening of the latter and counting of the votes, the determining the outcome of the elections as well as during the whole duration of the elections.

The authorization of the representatives must be endorsed by proper documents and the respective electoral district electoral committees must be notified of the latter at least 3 days prior to the date of the elections.

The respective electoral committee shall create equal conditions for ensuring the presence of the representatives.

No more than two proxies of each candidate for deputy and public-political organization may be present at an electoral precinct.

CHAPTER III. ELECTORAL COMMITTEES

Article 8. The bases for forming electoral committees

The electoral committees comprise the citizens of the Republic of Armenia that have the right to vote.

Members of the electoral committees are proposed by the governing bodies provided by the charters of the competing public-political organizations according to the principle of equal representation in the prescribed manner.

In case the competing public-political organizations do not submit enough proposals the electoral committees are formed and augmented by decision of a superior electoral committee 3 days prior to the deadline set by this law for forming the respective electoral committees.

If the superior electoral committee does not decide on forming or augmenting the membership of the respective electoral committee within the deadline provided by section 3 of this article, the decision is made by the chairman of the superior electoral committee.

Members of an electoral committees can not be laid off from their permanent employment by the management or be subjected to administrative penalty during the function of the electoral committee without agreement of a superior electoral committee.

Members of electoral committees can not be drafted into military service.

Decisions on proposing members of electoral committees are submitted to respective superior electoral committees.

Information on the membership of electoral committees is published in the manner prescribed by the Central electoral committee.

Chairmen, deputy chairmen and members of electoral committees can be elected only to one electoral committee and have no right to be nominated as candidates for deputies.

Article 9. The procedure for forming the Central electoral committee

The Central electoral committee comprises at least 7 persons, the chairman and 6 members. Candidates for membership of the Central electoral committee are proposed by the deputies of the Supreme Council, 1 candidate from every 10 deputies at least. The nomination of candidates by the deputies is certified on the letterhead of the deputies of the Supreme Council by personal signatures of supporting deputies or by means otherwise expressing their personal endorsement. The proposals for nominations are submitted to the secretary of the Supreme Council in the name

of the chairman of the Supreme Council 10 days prior to the deadline set for forming the committee.

Nominees for membership of the Central electo al committee submit to the secretary of the Supreme Council in person or through an agent appointed in a manner prescribed by law their agreement to be registered as members of the Central electoral committee.

The membership of the Central electoral committee based on the submitted nominations is registered in a special memorandum signed by the chairman and the secretary of the Supreme Council and is published 6 days prior to the deadline set for forming the Central electoral committee.

If the chairman or the secretary of the Supreme Council due to impossibility can not register the membership of the Central electoral committee, these tasks are carried through within the set timeframe by the officials provided as their replacement in the charter of the Supreme Council.

If that possibility is also excluded within the timeframe set in this article, the President of the Republic of Armenia registers the membership of the Central electoral committee based on the submitted nominations no later than the deadline set for the formation of the Central electoral committee.

If the number of nominees for the Central electoral committee proposed in the manner prescribed by this article is less than 6 the vacancies are filled by the President of the Republic of Armenia no later than the deadline set for the formation of the committee.

The work of the Central electoral committee is directed by its chairman, in whose absence - by the deputy chairman.

The chairman of the Central electoral committee is confirmed from among the members of the Central electoral committee.

The chairman of the Central electoral committee is confirmed by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia by a nomination from the President of the Republic of Armenia no later than 5 days prior the deadline set for the formation of the Central electoral committee.

If the Supreme Council does not confirm the nominee of the President of the Republic of Armenia, the Supreme Council elects the chairman of the Central electoral committee in a three day session 3 days prior the deadline set for the formation of the Central electoral committee.

If the Supreme Council does not decide on the appointment of the chairman of the Central electoral committee within the set timeframe, the chairman of the Central electoral committee is appointed by the President of the Republic of Armenia in the time set for the formation of the Central electoral committee.

The Central electoral committee elects from among its members a deputy chairman and a secretary of the committee.

Prior to the registration of the candidates for deputies one representative from each public-political organizations registered by the Ministry of Justice prior to the deadline set for the formation of the Central electoral committee can take part in the work of the Central electoral committee with an advisory vote.

Following the registration of the candidates for deputies one representative from each public-political organization or their blocs that had received a right to participate in the elections can take part in the work of the Central electoral committee with an advisory vote.

Article 10. The procedure for forming a district electoral committee

The district electoral committee comprises at least 7 persons.

Prior to the deadline for the registration of candidates for deputies of the National Assembly the membership of the committee, ensuring the principle of equal representation, includes representatives of public-political organizations that had submitted an application to participate in the elections by the proportional system.

The number of the representatives of public-political organizations in the district electoral committees is determined by the Central electoral committee. The date for the nominations of the public-political organizations is determined by the Central electoral committee within the provisions of this law. The Central electoral committee records the membership of electoral committees based on the nominations of the public-political organizations.

The district electoral committees elect from among their members chairmen of the committees within three days but no later than 6 days prior to the deadline set by this law for the formation of the district electoral committees. If the chairman of a committee is not elected in this timeframe the chairman of the district committee is appointed by the Central electoral committee from among the members of the district committee 3 days prior to the deadline set by this law for the formation of the district electoral committees. If the Central electoral committee does not appoint a chairman to the respective district electoral committee within this timeframe, the appointment is made by the chairman of the Central electoral committee from among the members of the district electoral committee.

The district electoral committee elects from among its members a deputy chairman and a secretary of the committee.

Following the deadline for the registration of the candidates for deputies the representatives of the public-political organizations not participating in the elections by the proportional system

The Central electoral committee elects from among its members a deputy chairman and a secretary of the committee.

Prior to the registration of the candidates for deputies one representative from each public-political organizations registered by the Ministry of Justice prior to the deadline set for the formation of the Central electoral committee can take part in the work of the Central electoral committee with an advisory vote.

Following the registration of the candidates for deputies one representative from each public-political organization or their blocs that had received a right to participate in the elections can take part in the work of the Central electoral committee with an advisory vote.

Article 10. The procedure for forming a district electoral committee

The district electoral committee comprises at least 7 persons.

Prior to the deadline for the registration of candidates for deputies of the National Assembly the membership of the committee, ensuring the principle of equal representation, includes representatives of public-political organizations that had submitted an application to participate in the elections by the proportional system.

The number of the representatives of public-political organizations in the district electoral committees is determined by the Central electoral committee. The date for the nominations of the public-political organizations is determined by the Central electoral committee within the provisions of this law. The Central electoral committee records the membership of electoral committees based on the nominations of the public-political organizations.

The district electoral committees elect from among their members chairmen of the committees within three days but no later than 6 days prior to the deadline set by this law for the formation of the district electoral committees. If the chairman of a committee is not elected in this timeframe the chairman of the district committee is appointed by the Central electoral committee from among the members of the district committee 3 days prior to the deadline set by this law for the formation of the district electoral committees. If the Central electoral committee does not appoint a chairman to the respective district electoral committee within this timeframe, the appointment is made by the chairman of the Central electoral committee from among the members of the district electoral committee.

The district electoral committee elects from among its members a deputy chairman and a secretary of the committee.

Following the deadline for the registration of the candidates for deputies the representatives of the public-political organizations not participating in the elections by the proportional system

are excluded from the membership of the committee and can participate in the sessions of the committee with an advisory vote.

The provision defined in the previous section of this article does not extend to the chairman of the committee.

The work of the district electoral committees ceases following the elections by a decision of the Central electoral committee.

Article 11. The procedure for forming a precinct electoral committee

The precinct electoral committee comprises at least 7 persons.

Prior to the deadline for the registration of candidates for deputies of the National Assembly the membership of the committee, ensuring the principle of equal representation, includes representatives of public-political organizations that had submitted an application to participate in the elections by the proportional system. The number of the representatives of public-political organizations in the committees is determined by the Central electoral committee.

The district electoral committee records the membership of precinct electoral committees based on the nominations of the public-political organizations.

The precinct electoral committees elect from among their members chairmen of the committees within three days 4 days prior to the deadline set by this law for the formation of the district electoral committees. If the chairman of a committee is not elected in this timeframe the chairman of the district committee is appointed by the district electoral committee from among the members of the precinct committee 2 days prior to the deadline set by this law for the formation of the precinct electoral committees. If the district electoral committee does not appoint a chairman to the respective precinct electoral committee within this timeframe, the appointment is made by the chairman of the district electoral committee from among the members of the precinct electoral committee.

The precinct electoral committee elects from among its members a deputy chairman and a secretary of the committee.

Following the deadline for the registration of the candidates for deputies to the National Assembly the representatives of the public-political organizations not participating in the elections by the proportional system are excluded from the membership of the committee.

The provision defined in the previous section of this article does not extend to the chairman of the committee.

The work of the precinct electoral committees ceases following the elections by a decision of the Central electoral committee.

Article 12. The procedure of introducing changes in the membership of the electoral committees

The powers of the chairman of the Central electoral committee can be terminated prematurely initiated by the President of the Republic of Armenia or the National Assembly.

The National Assembly shall discuss and adopt a decision on such initiative from the President of the Republic of Armenia within one month upon its receipt.

If the decision of the National Assembly approves of the initiative of the President of the Republic of Armenia, the chairman of the Central electoral committee is dismissed by a presidential decree within two days from the receipt of the approval of the National Assembly.

The decision of the National Assembly on dismissing the chairman of the Central electoral committee is submitted to the President of the Republic of Armenia. The President of the Republic of Armenia can dismiss the chairman of the Central electoral committee by his decree within one month of the receipt of the decision of the National Assembly or he can object to the decision of the National Assembly. In the latter case the President of the Republic of Armenia submits his objection to the National Assembly, which can reconfirm its decision to dismiss the chairman of the Central electoral committee within 15 days by a majority vote of at least 2/3 of the of the total number of the National Assembly deputies.

In case the chairman of the Central electoral committee is dismissed, the new chairman is appointed within 20 days in the manner prescribed by this law.

The powers of the deputy chairman, the secretary and the members of the Central electoral committee can be terminated prematurely:

a) based on a personal application;

b) through an initiative of the Central electoral committee.

The powers of the deputy chairman, the secretary and the members of the Central electoral committee can be terminated based on their personal applications by a decision of the committee. If the Central electoral committee does not adopt a decision to settle the application, the powers of the deputy chairman, the secretary and the members of the Central electoral committee are terminated prematurely following a second application reiterating the request by the author within one month from the declination of the first.

The vacancies in the Central electoral committee created by cases provided in this article are not filled unless the number of the members falls below 7. If the membership of the Central electoral committee falls below 7 it is augmented by a decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia within 20 days.

The powers of the persons within district and precinct electoral committees may be terminated prematurely in the same procedure in which they were included in the committee.

The premature termination of the powers can also be implemented either through a decision of a superior committee by its own initiative or through a decision of an inferior committee:

a) based on a personal application;

b) if the provisions of this law are not obeyed;

c) if five consecutive sessions of a committee are missed without a proper cause.

Point b) of the previous section of this article can only be applied to a person included in an electoral committee for at least one month.

In case of a premature termination of the powers of persons included in an electoral committee the electoral committees are augmented in a manner prescribed by this law for the forming of respective committees.

No changes can be made in the membership of the electoral committees through the 5 days preceding the elections and during the assessment of the results of the elections. Persons included in the electoral committees have no right to refuse their duties in the committees beginning from 6 PM on the day preceding the elections and through the completion of the assessment of the election results except for cases of health failure or death of a close relation, of which the superior electoral committee shall be notified.

Article 13. The powers of the Central electoral committee

The Central electoral committee is the body conducting the oversight of this law and ensuring its uniform implementation. In accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Armenia it has the following powers:

1) in case of a fact of breaking this law or of disobeying its provisions to apply to the respective bodies or to the court;

2) to form electoral districts and district electoral committees, to alter the borders of electoral precincts and membership of electoral committees in cases and the manner provided by law;

3) to manage the means allocated for the elections, disburse the finances among the electoral committees, to oversee the allocation of office space, furnishings, transportation means, electricity, communications equipment and other material and technical assets to district and precinct electoral committees;

4) to determine the layout of the election documentation, the ballots, ballot boxes, specimens of the seals, the procedure and timeframe for filling in and filing the documentation. To provide necessary documentation to the electoral committees;

5) in order to ensure uniform implementation of the law to pass and publish the necessary decisions and decrees on the procedure of the elections and their preparation, to oversee their implementation;

6) to attend to reports of the electoral committees and government bodies on matters concerning the implementations of the elections and their preparation;

7) to change in exceptional cases the time and site of the voting;

8) to discuss the appeals and complaints received concerning the decisions and actions of the electoral committees and to pass decisions on these;

9) to alter or annul the the decisions of the district and precinct committees;

10) to register the candidates for deputies nominated for participation in the elections to the National Assembly by the proportional system and issue them candidate certificates, to refuse or annul the registration of a candidate/candidates/;

11) to register or refuse to register the persons in detention regardless of their nomination for participation in a proportional or majoritarian election system. In these cases the Central electoral committee must receive a conclusion from the Prosecutor's office of the Republic of Armenia within the timeframe provided by law;

12) to render, summarize and confirm the results of the elections based on the proportional or majoritarian system, to verify them if necessary;

13) to register the elected candidates for deputies to the National Assembly and issue them certificates of a National Assembly deputy;

14) to declare the elections partially or completely invalid;

15) to appoint additional votings or by-elections;

16) to exercise other powers ensuring the oversight and the uniform implementation of this law.

Article 14. The powers of the district electoral committees

The district electoral committee, in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Armenia, has the following powers:

1) to oversee the implementation of this law in its district;

2) to form electoral precincts and precinct electoral committees, make changes in their membership;

3) to provide the precinct committees with the necessary material and technical means, election documentation, to organize in the prescribed manner the preparation and the implementation of the elections, to oversee the implementation, to provide the electoral precincts

with office space, furnishings, transportation means, electricity, communications equipment and other material and technical assets;

4) to attend to reports of the precinct committees, administrative bodies within the precinct territories and interested organizations on matters concerning the implementation of the elections and their preparation;

5) to follow the compilation of the lists of voters by the local authorities, the transfer of these to the respective precinct committees and submitting for general notification;

6) to discuss the applications and complaints received concerning the decisions and actions of the precinct electoral committees and to pass decisions on these;

7) to register and issue respective certificates to the candidates for deputies to the National Assembly and their proxies nominated in the district, as well as to the proxies of public-political organizations participating in the elections by the lists of candidates to the National Assembly. To refuse or annul the registration of a nominated candidate in accordance with this law;

8) to submit to the Central electoral committee all materials in its possession regarding the persons in detention nominated for participation in the elections in their district;

9) to organize the publication on an equal basis of the biographies and brief pre-election programs of the candidates for deputies nominated in the district, as well as to submit to the precinct electoral committees the pre-election programs of the public-political organizations or their blocs and the lists of the candidates for deputies;

10) to register the representatives and observers;

11) to ensure the the preparation of the district ballots and their distribution to the precincts along with the ballots for the list elections;

12) to summarize and declare the results of the voting in the district;

13) to exercise other powers ensuring the uniform implementation of this law in the district.

Article 15. The powers of the precinct electoral committees

The precinct electoral committee, in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Armenia, has the following powers:

1) to ensure the voters the possibility to acquaint themselves with the lists;

2) to accept and discuss complaints on the inaccuracies in the lists of voters and solve the issues of introducing the respective adjustments to the lists;

3) to organize the publication on an equal basis of the biographies and pre-election programs of the candidates for deputies, the pre-election programs of the public-political organizations or their blocs and the lists of the candidates for deputies;

4) to inform the voters on the location of the precinct, the day of the elections and the working hours of the committee;

5) to ensure the the preparation of the building, the booths, the ballot boxes and other means necessary for the elections;

7) to organize the voting, summarize the results of the voting and declare them in the precinct;

8) to exercise other powers in accordance with this law.

Article 16. The organization of the work of electoral committees

The work of the electoral committees is organised by the chairmen of respective committees or their deputies by their assignment, ensuring equal conditions for the presence at the committee sessions during deliberation of issues of the representatives of parties interested in them.

Members of electoral committees have the right to inspect the issues under the jurisdiction of their committees and access the corresponding documents.

The electoral committees determine the schedule for their regular sessions. The extraordinary sessions are convened by the chairman at his initiative or by a written demand of at least 1/3 of the committee members. The chairman must convene the extraordinary session before the regular session.

The sessions of a committee possess equal authority, if more than half of the total number of committee members attend.

The decisions of the electoral committees are passed by an open ballot. In special cases a secret ballot may be decided upon by the committee members. The ballot is considered valid if more than half of the total number of committee members have voted.

The decision is considered passed if it was voted for by more than half of the participants of the voting.

Upon the request of a superior committee the committees must submit to it all materials at their disposal concerning issues of interest for the former, including, provided existing, written memorandums on the issue presented by the committee members.

If the decisions of a committee contradict each other, the decision of the superior committee prevails.

The persons included in the electoral committees, in thee manner prescribed by the Central electoral committee, can be relieved of their obligations at the production or service employment.

The chairman and the secretary of the Central electoral committee are employed on a permanent basis and, until the termination of their powers, can not be engaged in other paid

employment except for scientific-pedagogical or creative work, can not have other state positions or engage directly in entrepreneurship.

The chairman of the Central electoral committee forms a staff. Compensation for work performed with connection to the elections is paid from the allocation for the elections. From the day of their formation the electoral committees maintain a register with pages numbered and sealed by the superior committee, in which mandatory dated entries are made on all factual activities carried out in connection with the elections.

Article 17. The procedure of appealing the the decisions and actions of electoral committees

The decisions and actions of electoral committees can be appealed at the superior electoral committee, while the decisions and actions of the Central electoral committee or, in other cases provided by this law, can also be appealed at the court of law by the public-political organizations, candidates for deputies, their proxies, observers and voters, within three days from the appealed decision or action.

The complaint must be discussed within 3 days from its submission. The decisions of the Central electoral committee concerning the results of the elections can be appealed at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia.

CHAPTER IV. LISTS OF VOTERS

Article 18. Lists of voters and the procedure for their compilation

Lists of voters are compiled according to the electoral districts, they are signed and sealed by the head of the local self-administration of the settlement that includes the district.

Lists of voters include citizens entitled to vote living in the respective district permanently or within the borders of the district during the last 6 months preceding the elections at the time of compilation of the lists.

The first and last names of voters, their patronimics, addresses, dates of birth and the documents serving as basis for including in the list are entered in the lists of voters in the format fit for the organization of voting. For voters 18 years of age the month and day of birth are also entered.

A voter can be included in the list of only one electoral district.

Article 19. The exposure of citizens to the lists of voters and the right to appeal the errors in the lists of voters

The lists of voters are exposed for general public 15 days prior to the date of the elections.

The citizens, candidates for deputies or their proxies are given the possibility to view the lists of voters and verify their accuracy in the offices of the precinct electoral committees.

A complaint on an inaccuracy in the list of voters is reviewed by the precinct electoral committee, it must discuss the complaint and introduce the necessary adjustments in the list or provide the applicant with a copy of a substantiated decision on rejecting the complaint within two days, and immediately on the eve or on the day of the election.

The decision of the precinct electoral committee can be appealed at the district (city) court of law five days prior to the elections day, the latter has to review the complaint within three days. The adjustment in the list of voters requested by a court of law is introduced immediately.

CHAPTER V. THE NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF THE CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTIES

Article 20. The procedure of nomination for the candidates for deputies

The candidates for deputies are nominated through supporting the nomination proposal by the signatures of the voters.

Each voter supporting the proposal of the candidate for deputy personally signs the official nomination ballot.

The official letterhead and nomination ballots of a confirmed layout for the candidate for deputy are given by:

the Central electoral committee in case of proposing a nomination for election by the proportional system;

the respective district electoral committee in case of proposing a nomination for election by the majoritarian system, or the Central electoral committee in case the Central electoral committee satisfies the appeal of a rejection by a district committee to give nomination ballots.

The official nomination ballots for the candidate for deputy are given to:

not more than 10 authorized representatives of a public-political organization, who present the decision of the governing body of the organization on submitting a list of candidates and are fully authorized by that body;

not more than 5 authorized representatives of an individual who had submitted an application to run in the elections by the majoritarian system or had sent in the legally verified application. The authorized representatives represent the interests of the proposed candidates from the list of a given public-political organization or their bloc, as well as the in te rests of the individual candidates in the Central electoral committee and are entitled to an advisory vote.

The candidates for deputies from a list are considered nominated if between 10000 and 12000 voters sign in support of the list.

The candidate for deputy in an election by a majoritarian system is considered nominated if between 500 and 700 voters from the given electoral district sign in support of his/her proposal.

An election deposit in the amount of a factor of ten of the minimum [monthly] salary in the republic is paid to the united electoral fund by the public-political organizations or the candidate for every proposed nomination of a candidate.

The deposit is refunded to those public-political organizations, their blocs or individual candidates, who receive more than 5% of the votes.

Every public-political organization or individual organizing their nomination is responsible for selecting the persons to be trusted with collecting the signatures and issues them certificates to that effect.

The documents proposing nominations of candidates for deputies should contain entries of the candidate's first and last names, patronymic, the day, month and year of birth, address of residence, employment and party membership.

When giving the official nomination ballots to the authorized representatives the Central and district electoral committees make mandatory entries in them of the receiver's first and last names, patronymic, and the basis for registering that individual as an authorized representative. Upon submitting the nomination ballots with the signatures of voters to the respective committees for the registration of nominations, entries are made of the first and last names, patronymic, address of residence, passport number and signature of the authorized collector of signatures of the given nomination ballot.

If the proposed candidate for deputy is in detention a special reference to that effect is to be made by the initiators in the document proposing the candidate.

Article 21. The registration of a candidate for deputy

The documents nominating a candidate for deputy are accepted by the respective electoral committees. The latter may discuss the issue of their registration only if the following documents have been received by the nomination deadline set by law:

1) the properly filled in nomination documents proposing a candidate for deputy;

2) the properly filled in official nomination ballots of a candidate(s) for deputy with signatures of a minimum of 10000 voters in case of elections by the proportional system and signatures of a minimum of 500 voters in case of elections by the majoritarian system;

3) a written declaration of the agreement by the candidate(s) for deputy to run in the elections, which, if not submitted by the candidate in person, must be legally verified;

4) a certification of residential address and registration;

5) the receipt of the election deposit;

6) for detained persons a written statement to the fact by the proposed candidate or his/her authorized representative.

The candidates for deputies are registered by respective electoral committees provided:

1) the number of invalid or false signatures revealed by an inspection of the official nomination ballots of a candidate(s) for deputy does not exceed 300 in case of elections by the proportional system and 50 in case of elections by the majoritarian system, and if these are neglected, the number of remaining signatures in the official nomination ballots is no less than 10000 in case of elections by the proportional system and no less that 500 in case of elections by the majoritarian system;

2) no falsification is revealed by inspection of the other submitted nomination documents.

The nomination of a candidate(s) for deputy is registered without voting in cases referred to in the previous sections of this article if the committee members with a decisive vote have no objections. In case of an objection the objection is voted on.

The registration of the nomination of a candidate for deputy can be refused by the respective committee if:

1) the number of invalid or false signatures revealed by an inspection of the official nomination ballots of a candidate(s) for deputy exceeds 300 in case of elections by the proportional system and exceeds 50 in case of elections by the majoritarian system, and in case these are neglected, the number of remaining signatures in the official nomination ballots is less than 10000 in case of elections by the proportional system and less that 500 in case of elections by the majoritarian system;

2) falsification is revealed by inspection of the other submitted nomination documents;

3) the candidate for deputy has agreed in writing to run in more than one district in case of elections by the majoritarian system and more than one list in case of elections by the proportional system;

4) the restrictions embedded in this law extend to the candidates for deputies.

In cases provided for by this article the refusal to register the candidate for deputy by respective electoral committees is recorded without a vote, unless the persons in the committee with decisive or advisory votes have objections. In case of an objection by the above-mentioned persons the objection is voted on.

The registration of the candidate for deputy is considered void if following the registration facts are revealed that extend the restrictions of this article upon the candidate. In such cases the respective committee records in its session and publishes the invalidity of the registration.

If the person proposed as a candidate for deputy is in detention the Central electoral committee passes a decision on his/her registration only if a written conclusion of the Prosecutor's office exists on the substantiated nature of that persons detention. In such cases the the necessary documents for nominating a candidate for deputy are submitted to the district electoral committee 10 days prior to the deadline set for the submission of the nomination documentation.

The person in detention or his/her authorized representative applies to the chairman of the Central electoral committee with a request to receive the written conclusion of the Prosecutor's office on the substantiated nature of the persons detention, attaching the receipt by the electoral committee in exchange for the necessary nomination documents, which the chairman or the secretary of the district electoral committee issues immediately upon receipt of the necessary documents, within one day.

Upon the receipt of the application by the person in detention or his/her authorized representative the chairman of the Central electoral committee within one day requests a conclusion from the Prosecutor's office, which must send its conclusion on the substantiated nature of the persons detention before the deadline set by this law for submission of the nominations of candidates for deputies.

In case of registration or the refusal to register the persons in detention as candidates for deputy the interested parties have the right to appeal at the Supreme Court the decision of the Central electoral committee within three days of its passing.

The decision of the Supreme Court to recognize the decision of the Central electoral committee as illegal is considered basis for changing the corresponding decision of the Central electoral committee. In this case the Central electoral committee records without voting the change of its own decision necessitated by the decision of the Supreme Court.

The registration of persons in detention as candidates for deputy and their election as deputies can not serve as basis for dropping the criminal charges or closing the indictment.

Starting from the moment of registration the degree of custody chosen for such persons, the detention, may be replaced by a milder measure of custody that does not prevent them from participating in a full-pledge pre-election campaign.

The communique on the registration of the candidates for deputies is published in the manner defined by the Central electoral committee.

Article 22. The annulation of the registration of the candidate for deputy

The candidate for deputy can terminate his/her nomination through submitting a withdrawal application to the respective electo al committee. The registration of a candidate based on his/her withdrawal can be annulled no later than five days prior to the elections. In case one of the candidates declares withdrawal 5 days prior to the 2nd stage of voting, the permission is granted by decision of the the district electoral committee to the candidate with the next biggest number of votes in the 1st stage to take part in the 2nd stage of voting.

In case of the death of a candidate, as well as in cases provided for in article 25 of this law when the facts are confirmed, the registration is annulled.

Article 23. Immunity of the candidates for deputies

The candidate for deputy can not be apprehended without a decision of a court of law.

CHAPTER VI. PROXIES OF THE CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTIES, PRE-ELECTION PROPAGANDA

Article 24. Proxies

To represent the interests of the candidates for deputies and public-political organiza tions in the respective electoral committees the district electoral committees, upon presentation by the candidates for deputies and public-political organiza tions, register not more than three proxies for each electoral precinct, who are issued certificates.

The proxies have the right to represent the interests of the candidate for deputy in the relations with state and public bodies, to be present unhampered at all functions of the respective electoral committee.

Not more than two proxies from each candidate for deputy or public-political organiza tion may be present concurrently at a function of the district electoral committee.

The registration of a proxy (proxies) is invalidated and a new proxy (proxies) is registered by the district electoral committee based on an application by the candidate for deputy or a public-political organiza tion.

A proxy can not be included in the electoral committee.

Article 25. Pre-election propaganda

The citizens of the Republic of Armenia have the right of free and diversified discussion of the political, business and personal characteristics of a candidate for deputy, as well as the right to freely propagate through meetings, rallies and the mass media.

The candidates for deputies and their proxies, public-political organiza tions have the right to organize meetings with the voters.

The electoral committees and respective state bodies must ensure the equal opportunity to use:

for the public-political organi. a tions participating in the elections by the proportional system the republican state-owned mass-media outlets;

for the candidates for deputies participating in the elections by the majoritarian system the local state-owned mass-media outlets. The Central electoral committee ensures the possibility of the gratuitous use by the public-political organiza tions and private candidates participating in the elections of the respective state-owned mass-media within the limits of the united elections fund.

Each public-political organiza tion and private candidate participating in the elections may also use the respective state-owned mass-media on a paid basis on their own expense but not to exceed the double of what the Central electoral committee has defined as the gratuitous limit.

During the pre-election campaign it is forbidden for the candidates for deputies either in person or through other persons, private, state enterprises or organizations to allocate funds, food, other goods or gifts to the voters using any pretext. In case any of the above-mentioned facts is confirmed to have happened, the Central electoral committee may declare the registration of the candidate void.

On the day of voting it is forbidden to propagate, have rallies, or for people to accumulate in the vicinity of the ballot buildings.

CHAPTER VII. THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF VOTING

Article 26. Ballots

The ballots in the election by the majoritarian system lists in the alphabetical order the first and last names, the patronymic of the candidate for deputy, his/her party membership, employment and job description, in the election by the proportional system the name of the registered public-political organization or their bloc (or the abridged name, if the public-political organization uses one), as well as the first and last names and the patronimics of the first three candidates for deputy in the list.

Article 27. The certificate of the right to vote

Each voter is issued a certificate of the right to vote. The certificate of the right to vote is a sheet of paper consisting of two similar sections that can be separated. It has entries of the first and last names and the patronymic of the voter, the day, month and year of his/her birth, the address of residence, the numbers of the electoral district and the electoral precinct, as well as the number across the last name of the voter in the list of voters. distribution

Article 28. The disbursing and collection of the voting documents

The voting documents are disbursed and received in the electoral committees with a mandatory entry in the register containing the signatures of the giver and taker as well as recording the transaction by way of issuing a receipt.

The ballots and certificates of the right to vote are allocated to the electoral committees in the previously approved quantities.

Article 29. The place and time of voting

The voting takes place on the day of the elections from 8AM to 8PM.

A voter participates in the elections only in the precinct that includes his/her residence.

In exceptional cases the the place and time of voting may be changed by a decision of the Central electoral committee.

Article 30. The organization of voting

The voting takes place in specially allocated buildings, where a sufficient number of booths or rooms must be furnished to carry out the secret ballot, and tables installed for the registration of voters and distribution of the ballots. The ballot boxes must be placed in a location visible for the majority of those entitled to be present in the precinct.

Before the voting begins the the precinct electoral committee approves by a decision the list of those its members, who will confirm with their signatures the authenticity of the ballots. If before the voting begin a member of the committee insists on the necessity of the ballots being signed by him/her, he/she is granted that opportunity. In such cases the decision of the committee is recorded without voting.

Then the chairman of the committee checks, closes and seals the ballot box in the presence of the members of the committee and persons entitled to be present at the sessions of the committee, after which he/she hands the counted quantity of the ballots to the persons responsible for the ballots and the persons responsible for registering voters with filled in certificates of the right to vote, making a corresponding entry in the register.

Article 31. The implementation of voting

Each voter registers by signing in the voter's list across from his/her last name, upon presenting the passport or other proof of identity.

The member of the committee responsible for registration signs and hands the voter the certificate of the right to vote, which is also signed by the voter. The member of the committee responsible for the ballots signs in the registered voter's certificate of the right to vote, separates the corresponding coupon from the certificate and drops it in the coupon box sealed by the committee, after which hands the voter the ballot.

The ballot is filled by the voter in the booth or room for secret ballots.

The voter that is incapable of personally fill in in the ballot may at his/her discretion invite another person into the ballot booth or room, excluding the members of the committee and proxies.

Except for the above-mentioned case the presence of other persons in the ballot booth or room during the filling of a ballot is prohibited.

In the ballot of the election by the majoritarian system the voter leaves the last name of only one preferred candidate, crossing out the last names of other candidates.

In the ballot of the election by the proportional system the voter leaves the name of only one preferred public-political organization or their bloc, crossing out the names of other public-political organization or their blocs.

In case there is only one candidate for deputy or one public-political organization on the ballot the voter crosses out the words 'I agree' if he/she votes against it, or crosses out the words 'I disagree' if he/she votes for.

The voter brings out the closed ballot from the ballot booth or room and personally drops it in the ballot box.

CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION

Article 31. The procedure of filling the summary records of the election results at the electoral precincts

In the summary records of the election results each computed figure is entered and signed across from by those who did the computation in the order defined by the procedure for summarizing the results of the elections.

The records of the elections by the proportional and the majoritarian system are filled separately, in the order by which the computations were done.

Entries are made in the records about the ballot box and the box for the coupons of the certificates of the right to vote being closed and sealed until the end of the voting.

The figures being computed and the results of the computation are declared out loud.

The summary records of the election results are signed by the members of the precinct electoral committee who participated in the activities of the committee during the day of the voting. If any member of the committee has a special opinion regarding the process or the results of the voting, he/she makes a respective entry across from the signature, submitting his/her opinion in writing.

The refusal of a committee member to sign the record is recorded by the committee and attached to the summary record of the election results.

Article 33. Invalid ballots

The ballots are recognized as invalid if they do not correspond to the approved speci men, do not bear the stamp of the given electoral precinct and the signatures of the members of the committee selected by the committee, are voted 'pro' for more than one candidate, are voted 'pro' for more than one public-political organization or their bloc, in cases where there is only one candidate for deputy or one public-political organization on the ballot the voter crossed out or leaved both the words 'I agree' and 'I disagree', as well as those ballots that bear extra inscriptions.

The ballots that cause suspicion are voted on by the electoral committee.

Article 34. The procedure of summarizing the results of voting in the electoral precincts

After closing the precinct at 8PM on the day of the elections the precinct electoral committee:

1) enters the number of the ballots received from the district electoral committee in the records;

2) counts the number of unused ballots along with those incorrectly filled or returned by the voters and cancels them in the prescribed manner to rule out future use;

3) counts:

a) the total number of voters based on the list of voters,

b) the number of registered voters based on the signatures,

c) the number of unused certificates of the right to vote;

4) opens the ballot box;

5) in the election by the majoritarian system counts:

a) the total number of ballots present in the ballot box,

b) the number of ballots recognized as invalid,

c) the number of 'pro' votes given to each candidate for deputy,

6) in the election by the proportional system counts:

a) the total number of ballots present in the ballot box,

b) the number of ballots recognized as invalid,

c) the number of 'pro' votes given to each list;

The counted and registered ballots are packed separately, the packs are sealed by the stamp of the precinct electoral committee.

The stamped records, the sealed box for the coupons of the certificates of the right to vote and packets of other election documents are sent to the superior electoral committee in the manner prescribed by the Central electoral committee.

Article 35. Summarizing the results of voting in the electoral districts

After placing the election documents received from the electoral precincts in the determined safe location and locking them up, the district electoral committee, based on the records of the precinct electoral committees, makes the following entries in the register of the district electoral committee:

the total number of the ballots given to the precinct electoral committees;

the total number of canceled ballots;

the total number of incorrectly filled and returned ballots;

the total number of voters;

the total number of registered voters;

the total number of unused certificates of the right to vote, by precincts;

the total number of the ballots in the ballot boxes;

the total number of ballots recognized as invalid;

the total number of votes in favor of each candidate for deputy;

the total number of votes in favor of each public-political organization or their bloc;

computes and enters the number by the precinct of the certificates in the boxes for the certificates of the right to vote. After the count the certificates are packed and sealed by the stamp of the district electoral committee.

The data in the register is confirmed by a vote of the district electoral committee, then signed and stamped.

The records of the district electoral committee, along with copies of the records of each of the [constituent] precinct electoral committees, are sent to the Central electoral committee in the prescribed manner.

Article 36. The rendition of the results of the elections

In order to distribute the mandates according to the lists and determine the deputies elected by the proportional system, the Central electoral committee, based on the records received from the electoral committees, renders:

the total number of voters;

the total number of registered voters;

the total number of the certificates in the boxes for the certificates of the right to vote;

the total number of the ballots in the ballot boxes;

the total number of the ballots recognized as invalid;

the total number of voters (valid votes) in favor or against each public-political organization or their bloc;

the total number of votes in favor of each list;

the total number of votes in favor of all public-political organization or their blocs;

the total number of votes in favor of those public-political organization or their blocs that received at least 5% of the total number of valid votes;

the effect of the inconsistencies in the numbers in the records on the result of the elections.

The Central electoral committee discusses the complaints received concerning the implementation of the elections and the summarizing of their results, if necessary, organizes inspections in a manner prescribed by itself.

Article 37. Recognizing the elections invalid

The Central electoral committee recognizes the elections invalid in certain precincts or districts if:

1) the candidate for deputy is changed or is not elected due to inconsistencies in the figures entered in the records of the electoral committees, or in accordance with facts confirmed by inspections, or, in the elections by the majoritarian system, passes to second round of voting and it is not possible to reconstruct the real result of the elections and thus determine the elected candidate;

2) violations of this law were made during the preparation and implementation of the elections that prevented the exercise of the equal direct free election right in a secret ballot.

The decision of the Central electoral committee regarding the results of the elections may be appealed within 10 days at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia, the decision of the latter is final.

Article 38. Summarizing the results of the elections by the majoritarian system

The Central electoral committee passes a decision on the election of a deputy to the National Assembly from the electoral district.

The candidate receiving the majority of votes in his/her favor, but no less than 25 % of the valid votes is considered elected in the first round.

If two candidates run in the first round and neither receives over 25% of the valid votes, the elections in that district are considered not to have taken place and the district's mandate remains unfilled.

If more than two candidates run in the first round and none is elected, a second round is carried out between the first and second candidates with the most votes in their favor, and the one getting in it the most votes in his/her favor is considered elected.

If only one candidate runs in any round of the elections, he/she is considered elected by receiving over 50% of the valid votes.

Article 39. Summarizing the results of the elections by the proportional system

The mandates are distributed only between the lists that received at least 5% in their favor from the valid votes.

The mandates allocated for the elections by the proportional system (40 for the regular elections) are distributed between the public-political organization or their blocs in proportion with the votes in their favor received.

The computation of the share of the mandates for each public-political organization or their bloc is done in the following manner: the number of votes in favor of each list is multiplied by the number of mandates allocated to the lists, the resulting number is divided by the total number of votes in favor of all lists that got at least 5% of the valid votes, the resulting respective integer values of the quotients represent the number of the mandates received by each list. The remaining mandates are distributed between the lists according to the descending value of the remainders of the computation, one remaining mandate to each. In case the remainders are equal, the disputed mandate is given to the list with the most votes in its favor, if those are equal, the decision is made by a lottery.

The candidate is considered elected if his/her number in the list is less or equal to the number of mandates received by that list.

The mandate of the candidate elected by the proportional system is given to the next candidate in the list if he/she was also elected by the majoritarian system. If the candidate has to participate in the second round of elections by the majoritarian system, the issue of his/her mandate is resolved after receiving the results of the second round.

The issue of the mandates not distributed due to the recognition of the elections as partially invalid is resolved after receiving the results of re-voting.

Article 40. Summarizing the results of the elections by the proportional system in case the elections are recognized as partially invalid

If the elections were recognized as invalid in any electoral precinct by a decision of the Central electoral committee the results of the elections are summarized in the following manner:

1) the lists receiving in their favor at least 5% of the valid votes are determined, for which:

the votes in favor received by each list in the precinct where the elections were recognized as invalid are neglected;

when computing the total number of valid votes the number of valid votes in the precincts where the elections were recognized as invalid is substituted by the total number of votes in the lists of the voters of those precincts;

2) the lists retaining the possibility of getting at least 5% of the votes in their favor are determined, excluding the lists referred to in point 1 of this article, for which in computing the total number of votes in favor of each list the number of votes in their favor in the precincts where the elections were recognized as invalid is substituted by the total number of votes in the lists of the voters of those precincts, and in computing the total number of valid votes the number of valid votes in the precincts where the elections were recognized as invalid is substituted by the total number of votes in the lists of the voters of those precincts.

Until the summarization of the results of the re-voting, the computation of the number of the mandates for each list is dome in the prescribed manner, whence:

in computing the total number of votes in favor of each list, the number of votes received in favor of that list in the precincts where the elections were recognized as invalid is neglected;

the number of votes in favor of all lists that received at least 5% of valid votes is substituted by the total number of votes in favor that were received or could have been received by all public-political organizations or their blocs that received or retained the possibility to receive at least 5% of votes in their favor, and when computing this in the precincts where the elections were recognized as invalid instead of computing the total of votes in favor of all of them the total number of votes in the lists of the voters of those precincts is counted;

mandates are not given to the lists retaining the possibility of receiving at least 5% of the votes in their favor;

the mandates due to the lists of public-political organizations or their blocs that received at least 5% of the valid votes in their favor computed in accordance with the provisions of this article are distributed in the prescribed manner, but no mandates are distributed according to the value of the remainders.

The computation of the number of mandates due to each list after the re-voting is done in the prescribed manner, where the numbers computed for the case when the elections were recognized as partially invalid are substituted by the corresponding numbers obtained from the re-voting and the unclaimed mandates are respectively allocated to the lists of public-political organizations or their blocs, thus completing the number of mandates due to them.

Article 41. The registration of the deputies to the National Assembly. The publication of the election results

The results of the elections are summarized no later than within 10 days from the day of the elections.

Irrespective of all possible outcomes of the re-voting to be carried out in the districts or precincts where the elections were recognized as invalid, the Central electoral committee registers the elected deputies to the National Assembly and, immediately upon expiry of the powers of the preceding National Assembly, issues them certificates of a deputy to the National Assembly.

The official memorandums on the results of the elections are published in the manner prescribed by the Central electoral committee.

Article 42. The premature termination of the powers of the deputy to the National Assembly

The powers of the deputy to the National Assembly may be terminated prematurely by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia, if:

1) the Supreme Court has recognized the elections as invalid within one month based this law or on complaints about the results of the elections;

2) a verdict by the Supreme Court of his/her confinement is empowered;

3) the operation of the public-political organization that had nominated the deputy by the proportional system is banned in the procedure prescribed by law, and the deputy is a member of that public-political organization at the time of the ban.

The powers of the deputy to the National Assembly are considered prematurely terminated in the event of his/her death.

CHAPTER IX. ADDITIONAL VOTING

Article 43. Re-voting

In case the elections are recognized as partially invalid, within two weeks following the summarizing of the results of the elections in the electoral districts or precincts, a re-voting is assigned to be carried out with the same registered candidates for deputies, less the candidates recalled or withdrawn since the assignment of re-voting, within the provisions of this law.

Respectively, re-votings by the proportional or majoritarian system are not carried out in those precincts, where the results of the re-votings can not influence the results of the respective elections.

Article 44. Repeat votings

Repeat votings for the elections by the majoritarian system are carried out in the electoral district within two weeks following the summarizing of the results of the elections, within the provisions of this law. The candidate for deputy running in the repeat voting can not be recalled or withdrawn with the exception of his/her death.

CHAPTER X. REGULAR ELECTIONS

Article 45. The procedure and intervals of assigning and carrying out regular elections

The regular elections are assigned 4 months prior to the expiration date of the powers of the National Assembly.

The elections are carried out no later than on the day of the expiration of the powers of the National Assembly.

The regular elections are prepared and implemented in the manner prescribed by this law.

Article 46. The timeframe for forming the electoral committees

The Central electoral committee is formed at least 80 days prior to the date of the regular elections.

The district electoral committees are formed at least 60 days prior to the date of the regular elections.

The precinct electoral committees are formed at least 30 days prior to the date of the regular elections.

Article 47. The timeframe for forming electoral districts and precincts

The division of the territory of the Republic of Armenia into electoral districts is done at least 70 days prior to the date of the regular elections.

The division of the electoral districts into electoral precincts is done at least 40 days prior to the date of the regular elections.

Article 48. The timeframe for nominating and registering the candidates for deputies

The nomination of the the candidates for deputies begins no sooner than 60 days prior to the day of the elections and is terminated 40 days prior to the day of the elections at 6 PM.

The applications for participating in the elections by the proportional system are submitted by the public-political organizations or their blocs at least 75 days prior to the day of the elections.

The registration of the candidates for deputies terminates 25 days prior to the day of the elections.

The pre-election programs may be submitted to the respective electoral committee 20 days prior to the day of the elections.

CHAPTER XI. BY-ELECTIONS

Article 49. The assignment of by-elections

If the mandate due to the electoral precinct by the majoritarian system remains unclaimed in the process of the regular elections to the National Assembly or due to the premature termination of the powers of a deputy, by-elections are assigned and carried out in the respective precinct.

By-elections by the proportional system are assigned and carried out in the republic in the event of no less than 10 vacancies in the allocation for the proportional system.

Article 50. The procedure of filling according to the lists of vacancies created by the premature termination of the powers of deputies elected by the proportional system

The mandate of the deputy to the National Assembly elected by the proportional system, whose powers were prematurely terminated, is given to the next candidate in the respective list within two weeks of the termination date by a decision of the Central electoral committee.

If the powers of the deputy to the National Assembly were prematurely terminated based on point 3 article 42 of this law, by-elections are assigned to fill the vacancy, provided the total number of vacancies in the National Assembly from the allocation for the elections by the proportional system is not less 10.

By-elections are also assigned in the case when less than 2/3 of the total number of the deputies to the National Assembly are elected in the regular elections. In such cases the by-elections are assigned by a decision of the Central electoral committee no later than 60 and no sooner than 50 days after the day of repeat voting. They are carried out in the procedure prescribed by this law and in the timeframe defined by the Central electoral committee.

Article 51. The timeframe for forming electoral committees for by-elections

The district and precinct electoral committees can be reorganized or formed in the timeframe defined by this law for regular elections.

Article 52. The electoral districts and precincts of the by-elections

By-elections are carried out according to the electoral districts and precincts formed for the regular elections.

Article 53. The nomination and registration of the candidates for deputies in the by-elections

By-elections are carried out with new nominations of the candidates for deputies.

The nomination of candidates or lists of public-political organizations or their blocs is done according to the procedure defined for regular elections.

The list of candidates nominated for previous elections by a public-political organization or their bloc taking part in the by-elections by the proportional system is voided.

Article 54. The procedure and timeframe of carrying out by-elections

The voting in by-elections is carried out in the month of May or October.

By-elections are carried out in the procedure prescribed by this law.

CHAPTER XII. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW ON THE ELECTION OF THE DEPUTIES TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Article 55. The responsibility for violating the requirements of this law

Persons violating the requirements of this law are held responsible in the manner prescribed by the legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

This law is enacted from the moment of its publication.

Levon Ter-Petrossian

President of the Republic of Armenia

April 4, 1995

Yerevan translated by Artashes Emin

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
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COMMISSION AD HOC POUR LES ELECTIONS EN ARMENIE

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CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, 15 mai 1995

AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) OJ 1

COMMISSION AD HOC SUR LES ELECTIONS EN ARMENIE

PROJET D'ORDRE DU JOUR

de la réunion qui aura lieu le lundi 29 mai 1995 à 12h00 à l'UEO, Palais d'Iéna - Aile Wilson, 43 ave du Président Wilson, Paris 16ème, tél. 53 67 22 00)

1. **OUVERTURE DE LA REUNION PAR LE DOYEN D'AGE**

2. **ELECTION DU PRESIDENT ET DU VICE-PRESIDENT DE LA COMMISSION AINSI QUE D'UN RAPPORTEUR**

CE DOCUMENT TIENT LIEU DE CONVOCATION À LA RÉUNION

pour les membres de la Commission Ad Hoc

3. **ORDRE DU JOUR**

<AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) OJ 1>

Adoption de l'ordre du jour.

4. **VISITE DE LA COMMISSION AD HOC EN ARMENIE POUR OBSERVER LES ELECTIONS PARLEMENTAIRES**

<AS/NM (1995).....,
AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) 1, AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) 2>

Echange de vues sur les lois électorales et certains aspects de la situation actuelle en Arménie pouvant avoir un impact sur les futures élections. Examen d'un avant-projet de programme.

5. **DIVERS**

6. **DATE ET LIEU DE LA PROCHAINE REUNION**

- à Strasbourg pendant la partie de la session de l'Assemblée (du 26 au 30 Juin 1995)
- à Erevan, du 2 au 6 Juillet 1995

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, 15 mai 1955 AS/Bur/Armenia (1995) 1

COMMISSION AD HOC SUR LES ELECTIONS EN ARMENIE

Avant-projet de Programme de la visite en Arménie (du 2 au 6 juillet 1995)

Samedi, 1er juillet 1995

Soir Arrivée des membres de la Commission

Dimanche, 2 juillet 1995

Réunion de travail de la Commission

Réunion avec les ambassadeurs en Arménie des pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe

Réunion avec des représentants de l'OSCE et d'autres organisations internationales observant les élections en Arménie.

Lundi, 3 Juillet /Mardi 4 juillet 1995

Rencontre éventuelle avec le Président Levon TER-PETROSSYAN

Rencontre avec M. Babken ARARKTSIAN, Président du Parlement

[Réunion avec les Juges de la Cour Suprême]

Réunion avec le Président et des membres du Comité électoral central

Réunion avec des représentants des différents partis politiques

Réunion avec des représentants des minorités nationales

Réunion avec des représentants des media

[Rencontre avec le Ministre de la Justice]

Rencontre avec le Ministre de l'Intérieur

Réunion avec des représentants des ONGs

Mardi, 4 Juillet

après-midi La Commission se divise en sous-groupes. Départ des membres des sous-groupes vers différents lieux en-dehors de Erevan. Réunions avec des représentants des comités electoraux locaux.

Mercredi, 5 juillet 1995 (journée électorale)

Visite de bureaux de vote à Erevan et ailleurs.

Jeudi, 6 juillet 1995

Echange de vues avec des représentants d'autres organisations internationales observant les élections.

Réunion avec les ambassadeurs des pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe

Conférence de presse éventuelle

Départ des membres de la Commission

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Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, le 2 mai 1995
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AS/NM (1995) 14

COMMISSION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES PAYS EUROPÉENS NON MEMBRES

L'ARMÉNIE

(Rapporteur: Mme Gelderblom-Lankhout, Pays-Bas, Groupe libéral)

Document d'information préparé
sur les instructions du rapporteur

Les premiers royaumes arméniens indépendants apparaissent dès avant J.-C. Ensuite, l'histoire de l'Arménie est faite de phases de dépendance, d'indépendance et de partages au gré des rivalités de ses puissants voisins. Le dernier royaume arménien disparaît au 14ème siècle.

Malgré cette histoire tourmentée les Arméniens ont toujours gardé une forte identité nationale, reposant notamment sur un christianisme adopté dès le 4ème siècle et une langue indo-européenne dotée de son alphabet propre depuis le 5ème siècle. L'identité arménienne est aussi une valeur constante des communautés diasporiques; aujourd'hui moins de la moitié des 6 à 7 millions d'Arméniens vivent dans leur pays.

L'histoire des Arméniens a été marquée à partir de la fin du 18ème siècle par l'expansion russe dans le Caucase et les Balkans et à la fin du 19ème siècle par la politique nationaliste turque. En 1894-96 des massacres de grande échelle ordonnés par le sultan Abdul Hamid font 200.000 morts parmi les Arméniens et, en 1915, la dictature jeune-turque se livre à un véritable génocide en exterminant 1 à 1,5 millions d'Arméniens sur les 2,1 millions qui vivaient dans l'Empire ottoman en 1914.

A partir du 28 mai 1918, après les défaites et révolutions russes, l'Arménie, privée d'une grande partie de son territoire, connaît une courte période d'indépendance, qui se termine par la soviétisation le 2 décembre 1920.

Après 1945, on assiste à de nombreux retours au pays d'Arméniens de la diaspora. L'Arménie a toujours connu une forte homogénéité ethnique (94 % de nationaux en 1989), les Kurdes constituant aujourd'hui la principale minorité nationale.

Sur le plan économique, la principale entrave au développement réside dans l'enclavement du pays qui n'a aucun accès à la mer. Les routes, voies ferrées, pipelines et gazoducs passent par la Géorgie ou l'Azerbaïdjan, ce dernier imposant à l'Arménie un blocus depuis 1989 en raison de son soutien aux Arméniens du Haut-Karabakh. Le pays n'est pas non plus épargné par les catastrophes naturelles comme en témoigne le terrible tremblement de terre du 7 décembre 1988.

L'histoire récente de l'Arménie a été marquée par le conflit du Haut-Karabakh, région autonome incorporée à l'Azerbaïdjan par Staline en 1921. Le 20 février 1988, le Soviet du Haut-Karabakh a demandé le rattachement de la région à l'Arménie. Le conflit armé qui en a résulté s'est soldé par plus de 20.000 morts, un million de réfugiés, l'occupation de 20 % de l'Azerbaïdjan. Un cessez-le-feu est intervenu le 12 mai 1994 qui semble assez bien respecté. La Commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres a consacré un rapport à ce conflit en octobre 1994 (voir Doc. 7182).

Sur le plan intérieur, ce conflit a fortement contribué à l'obtention de l'indépendance de l'Arménie. En effet, il a suscité la création du Comité Karabakh, un groupe de onze intellectuels, dont Levon Ter Petrossian, l'actuel Président de l'Arménie. L'arrestation des membres du Comité ordonnée par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev a eu pour effet de radicaliser l'opinion publique arménienne et le Mouvement pan-national arménien, issu du Comité, a remporté les élections législatives de l'été 1990 sur la base d'un programme ayant l'indépendance comme objectif principal. Le 21 septembre 1991, 99 % de la population se sont prononcés pour l'indépendance, qui a été proclamée par le Parlement deux jours plus tard. Le 16 octobre 1991, Levon Ter Petrossian a été élu Président de la République au suffrage universel avec 84 % des voix.

La reconnaissance internationale de l'Arménie a rapidement suivi la disparition de l'URSS en 1991, avec l'entrée notamment à l'ONU, la CSCE, le FMI et la Banque mondiale. De plus, l'Arménie a participé à tous les sommets de la Communauté d'Etats Indépendants et a notamment signé le traité de sécurité collective le 15 mai 1992 à Tachkent.

Parmi les premières mesures prises par le Parlement élu en 1990, il faut noter l'adoption de lois sur la liberté d'expression, de la presse, d'association et la propriété privée. Depuis lors, le pays s'est engagé dans un processus de réforme économique tendant à l'instauration d'une économie de marché (réforme agraire et privatisation).

A partir d'août 1990, le multipartisme a été illustré par la création d'une dizaine de partis et par le retour d'exil des partis nationaux historiques, notamment le parti Dachnaksoutioun.

Le 22 décembre 1991, le Parlement arménien demandait le statut d'invité spécial auprès de l'Assemblée Parlementaire.

Les prochaines élections législatives sont prévues pour le 5 juillet 1995. Ce jour-là les Arméniens seront également appelés à adopter une nouvelle constitution par référendum. Une délégation de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe suivra le déroulement de ce scrutin. Les élections législatives sont organisées sur la base de la loi constitutionnelle suivante adoptée par le Parlement de la République d'Arménie le 27 mars 1995.

Article 1 Le Parlement de la République d'Arménie nouvellement élu est renommé "Assemblée Nationale" de la République d'Arménie.

Article 2 La Constitution de la République d'Arménie est adoptée par la voie parlementaire ou référendaire selon l'approbation du Parlement.

Article 3 L'Assemblée Nationale est élue pour une durée de quatre ans.

Article 4 Les membres du Gouvernement, les juges, les fonctionnaires du parquet, du Comité d'Etat de la Sécurité Nationale et des ministères de la Justice, de l'Intérieur et des Forces armées ne sont pas éligibles.

Article 5 L'Assemblée Nationale est composée de 190 députés, dont 150 sont élus au scrutin majoritaire simple et 40 au scrutin proportionnel. Lors des élections chaque électeur a droit à une voix dans le cadre du scrutin majoritaire et une voix dans le cadre du scrutin proportionnel.

Article 6 Le droit de présenter une candidature appartient aux citoyens ayant le droit de vote, aux organisations politico-sociales ou à leurs sections.

Article 7 Les élections se déroulent conformément à la présente loi constitutionnelle et à la loi sur "Les élections des députés de l'Assemblée Nationale".

Article 8 Les autres actes législatifs de la République d'Arménie fonctionnent tant qu'ils ne contredisent pas la présente loi constitutionnelle ni la loi sur "Les élections des députés de l'Assemblée Nationale".

Etant donné la stabilité qui a caractérisé la vie politique en Arménie depuis son indépendance et le cours clairement démocratique choisi par ses dirigeants, il y a tout lieu d'espérer que ces élections se dérouleront de manière libre et démocratique.

Le paysage politique, qui est composé de plus de 30 partis dont 7 sont représentés au Parlement, se présente de la manière suivante:

- le Bloc majoritaire, auquel appartiennent notamment le Mouvement national arménien, le Parti Ramgavar (libéral), le Parti républicain et le Parti Hintchak (social-démocrate);

- le Bloc d'opposition intitulé "Pacte d'entente nationale", auquel adhèrent l'Union démocratique nationale, l'Union chrétienne pour l'autodétermination nationale, l'Union des droits constitutionnels et le Parti Dachnak;

- le Parti communiste, qui demeure une force importante et entend jouer un rôle significatif aux prochaines élections.

Les conditions d'un débat démocratique semblent donc réunies. La confrontation entre ces forces politiques met en évidence la diversité des choix qui s'offriront aux Arméniens lors des élections du 5 juillet 1995.

Il faut noter toutefois un événement qui pourrait jeter une certaine ombre sur l'organisation de ces élections: il s'agit de la décision de la Cour suprême d'Arménie du 13 janvier 1995 de suspendre le parti d'opposition Dachnaktsoutioun pour une durée de six mois, donc jusqu'au lendemain des élections. Cette décision confirme le décret présidentiel du 28 décembre 1994 qui a interdit ce parti; la Cour suprême accuse le parti d'avoir notamment violé la loi du 26 février 1991 (qui avait été votée avec le soutien des députés de ce parti) sur les organisations civiles et politiques d'Arménie, notamment les dispositions suivantes:

- l'obligation pour la direction des partis politiques de résider sur le territoire de l'Arménie;

- l'interdiction de recevoir une assistance financière et matérielle de l'étranger.

Il convient de noter à ce propos que le siège du parti est installé à Athènes.

Il faut noter aussi que la décision de la Cour suprême est suspensive. Dès lors que ce parti se sera conformé aux dispositions des lois qu'il a jusqu'à présent enfreintes, il pourrait alors retrouver sa place dans la compétition électorale.

En même temps, une douzaine de journaux, comprenant des titres affiliés à ce parti et des journaux "indépendants", mais liés au parti selon les autorités, ont été interdits. De plus, 21 membres du parti ont été arrêtés depuis 1994; ils sont soupçonnés d'être membres du "présumé" groupe terroriste clandestin que comprendrait le parti Dachnaktsoutioun.

Il y a lieu de souligner de manière générale que l'interdiction de partis politiques va à l'encontre des principes fondamentaux du Conseil de l'Europe, de même que la censure appliquée à la presse. D'un autre côté, tout parti démocratique doit respecter la législation en vigueur dans son pays, d'autant plus qu'il a contribué à l'adoption de cette législation.

Ne disposant pas de tous les éléments nécessaires, il serait prématuré de tirer des conclusions hâtives sur cette affaire, ainsi que sur les informations selon lesquelles les restrictions à la liberté de la presse, notamment la télévision, se multiplient. Il serait toutefois regrettable que de telles évolutions entachent d'irrégularité les élections législatives d'un pays qui a souvent démontré son attachement aux valeurs du Conseil de l'Europe et qui a demandé l'obtention du statut d'invité spécial auprès de l'Assemblée Parlementaire.



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Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, le 30 mars 1995
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AS/NM (1995) 8

COMMISSION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES PAYS EUROPÉENS NON MEMBRES

LA LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'ARMENIE SUR LES ELECTIONS

Document d'information

Le 27 mars 1995 le Parlement de la République d'Arménie a adopté la loi constitutionnelle sur les élections législatives.

Article 1 Le Parlement de la République d'Arménie nouvellement élu est renommé "Assemblée Nationale" de la République d'Arménie.
Article 2 La Constitution de la République d'Arménie est adoptée par la voie parlementaire ou référendaire selon l'approbation du Parlement.
Article 3 L'Assemblée Nationale est élue pour une durée de quatre ans.
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Président de la République d'Arménie L. Ter-Petrossian

Strasbourg, le 21 janvier 1992 s:\nm\armenie

ARMENIE

Population	3.300.000 habitants
Composition	90 % d'Arméniens 5 % d'Azéris 3 % de Russes 2 % de Kurdes Il s'agit de la république ex-soviétique la plus homogène au plan ethnique.
Capitale	Erevan (1.119.000 habitants)
Religion et culture	Tradition chrétienne
Indicateurs économiques	
Poids économique dans l'ensemble ex-soviétique:	0,9 % du PNB
Part dans la production agricole:	0,7 %
Part dans la production industrielle:	1,2 %
Les grandes dates du conflit arméno-azerbaïdjanais depuis 1988	
Février 1988:	Manifestations nationalistes en Arménie réclamant le rattachement du Haut-Karabagh et pogroms anti-arméniens à Soumgaït (Azerbaïdjan)
Septembre 1988:	Heurts entre Azéris et Arméniens dans le Haut-Karabagh.
Décembre 1988:	Tremblement de terre dans le Nord de l'Arménie et arrestation de la plupart des membres du Comité Karabagh.
Janvier 1989	Rattachement de l'administration du Haut Karabagh à Moscou.

Mai 1989:	Nouveaux affrontements meurtriers entre Azéris et Arméniens dans le Haut Karabagh.
Janvier 1990:	Pogroms antiarméniens à Bakou (Azerbaïdjan).
Mai 1991:	Regains de tension en Arménie. Envoi de parachutistes soviétiques.
Décembre 1991:	Combats intenses entre Arméniens et Azéris autour de Steparrakeib (Haut Karabagh)
Janvier 1992:	Décret de la présidence azerbaïdjanaise faisant passer la gestion du Haut-Karabagh sous son administration directe.
	Le Président arménien de la commission exécutive du Parlement du Haut Karabagh demande au Secrétaire Général de l'ONU l'envoi de casques bleus au Haut Karabagh pour prévenir "le génocide de la population arménienne".


Accession de l'Arménie à l'indépendance:

21 septembre 1991:	Les Arméniens se prononcent par référendum (99 % de oui) en faveur de l'indépendance.
23 septembre 1991:	Déclaration d'indépendance.
31 décembre 1991:	Les Douze se déclarent prêts à reconnaître huit des républiques issues de l'ancienne URSS et qui ont formé la CEI, dont l'Arménie.
31 décembre 1991:	Reconnaissance de l'Arménie par la France, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la Belgique.

Demande d'adhésion au Conseil de l'Europe Le 9 octobre 1991

Demande du statut d'invité spécial auprès de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe: 22 décembre 1991

Les Républiques et leurs nationalités



Strasbourg, le 27 octobre 1993
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COMMISSION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES PAYS EUROPEENS NON MEMBRES


LA TRANSCAUCASIE

Politiquement la Transcaucasie est constituée par trois Républiques qui ont acquis leur indépendance à la fin de 1991: l'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie. Elles ont toutes trois demandé le statut d'invité spécial auprès de l'Assemblée Parlementaire.

Géographiquement la Transcaucasie se situe entre les montagnes du Caucase au nord, la Mer noire à l'ouest, la Mer caspienne à l'est, la Turquie au sud-ouest et l'Iran au sud-est (voir carte en annexe).

Les problèmes de la Transcaucasie sont liés à l'extraordinaire complexité ethnique de la région. Son importance stratégique explique l'intérêt que lui portent ses trois puissants voisins: la Russie, la Turquie et l'Iran. Depuis 1988, les conflits sanglants se sont multipliés dans la région. Deux d'entre eux retiendront particulièrement notre attention: le Haut-Karabakh et l'Abkhazie.

I. Le Haut-Karabakh



En 1989, le Haut-Karabakh avait une superficie de 4.400 km² et une population de 188.000 habitants (dont 145.000 Arméniens, 40.000 Azéris et 3.000 Russes).

C'est en 1921 que le Haut-Karabakh a été déclaré région autonome et en 1923 qu'ont été tracées ses frontières qui ont exclu le couloir de "Latchine" reliant le Haut-Karabakh à l'Arménie.

Le conflit sanglant du Haut-Karabakh, qui a déjà fait plus de 2.000 morts, remonte à février 1988 quand les habitants de souche arménienne ont organisé d'importantes manifestations dans la capitale Stepanakert pour obtenir l'incorporation du Haut-Karabakh dans l'Arménie, et que la répression par les autorités azéries a été particulièrement violente.

Le 20 février 1988, les députés du Haut-Karabakh ont demandé au Soviet Suprême de l'URSS le transfert de la tutelle sur le Haut-Karabakh de l'Azerbaïdjan à l'Arménie, demande qui a été rejetée le 23 mars suivant.

Le 12 juillet de la même année, le Soviet du Haut-Karabakh vote la sécession de la région et son rattachement à l'Arménie sous le nom d'Artsakh.

Le 1er décembre 1989, le Parlement arménien et le Conseil de l'Artsakh votent ensemble la réunification de l'Arménie et du Haut-Karabakh.

Le 20 mai 1990, la population du Karabakh participe aux premières élections libres du Parlement d'Arménie.

Le 2 septembre 1991 est décidée la création de la République du Haut-Karabakh et, le 10 décembre, la population répond oui à 99% dans un référendum sur l'indépendance du Haut-Karabakh.

Le 28 décembre 1991 se tiennent des élections au Parlement du Haut-Karabakh et la proclamation de l'indépendance de la République intervient le 18 janvier 1992.

Du point de vue des autorités de la région, la légitimité de la nouvelle république repose, d'une part, sur leur volonté d'autodétermination "en vertu de la constitution en vigueur à l'époque en URSS et des lois qui donnent le droit aux populations des régions autonomes de décider elles-mêmes leur système d'Etat légal au cas où la république quitterait l'Union soviétique", d'autre part sur la volonté de la population manifestée lors du référendum du 10 décembre 1991.

Quant aux autorités azéries, elles refusent toute existence légale à la république du Haut-Karabakh, dans la mesure où le Conseil National d'Azerbaïdjan a annulé le statut d'autonomie de la région le 26 novembre 1991. L'ensemble de la classe politique de Bakou défend le principe de l'intégrité territoriale et ressent la question du Haut-Karabakh comme une manifestation des revendications territoriales de l'Arménie. A ce propos, la République du Haut-Karabakh n'a été reconnue par aucun pays à ce jour.

En septembre 1992, l'Azerbaïdjan estimait à 225.000 le nombre de ses réfugiés en provenance d'Arménie et du Haut-Karabakh.

Un certain nombre d'initiatives de médiation ont vu le jour à partir de 1992:

- la CSCE a décidé en mars 1992 la tenue d'une conférence internationale de paix sur le Haut-Karabakh (Conférence de Minsk);

- la Fédération de Russie et l'Iran ont proposé leur médiation;

- la Commission des relations avec les pays européens non membres a eu des échanges de vues en octobre 1992 à Strasbourg avec des délégations parlementaires d'Azerbaïdjan et d'Arménie et leur a présenté un plan de paix à soumettre à leurs parlements respectifs. A ce jour seule l'Arménie a donné une réponse.

A Bakou, en juin de cette année Gaïdar Aliev, l'ancien dirigeant du Parti communiste d'Azerbaïdjan, renverse le Président élu Eltchibey, alors que les forces du Haut-Karabakh s'emparent progressivement de près de 20 % du territoire azéri.

Le 29 août 1993 a eu lieu un référendum en faveur de Gaïdar Aliev, qui a destitué définitivement l'ancien Président Eltchibey. Les élections présidentielles du 3 octobre ont légitimé l'accession à la présidence de Gaïdar Aliev.

On assiste ces derniers jours à une forte diminution des hostilités et à la volonté des autorités azéries d'entamer des pourparlers directs avec les dirigeants du Haut-Karabakh. Le cessez-le-feu a été prolongé jusqu'au mois de novembre.

Le Comité des hauts fonctionnaires de la CSCE (Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe) a lancé un appel pour mettre en oeuvre le plan de paix élaboré au mois de juin.

Le groupe de Minsk, réunissant 9 pays membres de la CSCE, ainsi que l'Azerbaïdjan, l'Arménie et le Haut Karabakh, prépare une conférence de paix qui se tiendra dans la capitale bélarusse. Cette conférence devrait être suivie d'envois de forces de maintien de la paix de la CSCE. Ce serait la première opération de paix de grande envergure menée par la CSCE.

L'Azerbaïdjan a rejoint la CEI le 24 septembre 1993.

Le 8 octobre 1993 s'est tenue à Moscou une réunion entre les Présidents Eltsine (Russie), Ter-Petrossian (Arménie), Aliev (Azerbaïdjan) et Chevardnadze (Géorgie).

II. L'Abkhazie

La République autonome d'Abkhazie est située à l'ouest de la Géorgie, au bord de la Mer noire.



RÉP. DE GÉORGIE

Superficie : 69 700 km². *Population* : 5 401 000, dont : Géorgiens : 70,1 %, Arméniens : 8,1%, Russes : 6,3, Azéris : 5,7%, Ukrainiens : 1%.

République autonome d'Adjarie
Superficie : 3000 km². *Population* : 393 000, dont : Adjars : 40 %, Géorgiens : 29 %.

Rép. aut. d'Abkhazie
Superficie : 8600 km². *Population* : 540 000, dont : Géorgiens : 44 %, Abkhazes : 17%, Russes : 16 %, Grecs : 9 %, Arméniens : 8 %, Estoniens, Turcs et Adjars.

Rép. aut. d'Ossétie du Sud
Superficie : 3900 km² *Population* : 125 000, dont : Ossetes : 66 %, Géorgiens : 29 %.

Le conflit qui y a fait rage depuis août 1992 ne constitue que l'une des guerres qui ravagent le pays.

En effet, l'Ossétie du Sud est en sécession, les partisans de Zviad Gamsakhourdia, l'ancien Président, chassé du pouvoir en janvier 1992, poursuivent leur guérilla en Mingrélie et la tension monte en Adjarie qui, avec l'Ossétie du Sud et l'Abkhazie, était du temps de l'Union Soviétique l'une des trois Républiques autonomes de la Géorgie.

L'Abkhazie a été annexée par la Russie en 1864. En mars 1921 elle est tombée sous le contrôle soviétique et en 1931 elle s'est vue incorporée à la Géorgie en tant que République autonome. A la suite de divers mouvements de population, les Abkhazes sont à présent minoritaires dans leur propre pays. D'après le recensement de 1989, ils représentent 17,8 % de la population et les Géorgiens 45,7 %.

Des tensions se sont manifestées de longue date entre la population abkhazienne qui réclamait plus d'autonomie et le gouvernement géorgien qui s'efforçait de préserver l'intégrité territoriale du pays. D'autres facteurs séparent aussi les deux peuples, notamment la religion - les Abkhazes sont majoritairement musulmans alors que les Géorgiens sont des chrétiens orthodoxes - la culture et la langue.

Le présent conflit dans la région a éclaté en août 1992 quand les troupes géorgiennes sont entrées en Abkhazie et ont pris le contrôle de la capitale Soukhoumi. La raison officielle en était la lutte contre le sabotage de la ligne de chemin de fer et la recherche de personnalités enlevées, dont le ministre de l'Intérieur. Les autorités abkhazes ont considéré cette opération comme une invasion et les combats qui s'en sont suivis ont fait depuis lors des centaines de morts.

Il ne fait aucun doute que l'intérêt stratégique et économique de la région a entraîné des interventions de pays voisins dans le conflit.

C'est d'ailleurs sous l'égide de la Russie qu'a été signé un accord de cessez-le-feu fin juillet 1993. Celui-ci, plus ou moins respecté au début, a été rompu le 16 septembre. De plus, les négociations entre Géorgiens et Abkhazes ne progressent guère, d'autant plus que l'état d'urgence a été instauré le 20 septembre dans le pays et que le Parlement a remis tous ses pouvoirs pour trois mois au Président Chevardnadze.

Après deux semaines de siège et d'atrocités (trois avions de ligne abattus par des missiles abkhazes), Soukhoumi est tombé le 27 septembre aux mains des forces abkhazes. La perte de Soukhoumi aura pour les Géorgiens des conséquences désastreuses:

- elle provoquera le départ de près de 120.000 Géorgiens de la république autonome qui viendront rejoindre les quelque 70.000 réfugiés déjà arrivés dans la région de Tbilissi en 1992;

- elle aggravera le marasme économique du pays;


- elle transformera la composition ethnique de l'Abkhazie.

Rentré à Tbilissi, Chevardnadze déclarait: "Nous reviendrons à Soukhoumi". En même temps, Gamsakhourdia prévenait: "Nous renverserons le pouvoir illégitime de Tbilissi"....

La Géorgie a rejoint la CEI le 8 octobre 1993 et le Président Chevardnadze s'est vu contraint de solliciter une assistance militaire de la part de la Russie pour faire face à l'avancée des troupes de l'ex-Président Gamsakhourdia dans l'ouest du pays.

ANNEXE I

TRANSCAUCASIA



Between Anarchy And Despotism

Opposition Groups Grew More Active, with Mixed Political Results. Georgian and Azerbaijani Economies Continued Their Downward Spiral; Armenia's Leveled Off. In Spite of Cease-fire Agreements, No End to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Was in Sight

by **ELIZABETH FULLER**



THE CHRONIC POLITICAL instability, economic collapse, and plummeting living standards that plagued the Transcaucasus over the past several years persisted in 1994. Heads of state in Georgia and Armenia succeeded in maintaining power primarily because calls by an increasingly vociferous opposition for their resignation found little resonance among a demoralized and impoverished populace preoccupied with physical survival. In Azerbaijan, by contrast, President Heidar Aliev mobilized public support to neutralize an attempted coup. In all three countries, murders of prominent political figures went unsolved.

While the Armenian economy showed signs of stabilizing, economic collapse accelerated in Azerbaijan and Georgia; the respective parliaments' failure to enact substantive legislation to pave the way for market reforms, specifically to give the green light for price liberalization, delayed the granting of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. In addition, Moscow questioned the validity of Azerbaijan's "deal of the century," a joint venture with a consortium of eight Western oil companies to explore three Caspian oil fields.

One of the few pieces of encouraging news was the signing of formal cease-fire agreements as a first step toward resolving both the Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhaz conflicts, but in neither case is an acceptable political solution to the conflict in sight. Abkhaz authorities obstructed the intended repatriation of Georgian refugees who had fled Abkhazia in the fall of 1993. Moreover, the UN endorsed the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) decided at its summit in December to merge the parallel Russian and its own mediation efforts in the Karabakh conflict; those events signified notable success for Russian policy makers intent on gaining an international carte blanche for the conduct of all peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR.

ARMENIAN OPPOSITION INTENSIFYING

The latent tension between embattled President Levon Ter-Petrossyan and the Armenian opposition became considerably more acrimonious; nevertheless, the various opposition parties failed to present a united front. Following a public appeal in early February by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsyutyun) for the creation of a "government of national accord," members of several opposition parties formed a 39-member shadow cabinet. It included former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan, who had broken with Ter-Petrossyan over policy in late 1991 to form his own political party, the National Democratic Union, (NDU), and former Armenian Communist Party First Secretary Karen Demirchyan.

The announcement in late January of plans to reorganize the Armenian intelligence service gave rise to a heated battle between Interior Minister Vano Siradeghyan, who supported the proposed changes, and former National Security Advisor Ashot Manucharyan, who argued that they could have a devastating effect on national security. The debate degenerated into mutual allegations of corruption and malpractice.

Throughout the summer months, the NDU organized a series of protest demonstrations with an average attendance of 50,000 people. During the protests, Manucharyan accused Ter-Petrossyan's administration of corruption and abuse of power; most notable was the accusation that the administration engineered the assassination of three leading political figures, including former KGB chairman Marius Yuzbashyan. In late July,

> *The assassination of former Erevan mayor Ambartsum Galstyan prompted several deputies to resign, protesting the leadership's inability to combat terrorism.*

the Armenian procuracy formally charged Manucharyan with defamation. Spokesmen for Ter-Petrossyan dismissed the allegations with disdain, while the president himself, speaking at the sixth congress of the Armenian Pan-National Movement (APNM) in late November, expressed confidence that his party would remain in power until the year 2000. The Armenian populace demonstrated similar indifference: calls by the NDU

for a nationwide strike on 18 November went largely unheeded.

In September, in anticipation of the parliamentary elections due the next May, the APNM and five other right-wing Armenian parties issued a joint declaration enumerating the problems facing the present leadership, including privatization, police corruption, and adoption of a new constitution. (Opposition objections have held up the constitution in parliament for more than a year.) The right-wingers pledged to redouble efforts at resolving the problems. One month later, five opposition parties, spearheaded by the NDU and including the Dashnak Party, formed a coalition called the Union of National Accord and published a counter-manifesto arguing that the sole chance for national salvation lay in replacing the present "authoritarian leadership"; to that end, they proposed the adoption of a new election law.

Violent incidents toward the end of the year substantiated the opposition's charges of government repression. In October, a prominent TV journalist was beaten up; the perpetrators were never identified. In December, former Erevan Mayor Ambartsum Galstyan was assassinated; Galstyan, like Ter-Petrossyan, Manukyan, and Manucharyan, was a founding member of the Karabakh Committee that was set up in 1988 to coordinate the campaign for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian jurisdiction. His murder precipitated a major political crisis. Manukyan resigned as a parliament deputy to protest what he termed the leadership's inability to combat terrorism. Two days later, the Dashnak Party faction in parliament followed suit. One week after that, in a televised address, Ter-Petrossyan announced a temporary ban on the Dashnak Party, alleging that a secret terrorist organization associated with it was responsible for Galstyan's murder and was planning to assassinate others as well. A Dashnak spokesman denied the existence of such a clandestine group and said the party would appeal the ruling.

The one figure who might have served as an intermediary in negotiations between the leadership and opposition, as he had done in the past — the venerated Catholicos Vazgen I — died in August at the age of 85. Ter-Petrossyan ordered three days of national mourning culminating in a state funeral.

On the plus side, after two years of stagnation, 1994 saw the first tentative signs of Armenian economic stabilization and recovery. Indeed, during the first four months, Armenia led the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries in key economic indicators, registering increases of 2.6 percent in national income and 1.8 percent in industrial production. The overall positive trend continued throughout the year; monthly inflation fell from 82.5 percent in January to 8.1 percent in July, and consumer prices and the national currency-exchange rate stabilized. Still, there was no tangible improvement in living standards, and tens of thousands of families emigrated in desperation. In November, the parliament approved a wide-reaching economic reform program that included price liberalization, higher customs duties and food taxes, and the abolition of state subsidies. The reforms paved the way for a $250-million loan from the IMF.

> *Despite a recovering economy, there was no tangible improvement in Armenian living standards.*

Largely isolated since the fall of 1993, when Karabakh Armenians occupied a large chunk of Azerbaijani territory, Armenia in 1994 was able to rejoin the international community. Ter-Petrossyan's August visit to the United States, at President Clinton's invitation, signaled a warming in bilateral relations and brought promises of additional humanitarian aid. That, in turn, worsened already poor relations with Turkey. Armenia also concluded important financial, commercial, and military agreements with Russia, including one that calls for the latter to provide 60 billion rubles toward the cost of recommissioning the mothballed nuclear power plant at Medzamor. Indeed, the current "friendly and harmonious" — even exemplary — relations between Russia and Armenia led one Russian observer to postulate that the two countries could soon conclude an agreement on confederal relations that would serve as the first stage in transforming relations among the CIS member states. In October, Armenia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program.



LUBOMIR KOTEK

SUPPLYING DEMAND — ***The much-needed program for Armenian economic reform included higher taxes on food.***

POLITICAL JOCKEYING IN AZERBAIJAN

President Aliev, the veteran communist leader who returned triumphantly to power in Azerbaijan in June 1993 after the ouster of Abulfaz Elchibey, succeeded through a combination of ruthless repression and astute crisis management in warding off potential threats to his position. Throughout the year, police dealt harshly with any manifestations of dissent — intimidating journalists, detaining opposition activists, raiding the premises of several opposition parties, and forcibly dispersing protest demonstrations. In late February, Aliev had the headquarters of the Azerbaijan Popular Front (AzPF) sealed and dozens of its members arrested after the alleged discovery of arms and ammunition said to have been stockpiled for a coup.

Despite the constant harassment, the AzPF and four other opposition parties joined together in March to form the Democratic Congress Bloc. The bloc's stated goals were to protect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and to expedite the emergence of a democratic society. Two months later, 16 opposition parties demanded that the government "put an end to the campaign of terror, slander, and repression; restore legality and democracy; cancel political censorship; and create conditions for a normal political dialogue."

In early May, representatives of the parliaments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) appealed to CIS heads of state for peacekeeping troops to monitor a cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh. That action further compounded tensions between the opposition and the Azerbaijani government. Opposition parties demanded the resignation of parliament speaker Rasul Guliev on the grounds that by appending his signature to the appeal, Guliev had given de facto recognition to the NKR and thereby betrayed the national interest. The leadership's willingness to accept the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan galvanized the opposition: 17 deputies left the 50-member People's Assembly in protest, and 22 opposition parties formed a "national resistance movement" to forestall any attempt to deploy Russian or CIS forces in Azerbaijan.



CTK

BORN-AGAIN DEMOCRAT — *Resilient Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev holds on to the reins of power by changing with the times; a former Communist Party head (and KGB general), he became a promoter of market reform.*

The economic situation continued to deteriorate faster than anticipated. During the first six months, gross national product (GNP) fell by 25 percent, industrial production by 27 percent, and agricultural output by 13 percent. By August, the budget deficit had increased by 200 percent and stood at 91.4 billion manats, or 7.4 percent of GNP. (The official exchange rate in July was 970 manats to the dollar; by late October, in the wake of the coup attempt, it had fallen to 2,000-plus manats to the dollar, and by late December to 4,390 manats to the dollar.) The IMF and World Bank made offers of a $230-million, low-interest loan, contingent on such economic reforms as faster privatization and total price liberalization. Speaking in a parliamentary debate on the economic crisis in December, Economics Minister Samed Sadykhov and Finance Minister Fikret Yusifov urged speedy implementation of those reforms.

Heidar Aliev — The Arch-Survivor

October 1987, when career KGB general and former Azerbaijan Communist Party boss Heidar Aliev was forced by Gorbachev to step down as first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, his career appeared to be over. He had been known as the architect of the apparent economic miracle that prompted Leonid Brezhnev's euphoric pronouncement in 1981 that "Azerbaijan is walking tall." But when he was forced out as minister, correspondents for both the Azerbaijani and the Russian central press gleefully set about dismantling his carefully crafted reputation as a crusader against corruption.

Seven years later, however, the positions were reversed, with Gorbachev living in virtual retirement, while Aliev, now president of his native Azerbaijan, triumphantly signed a major oil deal with a consortium of eight Western oil companies. The deal is said to change the entire geo-political map of the Near East and pave the way for Azerbaijan's metamorphosis into a second Kuwait.

Like his Transcaucasian neighbor, Eduard Shevardnadze, Heidar Aliev is a classic example of the politician as chameleon, effortlessly adapting to blend with the political landscape. Born on 10 May, 1923, into a worker's family in the enclave of Nakhichevan, Aliev spent the early part of his career in security organizations. He started at the NKVD (forerunner of the KGB) in 1941 and worked his way up through the ranks of the Azerbaijani security service, joining the Communist Party in 1945. He was appointed a deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB in 1964 and promoted to chairman three years later.

In 1969, Aliev was elected Azerbaijan Communist Party first secretary and proceeded to make a name for himself as capable and energetic — qualities that were at a premium during the so-called "era of stagnation." Yuri Andropov brought Aliev to Moscow to fill a key government post immediately after he succeeded Brezhnev as Communist Party General Secretary in late 1982.

In the late summer of 1990, Aliev returned from retirement in Moscow to a rapturous welcome in his home base of Nakhichevan, where he was elected chairman of the local parliament. The situation was ripe for his arrival. In the autumn of 1991, Azerbaijan Communist Party leader Ayaz Mutalibov was compromised by his expression of support (hastily retracted) for the abortive August coup against Gorbachev and was under pressure from the nationalist Azerbaijan Popular Front. Aliev took the opportunity to launch his own foreign policy, quietly cultivating ties with Turkey (whose then-prime minister, Suleyman Demirel, he had known for over two decades) and Iran. Both countries subsequently supplied generous economic aid to Nakhichevan.

Following Mutalibov's ouster in March 1992, subsequent Azerbaijani leaderships did everything in their power to undermine Aliev's position. In May of that year, the law on presidential elections was amended to exclude candidates over 65 years of age, and in October, troops subordinate to the Azerbaijan Popular Front briefly occupied key government buildings in Nakhichevan in a clear attempt at intimidation.

Eight months later, however, when renegade colonel Suret Huseinov launched a coup against Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey, the latter summoned Aliev to Baku to lend moral support. After Elchibey fled two days later, Aliev was elected chairman of the People's Assembly (the rump parliament).

Now sporting the mantle of a democrat committed to market reform, Aliev adroitly consolidated his position, sidelining Huseinov, who had demanded the post of prime minister. He held a nationwide referendum in which the public overwhelmingly expressed their lack of confidence in Elchibey, and he finally engineered his own election as president in late September 1993.

For the moment, Aliev has demonstrated that he is firmly in control. But his opponents, both at home and abroad, are still trying to expedite the canny septuagenarian's final retirement from politics.

DEAL OF THE CENTURY

Oil workers went on strike in August to protest drastically declining living standards. But other groups in Azerbaijani society appeared to have faith in the economic miracle that was supposed to follow September's signing of the so-called deal of the century. After three years of tortuous negotiations, Azerbaijan completed a $7.4-billion contract giving eight Western oil companies a 70-percent share in exploiting three Caspian oil fields with combined estimated reserves of 4 billion barrels (600 million tons). However, the Russian Foreign Ministry cast doubt on the project's chances by claiming that the agreement violated the terms of existing international treaties concerning the status of the Caspian Sea.

> *Police in Azerbaijan dealt harshly with any manifestations of dissent.*

Moreover, the question of how the oil should be exported remained unresolved. Consortium members and the Turkish government favored construction of a pipeline from Baku through Armenia, Iran, and eastern Anatolia to Yumurtalik on Turkey's Aegean coast. But Russia, whose state-owned oil company, LUKoil, was granted 10 percent of Azerbaijan's initial 30-percent stake in late 1993, envisaged transporting the oil via an existing Soviet-era pipeline from Baku to Novorossiisk and then via tanker to Burgas in Bulgaria, where a new pipeline is to be constructed to Alexandropolis in Greece.

The deal was only ratified by the Azerbaijan People's Assembly in mid-November, almost two months after it was signed. Ratification came just days after the announcement that Iran had been granted 5 percent of Azerbaijan's 20-percent stake in return for considerable financial and technical assistance, without which Azerbaijan would reportedly have been unable to finance its share. In early December, during a state visit to Tbilisi, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel proposed yet another pipeline route; he wanted the oil to travel through Georgia rather than Iran and Armenia.

On 21 September, the day after Aliev and representatives of Western oil companies signed the oil deal, four top-ranking military officers — including former Defense Minister Rahim Kaziev — escaped from the high-security prison where they were being held for alleged crimes against the state. One week later, two of Aliev's close associates were assassinated in Baku. Then, on 2 October, a group of interior-ministry troops led by Deputy Interior Minister Rovshan Dzhavadov occupied the procuracy building in Baku and took the prosecutor-general hostage. Dzhavadov's group was protesting the arrest of three of its colleagues in connection with the assassinations; it demanded an emergency meeting of the People's Assembly and the resignations of the parliament speaker and interior minister. Although the group released the prisoner after just one day, Aliev promptly imposed a two-month state of emergency in Baku, arguing that the hostage-taking constituted a coup attempt.

Early on the morning of 5 October, Aliev announced in a televised address that a second coup, masterminded by Prime Minister Suret Huseinov (the key player in the June 1993 uprising that toppled Elchibey), had been thwarted. According to Aliev, Huseinov's associates, after briefly occupying administrative buildings in Gyandzha, the second-largest city in the country, were overpowered by government troops. Thousands of Baku residents were mobilized in what one Western journalist described as a carefully orchestrated show of popular support for Aliev. Despite his protestations of innocence, Huseinov was fired and charged with treason. He fled Baku and went into hiding; in November, he was reportedly in Russia.

First Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Guliev, an oil engineer who worked closely with Aliev during the latter's tenure as Azerbaijan Communist Party first secretary, was promoted to acting prime minister to replace Huseinov, and a purge swept through the government. Several senior officials, including Agriculture Minister Muzamil Abdullaev and Security Minister Nariman Imranov, were arrested on suspicion of complicity in the abortive putsch attempt, as were some 50 officials of the National Security Service. A number of other government officials were also fired for alleged corruption. Aliev extended the state of emergency in early December for another two months.

> *Azerbaijani President Aliev refused to agree to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops to monitor a formal cease-fire.*

KARABAKH SETTLEMENT ELUSIVE

The fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh remained a key influence on both foreign and domestic policy. The contingent of Afghan *mudjahedin* recruited by Aliev failed to turn the tables in ongoing hostilities during the early months of the year. A cease-fire mediated in February by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Karabakh never took effect. In May, however, the defense ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the NKR agreed to a second cease-fire for an initial period of two months. That one remained in force until the end of the year, and several exchanges of hostages and prisoners of war took place.

The efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group to mediate a political settlement of the Karabakh conflict were torpedoed by Russia's more aggressive diplomacy. But the Russian effort fared no better: Aliev's obdurate refusal to agree to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops to monitor a formal cease-fire precluded substantive progress toward a settlement. In addition, the Karabakh Armenian leadership was reluctant to surrender occupied Azerbaijani territory — in particular, the Lachin corridor, the sole overland link between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

At the summit in Budapest in early December, the CSCE agreed on the merger of the parallel CSCE and Russian mediation efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh. But despite the informal consent of 18 member states (including Croatia, Norway, and Turkey) to an Italian appeal for a CSCE peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh, the CSCE postponed a decision on any dispatch of troops until a political settlement is reached. Prospects for such a settlement receded a few weeks later, however, after the Nagorno-Karabakh parliament nominated hardline government head Robert Kocharyan as president of the self-styled republic.

The Karabakh conflict and the geo-political implications of the oil deal dominated Azerbaijan's foreign policy throughout the year, particularly relations with Turkey, Russia, and Iran. In February, Aliev visited Turkey, ending the cool period in bilateral relations that had followed Elchibey's ouster. Aliev and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel signed a 10-year treaty on friendship and cooperation, along with 15 other documents on trade, investment, and scientific and cultural cooperation.

The state visit to Iran at the end of June was less fruitful, although Aliev and Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani signed a number of agreements to expand political, economic, and cultural cooperation, and Aliev's assessment of the visit was characteristically upbeat. But the Iranian leadership remained profoundly suspicious of Azerbaijan's potential irredentist aspirations in northern Iran, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly warned Aliev of Iran's displeasure at the ongoing expansion of Azerbaijan's economic relations with Israel.

Relations with Russia were problematic. Still, the Azerbaijani leadership did agree to



LUBOMIR KOTEK

BORDER LAND — ***Locals and a borderguard at a crossing between Azerbaijan and Armenia display the resignation of a region beset by poverty and political instability. However, Armenia nudged ahead of its Georgian and Azerbaijani neighbors with some positive economic indicators.***

talks with the Russian military on the renewed leasing of the Gebele over-the-horizon radar facility, which was a crucial component of the Soviet anti-missile defense system.

GEORGIAN UNREST

Politics in Georgia remained highly unstable and downright dangerous, as evidenced by the assassinations in the spring of two high-ranking security officials and in November of opposition National Democratic Party leader Giorgi Chanturia. The aftermath of the loss of Georgian jurisdiction over the breakaway province of Abkhazia in October 1993 — which led to a rapprochement with Russia and the decision to join the CIS — dominated the year. The opposition laid the blame for those developments squarely on parliament Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze. In early March, parliament finally ratified Georgia's CIS membership; two months later the opposition staged a demonstration in Tbilisi to demand that it be invalidated.

The opposition's tenacious but unfruitful campaign to force a vote of no confidence in Shevardnadze virtually paralyzed the legislature. The campaign degenerated into endless debates on trivial procedural questions (Must male deputies wear a tie? May female deputies wear trousers or mini-skirts?) and on occasion even fist fights. One Russian journalist observed acidly in June that the number of laws enacted since the beginning of the year could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

In late March, warning that a coup was imminent, Shevardnadze forced through a controversial cabinet reshuffling. Unhappy with the nomination of the new interior minister, the Tbilisi police chief and his men briefly occupied the parliament building. Former Soviet army general Varden Nadibaidze was appointed defense minister, replacing Giorgi Karkarashvili, who had resigned in February in protest over an agreement giving Russia military bases in Georgia. Karkarashvili was later implicated in an embezzlement scandal and accused of supplying classified military information along to the Abkhaz leadership.

> *Organized crime in Georgia controls the privatization process.*

In August, opposition deputies succeeded in forcing an emergency session of parliament to debate a no-confidence vote in Shevardnadze, but the initiative collapsed for lack of a quorum. A similar attempt in late September failed when a majority of deputies rejected holding a vote of no confidence, prompting Shevardnadze to argue for the restoration of the post of president. Meanwhile, Temur Zhorzholiani, head of the Constitutional-Monarchist Party, held a hunger strike to demand Shevardnadze's resignation. Potentially more threatening to Shevardnadze was influential warlord Dzhaba Ioseliani's announcement in September that he was recruiting "talented and honest" candidates for his own political party (called simply "Elections") in the parliamentary elections of October 1995. (Ioseliani was one of the two people responsible for the violent ouster in January 1992 of late President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.)

A WORSENING ECONOMY

The process of economic collapse that began in 1991 under Gamsakhurdia's leadership intensified last year. In the first 10 months, Georgian industrial output fell 42 percent, the worst drop of any CIS state. Similarly, the October monthly inflation rate of 36 percent was the highest in the CIS. The breakdown in law and order in Georgia since the collapse of the USSR enabled organized crime to secure a virtual monopoly on gasoline distribution and on the privatization process; mafia members regularly bought up state-owned firms at auction. Nor was the government immune to corruption: the suicide in September of former National Bank chairman Demuri Dvalishvili (a crony of Shevardnadze during the latter's stint as Georgian Communist Party first secretary) raised embarrassing questions concerning the illegal distribution of bank credits.

Because of constant, petty bickering in parliament, the annual budget had still not been formally adopted in mid-September. Nor had key legislation on privatization, bankruptcy, government bonds, or investment been passed, although it was needed to pave the way for vital economic reforms.

Economic problems led to acute energy shortages. In the summer, Turkmenistan reduced natural gas supplies to Georgia to a minimum because the Georgian government could not raise the necessary hard currency to pay debts of $300 million for deliveries during the previous winter. In November, Turkmenistan cut supplies completely, leaving most districts of Tbilisi without heat, electricity, or running water. Only later that month, after a visit to Ashgabat by Deputy Prime Minister Zurab Kervalishvili, did the Turkmen government agree to freeze Georgia's debt for two years and resume supplies of gas. Despite the crisis, the Georgian government remained reluctant to comply with IMF requirements to implement an economic reform program (including price liberalization and a reduction in the state apparatus), delaying until mid-December approval of a much-needed $40-million IMF loan.

INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's one day state visit to Tbilisi in early February to sign a bilateral treaty on friendship and cooperation was the major foreign policy event of the year. Ten months later, however, the treaty had yet to be ratified by the Russian parliament. Still, 24 other agreements were signed on trade and economic ties; scientific and cultural cooperation; the status of Russian border troops in

Georgia; Russian military assistance; and the formal designation of three former Soviet military bases in Georgia as Russian bases.

Against a backdrop of sporadic skirmishes along the Abkhaz-Georgian border, four rounds of UN-mediated talks on a political settlement of the conflict were held early in the year. On 4 April, Georgian, Abkhaz, Russian, and UN representatives signed an agreement stipulating the conditions (including the initial deployment of either UN or CIS peacekeeping troops) and procedures for the repatriation of the estimated 200,000 ethnic Georgians who had fled Abkhazia in autumn 1993. In early May, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali ruled out sending UN troops to Georgia, recommending instead the deployment of a joint Russian/CIS peacekeeping force. Then, on 14 May, Georgian and Abkhaz representatives signed a formal cease-fire agreement in Moscow — much to the displeasure of the Georgian opposition, which labeled it a capitulation to Abkhaz separatism. In mid-June, the Russian Federation Council approved sending some 3,000 Russian peacekeeping troops to Abkhazia for six months.

The Abkhaz authorities, however, repeatedly obstructed the actual repatriation procedure, and it was late August before the first small group of Georgian refugees was permitted to return home. In mid-September, in response to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Georgii Kondratev's announcement of the imminent large-scale repatriation of Georgians to Abkhazia, the Abkhaz leadership placed its army on combat alert, warning that a mass influx of Georgians could lead to the resumption of hostilities. Rather than risk an armed confrontation between Russian peacekeepers and Abkhaz troops, Kondratev agreed to postpone the repatriation by 48 hours. Yeltsin quickly met in Sochi with both Shevardnadze and then-Abkhaz parliament Chairman Vladislav Ardzinba, and a quota system was announced. Beginning on 1 October, 200 Georgians would be permitted to return home each month; at that rate, it will take 83 years before all refugees are repatriated.

The Abkhaz parliament's decisions in late November to nominate Ardzinba president and to affirm Abkhazia's status as a sovereign republic subject to international law further exacerbated tensions. Shevardnadze denounced the moves as "an attempt by separatists to set up an independent state." A planned meeting of Boutros-Ghali, Shevardnadze, and Ardzinba scheduled for 2 December was canceled. Meanwhile, two of Shevardnadze's most serious rivals, former Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani and former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, announced the creation of an Abkhaz National Liberation Organization, which would recruit volunteers to take back Abkhazia by force.

In South Ossetia, parliamentary elections in March resulted in the demise of the radical nationalist leadership and the return to power of the Communist Party. But the radicals still managed to pressure the party to pursue total independence from Georgia and subsequent unification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation. The demands for independence delayed until November the resumption of CSCE-sponsored negotiations with Tbilisi on the repatriation of refugees and the region's future political status. ■

Apocalypse Now?

An open letter from Giorgi Chanturia, chairman, National Democratic Party of Georgia, to Eduard Shevardnadze, in *Kavkazioni*, 29 November, 1994:

I believe that a large part of our misfortunes can be attributed to subjective causes, of which the most crucial is our inept, disorganized and incompetent government....Certain of our ministers consider their function to be safeguarding the interests of a country other than their own....

The Georgian people's patience is not without limits, believe me. The capacity for tolerance is to a great degree based on hope, but today, when we have already attained our statehood, it is difficult for the people to comprehend why they are starving, why they have to suffer without heating or electric light, why they should tolerate the depredations of groups of official bandits — not to mention the fact that the current situation provides an ideal breeding ground for the fifth column — the Communist Party, the Social Democrats, the Zviadists....

If the Cabinet of Ministers is not changed and the traitors, bribe-takers and incompetents are not gotten rid of, if reforms are not implemented in all spheres of life and Georgians do not regain their hope that we can build an independent and democratic state, a social explosion will become inevitable....

Interview with Akaki Asatiani, chairman of the Union of Traditionalists and 1991 Parliament speaker under Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in *Biznes-kurier*, No. 27, 1994:

The leadership must be changed — I mean the Cabinet of Ministers and its structure....

If the leadership does not take measures to resolve the economic crisis, public dissatisfaction will intensify, and this could lead to a crisis for the entire state....If reforms are implemented swiftly and systematically, that could bring the country out of crisis. I do not wish to believe that someone is deliberately sabotaging this, but it is clear that in this respect there is no coordinated and single-minded approach within the Cabinet of Ministers....

I believe that the deterioration of the social situation will impel the head of state to change the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers, although this is not tantamount to solving our problems....

Interview with Guram Muchaidze, chairman, Social-Democratic Party of Georgia, in *Biznes-kurier*, No. 27, 1994:

It is imperative to make serious corrections in policy....We must desist from so-called shock therapy, as this is a shock for the people but therapy for mafia-criminal clans. The transition to a market economy must be effected gradually, with the government providing a social security net for population. An all-out struggle should be launched against mafia-criminal clans. A dictatorship of the law must be established in the country....

What is happening in Georgia cannot be called reform....Reforms should have as their objective an improvement, not a deterioration, in the people's standard of living. The measures that are being implemented serve only the interests of the mafia-criminal clans....

If things continue in this way, there will be a social explosion that will result in the population forcibly overthrowing the head of state and the Cabinet of Ministers. It is possible that this could evolve into a civil war. In order to avoid such extremes, either the head of state should radically change his foreign or domestic policy, or he should resign voluntarily.

regions, especially in Vorkuta, where spontaneous work stoppages occurred throughout February and March. During one seven-day strike at the Yuzhnaya pit in Vorkuta, the pit's independent trade-union chairman, Nikolai Stroyenko, told Interfax that the miners were demanding the resignation of the government and the president, "who betrayed the interests of the people and unleashed a civil war."

The increasingly political overtone to the miners' protests was realized in the formation of a new sociopolitical movement called Miners of Russia, which will represent Russia's 810,000 coal miners in the legislature.

Even if the government and the miners eventually reach an agreement, problems are likely to resurface in the future. The mining sector is considered by many observers to be outmoded and ineffective, yet only one mine has been closed in recent years. The World Bank has offered loans for restructuring the industry, provided the government close 80 pits over the next five years.

RUSSIA

Soldiers' Mothers on the March

"We will march in the face of bullets to stop this war and save our sons," said Maria Kirbasova, president of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, describing her group's plans to march to Grozny, the Chechen capital, and take their sons from the front if necessary. For the last three months, the mothers have lobbied and demonstrated in the name of their sons, forging a reputation as one of Russia's key protest movements against the war in Chechnya.

On 8 March, as Russia celebrated International Women's Day, the soldiers' mothers demonstrated at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow. The holiday has particular symbolic importance in Russia; it also commemorates the anniversary of a demonstration by angry women demanding bread in 1917, just days before the Tsarist regime collapsed. From Moscow, the mothers intend to travel by bus to Mineralnye Vody in the northern Caucasus, holding protests in cities along the way. Kirbasova said the group plans to walk to Grozny itself during the last week of March.

The Women's Day demonstration drew a mixed reaction from the Russian army. Interfax reported that General Anatoly Kulikov, commander of Russian troops in Chechnya, said he shared the mothers' pain and was doing his best to end the armed conflict as soon as possible. But, he said, the soldiers' mothers should direct their protests at the Dudaev regime, not the Russian army. Meanwhile, the very road the mothers had planned to use for their march on Grozny has already been mined by Russian troops to prevent Chechen forces from using it. Yet the road, which links the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don with the Azeri capital of Baku, has been under Russian control for weeks. One Chechen commander said he believed the road was purposely mined to avoid a public-relations coup by the mothers.

But the group has already received a great deal of publicity, and many Russians support its demonstrations against the widely unpopular war. A February opinion poll on the mothers' intention to stop traffic on the Trans-Siberian route and disrupt the army's spring draft yielded good news for their committee: 49 percent of respondents said they approved of one or both protest actions, while 30 percent said they disapproved. Another 21 percent were undecided.

Most recently, the mothers have decided to carry their protest beyond the Chechen crisis. On 11 March, *Sevodnya* reported on the group's intention to form an electoral association with the All-Russia Association of Independent Professionals and the Economic Analysis Institute. The new association will be called "Against Crime and Corruption" and will fight "corruption in court and the prosecutor's office, the replacement of arbitration with gangsters' showdowns, [and] the militia's involvement in organized criminal groups."



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
FAMILY CONCERN—*The mothers of Russian soldiers sent to fight in Chechnya have formed a key protest movement.*

ARMENIA

Privatizing Their Problems Away

Since 1991, Armenia has been struggling with a trade and transport embargo imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan. The embargo is the legacy of a brutal war between the two former Soviet republics that flared up again in March as the two sides engaged in artillery and tank battles, violating a May 1994 ceasefire agreement. Provided those clashes do not lead to a renewal of the protracted conflict, Armenia now appears to be recovering from three years of disastrous economic conditions. In 1994, Armenia was the only Soviet successor state to register even a 1 percent increase in gross domestic product (GDP) over the previous year.

The harshness of the embargo-imposed isolation has spurred the Armenian government to introduce a fast and effective privatization program. In 1992, land was privatized to give farmers incentives to produce food for



JAN SIBIK

WAR REPORT—***One of the less-expected results of the turmoil in Armenia has been an accelerated privatization process.***

domestic consumption. Around the same time, 330 small enterprises were privatized in the first phase of selling off state-owned firms. This year, the second phase begins with the first auctions to sell large and medium-sized enterprises, including the YerAZ auto manufacturing plant and a Yerevan bakery. The State Commission on Privatization has invited foreign investors to take part in the auctions on an equal basis, Interfax reported.

Those measures have put Armenia far ahead of its Transcaucasian neighbors and many other former Soviet republics in the drive to privatize. The Georgian government has been preoccupied with the separatist movement in Abkhazia and with power struggles among its political leaders, and the Azerbaijani government is counting on its giant oil deal with a foreign consortium to aid its struggling economy. An October 1994 World Bank report said that private enterprise accounted for 40 percent of the GDP in Armenia, compared with 30 percent in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and 15 percent in Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

On 28 February, Armenia received a boost for its efforts in the form of a $60 million credit from the International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank.

UKRAINE

White Cult on Trial

The high-profile trial of the leaders of the White Brotherhood cult began in Kiev on 1 March. With 19 defendants, 250 witnesses, and 25 volumes of paperwork on the case, the trial of the group's leaders on charges of organizing mass disorder, deliberately inflicting bodily injury, seizing a state building, and attempting to damage the health of citizens is expected to drag on for some time.

The cult's high priestess is a Russian-speaking woman of Bulgarian descent named Marina Tsvygun, who predicted that the end of the world would occur on 14 November 1993, on which day some 144,000 of her followers were supposed to commit suicide in Kiev. Tsvygun and her husband had been arrested four days earlier after leading a band of their followers into the St. Sophia Church — which they claim is the "closest point to the cosmos" — and damaging priceless icons and artifacts in a clash with police. Later, the cult leaders moved the date of the end of the world to 24 November, but no other major disturbances occurred.

Some 800 cult members were arrested in the fall of 1993, when Ukrainian authorities attempted to crack down on the growth of the cult and deal with the phenomenon, which was strikingly new to that part of the world. The government has since altered the name and responsibilities of the Ministry of Nationalities and Migration to the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, Migration, and Religious Cults.

The cult is said to have originated in Kazakhstan and traveled across Russia to Ukraine. Authorities in Kiev were incensed at the time, accusing Russia of knowingly allowing the cult to cross the border into Ukraine. Some Ukrainian officials openly claimed that the White Brotherhood was funded by the Russian military-industrial complex, and there were widespread calls for a tightening of the border with Russia, *The Times* reported.

As the trial begins, some observers believe international human-rights agencies will be taking a particular interest in the case, watching for potential violations of the defendants' rights. All of the defendants have refused legal counsel, and all but one have pleaded not guilty.

CZECH REPUBLIC

German War Dead Cause Controversy

President Vaclav Havel may insist that the time has come to move forward with Czech-German relations, but the controversy surrounding the remains of German soldiers in the Czech border town of Cheb tells another story. For several days, the remains were kept in a warehouse while a debate raged over whether to bury them in a separate cemetery for German World War II dead.

The controversy began when the former town council approved a plan by the Association for the Care of German War Graves, based in Kassel, Germany, to create a graveyard for German war dead. The remains were exhumed from graves in western and northern Bohemia and brought to Cheb. But in February, the new town council, elected to office last November, voted down the proposal for a German graveyard at a council meeting attended by Czech skinheads. The English-language weekly *The Prague Post* reported that the most strident opposition to the proposal came from the nationalist Club of the Czech Borderland.

Finally, on 10 March, Czech media reported that the town council had decided to bury the remains in a com-

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FACT FINDING MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA - JAN. 20 - 26,1995 VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS

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31 January 1995

I. INTRODUCTION - MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Human Rights Advocates (HRA) participated in a joint mission to Armenia with the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG - in Consultative Status with ECOSOC, Category II), the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), and the Covcas Center for Law & Conflict Resolution (CCL&CR). The mission was organized by CCL&CR. Edwin Rekosh represented IHRLG, Dimitry Danilyuk represented CPJ, and Hrair Balian represented HRA and CCL&CR.

The mission visited the Republic of Armenia from January 20 - 26, 1995, and held consultations with high level Government officials; the Chairmen and members of Parliamentary Permanent Commissions on Human Rights, the Press, and Defense, Internal & National Security; the President of the Supreme Court; former high level Government officials who have joined the opposition, including the former Prime Minister as well as the former National Security Advisor to the President of the Republic; opposition members of Parliament; representatives of independent human rights non-governmental organizations; representatives of opposition political parties; editors, journalists and staff members of newspapers and journals, including those shut down as a result of the decree signed by the President suspending the principal opposition political party in the Republic; eyewitnesses who were present when Government security forces searched the premises of the suspended organization and the editorial offices of the mass media which were shut-down; and defense attorneys for members of the suspended political party who have been detained and accused of various criminal offenses. The mission members also met with representatives of the US Embassy in Yerevan.

The following report reflects the views of Human Rights Advocates.

II. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

HRA is concerned about the following violations of Armenia's international human rights obligations in relation to a decree suspending the leading opposition political party:

1) Freedom of political association: The Supreme Court Decision upholding decree suspending the activities of the leading opposition political party failed to take into consideration Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);

2) Freedom of expression: Newspapers, journals, magazines and other news media as well as related organizations were shut down in violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR;

3) Minimum standards of due process: Armenian authorities have violated Articles 9, 13, 14 and 17 of the ICCPR; and

4) Derogation from or restrictions on human rights obligations: Armenian authorities' violation of obligations under the ICCPR based on a "clear and present danger" may constitute a violation of Article 4 of the ICCPR as well as a violation of permissible restrictions

III. LEADING OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTY SUSPENDED SHORTLY BEFORE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

During a televised address on 28 December 1994, President Levon Ter-Petrossian of Armenia announced that he had issued a decree suspending indefinitely the activities of the country's leading opposition party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). The President offered the following allegations as grounds for the suspension: (1) a clandestine terrorist group with 50 members was created within the ARF structure which was responsible for criminal activities, including racketeering, trafficking narcotics, and a number of political assassinations; (2) the clandestine group was planning additional political assassinations; (3) the clandestine group was engaged in gathering intelligence about the Republic's armed forces, internal ministry, and industry; (4) the clandestine group was created by and functioned with the approval of the ARF leadership; (5) the clandestine group - and by implication the entire ARF - represented a threat to the national security of the Republic; (6) the clandestine group was engaged in commercial activities to secure finances for the party, which is prohibited by domestic law; and (7) the ARF included within its ranks as well as its leadership foreign citizens, which is also prohibited by domestic law. While the President admitted that 90 percent of the party's membership were not aware of the alleged criminal activities of the clandestine group, he went ahead and suspended the activities of the entire party. The only evidence offered for these allegations was the subsequent publication in the government-owned Hayastani Hanrapetutyun Daily of hundreds of pages of the alleged "archives" of the clandestine group, without any indication as to their origin or safeguards to guarantee the credibility of the evidence offered

Following the President's speech, security forces searched without warrants the offices of the ARF as well as the homes of its leadership throughout the country. In addition, authorities briefly detained and interrogated all of the party's leaders. Editorial offices of the party press as well as the offices of several affiliated as well as independent women's, youth, athletic, and cultural organizations were also subjected to searches without warrants, their editors and

leaders briefly detained for interrogation, and their homes searched, all without warrants. During the illegal searches, police seized computer equipment, fax machines, files, and printing equipment. In addition, authorities closed down all ARF-affiliated publications, including the country's largest circulation newspaper Yerkir Daily, as well as a dozen independent literary, women's, cultural, and youth publications. The government's crack-down against the leading opposition political party comes shortly before parliamentary elections scheduled for May 1995.

In statements issued on December 29 and 30, the ARF leadership and its parliament members denied the existence of such a clandestine group within its structure, its involvement in any assassinations, narco-business or racketeering. The ARF said the "evidence" offered by the President was "fabricated allegations that are merely a product of the imagination", and charged that the President had clearly overstepped the authority granted to him by law. The ARF statements accused the Government of engaging in an increasingly virulent campaign to discredit the organization before the parliamentary elections, while the alliance of opposition political organizations, including the ARF, was gaining increasing popular support.

On December 29, the Ministry of Justice filed an application with the Supreme Court of the Republic requesting that the President's decree be confirmed on the grounds that (1) the ARF leadership bodies included foreign citizens which was a violation of the Republic's law on Civic-Political Organizations and the law on the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals residing in Armenia, and (2) a clandestine group existed within the structures of the ARF which violated the law on Civic-Political Organizations.

On January 13, a three-Judge panel of the Supreme Court ruled on the Ministry of Justice's application and suspended the activities of the ARF for six months. The court took into consideration only the first ground of the Ministry of justice's application and declined to take the second ground into consideration arguing that the issue was still under investigation and that a court had not yet ruled on the matter. The Court did not address the validity of the Government crack-down on newspapers and publications.

Since the President's decree and Court ruling, opposition political organizations and leaders have denounced the decree as politically motivated, and have demanded that the government's allegations be tried in an open court where the accused should have the right to respond. A United States Department of States statement issued on 18 January expressed concern about the suspension of a major political party, along with its newspapers, and said it ran "counter to the established principles of democracy and free speech. This is all the more important given that Armenia will be holding parliamentary elections in May of this year. We urge the Armenian Government and [ARF] to begin without delay a dialogue aimed at permitting the [ARF] to conduct the legitimate political activities, including the publication of newspapers, essential to a democratic state."

IV. FREEDOM OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION: THE SUPREME COURT DECISION FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ARTICLE 22 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR)

The Supreme Court decided on 13 January to suspend the ARF for six months for having "violated the provisions of Article 1 of the Republic of Armenia law On Civic-Political Organizations and Article 25 of the Republic of Armenia law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals...." The Supreme Court did not address the ironic situation presented by the absence of a law on citizenship in Armenia.

Article 1 of the Republic of Armenia law On Civic-Political Organizations (26 February 1991) defines such an organization as one formed through the voluntary association of citizens of the Republic of Armenia having reached the voting age. Article 25 of the Republic of Armenia law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals (17 June 1994) prohibits foreign citizens residing in Armenia from participating in the activities of civic-political organizations in the country.

The Supreme Court found that a number of the ARF leaders were foreign citizens, therefore violating the above referenced two provisions of the laws of Armenia, and ordered the organization's activities suspended for a period of six months. However, the Court's decision failed to take into consideration the provisions of Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

The Republic of Armenia Supreme Council (Parliament) resolved to accede to the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol on 1 April 1991 (Teghekagir, No 7 (987), 15 April 1991, Article 122). Armenia's accession was formally entered on 23 June 1993. So doing, Parliament resolved "To make all legislative actions of the Republic of Armenia conform to the United Nations' Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and "Until that conformity is achieved, to recognize the supremacy of those provisions over the laws of the Republic".

Article 22 of the ICCPR states "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests." The Human Rights Committee, established by the provisions of the ICCPR, is the competent body to interpret the Covenant. The Committee has stated that "the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens" (General Comment 15 (27), reprinted in Manual on Human Rights Reporting, UN Center for Human Rights, Publication HR/Pub/91/1, page 84). Furthermore, the Committee has stated that "once aliens are allowed to enter the territory of a State party they are entitled to the rights set out in the Covenant" (ibid., page 84) and "Aliens receive the benefit of the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of association." (ibid., page 85).

Furthermore, it is accepted that "Article 22 guarantees a person's freedom to form associations with other persons for political or for other purposes.... [R]estrictions that may be placed upon the exercise of the right of freedom of association ... must be necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public interests as indicated in the Covenant.... The right to freedom of association is of particular importance and must be protected particularly with regard to the free formation of political associations, and especially of political parties." (ibid., page 111). Any restrictions placed on Article 22 must not go beyond the need to protect certain public

interests, such as restrictions placed on the armed forces and police in exercising the right to free association. In any event, non-citizen status in and of itself may not be the basis for such restrictions on freedom of association.

The freedom guaranteed by Article 22 of the ICCPR is vital since the ability to form and join political associations or parties is one of the most important ways to participate in an election process. (Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, UN Center for Human Rights, Publication HR/P/PT/2 (1994), page 8, Par. 45).

The Supreme Court decision of 13 January failed to take into consideration the supremacy of the provisions of the ICCPR, especially Article 22, over the laws of the Republic of Armenia On Civic-Political Organizations and On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals. Had the Court considered the case under the appropriate international and domestic law, the decree would have been overturned and the ARF exonerated.

V. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: NEWSPAPERS, JOURNALS, MAGAZINES AND OTHER NEWS MEDIA AS WELL AS RELATED ORGANIZATIONS SHUT DOWN - ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR

Immediately following President Ter-Petrossian's December 28 televised address and decree suspending indefinitely the activities of the ARF, security agencies raided the editorial offices the ARF official newspaper Yerkir, the largest circulation daily in the Republic, as well as a dozen other ARF-affiliated and independent publications and related organizations. The security agency officers who raided the editorial offices produced no search warrants and, when asked, declared that the President's decree suspending the ARF was sufficient for the purposes of search and seizure. Yet, the President's speech and decree did not contain any reference to shutting down these news media outlets. Nor did the Supreme Court decision of January 13 order them closed. Nonetheless, all office equipment found on the premises, including computers, telephones, and fax machines, all files and documents, including manuscripts to be published, and office supplies were seized. Upon completion of the search, some of the editorial offices were closed and sealed, while other publications received an oral order from the security agency officers not to publish until further notice.

The following newspapers, journals, magazines and other news media as well as related organizations were shut down during night of December 28:

Yerkir Daily - official newspaper of the ARF; largest daily circulation newspaper of the Republic; published in Armenian; editorial offices closed and sealed;

Azadamard Weekly - official ARF journal of political theory; published in Armenian and Russian editions; editorial offices closed and sealed;

Arakast Weekly - the only women's publication in the Republic; independent; published in Armenian and Russian editions; editor-in-chief is an ARF member; although the editorial offices were not sealed by authorities, the editors have received an oral order not to publish;

Munedik Weekly - an independent journal; published in Armenian and Russian editions; editor-in-chief is an ARF member; it was not clear whether the editorial offices were sealed by authorities, nonetheless the editors have received an oral order not to publish;

Marzashkharh twice-weekly - a sports journal published by an independent but ARF-affiliated sports organization; published in Armenian; editor-in-chief is an ARF member who is under detention (Roland Sharoyan); although this publication's editorial offices were closed and sealed on the night of December 28, access to the editorial offices was permitted on January 24 and the seal removed from the doors; however, the oral order not to publish has not been rescinded.

Haylour News agency - an independent but ARF-affiliated news agency; clients include ARF-affiliated as well as independent newspapers, and government agencies in the US and Europe; publishes in Armenian, Russian, and English languages; the director is an ARF member; editorial offices closed and sealed;

Horizon TV Agency - field office for a Los Angeles based Armenian community TV program; director is an ARF member; editorial offices closed and sealed;

Andratarts Monthly - an independent cultural and literary publication; editor-in-chief is an ARF member; it was not possible to ascertain whether the editorial offices were sealed by authorities, nonetheless the editors have received an oral order not to publish;

Nork Monthly - the official publication of the Writers' Union; editor-in-chief is an ARF leader; it was not possible to ascertain whether the editorial offices were sealed by authorities, nonetheless the editors have received an oral order not to publish;

Armenian Documentation Center (ADC) - an independent agency providing technical services to foreign journalists visiting the region; the director is an ARF member who is under detention (Kegham Manukian); offices closed and sealed;

Mikael Varandian Printers - a Canadian-Armenian joint venture which publishes all ARF-affiliated newspapers and magazines as well as others; director is an ARF member; offices closed and sealed.

The Republic of Armenia Law on the Press and Other Mass News Media (1991) Article 11 stipulates that the activities of the press and other mass news media may be suspended for three months only by a court order and as a result of a violation of Article 6 of the same law. Article 6 lists the grounds for suspension: publication of state secrets; publication of articles promoting war and violence, national and religious hatred, prostitution, narcotics addiction,

and other criminal activities; and the publication of information about adoptions and "narrow personal information" without permission.

The government crack-down on the opposition newspapers, magazines and other mass media outlets clearly violates the Republic of Armenia Law on the Press and Other Mass News Media. Yet, during discussions held between members of the joint mission and the Chairmen of the Parliamentary Permanent Commissions on the Press (Mr. Merujean DerGulanian) and Human Rights (Mr. Rafael Babayan), the Chairmen attempted to justify the crack-down on the grounds that these news media outlets were affiliated with the ARF, they were "links of the same chain", and since the ARF was suspended its affiliated offices could not be permitted to continue their activities. So far as the independent publications and organizations were concerned, Mr. DerGulanian and Mr. Babayan asserted that a suspicion that those outlets were financed by the ARF was sufficient to close them down as well. Other high level government officials were more explicit in their antipathy of the media outlets closed down and simply justified the government's action by claiming the suspended publications were "nothing but trash anyway", "they constantly criticized the President", etc..

The fact finding mission members were informed of earlier incidents in Armenia when the opposition news media's right to seek, receive and impart information was violated. Since mid-1994, the Foreign Ministry of Armenia has revoked the accreditation of journalists working for the ARF-affiliated Yerkir Daily as well as the independent Golos Armenii. Another independent news agency, Noyan Tapan, was denied access to press services of the Parliament as well as the President. Another form of harassment has been financial pressure on the independent media. During recent months, the offices, editors and journalists of opposition newspapers, including Golos Armenii, Azg, Haylour, and others, have been attacked by unidentified assailants after the publication of particularly critical articles against the government.

Article 19 of the ICCPR stipulates that "(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." The Committee on Human Rights "has pointed out that the freedom of expression has a broad scope that includes all aspects relating to the circulation of information in any form and through any media." (Manual on Human Rights Reporting, UN Center for Human Rights, Publication HR/Pub/91/1, page 109).

The closure of opposition newspapers and other media outlets in Armenia violates not only the relevant domestic law but also Article 19 of the ICCPR and is not supported by any decision by a competent judicial or even quasi-judicial body.

VI. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS: ARMENIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE VIOLATED ARTICLES 9, 13, 14 AND 17 OF THE ICCPR

The following ARF members have been arrested since December 1994:

Detainees	Date arrested	Charges: Criminal Code Article
Markarian, Hrant	12/4/94	213, 232
Manukian, Mikael	12/24/94	100, 232
Shahinian, Armen	12/4/94	206
Manukian, Kegham	not known	not known
Sharoyan, Roland	12/19/94	206
Momjian, Armen	12/30/94	206
Aghayan, Armen	12/17/94	206
Harmandarian, Ara	12/2/94	206
Vartanian, Kevork	1/7/95	232
Kaprielian, David	12/25/94	206
Zakarian, Armen	12/4/94	99
Artzruni, Arsen	12/2/94	not known
Mikaelian, Hovig	Dec. '94	232
Pektashian, Armen	12/4/94	206
Soghomonian, Melkon	12/4/94	206
Krikorian, Ardo	12/2/94	99
(Last name not known), Tatul	not known	not known
Krikorian, Arsen	1/7/95	232
Menjoyan, A.	12/2/94	99
Megrdtchian, H.	12/2/94	99
Manoyan, A.	not known	not known

Brief description of the Armenian Criminal Code Articles cited:

99 Intentional murder with aggravating circumstances - penalty 10-15 years incarceration or death by execution;

100 Intentional murder without aggravating circumstances - penalty 5-12 years incarceration;

206 Knowledge of a crime committed and withholding of such information from authorities - up to 3 years incarceration;

213 Use of false documents - up to 3 years incarceration;

232 Possession of weapons or ammunition - up to 5 years incarceration.

The above referenced ARF members were arrested, their houses searched and evidence seized all without warrants. All were arrested on suspicion of membership in the alleged clandestine terrorist group within the ARF. Yet to date, none have been officially charged with that

offense and instead have been charged with various criminal offenses as cited above. Most are detained in the isolation holding cells of the former KGB in Yerevan. Since their detention, none have been allowed family visits or received family parcels. Although the mission discovered no evidence of actual torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the detainees have nonetheless reported pressure by the security agency officers to sign confessions. Defense attorneys have been granted access to parts of the investigation files in which the detainees have participated - i.e., interrogations. However, access has been denied to any parts of the files containing the results of state security agencies' investigations, reports from witnesses, and any other information from third party sources. Also, defense attorneys do not have the right to conduct their own independent investigations.

In addition, many other irregularities seem to have been committed by security agency officers as well as other government agencies in relation to these cases. A few examples will suffice to illustrate our concern.

While Hrant Markarian was arrested at home and his house searched without a warrant on the suspicion of membership in the clandestine group, charges filed against him include Article 213 - for two false passports delivered to him by authorities - and Article 232 - for a pistol for which he had a permit from the Nagorno-Karabagh authorities and a collection of 9 bullets of various caliber. Yet, a 17-page document circulated to the international community by the Republic's Foreign Ministry and prepared by the President's principal political advisor, accuses Markarian of drug trafficking and states that he was arrested at the Yerevan airport in possession of a suitcase full of narcotics.

Mikael Manukian surrendered to authorities after learning from a television broadcast that he was a suspect in the murder of former Mayor of Yerevan Ambartsum Galstian. He is charged with Article 100 - premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances and faces the death penalty by a firing squad. Manukian has denied the charges and presented an alibi for the day of the alleged murder. His alibi has been confirmed by witnesses and no contradictory information has been discovered. Yet he is still incarcerated with no date set for trial.

Roland Sharoyan is the editor of a weekly sports magazine (Marzashkharh). The magazine was closed by authorities on December 28. Sharoyan is accused of having knowledge about a murder and not informing authorities. No incriminating evidence was discovered when his house was searched without a warrant. Sharoyan has not been informed as to what exactly he is supposed to have had knowledge of and not informed authorities. In essence, Sharoyan has not been informed of the precise nature of charges against him.

The above cited examples of the violations of minimal standards of criminal proceedings lead to the conclusion that Articles 9,14 and 17 of the ICCPR has been violated by denying these detainees a fair administration of justice and interfering with their privacy.

Other provisions of the ICCPR have also been violated during the government's handling of the ARF case. A leader of the ARF, Apo Boghikian was expelled from Armenia without regard to due process requirements. Boghikian is a US citizen residing in Armenia with his wife and two

children since 1990 on a long-term visa granted by the Foreign Ministry. Boghikian was informed by the Foreign Ministry that his long-term visa was revoked and that he had 24 hours to leave the country. Article 13 of the ICCPR stipulates that "An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by ... the competent authorities..." Boghikian was expelled merely for his leadership role in the ARF and the Foreign Ministry has made no suggestion, let alone presented any evidence, that Boghikian is a threat to the national security of the country.

VII. DEROGATION FROM OR RESTRICTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: ARMENIAN AUTHORITIES' VIOLATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ICCPR BASED ON A "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" MAY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE ICCPR AS WELL AS A VIOLATION OF PERMISSIBLE RESTRICTIONS

In a 17-page document circulated to the international community by the Republic's Foreign Ministry and during discussions with high-level government officials, the measures taken against the ARF, the affiliated as well as independent newspapers and news agencies, and individual ARF members and leaders were justified by the "clear and present danger" associated with the discovery of an alleged clandestine group within the ARF. In addition, the President in his televised speech and government officials during discussions with the mission members asserted that the clandestine group within the ARF had committed a number of murders, had been engaged in narcotics trafficking and other illegal activities and was planning to commit further assassinations in the country. Again, the only evidence offered for these allegations was the publication in the government-owned Hayastani Hanrapetutyun Daily of hundreds of pages of the alleged "archives" of the clandestine group. The "archives" were published without any indication as to their origin or safeguards to guarantee the credibility of the evidence offered.

Leaving aside the evidentiary problems presented by the government's case, the government's attempt to justify its actions based on "clear and present danger" ignores the requirements of Article 4 of the ICCPR. The government seems to be using the "clear and present danger" argument to justify some of the measures taken against the ARF. Some highly placed government officials even suggested that they were forced to take some perhaps not so legal measures (a lesser evil) in order to prevent a greater evil.

However, such arguments clearly contradict Article 4 of the ICCPR which requires that "(1) In times of emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.... (3) Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself to the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other State Parties to the present Covenant ... of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated...." The

same article also obligates the State Party derogating to inform the other State Parties of the date on which its derogation is to be terminated.

By adopting the measures discussed above against the ARF, its members and the press, the Republic of Armenia has in effect derogated from its obligations under the Covenant. However, Armenia has not complied with the requirements of such a derogation from its obligations and has not officially proclaimed the existence of an emergency threatening the life of the nation. In addition, Armenia has not informed the other States Parties of the Covenant about the emergency measures and the date on which its derogation is to be terminated. Armenia has therefore violated its obligations under Article 4 of the ICCPR.

If the Republic of Armenia's argument of "clear and present danger" is to be considered under restriction permissible by the ICCPR, again, the Government actions cannot be justified. Article 5 of the ICCPR admonishes that "Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Covenant."

Articles 9 (freedom from arbitrary arrest), 14 (fair administration of justice) and 17 (freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy) recognize no restrictions whatsoever other than in cases of "public emergency" as provided by Article 4.

Article 13 (expulsion of aliens) recognizes that where "compelling reasons of national security otherwise require[s]," an alien lawfully residing within the territory of a State Party may be expelled without due process. As we have discussed in the previous section, Boghikian's expulsion was due to his leadership role in the ARF and not any "compelling reasons of national security."

Articles 19 (freedom of expression) and 22 (freedom of association) provide for restrictions of rights based on the need to protect national security or public order and safety. The UN Human Rights Committee has commented that "when a State Party imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself. Paragaph3 lays down conditions and it is only subject to these conditions that restrictions may be imposed: the restrictions must be 'provided by law'; they may only be imposed for one of the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be justified as being necessary for that State party for one of those purposes." (General Comment 10(19), in Manual on Human Rights Reporting, UN Center for Human Rights, Publication HR/Pub/91/1, page 109, emphasis added). As we have seen, the restrictions placed on the independent news media in Armenia were not "provided by law" as neither the President's decree nor the Supreme Court Decision ordered the closures. In addition, the Republic's Law on the Press and Other Mass News Media also does not permit the restrictions imposed by the government. The exercise of the rights provided in Article 22 may also be restricted for reasons of "national security or public safety", however any such restriction must be provided by law as well. (Manual on Human Rights Reporting, UN Center for Human Rights, Publication HR/Pub/91/1,

page 111). Again, as discussed in section IV above, the restrictions placed by Armenian law on the freedom of association is not justified.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since 1990, HRA has expressed concern about the shortcomings of democratic institutions in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. More than three years after independent statehood, most of those republics are still governed under constitutions inherited from the Soviet era and at best supplemented by a patchwork of legislation inadequate to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Strong executive powers without adequate legislative checks and balances promote arbitrary rule instead of democratic governance. Judicial authorities are dependent on the executive branches of government, thus infringing on the development of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Although new post-Soviet constitutions have been drafted in almost all republics, the results fall far short of democratic expectations. In most cases, drafting of the new constitutions has been shrouded in secrecy and adoption has been subjected to political manipulation rather than expert examination. Articles from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are incorporated in many of the new constitutions, but selectively and with key clauses excised.

Such grave shortcomings combined with the long-established Soviet history of absolute rule as well as intolerance for political pluralism provide a warning that the further development and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the former Soviet republics are at risk. Former leaders responsible for gross human rights violations in the Soviet Union are coming back to power one after the other in the independent republics. Democratically elected governments are toppled and fundamental freedoms restricted. Political opponents are demonized and then deported, jailed or even assassinated. As a result, political unrest and violence threaten the republics.

Until 1994, the Republic of Armenia seemed to have steered clear of the pitfalls presented by the shortcomings of its democratic institutions and to have avoided the political turmoil experienced by its neighbors to the north and east. However, 1994 has marked a turning point for Armenia. Its domestic political scene has been replete with political assassinations, intolerance, repression of the right to freedom of association and expression, and the establishment of the rule of force instead of law.

HRA is concerned and urges the following measures in an effort to improve the protection and promotion of human rights in the Republic of Armenia:

1) All parties concerned should make it possible for the Supreme Court to review its decision of January 13 suspending the ARF for six months and reconsider the case in light of the relevant international law provisions to which Armenia is a party;

2) The Armenian Government should annul the President's December 28 decree and permit without delay the resumption of the ARF activities until such time as the party's responsibility for the activities of the alleged clandestine group is established in a court of law;

3) The Armenian Government should permit without delay the resumption of publication of the ARF-affiliated as well as independent press closed down on December 28;

4) The Armenian Government should return without delay the property seized from the editorial offices of the press and affiliated organizations closed down on December 28 and pay compensation for all property damaged or destroyed during the search and seizure operation;

5) The Armenian Government should respect its obligations undertaken under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding the rights of detainees, the rights of the accused during criminal proceedings, and the rights of aliens lawfully residing in the territory of Armenia;

6) The international community, including the UN, OSCE, European institutions, and Governments should scrutinize more closely developments in Armenia and urge measures to improve the promotion and protection of human rights;

7) The UN Center for Human Rights should make its resources available to Armenia through the Advisory Services unit in order to establish and strengthen national legislation, national institutions and related infrastructures which could uphold human rights, the rule of law and democracy in Armenia; and

8) International human rights NGOs should assist in developing an essential safeguard of human rights by helping establish and train local NGOs in Armenia.

END REPORT

EUA0200 4 I 0395 IRK /AFP-AS84
Irak-ONU
Bagdad doute des intentions de Paris et Moscou

BAGDAD, 15 mars (AFP) - L'Irak a accusé mercredi la France et la Russie de faire "marche-arrière" dans leurs démarches favorables à un assouplissement des sanctions internationales de l'ONU et émis des doutes sur leurs intentions.

Les récents appels lancés par "la France, la Russie et d'autres pays" en faveur d'un assouplissement des sanctions "pourraient relever d'une interversion des rôles" avec les Etats-Unis pour obtenir plus de concessions de Bagdad, estime le quotidien irakien Babel (semi-gouvernemental).

Le journal, dirigé par Oudaï Saddam Hussein, fils aîné du président irakien, a affirmé que Paris et Moscou avaient fait "marche-arrière" dans leurs initiatives destinées à obtenir un assouplissement de l'ambargo, lors de leur réexamen lundi par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

"Les Américains ont agi par intermédiaires interposés, dont la Russie, pour nous demander des concessions", note Babel, en allusion au pressions exercées par Moscou pour que Bagdad reconnaisse en novembre dernier la souveraineté du Koweit.

Les autorités irakiennes, estime l'éditorialiste, doivent "fixer un calendrier à ne pas dépasser pour la poursuite des tractations diplomatiques" sur la levée de l'embargo imposé à l'Irak depuis août 1990.

L'Irak affirme avoir rempli les exigences de l'ONU en matière d'élimination de ses armes de detruction massive et réclame en contrepartie une levée de l'embargo pétrolier, prévue par le paragraphe 22 de la résoution 687.

Le Conseil de sécurité a estimé lundi que les conditions n'étaient pas réunies pour une levée de l'embargo. Aucun de ses 15 membres n'avait réclamé une levée ou un assouplissement des sanctions, selon des diplomates à New-York.

Cette réunion était "pire que la précédente lorsque la Chine, la France et la Russie avaient influencé les débats du Conseil dans le sens d'une levée de l'embargo. Lundi, aucun membre n'a parlé ou envisagé de discuter un quelconque aspect de cet embargo", ajoute Babel.

La France et la Russie envisagent de demander une levée de l'embargo pétrolier imposé à l'Irak dès que l'ONU aura certifié que ce pays a rempli ses obligations liées au désarmement. Le prochain rapport sur le désarmement est prévu en avril. Washington est opposé à tout assouplissement des sanctions.

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EUA0198 4 I 0226 URS /AFP-AS43
Arménie-politique
Elections législatives le 5 juillet en Arménie

EREVAN, 15 mars (AFP) - Le Parlement arménien a fixé au 5 juillet prochain la date des élections législatives et décidé une réforme parlementaire qui verra l'institution d'une "Assemblée nationale" avec un nombre de députés réduit, a-t-on appris mercredi auprès du Parlement.

Le nombre des sièges sera réduit de 260 actuellement à 160 et l'actuel "Soviet suprême" perdra son nom pour devenir "Assemblée nationale".

Cent vingt députés seront élus au scrutin majoritaire de circonscription et 40 au scrutin portionnel sur des listes présentées par les partis.

Le président de l'actuel parlement, Babken Ararktsian, a précisé à l'AFP que le parti Dachnaktsoutioun, un des principaux mouvements d'opposition récemment suspendu, ne pourrait pas présenter de liste pour les sièges élus à la proportionnelle, mais que ses membres pourraient se présenter en leur nom propre au scrutin majoritaire.

M. Ararktsian a souligné que la Cour suprême d'Arménie avait suspendu le Dachnaktsoutioun pour six mois le 13 janvier dernier. "Ce délai expire après la date fixée pour les élections", a-t-il affirmé.

"Mais tous les membres de ce parti pourront participer au scrutin majoritaire, sans être toutefois officiellement enregistrés sous le nom du parti", a-t-il poursuivi.

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1259 12MAY Arménie-Politique ->Référendum sur le projet de constitution le 5

1259 12MAY Arménie-Politique ->Référendum sur le projet de constitution le 5 juillet

EREVAN, 12 mai (AFP) - Le Parlement arménien a approuvé vendredi, à la demande du président Levon Ter-Petrossian, la tenue d'un référendum le 5 juillet sur un projet de constitution, le même jour que les élections législatives.

L'Arménie vit pour l'instant toujours sous son ancienne constitution de république soviétique.

Le projet de constitution, mis au point au bout d'un an de travaux d'une commission parlementaire dirigée par le président, prévoit le droit de former associations et partis politiques à condition qu'ils ne présentent pas de menace pour la sécurité nationale.

Les activités d'un des principaux partis d'opposition, le Dachnaktsoutioun, sont suspendues depuis décembre dernier par le président Ter-Petrossian, qui accuse notamment le parti de crime commandité, trafic de drogue et de fausse monnaie.

La constitution prévoit également un mandat présidentiel de 5 ans renouvelable une fois, et un mandat de 4 ans pour les députés, au nombre de

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Le Parlement a repoussé la demande des députés de l'opposition, qui voulait présenter un projet de constitution alternatif aux électeurs.

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Political structure

ARMENIA

Official name

Republic of Armenia

Legal system

the Republic of Armenia was independent between 1918 and 1921. It was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921. In 1922 Armenia joined Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In 1936 it became a Union republic in its own right. On September 21, 1991, a referendum on independence was passed and on September 23, 1991, Armenia became independent. A new constitution is expected in 1994

National legislature

the Supreme Soviet, now referred to as Parliament

Last elections

May 1990 (legislative); October 1991 (presidential)

Next elections due

1995 (presidential and legislative)

Head of state

Levon Akopovich Ter-Petrosian, directly elected in October 1991. The vice-president is Gagik Arutiunian

National government

the government is appointed by the prime minister, who is himself nominated by the president; the cabinet was reshuffled on February 16, 1993, after a new prime minister had been appointed on February 12, 1993

Main political parties

Dashnak Revolutionary Federation; Hentchak Party; Armenian Pan-National Movement; Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramkavars); National Democratic Union; Movement for National Self-Determination; Communist Party; Armenian Democratic Party

Council of Ministers	
Prime minister	Hrant Bagratian
Deputy prime minister	Vigen Chitechian
Key ministers	
agriculture	Ashot Voskanian
communications	Grigor Pokhpatian
construction	Felix Pironian
culture	Akop Movses
defence	Serzhik Sarkisian
economy	Armen Egiazarian
education	Gagik Kazarian
energy & fuel	Miron Shishmanian
environment	Karine Danielian[a]
finance	Levon Barkhudarian
food & procurement	David Zadoian
foreign affairs	Vahan Papazian
foreign economic relations	Armen Darbinian
higher education & science	Vardkes Gnuni
industry	Ashot Safarian
interior	Vanik Siradegian
justice	Vahe Stepanian
labour & social welfare	Ashot Esaian

[a] Has tendered his resignation.

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Economic structure

ARMENIA

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993[a]
GDP at current prices Rb m	9,489	9,693	15,920	59,068	820,000
GDP at constant prices[b] Rb m	8,698	8,804	8,840	7,589	4,918
NMP at current prices Rb m	6,915	6,977	11,516	51,409	690,000
Real GDP growth %	8.0	–7.2	–8.8	–52.3	–28.0
Real NMP growth %	14.1	–10.8	–11.6	–46.0	–30.0
Consumer price inflation %	n/a	10.3	175	729	1,823
Population m (mid-year)	3.52	3.58	3.65	3.60	3.60
Exports[c] Rb m	3,691	3,523	4,937	43,197	n/a
Imports[c] Rb m	4,898	4,655	7,286	46,832[d]	n/a
Trade balance[c] Rb m	–1,207	–1,132	–2,349	–3,635	n/a

August 8, 1994 Dram320.19:$1

Origins of net material product 1992	% of total	Components of net material product 1992	% of total
Agriculture & forestry	39.9	Private consumption	91.3
Industry	46.3	Public consumption	1.7
Construction	5.3	Net fixed investment	–11.3
Transport & communications	1.6	Increase in stocks	37.0
Trade & catering	4.1	Net exports	–19.9
Total incl others	**100.0**	Losses	1.2
		NMP	**100.0**

Principal exports 1992[c]	Rb m	Principal imports 1991[c]	Rb m
Machinery & metalworking	19,109	Light industry	1,753
Chemicals & petroleum	10,688	Machinery & metalworking	1,292
Non-ferrous metallurgy	5,920	Chemical products	595
Food industry	4,286	Ferrous metallurgy	585
Total incl others	**43,197**	Food industry products	443
		Total incl others	**7,286**

Main destinations of exports 1992[d]	% of total	Main origins of imports 1992[d]	% of total
Czechoslovakia	24.0	USA	37.4
Belgium	18.6	Turkey	15.5
USA	13.2	China	15.1
Other EU	26.8	EU	5.9
Former CMEA	4.5	Former CMEA	5.5

[a] EIU estimates. [b] In previous year's prices. [c] Domestic prices which represent internal prices originally set under the centrally planned economic system and thus differ substantially from world market prices: inter-republican trade only. [d] Percentage of all trade outside the former Soviet Union. Trade with other Union republics accounted for 95.7% of Armenia's exports in 1992 and 81% of imports in 1991.

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Armenia

Review

THE POLITICAL SCENE

The opposition tries to put the president under pressure—

In the last quarter there have been large anti-government demonstrations in the capital Yerevan. These are being organised by the former chief presidential adviser on national security, Ashot Manucharian, and the National Democratic Union (NDU). The NDU was formed in 1991 as a splinter from the Armenian Democratic Party (the former Communists). The protests against President Ter-Petrosian's administration are part of the warm-up for the parliamentary and presidential elections due in mid-1995.

Mass demonstrations are nothing new in Armenia. There were similar protests last year. The hardship created by the war and the Azerbaijani blockade and semi-blockade imposed by Turkey is considerable. Most Armenians receive only four hours of electricity per day and earn less than the equivalent of $3 per month. As a result, there is a large disgruntled constituency available for opposition groups and parties to tap. The problem for the opposition is to sustain such discontent and translate it into effective political pressure on the government. Last year's mass demonstrations rapidly petered out and this year's discontent has yet to register at the polls. In recent parliamentary by-elections the turnout was extremely low, and in some districts was less than 10%. In District No 8 in Yerevan the election was declared void because the only candidate for the seat pulled out the day before polling.

—but his main problems are internal—

The main challenge to Mr Ter-Petrosian probably arises from the corruption within his own administration. It has allowed the main opposition party, the Armenian Democratic Party (ADP) to make consistent attacks upon the whole government, alleging embezzlement of national and state assets. The ADP has called upon the prosecutor-general to act. In response, Mr Ter-Petrosian sacked his trade minister, Tigran Grigorian, on July 31. Mr Grigorian was reportedly arrested in May (2nd quarter 1994, page 25) and held for three days on bribery charges. However, a ten-week investigation cleared him through lack of evidence.

—and there is no progress on the constitution

Debates on a new constitution to replace the Soviet era text first introduced in 1978 have continued (2nd quarter 1994, page 25), but moves to put the draft constitution to a referendum remain deadlocked. The problem for the Armenian parliament is that the question of the system of government has to be resolved if elections are to take place next year. The debate has hardly changed with the passage of time. The president continues to advocate strong

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presidential rule. The political centre wants a balance between the presidential office and the legislature. The main opposition groupings want a purely parliamentary system of government.

There are, however, slight signs of compromise from Mr Ter-Petrosian. As the draft of the constitution stands, Armenia would be governed in a highly centralised fashion. Elected local councils would be abolished, to be replaced by regional administrators, appointed by the president. Mr Ter-Petrosian has told parliament that he is prepared to make some concessions on his powers over local government.

Relations with Russia are formalised

Ties between Yerevan and Moscow have become better defined. A government commission has been established, headed by Armenak Kazarian, to develop Russian-Armenian relations. The two Russian chambers of parliament and the Armenian parliament signed a cooperation agreement on June 9. An intergovernmental protocol on military and economic relations was signed in Yerevan on July 15. Armenia wants a full treaty with Russia to be agreed by the end of the year. There are already some Russian troops remaining in Armenia, leftovers from the Soviet army, but Yerevan wants their presence to be formalised and wants full Russian military bases on its soil. Finally, the Armenian permanent mission in Moscow has been abolished, and is to be replaced by a conventional embassy, headed by Yuri Mkrtumian as ambassador.

Although there is considerable popular prejudice against Armenians and other Caucasians in Russia, where they are popularly referred to as "blacks", even the racist right in Russia views Armenia as an ally. For the Russian far right, Armenia is an anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish bulwark, rather like the Bosnian Serbs. From this springs the willingness of the Russian parliament to sign an agreement with its Armenian counterpart. For the more responsible Russian government, Armenia is a useful way of keeping Turkey out of the Transcaucasus and maintaining pressure on Azerbaijan.

THE WAR IN NAGORNIY-KARABAKH

A Russian-backed ceasefire is signed—

After considerable arm-twisting of both sides a ceasefire mediated by Russia was signed on July 27. The ministers of defence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with the commander of the Armenian forces in Nagorniy-Karabakh, agreed to the ceasefire, originally mediated by Russia in May, and its extension for a further 90 days. There has been a lull in the fighting and there was talk in August of sending international observers to the conflict area.

The ceasefire violations that both sides have alleged are very minor. The Armenian authorities in Armenia proper alleged Azerbaijani attacks along the border region centred upon Noyemberyanskiy *raion* (district) in the middle of June. They also claimed that the villages of Shagat and Brnakot in Sisianskiy *raion*, which borders the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan, had come under fire in August, and that Shagat had been fired at in June. The Azerbaijanis have alleged Armenian attacks on the Tauz and Agdam *raiony* which are next to the Armenian-controlled and inhabited enclave of Nagorniy-Karabakh.

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—and the Russia and CSCE peace moves may merge—

The diplomatic scene has been dominated by continued discussions under the auspices of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the offer by Turkey to send peace-keepers to Nagorniy-Karabakh. The negotiating process is moving towards what is termed the Major Political Agreement (MPA), which will try to merge the Russian peace initiative and that proposed by the CSCE's Minsk group (Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, UK, USA, Belarus, Italy). A big stumbling block to the MPA has been Azerbaijan's insistence that the numbers of Russian peace-keepers be limited (see Azerbaijan: THE POLITICAL SCENE). The Azerbaijani position is that only one-third of any peace-keeping force should come from one country, and that any Russian troops must be under CSCE auspices.

In a move directed partly by domestic considerations, the Turkish prime minister, Tansu Ciller, sought approval from the Turkish parliament on June 27 for the use of peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the CSCE. She also asked for a logistics support centre for the CSCE forces, to be based in Erzurum in eastern Turkey. Azerbaijan was pleased by the offer of Turkish troops as peacekeepers. Moscow also welcomed Mrs Ciller's proposal, for two reasons. First, it provides Russia with a pretext to demand that its own troops be involved, on the argument that if the peace-keeping troops are to contain pro-Azerbaijani forces, then they should contain a pro-Armenian contingent. Second, there is no place where Russia can host a logistics base for such a force.

Both the Armenian government in Yerevan and the Nagorniy-Karabakh Armenians were less than delighted at the prospect of Turkish involvement in a peacekeeping operation, for a number of reasons. Turkey has been training the Azerbaijani military, as the Turkish army freely admits. However, the evidence is that what training and aid there has been is on a low level, and its effectiveness has been virtually nil. Moreover, there are no diplomatic links between the two countries. Turkey will allow Armenia to open an embassy in Ankara only after the occupation of Azerbaijani territory is ended. Finally, the sight of Turkish troops would anger many Armenians, given that the Turkish government still officially denies the 1915 genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

—with disarmament a key element in the future talks

Controls on heavy weapons will be an important element of any ceasefire, especially given the readiness of both sides to target civilians. The favoured weapons for this are the BM-21 Grad rocket-launchers. The table below reproduces figures for armed forces and equipment given by the Georgian newspaper, *Seven Days*, and based upon what it calls "international assessments". Although there must be some scepticism about the figures, they do provide a guide to the volume of weapons in the region. The figures do not differ substantially from those given by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, except that the Armenian personnel numbers are larger, possibly because *Seven Days* included the Nagorniy-Karabakh forces.

There appears to be a preponderance of arms and personnel in favour of Azerbaijan, although perhaps not as large as has been claimed over the past four or five years. The consistent Armenian and Nagorniy-Karabakh Armenian victories over the larger Azerbaijani forces stem from better organisation, better discipline and a well-trained infantry. The Azerbaijanis have suffered from having

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inherited few officers from the Soviet army. Although among the best educated of the Muslim populations of the former USSR, Azerbaijanis tended to be put into construction battalions, probably as a result of discrimination. By contrast, many Armenians served as officers in the technical corps of the Soviet army.

Military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 1994

	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Armed forces	**32,682**	**56,000**
Equipment		
Tanks	129	279
Infantry fighting vehicles	230	332
Airborne combat vehicles	12	95
Armoured personnel carriers	106	313
Aircraft		
MiG-25	1	35
MiG-21	0	6
Su-25	5	3
Su-24	0	7
Mi-24 Helicopter	13	6
Su-17	0	2
Artillery		
Howitzer D-30	63	153
Gvozdika 2S-1	10	14
Akatsiya 2S-3	32	36
Howitzer D-20	31	36
2A-36B Giatsint	20	24
Howitzer D-1	2	0
Mortars	19	0
BM-21 Grad	48	66

Source: Seven Days.

THE ECONOMY

The Armenian economy is finally growing—

Official figures suggest that the Armenian economy is finally expanding after four years of severe economic contraction. The government reports that GNP in the first five months of this year was 7.5% up on the corresponding five months in 1993. During the same period industrial output rose 12% year on year. The Ministry of Industry is claiming that all sections of Armenian industry are now working. The main reason behind the pick-up appears to be a restoration of reliable gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Russia. The frequent sabotage of the gas supply pipeline that flows through Georgia has ended for the moment, mainly because the situation there is so quiet. Armenia is such a reliable payer to Turkmenistan that it is negotiating for electricity supplies from the country (see Turkmenistan: THE ECONOMY). Also, energy is being diverted away from domestic users to industry. Most Armenians receive only four hours of electricity each day, and those in Yerevan get two.

Although encouraging, the figures need to be set in context. First, the fall in output has been so deep that a marked rebound is to be expected, and the economy still has a long way to go to return to its previous level of output. Second, although production has restarted, there is little demand for the goods

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being made. Only 50% of goods produced are being sold, with the rest going into inventories.

—but drastic measures are still needed—

The severe cash shortage in the country, caused mainly by high inflation, has led to measures to ration the supply. Mr Ter-Petrosian issued a decree, effective from July 1, which limits the amount of cash each firm can receive from its bank. A firm cannot take out more than the equivalent of ten times the minimum monthly salary (roughly equivalent to $10) per employee or more than the value of its manufactured output (at cost price). Enterprises withdrawing more than that amount of cash will be taxed on it.

—while the process of reform continues

The government is trying to encourage share ownership among its impoverished population. On June 18 parliament passed a further privatisation law granting employees the right to free shares in their place of work. The upper limit of the offer is 20%. Despite its calamitous economic position, Armenia has thus gone further than Azerbaijan and Georgia in its privatisation and reform programme. Indeed, had it not been for the large-scale land reform and privatisation campaigns carried out as far back as 1991, the economy might have been in a worse position. Despite the blockade, Armenia has just managed to feed itself.

In a similar vein, the parliament passed a new law protecting foreign capital from subsequent changes in legislation. Regulations in force at the time of the original investment apply for five years thereafter, whatever the subsequent legislation. Although the measure is designed to encourage foreign investment, no Armenian official seriously believes that it will have much effect while the blockade continues. Instead it is designed to ensure that Armenia is positioned to receive investment when the war in Nagorniy-Karabakh is over.

A setback in the quest for energy independence

The Armenian government has for two years wanted to reopen the Metzamor nuclear power station, which is close to its border with Turkey. Although Armenia secured a Rb100bn ($50m) credit from Russia to reactivate the station, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which inspected the plant, is demanding further safety measures. There has been widespread opposition to the reopening of Metzamor, from Western governments, from local environmentalists and from the Turkish government. The Armenian authorities have used the possibility of reopening the facility as a bargaining counter to try to have Ankara lift its secondary blockade on the country. The Russian credit line will be used to purchase spare parts and fuel rods from Russia, which manufactures both.

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Draft

PROGRAM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA
(JULY 2-8)

(Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, European Parliament)

Saturday, July 1	
Evening	Arrival in Yerevan
Sunday, July 2	
10.00-12.00	A working meeting of the international observers group
12.30-14.00	Meeting with the experts of the Supreme Council Information about the draft constitution and election laws
16.00	Meeting with the coordinating unit of the OSCE/UN joint operation on election monitoring in Armenia
17.30	Meeting with the Ambassadors of the member states of the Council of Europe
Monday, July 3	
10.00-11.00	Meeting with H.E.. B. Araraktsian, Chairman of the Supreme Council (or H.E. A. Sahakian, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council)
	Meeting with H.E. H. Bagratian, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia
	Meeting with H.E. L. Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia
13.30-14.30	Meeting with the representatives of mass media

16.00-18.00	Meeting at the Central Electoral Commission
18.15-19.15	Meeting with representatives of national minorities
19.00-20.00	Meeting with NGO representatives
Tuesday, July 4	
9.00-13.00	Meeting with representatives of political parties
15.30-16.00	Meeting with H.E. V. Papazian, Minister of Foreign Affairs
16.15-16.45	Meeting with H.E. V. Stepanian, Minister of Justice
17.00	Departure for Echmiadzin Meeting with H.H. Garegin I Catholicos and Supreme Patriarch of all Armenians
	Departure for Yerevan
Wednesday, July 5	Election Day Visits to polling-stations
Thursday, July 6	
9.00-10.00	A closed meeting of the observers' group
10.15-11.30	Exchange of information with representatives of international organizations
12.00-13.00	Meeting with the Ambassadors of the member states of the Council of Europe (for observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and European Parliament)
	Press- Conference
13.00-14.30	Official reception
19.00	

Friday, July 7 10.00-12.00	Meeting with representatives of the Central Electoral Commission, information on voter participation and election results
Afternoon	Cultural program
Saturday, July 8	Departure of the observers from Yerevan

Union Européenne
Commission des Communautés Européennes
Programme Démocratie TACIS

Guide à l'intention des candidats à l'élection législative du 5 juillet 1995

I - LE MODE DE SCRUTIN

1 - Le double scrutin

Le mode de scrutin adopté par la loi du 4 avril 1995 est un mode de scrutin mixte :
- 150 députés sont élus dans 150 circonscriptions au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours ;
- 40 députés sont élus au scrutin de liste à la représentation proportionnelle dans une unique circonscription couvrant l'ensemble du territoire.

Chaque électeur reçoit deux bulletins :
- 1 bulletin comprenant les noms des candidats dans la circonscription où il vote ;
- 1 bulletin comprenant la liste des partis politiques admis à présenter des candidats.

Les candidats dans une circonscription peuvent en même temps être candidats dans l'une des listes de la circonscription nationale.

2 - Le scrutin de circonscription

Les 150 circonscriptions ont été délimitées par la Commission électorale centrale sur la base du principe d'égalité du nombre d'électeurs par circonscription, de sorte que, dans chaque circonscription, le nombre d'électeurs ne dépasse pas 15 % de la moyenne du nombre d'électeurs par circonscription ni ne soit inférieur de plus de 15 % à cette moyenne.

Les candidats ont été enregistrés par les commissions électorales de circonscription sur la base d'au moins 500 signatures d'électeurs de la circonscription reconnues valides par la commission. Le scrutin est un scrutin à deux tours. Les conditions pour être élu varient selon le nombre de candidats par circonscription.

1ère hypothèse : plus de 3 candidats dans la circonscription

1er tour : est élu le candidat qui obtient en sa faveur :

1) le plus grand nombre de voix ;

2) au moins 25 % des suffrages exprimés.

2ème tour : Si aucun candidat n'est élu au premier tour, un second tour est organisé entre les deux candidats ayant obtenu le plus grand nombre de voix au premier tour. Est élu au second tour le candidat qui obtient le plus grand nombre de voix.

2ème hypothèse : 2 candidats dans la circonscription

Comme dans le cas précédent, est élu au premier tour le candidat qui obtient :

1) le plus grand nombre de voix ;

2) au moins 25 % des suffrages valides.

Si aucun candidat n'obtient 25 % des suffrages valides, le siège de député n'est pas pourvu au premier tour. Un second scrutin a lieu dans la circonscription dans les deux semaines qui suivent la publication des résultats du premier tour.

3ème hypothèse : candidature unique

Premier tour : Le candidat est élu s'il obtient plus de la moitié des votes valides. Sinon, un second scrutin est organisé, également dans les deux semaines qui suivent la publication des résultats du premier tour.

Candidats lors du second scrutin

Lors du second scrutin, le candidat ne peut pas déclarer se retirer, et le retrait de sa candidature n'est possible qu'en cas de décès.

3 - La représentation proportionnelle

Les listes de candidats pour les 40 sièges attribués sur le plan national sont enregistrés par la Commission électorale centrale sur la base de 10 000 signatures valides.

1 - La répartition des sièges entre les listes

Les sièges sont répartis uniquement entre les listes qui ont obtenu lors du scrutin plus de 5 % des votes valides.

Le système de répartition des sièges est la représentation proportionnelle avec attribution des sièges au plus fort reste.

1 - Le "quotient électoral" qui sert à répartir les sièges est obtenu en multipliant par 40 le nombre de voix obtenues par toutes les listes et en le divisant par le nombre de voix obtenues par toutes les listes qui ont recueilli plus de 5 % des voix.

2 - Chaque liste obtient autant de sièges que le nombre de voix qu'elle a recueilli contient le quotient électoral.

3 - Les sièges non attribués selon les règles précédentes sont attribués successivement aux différentes listes selon le système du plus fort reste. En cas d'égalité des restes, le siège est attribué à la liste qui a recueilli le plus grand nombre de voix. Si deux listes ont le même nombre de voix, il est procédé au tirage au sort.

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2 - La désignation des candidats élus

Sont en principe élus les candidats dont le numéro d'ordre sur la liste est inférieur ou égal au nombre de mandats attribué à la liste.

Si l'un de ces candidats est également élu dans une circonscription électorale au scrutin majoritaire, est réputé élu le candidat suivant sur la liste. En cas de second scrutin, l'attribution des sièges n'est effectuée qu'après la proclamation des résultats de ce second scrutin; Si l'élection est invalidée, l'attribution de siège est réglée après la proclamation des résultats du nouveau scrutin.

II - LE DROIT DE VOTE ET L'INSCRIPTION SUR LES LISTES ELECTORALES

*** Le droit de vote**

Ont le droit de vote les citoyens de la République d'Arménie qui :

1) ont au moins 18 ans au jour de l'élection

2) ont résidé en République d'Arménie au moins un an avant le jour de l'élection.

*** Les bureaux de vote**

Les bureaux de vote sont établis par les commissions électorales de circonscriptions de sorte que le nombre d'électeurs dans chaque bureau de vote ne soit pas inférieur à 100 ni ne soit supérieur à 3 000, à l'exception de cas particuliers où les bureaux de vote sont formés avec l'autorisation de la Commission électorale centrale.

*** L'inscription sur les listes électorales**

Les listes électorales sont établies par bureau de vote. Les listes sont signées et revêtues du sceau du chef de l'administration locale de la circonscription administrative dont relève le bureau de vote.

Sont inscrits sur les listes électorales les citoyens ayant le droit de vote, résidant en permanence sur le territoire du bureau de vote correspondant et également au moins 6 mois avant le jour de l'élection au moment de l'établissement de la liste.

Les électeurs qui ont changé de résidence dans l'année votent dans le bureau de vote de la nouvelle résidence s'ils y sont établis depuis plus de 6 mois, dans l'ancienne s'ils y sont établis dans la nouvelle depuis moins de 6 mois (art. ...).

Figurent sur les listes électorales pour chaque électeur :

- les nom, prénom et patronyme
- l'adresse

- l'année de naissance et également à côté pour les électeurs âgés de 18 ans le mois et le jour
- l'indication du document servant de base à l'inscription sur la liste électorale.

L'électeur ne peut être inscrit que sur une seule liste électorale.

2 - La publication des listes électorales

Les listes électorales sont rendues publiques 15 jours avant les élections. Les électeurs, les candidats et leurs mandataires ont accès aux listes électorales et peuvent vérifier leur exactitude dans les édifices des commissions électorales de bureau de vote.

Les recours relatifs aux inexactitudes dans les listes électorales sont examinées par les commissions électorales de bureau de vote dans le délai de deux jours ou, la veille et le jour de l'élection, le jour même. La commission électorale effectue dans la liste les rectifications nécessaires ou remet aux requérants une copie motivée de la décision de rejet.

Jusqu'à 5 jours avant l'élection, la décision de la commission électorale de bureau de vote peut faire l'objet d'un recours au tribunal d'arrondissement ou de ville, qui doit l'examiner dans les 3 jours. La rectification décidée par décision du tribunal est effectuée immédiatement par la commission électorale.

III - LES CONDITIONS D'ELIGIBILITE - LES INCOMPATIBILITES

Ont le droit d'être élus les citoyens de la République d'Arménie âgés de 25 ans au jours de l'élection et qui ont résidé en permanence dans la République d'Arménie au moins 3 ans avant le jour de l'élection.

Les juges, les employés de la Procuratura et de la Direction d'Etat de la Sécurité nationale, les personnes effectuant leur service au ministère de l'Intérieur et dans les Forces armées ne peuvent être candidats.

Les présidents, vice-présidents, membres des commissions électorales ne peuvent être candidats. Ceux d'entre eux qui désirent l'être doivent donc préalablement démissionner avant d'être enregistrés comme candidats.

Les fonctions de membre du gouvernement sont incompatibles avec le mandat de député à l'Assemblée nationale. Les membres du Gouvernement peuvent être candidats, mais s'ils sont élus, ils doivent choisir entre leur mandat de député et leur fonction de membre du Gouvernement.

IV - L'ANNULATION DE L'ENREGISTREMENT ET LE RETRAIT DU CANDIDAT

1 - L'annulation de l'enregistrement

L'enregistrement d'un candidat est annulé par la commission électorale de circonscription :

1) si, après l'enregistrement, sont révélés des fait qui empêchent l'enregistrement. La Commission électorale de circonscription compétente en prend acte au procès-verbal et rend publique la non-validité de l'enregistrement ;
2) en cas de décès du candidat.
L'enregistrement est annulé par la Commission électorale centrale s'il s'est avéré que lors de la campagne électorale le candidat a donné aux électeus de l'argent, des produits alimentaires, des marchandises ou d'autres cadeaux (cf. V.3).

2 - Le retrait du candidat

Le candidat peut retirer sa candidature avant le scrutin par une lettre adressée à la commission électroale de circonscription. L'enregistrement peut être annulé au plus tard 5 jours avant l'élection.
Si la déclaration de retrait intervient 5 jours au plus tard avant le second tour, la commision électorale donne droit à participer au second tour au candidat suivant ayant obtenu le plus grand nombre de voix au premier tour.

V - LA CAMPAGNE ELECTORALE

1 - Les mandataires des candidats et des organisations politiques

Dans chaque bureau de vote, chaque organisation socio-politique participant à l'élection et chaque candidat a droit d'avoir jusqu'à 3 mandataires enregistrés par la commission électorale de circonscription sur proposition de l'organisation socio-politique ou du candidat.
Le mandataire représente les intérêts des candidats et des organisations socio-politiques auprès de la commission électorale correspondantes. Il a le droit de représenter ces mêmes intérêts dans les relations avec les organisations publiques et sociales, de prendre part sans obstacle à toutes les manifestations organisées par la commission électorale correspondante. Pas plus de deux mandataires de chaque candidat ou organisation ne peuvent être présents simultanément pendant le processus de fonctionnement de la commission électorale de circonscription. Le mandataire ne peut être membre d'une commission électorale. Le candidat ou l'organisation socio-politique peuvent proposer à la commission électorale de circonscription de remplacer un mandataire.

2 - L'accès aux moyens d'information publics

- L'accès gratuit et égal aux moyens d'information publics doit être assuré par les commissions électorales :
  - aux moyens républicains pour les organisations politiques participant aux élections selon le système de la représentation proportionnelle ;

- aux moyens locaux pour les candidats participant aux élections dans les circonscriptions selon le système majoritaire.

Cet accès gratuit est assuré par la Commission électorale centrale dans les limites d'un fonds électoral unique pour les organisations socio-politiques et les candidats individuels.

- Les limitations de l'accès payant aux moyens d'informations publics

Les organisations socio-politiques participant à l'élection et les candidats individuels peuvent également avoir un accès payant aux moyens publics d'information en utilisant leurs moyens propres mais dans la limite du double des moyens assurant l'accès gratuit établi par la Commission électorale centrale.

3 - La propagande électorale par les autres moyens

Les citoyens de la République d'Arménie ont le droit à la discussion libre et multiple des qualités politiques, professionnelles et personnelles des candidats ainsi qu'à la libre propagande dans les réunions et meetings.

Les candidats et leurs mandataires, les organisations socio-politiques ont le droit d'organiser des rencontres avec les électeurs.

Lors de la campagne électorale, il est interdit aux candidats personnellement en leur nom, ainsi que par l'intermédiaire d'autres personnes, par l'intermédiaire d'entreprises et organisations publiques ou privées, d'associations, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit de donner aux électeurs de l'argent, des produits alimentaires, des marchandises ou d'autres cadeaux. L'enregistrement du candidat peut être annulé par la Commission électorale centrale au cas où de tels faits seraient confirmés.

Le jour de l'élection, la propagande électorale, la tenue de meetings, de manifestations, le rassemblement de gens en groupes à l'entrée du bâtiment où a lieu le scrutin sont interdits.

4 - Le financement de la campagne électorale

En dehors des fonds attribués par la Commission électorale centrale pour l'accès gratuit aux moyens d'information de masse, les candidats et les organisations socio-politiques prenant part à l'élection ont le droit d'utiliser leurs moyens propres ainsi que les moyens recueillis ou reçus en don.

Les dépenses de campagne électorale de chaque candidat ne peuvent dépasser 500 fois le salaire minimum établi dans la République, soit 237 500 D. Cette règle s'applique aussi bien aux candidats individuels qu'aux candidats figurant dans les listes nationales. Les candidats et les organisations socio-politiques présentent à la Commission électorale centrale une déclaration relative à leurs dépenses.

VI - L'ORGANISATION DU SCRUTIN

Le bulletin de vote et les certificats de vote

Les bulletins de vote pour l'élection au système majoritaire comprennent la liste des candidats dans l'ordre alphabétique avec indication de leurs nom, prénom, patronyme, leur appartenance à un parti, le lieu de travail et la fonction (profession).

Les bulletins de vote pour l'élection au système proportionnel comprennent les noms des organisations socio-politiques (ou l'abréviation si l'organisation socio-politique l'utilise) ou des blocs, enregistrés pour l'élection au système proportionnel, ainsi que les noms, prénoms, patronymes des trois premiers candidats de la liste.

Chaque électeur reçoit un certificat de vote qui est une feuille constituée de deux parties identiques séparables; Chacune des deux parties mentionne les nom, prénom et patronyme de l'électeur, le jour, le mois et l'année de sa naissance, son adresse, le numéro de la circonscription et du bureau de vote, le numéro figurant sur la liste électorale en face de nom de l'électeur.

La transmission des documents électoraux est enregistrée avec les signatures de celui qui transmet et celui qui reçoit.

Le scrutin

Le scrutin a lieu de 8 h à 20 h dans les bâtiments désignés par les commissions électorales. La loi prévois que les isoloirs doivent être en nombre suffisant, mais laisse aux commissions électorales de bureau de vote le soin de fixer ce nombre. Des tables sont installées pour l'enregistrement des électeurs et la remise des bulletins.

Les urnes doivent être placées de façon à être visibles par la majorité des personnes autorisées à être présentes dans le bureau de vote (représentants des organisations socio-politiques, de la presse, de la télévision et de la radio, observateurs, mandataires des candidats enregistrés dans la circonscription).

Les bulletins de vote sont signés par les membres de la commission désignés par celle-ci. Si avant le début du scrutin, un membre de la commission électorale demande que les bulletins soient également signés par lui, ce droit lui est accordé.

Le président clôt l'urne et la scelle en présence des membres de la commission et des personnes mentionnées ci-dessus; Il remet les bulletins comptés aux personnes responsables de la remise des bulletins aux électeurs et les certificats de vote remplis aux personnes responsables de l'enregistrement des candidats, avec mention correspondant aux registre des opérations du scrutin.

L'électeur est enregistré sur la liste électorale en apposant sa signature en face de son nom, sur présentation de son passeport ou de tout autre document attestant son identité.

Le membre de la commission responsable de l'enregistrement signe la première partie du certificat de vote et remet le certificat de vote à l'électeur, qui signe les deux parties.
Le membre de la commission responsable de la remise des bulletins signe la seconde partie du certificat de vote de l'électeur enregistré, sépare cette partie et la place dans l'urne destinée à ces certificats, scellée par la commission et remet le bulletin de vote à l'électeur.
Le bulletin de vote est rempli par l'électeur dans l'isoloir ou la salle destinée à assurer le secret du scrutin.
L'électeur qui n'est pas en mesure de remplir lui-même le bulletin de vote invite une autre personne dans l'isoloir ou la salle particulière, à l'exclusion des membres de la commission et des mandataires.
A l'exception de ce cas, la présence de toute autre personne dans l'isoloir ou la salle particulière est interdite.
Dans le bulletin pour l'élection au système majoritaire, l'électeur ne laisse que le nom du candidat pour lequel il vote, et barre les noms des autres candidats. S'il n'y a qu'un seul candidat, l'électeur barre le mot "Pour" en face du nom s'il vote contre et barre le nom "Contre" s'il vote pour.
Dans le bulletin pour l'élection au système proportionnel, l'électeur ne laisse que le nom de l'organisation socio-politique (ou du bloc) pour lequel il vote et barre les noms de tous les autres organisations socio-politiques ou blocs.
L'électeur sort de l'isoloir ou de la salle particulière avec le bulletin rempli et plié et le met personnellement dans l'urne.

VII - LE DEPOUILLEMENT DU SCRUTIN ET LA PROCLAMATION DES RESULTATS

1 - La validité des bulletins

Sont considérés non valides :
- les bulletins qui ne sont pas conformes au modèle établi ;
- les bulletins qui ne comportent pas le cachet de la cour électorale correspondante et des membres de la commissions ;
- les bulletins contenant un vote en faveur de plus d'un candidat ou de plus d'une organisation socio-politique ou bloc, ou au cas où il n'y a qu'un candidat, les bulletins où ont été maintenus ou barrés les deux mentions "Pour" et "Contre" ;
- les bulletins contenant des inscriptions supplémentaires.

Le dépouillement du scrutin au niveau du bureau de vote

I) Avant l'ouverture de l'urne

- Enregistrement au procès-verbal du nombre de bulletins reçus de la commission électorale de circonscription.

- Décompte du nombre de bulletins inutilisés, incorrectement remplis ou rendus par les électeurs et dénaturation pour empêcher leur utilisation.
- Décompte :
  a) du nombre total de votants fondé sur la liste des votants ;
  b) du nombre total de votants enregistrés sur la base de leur signature ;
  c) de nombre de certificats de vote non utilisés.

2) Après l'ouverture de l'urne

- Pour les bulletins du système majoritaire
  a) le nombre total de bulletins présents dans l'urne ;
  b) le nombre de bulletins reconnus non valides ;
  c) le nombre de voix recueillies par chaque candidat.
- Pour les bulletins du système proportionnel
  a) le nombre total de bulletins présents dans l'urne ;
  b) le nombre total de bulletins reconnus non valides ;
  c) le nombre de voix recueillies par chaque liste.

Les procès-verbaux revêtus du cachet, les urnes scellées avec les certificats de vote et les autres paquets de documents électoraux sont transmis à la commission électorale de circonscription.

Le dépouillement au niveau de la circonscription électorale

Sur la base des procès-verbaux des commissions électorales de bureau de vote, la commission électorale de circonscription enregistre au procès-verbal de la commission électorale de circonscription :

- le nombre total de bulletins donnés aux commissions électorales de bureau de vote ;
- le nombre total de bulletins dénaturés ;
- le nombre total de bulletins incorrectement remplis et rendus par les électeurs ;
- le nombre total de votants ;
- le nombre total de votants enregistrés ;
- le nombre total de certificats de vote non utilisés par bureau de vote
- le nombre total de bulletins dans les urnes ;
- le nombre total de bulletins reconnus non valides ;
- le nombre total de bulletins en faveur de chaque candidat ;
- le nombre total de bulletins en faveur de chaque organisation socio-politique ou bloc.

La commission établit et enregistre également le nombre de certificats contenus dans les urnes pour les certificats. Après leur décompte, les certificats sont mis en paquet avec le sceau de la commission électorale de circonscription.

Les données du procès-verbal sont approuvées par la commission électorale de circonscription, signées et revêtues du sceau.

Les procès-verbaux des commissions électorales ainsi que les procès-verbaux (en un exemplaire) des commissions électorales de bureau de vote sont transmis à la Commission électorale centrale.

Au niveau de la Commission électorale centrale

La commission électorale attribue les sièges répartis à la représentation proportionnelle et prend une décision relative à l'élection de l'Assemblée nationale de chaque circonscription électorale.

3 - L'annulation des élections

Les élections dans un bureau de vote ou une circonscription peuvent être annulées :

1) au cas de non concordance des chiffres portés au procès-verbal de la commission électorale ;

2) si conformément à des faits vérifiés, le candidat élu au scrutin majoritaire a été remplacé par un autre ou déclaré non élu et s'il est impossible en fait de rétablir les résultats réels et d'établir sur cette base quel est le candidat élu ;

3) si au cours de la préparation et du déroulement du scrutin ont eu lieu des violations de la loi dans la conséquence a été que le droit de vote égal, direct, libre et le secret du scrutin n'ont pas été respectés.

Les règles relatives à l'incidence de l'annulation de l'élection dans un bureau de vote sur la proclamation des résultats de l'élection au système proportionnel sont fixées par l'article 40 de la loi du 4 avril 1995 relative à l'élection des députés à l'Assemblée nationale.

VIII - LE CONTROLE ET LA SURVEILLANCE DE LA REGULARITE DU SCRUTIN

1 - Le contrôle par les commissions électorales

La commission électorale de bureau de vote reçoit et examine les recours relatifs aux inexactitudes dans les listes d'électeurs et règle les questions de rectification.

La commission électorale de circonscription examine les demandes et les recours relatifs aux décisions et actes des commissions électorales.

La Commission électorale centrale examine les recours concernant le déroulement des élections et l'établissement des résultats et organise si nécessaire des inspections. Elle peut annuler les élections des commissions de circonscriptions et de bureau de vote. En cas de violation de la loi ou de non respect de ses dispositions, elle peut saisir les instances compétentes ou le tribunal.

2 - Le contrôle judiciaire

Les décisions de la Commission électorale centrale, et dans les cas prévus par la loi, les décisions et les actes des autres commissions, peuvent être déférées au tribunal par les organisation socio-politiques, les candidats, les mandataires, les observateurs et les élections, dans le délai de trois jours après l'adoption de la décision ou l'accomplissement de l'acte. Le recours doit être examiné dans le délai de trois jours à compter de la saisine.

Les décisions des commissions électorales de bureau de vote relatives aux listes électorales peuvent être déférées au tribunal d'arrondissement ou de ville au plus tard 5 jours avant la date du scrutin (cf. II-2).

Les décisions de la Commission électorale centrale relatives aux résultats de l'élection peuvent être déférées à la Cour suprême de la République d'Arménie dans les dix jours (art. 37).

3 - L'observation des élections

1 - Le principe

Les représentants des organisations socio-politiques, de la presse, de la télévision et de la radio, les observateurs, les mandataires des candidats enregistrés dans la circonscription ont le droit de participer aux séances des commissions électorales, y compris lors de l'enregistrement des candidats, le scellement et l'ouverture des urnes, et au dépouillement du scrutin, à la détermination des résultats ainsi que durant toute la durée du scrutin.

Dans la circonscription, les représentants et observateurs sont enregistrés par les commissions électorales de circonscription.

Les observateurs étrangers

Le statut des observateurs étrangers a été fixé par un règlement adopté par la Commission électorale centrale.

Accréditation des observateurs étrangers

Les observateurs étrangers sont accrédités par la Commission électorale centrale entre le 1er juin et le 1er juillet 1995 et reçoivent un certificat d'accréditation établi en arménien. La Commission électorale centrale fixe la durée de l'accréditation.

Les propositions d'accréditations sont formulées par :

- les organisations gouvernementales et non gouvernementales internationales et nationales ;
- les personnes ayant une activité dans le domaine des droits de l'homme.

2 - Droits des observateurs

1) Pendant toute la période de leur accréditation :

- en accord avec la Commission électorale centrale d'établir des groupes de travail ;
- de tenir des conférence de presse, d'intervenir dans les mass médias conformément à la législation en vigueur dans la République d'Arménie ;
- d'être présents aux séances des commissions électorales ;
- de présenter aux commissions électorales les suggestions, d'exprimer leur opinion sur le processus électoral et les résultats.

2) Pendant la campagne électorale :

- d'être présents aux réunions des organisations politiques, de leurs associations et des candidats avec les électeurs,
- de prendre connaissance des listes électorales, des modèles de bulletins.

3) Le jour du scrutin :

- d'être présents pendant le vote,
- de prendre des photographies, d'utiliser des caméras et vidéos caméras, mais sans ajouter de lumière supplémentaire.

3 - Obligations

- Respecter la législation arménienne.
- Ne pas utiliser leur statut pour des activités étrangères à la campagne électorale. la Commission électorale centrale peut retirer à un observateur étranger son accréditation en cas de violation des lois de la République d'Arménie, du règlement sur les observateurs et des normes du droit international.

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Mrs. Antonina Bakardjieva
Parliamentary Assembly
Council of Europe

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA
FAX: (33) 88 412 702

16. 06. 95
18/3342

Dear Mrs Bakardjieva,

Reffering to the letter, signed by Mrs Gelderblom-Lankhout, on behalf of the Central Electoral Commission, I would like to assure, that all members of Your delegations will have a guaranteed possibility to freely perform their functions during the parliamentarian elections in Armenia.

According to the article 4, paragraph 2 of the „Regulations concerning the Status of Foreign Observers...", „the Central Electoral Commission has right to nullify the powers of a foreign observer taking away his certificate in case he violates the laws of the Republic of Armenia, International Law or these Regulations".

As far as incidental violation of traffic rules is concerned, it will not be considered as a cause for depriving the observers of monitoring capacities.

If action of the observer is carried out according to the International Law, there will be no obstacle for free fulfillment of monitoring duties.

V. Karmirshalian
Head of Iternational Organizations
Department

Media Law

Chapter 1 - General propositions

Article 1 Media

Television, radio programms, documentary and periodicals which prepare and spread information established by the present Law, as well as newspapers, magazines,articles published for more than 100 copies at a time are approved to be media.

Media is prepared and spread by editorial staff, information agencies, publishers, other institutions and by sitizens realizing mass information [farther - media].

Media publishers may be juridical persons possessing necessary means, equipment, property and printing house.

The present Law does not spread over the legislative and other activities of State Power and Government bodies.

Article 2 Freedom of media

In the Republic of Armenia media is free and does not pass cenzure. The citizens of the Republic of Armenia have the right to express their points of veiw and their opinions, to get actual and true information on any subject of social life through media. Monopoly of media is prohibited in the Republic of Armenia.

Article 3 Activity principles of media

Media is controlled in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Armenia, the principles of equality, humanism, pluralism of oppinions, tolerance, respect, freedom of conscience and human values, promote publicity and democracy,liberty of thoughts, speech pluralism.

Article 4 The right of getting information

Media has right to get information from any state body, social, social-political institutions, their leaders, if the information needed does not contradict the charter of the present organization and demands contained in Article 6 of the present Law.

Article 5 Armenian is the media language in the Republic of Armenia

The mass information is prepared and spread in Armenian in accordance with founder's suggestion and by the permission of the body registering media in other languages as well. Media must take care of the purity of mother tongue,permitted by the State Law.

Article 6 Inadmissibility of speach liberty abuse

Spreading the information which contains state secrets enumarated by Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia is not allowed. The information propaganding war, violence, giving rise to national and religious enmity,propaganding pornography, drugs, criminal actions, lies and unchecked information must not be published. The information about adoption and private life of citizen should not be published without his permission.

Chapter 2 Establishment of media, suspending and ceasing its activity

Article 7 The right to establish media

State Power and Government bodies of the Republic of Armenia, enterprices, social social-political institutions, social movements, creative unions, scientific and other societies, working associations, religious institutions and adult citizens living in the Republic of Armenia have the right to establish media.

Article 8 Media registration

Media publishers can act only after registration in the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia. The application and media charter must be presented by the founder. The application is considered within a month. The following must be noted in the application:

1 Founder, editor, publisher

2 Name, language and address

3 Periodicity and circulation, hours of broadcasting,financial source, sponsor

Making other demands during the registration of media is forbidden. State tax, fixed by Council of Ministry of the Republic of Armenia is imposed for media registration. The certificate is given to the founders after media registration.

The certificate loses its validity if media does not set to its work within a year after receiving the certificate.

Article 9 Cases of publishing information without registration

State Power bodies, justice, procurator's offices have the right to publish official information without registration. Entertainments,offices,organizations, education institutions have the right to publish necessary information for their work, if it does not intend dissimination among population.

Article 10 Refusal of media registration

Media registration is refused if:

1 The demands contained in articles 6,7 and 8 of the present Law are not kept.

2 Registration body has already given a certificate with the same name to another media.

3 The State tax is not paid

4 A year has not passed since the end of media activity in legal form.

The applicant must be informed about the main causes of refusal within 5 days, if media registration is refused.

Article 11 Suspending media activity

Media work can be suspended either by founder's will, or by the judgment for 3 months period, if violation of the demands contained in Article 6 of present Law takes place.

Article 12 Stopping (ceasing) media activity

Media activity is stopped for 6 months, if it makes new violations,after their work was suspended.

Media activity may be also stopped by the founder's will.

Article 13 Appealation

The decision of violation of the registration period,the refusal of registration suspending or stopping media activity by court can be appealed in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

Chapter 3 Organization of media work

Article 14 Economic activity of media

Economic activity of media is governed by the legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 15 Media government

Media is governed by the founder or by nominated person - editor (head editor), if something else is not specified by media.

Article 16 Founder and editor of media

Media editor realizes founder's program on the basis of professional independance. Founder's and editors economic properties and financial relations are regulated by the contract signed by them. The contract must not contradict the legislation. The same person may be both founder and editor.

Article 17 Editor (Head editor), editorial staff, editorial board

The work of editorial staff and editorial board is governed by editor (head editor), who is responsible for media activity. Editorial staff and editorial board are formed in accordance with editorial charter. The chairman of the editorial staff and editorial board is the editor (head editor).

Article 18 Editorial Charter

Editorial Charter is accepted at the editorial staff meeting by the majority of votes and is confirmed by founder. The Charter controls the relations among founder, editor, editorial staff and editorial board. Editorial Charter must not contradict the legislation.

Article 19 Editorial work and publication

In creative work media editor controls in accordance with editorial charter, orders,studies and publishes articles, letters etc. Media has to keep the legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 20 Data of issues and publications

Each of published issues should contain the following information:

1 Name of issue
2 Founder, editor (head editor), publisher
3 Ordinal number of issue, the date and the time when it was signed
4 Index
5 Price
6 Address of editorial office, publishing house
7 Circulation
8 Media certificate number

Editorial staff has to announce the name of every tele- and radio broadcasting, announcer's first and second names, and repeat it at least for 3 times in case of 24 hours broadcasting. Audio and video-recordings should contain information about editor,editorial staff, when and where they are prepared.

Article 21 Spreading media

Founders, publishers, editors, state and social institutions, citizens spread media in accordance with contract signed by the founder or publisher of mass information. Sending copies of all printed editions to Book Palace, National Library of the Republic of Armenia, the founder and the body, which gave the certificate for the particular media is free of charge.

Printed or other kind of media may be copied or spread only in case it does not violate author's or publisher's rights and interests.

It is forbidden to spread non-registered media and video and audio records if their number exceeds 100 copies.

Article 22 Publication of Official Information

Media established by State Power and Government bodies must publish official reports of these bodies in time and free of charge, as well as the reports given by court.

Article 23 Keeping the published information

Media publisher must keep the originals of printed and published materials within a year since the day of spreading. The publisher of audio,audiovisual means of information must keep video and audio records during a week, and in case of action - during a month since the day it was published. Innumeration and periods of keeping materials requiring long-term or constant storage are set by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 24 Refutation and Reply

Citizens and organizations or their legal representatives have the right to refute the information published in media, not corresponding to the facts, or they have the right to `article (state) a reply. To publish the refutation or the reply is free of charge within 3 days time in the next issue, just in the same kind of media and in the same aspect as the refuted information. The refutation of information, published about candidates in

elections of deputes to Supreme Council and local councils of the Republic of Armenia,the President of the Republic of Armenia, is made within 24 hours, or at the moment it is received, if not more than 24 hours is left before the voting begins. The size of published refutation should not be more than twice as large as the size of refuted information.

If media violates the order and the period of reputation fixed by the present Law or refuses to refute the published information, the organization or citizen has the right to apply to the court by the time fixed according the Law. Media may refuse to refute the information if it is not responsible for its publication according to Article 31 of the present Law.

Article 25 Editorial secrecy

It is not necessary for media to point to the source of information and they must not name the person, who has given the information, without his permission. Editorial staff or the journalist has to point to the source of information in case it is demanded by the right defending bodies, or it is necessary for legal procedure.

Chapter 4 Journalist's Rights and Duties

Article 26 Journalist

According to present Law a journalist is a competent person, who collects, prepares, corrects materials for media in accordance with labour contract or authorized by another media.

Article 27 Journalist's Rights

Journalist has the right:

1 To collect and publish information.

2 To refuse to prepare materials contradicting his convictions.

3 To take away his signature from the article written by himself, or from the ready material, in case the content is distorted by the editor or editorial staff.

4 To make records, take picture and fix by other means, if it is not forbidden by legislation.

5 Showing the journalist's certificate, he may be present at meetings, demonstrations, trials, in places of natural colamities in fixed order in accordance with the Law.

6 To have a pen-name.

One cannot prevent the journalist to fulfill his professional duties.

Article 28 Journalist's Duties

The journalist must:

1 Be governed by working legislation, rules, editorial staff program to which he collaborates.

2 To tell checked and true information.

3 If necessary name the persons who have given the information, or its source, in case the information is published for the first time.

4 Let the editor learn about unchecked facts or information, publication of which may violate the requirements of Article 6 of the present Law.

Article 29 Journalist's accreditation

According to preliminary agreement media is able to accredit its journalist attached to state or public organizations. The accredited journalist has the right to participate in the work of those organizations and elucidate it. Journalists of other countries are accredited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, which may cancel the accreditation of any foreign journalist if he violates the Constitution or Laws of the Republic of Armenia.

Chapter 5 Responsibility for violating the Law of Media.

Article 30 Bases of Responsibility

The activity of non-registered mrdia,misuse of speech liberty, publication of information, not corresponding to the reality, abusing person's honour and dignity and violating the rights and legal interests of citizens and organizations are responsible in accordance with Law.

Article 31 Cases of Release from Responsibility

Media publishers are not responsible for the published information, if it does not correspond to the reality, if the information:

1 is contained in official documents and in the reports of State Power bodies, Government, right protecting bodies, public, social, political organizations.

2 is a word for word reproduction of public statements and not a misrepresented one.

3 is received from other media or information agencies of State and public bodies.

Chapter 6 Collaboration of Press and Media on International Scene

Article 32 International agreements

Media, organizations,journalists have the right to sign contracts with foreign informational organizations and citizens.

If there are other rules established by international agreements signed at the participation of the Republic of rmenia different from mentioned in the present Law, then the norms of international agreements act.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia — L.Ter-Petrossian

Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia — A.Sahakian

8 October 1991
Yerevan

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4 A year has not passed since the end of media activity in legal form.

The applicant must be informed about the main causes of refusal within 5 days, if media registration is refused.

Article 11 Suspending media activity

Media work can be suspended either by founder's will, or by the judgment for 3 months period, if violation of the demands contained in Article 6 of present Law takes place.

Article 12 Stopping (ceasing) media activity

Media activity is stopped for 6 months, if it makes new violations,after their work was suspended.

Media activity may be also stopped by the founder's will.

Article 13 Appealation

The decision of violation of the registration period,the refusal of registration suspending or stopping media activity by court can be appealed in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

Chapter 3 Organization of media work

Article 14 Economic activity of media

Economic activity of media is governed by the legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 15 Media government

Media is governed by the founder or by nominated person - editor (head editor), if something else is not specified by media.

Article 16 Founder and editor of media

Media editor realizes founder's program on the basis of professional independance. Founder's and editors economic properties and financial relations are regulated by the contract signed by them. The contract must not contradict the legislation. The same person may be both founder and editor.

Article 17 Editor (Head editor), editorial staff, editorial board

The work of editorial staff and editorial board is governed by editor (head editor), who is responsible for media activity. Editorial staff and editorial board are formed in accordance with editorial charter. The chairman of the editorial staff and editorial board is the editor (head editor).

Article 18 Editorial Charter

Editorial Charter is accepted at the editorial staff meeting by the majority of votes and is confirmed by founder. The Charter controls the relations among founder, editor, editorial staff and editorial board. Editorial Charter must not contradict the legislation.

Article 19 Editorial work and publication

In creative work media editor controls in accordance with editorial charter, orders,studies and publishes articles, letters etc. Media has to keep the legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 20 Data of issues and publications

Each of published issues should contain the following information:

1 Name of issue

2 Founder, editor (head editor), publisher

3 Ordinal number of issue, the date and the time when it was signed

4 Index

5 Price

6 Address of editorial office, publishing house

7 Circulation

8 Media certificate number

Editorial staff has to announce the name of every tele- and radio broadcasting, announcer's first and second names, and repeat it at least for 3 times in case of 24 hours broadcasting. Audio and video-recordings should contain information about editor,editorial staff, when and where they are prepared.

Article 21 Spreading media

Founders, publishers, editors, state and social institutions, citizens spread media in accordance with contract signed by the founder or publisher of mass information. Sending copies of all printed editions to Book Palace, National Library of the Republic of Armenia, the founder and the body, which gave the certificate for the particular media is free of charge.

Printed or other kind of media may be copied or spread only in case it does not violate author's or publisher's rights and interests.

It is forbidden to spread non-registered media and video and audio records if their number exceeds 100 copies.

Article 22 Publication of Official Information

Media established by State Power and Government bodies must publish official reports of these bodies in time and free of charge, as well as the reports given by court.

Article 23 Keeping the published information

Media publisher must keep the originals of printed and published materials within a year since the day of spreading. The publisher of audio,audiovisual means of information must keep video and audio records during a week, and in case of action - during a month since the day it was published. Innumeration and periods of keeping materials requiring long-term or constant storage are set by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia.

Article 24 Refutation and Reply

Citizens and organizations or their legal representatives have the right to refute the information published in media, not corresponding to the facts, or they have the right to `article (state) a reply. To publish the refutation or the reply is free of charge within 3 days time in the next issue, just in the same kind of media and in the same aspect as the refuted information. The refutation of information, published about candidates in

elections of deputes to Supreme Council and local councils of the Republic of Armenia,the President of the Republic of Armenia, is made within 24 hours, or at the moment it is received, if not more than 24 hours is left before the voting begins. The size of published refutation should not be more than twice as large as the size of refuted information.

If media violates the order and the period of reputation fixed by the present Law or refuses to refute the published information, the organization or citizen has the right to apply to the court by the time fixed according the Law. Media may refuse to refute the information if it is not responsible for its publication according to Article 31 of the present Law.

Article 25 Editorial secrecy

It is not necessary for media to point to the source of information and they must not name the person, who has given the information, without his permission. Editorial staff or the journalist has to point to the source of information in case it is demanded by the right defending bodies, or it is necessary for legal procedure.

Chapter 4 Journalist's Rights and Duties

Article 26 Journalist

According to present Law a journalist is a competent person, who collects, prepares, corrects materials for media in accordance with labour contract or authorized by another media.

Article 27 Journalist's Rights

Journalist has the right:

1 To collect and publish information.

2 To refuse to prepare materials contradicting his convictions.

3 To take away his signature from the article written by himself, or from the ready material, in case the content is distorted by the editor or editorial staff.

4 To make records, take picture and fix by other means, if it is not forbidden by legislation.

5 Showing the journalist's certificate, he may be present at meetings, demonstrations, trials, in places of natural colamities in fixed order in accordance with the Law.

6 To have a pen-name.

One cannot prevent the journalist to fulfill his professional duties.

Article 28 Journalist's Duties

The journalist must:

1 Be governed by working legislation, rules, editorial staff program to which he collaborates.

2 To tell checked and true information.

3 If necessary name the persons who have given the information, or its source, in case the information is published for the first time.

4 Let the editor learn about unchecked facts or information, publication of which may violate the requirements of Article 6 of the present Law.

Article 29 Journalist's accreditation

According to preliminary agreement media is able to accredit its journalist attached to state or public organizations. The accredited journalist has the right to participate in the work of those organizations and elucidate it. Journalists of other countries are accredited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, which may cancel the accreditation of any foreign journalist if he violates the Constitution or Laws of the Republic of Armenia.

Chapter 5 Responsibility for violating the Law of Media.

Article 30 Bases of Responsibility

The activity of non-registered mrdia,misuse of speech liberty, publication of information, not corresponding to the reality, abusing person's honour and dignity and violating the rights and legal interests of citizens and organizations are responsible in accordance with Law.

Article 31 Cases of Release from Responsibility

Media publishers are not responsible for the published information, if it does not correspond to the reality, if the information:

1 is contained in official documents and in the reports of State Power bodies, Government, right protecting bodies, public, social, political organizations.

2 is a word for word reproduction of public statements and not a misrepresented one.

3 is received from other media or information agencies of State and public bodies.

Chapter 6 Collaboration of Press and Media on International Scene

Article 32 International agreements

Media, organizations,journalists have the right to sign contracts with foreign informational organizations and citizens.

If there are other rules established by international agreements signed at the participation of the Republic of rmenia different from mentioned in the present Law, then the norms of international agreements act.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia — L.Ter-Petrossian

Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia — A.Sahakian

8 October 1991
Yerevan

Briefing

from the

Documentary Information Section

Armenian elections

22 June 1995

Source : FT Profile

Enquiries to : Tim Lisney 25.73

Economist Intelligence Unit

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4	FT 07 Jun 95	Survey of Armenia (6): Hard line on diaspora groups - The president is taking a tough stance in the race for power
5	GDN 19 Apr 95	The authoritarian route to democracy: Rights have been trampled and cracks are beginning to show in Armenia's facade of stability (1044)

1 EG1 24 Apr 95 Business Eastern Europe: ARMENIA: Business oulook in Armenia: Down and out but headed up (927)

* Economy hits bottom, rebounds * Stabilisation wins IMF support * New privatisation offensive * Persistent regional instability

Macroeconomic orthodoxy is showing results but Armenia remains crippled by war. Recovery depends on foreign aid and reliable energy supplies

Western sales are marginal at dollars 150m. The onset of recovery, however welcome, will bring at best a minimal increase in OECD imports, largely in the form of inputs needed to restore energy production and rebuild infrastructure. Total imports amounted to only dollars 381m last year, with just over dollars 200m originating outside the former Soviet Union. Total exports were only dollars 209m.

The trade blockade imposed by Azerbaijan (and, to a lesser extent, Turkey) in the conflict over Nagorniy-Karabakh has devastated the economy, which in Soviet times was highly import- dependent. Ethnic warfare in Georgia has jeopardised the country's alternate supply route; explosions have severed gas supplies. Lingering effects of the 1988 earthquake are also felt (75,000 residents still live in temporary housing).

Industry has collapsed; agriculture's share in economic output rose from 15% in 1989 to 55% in 1993. Living standards are depressed. Monthly wages in Yerevan amount to about dollars 10. An estimated 80% of household incomes is spent on food. Unrecorded private-sector trade and support from the Armenian diaspora cushion the impact somewhat, but daily life is grim. The capital gets two hours of electricity per day; there is no central heating. Small wonder that some 800,000 Armenians have emigrated (the population is currently 3.5 million).

Armenia was the only (non-Baltic) former Soviet republic to show growth in 1995, estimated by the EIU at 1%. Such statistical success is cold comfort, however, as Armenia's GDP had previously taken the steepest plunge of all the countries in the region, plummeting by over 60% in 1992 and 1993.

The government's adoption in mid-1994 of a tough stabilisation package should bring sturdier growth this year. GDP is expected to rise by as much as 5%, although, as in Albania, growth is measured from an exceedingly low starting point. Virtually all prices were freed in December, leaving bread, rents, heating and public transport as the only subsidised exceptions. Real interest rates have been highly positive since last June.

As a result inflation has dropped sharply from the average of 50% recorded in the first months of 1994. The monthly average amounted to 26.3% last year. The government has pledged to bring the monthly rate down to 1% by end-1995. The January result was a surprisingly modest 3.9%. Such successes enabled the central bank to cut the refinancing rate from 210% to 120% in February, and again to 90% in March of this year.

The plunge of the national currency, the Dram (which was introduced in November 1993), has also slowed. After falling from Dram77:dollars 1 at end-1993 to Dram421:dollars 1 in November 1994, the Dram has held steady at around Dram400:dollars 1 since the beginning of this year.

Keeping the budget deficit under control will require further heroic spending cuts. The deficit amounted to an astounding 56% of GDP in 1993; last year's figure was 24%. The government has pledged to limit the deficit to 12% this year, but achieving this goal will require further sacrifice from a population already sorely tested by austerity.

Foreign funding is the only way to bridge the gap. The government's stabilisation measures won high praise from the IMF and a first systemic transformation facility of dollars 25m last December. The World Bank's International Development Association granted a dollars 62m loan in February and another dollars 20m grant to fund social welfare programmes is pending. The European Union has provided substantial humanitarian aid.

Restoring energy supplies is a national priority. The EBRD has lent dollars 57m to rehabilitate the Hrasdan power plant (as well as dollars 23m for a new cargo terminal at Yerevan airport). Russia is providing credits for work on the Chernobyl- type Medzamor nuclear power plant, which was shut down after the 1988 earthquake. The plant's return to service could increase electricity supplies by 40%, and the need to revive industry and boost public moods will prevail over safety concerns voiced by neighbouring Turkey.

Privatisation is more advanced in agriculture than industry. According to government figures, 63% of cultivated land, 80% of orchards and 91% of vineyards are now in private hands. A new offensive is planned for 1995 to complete the sale of small firms and dispose of 1,000 larger companies, including the YerAZ car plant. Outsider participation is welcome but unlikely. Despite a favourable legal framework, foreign investment is negligible.

This will remain the case until the conflict with Azerbaijan is resolved and dependable ties with the outside world are restored. The Russian- brokered ceasefire has held since last May, but peace talks look likely to remain stalled for some time. A clampdown on the opposition at home has prompted charges that President Levon Ter-Petrosian is erecting a police state, and political conflict has blocked the adoption of a new constitution and an electoral law for Armenia's first post-independence elections. Unsettled politics add to the impression of instability which keeps outsiders at a safe distance.

Facts and forecasts

	1993	1994(a)	1995(b)	
Real GDP growth (%)		-15	1	5
Average annual inflation (%)		3,732	5,000	n/a
Trade balance (with non-FSU countries, $ m)		-197	-179	n/a

(a) Estimates; (b) IMF forecast.

Source: EBRD, IMF, EIU.

Business Eastern Europe 24 April 1995
Country: ARMENIA.

Economist Intelligence Unit

2 EG2 01 Mar 95 Country Profiles: ARMENIA: Political Background: The move to independence (120)

The conflict over Nagorniy Karabakh created a growing disillusionment with the Soviet structure. Elections to the Armenian Supreme Council in May 1990 gave the biggest share of votes to the non-communist Armenian Pan- National Movement (ANM), whose leader, Levon Ter-Petrossian, became speaker of the parliament and then president. Armenia refused to take part in negotiations on the All-Union Treaty, and in a referendum on September 21, 1991, more than 99% of voters opted for independence. This was formally declared on September 23, 1991. Presidential elections the following month returned Mr Ter-Petrossian for a five-year term.

Country Profiles 01 March 1995
Country: ARMENIA.

Economist Intelligence Unit

3 EG2 01 Mar 95 Country Profiles: ARMENIA: Political Background: Constitution and political forces (455)

The amended 1977 constitution gives Mr Ter-Petrossian the useful prerogative of being able to appoint his own prime minister. In July 1992 his first prime minister and possible future presidential candidate, Vazgen Manukian, resigned and was replaced by Khosrov Harutunian who, in his turn resigned in February 1993 in protest at the government's programme of radical economic reform. He was replaced by Hrant Bagratian who was, in many ways, the architect of those very reforms.

The ANM has managed to maintain its control over the legislature and, despite frequent deadlock because of lack of a quorum, has been able to force through the bulk of its legislative programme. The main threat to the ANM comes from the opposition parties who are best able to mobilise popular unrest outside parliament. They include the Armenian Movement for National Self-Determination, led by Paruir Hairikian, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or Dashnaks, a socialist party with a nationalist orientation very strong in the powerful Armenian diaspora. These groups were able to organise enormous demonstrations against the government in Yerevan during the hard winter of 1992-93. They also stand for a more assertive policy in relation to Nagorniy Karabakh (many of the fighters in the war are associated with the Dashnaks), opposing Mr Ter-Petrossian's policy of refusing to recognise the independence of the Nagorniy Karabakh Republic.

In December 1994 the president, Mr Ter-Petrossian, issued a temporary ban on the Dashnak party, alleging it had been involved in drug running, extortion and political assassination. Several Dashnak party members were due to face trial in spring 1995 on charges that have yet to be specified. The suspension, which heaped international condemnation upon Yereban, followed an almost complete breakdown in relations between the government and its opponents within parliament. Dozens of deputies had already walked out in protest at what they described as presidential attempts to deprive parliament of its proper role in the running of the country.

The most fundamental disagreement concerns the draft for a new constitution, which was first discussed by parliament in October 1993 and which was to have been put to a nationwide referendum in 1994. Not surprisingly, Mr Ter-Petrossian is proposing a variant which would grant the president strong powers while the opposition want a stronger parliament. A constitutional committee has been charged with finding some common ground between the two variants. But even the question of how the new constitution should be decided is still subject to debate. It is now unlikely that the issue will be decided before election for Armenia's first post-independence parliament, due to be held in mid-1995.

Country Profiles 01 March 1995
Country: ARMENIA.

Economist Intelligence Unit

1 SWB 19 Jun 95 Armenian Opposition Rallies Ahead of Elections (416)

Source: ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in English 1238 gmt 15 Jun 95
Text of report by ITAR-TASS news agency
Yerevan, 15th June, ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan: Armenia's 10 opposition political parties today announced that they would act in concert ahead of the forthcoming parliamentary elections and referendum on constitution scheduled for 5th July.
The opposition parties have formed a coordinating council with former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan, who is now chairman of the board of the National-Democratic Union of Armenia and one of the opposition leaders, at the head.
The party leaders told a joint press conference here that the republic was unable to hold fair democratic elections. For this reason, they called for postponing elections to enable all political forces to take an equal part in the election campaign.
Democratic Party chairman Aram Sargsyan said that after 'the central commission for elections to the National Assembly of Armenia refuse to register certain political parties and individual politicians, it became obvious that a new situation was arising in the republic and the power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of a narrow group of people headed by President Levon Ter-Petrosyan.'
According to Sargsyan, the state-run propaganda was brainwashing the people by presenting only one viewpoint in favour of the constitution and indirectly agitating in favour of the candidates close to the power-to-be.
The leadership of Armenia is deliberately working to weaken the opposition, he said.
According to former Premier Vazgen Manukyan, it was important to have hundreds of thousands of people express their desire for fair democratic elections. This alone will make possible a revision of the Central Electoral Commission's decision, he said.
Manukyan admitted that a question about nominating the same candidates by all opposition parties had not been discussed.
Leader of the party Dashnaktsutyun, Vagan Oganesyan (as received), declared that 'the people's hatred of the government is very great' . He insisted that the authorities had crossed the watershed when they removed the opposition not only from participation in the elections but also from supervision of voting.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia Gagik Tatevosyan (as received) declared that his party had joined the opposition coordinating council as an associate member. The communists also favour fair elections and reject the proposed constitution.
Representatives of the ten parties were unanimous in rejecting the draft constitution to be submitted to a plebescite on 5th July concomitantly with the parliamentary elections.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

2 SWB 14 Jun 95 Armenian Political Bloc Leader Attacks US Influence on Government (150)

Source: Snark news agency, Yerevan, in English 1418 gmt 12 Jun 95
Text of report by Snark news agency
Yerevan, 12th June: 'Armenia is governed by the US ambassador, whose actions are slightly corrected by the Russian ambassador,' Igor Muradyan, the leader of West-Armenian club 'Zharang' (Heritage), announced today (12th June) at a press conference organized by the ' Azgayin Dashink-Dashnaktsutyun' pre-election bloc.
The leaders regarded the rejection of the Central Election Committee to register their bloc as illegal (as received) and said this was actually a ban of ideology. Armenia may either exist as a nationalist republic, or not to exist at all, stated Muradyan. A liberal-totalitarian regime is set up in the republic, he said, assisted by the so-called 'influence agents'. The regime is taking Armenia along the road of colonial development, stated the bloc leaders.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

3 SWB 12 Jun 95 Armenian Politician 'Illegally' Barred From Elections (131)

Source: Snark news agency, Yerevan, in English 1258 gmt 10 Jun 95
Text of report by Snark news agency
Yerevan, 10th June: Leader of National Self-Determination Christian Union Paruyr Ayrikyan announced today during a rally that former Chief Adviser of Armenian President on National Security Issues, Ashot Manucharyan, had been illegally turned out from struggle to be in parliament.
According to him, while checking signature lists for Manucharyan, members of Central Election Committee were making people to renounce their signatures. Ayrikyan explained these actions with the fact that present government is afraid to lose elections in the district where Manucharyan is put to the vote. He added that Manucharyan had deliberately proposed his candidature against that of Supreme Council Chairman Babken Ararktsyan.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

4 TAS 12 Jun 95 Armenia's Supreme Patriarch To Visit Moscow (406)

By OLGA KOSTROMINA
MOSCOW

Garegin the frst, the supreme patriarch and catholicos of all Armenians, arrives in Moscow on Monday afternnon. This will be the first official visit by the head of the Armenian apostolic church since his election to the see.

It has become known to the Itar-Tass correspondent that the principal aim of the four-day stay of the catholicos in Moscow is to participate in a joint meeting of the spiritual leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. A peaceful settlement of the inter-ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is expected to be considered during the meeting which has been arranged on the initiative and with the mediation of patriarch alexy II of Moscow and all Russia.

The programme for the visit also includes talks with patriarch alexy II and a delegation of the Russian orthodox church to discuss common church problems. The distinguishing guest will lay wreaths at the unknown soldier's tomb and is to give a press conference at the embassy of Armenia on June 15 on the eve of his departure by air for Yerevan.

Catholicos garegin I (nshan sarkisyan in the world) was born on August 27, 1932, in Syria. After studying in a theological seminary he took the monastic vows and was ordained in 1952. He received a higher theological education at oxford university. He authors many literary and theological works.

In 1964 garegin was ordained bishop and nine years later archbishop. The places of his ministry were the Iranian-Indian diocese, the eastern diocese in the United States as well as Syria. In 1983 he was elected the catholicos of cilicia. On April 4, 1995, he became the 131st supreme patriarch and catholicos of all Armenians to head the Armenian apostolic church both in Armenia and abroad.

This is one of the most ancient eastern christian churches: it came into being in the 4th century and has retained its spiritual distinctiveness up to this date. In its creed the Armenian church bases itself on the holy scriptures, the holy legend. And resolutions of the first three ecumenical councils. It belongs to the family of the ancient eastern (oriental) churches which is the closest to orthodoxy and which also includes the coptic, Syrian, malabar, and Ethiopian churches.

About 2.5 million Armenians now live outside Armenia. Their spiritual leaders are the Armenian catholicos of cilicia (Syria), the catholicos of Jerusalem (Israel), and the catholicos of constantinople (Turkey).

ITAR - TASS

5 SWB 10 Jun 95 Armenian President Expresses Optimism at 'Republica' Session (220)

Source: Snark news agency, Yerevan, in English 1524 gmt 8 Jun 95
Text of report by Snark news agency
Yerevan, 8th June: At today's session held by the 'Republica' (Republic) bloc, President Levon Ter Petrosyan stated that no adventurer like Gamsakhurdia or Elchibey comes into power in Armenia. According to him, the ruling Armenian National Movement (ANM) has the right to the people's confidence before the elections to the National Assembly because of services to the country within the last five years. It was (to) the ANM's merit that Armenia had escaped chaos during the collapse of the USSR, but only future generations are able to evaluate (the) ANM's five-year activities.
The president appreciated the 'Republica' pre-election programme saying that, as before, they do not promise the people miracles, but they guarantee positive moves in future. Armenian statehood is not strong enough, and therefore the country needs its present leaders.
The draft constitution is an approved document based on laws which have helped restructure the Armenian society within the past three and half years. The president said he is sure about (the) positive results of the constitution referendum on 5th July and, to his opinion, 80 per cent of the session's participants will be elected to the future National Assembly.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

8 RTN 18 May 95 ARMENIA: GOVERNMENT LIST. (313)

ARMENIA GOVERNMENT LIST (950518)

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* 5 Jul 95 - General election and referendum on a new *
* constitution. *

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- - - - - -

President .....Levon TER-PETROSYAN
Vice-President .....Gagik ARUTYUNYAN

- - - - - - -

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Prime Minister (Apptd 12 Feb 93) .....Grant BAGRATYAN
Deputy Prime Minister .....Vigen CHITECHYAN
State Ministers (on defence) .....Vazgen SARKISYAN
(energy and construction) ..Gagik MARTIROSYAN
(on agriculture) .....Gagik SHAKHBAZYAN
(culture education) .....Armenak KAZARYAN
(huminitarian relief) .....Rafael BAGOYAN

- - - - - - -

MINISTERS:
Agriculture .....Ashot VOSKANYAN
Communications .....Grigor POKHPAZYAN
Construction .....Felix PIRONYAN
Culture .....Akop MOVSES
Defence (Acting) .....Mikhail ARUTYUNYAN
Economy .....Armen YEGIAZARYAN
Education (Acting) .....Ashot BLEYAN
Energy & Fuel .....Miron SHISHMANYAN
Environment (Acting) .....Suren AVETISYAN
Finance .....Levon BARKHUDARYAN
Food & Procurement .....David ZADOYAN
Foreign Affairs .....Vaan PAPAZYAN
Health Care .....Ara BABLOYAN
Higher Education & Science .....Vardkes GNUNI
Industry .....Ashot SAFARYAN
Interior .....Vanik SIRADEGYAN
Justice .....Vage STEPANYAN
Labour & Social Welfare .....Ashot YESAYAN
Light Industry .....Rudolf TEIMURYAZAN
Material Resources .....Vagan MYELKONYAN
Trade .....Levon Manuki KHACHATURYAN
Transport .....Genrik KOCHINYAN

- - - - - - -

STATE DEPARTMENTS:
Architecture & Urban building .....Romeo DZHULAKYAN
Emergencies .....Stepan BADALYAN
National Resources .....Lazar SARKISYAN
National Security .....Serzhik SARKISYAN
Refugees .....Vladimir MOVSESYAN
Statistics .....Levon DAVTYAN
Special Programmes .....Leonard PEROSYAN
Radio & Television .....Tigran AKOPYAN
Acting Tax Inspection chief .....Pavel SAKHARYAN

- - - - - - -

Speaker of Parliament .....Babken ARARTSKYAN

Chairman of the Supreme Court .....Tariel BARSEGYAN
General Prosecutor .....Artavaz GEVORKYAN
Chairman of the Central Bank .....Bagrat ASATRYAN

- - - - - - -

NOTE: Any comments/queries on the content of this government list, please contact the Reuter Editorial Reference Unit, London, on (171) 542 7968.

(End Government List)

(c) Reuters Limited 1995

Source: REUTGL Reuter News - Government Lists
LBA
Countries: ARMEN Armenia.
Categories: G12 Internal Politics.

Reuter News

9 RTN 12 May 95 ARMENIA: Armenia calls referendum on constitution. (118)

YEREVAN
) - The Armenian parliament approved a draft for a new constitution on Friday and said the people would rule on it in a national referendum on July 5.
Parliamentary elections have already been fixed for the same date.
It was not immediately clear what changes were envisaged in the new constitutional draft.
Itar-Tass news agency quoted the political opposition in the Transcaucasus country as accusing the Armenian leadership of seeking to strengthen presidential power at the expense of parliament.
(c) Reuters Limited 1995

Source: REUTEE Reuter News - USSR & Eastern Europe
LBA
Countries: ARMEN Armenia.
Categories: G12 Internal Politics.

Reuter News

10 TAS 12 May 95 Armenia To Combine Constitutional Referendum With Elections (84)

By TIGRAN LILOYAN
YEREVAN
The Armenian parliament on Friday approved a draft constitution and decided to hold a referendum on it alongside with legislative elections scheduled for June 4.
The draft was approved after heated debates as opposition accused its architects of a desire to strengthen presidential powers by narrowing those of the parliament.
The Armenian parliament is the only national legislature of all former Soviet republics that has survived its 5-year term in full.
ITAR - TASS

11 SWB 08 May 95 Armenian Parliament Discusses New Constitution (341)

Source: ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in English 1352 gmt 5 May 95
Text of report by ITAR-TASS news agency
Yerevan, 5th May: A new draft constitution of Armenia is the centre of debate at an extraordinary session of the Armenian parliament. The attendance of the session is almost full, an event of note in the parliament's recent activities. The parliamentary lobby says the diligent attendance is explainable by the parliament's decision to ha ve the debate televised. With the parliamentary election ahead on 5th June, parliamentarians want more television appearances.
With the importance of the agenda is mind, the parliament decided to put aside the rules of order and let everyone ample time to speak up, ITAR-TASS was told by the first deputy chairman of the parliament, Ara Saakyan.
The opposition insists on scrutiny of its alternatives to the draft constitution. 'It is an attempt to impose on our people an anticonstitutional version of the constitution and we will fight to have the passing of it hindered,' said Grant Khachatryan, chairman of an opposition alliance.
Controversy between ruling forces and the opposition revolves around presidential powers and the makeup of self-rule. The opposition insists on broad powers for the legislature, to make Armenia a parliamentary republic. The opposition rejects a prospect of strengthening of presidential power and describe the presidency as a monarchy.
According to Vladimir Nazaryan, a member of the parliamentary constitution commission, the constitution draft generated by the commission is a compromise version as it takes account of many constructive proposals of the opposition. Paradoxically, Nazarayn, a scientist and former prosecutor in Soviet-era Armenia, is an author of both the currently debated constitution and the opposition's versions of it.
A new administrative and territorial division of Armenia laid down by the draft constitution is a subject of harsh controversy. The draft projects enlargement of Armeia's districts to regions, whose administrators are to be appointed by Armenian president. The districts are to be called communities and governed by elected authorities.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

13 SWB 03 May 95 Armenia: Two Party Blocs Formed to Contest Armenian Parliamentary Elections (182)

Source: Snark news agency, Yerevan, in English 1134 gmt 1 May 95
Text of report by Snark news agency
Yerevan, 1st May: Snark was informed by the Central Electoral Committee that two party blocs, 10 public and political organizations as well as 10 other parties have applied to participate in the parliamentary elections of Armenia.
The Republican Party, Christian-Democratic Party (Christian Democratic Union), Social Democratic Party, Intellectual Armenia Union (possibly Council of Armenian Intellectuals), as well as Democratic-Liberal Party (Liberal Democratic Party) joined the ' Republic' bloc, formed within the ruling Armenian National Movement Party (Armenian Pan-National Movement).
The main opposition bloc, 'National Consent' , is led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun and includes the Constitution Right Union (as received), Armenian Intellectuals'Union (Union of Armenian Intellectuals), Artsakh-Armenia public and political organization and 'Zharang' (Heir) West Armenian Club (as received).
The Communist Party, National Democratic Union as well as 'Rumgavar Azatakan' (Democratic Liberal) Party (Ramkavar-Azatakan branch of Liberal Democratic Party) will struggle alone to be elected to the parliament.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

14 SWB 02 May 95 Armenia: Supreme Council Presidium Accuses President of Undemocratic Behaviour (191)

Source: Snark news agency, Yerevan, in English 1429 gmt 29 Apr 95
Text of report by Snark news agency
Yerevan, 29th April: The Armenian Supreme Council Presidium's 10 members held today a press conference to discuss the results of their yesterday's session. The 10 members, who represented various opposition parties and parliamentary factions, made a joint declaration to condemn the ruling party's policy before discussing the draft constitution of Armenia. They stated that the draft constitution disregards democratic principles and grants the Armenian president unlimited power.
The 10 members stressed that Armenian authorities are increasing the pressure on mass media, particularly on 'Golos Armenii' (Armenia's Voice) opposition newspaper in Russian and 'Freedom' American radio station. According to them, Armenian authorities are trying to monopolize information with the help of pro-governmental mass media, including TV.
The 10 members said the Central Election Commission on Forming Electoral Districts is creating the most favourable conditions for the ruling party's candidates. However, the situation in Armenia and the people's negative attitude towards the ruling party 's candidates are serious obstacles for their election.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

16 SWB 24 Apr 95 Armenia: Banned Party Plans to Take Part in Elections (169)

Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1058 gmt 18 Apr 95
Excerpt from report by Interfax news agency
Yerevan, 18th April: Members of the opposition Dashnaktsutyun party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), outlawed by the government until the middle of this summer, plan to take part in general elections scheduled for 5th July. Party representatives will run both on party tickets and in single-mandate constituencies, one party leader Khrayr Karapetyan told Interfax on Monday (17th April). Armenia's new parliament, National Assembly, provides for 40 seats to be contested on party lists and 150 others in single-mandate constituencies. Karapetyan said that several parties offered Dashnak leaders to run on their tickets but he refused to identify them until 20th April, the last day the Central Electoral Commission registers party candidates. He believes it is a possibility that the authorities could put 20 party members on trial on 'unsubstantiated charges' in order to discredit Dashnaktsutyun before the July polls. ..

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

18 TAS 11 Apr 95 Armenia Prepares For Parliamentary Elections (56)
By TIGRAN LILOYAN

YEREVAN
According to preliminary information, 2,365,000 people will take part in the parliamentary elections in Armenia, scheduled for July 5, said chairman of the central electoral commission robert amiryan.
The republican parliament will be called the national assembly and will be made up of 190 deputies.

ITAR - TASS

22 SWB 05 Apr 95 Armenia: Parliament Adopts Law on Election of Deputies at Second Reading (214)

Source: Armenian Radio, Yerevan, in Armenian 1900 gmt 31 Mar 95
Excerpts from report by Armenian radio
In keeping with its own decision, the Supreme Council held an extraordinary session today (31st March). The Supreme Council press service reported that First Deputy Chairman of Parliament Ara Sahakyan, who was chairing the meeting, read out the extraordinary session's agenda, which included the second reading of the bill on the election of the deputies to the National Assembly, and matters relating to it.
Next, Kim Balayan, chairman of the Supreme Council Legal Affairs Commission (Standing Commission on Legal Issues), took up the issue of introducing amendments and addenda to the republic's criminal code in connection with the bill on the election of deputies to the National Assembly ..
After a prolonged and comprehensive debate, the Supreme Council adopted at the second reading the bill on election of deputies to the National Assembly of the Armenian republic.
The long-awaited law was thus adopted by the parliament in its entirety. It will be submitted for the president's signature. This important document in effect creates the opportunity to hold the next parliamentary elections in Armenia in line with qualitatively new principles and new laws. ..

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

29 SWB 01 Apr 95 Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Nagornyy Karabakh Prepares to Elect New Parliament (256)

Source: 'Vremya', Yerevan in Russian 25 Mar 95
Preparations for the election of new deputies to the Nagornyy Karabakh Supreme Council have started with the formation of electoral commissions and the nomination of candidates already under way, the Yerevan newspaper 'Vremya' reported on 25th March, quoting a report by the Noyan Tapan news agency.
The Supreme Council adopted a decree on holding elections on 14th February. There are to be 33 seats in the new parliament and the nominations close on 10th April, the report said. The elections are due to be held on 30th April.
The chairman of Nagornyy Karabakh's Central Electoral Commission, who was identified as Musheg Ohandzhanyan, said that the new parliament would be 'permanent and professional' . He also said that according to the terms of the new law on elections 'the president of the Nagornyy Karabakh Republic, the chairman of the government and his deputies, and members of the government and their deputies, justices, prosecutors and arbiters may not simultaneously be members of parliament' .
Ohandzhanyan said he hoped the new parliament would not repeat 'the crude mistake of the last parliament when among the 75 deputies there was not a single woman' , the newspaper said.
'We must show that the people of Karabakh are so confident of their future and the victory of their just cause that they can even under martial law find the time to hold elections to a new permanent parliament' , he said.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

30 SWB 31 Mar 95 Armenia: Dashknaktsutyun Party Holds Rally in Yerevan (236)

Source: SNARK news agency, Yerevan, in English 1531 gmt 24 Mar 95
Text of report by SNARK news agency
Yerevan, 24th March: Nearly 10,000 people came today (24th March) to a mass meeting organized today by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun (ARFD) in order to inform the population of situation both inside the party and round it. Suspension of ARFD activity for six months by presidential decree, backed up later by the Supreme Court, was intended not only to cut the ground from under the most influential oppositional force on the eve of parliamentary elections in July, said orators. This was also another curtsy towards the neighbouring Turkey with whom the present Armenian authorities are very much interested to establish better relations.
At the same time, the ARFD party members greeted the signing of agreement by presidents Yeltsin and Ter-Petrosiyan on deployment of Russian military base on Armenian territory, noting the agreement could have been signed earlier.
Concerning the situation in the party itself, Dashnaktsutyun leaders stated that no dissidence in its ranks anticipated by authorities took place, and that party continues functioning despite persecutions . Armenia should have authorities in power who base their policy on national ideology, emphasized the ARFD leaders assuring the audience that Dashnaktsutyun would make everything possible to be in the first ranks of those who defend the interests of nation.

BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts

31 RTN 28 Mar 95 ARMENIA: ARMENIA PARLIAMENT, CONSTITUTION POLL SET IN JULY.

(161)

YEREVAN
) - Armenia is to hold a general election to replace a Soviet-era parliament and stage a referendum on a new constitution on July 5, deputies decided on Monday.
Deputies to the renamed National Assembly will be elected for a four-year term. The seats are to be divided between 150 deputies elected on a first past the post basis and 40 elected on a proportional system.
Armenia has recently achieved a measure of economic stability more than three years after the Soviet Union broke up.
But the tiny republic of three million has been in a virtual state of war with Azerbaijan since 1988, when the mainly-Armenian populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence.
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan faces re-election in 1996.
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Source: REUTEE Reuter News - USSR & Eastern Europe
LBA
Countries: ARMEN Armenia.
Categories: G12 Internal Politics.

Reuter News

1 ECN 17 Jun 95 An unusual Armenian vote-winner / Armenia resumes nuclear power (316)

YEREVAN

SIX years ago, most Armenians cheered when their government shut down an ageing nuclear power plant that had come horribly close to catastrophe in an earthquake. Today, in a curious twist, the government is about to reopen the plant. One odd reason is that next month Armenia has a general election: switching on the plant could, astonishingly, prove a vote-winner.

'To be honest, it scares me to death,' says a pensioner, peering through her net curtain at the rusting hulk of the Medzamor Station, some 30km (20 miles) outside Yerevan, Armenia's capital. 'But what can we do? We've all had enough of living in the dark.' And dark it has been these past few years. Cold too. Enough to make even the most fervent environmentalist feel a touch nostalgic.

The trouble is that Armenia has no other source of power. The country's two biggest neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey, cut off all energy long ago, in retaliation for Armenia's so far successful military struggle for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The effect has been dramatic. Once, Armenia was an electricity exporter, thanks to huge oil imports from the rest of the Soviet Union. Now, with no natural resources of its own, it cannot even keep the traffic lights on. For a while, patriotism made Armenians - preoccupied with the war - patient. They hoped neighbouring Iran might save the day with a new gas pipeline from the south. The war has been on hold for more than a year now, but western banks show scant enthusiasm for financing the Dollars 40m-plus Iranian deal. So, in a struggle for the Armenian mind between safety on the one hand and bright lights and warm nights on the other, the gamblers appear to have won. And the voters are expected to approve the gamble.

The Economist
Volume 335. Issue 7919.

2 IND 12 Jun 95 Where true democracy is the first casualty: In ex-Soviet Armenia the ballot box is no guarantee that dissent will not be labelled terrorism (935)

By ANDREW HIGGINS

Bagrat Sadoyan suspected something sinister - the electricity was working. It was a welcome but, on this occasion, ominous sign.

The President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was going on television with an important announcement and, in a country forced to live mostly by candlelight, he wanted to ensure an audience wider than just the few homes and embassies equipped with emergency generators.

Late that same night the police arrived at Mr Sadoyan's Hailour news agency. They had no search warrant but carted away six computers, two fax machines, two copiers, two television sets, a paraffin-powered generator and documents. They also took away Mr Sadoyan.

Today, five months later and less than a month away from elections and a referendum on a new constitution, the metal door of the news service's basement office is chained shut. The premises - along with those of about a dozen newspapers and news organisations affiliated to a leading opposition party - are occupied night and day by police.

Mr Sadoyan is out of jail but also out of work, as are 50 of his staff: 'The closer we get to elections, the less democratic Armenia becomes.'

The same paradox defines politics across much of the former Soviet Union, where the 15 states that emerged from the ruins of Communism in 1991 all declare themselves democracies and periodically invite citizens to the ballot box, but often seem to be sliding in the opposite direction.

President Ter-Petrossian, an Orientalist scholar and veteran dissident, is one of the few post-Soviet leaders untainted by past service in the Communist Party apparat. His credentials, however, merely highlight the difficulty of translating democratic intentions into reality.

What he had to say on television last December came as an even bigger shock than the bonus supply of electricity. He denounced political foes as agents of a criminal conspiracy, alleged a network of terrorism and drug-running, and suspended a leading opposition party known as Dashnak.

'He has let a genie out of the bottle and it is vary hard to get it back in,' said Vazgen Manoukian, the President's former prime minister and friend. 'I'm not saying this is already a totalitarian state but I'm no longer sure this government is moving towards democracy.'

Such fear fits a pattern of steady drift towards public disillusionment and authoritarian rule in much of the former Soviet Union. Only the three Baltic states have entirely resisted the temptation to see politics as a choice between strong-arm tactics and turmoil. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan are all ruled by former Communist Party potentates of one sort or another. The rest, including Russia, have moved further but still feel the tug of old instincts.

Armenia, with a well-educated and homogeneous population (only 3 per cent of its 3.7 million people belong to other ethnic groups), was initially seen as one of the best chances for democracy - a promise reflected in its status as the second highest per capita recipient of US foreign aid.

Despite its economic misery and the brutality of a war with Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh, Armenia projected an image of relative stability and tolerance. It avoided the coups that troubled the rest of the Caucasus, the personality cults of Central Asia and the grim spectacle of tanks shelling parliament as in Moscow.

With more Armenians living abroad than in Armenia, a million of them in the US, a huge, well-heeled diaspora promised not only money and moral support but also a link with non-Soviet political traditions. The diaspora connection, however, lies at the root of what critics see as a lurch towards intolerance.

The Dashnak party suspended by Mr Ter-Petrossian is the modern-day incarnation of an organisation set up in 1890 in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, to press for what was then the distant dream of an independent Armenia. Consumed by horrific memories of past persecution, particularly the Turkish 'genocide' of 1915, Dashnak is run by a secretive 14-member bureau based overseas.

In a speech to parliament last month explaining his crackdown, the President mocked Dashnak as a '105-year-old senile old man' that 'is not a political party, but rather a terrorist, fascist organisation'.

Some two dozen of its members have been arrested. The authorities have compiled 18 thick volumes of evidence for a trial which they say will prove links between Dashnak and a supposed clandestine terrorist group called DRO. A date for the trial, however, has yet to be fixed.

'We want a strong state. Power must be strong to ensure the transition to market relations and democratic state,' said Ara Sahakian, vice-chairman of the Armenian parliament and a loyal supporter of the governing Armenian National Party. The US has expressed mild concern about press restrictions but diplomats in Yerevan seem keen to give Mr Ter-Petrossian the benefit of the doubt, at least until the trial of the alleged terrorists.

A dangerous precedent has been set, though. 'If there are terrorists let them go on trial, but why suspend the whole party?' said Samual Sahinian, a member of parliament and head of the small Liberal National Conservative Party.

'Tomorrow they might say that I'm the head of a fascist organisation. Without any proof they can close me down. What can I do? Nothing. That is the end of democracy. We are all sick with the Communist bacillus. We were all raised in this system. It is very difficult to live in a different way.'

INTERNATIONAL 12

The Independent

3 FT 07 Jun 95 Survey of Armenia (1): Economic reforms prompt hopes of renaissance - For centuries, Armenians have endured tyranny and deprivation. Government policy could reward their stoicism but only if married to a commitment to democracy (2067)

By CHRYSTIA FREELAND

Fate has been unkind to the Armenian people. Since the fifth century, their country has been almost constantly subject to foreign domination. And, in 1915, they were the victims of genocide when Ottoman Turkey massacred an estimated one million of its Armenian inhabitants. Even the natural world has been hostile: the earthquake of 1988 devastated the country, killing 25,000 people and causing millions of dollars worth of damage.

Over the past four years, while the entire former Soviet Union has been struggling to cope with the economic and political legacy of communism, Armenia has laboured under a double burden. In addition to the massive problems of the post-communist transition, it has endured an economic blockade from Azerbaijan and Turkey which has led to an energy crisis so acute that electricity is available in most homes for only one or two hours a day.

But Armenia's long history of adversity has proven to be a useful preparation for its current difficulties. Ordinary Armenians have adapted to the severe energy shortage with remarkable cunning, rigging up small power generators in their homes and even running television sets off automobile batteries.

Necessity is the mother of invention, but the cheerful ingenuity with which Armenians have coped with one of the most severe economic crises in the former Soviet Union is also animated by the deep-seated sense of national identity they have nursed through 15 centuries of foreign rule. From the long-range historical perspective that comes naturally to most Armenians, their economically devastated and isolated country is actually in the midst of one of the most promising opportunities for a national renaissance that it has experienced in more than a millennium.

For the first time in centuries, Armenians control their own, sovereign state, albeit one which, in the eye of the Armenian nationalist, occupies only a fraction of the true national homeland. Moreover, Armenians, who, since the fifth century, have tended to be on the losing side of territorial wars with their neighbours, have managed to wrest Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous enclave within Azerbaijan, from the control of their ancient enemies, the ethnically Turkic Azeris.

The Armenian government scrupulously disavows any desire to incorporate Karabakh into greater Armenia. But the fact that the territory is now controlled by its Armenian residents, rather than Baku, is felt to be Armenia's great national achievement of the past four years, and one for which most Armenians are cheerfully willing to endure far more than electricity blackouts.

Slowly, this Armenian stoicism for the sake of national survival is being rewarded. The brightest star on the horizon is the economy. The lack of electricity and hot water sometimes obscures the unexpected fact that, in many respects, Armenia is one of the models of post-communist economic reform in the former Soviet Union.

As Armenian officials explain, the economic blockade has acted as an unlikely catalyst for reforms, forcing Yerevan to adopt radical economic measures that more prosperous former Soviet republics could afford to delay.

As Mr Bagrat Asatrian, the chairman of Armenia's Central Bank, explains: 'Maybe the fact that we have no natural resources is our salvation. We joke that if an oil well were to be discovered we would have to cover it up quickly. Our people today understand that, in the conditions which God has given us, our republic's only way to survive is through liberal economic policies.'

In Armenia, the energy blockade exacerbated the sharp decline in output experienced by all of the former Soviet republics following the collapse of communism. GDP fell by 52 per cent in 1992 and dropped another 15 per cent in 1993. But last year it grew by 3 per cent and government officials expect it to increase by at least 5 per cent this year.

Sceptics point to the fact that Armenia's robust new economic indicators are a statistical fluke born of the country's depressed starting point. But the gentle upturn in the economy is also the result of the radical economic reforms that the government has pursued since 1991, when Armenia formally declared its independence from the Soviet Union.

The first radical move came in 1991, when the government implemented a tough land privatisation programme. Land privatisation, which has put more than 80 per cent of agricultural land in the hands of private farmers, who are now freely able to buy and sell their holdings, has acted as an important linchpin for the rest of Armenia's economic reforms.

In other former Soviet republics, such as Russia, the unreformed agricultural sector is a millstone, pushing up inflation with its demands for continued government subsidies and serving as an important powerbase for anti-reform communist politicians. But Armenia's pioneering land privatisation has transformed the countryside into one of the most important sources of support for market reforms and, by weaning farmers off government subsidies and making them more efficient, has helped Armenia to survive the energy blockade.

'During the most difficult times which our republic endured, the energy crisis and the blockade, I think we were saved from famine by land privatisation,' Mr Asatrian says.

The second important achievement of Armenia's economic reformers was the result of circumstances beyond Yerevan's control. Until the autumn of 1993, Armenia was a part of the rouble currency zone, and like other republics within the rouble's orbit pursued spendthrift monetary and fiscal policies. But, in November, 1993, Russia's decision to exclude other republics from the rouble zone forced Armenia to introduce its own currency, the dram, and independently set its monetary and fiscal course.

After a shaky start, the dram has proven to be a success. Since May, 1994, the nominal exchange rate has been stable, and the dram has sharply appreciated in real terms over the same period. The government's battle with inflation, which averaged 46 per cent a month in the first quarter of 1994 but was down to 1.2 per cent in March, has been an equally important achievement. Oil-rich Russia, struggling with inflation of nearly 18 per cent a month at the beginning of this year, can still only dream of the macro-economic stability Yerevan has already attained.

The one sphere in which Armenia's economic reformers have lagged has been industrial privatisation, but the government has pledged to implement a mass privatisation programme this year.

However, Armenia's impressive internal macro-stabilisation is likely to have little real significance unless it is accompanied by the more difficult achievement of a rapprochement between Armenia and its largely hostile or unstable neighbours. Endowed with scarce natural resources, land-locked Armenia is unlikely to develop very much beyond a subsistence economy, no matter how skilled the economists in its cabinet, unless its diplomats can negotiate an end to the economic blockade.

Government officials are hopeful that, slowly, the political situation is improving.

'Armenia occupies an important geopolitical crossroads and, as a result, a lot depends on our relations with our neighbours,' says Mr Armen Yeghiazarian, minister of the economy and a member of the government troika that has masterminded the economic reforms. 'But there are some signs, unofficial ones, that our relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan are improving.'

The past year has brought some encouraging signals that give weight to the official optimism in Yerevan. The blockade of trade and transport routes through Azerbaijan, traditionally Armenia's principal avenue into the world, was triggered by the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. More than a year ago, that battle settled into an uneasy stalemate, with local Armenians in control of the disputed enclave and large swathes of Azeri territory between Karabakh and Armenia occupied by Armenian forces. Azerbaijan is, naturally, little pleased with this status quo, but more than a year ago the warring parties agreed a ceasefire that has generally been honoured, despite the absence of neutral peace-keeping forces.

Yerevan is hopeful that the next stage will bring an incremental lifting of Azerbaijan's blockade, perhaps in exchange for some of the occupied land held by Armenian forces. The delicate detente between Armenia and Azerbaijan has also slightly eased relations between Yerevan and Turkey, which closed its border with Armenia at the height of the Karabakh dispute. Turkey has already opened its air corridor to Armenia and, thanks to a US Armenian lobby, is under gentle pressure from Washington to lift the blockade further.

Armenia's isolation has been further eased by the gradual political stabilisation in neighbouring Georgia. Georgia is an important transit route for energy, particularly natural gas, and civil war there compounded the difficulties Armenia faced because of Azerbaijan and Turkey's blockade.

But one of the most promising windows on to the rest of the world for Armenia is Iran. Nothing better exemplifies Armenia's unhappy geopolitical destiny than the fact that Iran, one of the pariahs of the western world, is Armenia's most stable, reliable and friendly neighbour. The two countries have an ancient history of good trading relations.

In an effort to break out of its geographic isolation, Armenia, whose foreign minister speaks fluent Persian, has been nursing closer economic links with Iran. Iran is now second only to Russia among Armenia's trading partners, and Yerevan sees a planned gas pipeline from Iran as its most reliable way out of the energy blockade.

Armenia's other unlikely saviour is Medzamor, a nuclear power station which the government hopes to restart within the next few weeks. The two water-cooled reactors at Medzamor were shut down in 1989, after the 1988 earthquake led Armenian public opinion to question the wisdom of operating a Soviet-constructed nuclear power plant in one of the world's most seismically precarious regions. But four cold winters have led Armenians to reconsider and, to the consternation of western observers, one of Medzamor's reactors is scheduled to be back on line by the autumn.

Armenians, who argue that the west has been quick to complain about Medzamor but has rebuffed most of Yerevan's requests for technical assistance, are unsympathetic to western worries. 'It is easy to sit in Brussels and say the Armenians should not start up their nuclear reactor because it is not safe enough,' says Mr Vahan Papazian, Armenia's foreign minister. 'But here in Armenia we have a terrible energy crisis and we are not willing to endure another frozen winter.'

But if Armenia's ability to cope with some of the most difficult economic circumstances facing any former Soviet republic is an uplifting lesson in the uses of adversity, political trends in the republic are more disheartening.

Armenia has long prided itself on being an oasis of democracy and stability in a region known for civil war and authoritarian politicians. But, as it prepares for July parliamentary elections, the republic's first, post-communist ballot, it has begun to display the undemocratic inclinations of its neighbours.

The most worrying development is the government's suspension of one of the most popular, emigre-based opposition parties, popularly known by its Armenian shorthand as Dashnak. The crackdown on the Dashnaks, and the closure of many opposition newspapers, have raised serious doubts about Armenia's democratic credentials.

Equally worrying is a proposed constitution that will be decided by a popular referendum at the same time as the parliamentary elections. Western constitutional experts say the draft, which government officials are confident will be passed, will introduce the most powerful presidency anywhere in Europe.

Even members of the government agree that Armenia has some way to go before it becomes a fully democratic state. 'Armenia is certainly not a model of democracy,' says Mr Yeghiazarian. 'Armenia is a country which is trying to become democratic, and that's not something you can do in four years.'

Since 1991, Armenians have responded to severe external challenges with a remarkable national resilience and commitment to tough economic reforms. As the economy slowly improves, and the external threats begin to recede, Armenia's most dangerous temptation is to drift into the type of authoritarian political system that appears to have lured many of the former communist states. Armenia has a long history of resisting external enemies, but over the coming year Yerevan's priority should be to set its own house in order.

Countries: AM Armenia, East Europe.
Industry: P9311 Finance, Taxation, and Monetary Policy.
P9611 Administration of General Economic Programs.
Types: CMMT Comment & Analysis.

The Financial Times
London Page 35

4 FT 07 Jun 95 Survey of Armenia (6): Hard line on diaspora groups - The president is taking a tough stance in the race for power

By STEVE LEVINE

Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the Armenian president, is a former college professor with a passion for chess and languages who has impressed many foreign visitors as a steady, Western-minded leader in an unruly sea. But politics can test anyone's image and, a month before parliamentary elections, diplomats are starting to complain about some Soviet impulses in the president.

Western diplomats have criticised Mr Ter-Petrosyan for suspending a leading opposition political party, which he branded 'a terrorist and fascist organisation.' Western officials have also worried about his jailing of two dozen party members, one of whom died in custody last month, and a shut-down of opposition newspapers. He has even been accused of establishing a classic communist-style political machine to ensure an acceptable result in the July 5 elections.

'It's a phenomenon you see all over the world,' says a senior western official in Armenia's capital, Yerevan. 'You could have the softest man in charge. But once someone comes to power, he clings to it by all means.'

Four years after leaving an academic career at Yerevan State University, Mr Ter-Petrosyan, 50, indeed appears like a man trying to entrench himself and his party in power.

The president, who has studied 13 languages, came to prominence in 1988 as a leader in the so-called Karabakh Committee. The committee pressed the case for independence in a tiny Armenian-dominated enclave called Nagorno-Karabakh, which was situated by Josef Stalin inside neighbouring Azerbaijan. Yerevan thus became the site of the first big nationalist demonstrations of the Gorbachev era - the huge public outpourings in the non-Russian republics that helped bring down the Soviet Union.

The crusade, which led to a still-simmering, undeclared war with Azerbaijan that has killed at least 5,000 people, informed both contemporary Armenian politics and a new generation of leaders.

Although the Karabakh issue has receded from everyday Armenian political discussions, the edge it gave to Mr Ter-Petrosyan still remains today. Elected president overwhelmingly in 1991, he simply has no formidable challenger.

The only rival who had a national following, Mr Raffi Hovanissian, whom Mr Ter-Petrosyan sacked as foreign minister, has been barred from next year's presidential elections because he is a US citizen.

In trying to understand why Mr Ter-Petrosyan has moved to impose such a tight political grip in Armenia, some analysts look at the nearby examples of chaos that he has witnessed.

In Georgia, leader Eduard Shevardnadze came to power after a rebellion against his elected predecessor, and has since had to bring back his republic from the brink of disintegration. In Azerbaijan, Mr Heydar Aliyev, the president, is leading the republic's fifth government in four years, and had to crush what he called a coup attempt last autumn.

Armenia's relative political stability may be born of its people's post-Soviet tendency to pull together during crises. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, often changes governments during hard times.

Mr Ter-Petrosyan, however, evidently wants more stability in the run-up to elections. 'They want an assured victory,' says a western diplomat in Yerevan.

'What's happened to Ter-Petrosyan,' the diplomat adds, 'is that he has identified his fate with the fate of the Armenian nation: if he stays in

office, at whatever cost, it must be to the benefit of the Armenian people.'
In December, Mr Ter-Petrosyan made his first move by going against the chief opposition political party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, known by its Armenian language shorthand, 'Dashnak.'
Dashnak is perhaps the strongest of a handful of Armenian diaspora groups spread through Europe, the US, South America and the Middle East that are also politically influential in Armenia itself.
The groups marshall financial support from abroad for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and have become politically vital lobbying groups for Armenian causes in Washington and Paris. Last month, diaspora lobbyists helped push a bill through a US congressional committee that would sever assistance to Turkey if it continues to obstruct US humanitarian aid from reaching Armenia by land.
Increasingly, Mr Ter-Petrosyan's government, while expressing gratitude to the diaspora, has bristled at its attempts to influence Armenian policy. His conflict with Dashnak, however, appears to be especially visceral.
From their side, some Dashnak leaders have felt that they maintained the flame during the diaspora's darkest hours this century, and that they thus possess a right to govern Armenia.
This naturally angers Mr Ter-Petrosyan, whose policies are generally more moderate than Dashnak's. The president, for example, rejects Dashnak's demand that official relations with Turkey be suspended until Ankara concedes the Ottoman government's role in the 1915 massacre of more than a million Armenians.
'The Dashnaks felt they had the God-given right to govern Armenia,' says Mr Gerard Libaridian, a senior adviser to Mr Ter-Petrosyan. 'They felt that no-one (else) in Armenia was qualified to lead the nation.'
Mr Ter-Petrosyan has reinforced this belief by alleging that Dashnak has maintained a secret cell called 'Dro' that has carried out political assassinations and trafficked in narcotics. He has specifically accused Dashnak of the December 17 execution-style slaying of Mr Humbartsum Galstyan, the former mayor of Yerevan.
Regardless of the truth of the charges, the government's anti-Dashnak policy has subjected it to increasing criticism.
On January 6 it suspended Dashnak political activities for six months, effectively excluding the party from the July 5 elections. Even more controversial, however, was the death in custody of a prisoner, Mr Artavazd Manukian. The prisoner's lawyer has claimed that government security officials refused proper medical treatment to Mr Manukian, who he said suffered daily bleeding, headaches and back pain. Mr Ter-Petrosyan has denied any government liability.
Meanwhile, the parliamentary race is quickly gaining momentum. The elections consist of voting to fill a 190-member parliament and a referendum on a constitution that would create a strong-presidential system.
Most analysts expect the new parliament to have a close resemblance to the current legislative body, which is dominated by state factory directors, local politicians and other allies of Mr Ter-Petrosyan.
The president, western analysts say, has at least partly guaranteed this outcome by arranging the appointment of pro-government chairmen in 129 of Armenia's 150 electoral districts. Such officials in other former Soviet republics have been responsible, if need be, for nudging the vote in the proper direction.
'Here, politicians are intellectuals who only came to politics five years ago, so you would expect a different approach,' says a western political analyst in Yerevan. 'But they were raised in the Soviet system. They don't know any other way.'

5 GDN 19 Apr 95 The authoritarian route to democracy: Rights have been trampled and cracks are beginning to show in Armenia's facade of stability (1044)

By JAMES MEEK

VOSKAN Mamigonian has not seen his computer since he logged off for the night three days before the new year and drove home through the cold, unlit streets of the Armenian capital.

Minutes later he was racing back to the offices of Yerkir, the country's biggest daily newspaper, having just seen President Levon Ter-Petrossian's televised denunciation of alleged terrorist cells within the opposition party which backs the publication.

It was too late: the three-storey building near Yerevan's opera house was sealed off by police and troops. The newspaper was, and remains, closed.

'They asked everyone to leave the building, to leave all their papers, all the material for that night's edition, which was almost ready,' said Mr Mamigonian. 'It later turned out that everything had been confiscated - all computers, papers, accounts, safes, archives.'

Armenia, united in its proxy war with the government of Azerbaijan and shielded from Western censure by a rich, well-organised emigre lobby, always prided itself on being an island of stability in the turbulent Caucasus compared to neighbouring Georgia and Azerbaijan, still racked by post-Soviet warlord chaos versus authoritarianism.

Now the cracks in Armenia's democratic facade are beginning to show. Doubts are growing over the legitimacy of parliamentary elections in July following the closure of 11 opposition publications and a six-month suspension of the main political party they had ties with, the ARF-Dashnaktsutiune, known as the Dashnaks.

Relays of the American-funded Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe by local medium wave transmitters were also halted. In all, 300 journalists and media workers found themselves out on the street.

The government is unrepentant, saying it had to act when it did, and forthcoming public trials of 19 people accused of murder and drug-trafficking would reveal all.

'That party was leading the republic to instability . . . the people would have lost faith in the government and the rest of the opposition,' said a presidential aide, Jirain Libaridian, a United States citizen and a Dashnak member until 1988. 'The Dashnaks would have presented themselves as the only party disciplined and powerful enough to restore law and order. This president will never allow Armenia to become a Weimar republic.

'Better to trample on the rights of the few temporarily, so that the republic has stability and continuity to have a change of power in a legitimate manner. I'm perfectly willing to see Armenia a little less democratic now - if that's what this means - as long as it's democratic for the next 50 years.'

President Ter-Petrossian'stelevision address on December 28 followed the murder 16 days earlier of the former mayor of Yerevan, Hambartsum Galstian, a businessman-politician and former associate of the president who had subsequently fallen foul of the authorities.

In his speech, President Ter-Petrossian announced the discovery of a secret terrorist organisation, DRO Special Services, operating under cover of the Dashnaks and functioning in Armenia since 1992.

Although he did not accuse them directly of Galstian's murder, the president said the DRO's Armenia battalion had carried out at least three assassinations, all neatly recorded in code in an archive, seized by police, of 506 computer diskettes and dozens of handwritten files. Murder was recorded as 'printing' or 'publishing'.

The president said the DRO had raised money through heroin trafficking: five kilograms of the drug had been seized, along with arms, ammunition, explosives and forged passports.

The following day, a presidential decree suspended the ARF-Dashnaktsutiune's activities. On January 12, Armenia's supreme court legalised the move as a six-month suspension - meaning the ban will be lifted a week after the elections.

Even critics of the move accept that the concrete nature of President Ter-Petrossian's allegations implies some hard evidence against the suspects now held on remand.

But why, apart from political expediency, with the president himself acknowledging that most Dashnaks were unaware of the clandestine group, should he outlaw the whole party and shut down so many publications?

Polls suggest the ruling Armenian National Movement, led by Mr Ter-Petrossian, would have lost out at the elections to both the Dashnaks and the communists. Under the terms of the ban, the Dashnaks will be able to stand only as non-party individuals.

'These elections are unfair right from the start,' said Seiran Baghdasarian, a Dashnak MP. 'It's not a level playing field. My opponents have a newspaper, they have finance, they have a structure allowed to operate, they can use television. I don't have these opportunities because the activity of my party has been stopped.'

Although the president's decree was based on the DRO allegations, the supreme court decision was on different grounds: that the Dashnaks' ruling Athens-based 'bureau' broke Armenian law by having foreign citizens as members.

Mr Baghdasarian accepted that a majority of bureau members were not Armenian citizens - out of 13, one is Iranian, one Canadian, one French, three Lebanese and one Greek.

But he said the court and the justice ministry had refused to explain how he should legally sever the Armenian party's ties with the bureau.

The US has expressed concern over the suppression of the opposition. But foreign governments are also conscious that, the less the voice of the century-old nationalist Dashnak movement is heard in Armenia, the easier it will be for the Ter-Petrossian administration to compromise with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Even the diaspora is anxious lest Dashnak protests harm the formidable lobbying power of Armenians abroad. Despite many similarities between the Yerevan-Karabakh and the Belgrade-Bosnian Serb relationship, the US congress has been persuaded to treat the former as victims and the latter as aggressors.

Yet concern remains about a compromised election and a general swing towards authoritarianism. Another opposition paper, Azg, backed by another party with its roots in the diaspora, was fire-bombed twice last year and two of its journalists were beaten up.

'Authoritarianism? Against a background of closing down these papers, banning the party, the fact that entrepreneurial activity can't develop freely in Armenia because they immediately sort you out if you don't tie yourself to the mafia structures now in power - you could say it was true,' said Hakop Asatrian, an Azg reporter.

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