

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NDI PRE-ELECTION REPORT

THE DECEMBER 1993 ELECTIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

November 23, 1993

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National Democratic Institute For International Affairs

conducting nonpartisan international programs to help promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions

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This document has been prepared by the Moscow-based staff of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in order to provide a brief summary of the issues and actors in Russia's December elections.

Section 1 outlines the structure of Russia's new parliament, and then summarizes the main rules and regulations governing the elections to this body.

Section 2 describes the 13 electoral blocs competing in the December election. After sketching Russia's current political spectrum, this section outlines the history, program and principal leaders of each electoral bloc to the extent that these subjects and personalities were known at the time of publication of this document.

Section 3 briefly describes the kinds of programming which NDI has conducted during the course of this election period.

Section 4 is the text of the Presidential Decree on the Regulation of the December elections.

Section 5 includes several sample forms for domestic and international election monitors.

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
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RUSSIA
Population
147.4 Million
Area (sq mi)
6,592,819
City Population
Over 1,000,000
Over 500,000
Over 100,000
Under 100,000
Capital
1000 mi
Murmansk
St. Petersburg
Yekaterinburg
Novosibirsk
Omsk
Chelyabinsk
Irkutsk
Khabarovsk
Kuybyshev
Vladivostok
Nizhni Novgorod
MOSCOW

RUSSIA
Population
142.4 million
Area (sq mi)
6,592,812
City Population
Over 1,000,000
Over 500,000
Over 100,000
Under 100,000
Capital
1000 mi
Arctic Ocean
Murmansk
Archangel
Leningrad
Moscow
Volgograd
Kuybyshev
Gorki
Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Irkutsk
Khabarovsk
Vladivostok

SECTION ONE

Election Regulations, Pre-election Environment and the New Structures of Power

When the citizens of the Russian Federation go to the polls on December 12, they will elect their representatives to new political institutions according to an entirely new electoral process.

The institutions and systems have emerged from a series of presidential decrees issued since September 21. Since the original decrees, clarifications have been issued continuously. This flurry of pronouncements has produced confusion not only for the Russian voter, but even for the parties and individuals who must comply with these decrees. This chapter attempts to describe the new structures and the electoral regulations created by the recent decrees.

THE NEW STRUCTURES OF POWER

In Decree No. 1400 of September 21, 1993, President Boris Yeltsin outlined the framework for the new federal structures of power to replace the former system of soviets. These structures will be codified in the draft constitution, which will be voted upon on December 12, 1993.

The December elections will create a new, two-house parliamentary structure, the Federal Assembly. The upper house, the Council of the Federation, will have 176 members, two each from 88 regions of the Russian Federation. The 89th region, Chechnya, has claimed independence and has refused to participate in these elections. Because two deputies to the Council of the Federation are elected from each region regardless of size or population, it is expected that the Council of the Federation will represent the interests of their regions, much like the U.S. Senate. The lower house, the State Duma, will have 450 members, 225 elected from single-mandate districts in a majoritarian election and 225 elected by national party list using a system of proportional representation.

Deputy Terms

According to the draft constitution, legislative members in both houses will serve for four years. A special transition addendum to the draft constitution, however, limits the terms of those elected in the December 1993 election to two years. Furthermore, as stipulated in this transition supplement, deputies to the Federal Council, will be elected directly in December, but appointed by regional governments in the future.

The Electoral Regulations

The December 12 elections to the Federal Assembly will involve three ballots and three different electoral systems. Voters will receive one ballot for the Council of the Federation and two separate ballots for the State Duma -- one for the federal party lists and one for the single-mandate districts. Because of the ambiguities in the initial legislation, the daily clarifications, and the fact that all previous Russian and Soviet elections had been held through a simple, majoritarian system, considerable confusion surrounds these elections.

The Council of the Federation

The Council of the Federation will have two representatives from each of Russia's participating 88 regions. Electoral blocs have no special rights to nominate candidates for the Council of the Federation. Individuals have the right to run. In order to qualify as a candidate, an individual or bloc had to collect signatures from 1 percent of the population of the region. These signatures had to be submitted to the district election commission no later than midnight on November 14, 1993.

On the ballot, candidates will be listed as individuals. Each voter can mark up to two names on the ballot for the Council. The two candidates who receive the greatest amount of votes will represent that region in the Council.

The State Duma - Single Mandate Districts

For the State Duma, there will be two separate ballots. The first ballot will be for the 225 single-mandate districts across the Russian Federation.[1] Candidates for these seats may be nominated in two ways. First, if the candidate is nominated by an electoral bloc which has qualified for the federal list of candidates (see below), then he or she may be automatically placed in candidacy for a single-member district. If, however, a party or bloc wishes to nominate a candidate who is not on the federal list, or if an independent wishes to run, then they must collect signatures from one percent of the voting population in that district. These signatures must be presented to the candidate's district election commission no later than midnight on November 14.

Voters vote for one candidate in these single mandate seats. The candidate who receives the greatest number of votes wins. So far, the government has declared that there will be no second round run-offs.[2]

If two candidates are not registered in a single-mandate district or three candidates are not registered in a dual-mandate district, the Central Election Commission is required to call new elections in that district in 12 weeks. In Tatarstan, for example, three candidates for the Council of the Federation were not registered, and the there will be no vote on December 12.

The State Duma - National Lists/Proportional Representation

The other 225 deputies will be elected to the State Duma through a system that is entirely new for Russia -- a proportional system of voting for lists of candidates nominated by parties, electoral blocs,

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[1] These districts average approximately 500,000 voters. District boundaries may not cross the boundaries of the 88 regions, and within each region, districts should not vary from each other by more than 15 percent.

[2] It should be mentioned, however, that at the time of writing the possibility of adding a second round of voting was being discussed. Because democratic forces are afraid that competing democratic candidates may split the vote and thus enable a communist candidate to win, they have been advocating that a run off should occur between the top two candidates. This provision would enable the democrats to consolidate behind one candidate for the second round.

or electoral associations. In the election regulations, the right to nominate federal lists of candidates is reserved for "electoral associations." These associations are defined as "a federal party, a federal political movement with rules registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, or a bloc of such public associations, established for the period of elections. The bloc may also be comprised of other federal public associations registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation if participation in the elections is provided for in their charter." This last clause has enabled a number of civic organizations, including the Women of Russia and the ecological society KEDR to run their own candidate lists.

These electoral associations were entitled to register lists of up to 270 names.[3] In support of these lists, the parties and blocs were required to collect 100,000 signatures from throughout the Russian Federation, of which no more than 15 percent could be from any one region. These lists had to be turned in to the Central Election Commission no later than midnight on November 6, 1993.

A further provision of the electoral regulations has added to the confusion of the candidate lists. If desired, an electoral association may split its national list into federal and regional components. In this instance, the federal component would be at the beginning of the list, with three names, followed by a series of regional lists, each with three names. A bloc which decides to have regional lists is not required to have a list for every region. This could result in a different ballot being printed in each of the 88 regions of the Russian Federation.

When casting a ballot for the federal lists, the voter places a mark in the box next to the bloc name that he or she supports -- not next to the names of the candidates on that list. Seats in the parliament will be allocated according to the proportion of the vote received by each bloc garnering more than 5 percent of the votes cast. Blocs which receive less than 5 percent of the votes cast will not receive any parliamentary seats.

The seats are distributed in the following manner: First, the total number of valid ballots is determined and divided into the total number of mandates available (225). This determines the electoral quotient, or the number of votes needed to obtain one seat. The number of votes cast for each federal list with more than 5 percent of the votes is then divided by this electoral quotient. The resulting whole number is the number of mandates initially allocated to each list. Since votes will have been cast for lists that did not reach the 5 percent threshold, there will be undistributed mandates after this process. These mandates will be divided among the federal lists that have the largest decimal parts remaining (in declining order) after the above calculations.

For those electoral blocs that have regional lists, there is a second step to the process. First, by the above process, the total number of mandates won by a bloc is determined. Next, mandates are allocated to candidates on the federal lists of each bloc. After this, remaining mandates are divided among the regional lists by the same calculations used above. For example, if a bloc wins 70 seats in the parliament and has 15 people on its federal list, 55 seats are distributed among the bloc's regional lists according to the following procedure.

First, the electoral quotient is determined by dividing the number of valid ballots cast for the bloc

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[3] The excess is to allow for candidates who might either drop out of the elections or be elected from a single-member district.

by the number of mandates remaining after distribution to the federal component of the list. Then the number of votes cast for the bloc in each region is divided by this electoral quotient to determine the number of mandates allocated to each region. In this way, the various regions in a given bloc list compete with each other in the same way as the federal blocs.

THE CONSTITUTION

The December elections will include a referendum on a new Russian constitution. The electorate will be asked to vote for or against a draft constitution proposed by President Yeltsin.

In May, following the April referendum, Yeltsin called for the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly was first conceived by Yeltsin as a way to realize his vision of the future structure of the Russian Federation as a presidential republic.

In an attempt to win support for his conception, Yeltsin presented his draft to the leaders of the 88 constituent republics and regions of the Russian Federation and called on them to offer their amendments to this draft by the end of May. The parliament, led by Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, had also sought the support of the regional leaders for the competing parliamentary draft constitution. This support was considered extremely important to ensure the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the stability of the transitional process and the adoption of the new constitution.

After October, the process of amending and negotiating over the constitutions changed dramatically. While the Constitutional Assembly reconvened in October, many new amendments were made by Yeltsin's advisors, led by Chief of Staff Sergei Filatov, without consulting either the Assembly or regional leaders.

The latest draft curtails the power of the regions. For instance, the Council of the Federation was to have consisted of each of the 88 regional administrations and regional soviets. The new draft, however, calls for the upper house to be elected, and decreases the power of the Council, which will still be the main representative of the regional interests.

In addition, the draft is strongly worded to impede any further attempts to increase regional sovereignty. As opposed to the previous drafts, there are no special rights accorded to the national republics. Rather, the draft promises all regions of the Russian Federation equal rights, and bans any right of secession.

Finally, the draft has further strengthened the post of the presidency, giving the president the right to select the prime minister, subject to parliamentary confirmation. The president would have the right to dissolve the State Duma if (1) it rejects the president's nomination for prime minister three times, or (2) it calls a vote of no confidence in the government twice in three months.

In the final draft of the constitution, all bodies in all branches of power are given the right to introduce legislation including the State Duma, the Council of the Federation, the government (*pravitel'stvo)*, the president, and the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Arbitration Courts. This legislation is adopted by the State Duma and confirmed by the Council of the Federation -- either by a two-thirds vote or automatically if a vote is not held within 30 days. Legislation regarding the federal budget, taxation, monetary policy, international treaties, borders and war and peace must be considered by the Council of the Federation. A two-thirds vote by the State Duma can override the Council of the

Federation's rejection of any legislation. A presidential veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house.

Presidential Elections

At the time of the September 21 decree, Yeltsin stated that he would submit to early presidential elections on June 12, 1994. However, on November 6, 1993, claiming that only a strong presidency could guarantee the stability of the state in this time of change and that his earlier commitment had been made under duress, Yeltsin announced that he would serve out his full term of office until 1996. Since this statement, he has again begun to equivocate and is now suggesting that he may submit to the new parliament's recommendation regarding early elections.

Campaign Rules and Timetable

The government chose speed over exactness in setting forth new elections. An 82-day advance warning of elections, in which a new structure of government was presented, resulted in a confusing situation for citizens and parties alike. It left little room for discussion or negotiation on the new structure of government or on how the election process would proceed.

According to a nationwide public opinion survey taken in middle October of Russian citizens, almost half of the respondents (49 percent) felt that it is not possible to have democratic elections under the current environment, while 34 percent believed it is possible.

But despite the confusion and the October 3-4 events at the White House, Yeltsin continued to enjoy support from the public for moving forward with the elections. 50 percent of the population believed that Yeltsin did the right thing in dissolving the Russian parliament, while one-third (33 percent) thought he should not have taken that action.

Curfew and Censorship

In the two weeks following the October 3-4 events, Moscow was subject to a city-wide curfew from 11:00pm until 5:00 am. The curfew provided Moscow authorities with an excuse to forcibly relocate dark skinned people from the Caucasus mountain regions whom Russians have traditionally blamed for crime and high prices in mafia-controlled markets. Articles in several Western newspapers reported that drivers with dark features were being singled out in searches. Up to 10,000 people reportedly were either expelled from the city or left in fear.

At the same time, 14 political parties were banned. In the subsequent weeks, the ban on most of these parties was lifted, except for several ultra-nationalist and communist groups. For example, the ban on the Communist Party of Russia was lifted and they are now running candidates in the December 12 elections.

Ruslan Khasbulatov and Ilya Konstantinov, whose followers collected enough signatures for their nomination in the new parliament, were prohibited from participating by special decree, even though the law does not prohibit their participation.

Electoral Timetable

Officially, (according to Article 30 of the election regulation,) the election campaign begins after the candidate or federal list of candidates is registered and ends one day before the election day on December 12. This means that the campaign for the federal list candidates for the State Duma begins on November 7 (35 days prior to the election), for the single mandate seats in the State Duma on November 15 (27 days prior to election), and for the Federal Council also on November 15 (27 days prior to the election).

Financing

The election regulation permits electoral associations and candidates standing for office in the State Duma to create their own election funds to finance their election campaign. Such funds may be drawn from those allocated from the central or relevant regional election commissions to conduct the campaign, from the electoral association's or candidate's own funds, from funds given by the entity that nominated the candidate, and from voluntary donations from private individuals and legal entities.

Specific limits are stipulated in the election regulation on the amount of funds that private individuals or legal entities can contribute. Further, donations by foreign states, organizations or individuals, or by Russian legal entities with foreign capital or international organizations and public associations are expressly prohibited.

Sixty days after the election results are known, a report detailing sources of income and expenses must be submitted by the electoral association or candidate to the Central and constituency election commission.

Because the reporting requirements come after the election, it is difficult to assess the exact level or source of funding for each electoral association or candidate during the campaign. However, the system of favoritism popular under the old Soviet regime has parallels with the current situation. The complaint most often heard is that Russia's Choice, whose leadership is largely drawn from the current Yeltsin administration, has access to governmental resources unavailable to many of the other parties. These charges, however, have not been substantiated or documented.

Election Commissions and Administration

The election regulations provide for three levels of election commissions: the Central Election Commission (CEC), the constituency election commissions for the elections to the State Duma, and the district election commissions.

The CEC is chaired by Nikolai Ryabov, former Deputy chairman to Khasbulatov in the Supreme Soviet, appointed to this position shortly after Yeltsin's decree dissolved the parliament. Of the remaining 20 members on the CEC -- who are appointed by Yeltsin -- half are drawn from recommendations by the regional councils, while the other half were recommended by the regional administrators. Similarly, the constituency and district election commissions have half of their members appointed by the respective legislative bodies and the other half by the respective administrators.

Access to the proceedings of the various election commissions is open but limited. Meetings of the CEC and constituency election commission must be open to accredited representatives of the mass media, and, at the district election commission level, by any member of the mass media. In addition, electoral associations that have registered a lists of candidates for the federal constituency -- or, at the constituency and district levels, candidates for the single mandate State Duma seats -- are entitled to

appoint one member with deliberative rights to each election commission.

On election day, each electoral association or candidate may appoint up to five observers who are entitled to be present until the completion of the vote count in the district election commission.

This presence of observers from the press and candidates should provide substantial guarantees that the process of voting and ballot counting will be free and fair. However, it remains unclear why the Russian government removed clauses from earlier drafts of the election law which guaranteed non-partisan observer groups the same rights. The presence of such observers would add credibility to the process and results of the election.

Mass Media

In the days directly following the October 3-4 events at the White House, ten opposition newspapers were banned entirely. Government and self-censorship in the mass media was widespread. One symbol of this was the front pages of several newspapers (e.g., *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*) which chose to leave blank white spaces in place of censored articles. In addition, several editors of newspapers and television producers met and released an announcement of their support of Yeltsin. Opposition newspaper such as *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Den'* were completely closed down.

In addition, several leaders of Russia's Choice are closely associated with leading media outlets. The Chairman of Ostankino Television, Vyacheslav Bragin, removed himself from the federal list of Russia's Choice in order to preserve Ostankino's impartiality, though Kiril Ignatiev, first deputy chair of Ostankino, remains on the list.

Nonetheless, by presidential decree, all electoral associations running federal lists are to be guaranteed equal access to unpaid time on state television. Beginning November 22, each of the two national state television networks will allocate one hour per night during the work week for the use of the parties and blocs. This time can be used by the parties at their discretion. Each bloc will receive one hour of Ostankino and one hour of Russian television airtime. The order in which they will appear was decided by lottery. Russia's Choice, Bloc Yavlinsky, Boldyrev, Lukin and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms have already agreed to subdivide their time slots in order to permit each to appear more frequently. Each candidate is also entitled to one statement over state television and one statement on the state radio. In addition, a court has been established to adjudicate the neutrality of the state media.

The election regulations also prohibit opinion poll results pertaining to the December 12 election to be published within 10 days of the election.

SECTION TWO

Russian Electoral Parties and Blocs

OVERVIEW

By the end of October 1993, 35 parties, social organizations, and electoral blocs had registered with the Central Election Commission to compete in the December election. Of these 35, only 21 succeeded in turning in the 100,000 signatures necessary to appear on the ballot by the November 6th deadline. Significant blocs which did not garner enough signatures included *Avgust*, (August) a coalition of the Party of Economic Freedom (Konstantine Borovoi and Irina Khakamada) and the Party of Constitutional Democrats (Victor Zolatarev), the Russian Christian Democratic Movement led by Russian Unity nationalist Victor Aksiuchits, and *Otechestvo* (Fatherland), an electoral bloc coalition consisting of the Socialist Party of Workers (Ludmila Vartazarova), the Union of Rebirth (Dmitrii Rogozin), the Union of Cossacks (Ivan Martynov), the Russian Union of Working Collectives (Vera Lasch), the Union of Oil-Producers and a host of other industrial organizations affiliated with former Security Council chair, Yurii Skokov. While these notable blocs and personalities failed to make the cut, a host of unknown blocs and organizations, discussed below, managed to collect 100,000 signatures, suggesting that the results of the December election may also hold some surprises.

Upon reviewing the signatures submitted by these 21 blocs and parties, the Central Election Commission disqualified eight more blocs, reducing the list of those parties which will appear on the ballot to 13. The Commission rejected parties for several reasons: applications submitted by fax, too many signatures from one region, unsigned petitions, incomplete documentation accompanying signatures. None of these blocs was qualified for fraudulent activity. Of the eight which were disqualified, three were prominent national patriotic blocs: the Russian All-People's Union headed by Sergei Baburin, the Constitutional Democratic Party - Party of People's Freedom headed by Mikhail Astafiev, and the National Republican Party headed by Nikolai Lysenko (not to be confused with the Republican Party of Russia headed by Vyacheslav Shostakovsky and Vladimir Lysenko).

With the notable exception of some electoral blocs such the Democratic Party of Russia or Civic Union, most electoral lists were created very hastily during the month of October. Small political parties which had formed in 1990 and 1991 such the Social Democratic Party of Russia or the Republican Party of Russia were not strong enough in 1993 to field their own candidate lists.[4] Instead, they were compelled to join forces with other electoral blocs which were created around individual leaders, rather than parties representing social organizations. Electoral blocs, as such, more closely resemble coalitions of leading political personalities rather than interest-based parties. These hastily formed alliances of well known individuals suggest that electoral blocs will split and perhaps regroup along different lines of cleavage after the election.

While recognizing that individuals constitute the basis of most electoral blocs, nevertheless a rough outline of a political spectrum can be sketched. Traditional Western left-right categories still do not apply in Russia. Rather, the divisions which emerged in 1992 between "democrats" or liberals, centrists, and

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[4] Had Russia's first multi-party election been held in 1991 or even 1992, these parties would have played a greater role.

traditionalists can again be discerned in the wake of the "October events."[5]

The Liberals

The liberal or democratic (this is the label Russians themselves use to describe this group) are those parties most closely identified with the current government and its policies. Regarding economic issues, parties and blocs associated with this orientation support (to varying degrees) rapid economic reform. Regarding issues of state power and state structure, this political grouping had supported greater autonomy for both oblasts and autonomous republics, including special provisions for insuring the sovereignty of the most vocal autonomous republics such as Tatarstan and Tuva. Since the October conflict, however, most parties with the democratic camp have adopted a decidedly more nationalist rhetoric.

Vybor Rossii, or Russia's Choice, is the largest and most prominent electoral bloc in this camp. Despite aspirations to the contrary, however, Russia's Choice failed to unite all democratic, pro-Yeltsin individuals, government leaders, and political organizations into one bloc. While Russia's Choice leaders have labeled their organization the president's bloc, Yeltsin decided not to attend the bloc's founding congress and has not endorsed the bloc. Nor have all members of the government joined Russia's Choice. As discussed in detail below, this bloc unquestionably contains the largest number of government ministers. Important members of the current government, however, such as deputy prime ministers Sergei Shakrai, Alexander Shokin, and Oleg Soskevets have created or allied with other electoral blocs.

Besides Russia's Choice, the three other most important electoral blocs in the democratic camp are: the Yavlinsky bloc, lead by Grigorii Yavlinsky, an economist and a co-author of the ill-fated 500 Day Plan, Yurii Boldyrev, a former Yeltsin official in charge of investigating corruption within the government, and Alexander Lukin, currently Russian Ambassador to the US who believes Russia's foreign policy os too accommodating to the West; the Party for Russian Unity and Accord (*Partiya Rossiiskoi Edinstva i Soglasii* or PRES) created by Sergei Shakrai, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform led by the Mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, and former Moscow Mayor, Gavriil Popov. The distinguishing features of these blocs are discussed below.

The Centrists

Centrism as a political orientation gained prominence in the first half of 1992 with the formation of Civic Union, a coalition of three political parties: the People's Party for Free Russia (then headed by former vice-president Alexander Rutskoi), the Democratic Party of Russia (Nikolai Travkin), and the Union "Renewal" (*Obnovlenie*), the political arm of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Arkadii Volsky and Alexander Vladislavlev). Civic Union attempted to construct a bloc of centrist forces between the radical democrats in the Democratic Russia movement and the ultra-nationalists and communists of the Red-Brown coalition. In contrast to communist diehards, Civic Union founders recognized the necessity of transforming the Soviet command economy into a market system. Different from Democratic Russia and the Gaidar government, however, Civic Union asserted that economic reform should be undertaken slowly, without the social and economic dislocations associated with shock therapy.

During the spring and summer of 1993, when Russian politics became polarized once again, Civic Union collapsed. The Democratic Party of Russia quit the coalition in April 1993 while Arkadii Volsky and

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[5] During the spring and summer of 1993, Russia's political spectrum polarized into two camps, pro-government and anti-government. This polarization culminated in the armed conflict between the president and the parliament on October 3 and 4, 1993.

Alexander Vladislavlev quietly distanced themselves from the increasingly militant Alexander Rutskoi. In October 1993, neither Travkin, Volsky, nor Vladislavlev supported Rutskoi during his stand at the White House.

The resolution (however temporary) of the polarized situation in October has created space for parties and blocs claiming a "centrist" orientation between the actions and policies of the president and his supporters, who launched a military attack on the White House, and the combative stances and actions of communists and nationalists groups which organized the violent attacks against the Russian television station and the mayor's office. Many of the "democratic" parties and blocs mentioned above have attempted to recast themselves as "centrists," including even Russia's Choice.

The policies and positions of a centrist orientation, however, have become less distinctive as more parties and blocs compete for the centrist label. Regarding economic issues, centrists support the creation of a market economy, but reject shock therapy as a method for achieving it. In making the transition to a market economy, centrist parties generally support a slower pace of privatization, greater state resources for social welfare, and less attention to the macroeconomic stabilization goals proscribed by the International Monetary Fund. This generic platform, however, can be used to describe such different electoral blocs as Yavlinsky's group and the newly re-incarnated Civic Union.

The lines of cleavage have become even more obscured regarding issues of state power and structure. In contrast to the federalist and confederalist positions of the democrats, centrists before October 1993 supported a unitary Russian state, an assertive role for Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Some self-described "centrists" even support reconstructing the Soviet Union. Since October 1993, however, many (the exceptions are described below) liberal, democratic parties have incorporated much of the centrist rhetoric on state power and state structure into their platforms. In sum, the lines of cleavage have become increasingly difficult to discern, making the role of individual personalities for establishing the identity of an electoral bloc all the more important.

In the categorizations of the electoral blocs which have appeared in the Russian press this fall, the Democratic Party of Russia and Civic Union almost always appear in the centrist grouping. Some analysts move Shakrai's PRES from the liberal camp to the centrist group, while others have named the Agrarian Party as a centrist rather than communist or traditionalist electoral bloc.

The Ultra-Nationalist and Communist Blocs

For most of Russia's post-communist history, ultra-nationalist and communist political forces have worked closely together. While sharing very few positions regarding economic reform or social issues, they united behind two shared concerns: their hatred of Yeltsin and their nostalgia for the past, be it Stalinist communism or pre-revolutionary Russia. After several false starts, a compact of ultra-nationalist and communist movements called the National Salvation Front (NSF) finally coalesced in October 1992. Russian Unity was the parliamentary faction closely associated with the NSF.

During the increasingly polarized situation in the spring and summer of 1993, this communist-nationalist alliance -- the "Red-Brown" coalition -- grew more solid, reaching its greatest level of coherence when Alexander Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov assumed *de facto* leadership of the Front in the summer of 1993. This consolidation of militant anti-Yeltsin forces helped to precipitate the tragic events of October.

Since October, the ultra-nationalists, or so-called national patriots, and communists have failed to reunite. Regarding the issue of whether to participate in the December elections, several ultra-nationalist and communist groups have decided to boycott, while several other parties and bloc have chosen to participate.

Those that decided to participate, however, were unable to form a unified bloc, either between ultra-nationalists and communists or even within the ultra-nationalist camp. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation headed by Gennadii Zuganov, who also was a co-chairman of the National Salvation Front, is the largest and most prominent electoral bloc from the communist camp, although the Agrarian Party, considered by most an ally of the Communist Party, managed to collect 500,000 signatures, over twice as many as any other bloc. The Russian All-People's Union (ROS) led by Sergei Baburin was the most well-known electoral bloc from the "nationalist/patriotic" ledger. The Constitutional Democratic Party - Party of People's Freedom headed by Mikhail Astafiev, a former National Salvation Front and Russian Unity leader, also managed to collect the necessary 100,000 signatures. However, as already mentioned, both of these blocs were disqualified after submitting their signatures. Even before turning in ROS's petitions, Sergei Baburin claimed that several thousand of their signatures were stolen only days before the deadline for submission. When his bloc was later disqualified, Baburin rebuked the government for election fraud, arguing that Yeltsin and his government wanted to eliminate genuine nationalist and patriotic organizations from the ballot so that Russia's Choice could capture the nationalist vote.

Two extreme nationalist groups -- the Liberal Democratic Party headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the National Republican Party headed by Nikolai Lysenko collected over 100,000 signatures. Like Baburin's bloc and Astafiev's party, the National Republican Party was declared invalid by the Central Election Commission.

INDIVIDUAL ELECTORAL BLOCS

The following electoral blocs have qualified to appear on the December ballot. The list is divided into four broad categories: liberal democratic parties, centrist blocs, traditionalists, and newly formed corporatist blocs formed not according to some ideological orientation but rather according to some specific social group. A brief description of blocs and leaders of each bloc is provided below.

Liberal Democratic Parties and Blocs

1. *Vybor Rossii* (Russia's Choice)
2. "Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin" Bloc
3. Party of Russian Unity and Agreement (PRES)
4. Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms

Centrist Parties and Blocs

5. Civic Union
6. Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)
7. Future of Russia - New Names

Ultra-nationalist and Communist Parties and Blocs

8. Agrarian Party
9. Communist Party of Russian Federation
10. Liberal Democratic Party

Corporatist Blocs

11. Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR)
12. Women of Russia
13. Dignity and Charity (*Dostoinstvo i Miloserdie*)

Liberal Democratic Parties and Blocs

1. *Vybor Rossii* (Russia's Choice)

Entering the campaign period, *Vybor Rossii* or Russia's Choice is the strongest, most well known electoral bloc of any ideological orientation. Russia's Choice is very closely affiliated with President Yeltsin and the current government. While Yeltsin has not personally endorsed Russia's Choice, and several prominent government ministers have joined other blocs, Russia's Choice leaders have nonetheless nurtured the idea that their bloc is a presidential party.

The Russia's Choice Bloc unites seven different major political movements and organizations: the "Russia's Choice" Movement headed by Yegor Gaidar and Sergei Yushenkov; the Democratic Russia Movement led by Lev Ponomarev and Father Gleb Yakunin; the Association of Private and Privatized Enterprises headed by Yegor Gaidar and Alexei Golovkov; the Peasant Party of Russia led by Yurii Chernichenko; the League of Cooperatives and Entrepreneurs and the newly created political arm of the organization the Party of Democratic Initiative headed by Pavel Bunich; and the Association of Peasant's Farms and Cooperatives of Russia (AKKOR) headed by Vladimir Bashmachnikov. Of these seven organizations, however, two were most critical to formation of the bloc -- Democratic Russia and Russia's Choice Movement.

Since its creation in October 1990, Democratic Russia has been the leading liberal, democratic, pro-Yeltsin political force in Russia. During its heyday in the spring and summer of 1991, Democratic Russia claimed nearly 500,000 members and had the capacity to mobilize millions for anti-communist, pro-Yeltsin demonstrations. Democratic Russia organized the political campaign which swept "democrats" into power in city soviets and the Russian parliament in March 1990, mobilized mass, anti-communist demonstrations throughout the spring of 1991, coordinated Yeltsin's successful campaign to become Russia's first elected president, and finally and most dramatically, spearheaded the defense of the White House in August 1991.

After the collapse of communism, however, Democratic Russia lost its unifying mandate. Several prominent Democratic Russia leaders such as Gavriil Popov and Arkadii Murashev quit the movement to focus on their new government jobs, while others simply drifted away because they saw no need for this anti-communist coalition in a post-communist Russia. Within parliament, the Democratic Russia bloc also fractured as opposition forces consolidated. During this period, Lev Ponomarev and Father Gleb Yakunin persisted to lead both Democratic Russia's parliamentary faction and its grassroots organization.

During the summer of 1993, democratic leaders both within and outside the government increasingly recognized the need to reconsolidate their ranks in the face of the militant opposition's growing strength. The initiative for renewed consolidation came from political figures such as Yegor Gaidar and Gennadii Burbulis (both, at the time, out of government). Gaidar, Burbulis and others wanted to forge a new alliance of prominent national political leaders. Democratic Russia leaders would then be asked to join this new coalition -- Russia's Choice -- as individuals. Finally, the organizational arm of Democratic Russia would then be incorporated into Russia Choice giving the new coalition both leadership and grassroots organizational capability.

At the founding congress of Russia's Choice on October 16 and 17, the old leaders of Democratic Russia and the new leaders of the Russia's Choice reached a compromise. Instead of being forced to join the Russia's Choice Movement as individuals, Democratic Russia's leaders entered into an electoral bloc with Russia's Choice as a unified movement. In other words, Democratic Russia Movement and Russia's Choice Movement joined together to form Russia's Choice Bloc, while each movement retained its individual identity and organizational integrity. Despite this compromise, the list of candidates from the Russia's Choice Bloc

is heavily dominated by Russia Choice Movement people. Of the 19 people nominated and chosen for the bloc's federal list, none are from Democratic Russia proper.[6]

Though the compromise forged between Democratic Russia and Russia's Choice was difficult and complicated as negotiated by their respective Moscow leaders, the repercussions were much more dramatic in the regions outside of Moscow. In seeking support of leaders of a less radical persuasion, Russia's Choice organizers courted many regional leaders (heads of administration, presidential representatives, and some factory directors) to join their coalition. In many regions, these were the very people with whom local Democratic Russia leaders had been opposing for the past year. Not surprisingly, therefore, provincial Democratic Russia activists and Russia's Choice regional members proposed very different lists of local candidates for the Russia's Choice party list, a list which was to be divided into regional sections after the first 19 federal candidates. When Russia's Choice Moscow leadership unilaterally decided to name their candidates for the blocs' federal list, many regional Democratic Russia branches threatened not to support these candidates.[7] An arbitration commission between the two movements was formed in Moscow to help resolve some of the most controversial conflicts. Again, the difficult process of forming the regional lists indicates that the alliance between Democratic Russia and Russia's Choice may be short-lived. In some regions, Democratic Russia organizations are currently planning to campaign against Russia's Choice.

Program

As already mentioned, personalities not programs will play the decisive role in this short, hastily organized campaign. However, of all the electoral blocs, Russia's Choice has the most developed and well known platform as, unlike other electoral blocs, the leaders of Russia's Choice have established records in government. Above all else, Russia's Choice platform is affiliated with the rapid economic reform measures initiated by Yegor Gaidar in January 1992. Russia's Choice leaders have promised greater acceleration of privatization, more staunch anti-inflationary measures, and more open trade if they form the post-election government.

Regarding the organization and structure of the Russian state, Russia's Choice firmly supported President Yeltsin's banning of the parliament, and now adamantly endorses the new presidential constitution. Not surprisingly, since many of its candidates are government ministers, Russia's Choice also supports Yeltsin's decision to allow executive officials serve in legislative structures. Russia's Choice supports the notion that a strong state is needed to carry out radical economic reform.

As for Russia's federal structure, Russia's Choice has also endorsed the president's decision to remove all references to sovereignty for the republics from the new constitution. Russia's Choice regards the separation of autonomous republics as a serious threat to the future of the Russian Federation. Though not rejecting the concept of federalism, Russia's Choice leaders have argued that every region of the country is primarily ethnically Russian, and as such should maintain its identity first and foremost as a part of the Russian Federation.

Finally, regarding foreign policy, "Russia's Choice" emphasizes the importance of forging neutral alliances with democratic, industrial countries. The bloc, however, recommends a more assertive Russian

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[6] Fourteen of these candidates were determined by a poll of delegates at the October founding congress. As agreed at the congress, Gaidar was granted the right to personally select an additional five candidates. These were Arkady Murashev, Sergei Yushenkov, Alexei Golovkov, Gennadii Burbulis, and Pyotr Aven.

[7] Democratic Russia had pushed for the idea of holding primaries in the regions as a mechanism for decided their candidate lists, but it was determined that there was not enough time.

foreign policy towards the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

The Campaign

Russia's Choice begins the campaign period with certain advantages over its opponents. First, Russia's Choice candidates enjoy nationwide name recognition because many of its candidates are senior government ministers. Second, these candidates are drawing on Democratic Russia's vast and experienced network of regional supporters and activists. Third, Russia's Choice has significant financial resources. Because new entrepreneurs, bankers, and privatized corporations see their future best served by this bloc, Russia's Choice will probably have the best financed campaign of any bloc. Finally, Russia's Choice has received extensive and favorable coverage on the national television stations Ostankino and the Russian Television Network (RTR), as well as from several major newspapers including, *Izvestiya* and *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*. Opposition parties and blocs have complained that Russia's Choice has received a disproportionate amount of television coverage. As noted earlier, however, all electoral parties and blocs running federal lists were guaranteed equal unpaid time on television.

The bloc coined the slogan -- Freedom, Property, Legality -- as its logo for the campaign. Since the October events, however, polls commissioned by the bloc have indicated that people care very little about freedom and property (a word closely associated with the much despised voucher system). Consequently, Russia's Choice campaign strategists plan to emphasize the effective implementation of the current government's policies as its main themes. Russia's Choice's symbol for the election is the image of Peter the Great, reflecting the bloc's Choice new, more nationalist proclivities. Finally, of course, they plan to do all they can to forge the connection between their bloc and President Yeltsin.

Yegor Gaidar is the leader of Russia's Choice bloc, but Sergei Kovalev, the well known human rights activist, is the official campaign chairman. Alexei Golovkov, Arkadii Murashev, and Sergei Yushenkov manage the election campaign headquarters.[8] Pyotr Aven, Gaidar's former Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, is the finance secretary for the bloc.

The social groups who are most likely to support "Russia's Choice" include Yeltsin's partisans, new entrepreneurs, residents of big cities, and coastal cities which are centers for foreign trade. People who support rapid economic reform, or employed in raw material branches of industry are also expected to favor this bloc. Conservative voters, who view Boris Yeltsin as a strong leader who can preserve order and stability and abolish opposition, may support "Russia's Choice" as well. Finally, people who view the path to a western-like society as the most effective for Russia will provide support for the bloc.

Leaders of "Russia's Choice" anticipate receiving 35 to 45 percent of the vote, and most polls indicate that 20 to 35 percent of the populace will support the bloc.

Expected allies of the bloc are Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, Shakrai's PRES, and the "Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc.

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[8] Alexei Golovkov is the former Secretary of Gaidar's government and is closely affiliated with Gennadii Burbulis. Arkadii Murashev formerly served as the chief of Moscow police and as a member of the Soviet parliament. He was also one of the leaders of the Interregional Deputy's Group in the Soviet parliament and one of the original six co-chairs of Democratic Russia. (He is now a major critic of Democratic Russia). Sergei Yushenkov also served as a former member of the Russian parliament and a leader of the parliamentary faction, "Radical Democrats."

Leaders

The top three candidates from Russia Choice -- that is, the names which will appear on the ballot -- are Yegor Gaidar, Sergei Kovalev, and Ella Pamfilova.

Yegor Gaidar serves as the First Deputy to the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Association of Private and Privatized Enterprises, and the main ideologist of radical economic reform. He is the former acting prime minister.

Sergei Kovalev, a former dissident and political prisoner during the Brezhnev era, now acts as Chief of Presidential Committee on Human Rights. He was a People's Deputy in the Russian Supreme Soviet and the chaired its committee on human rights.

Ella Pamfilova is the Social Security Minister and an associate of Yegor Gaidar.

Other prominent names on the bloc's federal list includes Sergei Filatov, Chief of Presidential Staff; Anatolii Chubais, First Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for Property (GKI); Gennadii Burbulis, chief of Foundation "Strategy," former First Deputy Prime Minister in Yeltsin's Government, and a long-term friend and adviser to Boris Yeltsin; Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister; Mikhail Poltoranin, Chief of Federal Information Center; and Boris Fyodorov, Finance Minister.

The leaders of the Moscow list are Vasilii Selunin, a publicist and economist; Nikolai Vorontsov, a professor, biologist, environmentalist, and a former Environmental Minister of the USSR; and Andrei Nuikin, a publicist. The two top candidates on the Moscow oblast list are Father Gleb Yakunin and Anatoly Shabad. Father Gleb Yakunin is a former dissident, a co-chair of Democratic Russia and a former people's deputy. Anatoly Shabad was one of the most active people's deputies from the Democratic Russia faction. The Saint-Petersburg regional list is headed up by three candidates: Mikhail Molostvov, a former dissident; Grigorii Tomchin, chief of privatization in Saint Petersburg; and Igor Soshnikov, Co-chairman of the Free Democratic Party.

Others prominent politicians further down on the list are Viktor Danilov-Danilian, Minister of the Environment and Natural Resources; Yurii Yarov, Deputy Prime Minister; Boris Saltykov, Science Minister; Alexei Yemelyanov, member of the Presidential Council; Ostankino; Kirill Ignatiev, First Deputy of Ostankino State Broadcasting Company; and Evgenii Sidorov, the Minister of Culture. Many regional Presidential Representatives and Heads of Administration, appointed by President Yeltsin, are also on the candidate list.

2. Yavlinsky Bloc

While the political careers of its leaders are longer and well known, the history of the Yavlinsky bloc or the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc is a short run. Grigorii Yavlinsky is an economist most noted for his role in drafting the 500 day economic plan in 1990. During the fall of 1991, Yeltsin appointed Yavlinsky as one of the four custodians of the Soviet economy. At that time, many speculated that Yeltsin would appoint Yavlinsky as his prime minister. Yeltsin instead selected Yegor Gaidar and his team of economists to draft Russia's economic reform plan. Yavlinsky subsequently formed a think tank, EPItsentr, which he has used to formulate alternative economic reform strategies to Yeltsin's government. In 1992, Yavlinsky relocated temporarily to Nizhnii Novgorod where he attempted to apply his regionally-focused economic reform plan.

In the spring of 1993, Yavlinsky teamed with entrepreneur Konstantine Zatulin to form Entrepreneurs for a New Russia. The aim of this new political organization was to create an alternative political force somewhere in between the radical economic and political policies of Democratic Russia and the Gaidar government and the centrist policies of Civic Union.

Throughout the summer of 1993, Yavlinsky enjoyed a gradual but steady climb in national ratings as a future national leader. In television and press interviews, he argued that his economic reform package could achieve the same results as Gaidar's formula but without the pain of shock therapy. Whatever the validity of the claim, it proved to be very popular.

When Yeltsin announced elections for both a new parliament and president, Yavlinsky quickly announced his attention to run in both races, and formed his own bloc. Zatulin split with Yavlinsky and later joined Shakrai's bloc. After much negotiating with other political leaders and blocs, Yavlinsky finally forged an alliance with two other prominent figures -- Yurii Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin -- both of whom lacked strong political affiliations to other parties or movements.

Boldyrev, a young and radical former deputy in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies from St. Petersburg, most recently served as the head of the Control Department in charge of investigating corruption. According to his supporters, Boldyrev was forced out of this position earlier in the year because of his investigations of corrupt officials. This experience has made him a truculent critic of the current Russian government. Boldyrev however has removed himself from his bloc's federal list in order to run for the Council of the Federation. Vladimir Lukin, the former Chairman of parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and current Russian Ambassador to the United States, is known for his critical view of Foreign Minister Kozyrev.[9]

Beyond this troika of individuals, large segments of the Republican Party of Russia and the Social Democratic Party of Russia have joined Yavlinsky's bloc. Roughly one-third of regional Republican Party affiliates joined Russia's Choice, but the Moscow leadership of the party -- Igor Yakovenko, Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, Vladimir Lysenko and Alexander Mekhanik -- and roughly two thirds of the party's regional affiliates have sided with Yavlinsky. The Social Democratic Party of Russia has suffered a series of serious splits in the last year, but the majority of regional affiliates and the current chairman of the party, Anatolii Golov, have joined this bloc.[10] Finally, the smaller Christian Democratic Union also has entered this coalition. Relations between these newly-forged allies, however, is still complex and tenuous. While the Republican Party of Russia and, to a lesser extent, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, have histories and regional organizations, Yavlinsky does not. Yavlinsky, nonetheless, has made very clear to bloc affiliates that all major decisions about the campaign will be made by him and his colleagues at his think tank, EPItsentr, who are now working on the campaign and on behalf of candidates on the federal list. Like the Russia's Choice coalition, it is still unclear as to whether this bloc will remain a unified political force after the election.

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[9] Lukin has charged that Kozyrev has not defended Russian national interests in his dealings with the West and the United States in particular. Kozyrev in return has called for Lukin's removal as ambassador.

[10] Oleg Rumyantsev, the former leader of the SDPR, has formed his own Social Democratic Center which has allied with Civic Union. Another former SDPR leader, Pavel Kudiukin, has also split with the party. Claiming that the current leadership is too liberally oriented to be a genuine social democratic party, Kudiukin and his associates are trying to forge a more left-of-center coalition with trade unionists.

Program

During the fall of 1991, when Yavlinsky and Gaidar were both vying to become prime minister, two general issues distinguished their reform programs. First, Yavlinsky supported the preservation of the Soviet Union, one economic union within the USSR, and one currency. Gaidar, at the time, did not. Second, Yavlinsky advocated a gradual approach to economic reform, an approach which included a slower pace of privatization and a more lenient attitude towards macroeconomic stabilization (i.e. a tolerance of higher levels of inflation and budget deficits). Gaidar did not. Since then, Yavlinsky has promoted a "regional" approach to economic reform based on his experiences in Nizhnii Novgorod.

To what extent these previous differences between Yavlinsky and Gaidar regarding economic policy become part of this bloc's platform still remains uncertain. In forming this electoral bloc, Yavlinsky has stressed that he has a still liberal, yet less painful economic program than Gaidar's strategy of shock therapy.

Regarding state power, Yavlinsky has promoted increased autonomy for the regions in regard to economic reforms. Both Yavlinsky and Lukin, however, have been critical of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deterioration of the Russian Federation.

The Campaign

Generally, the Yavlinsky bloc plans to position itself in the campaign as the loyal opposition to the present government with a more moderate orientation both in terms of policies and tactics. The bloc will avoid using the word "opposition," however, because some elements of the bloc, particularly the Republican Party, think that word conjures up images of the "opposition" which attacked the Ostankino television building and then defended the White House. Nonetheless, bloc leaders and especially Yurii Boldyrev have strongly criticized President Yeltsin and regard the present regime as authoritarian. It faults both the parliament and the president for the bloodshed which occurred in September and October. In addition, the bloc argues that the present government is rife with corruption and generally lacks professionalism. The bloc stresses their intention to fight against corruption, and poses their candidates as honest politicians.

In polls in late October and early November, Yavlinsky's bloc has attracted over 10 percent of the electorate. Bloc leaders have predicted that they will garner 20 percent or more of the total Duma seats. Most analysts believe that this bloc will be the most serious challenger to Russia's Choice. Liberal intellectuals who blame the present government for both continuing economic decline and the recent bloodshed in Moscow are primary supporters of this bloc. Because of the bloc's image as fostering "practical" and "professional" candidates, it is attracting people who are seeking a new kind of politician.

After the election, Yavlinsky's bloc could work closely with Russia's Choice, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, and PRES in the parliament. Many within the bloc have worked with and in the present government. Equally likely is a split within the Yavlinsky bloc after the elections with some bloc members opting to work with the post-election government and others deciding to remain in "loyal" opposition.

Leaders

As already described above, the bloc's top three candidates on its federal list were initially **Grigorii Yavlinsky**, **Yurii Boldyrev**, and **Vladimir Lukin**. Now that Boldyrev has decided to run for the Council of Federation, Lukin and Alexei Mikhailov will become the second and third candidates. Joining these three on this bloc's federal list are several research associates from Yavlinsky's think tank EPItsentr, including economists Alexei Mikhailov and Mikhail Zadornov. While unknown nationally or even within Moscow

political circles, Yavlinsky has repeatedly insisted that his colleagues be included on the federal list so that "professionals" will serve in the new parliament. Other prominent politicians include Victor Sheinis, a former people's deputy and active participant in the drafting of the Russian constitution and electoral law; Nikolai Petrakov, an economist and former advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev; Valerii Borshchev, leader of the Russian Christian-Democratic Union; Pyotr Schelisch, Chairman of the Union of Consumers; and Vyacheslav Igrunov, a former dissident and acting director of the Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies. Leaders of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, Igor Yakovenko, Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, Vladimir Lysenko and Alexander Mekhanik and leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, Anatoly Golov and Kirill Yankov, also appear prominently in the Yavlinsky list.

While some of these candidates are well known in Moscow, few are known to the general public. Significantly, no senior government member appears on this bloc's list. The success of the electoral bloc depends, in large measure, on the popularity of Grigorii Yavlinsky.

3. *PRES - Party of Russian Unity and Agreement*

Like the Yavlinsky bloc, the Party of Russian Unity and Agreement is a short-lived organization created by Sergei Shakrai. Since moving from the parliament into the president's staff, Sergei Shakrai has emerged to become one of the most visible young political leaders in Russia. He has gained notoriety by holding a number of high profile positions, first as a leading prosecutor in the trial against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, then as one of the authors of the President's alternative constitutional draft (at the time, it was an alternative to the draft associated with Oleg Rumyantsev), then as the emergency head of administration in war torn Ossetia and Ingushetiya, and finally as Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee on Nationalities and Federation Issues. Sergei Shakrai has been and continues to be one of President Yeltsin's closest advisors regarding nationality issues. He took an official leave of absence from his post as Chief of Main Law Department on the Presidential Staff in order to emphasize his commitment to separating the executive and legislative branches of government. He has called on other government ministers running for seats in the new parliament to follow his lead, but so far no one has acted.

Soon after the April referendum, Shakrai began courting allies especially regional leaders with the aim of eventually creating an electoral bloc to support his candidacy for president. While initially an ally and colleague of Russia's Choice leaders, Shakrai gradually distanced himself from the bloc, reportedly for three reasons. First, he wanted to cast himself as more moderate than the "democrats." Second, he and his immediate associates wanted to create a political organization composed primarily of new, young political figures. Third, he did not want to be one of many leaders in an electoral bloc, a situation which would especially complicate his chances to build a presidential base.

The process of forming this party was vastly accelerated by Yeltsin's September announcement of elections. From the government, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shokin and Presidential Advisor Sergei Stankevich have joined forces with Shakrai. Ramazan Abdulatipov, the former chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, and now acting Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Nationalities and Federation Issues, also joined Shakrai's bloc in his belief that Shakrai's best understands the interests of Russia's autonomous republics. Finally, after his falling out with Yavlinsky, the entrepreneur Konstantine Zatulin also joined PRES.

In forging this alliance, Shakrai made clear to all his partners that they are joining a party and not just a temporary electoral bloc. In practice, however, it remains to be seen whether this coalition will survive beyond December. In the initial stages of the campaign season, the offices of Shakrai, Abdulatipov, Shokhin and Konstantine Zatulin's Entrepreneurs for a New Russia were working almost completely independent of each other.

Program

Little distinguishes Shakrai's program from the general orientation of either Yavlinsky's bloc or Russia' Choice. It is the issue of federal structure that constitutes the most distinguishing feature of the PRES platform. PRES's program stresses the absolute necessity of maintaining a single Russian state. Different from militant nationalists and even now Russia's Choice, however, Shakrai does not see this state as a unitary one. Rather, Shakrai has championed the notion of a asymmetrical federation, in which some federal members have more rights than others. Under this arrangement, Tatarstan, for example, may be granted more autonomy -- or different kinds of rights -- than other republics. By advocating the asymmetrical federation, Shakrai hopes to attract support for PRES in both Russian oblasts and the autonomous republics.

Regarding economic matters, PRES is only in the process of defining a clear program. Alexander Shokin, as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of foreign economic relations has become increasingly protectionist in his attitude towards the international market. Similarly, Konstantine Zatulin, as a new Russian entrepreneur, has also declared that Russia's market needs to be preserved, first and foremost, for Russians. As of mid-November, however, economic issues did not figure prominently in the published statements of PRES leaders.

PRES leaders have begun to attack government corruption, suggesting that this issue may become an increasingly important theme in the campaign. In late October, Shakrai published an article in *Izvestiya* which listed all his modest sources of income, effectively challenging all other political leaders to do the same. Shakrai also took of leave of absence from his government posts for the duration of the campaign, again challenging other government leaders to do the same so to not use government funds and facilities for electoral ends. Leaders of Russia's Choice have already denounced Shakrai's actions as fueling divisions within the democratic camp.

Of the four parties considered within the democratic camp, PRES is the most distant from Russia's Choice. Paradoxically, leaders of other electoral blocs and not PRES leaders, have highlighted the differences between PRES and Russia's Choice. At a press conference in October announcing their candidate lists, Russia's Choice leader Arkadii Murashev listed Yavlinsky's bloc and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform as potential parliamentary partners, but doubted whether PRES and Russia's Choice could form a coalition. From the other side, Arkadii Volsky at a press conference announcing Civic Union candidates doubted whether their centrist bloc could join Russia's Choice in forming a government, but expressed optimism about working with Shakrai. In general, Shakrai is known to have better relations with the conservative wing of the current government led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his deputy Oleg Soskovets than he does with the Gaidar faction.

The Campaign

Like Yavlinsky's bloc, the PRES electoral bloc and campaign was very hastily formed. Few leaders within the bloc have real campaign experience and the party has virtually no regional structures. The PRES campaign, therefore, will be focused on promoting the image of its young leader Sergei Shakrai. Shakrai's *Izvestiya* letter and his decision to take a leave of absence from government already suggests that the campaign has developed a strategy for distinguishing this nascent party from its competitors. The addition of Zatulin to the bloc and Shakrai's good standing with many regional entrepreneurs means that the party will not lack financial resources to spend on the campaign.

In early public opinion polls, Shakrai's party has ranked either third or fourth after Russia's Choice, Yavlinsky's bloc, and sometimes behind the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. PRES leaders, however, are confident that the actual campaign will boost their standing while hurting both Russia's Choice

and the Communist Party. They estimate that they will receive 15 to 30 percent of the vote. PRES candidates may also fair well in the single-mandate seats as many of its members are regional leaders. Many independent deputies may join PRES's parliamentary bloc.

Leaders

The three names which will appear on the ballot for PRES are Sergei Shakrai, Alexander Shokhin, and Konstantine Zatulin.

Sergei Shakrai, as already described, is the unequivocal leader of this electoral bloc. He is a former Russian people's deputy where he chaired the Legislative Committee. He presently serves in the government as a Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee on Nationalities and Federation Issues.

Alexander Shokhin is also a Deputy Prime Minister overseeing Russian foreign economic relations. Shokhin was named one of the first three deputy prime ministers in Yeltsin first post-communist government along with Yegor Gaidar and Gennadii Burbulis. At that time, he also served as Minister of Labor. Originally considered one of Gaidar's allies, he has more recently distanced himself from the harsh policies of shock therapy while also advocating more protectionist measures to defend Russian enterprises.

Konstantin Zatulin, the third name on the PRES list, is the chairman of different business associations and the leader of Entrepreneurs for a New Russia. As a former member of the Komsomol Central Committee staff, he gained extensive connections in the first "Komsomol wave" of private business. He later was involved in the formation of Moscow Consumer Exchange and is presently involved in a financial group which emerged from this exchange. After Konstantine Borovoi's Party for Economic Freedom failed to qualify for the ballot, Zatulin has actively sought to represent the voice of entrepreneurs in this election.

Other prominent members on the PRES federal list include President Yeltsin's political advisor Ramazan Abdulatipov (already described above); Yurii Kalmykov, Minister of Justice; Valerii Kirpichnikov, President of the Union of Russian of Cities; Gennadii Melikyan, Minister of Labor; Anatolii Sliva, Deputy Chief of the Presidential Law Department; Vladimir Lepyokhin, Chief Analyst of Entrepreneurs for a New Russia; and Sergei Stankevich, a former USSR People's Deputy, former deputy chairman of the Moscow City Council and presently an advisor to President Yeltsin on political issues. Most of PRES's list, however, is composed of regional leaders who are not nationally known.

4. *RDDR - Russian Movement for Democratic Reform*

The Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RDDR) is one of the few electoral blocs with a history as a political party. Unlike Yavlinsky's bloc, PRES or even Russia's Choice,[11] RDDR was not created solely for this December election. The origins of this party date back to the summer of 1991 (a long time ago in the context of the rapid political changes in Russia) when Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze quit the CPSU and then joined with Anatoly Sobchak, Gavriil Popov, Alexander Rutskoi, and Arkadii Volsky to form the Movement for Democratic Reform (DDR). The Movement's leadership hoped to unite reformers within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) who were dissatisfied with Gorbachev's turn to the right with all the major democratic parties and movements challenging the CPSU from without.

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[11] Democratic Russia, of course, has long history, but Russia's Choice Movement and Russia's Choice Bloc do not.

Throughout the summer of 1991 and even more so in the immediate aftermath of the abortive August coup attempt, the Movement for Democratic Reform increasingly played a central role in Soviet politics with DDR leaders assuming major positions in the Soviet and Russian government.[12] The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, undermined the DDR's hegemonic political power almost as fast as the August putsch had created it. First, all those Union posts which DDR leaders occupied were abolished. People like Shevardnadze (who had returned to the post of Soviet Foreign Minister), Yakovlev, and Bakatin, suddenly found themselves without government positions. Second, unlike most other political organizations, the DDR had been created intentionally on an all-Union basis. The organization tried to remake itself as the International Movement for Democratic Reform, but without success.

Within Russia, Volsky and Rutskoi moved on to form their parties and political organizations, leaving Sobchak and Popov to resurrect the abandoned party as the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RDDR). RDDR held its founding congress on February 15, 1992 and has continued to function as a small, but well organized political party ever since. After resigning as mayor of Moscow in December 1991, Gavriil Popov has devoted his full political energies towards organizing the party while Anatoly Sobchak remains the party's public leader.

The Program

The RDDR program has few features which distinguish it from the other liberal, democratic parties. Generally, RDDR supports rapid, economic reform; the party claims to serve the interests of the new entrepreneurs and Russia's emerging middle class. Concrete differences between RDDR and Russia's Choice regarding economic issues are difficult to discern.

RDDR and its leader, Gavriil Popov, have been very vocal in pushing for political reform over the last two years. Popov's famous treatises, *Shto Delat'?* (What is to be done?) and *Shto Dal'she?* (What is to be done further?) called for the abolition of the system of soviets and the creation of strong executive structures. He has also proposed abolishing the republican structure of the Russian Federation, and recreating the gubernial structure of Imperial Russia. Similarly, Anatoly Sobchak joined forces with some of Russia's leading lawyers to draft an alternative constitution which granted the president considerably more power than the original parliamentary draft (the Rumyantsev draft). During the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly in the summer of 1993, many of Sobchak's recommendations were incorporated into the revised constitutional draft.[13]

Campaign

Though small, RDDR is an organized and focused political party. It has already printed several programs and position papers and promises to run a Western-style campaign. Through his close relations with many Moscow entrepreneurs, Gavriil Popov has garnered significant financial resources for the

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[12] In purging the Soviet government of those who supported the coup, Yeltsin and Gorbachev appointed many of the DDR's founding members to ministerial posts. For instance, Vadim Bakatin became head of the KGB, Yegor Yakovlev took over Soviet television, Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev returned to the Kremlin as advisors to the President, and three of the four members of the committee assigned to run the economy were Movement members. When coupled with the fact that Popov was Mayor of Moscow, Sobchak was Mayor of St. Petersburg, and Alexander Rutskoi was Russia's Vice President, the DDR temporarily became the new ruling party in the wake of the 1991 coup attempt.

[13] Significantly, however, Sobchak has criticized the latest draft as granting too many powers to the president.

campaign.

RDDR's greatest difficulty in the December election will be to define an identity for the party distinct from the other liberal, democratic parties. While many of its candidates are well-known, they do not have positions on issues which distinguish them.

Early polls suggest that RDDR will be close to the 5 percent threshold needed to win seats in the Duma through the proportional representation system. RDDR leaders are more optimistic, however, expecting to win roughly 10 percent of the vote. In parliament, RDDR deputies are expected to work closely with the other liberal, democratic parties mentioned above.

Leaders

Anatoly Sobchak, Svyatoslav Fyodorov, and Oleg Basilashvily will appear on the ballot for RDDR.

Anatoly Sobchak is a former USSR People's Deputy and current mayor of St. Petersburg. He receives high approval ratings in national polls nationally and is considered a potential presidential candidate after Yeltsin steps down.

Svyatoslav Fyodorov is a world-renowned eye surgeon who has set up surgery clinics around the world. He is a new member of RDDR, having had brief political affiliations with the Democratic Party of Russia and the Party of Economic Freedom before settling on this bloc's electoral list.

Oleg Basilashvily is a popular artist and former people's deputy of the Russian parliament. His candidacy balances RDDR's troika: one politician, one entrepreneur, and one artist.

Other prominent politicians and well-known individuals on RDDR's electoral list include Ivan Kivelidi, an entrepreneur who serves as Chair of the President's Council on Entrepreneurs and as leader of Party of Free Labor; Evgenii Shaposhnikov, a Marshal and former Chief Commander of the United Armed Forces of CIS; Nikolai Shmelev, a famous economist; and Oleg Gazmanov and Ludmila Zykina, two popular singers.

Significantly, RDDR's chairman and most influential leader, Gavriil Popov, is not on the electoral list.

5. *Democratic Party of Russia*

Formed in 1990, the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) was one of the first political parties to emerge in Russia. At the time, DPR leader Travkin was one of the most vocal critics of communism and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His famous oratories made the DPR the most well known political party in Russia.

Originally part of the Democratic Russia Movement, DPR left this coalition in November 1991 due to disagreements about the fate of the Soviet Union; Democratic Russia supported the dissolution of the USSR, Travkin did not. In the fall of 1991, Travkin joined forces with Victor Aksiuchits of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement and Mikhail Astafiev of the Constitutional Democratic Party-- the Party of People's Freedom to form *Narodnoe Soglasie* or Popular Accord, a "centrist" coalition dedicated to preserving a strong Russian state.[14] This coalition did not last long, however, as Aksiuchits and Astafiev drifted further to the right, eventually forming alliance with more militant nationalist forces. Soon thereafter, Travkin teamed up with Alexander Rutskoi and Arkadii Volsky to form Civic Union.

In the view of many observers, DPR was becoming overshadowed by their partners in the Civic Union coalition. Moreover, as Rutskoi became increasingly anti-Yeltsin, Travkin began to distance himself from the Vice President and the Civic Union more generally. Soon after of the April referendum in which people expressed their support for Yeltsin, DPR made the decision to abandon Civic Union altogether. Travkin, reportedly, did not want the DPR to be considered in opposition to a popularly-elected president.

Program

DPR leaders and party documents declare that their party is liberal-conservative. Actual DPR positions on various political and economic issues, however, reflect Travkin's flexible attitude towards political ideologies. Above all else, Travkin has championed "common sense" as the overarching philosophy of his party.

Regarding economic matters, the party claims to be centrist between liberal reformers like Gaidar and the protectionists in Civic Union or the Communist Party. The party supports the notion of private property, but criticizes the present government for failing to promote its creation. DPR also believes that liberalization of prices under the current conditions of a highly monopolized economy has only fueled inflation and decreased production, and not aided the transition to a market economy. More generally, DPR documents and Travkin in particular have criticized the Yeltsin/Gaidar government for the dramatic decline in the standard of living of the average Russian. In the fall campaign, the DPR has adopted the slogan "It is better with us" (*luchshe c nami*) to suggest that such hardships will be alleviated under a DPR government.

The Campaign

Of all electoral blocs, DPR most closely resembles a traditional political party, complete with hierarchy, internal discipline, and decentralized self-financing. However, this highly structured approach has alienated past members of the party, including such prominent politicians as Lev Ponomarev, Marina Salye, Arkadii Murashev, Gary Kasparov, Vyacheslav Fyodorov, and most recently, the DPR's leading ideologist,

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[14] This bloc was actually formed in the spring of 1991 as a faction within Democratic Russia, but then became its own bloc when these three parties left Democratic Russia in November 1991.

Ilya Riotman. With the possible exception of Democratic Russia in Russia's Choice, the DPR also has the strongest set of regional organizations of any electoral bloc. In many regions, however, DPR representatives are still affiliated with different kinds of democratic blocs, making it difficult for them to oppose another democratic bloc.[15] Curiously, however, few DPR affiliates also allied with Democratic Russia have quit the party due to a strong sense of party loyalty and discipline.

DPR has devoted considerable attention and resources to training its activists in campaign techniques and preparing their candidates for elections. DPR leaders see the December elections as an important step in the development of their organization.

DPR leaders have adopted a long term strategy for their party's development. They see this December election as simply one small stage in the party's growth. DPR expectations are very modest; they hope to make the 5 percent threshold and then establish a small, but disciplined party faction in the parliament.[16] This effective faction will then establish a record for the DPR as a party of action.

Like many of electoral blocs, DPR's success depends on the success of its populist leader, Nikolai Travkin. DPR lacks the financial resources to conduct extensive television advertising, and its leaders are hoping that Travkin will be able to participate in public debates with other electoral bloc leaders. Travkin also has plans numerous speaking engagements throughout Russia during the campaign.

Leaders

Nikolai Travkin, Oleg Bogomolov, and Stanislav Govorukhin are the names which will appear on the ballot for DPR.

Nikolai Travkin, a former construction boss and people's deputy in both the Soviet and Russian parliaments, is the charismatic leader and soul of the DPR. Many, in fact, refer to the DPR as Travkin's Party. Beginning with his involvement with the Interregional Group in the USSR Congress of People's Deputy, Travkin has been one of the most prominent leaders of the democratic movement. His image is that of a pragmatist, not a bantering politician. For instance, in January 1993, Travkin effectively quit the ineffective parliament to become head of administration of Shakhnovskoi Rayon, a rural region not far from Moscow. According to his staff, Travkin accepted this job in order to establish a record as a political leader who gets things done. Travkin is a talented orator and considered by many to be a leading candidate to become Yeltsin's successor.

Oleg Bogomolov, Director of International Institute of Economic and Political Studies and former USSR People's Deputy, was one of the leading political ideologists of the perestroika period in Soviet politics. After nearly two years of virtually no political activity, he only recently joined forces with the DPR.

Stanislav Govorukhin is a famous film director known for making political, nationalist movies. His films are well known by most Russians. Like Bogomolov, Govorukhin began cooperating with Travkin from 1991.

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[15] In general, many cities outside of Moscow are still divided between "democrats" and the old communist nomenklatura. While differences between the DPR and Russia's Choice may seem acute in Moscow, members of the democratic camp in other cities are often too small to be divided between different political parties or blocs.

[16] Their model is the former faction, *Smena*, which was small but wrote the vast majority of legislation discussed and adopted by the last parliament.

Other prominent DPR candidates include Sergei Glaziev, former Minister of Foreign Economic relations, who retired in September 1993 in protest against President Yeltsin's decree dissolving the parliament; Nikolai Fyodorov, former Minister of Justice; and Alexander Titkin, acting chief of the Financial Investment Company, and former Minister of the Economy and Minister of Industry.

Unlike most other blocs, the DPR electoral bloc is not divided regionally.

6. Civic Union

As already discussed in the introduction above, Civic Union (*Grazhdanskii Soyuz*) was one of the most important political organizations to emerge in Russia after the August 1991 coup. Formed originally in the first half of 1992 as a coalition of three political parties -- the People's Party for Free Russia (headed by Alexander Rutskoi), the Democratic Party of Russia (Nikolai Travkin), and the Union "Renewal" *Obnovlenie* (the political arm of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs led by Arkadii Volsky and Alexander Vladislavlev) -- Civic Union attempted to construct a bloc of centrist forces between the radical democrats of Democratic Russia and the ultra-nationalists and communists of the "Red-Brown" coalition. In contrast to the communist diehards, Civic Union founders recognized the necessity of transforming the Soviet command economy into a market system. Different from Democratic Russia and the Gaidar government, however, Civic Union asserted that economic reform should be undertaken slowly, without the social and economic dislocations associated with shock therapy. Civic Union's "centrist" path to the market had immediate appeal to all those who suffered during the first months of radical economic reform launched by the Gaidar team of economic advisors in January 1992. By the end of the year, and especially after the naming of Victor Chernomyrdin as prime minister in December 1992, many predicted that Civic Union would form the first post-Yeltsin Russian government.

The increasingly polarized power struggle between the Congress of People's Deputies and President Yeltsin, however, during the spring and summer of 1993, left little room for Civic Union centrists. Political polarization also pulled the Civic Union coalition apart, as Rutskoi drifted into a closer relationship with the ultra-nationalist/communist bloc, while Volsky, Vladislavlev, and other members of Rutskoi's party sought better ties with moderate liberals. By October 1993, the organization was effectively defunct.

After some hesitation, Volsky and Vladislavlev decided that they would seek election to the new Duma. Volsky initially announced the creation of an Industrial Party as his new political organization. Polls commissioned by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, however, demonstrated that the name Civic Union still enjoyed considerable, and largely positive name recognition among voters. Volsky thus revived the name even though the post-October Civic Union alliance bears only slight resemblance to the original coalition. In addition to the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and Union Renewal[17] -- the core organizations of this new electoral bloc -- new allies include the Social Democratic Center headed by Oleg Rumyantsev, the Trade-Union of the Forest Industry, the Trade-Union of the Construction Industry, the movement Veterans for Peace, and individual members of the People's Party for a Free Russia.[18]

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[17] Officially, these two organizations are separate. Volsky is President of RUIE and Vladislavlev is the Vice-President. Vladislavlev is the Chairman of Union Renewal. Obviously, however, they are two very closely related entities.

[18] Other members of the largely defunct People's Party have joined various communist and nationalist blocs, as well as Russia's Choice. Significantly, Civic Union leaders decided not to allow Smena-Novaya Politika members rejoin their coalition as those people's deputies affiliated with this parliamentary faction are too closely associated with those that defended the White House in October. Rumyantsev, who also remained in the White House during the October conflict, had to publicly apologize for his actions in order for Volsky

Program

As already explained, Civic Union supports market reforms but rejects the strategy of shock therapy. Unlike other critics of shock therapy, however, Civic Union has devoted much attention to formulating alternative comprehensive economic plans. Most importantly, Civic Union original economic programs sought to (1) slow down the pace of privatization, focusing on small enterprises first, and insuring that directors, not outside stockholders, acquire majority ownership of their respective enterprises; (2) increase credits to large state factories; (3) accompany these credits with indexed wages and prices (to stimulate demand); (4) protect Russian enterprises from outside competition in the domestic market; (5) disregard the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank, which Civic Union considers a set of guidelines for turning Russia into a Third World country, (i.e., increase the export of raw materials and decrease industrial production). Civic Union has identified factory directors and industrial workers as its primary constituents.

Regarding issues of state structure, Civic Union leaders lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union and consider it absolutely necessary for the Russian Federation to be a unified state. They believe that the union of former Soviet republics will be re-recreated in a more contemporary and voluntary form. For the now, they are proposing an economic federation because of the high levels of economic interdependence. Since October, however, Civic Union leaders have focused more on economic issues so as to distance their organization from the former Civic Union allies involved in the defense of the White House.

Civic Union leaders have rejected radicalism of both the nationalist/communist bloc and the radical democrats. As they did in 1992, Civic Union leaders want to nurture the image of being moderate centrists. With the departure of Rutskoi and the parliamentary faction "Smena," the new Civic Union in fact has become more moderate. In addition, the more influential business interests of the bloc, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and some trade unions, are interested in preserving good relations with any government for future lobbyist activity. The new Civic Union, therefore, is more open to cooperation with the government.

The Campaign

The Civic Union running in the December election is weaker than the Civic Union of a year ago. Given its setbacks during the last years and the image of its leadership as leftovers from the old CPSU nomenklatura, some political analysts consider Civic Union a spent force.

To combat these image problems, the post-October Civic Union has added to its ranks young, well-known politicians such as Oleg Rumyantsev along with reformist directors such as Nikolai Bekh, director of KAMAZ truck factory.

Instead of working through television or grassroots organizations, Civic Union will focus on enterprises as its arena for campaigning. In garnering the 100,000 signatures necessary to qualify for the ballot, Civic Union relied heavily on the influence of individual directors to collect signatures among their workers. Civic Union leaders will use a similar strategy to gain electoral votes in the December election.

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to accept him into the Civic Union coalition.

Leaders

The names of Arkadii Volsky, Alexander Vladislavlev, and Nikolai Bekh will appear on the ballot for Civic Union.

Arkadii Volsky is the present leader of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a former Chief of Department for Industrial Policy of CPSU Central Committee. He has preserved his connections with directors of state enterprises which in turn preserved and even strengthened their influence among their employees. He was very popular in Russian media during last year as the leader of Civic Union. During the fall of 1992, Volsky's name was frequently mentioned a candidate for prime minister.

Nikolai Bekh is the director of KAMAZ, the biggest Russian enterprise for truck production and one of the largest enterprises in all of Russia. KAMAZ was one of the first large state enterprises to privatize and now serves as a model for other large state companies seeking to privatize. A new member of Civic Union, Bekh also has ties with Gaidar's Association of Privatized and Privatizing Industries.

Alexander Vladislavlev is Arkadii Volsky's long time associate. A former Foreign Trade Minister in the interim Soviet government after the August coup, he presently is chairman of the political party, Union Renewal, and Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

Other prominent politicians on the Civic Union list include:
Pyotr Semenenko, director of *Kirovsky Zavod*, one of the largest enterprises in Saint Petersburg; Igor Yurgens, leader of the United Confederation of Trade Unions; Vladimir Piskunov, President of the Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Russia; Oleg Rumyantsev, leader of Russian Social Democratic Center, former Secretary of Constitutional Commission of the Russian parliament, and the founder of the Social-Democratic Party of Russia; Vladimir Ispravnikov, former Deputy of Chairman of Russian parliament and Chairman of Higher Economic Council; Vasilii Lipitskii, Chairman of Political Council of Civic Union, former chairman of People's Party of Free Russia (Rutskoi's party), and a former close adviser to Alexander Rutskoi; Alexander Tsipko, philosopher, ideologist, and present Executive Director of the Gorbachev Foundation; Pavel Voshanov, journalist and former Press Secretary to President Yeltsin; Ruslan Aushev, President of Ingushetiya; and Iosif Kobzon, a singer very popular among older people.

7.Future of Russia - New Names

This recently formed electoral bloc is, in some part, the youth wing of the now defunct People's Party for a Free Russia (Rutskoi's party). Unlike Rutskoi, however, the young leaders of this organization are not militant nationalists, but claim to espouse a moderate, centrist course regarding both economics and politics. Many of its leaders are former functionaries from the former Young Communist League (the Komsomol) who are trying to maintain the Komsomol's former monopoly position as the sole representative of youth issues. The bloc has not well known, has no prominent politicians among them, and does not have many organized regional affiliates. Few expect this group to clear the 5 percent threshold. As the only electoral bloc claiming to address youth issues, however, they may fare better than expected.

Leaders

Vyacheslav Laschevsky heads the electoral list. He is the leader of Russian Union of Youth.

Oleg Sokolov, the second name on the list, is the leader of youth organization of People's Party of Free Russia.

Vladimir Mironov, the third name on the list, is the Director of the Institute of Politics.

Other prominent candidates from this list include Irina Vinogradova, the former leader of the parliamentary fraction, Free Russia, and one of the (former) leaders of the People's Party of Free Russia; and Victor Ivanenko, a former KGB Chairman.

8. *Agrarian Party*

The Agrarian Party collected 500,000 signatures in October, more than that of any other electoral bloc or party. The party grew out of the former parliamentary faction, Agrarian Union, which was headed by the party's current chairman, Mikhail Lapshin. This faction was part of the militant opposition bloc, Russian Unity, which spearheaded the occupation and defense of the White House in September and October. Most members of this party are former CPSU functionaries connected with the agro-industrial complex. While the party was only recently created, it has a very well defined social base from which to launch its electoral campaign.

Program

The party's platform calls on strong state financial support for agriculture. While the party recognizes the necessity of allowing all forms of property -- state, cooperative, and private -- Agrarian Party leaders have made known the preference for preserving collective farms and have criticized Yeltsin's recent decree allowing for privatization of agricultural properties. Because many party members are chairmen of state and collective farms, the party opposes the free sale and trade of land. During the polarized summer months, Agrarian Party leaders supported the Russian parliament in it struggle with President Yeltsin and strongly criticized Yeltsin's economic policy.

Since the October events, many former nationalist leaders from Russian Unity and the National Salvation Front have joined the Agrarian Party as a means to remain active in politics. This strategy proved to be wise as all of the other openly ultra-nationalist electoral blocs were disqualified by the Central Election Commission for having errors in their petition lists.

The Campaign

The Agrarian Party will fair poorly in Russia's major industrial cities, but could emerge as a strong contender in the southern regions of European Russia because of its rural and conservative nature. It considers the Communist Party of the Russian Federation its closest ally. Tapping their tremendous network of collective farms, Agrarian Party activists actually gathered signatures not only for their party but also for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Russian All-People's Union. This party is located, ideologically, somewhere between the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Civic Union, compelling some analysts to label it a centrist party. After the elections it should be able to find common ground to cooperate with both of these organizations.

Though it is difficult to estimate how many votes the Agrarian Party will receive because of its regional peculiarity, 10 to 15 is a good guess.

Leaders

Mikhail Lapshin, Alexander Davydov, and Alexander Zaveryukha head the Agrarian Party list.

Mikhail Lapshin is the currently Agrarian Party chairman and former leader of the parliamentary faction, Agrarian Union. While a vicious critic of the present government, Lapshin is known to be more moderate than many other Agrarian Party leaders.

Alexander Davydov is the leader of the Trade Union of Agrarian and Industrial Complex, (a former official Soviet trade union).

Alexander Zaveryukha is the current Deputy Prime Minister responsible for agriculture.

The Agrarian Party's ranks include several other prominent politicians including Vladimir Scherbak, First Deputy Minister for Agriculture; Magomedtagir Abdulbasirov, Chairman of the Food Industry; Igor Klochkov, recently retired Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (the predecessor organization to the former federation of official Soviet trade unions); Ivan Rybkin, former leader of a parliamentary faction, Communists of Russia; Vladimir Isakov, former Deputy to the Chairman of the Russian parliament, and former leader of both the parliamentary opposition bloc, "Russian Unity," and its sister organization, the National Salvation Front; Valentin Rasputin, a famous nationalist writer; and Vasilii Starodubtsev, Chairman of the Agrarian Union of Russia and one of the leaders of the August 1991 putsch.

9. Communist Party of the Russian Federation

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is the largest communist organization in Russia and the closest successor to the banned Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

After initial disarray, a whole series of communist parties, blocs, and fronts proliferated after the banning of the CPSU in August 1991. Victor Anpilov, Richard Kosolapov and others from the Moscow branch of the United Workers Front created *Trudovaya Moskva*, and later *Trudovaya Rossiya*, umbrella groups for all post-communist communist parties.

Beginning soon after the end of the trial of the CPSU, several former leaders of the Russian Communist Party (created in 1990) attempted to reunite all communist forces into one party. In February 1993, they convened the first congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to which 651 delegates representing more than 500,000 members attended. On paper, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was born as the largest single party in Russia. Only the most militant leaders such as Victor Anpilov and Nina Andreevna refused to join. The Congress elected Gennadii Zuganov, a nationalist (as opposed to an orthodox communist) and leader of the National Salvation Front, as the party's chairman.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was a strong supporter of the anti-Yeltsin forces in parliament. Once the fighting began in October, however, Communist Party leaders did not take sides. Nonetheless, the Party was banned initially in October, but then allowed to resume its activities including participation in the December elections.

Program

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has sought to nurture a image of renewal among communist supporters by distancing itself from the mistakes, corruption, and ideological impurities of the CPSU. The Party has adopted several socialist principles from Lenin's time as its new ideological orientation. For instance, as outlined in the party program adopted by its founding congress in February 1993, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation wants to create a "planned-market economy," based on a system of self-managed enterprises. Land would remain state property, but agricultural and industrial collectives could lease this land for indefinite periods. The creation of this economic system would require the immediate termination of the current government's privatization program, huge investments in agriculture, the restoration of state control of prices and foreign trade, and indexation of all wages and salaries.

Like other ultra-nationalist and communist organizations, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation considers the dissolution of the USSR an illegal act which violates the results of March 17, 1991 referendum. While refraining from pushing for an immediate recreation of the USSR, the new party's leadership has sought to establish a federation of communist parties of the new states of the former Soviet Union. In sum, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation program has blended socialism, nationalism, and imperialism into one ideological treatise.

The Campaign

In the weeks before the registration deadline for electoral blocs, Zuganov attempted to unite all prominent nationalist and communist leaders into one bloc, something akin to the now banned National Salvation Front. The attempt failed as nationalist figures such as Sergei Baburin, Victor Aksiuchits, and Mikhail Astafiev all formed their own electoral blocs, thinking that they stood a better chance running as pure nationalists rather than tainting their credentials with communist allies. None of these blocs, however, qualified for the final ballot. Consequently, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation will seek to gain the support of those voters who would have voted for these nationalist leaders.

More generally, the Communist Party's electorate is not revolutionary but conservative. Pensioners are their greatest supporters. Communist Party leaders expect to win as much as 20 percent of the vote, but mid-November polls show support for this party somewhere between 5 and 9 percent. Its main allies in the new parliament will be the Agrarian Party. The Communist Party will suffer from the decisions of some radical communist organizations to boycott the elections entirely on the grounds that they are illegal.

Leaders

The three leaders of this electoral list are Gennadii Zuganov, Vitalii Sevostyanov, and Viktor Ilyukhin.

Gennadii Zuganov is Chairman of Communist Party of the Russian Federation and former Co-Chairman of the National Salvation Front. He is a popular, charismatic leader. He is considered by many observers to be more nationalist than communist and more moderate than many of his colleagues from the National Salvation Front.

Vitalii Sevostyanov is a former people's deputy in the Russian parliament but is most famous as a former astronaut.

Viktor Ilyukhin is a publicist for *Pravda* and an activist of both the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the now banned National Salvation Front. He was formerly a prosecutor for the KGB and became famous launching an investigation against Mikhail Gorbachev.

Other prominent politicians on the Communist Party list include Anatolii Lukyanov, former CPSU Politburo member, Chairman of Soviet parliament and co-conspirator in the August 1991 coup; Valentin Chikin, Chief editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*; and Gennadii Seleznev, former Chief editor of *Pravda* who was recently forced to retire by the Yeltsin government.

10. *Liberal-Democratic Party*

The Liberal Democratic Party headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky is the most extremist electoral bloc to qualify for the December ballot.

Founded by a handful of people in March 1990, the Liberal Democratic Party claimed over 30,000 members just a few months later. The brash statements of the party's leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky attracted an immediate and avid following although many analysts claim that the KGB helped to fund this organization as a way to break up the vote in the June 1991 Russian presidential election. In that election, Zhirinovsky, a virtual unknown before the campaign, won six million votes or 7 percent of the total vote, placing third in a field of six. The election results sent shock waves through Russia's intelligentsia, prompting many analogies with Hitler's rise to power during Germany's weak democracy in the 1920s.

After the election and the August coup, Zhirinovsky attempted unsuccessfully to join forces with other nationalist organizations. Even the National Salvation Front, however, considered Zhirinovsky too extreme. Remarkably, his small party has survived and successfully managed to collect over 100,000 signatures, suggesting that extremist views have some level of electoral support.

Program

While the official Liberal Democratic Party platform is filled with democratic, reformist discourse, Zhirinovsky is neither liberal nor democratic. Above all else, Zhirinovsky promises to remake Russia into a great international power. According to Zhirinovsky, the dissolution of the USSR was an unlawful act which must be avenged, while Russians living outside of Russia must be protected. Once in power, Zhirinovsky has promised to readjust Russia's borders, making claims on territories in Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Finland. As for ethnic conflicts in Russia and the other new states of Commonwealth, Zhirinovsky has promised to end all wars within 72 hours of becoming President. To accomplish this task, Zhirinovsky has estimated that 300,000-400,000 lives would be lost.

Zhirinovsky is less specific regarding economic issues. At times, Zhirinovsky has called for the construction of a market economy, but on other occasions he has advocated the "quarantine" of privatization and the destruction of the "southern mafia" (i.e. people from the southern republics of the former Soviet Union) and the "Zionists" which seeks to pilfer Russia's assets through privatization schemes.

The Campaign

As in the June 1991 election, the Liberal Democratic Party appears to have access to substantial financial resources to spend in the election. Critics of Zhirinovsky have asserted that he has received financial support from Saddam Hussein.

Zhirinovsky's best medium is the debate format with democratic leaders. Zhirinovsky is a populist, charismatic speaker; the master of one-liners. The more exposure Zhirinovsky gains during the campaign, the better off the party will be.

Leaders

Beyond **Vladimir Zhirinovsky**, the Liberal Democratic Party does not have any other prominent political leaders. **Victor Kobelev**, a sociologist, and **Vyacheslav Marichev**, the LDP head in St. Petersburg round out the party's list for the ballot. The only other notable candidate on the LDP list is Anatoly Kashpirovsky, a popular hypnotist, who appears frequently on Russian television.

Corporatist Electoral Blocs

The following three electoral blocs were formed very recently and seek to represent specific social groups. While the interest groups they claim to represent are obvious, their ideological orientations are vague. Few of their leaders are nationally known.

11. Women of Russia

Women of Russia coalesced as an electoral bloc in an effort to assist women candidates get elected into the parliament. The Women of Russia Movement, Union of Women of Russia, the Association of Women Entrepreneurs, and the Union of Naval Women constitute the main coalition members. While some coalition members are former leaders of communist women's organizations, the ideological orientation of this bloc is still unknown.

Leaders

Alevtina Fedulova is the Chairperson of the Union of Women of Russia and heads this electoral bloc's list.

Yekaterina Lakhova, the second name on the list, is currently an advisor to President Yeltsin on family issues.

Nataliya Gundareva, the third name on the list, is a popular actress.

12. Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR)

This hastily formed bloc combines two different groups: environmentalists and mothers with sons in the army. These environmentalists, however, do not include the Green Party (which failed to qualify for the ballot) or other grassroots environmental organizations. Rather, they are more conservative, affiliated with state organizations and departments. The Mothers of the Soldiers Movement is a well-established, active civic group concerned with remedying the horrific conditions for young soldiers. It remains to be seen what kind of political orientation members of this group would have if it crossed the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Lubov Lymar, the first name on the list, is the leader of the Mothers of Soldiers Movement.

Vladimir Chiburayev is Chief of the State Department on Epidemic Control.

Stanislav Baranov is a factory director from Nizhnii Novgorod.

Another prominent candidate on this list is General Alexander Lebed, the Commander of 14th Army, which is stationed in Eastern Moldova and has been involved in fighting for Russian separatist leaders in Moldova. He is a well known maverick soldier and Russian nationalist.

13. Dignity and Charity (Dostoinstvo i miloserdie)

Least well known of all is this electoral bloc. Formed only weeks before the registration deadline, few expected this bloc to collect the necessary 100,000. The neutral name of the bloc and its main campaign promise of defending the interests of the poor and invalid most likely account for its immediate success. Several of the bloc's candidates are well known political figures from the perestroika period. While still too early to assess its ideological orientation, many of its leaders have moderate socialist views.

Leaders

Konstantine Frolov, the head of this bloc's list, is the acting Director of a technical research institution and the Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Nikolai Gubenko is a theater producer and the former Minister of Culture in the last Soviet government.

Vyacheslav Grishin is President of the Chernobyl Union.

Other prominent leaders include Mikhail Trunov, the Chairman of the All-Russian Council of Veterans; and Alexander Dzasakhov, a former member of the CPSU Politburo and a former deputy in the Soviet parliament.

SECTION THREE

NDI'S SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR THE DECEMBER 12, 1993 ELECTIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) has been conducting programming to assist the democratic transition in the Russian Federation since 1990 and has maintained a five-person field office in Moscow since July 1992. In preparation for the December 12 parliamentary elections, NDI intensified its broad range of training activities. The NDI election support program was designed to promote confidence and participation in the electoral process and, more important, to assist the development of institutions and organizations that are the foundation of a democratic civil society. NDI views these elections as a vehicle through which political parties and civic organizations can enhance their long-term organizational capabilities.

Political Party Training

NDI's expanded activities for the elections included fielding 12 international political experts to 14 cities throughout Russia. These experts arrived in Moscow in late October and conducted a three-week program to assist democratic political parties and blocs in developing organizational skills necessary to compete in Russia's first multiparty elections.

In addition, NDI printed 10,000 copies of a Russian language election-preparation manual, which is being distributed to political parties across the Russian Federation. Finally, NDI prepared a training video designed to assist the political parties organize for the elections. This video was circulated to political activists throughout Russia.

Election Monitor Training

Beginning in mid-November, NDI sent 10 international experts with grassroots organizing expertise to Russia to train nonpartisan civic organizers and political party activists to monitor the elections. These civic organizers -- from the U.S., Eastern Europe, the Philippines and Latin America -- conducted a three-week program in the 14 cities visited by NDI's political experts. The civic organizers provided advice on monitoring activities, including pollwatching and the reporting of election irregularities.

Consultations with Russian Television

To help promote fair and meaningful television broadcasts of election-related issues and candidates, NDI sent experts to Moscow to consult with network management. These experts worked with the two national television networks on guidelines for elections reporting, allocation of free media time and the principles and formats for producing political debates.

Voter Education

In cooperation with Russian television executives, NDI produced three voter education spots for airing on national television. These films explain voters' rights and responsibilities, describe the complex voting procedures and encourage participation in the elections. This project is modeled on NDI's highly successful voter education program that was aired on Russian television prior to the April referendum. NDI

also assisted Russian civic organizations in developing similar public service announcements for the radio and print media.

Legal Clinics

In order to clarify the new election law to voters, NDI worked with the nongovernmental organization Interlegal to organize a series of explanatory roundtable discussions. These roundtables included dialogue between government representatives, political analysts, legal scholars, journalists and international experts, focusing on the rules and processes of elections and the election campaign, the duties and responsibilities of elected offices, the role of independent and political party pollwatchers and the relationship of the elections to the development of a democratic society. Portions of these roundtables were televised nationally.

Election-Day Observing

On election day, NDI's field representatives in Moscow, Kiev and Almaty will travel throughout the Russian Federation to observe the voting and counting process. They will be joined by NDI's election monitoring trainers, who will remain in Russia to observe the process.

SECTION FOUR

REGULATIONS ON THE ELECTION OF DEPUTIES TO THE STATE DUMA IN 1993

Enacted by Presidential Decree No. 1557 Of October 1, 1993

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Article 1. Basic Principles for the Elections

The election of deputies to the State Duma shall be carried out by the citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

Article 2. Electoral Right

1. Every citizen of the Russian Federation who has reached the age of eighteen has the right to vote in elections to the State Duma.

2. Every citizen of the Russian Federation who has reached the age of twenty-one may be elected to the State Duma.

3. Citizens that have been found by a court of justice to be not sui juris or who are being held in detention centres under a court ruling may not vote or be elected.

Article 3. Elections to the State Duma

1. The State Duma shall be composed of 450 deputies.

2. 225 deputies to the State Duma shall be elected on the basis of a majority in one-mandate (one constituency, one deputy) constituencies set up by Federation members on the basis of a single representation quota, excluding the constituencies formed by the Federation members which have fewer electors than the average determined by the Central Election Commission for Elections to the State Duma (to be called henceforth the Central Election Commission for one-mandate constituencies.

3. The remaining 225 deputies to the State Duma shall be elected on the basis of a system of proportional representation in a federal constituency.

Article 4. The Date of the Elections

The election of deputies to the State Duma shall be held on December 11-12, 1993.

Article 5. The Right to Nominate Candidates

1. The federal-constituency lists of candidates for the State Duma shall be nominated by election associations. Candidates for the State Duma from one-mandate constituencies shall be nominated by groups of electors and election associations.

2. An election association shall be a federal party, a federal political movement with rules registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation or a bloc of such public associations, established for the period of the elections. The bloc may also be made up of other federal public associations registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation if participation in the elections is provided for in their rules. A party, a political movement or a public organisation may not be part of more than one election association. A party or a political movement that forms part of a bloc may not act as a separate election association.

3. The submission to the Central Election Commission of documents for the registration of a list of candidates or individual candidates shall be made by a decision of a body of the party or political movement that has been duly authorized in accordance with the rules, and in case of the establishment of a bloc of parties, political movements and other public associations - by a joint decision of the respective authorized bodies of the member organizations.

Article 6. Financing the Elections

1. The financing of all activities associated with the organisation and holding of elections to the State Duma shall be done out of the resources of the Republican Budget of the Russian Federation.

2. Candidates for deputies and the election associations shall have the right to use their own funds and voluntary donations to finance pre-election canvassing.

Article 7. The Holding of Elections by Election Commissions

1. The organisation of the elections to the State Duma shall be the responsibility of election commissions. The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and the lower commissions shall, within the competence established by these Regulations, be independent of other state bodies with regard to all questions related to the preparation and holding of the elections.

2. The election commissions shall operate on a collective basis. The preparation and holding of the elections shall be carried out by the election commissions in an open and public manner.

Chapter 2. Constituencies. Voting Districts. Voter Lists

Article 8. The Setting up of Constituencies for Elections to the State Duma

1. One-mandate constituencies shall cover the whole territory of the Russian Federation and shall meet the following requirements:

a) the availability of at least one election district on the territory of every Federation member;
b) the equality of the constituencies within one and the same Federation member in number of voters with an allowable deviation of up to 15%;
c) territorial integrity: the existence or creation of a constituency made up of territories not adjoining each other shall not be permitted;

2. The number of constituencies for the elections to the State Duma in each member of the Russian Federation shall be determined by the Central Election Commission commensurate to the number of the electors that it had at the time of the April 25, 1993, referendum.

3. The scheme of constituencies shall be approved and published by the Central Election Commission no later than 60 days before election day.

Article 9. The Federal Constituency for Elections to the State Duma

1. The federal constituency for elections to the State Duma shall comprise the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

2. Belonging to the federal constituency shall also be voting districts to be formed in accordance with part 4 of Article 10 of these Regulations.

Article 10. The formation of Voting Districts

1. Voting districts shall be formed no later than 45 days before polling day by decisions of the administration heads of the regions, cities and districts within cities with 100 to 3,000 voters per district. In Far Northern areas, in mountainous and other sparsely populated localities the formation of voting districts with 20 voters shall be permitted.

2. Voting districts shall be formed with due regard for the limits of regions, cities and districts within cities and with a view to providing the maximum of convenience for voters. The borders of voting districts shall not cross the borders of constituencies.

3. The list of voting districts with the indication of the addresses of district election commissions and the attachment of a diagrammatic chart shall be published by the head of administration in the local press within three days and in the form of posters within 10 days after the adoption of the decision mentioned in part 1 of this Article.

4. Voting districts for citizens of the Russian Federation whose permanent place of residence is outside the Russian Federation shall be consular districts on the territory of the host country, or, in the absence of consular institutions of the Russian Federation on its territory--consular districts on the territory of an adjacent or nearby country. The Central Election Commission shall incorporate a foreign voting district into a constituency for elections to the State Duma the population of which is less than the average representation quota. The number of voters added to the constituency in this way shall not exceed 10% of their total number.

Article 11. Voter Lists

1. Area administrations (in autonomous areas not having a district division) and the local administrations in regions, cities, districts within cities, townships and rural populated localities shall ensure the registration of voters and shall hand over to the constituency and district election commissions information on the voters residing within the relevant territory.

2. A clarification of the voter lists shall be completed no later than 30 days before polling day. Voters who have settled within a voting district after this time limit but before polling day shall be included by the district election commission on a list of additional voters on the basis of documents confirming their place of

residence.

3. Each citizen of the Russian Federation who meets the requirements of Article 2 of these Regulations (as of election day) and has a permanent place of residence within the territory of the relevant voting district shall be put on the voter list.

4. The voter list shall be drawn up in alphabetical or other order (by populated areas, streets, buildings, or on the basis of the addresses of the voters). The surname, name, patronymic, date of birth and the address of a voter shall be indicated in the voter list.

5. The appropriate administration, and during the election campaign, the district election commission shall make the voter list available to citizens who wish to see it.

6. The lists of voters with a permanent place of residence outside the Russian Federation shall be drawn up by the consular institutions of the Russian Federation operating within the territories of the respective countries. Voters with a permanent place of residence in countries where there are no consular institutions of the Russian Federation may ask the consular institution of the Russian Federation on the territory of an adjoining or nearby country to be included in their voter list.

Chapter 3. Election Commissions

Article 12. Types of Election Commissions

To organize and hold the elections to the State Duma the following election commissions shall be formed:

a) the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (hereafter the Central Election Commission;

b) constituency election commissions for the elections to the State Duma;

c) district election commissions.

Article 13. The Procedure for Forming the Central Election Commission

1. The Central Election Commission shall comprise a Chairman and twenty members of the commission and shall be formed no later than 70 days before the election of deputies to the State Duma.

2. The Chairman of the Central Election Commission shall be nominated by the President of the Russian Federation.

3. The Deputy Chairman and members of the Central Election Commission shall be approved by the President of the Russian Federation upon submission by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission.

4. Ten members of the Central Election Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Russian Federation from among candidates put forward by the members of the Russian Federation in the person of their legislative (representative) bodies of power.

5. Ten members of the Central Election Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Russian Federation from among candidates put forward by the heads of executive power of the members of the Russian Federation.

6. The Chairman and members of the Central Election Commission shall have a higher legal education or a scientific degree in the area of law.

7. The Secretary - head of the apparatus - of the Central Election Commission shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission.

8. Each election association that has registered its list in the federal constituency shall be entitled to appoint one member of the Central Election Commission with deliberative voting rights.

Article 14. The Procedure for Forming Constituency Election Commissions

1. A constituency election commission for the election of deputies to the State Duma shall be formed in each State Duma election constituency.

2. Constituency election commissions for the election of deputies to the State Duma shall be formed by the Central Election Commission no later than 50 days before the holding of the election of deputies to the State Duma and shall consist of the chairman and 12 to 18 members from among the candidates put forward by the representative and executive bodies of the respective Federation members, with half the election commissions members to be appointed from among the persons proposed by the heads of executive power of the members of the Russian Federation and the other half from among the persons proposed by the respective bodies of representative power. The commissions' chairmen shall be appointed by the Central Election Commission.

3. If the representative and executive authorities of a Russian Federation member have not nominated candidates to the relevant constituency election commission by the deadline set, the Central Election Commission shall make the nominations on the proposal of the political parties and other public political movements of a given constituency within five days.

4. The chairman of an election commission shall have a higher legal education or a scientific degree in the area of law.

5. Each election association that has registered its list in the federal constituency, and each candidate for deputy in the respective one-mandate constituency shall be entitled to appoint one member of the constituency election commission with deliberative voting rights.

Article 15. The Procedure for Forming District Election Commissions

1. District election commissions shall be formed no later than 40 days before the elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council of a new convocation and shall consist of the chairman of the commission and 6 to 18 members of the commission. The membership of the commission shall be determined by area bodies of representative power (in autonomous areas without a district division) and by region, city and city district representative bodies of local self-government, with half the members of the election commissions to be elected by said bodies of representative power or local self-government, and the other half to be appointed by the heads of the respective administrations. The chairman of the commission shall be elected by the appropriate body of representative power or local self-government based on the proposal of the head of the administration. Should the chairman's election fail to take place within the specified time, he shall be appointed by the appropriate constituency commission for the elections to the State Duma.

2. If the authorized representative and executive bodies have failed to nominate candidates by the deadline

set, the corresponding constituency election commission shall make the nominations on the proposal of the political parties and other public political movements of a given constituency within five days.

3. Each election association that has registered its list in the federal election constituency and each candidate for deputy in the respective one-mandate constituency shall be entitled to appoint one member of the district election commission with deliberative voting rights.

4. In addition, on election day the election associations and the candidates for deputies shall be entitled to send to the appropriate election commission up to five observers from each association or candidate; said observers shall be entitled to be present till the completion of the vote count in the district election commission.

Article 16. The Status of a Member of an Election Commission

1. The chairman and the members of the appropriate election commissions appointed by the bodies of state power shall be entitled to a decisive vote in the adoption of decisions by the election commission and shall be obliged to attend all the sessions of the election commissions.

2. The representatives of candidates for deputies and election associations shall have deliberative voting rights.

3. The members of the commission with decisive anddeliberative voting rights shall:
be informed in good time of sessions of the appropriate election commission and attend them;
be entitled to speak at sessions of the appropriate election commission, put forward proposals on matters coming within the competence of the appropriate election commission and demand the holding of a vote on them; be entitled to ask other commission members questions relating to the agenda and receive substantive answers to their questions; be entitled to acquaint themselves with any documents and materials of the appropriate election commission.

Article 17. The Powers of the Central Election Commission

1. The Central Election Commission shall:

a) give explanations of the procedure for applying the present Regulations and ensure their uniform execution;

b) guide the work of the constituency election commissions;

c) examine applications and complaints against decisions and actions by constituency election commissions and take decisions on them;

d) in cases specified in the present Regulations, issue instructions and other acts on questions relating to the organisation of the elections;

e) register the lists of candidates for the State Duma nominated by election associations in the federal constituency and of the authorized representatives of these election associations and issue the above-mentioned candidates and authorized representatives certificates of an established type;

f) ensure the observance of equal legal conditions of pre-election activity for all the election associations that have registered their federal lists of candidates;

g) exercise supervision over the legality of the holding of the elections to the State Duma;

h) on the basis of data submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, decide matters concerning the registration of voters who are outside the territory of the Russian Federation with constituencies that exist on the territory of the Russian Federation;

i) decide on the forms of ballots, voter lists and other election documents and the procedure for their storage, and approve the text of the ballot for voting in the federal constituency for the elections to

the State Duma and the model seals of election commissions;

j) distribute funds allocated from the state budget of the Russian Federation for financial support for the elections and supervise their purposeful use;

k) examine the questions of material and technical supplies for the preparation and holding of the vote;

l) establish the voting results in the Russian Federation as a whole and publish them in the press, ensure the transfer of the documents associated with the holding and organisation of the elections to the archives;

m) establish who has been elected as deputies to the State Duma in the federal constituency and issue them certificates of election;

n) draw up lists of people elected as deputies to the State Duma and hands them over, along with the documentation necessary for verifying the powers of the deputies, to the credentials committee of the State Duma;

o) organize repeat elections of deputies to the State Duma;

p) perform any other functions in accordance with the present Regulations.

2. The decisions adopted by the Central Election Commission within its competence shall be binding on the state bodies, public associations, enterprises, institutions and officials who must give it assistance and provide information and materials required for its work.

3. The Central Election Commission shall work till the formation of a new Central Election Commission, in accordance with the Law on Elections to the Federal Assembly.

4. Regulations on the Central Election Commission shall be approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 18. The Powers of a Constituency Election Commission

1. The constituency election commissions for the elections to the State Duma shall:

a) supervise compliance with the present Regulations within their respective constituencies;

b) guide the work of the district election commissions, consider applications and complaints against decisions and action of these commissions and act upon them;

c) register the candidates for deputies and their authorized representatives and issue them certificates of the established form;

d) ensure the observance of equal legal conditions of pre-election activity for all candidates for deputies;

e) dispose of the monetary and material resources allocated by the Central Election Commission for the organisation and holding of the elections in the constituency;

f) establish the election results in the constituency and hand them over to the Central Election Commission and ensure the transfer of the documentation related to the holding and organisation of the elections to the archives;

g) approve the text of the ballots for voting in one- and two-mandate constituencies and ensure that ballots are made and supplied to the district commissions;

h) supervise the provision to district commissions of premises, transport, communications and consider other logistical matters relating to the elections;

i) perform any other functions in accordance with the present Regulations.

2. Constituency election commissions shall work till the expiry of the powers of the Central Election Commission.

Article 19. The Powers of a District Election Commission

1. The district election commission shall:

a) organize the compilation of the additional voter list in the district;

b) supervise the acquaintance of voters with the voter list, accept and consider applications on errors and irregularities in the voter lists and decide matters on introducing the appropriate modifications into it;

c) notify the population of the day of the elections and the polling place;

d) supervise the placement of election canvassing materials in the order and amounts specified in the present Regulations;

e) ensure the preparation of the premises for voting, the ballot boxes and other election equipment;

f) organize voting in its voting district on election day;

g) carry out the vote count, determine the voting results in the district and ensure the transfer of the documentation related to the holding and organisation of the elections into the archives;

h) consider applications and complaints with respect to the preparation of the elections and organisation of the voting and make decisions on them;

i) perform any other functions in accordance with this Regulation.

2. The powers of a district election commission shall be terminated the moment when it submits all election documents.

Article 20. The Organisation of the Work of the Election Commissions

1. A meeting of the election commission shall be valid if it is attended by no fewer than half of the commission members with voting rights and also by the chairman of the commission or his deputy.

2. The deputy chairman and the secretary of the election commission shall be elected at the first meeting of the commission from among its members with decisive vote.

3. Meetings of the election commission shall be called and held by the chairman or, on his instructions, by the deputy chairman of the commission. A meeting shall also be held at the request of no less than one-third of the commission members.

4. Decisions of the election commission shall be passed by the majority of the voting members of the commission present at the meeting.

5. Instructions and other decisions of the Central Election Commission that have a regulatory character shall be adopted by the majority of the votes of the total number of voting members of the commission. The regulatory decisions of the Central Election Commission shall be subject to publication.

6. The chairman, deputy chairman and secretary of the Central Election Commission shall work in the commission on a full-time basis. Other voting members of the Central Election Commission may work on a permanent or temporary basis, taking a leave from their regular place of employment.

7. By decision of constituency election commissions, which shall be due for approval by the Central Election Commission, the chairman and some members of a constituency or district commission may perform their responsibilities in the commission on a permanent or temporary basis, taking a leave from their regular place of employment.

8. Remuneration shall be made within the budgetary allocations for the maintenance of the corresponding commission.

9. The estimate of expenses connected with the activities of the Central Election Commission shall be included in the Republican Budget of the Russian Federation as an individual item.

10. Meetings of the Central and Constituency Election Commissions may be attended by the representatives of the mass media who are accredited to them. Meetings of the district election commissions may be attended by representatives of any mass media.

11. During the examination of complaints the representatives of the parties concerned may attend meetings of election commissions.

12. The minutes (protocols) of the election commission shall be signed by the person presiding over the appropriate meeting and by the commIssion secretary.

13. All state bodies, bodies of local self-government and their officials shall be obliged to render the election commissions necessary assistance for the proper fulfillment of their tasks.

Article 21. Appealing Decisions and Actions of Election Commissions

1. The decisions and actions of the Central Election Commission carried out in violation of the present Regulations may be appealed in the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in the manner specified by federal law.

2. The decisions and actions of constituency and district election commissions carried out in violation of the present Regulations may be appealed at the higher election commission or in a court of justice in the manner specified in law. A preliminary application to the higher election commission shall not be required for application to a court of justice.

3. The Central Election Commission and constituency election commissions shall examine complaints within their terms of reference about the decisions and actions of lower election commissions and shall be obliged to answer them within a five-day period, and, on election day, immediately.

Chapter 4. Nomination of Candidates for Election as Deputies of the State Duma

Article 22. Incompatibility of Deputy Status with Holding Any Other Office or Engaging in Any Activity in State or Other Bodies

1. Individuals whose office, mandate or occupation are, in accordance with the present Regulations, incompatible with the mandate of State Duma deputy shall promise in writing to discontinue their respective activities if they are elected.

2. Should any person fail to comply with the restrictions imposed by this Article, his election shall be declared null and void.

Article 23. Federal Lists of Candidates Standing for Election to the State Duma

1. The federal list of candidates for election as deputies of the State Duma shall be put forward by an election

association. An election association may not put forward more than one federal list of candidates. The number of candidates on a federal list cannot exceed the number of State Duma seats elected in the federal election district by more than 20 per cent. The names of the candidates on a federal list submitted for registration shall be arranged in the order established by the election association.

2. In establishing the order of arranging the candidates' names on the list, the election association may divide it, wholly or partially, into regional groups of candidates. In so doing, it must indicate to which member or groups of members of the Russian Federation each regional group of candidates corresponds.

3. An election association may nominate candidates who are not members of the political parties or other public organizations represented by the association.

4. The federal list of candidates shall indicate the full name, date of birth, occupation and permanent address of each candidate.

5. The registration of a federal list of candidates requires at least 100,000 voters' signatures in its support, of which no more than 15 per cent of signatures should be collected in one and the same member of the Russian Federation. The subscription sheets shall be executed in accordance with the form given in Supplement No. 1 to the present Regulations. Each subscription sheet shall comprise information about the first three candidates in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, and, if the sheet is divided on a regional basis, information about the first three candidates in the Russian Federation member, or members, where the signatures are collected. At a voter's request, the person collecting signatures must show him the full federal list of candidates, in which the names of the candidates and their arrangement are confirmed by the authorized representatives of the election association.

6. Prior to the beginning of the signature-collecting campaign, the above-mentioned list of candidates must be submitted to the Central Election Commission. Upon receipt of the list, the Central Election Commission must hand a certified copy of the list to the person who has submitted it.

7. The names of candidates on the list, their arrangement and the division of the list into regional groups shall be decided by the election association that proposes the list and cannot be changed after it has been submitted to the Central Election Commission, excluding changes caused by the withdrawal of the candidates. In the latter case, no new candidates may be put on the list and no changes can be made in the arrangement of the candidates' names on the list or their division into regional groups. When a list of candidates, divided into regional groups, is registered, no candidate may be included in more than one group.

8. When signing a subscription sheet, a voter must write down his or her full name, date of birth, address and serial number and number of his or her passport or other identification document.

9. The subscription sheet shall be certified by the person who has collected the signatures, who shall indicate his full name, address, serial number and number of his identification card or passport, and the authorized representative of the election association proposing the federal list of candidates.

10. The federal list of candidates, along with the subscription sheets and the statements by the candidates, indicating that they have consented to run on this list, shall be submitted by the authorized representatives of the election association to the Central Election Commission for registration not later than 35 days before the election. The Central Election Commission shall verify compliance of the submitted federal list of candidates with the requirements of this Law and either shall register and make it public within five days, giving the information about each candidate in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, in the periodicals

where federal laws are published, or shall refuse to register it. Each candidate of the registered list shall be issued a certificate of registration, indicating the registration date. The registered federal lists of candidates shall be made known to the central mass media within two days of the registration.

11. If a political party or other public association that has submitted a federal list of candidates separately or within a coalition is declared unconstitutional before election day or if the registration of this association's rules is annulled, the registration of the list or the corresponding part thereof shall be canceled.

12. If no federal list of candidates is registered or only one such list is registered within the time-limit indicated in Paragraph 10 of this Article, election on the lists of candidates shall be delayed by 12 weeks by the Central Election Commission, during which additional federal lists of candidates shall be proposed and other election actions performed, in accordance with the time-limits laid down in the present Regulations.

Article 24. Nomination of Candidates in the One-Mandate Constituency for the Election of the State Duma

1. An election association that has proposed a federal list of candidates may nominate candidates for election as deputies to the State Duma in one-mandate constituencies organized for the election to the State Duma. An election association may nominate no more than one candidate in each of these constituencies. The registration shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 5 of this Article and require that the name of the election association that has nominated the candidate be indicated.

2. The nomination of a different candidate in a one-mandate constituency established for the election to the State Duma, shall require the signatures of at least one per cent of the overall number of voters of the given constituency. The subscription sheets shall be executed in the form indicated in Supplement No. 2 to the present Regulations. Each subscription sheet should indicate the full name, date of birth, occupation and permanent address of the candidate.

3. Voters signing the subscription sheet shall indicate their full name, date of birth, address and serial number and number of the identification card of the citizen of the Russian Federation or passport. The subscription sheet shall be certified by the person collecting the signatures, who shall indicate his full name, address and serial number and the number of his identification card or passport, and by the person for whose nomination the signatures have been collected.

4. Russian Federation citizens outside the Russian Federation may send subscription sheets to the constituency commission of their electoral district through the consular institutions of the Russian Federation.

5. The people who have nominated the candidate or the candidate himself shall submit the subscription sheets and the candidate's statement indicating his intention to run in the given constituency for registration to the constituency election commission no later than 27 days before election day. The constituency election commission shall verify compliance of the candidate's nomination with the requirements of the present Regulations, and, within five days, shall either register the candidate, make public the information about him, in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this Article, in the periodicals which publish federal laws, and issue the candidate a certificate of registration, indicating the registration date, or refuse to register the candidate. The information about the registered candidates shall be made known to the central and local mass media within two days of registration.

6. If, during the period between the registration of the candidates and election day fewer than two candidates remain in a one-mandate constituency, the elections in such constituencies shall be postponed for 12 weeks during which additional candidates shall be nominated and other election actions will be performed.

Article 25. The Rights and Duties of the Nominees

1. The employer must grant nominees, who request it, an unpaid leave from the registration date till the publication of the election results. During that period the average salary or any other regular income, calculated on the basis of the nominee's salary during the three months preceding the registration date, but not exceeding seven minimum wages, shall be paid to the nominee on a monthly basis by the election commission that has registered him, out of the budgetary funds allocated for the holding of the election.

2. Candidates standing for office in the State Duma in one-mandate constituencies shall be able to use any means of public transport, excluding taxi and chartered trips by other means of transportation, on the territory of the constituency where they have been nominated from registration day till the election results are made public. If the nominee has a permanent place of residence outside the constituency where he stands for office, he shall be entitled to three trips by railway, ship or car (excluding taxi and chartered trips) or one trip by air to his electoral district and back during the aforementioned period. In cities with several electoral districts a candidate may use free city and suburban public transport (excluding taxi and chartered trips) on the territory of the entire city. His travelling expanses shall be paid by the corresponding election commission out of the budgetary funds allocated for the election.

3. Candidates for deputies to the State Duma, who run in a federal constituency, shall, according to the conditions stipulated in Paragraph 2 of this Article, use transportation within the boundaries of the Russian Federation member where he permanently resides or the Russian Federation member where he has been included in a regional group of candidates, if the corresponding list of candidates is divided into such groups. In addition, he shall be entitled to one trip by railway, water, automobile (excluding taxi) and air transport from his permanent place of residence to the corresponding territory of the Russian Federation. These trips shall be paid for by the Central Election Commission out of the budgetary funds allocated for the election.

4. No candidate shall run in more than one constituency with the exception of the cases listed in Paragraph 5 of this Article. No candidate shall be a member of any election commission.

5. A candidate running for office on a federal list may seek nomination in a one-mandate constituency.

6. No candidate shall be prosecuted or subjected to any administrative penalties by a court of law without the consent of the Russian Federation Prosecutor-General. A candidate may be detained or criminally persecuted in any other manner only by a decision of the Russian Federation Supreme Court.

7. A candidate nominated in a one-mandate constituency may have up to 10 authorized representatives, who shall be registered by the election commission which has registered the candidate. An election association which has nominated a registered federal list of candidates may appoint authorized representatives, whose number shall not exceed by more than two times the number of one-mandate constituencies, established for elections to the State Duma, and who shall be registered by the Central Election Commission. Authorized representatives shall comply with Article 2 of the present Regulations. Authorized representatives shall receive from the corresponding election commission registration cards and carry out electioneering and other activities for the election of the candidates. During the period stipulated by Paragraph 1 of this Article the employers shall grant authorized representatives an unpaid leave at their request. Candidates and election associations who have appointed authorized representatives shall have the right to recall them at any time by notifying the corresponding election commission, which shall cancel the registration cards of the recalled representatives.

8. Any candidate shall have the right to withdraw from the election race at any time before election day.

Should he withdraw without any circumstances that may force him to do so (ill health, etc.), the election commission shall make him pay the corresponding part of its expenses, including the expenses involved in the election campaign.

9. The election association may, in accordance with the decision of a body authorized to do so, cancel at any time before election day the nomination of any candidate nominated in a one-mandate constituency and, if the registration deadline established by the present Regulations has not expired, submit a new candidate for registration by the Central Election Commission. Should this be done without any circumstances that may force such a decision (such as ill health, etc.), the election commission shall make the given election association pay the corresponding part of its expenses, including the expenses involved in the election campaign. The election association may remove any candidate from its registered federal list of candidates at any time before election day, but no replacement may be permitted. The report on the withdrawal and/or replacement of a candidate standing for office in the State Duma shall be published within the next three days by the corresponding election commission in papers and magazines in which federal laws are published, and made public through other mass media.

10. Candidates standing for office may not be called in the army before the election results are published.

Chapter 5. Election Campaign

Article 26. The right to participate in political campaigns

1. Russian Federation citizens and public associations shall enjoy the inalienable right to conduct election campaigns for or against any candidates.

2. State bodies and local self-government bodies shall not take part in election campaigns for or against any candidates.

Article 27. The procedure for conducting electoral events

1. State bodies and local self-government bodies shall help the candidates and electoral associations in the organisation and holding of pre-election meetings, meetings of candidates or their authorized representatives with voters. State bodies and local self-government bodies shall respond to the application for the allocation of premises for the conduct of such meetings within five days and grant permission pursuant to the procedure established by the constituency election commission.

2. Pre-election meetings shall be organized and conducted in accordance with the procedure established by existing legislation.

3. No electioneering shall be allowed on the premises of the polling stations.

4. The owners of state or municipal halls shall, upon the request of the election commissions, make them available for meetings between the candidates or their proxies and the public. Election commissions shall pay for the use of such halls within the limits established by the Central Election Commission from the budgetary funds earmarked for the preparation and conducting of the elections to the State Duma. The election commissions shall provide equal opportunities for all candidates and federal lists of candidates.

Article 28. Election campaign in the mass media

1. No poll results pertaining to the coming election shall be published during the last ten days before the election.

2. Mass media organizations whose co-founders include state bodies, organizations, agencies or local self-government bodies, as well as mass media organizations that are at least partially financed by state or local self-government bodies shall ensure equal opportunities for all candidates to the State Duma to make public statements.

3. A candidate shall be entitled to one statement over state television and one statement on the state radio. The procedure for candidates' appearances over state television and on the state radio shall be established by the Central Election Commission with a view to ensuring equal access to airtime (in terms of the length of the statement, time of day and other conditions).

4. On every working day during the last three weeks of the election campaign Federal television and radio companies shall provide no less than one hour of airtime between 7 and 9 a.m. and 7 and 11 p.m. (taking into account time differences between the time zones of the Russian Federation) for election associations that have nominated federal lists candidates so that each election association gets access to equal air time on an equal footing.

Article 29. Issue of printed propaganda materials

1. Political parties and other public associations participating in the election campaign, and candidates standing for office in the State Duma shall enjoy the inalienable right to publish posters, leaflets and other campaign materials.

2. All printed campaign materials shall print information about the organizations and individuals responsible for their issue. No anonymous campaign materials shall be allowed.

3. If constituency election commissions are advised of the distribution of anonymous or false campaign materials, they shall take measures to put an end to such activities and may appeal to the corresponding law-enforcement authorities, requesting them to take necessary measures to suppress the unlawful activities.

4. Election programs and campaign materials shall not contain appeals for a violent overthrow of the constitutional order or violations of the integrity of the Russian Federation and shall not incite social, racial, ethnic or religious hatred. If such programs and materials do appear, the constituency election commissions shall act in accordance with the rules laid down in Paragraph 3 of this Article.

5. Printed campaign materials can be posted, subject to the agreement of the owner, inside any premises, on any building or other facility, excluding the buildings and premises of the election commissions and polling stations.

Article 30. Duration of an election campaign

1. The campaign may not start before the candidate or the federal list of candidates is registered and shall end one day prior to the election.

2. No electioneering shall be permitted on election day. All printed campaign materials that had been earlier posted outside of the polling stations must be removed. In the last seven days before the election no materials damaging the honor and dignity of the candidates may be distributed.

Chapter 6. Financing the Elections

Article 31. Financing the preparation and holding of the elections

1. The funds allocated out of the republican budget of the Russian Federation for the organisation and holding of the election shall be placed at the disposal of the Central Election Commission immediately after it is created and shall be distributed by it among all election commissions.

2. The election commissions shall submit to the Central Election Commission a report on the spending of the funds given to them by the Central Election Commission no later than 45 days after the official publication of the election results.

3. The Central Election Commission shall submit to the State Duma a report on the spending of the funds mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the present Article no later than three months after the official publication of the election results. The stated report shall be published by the Central Election Commission in the newspapers and magazines where federal laws are published and made available to other mass media no later than one month after it is submitted to the State Duma.

Article 32. Election funds of the candidates and the procedure for their creation

1. Election associations and candidates standing for office in the State Duma shall be entitled to create their own election funds to finance their election campaign. Such funds may include the following:

a) funds allocated by the Central or, correspondingly, constituency election commission to the election association or candidate to conduct the election campaign;

b) the electoral association's or candidate's own funds;

c) funds given to the candidate by the election association, party, political movement or any other public association that nominated him;

d) voluntary donations by private individuals and legal entities.

2. The donation by a private individual or legal entity may not exceed an amount equal to 20 minimum monthly wages, in case of a candidate's election fund, and 30 minimum monthly wages, in case of an election association's fund. Donations by legal entities may not exceed an amount equal to 200 and 20,000 minimum monthly wages, respectively.

3. No donations by foreign states, organizations or individuals, Russian legal entities with foreign capital or international organizations and public associations shall be allowed.

4. The right to dispose of the election funds shall belong only to the election associations or candidates.

5. Election associations and candidates who have created election funds under Paragraph 1 of the present Article shall, within the deadline stated in Paragraph 3 of Article 33, submit to the Central and constituency election commissions respectively reports on the spending of the funds. The stated reports shall be given to the mass media by the Central or constituency election commissions, respectively, together with the report on the spending of funds submitted by the Central Election Commission to the State Duma under Paragraph 3 of Article 31.

Article 33. The procedure of spending the election funds

1. All the money intended for the election fund of the election association or a candidate standing for office

in the State Duma shall be deposited to a special bank account, which is opened by the constituency election commission after the candidate is registered.

2. Procedures for reviewing the spending of election fund money shall be determined by the Central Election Commission.

3. No later than 60 days after the results of the elections in a given constituency are known, the election association or the candidate shall submit to the Central or, correspondingly, to the constituency election commission a statement of all election campaign receipts (including their sources) and expenses. The form of the statement shall be established by the Central Election Commission in coordination with the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.

4. After the elections, the unspent balance of the election fund proportionate to the amount allocated by the Central or constituency election commission to an election association or a candidate shall be remitted to the Republican budget of the Russian Federation.

SECTION FIVE

SAMPLE FORMS FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

GENERAL COMMENTS

The December 12th elections represent an important step towards securing democracy in Russia. International election observers will help to demonstrate the international community's support for Russia's democratization process. They also will play a significant role in aiding the international community's understanding of whether these elections genuinely represent the will of the Russian people. This brief manual is intended to assist international election observers in the course of their activities.

DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS

Each polling site will be administered by the District Election Commission (DEC). Each DEC will range in size from 6 to 18 members. The commission members have been appointed by the head of the local administration as well as the local body of self-government. Additionally, each electoral association or candidate qualified to run in the single-mandate constituency may appoint a representative to the commission who may participate in all deliberations but who will not have a vote on the DEC.

WHO CAN VOTE

Every Russian citizen who is eighteen years of age is entitled to vote as long as they are not in detention or *sui juris*. Each voter must present an official passport or identification card to receive a ballot. If voters are not on the official voter list, but can prove to the DEC that they reside within the constituency of the polling site, they may vote.

A voter may receive and cast only one set of ballots. No one is allowed to vote on behalf of a family member or neighbor. Although this has been allowed in the past, it is now against the law.

MOBILE BALLOT BOXES

If there is an individual who is entitled to vote but who cannot come to the polling site, that individual may apply to the electoral commission to have a portable ballot box brought to his/her home or hospital. Domestic monitors have the right to travel with the commission members and the ballot box to these locations. The election commissioners should only take the exact number of ballots requested when traveling with the mobile ballot box.

BEFORE ELECTION DAY

1) Read a copy of the election law to familiarize yourself with the voting and ballot counting process. The process is very different form past elections. Even if you have monitored Russian elections before, it is important that you familiarize yourself with the present procedures.

2) The regulation on the status of foreign observers provides for the Central Election Commission to issue credentials for international observers. Be sure to have your credentials with you when carrying out monitoring activities.

3) The regulation on the status of foreign observers provides that you may enter the voting sites, attend sessions of the election commissions, examine electoral documentation (voter registration lists, ballots, disclosure documents of the political associations, etc.), and observe vote counts. It also allows you to attend meetings and rallies called by electoral associations and candidates, to submit proposals to the election commissions and to hold press conferences.

4) Please review the reporting form which accompanies this manual. It should help you identify things to look for at the polls and may be helpful to your monitoring activities.

5) Every party and candidate is entitled to have five monitors in each polling site. There may also be other international observers at the sites as well as news media.

ELECTION DAY

o Polls are open from 8:00-22:00.

o Dress warmly; bring food and water as well as monitoring supplies; this manual and reporting for may also be helpful to have with you.

WHEN POLLS OPEN

At 8:00 a.m. the chairman will proclaim the beginning of the voting and show the empty ballot boxes to the commission members and observers. The ballot boxes will then be sealed.

Next, the chairman will open the sealed envelopes containing the absentee ballots and place them in the ballot box. The voters will then be invited to begin voting.

WHILE OBSERVING

While observing you cannot:

- o Speak with voters inside the polling sites.
- o Touch any of the ballots or voting materials.
- o Interfere in any decisions by the DEC.

AFTER THE POLLS CLOSE

At 22:00 the chairman will announce the end of voting. Any individuals in line to vote at 22:00 must be allowed to vote. Before the ballot boxes may be opened, the DEC must cancel all of the unused ballots; traditionally this is done by tearing a corner of the ballot or drawing a line through it. The chairman then must announce the total number of unused ballots.

The chairman will ensure that the box is sealed before breaking the seals on the ballot box. The DEC will begin separating the ballots for each category of votes as well as invalid ballots. Any ballot that is marked twice, not marked at all or missing the stamp of the electoral commission and/or signature of a DEC member will be considered invalid.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE COUNTING

Be sure to observe that the chairman records the correct totals on the official tabulation forms which will be forwarded to the Constituency Electoral Commissions for each type of ballot.

Each member of the DEC should sign the report. If they disagree with the report they should write on the report that they have problems with it. The report should also note complaints lodged during the day.

This document was prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in cooperation with the International Republican Institute.

ELECTION MONITORING RECORDING FORM
DECEMBER 12, 1993, RUSSIAN ELECTIONS

Monitor's Name(s) :_____
Monitor's International Delegation:_____
Polling Site #_____ Location:_____

District or Constituency Election Commission
Chairman's Name:_____
How many other Commission members were present? _____
How many other observer teams were at the site? _____
What parties or organizations were they representing? _____
_____
_____
_____
Name of news media present at site: _____

Number of registered voters: _____
Number of State Duma ballots issued to the polling site: _____
Number of other types of ballots, if different: _____

Were official stamps, ink, reporting forms and other supplies present in sufficient quantities? If not, explain below.
Were voting areas private? _____
Were the ballot box and mobile ballot box inspected to prove they were empty before voting began; were they sealed prior to voting; and did party observers witness these steps? _____
_____
Was the ballot box placed so that it and the paths to the voting areas could be seen by party and other observers? _____
Were the voter lists present and in good order? _____

Number of absentee ballots cast and placed in ballot box before other voting began: _____
Did this match the number of voters crossed off the voter list for casting absentee ballots? _____
Number of ballots issued for mobile ballot box during course of election day: _____
Did this match the number of ballots removed from the mobile ballot box at the close of voting? _____

Did the polls open on time? _____
Was the site free of campaign posters and literature? _____
Was there any campaigning at the site during voting? _____
Was the voting interrupted at any time and for how long? _____
Were there any other incidents that may have affected voting; if so, describe in the space provided below.
Approximately how long did it take for a voter to vote? _____
_____

This form was prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Moscow office telephone: (095) 956-63-37; fax 241-23-66.

What time did the polls close? _____
Were voters in line at 10:00 p.m. allowed to vote? _____
Were all unused ballots and stamps put away before the ballot boxes were opened? _____
Were the ballot box seals inspected before they were opened? _____
Did the party and other observers witness these steps? _____
Who was present during the count (which election officials, party and other observers)? _____
_____
Were there any unauthorized persons present during the count; if so describe who they were: _____
_____
How long did the counting process take? _____
Were the ballots properly sorted and counted? Were spoiled ballots carefully reviewed? Were the voting marks carefully read and
accurately recorded? _____

Were the tally sheets properly filled out, signed by the election officials, and forwarded to the appropriate constituency election commission; did observers record the count that was announced?_____

Were there any reported incidents or complaints lodged with election officials at the site during the day: if so describe them below, with names of witnesses, and provide a description of how they were responded to by the officials: _____

R e m a r k s :
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Date: _____ Signed: _____

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ON ELECTION DAY
(describe examples observed)

--Inadequate privacy for voting

--Inaccurate voter lists

--Inadequate proof of identity of voters

--Challenges to voters' identity ignored

--Multiple voting (one person casting several ballots at a time [e.g., for family members], or one person traveling to several polling sites to cast ballots)

--More than one person entering voting booth at the same time

--Voters denied right to vote arbitrarily by election officials

--Ballots deliberately or negligently not stamped by officials

--Vote-buying and/or bribing voters not to vote

--Mobile ballots not cast under secret conditions and number of ballots cast does not match the number of mobile ballots requested

--Campaigning inside or too close to polls

--Intimidation of voters or observers inside or outside polls

--Insufficient number of ballots

--Apparently deliberate delays in balloting process

--Suspension or cancellation of voting

--Failure of officials to respond to complaints

Remarks: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

ELECTION DAY REPORTING FORM

(1) Federation Council

invalid ballots
Total # of valid ballots

Candidates:

(2) Federal list to State Duma

invalid ballots
Total # of valid ballots

Parties:

"Against All Candidates"
(None of the above)

Total

"Against All Lists"
(None of the above)

Total

(3) Single mandate to State Duma

invalid ballots
Total # of valid ballots

Candidates:

Constitutional Referendum

invalid ballots
Total # of valid ballots

Yes

No

Total

"Against All Candidates"
(None of the above)

Total


Signature of Monitor:

_____

СВОБОДА СОБСТВЕННОСТЬ ЗАКОННОСТЬ

ВЫБОР РОССИИ

ДОВЕРЬТЕ СОЗДАНИЕ ЗАКОНОВ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛУ



ЕМЕЛЬЯНОВ МИХАИЛ ВАСИЛЬЕВИЧ

кандидат в депутаты Государственной Думы по 145 Ростовскому Советскому избирательному округу

Чтобы законы,
принимаемые парламентом,
не порождали правовой беспредел,
чиновничий произвол и
социальную нестабильность,
а защищали человека и общество,
их должны создавать
профессионалы, а не дилетанты.

Чтобы парламент не становился
всемирным посмешищем,
позоря страну и создавая
нездоровую атмосферу в обществе,
в нем должны быть
люди, знающие,
как должен работать парламент.

Чтобы неумеренные претензии
одной из ветвей власти
не приводили к пролитию крови,
в парламенте нужны специалисты
по проблемам разделения властей
и роли представительных органов
в жизни государства.

Емельянов Михаил Васильевич родился 9 мая 1962 г. в семье инженеров. Коренной ростовчанин. В 1984 г. окончил с отличием юридический факультет Ростовского госуниверситета.

В 1988 г. защитил кандидатскую диссертацию по теории конституции. Доцент юридического факультета РГУ. Специалист по проблемам организации деятельности представительных органов власти в России и европейских странах.

Автор более 30 научных статей по государственному управлению, конституционному праву и избирательным системам.

В КПСС не состоял. В 1990 году вступил в Социал-Демократическую Ассоциацию. С 1991 г. - член Социал-Демократической партии России и председатель ее Ростовской областной организации. В мае-июне 1993 г. прошел стажировку в Парламенте Великобритании и исполкоме Британской Лейбористской партии.

С 1991 г. является сопредседателем областной организации движения "Демократическая Россия",
с 1993 г. - заместитель координатора блока "Выбор Дона".

При этих объединениях создал профессиональную команду политологов, юристов и журналистов, активная работа которых позволила успешно провести целый ряд политических кампаний.

В настоящее время руководит программно-политическим отделом блока "Выбор Дона".

СВОБОДА СОБСТВЕННОСТЬ ЗАКОННОСТЬ

ВЫБОР РОССИИ

ПРАВОТУ ЛУЧШЕ ДОКАЗЫВАТЬ В ГАЗЕТАХ, А НЕ НА БАРРИКАДАХ



АМЕЛИНА АЛЛА ЛЕОНИДОВНА

кандидат в депутаты Государственной Думы по 144 Ростовскому Первомайскому избирательному округу

Ее стремление к стабильности, понимание важности "житейских мелочей", трезвый реалистический оптимизм - вот качества, необходимые современному парламентарию.

Профессиональный журналист, она умеет четко формулировать и грамотно излагать свое мнение; вопреки сложившейся в Советах традиции, в качестве аргумента использует слово, а не кулак - все это так необходимо новому российскому парламенту.

Опыт участия в экологическом движении привел ее к пониманию подлинных ценностей: Природы, Жизни, Человека. Такая позиция будет способствовать снижению уровня конфликтности в современной политике.

Амелина Алла Леонидовна родилась 13 ноября 1952 года, коренная ростовчанка. Отец - инженер, мать - учительница.

В 1975 году окончила Ростовский университет по специальности "журналистика". Работала в газете "Амурская правда", на Амурском и Ростовском телевидении.

С 1980 года - в редакции "Вечернего Ростова", а с августа 1991 - заместитель главного редактора этой газеты, ведет раздел общественно-политической жизни. Известна как автор целого ряда острых публикаций по проблемам жизни Ростова.

Одна из организаторов общественного экологического центра, член международных экологических организаций. Прошла курс обучения экологическому мониторингу в США.


В 1989 г. была избрана депутатом Ростовского горсовета, возглавляла постоянную депутатскую комиссию по экологии. После событий 3 и 4 октября 1993 г. в Москве сложила депутатские полномочия.

Инициатор создания регионального отделения Комитета по защите свободы слова и прав журналистов, вошедшего в блок "Выбор Дона".

Замужем, имеет двух взрослых сыновей.


ALERTA CONTRA EL SEXISMO EN LA PUBLICIDAD PARA NIÑOS • PÁG.5

REVISTA



9

Diana de Gales reaparece para bautizar el nuevo avión de Virgin



12

Ventoso en el sur y algunas nevadas en el Pirineo de Lleida



GATT

La libertad interesada

Claves del acuerdo que intenta eliminar las trabas al libre intercambio de mercancías en el mundo

LLUÍS AMIGUET


ROCAROLS

¡Que venda el mejor!

El GATT intenta borrar fronteras comerciales y lograr el mercado planetario

LLUÍS AMIGUET


La CE domina el comercio mundial...




LOS TRES GIGANTES DEL COMERCIO


El mapa muestra el valor en billones de dólares de los bienes que Japón, Estados Unidos y la CE exportaron a cada uno en 1990. Las cifras revelan cómo las exportaciones entre EE.UU. y la CE se equilibran y cómo un competidor comercial formidable, Japón, está exportando dos veces más de lo que importa de Estados Unidos y de la CE

La CE tiene un creciente superávit de comida y bebida...




... aunque tiene déficit con sus mayores socios comerciales...







... pero el coste de los subsidios agrícolas crece...



... y los estados de la CE comercian más entre ellos que con el resto del mundo



... y tiene a Francia como el mayor beneficiario de los subsidios



FUENTE: "The Independent"

LA VANGUARDIA

Debe proteger un gobierno a sus industrias y a sus empleos de la competencia extranjera o al hacerlo las condena a desaparecer a medio plazo y frena la creación de riqueza en el mundo?

Respuesta: si su gobierno hace que los coches de importación cuesten más caros con impuestos, el empleado compatriota suyo que fabrica coches asegura su puesto de trabajo, al menos de momento, pero usted tendrá que pagar un precio más alto por un coche que, en realidad, cuesta menos. Está usted, en el fondo, subvencionando indirectamente el puesto de trabajo de su conciudadano. Esta paradoja y otras similares forman parte de nuestra vida cotidiana y nuestras pautas de consumo, y están directamente relacionadas con las reglas del comercio mundial.

Si usted pudiera comprar un coche japonés o coreano, por ejemplo, al precio estadounidense –incluso con el dólar a 140 pesetas–, las marcas europeas pasarían un mal rato. Lo mismo sucedería con las llamadas telefónicas: de no estar restringido el mercado, nadie usaría la Telefónica y sus tarifas. Y así con un largo etcétera de productos encarecidos por las subvenciones de los gobiernos, las tarifas aduaneras o restringidos por las cuotas.

Los dirigentes mundiales creen que las tarifas y las restricciones a los productos extranjeros son malas para todos: para las industrias nacionales, que no mejoran al sentirse protegidas, y para el comercio mundial, que se empobrece al frenarse el intercambio.

La discusión doctrinaria librecambismo-proteccionismo es ya centenaria, pero desde que acabó la II Guerra Mundial los líderes occidentales han estado convencidos de que limitar sistemáticamente la entrada de productos extranjeros y encarecerlos con impuestos conduce a la guerra comercial, a crisis económicas como la de 1929 y, en último extremo, a los conflictos armados.

Estos dirigentes creen que un país tiene dos formas de mantener sus puestos de trabajo: o sus empresas producen mejor y más barato que las de otros países, y así exportan más, o impiden, por medio de cupos y tarifas aduaneras, que otros países les vendan sus productos, aunque sean más baratos y mejores que los que fabrican. Si todos los países eliminan sus cupos y tarifas aduaneras a la vez, todos acaban saliendo beneficiados, porque la economía mundial no es una suma cero. Es decir, no tiene que perder uno para que otro gane: con el intercambio, todos salen ganando.

Ese es el convencimiento que hace 43 años que lleva a las potencias económicas a sentarse a la mesa de negociaciones y tratar de ponerse de acuerdo para eliminar las barreras al comercio mundial. Al acabar la II Guerra Mundial, en 1947 veintitrés países reunidos en Bretton Woods inauguraron un nuevo orden económico y firmaron, entre otros, un acuerdo: el GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Taxes, acuerdo general sobre el comercio y las tarifas aduaneras), que fijaba las nuevas reglas del comercio mundial. Ahora, el próximo día 15 puede ponerse fin en Ginebra a la última etapa de ese esfuerzo por eliminar trabas al libre intercambio de mercancías, etapa concretada en la octava ronda de negociaciones, llamada Ronda Uruguay porque comenzó en 1986 en la ciudad uruguaya de Punta del Este, con participación de 111 países. Ayer se negociaba duramente en Bruselas, con el fin de llegar a un acuerdo de principio en materia agrícola entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea que mejoraría las perspectivas, ya que este apartado constituye el gran obstáculo.

La economía mundial necesita ahora como nunca un empujón en la liberalización del comercio. Además de aumentar la integración regional en bloques como la Unión Europea o el Nafta (área de libre comercio entre Canadá, EE.UU. y México recién creada), las potencias tratan de ponerse de acuerdo estos días contrarreloj en busca de un acuerdo antes del 15, día en que expira el plazo concedido por el Congreso estadounidense al presidente Clinton para poder negociar libremente.

Perspectiva del Tercer Mundo

Si, como todo parece indicar, finalmente se produce este acuerdo, los expertos creen que se inyectarían en el flujo del comercio mundial 200.000 millones de dólares. Hasta ahora, en las siete anteriores rondas de negociaciones del GATT para liberalizar el comercio las tarifas y los cupos aduaneros han sido reducidos en un 75 por ciento. Gracias a esta reducción, comprar extranjero ha sido más barato y mejor en cada país, de forma que el comercio a través de todas las fronteras ha florecido y la universalización del trabajo ha creado una enorme cantidad de riqueza. Ese comercio ha permitido, además, repartirla como nunca –excepto en los países ex comunistas marginados hasta ahora– y ha sido la base para un largo periodo de paz global.

Los países más ricos serán, en efe

Tintín contra el pato Donald

■ ¿Es una película tan mercancía como una lechuga? ¿Es más cultura Truffaut que Schwarzenegger? ¿Si no hubiera subvenciones y protección estatal se representaría a Molière, a Shakespeare?, ¿se leería a Cervantes o a Joyce? ¿Barrería el pato Donald a Tintín de la escena infantil europea si la Unión Europea no protegiera a Tintín con cuotas de pantalla y subvenciones?

Preguntas como las anteriores han plagado el debate cultural y económico intercontinental de la década: la inclusión de la cultura y, especialmente, de los productos audiovisuales en las negociaciones del GATT.

Estados Unidos quiere incluir el cine en las negociaciones, junto con las patatas y las oleaginosas, para que sus películas –la segunda fuente de empleo para los estadounidenses– no tengan que pagar aduana en el extranjero ni verse restringidas como en Francia, donde no pueden programarse en televisión más de un 40 por ciento de películas producidas fuera de la Unión Europea.

Los franceses se han erigido en defensores de la "identidad cultural" europea o francesa y, más aún, de la "diversidad cultural planetaria". Han firmado manifiestos artistas y directores de cine, actores y ex ministros, y se han celebrado encarnizadas polémicas periodísticas, como la que ha enfrentado a Régis Debray y a Mario Vargas Llosa, quienes han suscrito párrafos como los siguientes:

Vargas Llosa: "Cuando funciona libremente, el mercado permite que las producciones culturales de la 'periferia' compitan en millares de salas de exhibición de todo el mundo".

Régis Debray: "¿Qué pensarías tú de un mundo en el que un libro que se supiera de antemano que su tirada no iba a llegar a los 100.000 ejemplares en los seis primeros meses no pudiera materialmente escribirse?".

La postura francesa ha sido secundada en España por manifiestos de personalidades de la cultura.

De momento, es el paquete cultural precisamente el que está dilatando la consecución de un acuerdo final en la Ronda Uruguay. El desenlace de esta película con escenas en París, Hollywood y Bruselas se verá el día 15 en Ginebra.

que más ganen, pero los más pobres también salen beneficiados de la liberalización del comercio mundial y de la eliminación de barreras aduaneras, porque pueden competir con su mano de obra más barata –lo único que les da ventaja competitiva– en el mercado planetario. Al fin y al cabo, lo peor que le puede pasar al Tercer Mundo es que no lo "exploten", es decir, que los países desarrollados hagan caso omiso de él y lo abandonen en su propio atraso, obligando a sus habitantes a emigrar para poder vivir como los seres humanos de los países ricos, a quienes, en algunos casos, ven en sus televisores.

Si se invierte en los países del Tercer Mundo y se les abre el acceso a los mercados, su mano de obra barata les permitirá competir y el trabajo duro puede aumentar su nivel de rentas y llegar incluso a convertirles en nuevas potencias económicas, como les ha sucedido a los "tigres asiáticos" (Taiwan, Corea, Singapur, Indonesia, Hong-Kong).

Si se mantienen las barreras aduaneras y los cupos, los países pobres no pueden vender en los ricos sus productos más baratos, por lo tanto no los fabrican y no crean empleo. O sea, que a falta de trabajo se ven obligados a exportar su mano de obra. Como advierte Peter Sutherland, el nuevo director general del GATT, si fracasara la Ronda Uruguay se producirían emigraciones masivas legales o ilegales de los países pobres a los ricos.

Proteger mercados, no obstante, perjudica a los países exportadores y al comercio mundial, pero en ocasiones, históricamente, ha sido una práctica eficaz utilizada para facilitar el "despegue" productivo.

El caso japonés

Japón, por ejemplo, fue un país enormemente proteccionista y el proteccionismo sigue siendo un reflejo cultural típicamente nipón. Durante los años de la posguerra, Japón hizo que, a fuerza de tarifas aduaneras y cupos, los productos extranjeros costaran mucho más caros a sus ciudadanos, que compraban japonés, no sólo por nacionalismo, sino porque no había otra cosa.

Así, la industria nipona, que estaba desmantelada por la guerra y producía bienes más caros y peores que los de otros países, dispuso de una tregua para "rearmarse" y hacerse muy competitiva en el mercado mundial. Ahora, después de años de reinversión y sacrificio, los japoneses compran japonés, no porque es japonés, sino porque es más bueno, bonito y barato. Han hecho un "ahorro" previo con su proteccionismo, que aún mantienen –de momento– en productos como el arroz.

También el franquismo fue, en la España autárquica y después –como demuestra el caso emblemático de Seat–, enormemente proteccionista.

Pero, a pesar de su eficacia eventual, más a menudo las barreras proteccionistas conducen a la "relajación" productiva. Como no tienen competencia, los fabricantes nacionales no necesitan fabricar ni mejor ni más barato y, en consecuencia, no mejoran. Así que, como regla general, los dirigentes mundiales están de acuerdo en que abrir mercados es bueno, pero el problema se plantea cuando se trata de llevar ese principio general a la realidad. Lógicamente, cada país quiere proteger sus sectores más débiles –sus puestos de trabajo– y hacer que los demás países permitan la entrada de sus productos más competitivos sin que los encarezcan con impuestos.

Detallar ese mapa de intereses comerciales de cada Estado es enormemente complicado y obliga, desde hace 40 años, a que cientos de

LAS BARRERAS PROTECCIONISTAS

■

El proteccionismo conduce a la "relajación" productiva. Como no tienen competencia, los fabricantes nacionales no necesitan mejorar

técnicos discutan, producto por producto y país por país, cómo se puede liberalizar el comercio con el mínimo trauma para las economías nacionales. A grandes rasgos, Estados Unidos es muy competitivo, es decir, que fabrica bueno y barato en alta tecnología, construcción, finanzas y cultura –películas, modas, contenidos–. Así que, lógicamente, trata de evitar que los demás países limiten con cuotas o con tarifas aduaneras la entrada de sus productos.

La Comunidad Europea, singularmente Francia, tiene cinco veces más granjeros que



REUTER

Unos 5.000 granjeros franceses y suizos se manifestaron el sábado en Ginebra



REUTER

A la protesta ante la sede del GATT no faltaron los japoneses

Estados Unidos, por lo que pone empeño en mantener sus subsidios agrícolas para no enviar a sus agricultores al paro. También Japón –sin duda el país que, como primer exportador mundial, obtendrá más de la liberalización– se resiste a abrir sus mercados en agricultura. De modo que los japoneses, para mantener a sus agricultores, tienen que pagar siete veces más por su arroz que los ciudadanos de otros países. Y en el resto del mundo, los países en vías de desarrollo tratan de proteger sus incipientes industrias de alta tecnología y servicios, mientras piden que les den mayor acceso a los mercados de los países más ricos para sus productos textiles y agroalimentarios.

Las reglas del comercio mundial, las reglas del GATT, fueron escritas hace 43 años, exactamente, en la misma reunión de Bretton Woods. Esas reglas definen lo que es comercio legal y disponen las normas para solventar disputas comerciales y velar por la competencia. Para eso, incluso dictan multas contra los precios abusivos (por altos o por bajos) y los subsidios que distorsionan la competencia.

La alternativa al GATT es el enfrentamiento bilateral entre dos países o bloques comerciales. Cuando este se produce, un Gobierno toma represalias contra otro país, restringiendo las importaciones de su rival comercial, que, a su vez, acostumbra a responder.

Por ejemplo, en 1987, Estados Unidos multó a Japón con 300 millones de dólares en tarifas sobre bienes electrónicos cuando Japón "inundó" el mercado estadounidense con semiconductores, chips, baratísimos y de buena calidad. Japón exportaba a Estados Unidos, incluso por debajo del precio de coste real (practicando "dumping"), para abrir así mercados a sus semiconductores en América. Como resultado, los consumidores americanos vieron encantados caer el precio de los ordenadores, pero la industria informática estadounidense –especialmente IBM– perdió miles de puestos de trabajo. Es este un episodio de los muchos que han jalonado el camino hacia la liberalización del comercio mundial. En este camino, los negociadores, además, sufren las enormes presiones políticas de los grupos de interés ("lobbies") de importadores, exportadores, sindicatos o fabricantes.

UN "EMPUJÓN" A LA ECONOMÍA

■

La economía mundial, con la CE en recesión, necesita más que nunca un empujón en la liberalización del comercio

Entre guerras comerciales, sanciones, presiones y complicadas cláusulas, en un flujo comercial cada vez más sofisticado, no es extraño que la Ronda Uruguay dure ya siete años y haya sido la más larga negociación comercial en toda la historia. El último avance importante se produjo en Blair House, Washington, el 20 de noviembre del año pasado. La Comunidad Europea accedió a limitar sus cultivos de oleaginosas y a reducir las subvenciones a los productos agrícolas en un 36 por ciento, así como la exportación de productos subvencionados. Era un importantísimo avance para la Ronda Uruguay, que parecía a punto de acabar. Pero Francia consideró lesionados sus intereses agrícolas y –en medio de gigantescas manifestaciones de agricultores que paralizaron carreteras y ciudades galas– exigieron la renegociación del acuerdo. Ese había sido hasta ahora el principal escollo para la finalización de la Ronda Uruguay.

¿Y España? ¿Cuál es su posición negociadora en la Ronda Uruguay? Básicamente, Madrid apoya las posturas comunitarias y espera que la política agraria común (PAC) no se vea afectada por los nuevos acuerdos de liberalización, aunque el Ministerio de Agricultura mantiene reivindicaciones sectoriales ante Bruselas en sectores como el vino, el arroz, el azúcar y las hortalizas.


A beneficio del consumidor

Quiénes se benefician más de un acuerdo de liberalización? Pues los consumidores, sin duda. Y eso resulta evidente en países como Estados Unidos, de mercados más abiertos que los europeos y mucho más que los japoneses. Esta apertura permite a sus ciudadanos acceder a productos importados con precios muy inferiores a la media mundial.

La voz de los consumidores, sin embargo, es la única que no se ve defendida por grupos de presión sobre los negociadores de la liberalización comercial, que sí reciben presiones, en cambio, de fabricantes, sindicatos, exportadores, importadores o agricultores. Los consumidores apenas cuentan con el valor de su voto en las elecciones como única medida de presión.

En estos momentos, una familia de cuatro personas de la Europa comunitaria está pagando 8.000 pesetas extra por el azúcar que consume anualmente, a fin de pagar los impuestos que Bruselas impone al azúcar de importación. Una familia británica, por ejemplo, paga 200.000 pesetas al año de sobreprecio en su consumo de productos vegetales para mantener a los agricultores europeos subvencionados. Y la lista continuaría, extendiéndose a los automóviles, la informática, la electrónica... Una liberalización del comercio mundial, aun siendo parcial, repercutirá inmediatamente en los precios de numerosos productos.●

EL PACÍFICO GANA AL ATLÁNTICO



LA VANGUARDIA

BARCELONA

LA CRÓNICA

F. GONZÁLEZ LEDESMA

Bombillas para soñar

Todos llevamos en el fondo de nuestros corazones un bando municipal de riguroso cumplimiento, y además a fecha fija. Cuando lleguen los días de Navidad se servirán ustedes –dice el bando– confiar en que les tocará la lotería, creer que sigue habiendo algo en su libreta de ahorros, desear ver a los parientes, aunque los parientes sean a veces unos pelmazos, y buscar la ilusión en la mirada de sus hijos. Se servirán ustedes –sigue diciendo el bando– sonreír a los Papá Noel de las tiendas, dormir abrazados a una tarjeta de crédito, acordarse de que un día amaron y pueden seguir amando, y, sobre todo, se servirán ustedes, señores ciudadanos de Barcelona, mirar los adornos de luz de nuestras calles y creer que las bombillas son estrellitas de la buenaventura, cometas de la felicidad que se han instalado aquí sin pagar radicación, en un descuido del señor **Maragall**.

Después del día de Reyes, cuando la última bombillita se apague y el último niño deje de oír el galope de la cabalgata real, nos daremos cuenta de que los alcaldes no se descuidan nunca. Las 250.000 bombillas de este año las pagamos entre comerciantes y vecinos, como debe ser, para animarnos unos a otros. Si este año del Señor puede poner en peligro 250.000 empleos, criar una arruga en las frentes de 250.000 madres de familia y fabricar 250.000 deudas, que nos dé también al menos 250.000 esperanzas, 250.000 parpadeos de luz y en definitiva 250.000 ilusiones convertidas en bombillas.

En virtud del bando municipal que llevan ustedes dentro, señores ciudadanos de Barcelona, se servirán estos días creer en su buena estrella. No se queden en casa, no busquen en las habitaciones conocidas el sentido del tiempo ni miren sus relojes en los que ya no hay manos de artesano, sino corazones de cuarzo. Salgan a la calle y vean las luciérnagas amigas: las luciérnagas que dan un sí a la Rambla y desvelan a los pájaros con permiso de residencia. Las que llegan a la profundidad centenaria de las Rondas, las que hacen brotar un amor en una tienda de la calle Pelai, las que hacen nacer en las puertas de los grandes almacenes una sonrisa de niño, una ilusión de madre y, en las manos del padre, una máquina de calcular. Las máquinas de calcular, estos días, siempre nos dan datos falsos, pero no importa: quizás es que tienen escondido un corazón y cuentan números, pero también esperanzas.

Hace tiempo un escritor ya fallecido, **Tomás Salvador**, se preguntaba en un artículo por qué no continuábamos todo el año con las luces de Navidad, con las sonrisas, los regalos y los amores compartidos. Es decir, por qué no continuábamos todo el año –pienso yo ahora– con las mentiras hechas puntitos de luz. Pero es que no son mentiras: son verdades imposibles, que no es lo mismo. Las 250.000 bombillas del alumbrado navideño de estos días son, al fin y al cabo, 250.000 promesas, de las cuales quizás alguna se cumpla, y su consumo son 5.500 kilowatios de amores soñados, de los cuales quizás algunos se hagan realidad en la calle. Yo reivindico, mientras contemplo las luminarias de Navidad, el constructivo arte de fabricar mentiras, con cuatro condiciones: que sean mentiras nobles, que sean creíbles, que sean hermosas y que no incrementen el déficit público y municipal.

¡Amigos, hosanna! Salgamos a la calle. Saludemos a las luces de la buena voluntad.



DAVID AIROB

Barcelona se ha iluminado con 250.000 bombillas para soñar en tiempos de crisis

LA NOCHE AL DÍA

Santas, pero ¿inocentes?

JOSEP SANDOVAL



Rosa Villacastín lo cuenta todo

Dice la abogada **Remedios Avilés** que, cuando se le presenta una separación, los matrimonios empiezan discutiendo por la custodia de los hijos y terminan a bofetada limpia por el equipo de música. Y por esta regla de oro pasan hasta las vips más vips, aquellas que han recabado la atención de la periodista **Rosa Villacastín**, que las ha reunido en un libro titulado "El club de las santas". En las páginas, divertidas en rosa, salen todas aquellas que son y están. A lo mejor que ni son, pero de quienes todos conocen al dedillo sus vidas y milagros. De ahí lo de las "santas", suponemos. **Rosa** es una pluriempleada del amor, todo sea dicho en el mejor sentido literario de la palabra. Se sabe todas las coordenadas amatorias de las selectas de lujo, apellidos célebres de esos que le asaltan a uno que las conoce y recuerda mejor que la lista de los reyes godos, y eso que las guapas en cuestión únicamente aparecen en las revistas que sólo se leen "en la peluquería y en la consulta del médico". **Rosa** está en todas partes, hasta salió la otra noche en el cursillo intensivo de italiano de **Raffaella Carrá** que TVE1 ha preparado con vistas a una normalización del idioma y facilitar al mismo tiempo una aproximación entre el proletariado español y el del país vecino a través de la rubia teñida que canta, baila y da esplendor. La periodista está martes y viernes en los "Días de radio", que comanda la guapa **Concha García Campoy**. Y allí se suelta la lengua. Pero como ya se sabe que las palabras vuelan y lo escrito queda, ahí está el libro donde no se salva ninguna. Todo lo más la ex esposa de **Mariano Rubio**, **Isabel Azcárate**, que cuando su ex la cambió por **Carmen Posadas**, ella hacía ya tiempo que había abandonado la labor, es decir se habían separado tras veinte años de matrimonio. Tiene gracia, en otro orden de cosas, la presentación a lo triunvirato de determinadas situaciones. Por ejemplo, **Elena Arnedo**, **Miguel Boyer**, **Isabel Preysler**. O esta otra: **Matilde González**, **José Federico de Carvajal**, **Elena Boyra**. No puede obviar **Villacastín** sus simpatías hacia una u otra persona. Pero la objetividad, cuando se vive y se disfruta Madrid, no puede ser de otra manera: se ama o se odia, se critica o se peca. Nunca, salvo en el caso de **Almodóvar**, se mantienen las posturas unilaterales. Claro que al cineasta manchego no se le ha detectado aún infidelidad manifiesta ni siquiera con sus mujeres al borde del ataque de nervios.

Que eso debe ser, más o menos, lo que deben haber sentido en sus carnes algunas de las famosas cuyas trayectorias amatorias se definen en el libro en cuestión. Un tratado general básico de cómo el amor es patrimonio de la Bolsa , como el honor lo es del alma. Y aunque las dos sean cosas divinas (en la primera de ellas es el corazón el rey del juego), salta a la vista que historias como la que abre esta guía de la infidelidad no tiene pérdida. Más allá del terceto, número mágico para el inicio de cualquier relato de desamor, se marca **Villacastín** una sexteto que no tiene desperdicio: **Alicia Koplowitz**, **Alberto Cortina**, **Marta Chávarri**, **Esther Koplowitz**, **Alberto Alcocer**, **Margarita Hernández**. Todo es amor y lujo en esta historia de **Rosa** en rosa. Y es que ya se sabe que las penas del amor, con "jet", velero, cuenta corriente, visón y chalet en la sierra, siempre son menos.

Agenda

MÚSICA

21.00 Representación de la ópera "La fille du régiment", de Gaetano Donizetti. Gran Teatre del Liceu. Rambla, 65

22.00 Actuación del grupo Vinyals-Giannotti. Harlem Jazz Club. Comtessa Sobradiel, 8

23.30 Jam session con Alfredo Karam. Barcelona Pipa Club. Plaza Reial, 3

VARIOS

11.00 Taller de instrumentos musicales. Centre Permanent d'Artesania. Paseo de Gràcia, 55

21.30 III Vetlla de la Immaculada. Iglesia de Santa Maria del monasterio de Pedralbes

22.30 Discoteca familiar. Casa Regional de Murcia y Albacete. Portaferrissa, 21

FERIAS

9.00 Mercat Gòtic. Plaza del Pi. Horario: de 9.00 a 21.00 horas. Hasta el 24 de diciembre

9.00 Fira de Santa Llúcia. Pla de la Catedral.Horario: de 9.00 a 22.00 horas. Hasta el 23 de diciembre

10.00 Fira de Nadal. Plaza de la Sagrada Família. Horario: de 10.00 a 22.00 horas. Hasta el 21 de diciembre

Música clásica

■ A las 19.30 horas, concierto de Marta Guasch (saxo), Joan Josep Villarroyo (flauta), Agnès Borràs (piano) y el Quartet de Flautes Fu-Mon, ganadores de los podios musicales de la Escola de Música de Sant Joan de Vilatorrada. Caja de Madrid. Plaza Catalunya, 9



Marta Guasch

EXPOSICIONES

9.00 "Artifici i desig", artesanía. Centre Artesà Tradicionàrius. Travessia de Sant Antoni, 6-8. Abierta hasta el 17 de diciembre

10.00 Inauguración de "Jean- Martin Charcot: homenaje en el centenario de su muerte". Palacio de Congresos. Avda. Reina Maria Cristina, s/n. Hasta el 10 de diciembre

10.00 Setmana del Llibre Infantil i Juvenil. Saló del Tinell. Plaza del Rei, 9. Abierta hasta el 17 de diciembre

Mañana

10.30 Varios. Celebración de la eucaristía, presidida por el arzobispo Ricard M. Carles, con motivo de la Immaculada. Catedral

21.00 Música. Royal Scottish National Orchestra y Orfeó Català. Palau de la Música Catalana. Sant Francesc de Paula, 2

0.00 Música. Fiesta del bugui bugui con la Orquestra Terremoto y Frank Mercader. La Tierra. Aribau, 230

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