COUNCIL OF EUROPE
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

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For debate in the Standing Committee see Rule 47
Pour débat à la Commission permanente – Voir article 47 du Règlement

Doc. 8347
15 March 1999

Situation in the Middle East: Israeli-Palestinian dimension

Report
Political Affairs Committee
Rapporteur: Mr Vladimir Lukin, Russia, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group

Summary

Significant progress has been accomplished in the Middle East peace process since 1990, thus confirming its irreversibility. Nevertheless, despite the signature of the Wye River Agreement in October 1998, the present deadlock in the peace process and the lack of progress in the negotiations on permanent status, which are supposed to come to a conclusion by 4 May 1999, are very worrying.

Accordingly, the report calls on the Israeli and Palestinian authorities to refrain from all unilateral action that might jeopardise the peace process. It appeals also to the Palestinian authorities not to declare unilaterally a Palestinian state on 4 May 1999 and calls on the international community to step up its efforts to bring about an agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities before this expiry date.

Finally, the report proposes that the Assembly's competent committees be instructed to hold a parliamentary meeting with delegations of the Knesset and the Palestinian Legislative Council in Strasbourg in autumn 1999 and to prepare a report on practical assistance to the Palestinian authorities in the fields of democratic institutions, rule of law and human rights.

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I. Draft resolution

1. The Parliamentary Assembly, while welcoming the significant progress made in the Middle East peace-process since the early 1990s, regrets that this process is again in a deadlock.

2. It resolutely supports the October 1998 Wye River Agreement and regards it as confirming the irreversibility of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process begun in Oslo. The Agreement both signals acceptance of the process by the majority of politicians as well as public opinion in Israel and is further proof of the Palestinian authorities' commitment to peace.

3. The Assembly reiterates its firm condemnation of terrorism and calls for strict compliance with the security requirements laid down in the Wye River Agreement

4. The Assembly regrets that the negotiations on permanent status have not yet begun and that, given the present political situation in Israel, there is little chance of reaching a positive outcome by 4 May 1999, the deadline set by previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

5. The Assembly calls on both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities to refrain from all unilateral action that might jeopardise the peace process and strengthen the hand of the extremist forces in both camps.

6. Without calling in question the principle of setting up a viable Palestinian state, the Assembly appeals to the Palestinian authorities not to declare a Palestinian state unilaterally on 4 May 1999, taking the view that, at the moment, the consequences of such an action would be contrary to the interests of the Palestinian people and to peace in the region.

7. The Assembly calls on the international community to take prompt action to help produce an agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities setting a new time limit for concluding the negotiations on permanent status and to guarantee compliance with the agreement.

8. The Assembly invites European states, in particular permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union to step up their efforts to bring about such an agreement by 4 May 1999. It believes that initiatives to that end should also be encouraged by the G-8 Group.

9. The Assembly points out that successfully overcoming the present deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is crucial to the peace process in the region as a whole and to resumption of negotiations between Israel on the one side and Syria and Lebanon on the other. The Assembly urges the European Union and Russia, as a co-chairman of the Madrid process, to play a more active role in such negotiations.

10. The Assembly, recalling its Resolution 1156 (1998) calling for the establishment of a new United Nations fund to finance the inevitable resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, urges the international community to begin consideration of this proposal to ensure its early implementation, following the outcome of the permanent status negotiations, as an essential contribution to stability and a reduction in tension in the region.

11. The Assembly declares its willingness to strengthen co-operation with the Knesset, in particular through the Knesset observer delegation to the Assembly, and with the Palestinian Legislative Council in order to promote full observance of human rights in Israel, the West Bank and territories under the control of the Palestinian authority and foster democracy in Palestinian society.

II. Draft order

1. The Assembly, further to its Resolution .... (1999), instructs its Political Affairs Committee to hold a parliamentary meeting with delegations of the Knesset and the Palestinian Legislative Council in Strasbourg in autumn 1999.

2. The Assembly also instructs its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to prepare a report on practical assistance to the Palestinian National Authority with a view to strengthening democratic institutions, implementing the rule of law and ensuring the respect of human rights.

III. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Lukin

I. Introduction

1. The situation in the Middle East has evolved considerably since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The signing of the Declaration of Principles on interim self-government arrangements in Washington on 13 September 1993, the so-called Oslo agreements which they envisage - the *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area* or *Oslo I* (4 May 1994) and the *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* or *Oslo II* (28 September 1995 - and, more recently, the Hebron Agreement (15 January 1997) and the Wye River Agreement (23 October 1998) have created a framework for settling one of the oldest regional conflicts.

2. The implementation of these agreements has enabled considerable and tangible progress to be made, such as the establishment of Palestinian self-government, the setting up of an elected Palestinian Council and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from part of the occupied territories.

3. The peace process has, however, encountered many obstacles, and today it is deadlocked once again.

4. Accordingly, the rapporteur believes that it is necessary to consider how the Israeli-Palestinian agreements are being implemented so as to identify difficulties currently facing the peace process and to try to propose measures to create conditions conducive to progress. This is crucial because 4 May 1999 is approaching, the date on which the transition period ends, and the Palestine National Authority has announced that it might unilaterally proclaim an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

5. The rapporteur hopes that, following this report, which deals with the "Palestinian track" of the negotiations, it will be possible to present a comprehensive report on the situation in the region at the end of 1999 in the light of the political context arising from the general election to be held in Israel on 17 May 1999.

6. From 10 to 13 January 1999, the rapporteur visited Israel and the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority, where he met representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian authorities. He wishes to thank them for the welcome which they extended to him and for the excellent organisation of the programme[1]. He also wishes to express his appreciation to the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Israel and his staff for their invaluable assistance during the visit.

7. The rapporteur sees his work as an extension of the detailed report by Mr de Puig of November 1996 on the situation in the Middle East: the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Doc. 7700, Resolution 1103) and the report by Mr Atkinson of April 1998 on the Palestine refugee situation in the context of the Middle East peace process (Doc. 8042, Resolution 1156). These exhaustive and impartial reports have enabled the rapporteur to avoid recapitulating the historical context of the problem, the basis of the agreements and a

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1 The programme of the visit is appended.

detailed analysis of the status of the autonomous Palestinian territories and the Palestinian Council.

II. Developments in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations since 1996

a. *Interim Agreement*

8. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement ("Interim Agreement"), signed in Washington on 28 September 1995, was concluded for the purpose of establishing how the region should be administered and dividing power between Israel and the Palestinian authorities. Neither of the parties has openly criticised or denounced the provisions of the agreement, but its articles have given rise to "conflicting interpretations" and an exchange of accusations of failure to comply with them.

9. As set out in the Interim Agreement, the election of the Palestinian Legislative Council and of the Chairman of the Executive Authority was held on 20 January 1996 in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, making it possible to set up institutions of Palestinian self-government with a view to implementing the later stages provided for in the peace agreements. In conformity with the Agreement on Gaza and Jericho, signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994, the Israeli army has withdrawn its troops from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and the powers of the Israeli military authorities and civil administration in these areas have been transferred to the Palestinian authorities.

10. The Interim Agreement also called for a phased redeployment of Israeli armed forces in the West Bank. The first phase of redeployment, completed just before the Palestinian elections, covered population areas in the West Bank — cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets — with the exception of Hebron, the city in which Jewish settlers live.

11. After the general election in Israel in May 1996, the new government, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, declared that it was prepared to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority with a view to bringing about a lasting arrangement, provided that the Palestinians honoured their obligations in full. The Israeli Government would, however, oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state and the "right of return" for the Arab population to any part of Eretz Israel west of the Jordan River.

12. Benjamin Netanyahu's uncompromising attitude, the failure to comply with the agreements and the ensuing deadlock created a pessimistic climate in the Arab world. Faced with an outbreak of violence in the Palestinian territories in September 1996 and the deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian talks, US President Bill Clinton invited the leaders of the region to meet in Washington to try to save the peace process.

13. The summit took place on 1 and 2 October 1996 in the presence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Executive Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, President Bill Clinton and King Hussein of Jordan (the Egyptian President declined the invitation).

b. *The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron*

14. Although the parties were unable to overcome their differences, the summit led to a resumption, on 6 October 1996, of the interrupted Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the

redeployment of the army in Hebron, conducted in the presence of United States special envoy Dennis Ross.

15. The protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron to which these new negotiations gave rise was initialled on 15 January 1997. A "Note for the Record" accompanying the protocol reaffirms the commitment of the two parties to continue the process in the spirit of Oslo, but the timetable envisaged under this new instrument was not complied with either.

16. The protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron called for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from four fifths of the city (this took place on 17 January 1997) and subsequent withdrawal from rural areas in the West Bank. It also made provision for the resumption, within two months, of negotiations on the final status of the territories.

17. However, a letter from the US Secretary of State to Mr Netanyahu which accompanied the protocol makes no mention of the territorial extent of further redeployment and states that the two subsequent phases of the withdrawal "should be completed within twelve months [...] but not later than mid-1998". Initially, under the agreement on self-government, this redeployment was to begin in September 1996 and be completed in September 1997.

c. *The deadlock of the Oslo process*

18. Despite these efforts, Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly. Eventually this led to a deadlock of the peace process begun in Oslo. The lack of progress in the negotiations, the unwillingness to implement the agreements, terrorism and the resurgence of violence were all elements which undermined not only mutual trust but also the confidence of both parties in the peace process.

19. The Netanyahu Government's policy of establishing settlements in the Palestinian territories seems to be at the core of the crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The Israeli Government maintains that the Interim Agreement left out the question of settlements so that it could be addressed in the framework of negotiations on permanent status and that new settlements are not therefore a violation of the Oslo Agreement; the freeze on new settlements was merely an internal decision of the previous government which does not bind the present one.

20. The Palestinian side sees the new settlements as a grave violation of the peace agreements. The future of existing settlements should be addressed as part of the negotiations on permanent status, whereas new settlements constitute a violation of the Interim Agreement, which prohibits any activity that might compromise the negotiations on permanent status.

d. *Negotiations on permanent status*

21. The implementation of the last phase of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, which calls for negotiations on questions of permanent status in connection with Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security agreements, borders, relations and co-operation with the neighbouring countries and other matters of joint interest, and which is supposed to be completed on 4 May 1999, has been constantly postponed — in fact, negotiations have never begun.

e. *The Wye River Agreement*

22. In this context, the signing of the Wye River Agreement by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat on 23 October 1998 constituted a breakthrough after a nineteen-month standstill in the peace process.

23. The key elements of the agreement are as follows:

— phased Israeli withdrawal from 13% of the territory of the West Bank and appointment of an Israeli-Palestinian committee to discuss the third phase of redeployment;

— security plan together with a timetable for the arrest of suspected terrorists and the confiscation of weapons by the Palestinian authorities, under the supervision of the CIA;

— release of several hundred Palestinians detained in Israel;

— opening of an airport and a harbour in Gaza and guarantee of "safe passage" for Palestinians between Gaza and the West Bank;

— commencement of talks on "final status" regarding questions of borders, Jerusalem, the autonomous Palestinian sector and refugees.

III. Current status of implementation of the Wye River Agreement

24. The Wye River Agreement establishes a set of obligations for the two sides which must be gradually implemented in accordance with a specific, detailed timetable. But once again, the various articles of the agreement have given rise to conflicting interpretations and to accusations by both sides of non-compliance.

25. Under the terms of the agreement and in accordance with the timetable, Israel implemented the first phase of the redeployment of its army. However, in December the head of the Israeli Government suspended implementation of the agreement, arguing that the Palestinians were not keeping their part of the bargain because they were releasing Islamic militants rather than intensifying the fight against terrorism in the autonomous territories.

26. For its part, the Palestinian side considers that it has honoured its commitments and accuses Mr Netanyahu of using the parliamentary elections of 17 May as a pretext to impede the peace process.

a. *Security questions*

27. Israel is of the opinion that a number of important Palestinian obligations included in the first phases of the agreement's timetable are still in abeyance, notably as concerns measures to "outlaw all organisations (or wings of organisations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure" [paragraph II.A.*c*].

28. The Israelis also accuse the Palestinians of failing to implement the work plan and not committing themselves to "full bilateral co-operation" [paragraph II.B.1] as required in the agreement.

29. Furthermore, the Israelis say that they are concerned about the attitude of the Palestinian authorities towards individuals who are a threat to security, who, they say, are detained in token arrests, only to be released almost immediately.

30. The Palestinians say that they have implemented the work plan to be shared with the United States, which should make it possible to ensure "the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organisations and their infrastructure".

31. With regard to "full bilateral co-operation" [paragraph II.B.1], the Palestinian side considers that co-operation has been intensive, continuous and comprehensive.

b. *Illegal weapons*

32. The Palestinian side has committed itself to setting up an effective legal framework for collecting illegal weapons.

33. According to the Israeli side, notwithstanding this commitment, and despite the decree issued by the Palestinian side, there are still hundreds of illegal weapons freely held in the area under Palestinian jurisdiction, not only in the hands of civilians but also in the hands of the Palestinian police.

34. The Palestinian side believes that, having issued the decree and organised the collection of illegal weapons, it has honoured its commitment.

35. The Israelis say that notwithstanding the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinians have refused to discuss in the Joint Security Committee the arrangements for granting weapons licences.

c. *The Palestinian police*

36. The agreement directly addresses a number of important Palestinian obligations. In particular, it stipulates that, in conformity with earlier agreements, the Palestinian side must provide the Israeli side with a list of its police officers.

37. Although the Palestinian side says that it is prepared to provide such a list, Israel complains that there are too many Palestinian police officers (the number greatly exceeds the 30 000 permitted under the Interim Agreement) and that it has still not received the list of police officers.

d. *Prevention of incitement to violence*

38. Under the agreement, the Palestinian side committed itself to issuing a decree "prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror".

39. The Palestinian side maintains that it has honoured its commitments in this area, whereas the Israeli side says that it is still waiting for the decree against incitement to be implemented.

e. *The PLO Charter*

40. Israel is pleased that at a meeting in Gaza on 14 December 1998, the Palestine National Council adopted a resolution amending the PLO Charter.

f. *Unilateral action*

41. The Israeli side deplores the repeated statements by the Palestinian side to the effect that it intends unilaterally to proclaim an independent state in May 1999 with Jerusalem as its capital.

42. The Palestinian side deplores the fact that the negotiations on permanent status, which should have begun with the signing of the agreement and led to an agreement by 4 May 1999, have not even been started.

g. *Further redeployment*

43. The two sides agree to recognise that, in conformity with its commitments under the agreement and in keeping with the timetable envisaged, Israel transferred 2% of Area C to Area B and 7.1% of Area B to Area A at the end of the second week of the timetable.

44. With regard to further redeployment, Israel expects the Palestinian side to honour its commitments with regard to security.

45. The Israeli side has announced that it does not intend to implement phase 3 as provided for in the agreement.

h. *The release of prisoners*

46. Israel committed itself to releasing 750 Palestinian prisoners in three stages. However, this commitment does not concern terrorists or members of Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. Israel therefore refuses to meet the Palestinian demand that it release those prisoners it considers as terrorists.

47. That being the case, the Palestinian side considers that this commitment has been only partially honoured.

48. Moreover, the Israeli side is of the opinion that the Palestinian side does not denounce manifestations of violence strongly enough and accuses it of ignoring such actions and even encouraging them.

i. *Interim committees and economic questions*

49. According to the Israeli side, all the committees established by the Interim Agreement were reconstituted by the Wye River Agreement, with the exception of the Legal Committee and the Standing Co-operation Committee, for which the Palestinian side refused to meet.

50. The Palestinian side believes that the committees which met did not yield tangible results, except in the case of the committee on the Gaza industrial estate and airport and the committee on the ministerial conference of donors.

IV. Position of the Council of Europe

51. Given the complexity of the current situation, the rapporteur deems it useful to draw attention to the political principles formulated by the Assembly in various texts which it has adopted and on which a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be based:

a. implementation of a settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

b. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

c. respect for the principles of democracy and the rule of law;

d. the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and the assurance of identical security and favourable conditions of development for all the states of the region;

e. a firm denunciation of terrorism in all its forms and of the use of military methods and, more generally, of force to resolve the problem;

f. support for the decisions of the Madrid Conference, the Washington Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; requirement of strict compliance by all sides with the agreements set out in these documents;

g. support for the start, as soon as possible, of negotiations on final status and the avoidance of any action that might be prejudicial to them, such as the extension of Jewish settlements on Palestinian territory or a change in the status of the holy places of Jerusalem;

h. support for political initiative by Europe to bring about a settlement of the conflict, the promotion of active co-operation with the countries involved in the Madrid Conference, in particular both co-chairmen of the Conference, and the closest possible ties between Europe, Israel and the autonomous Palestinian territories in various areas.

V. Conclusions

a. *General situation*

52. During meetings between the rapporteur and senior Israeli and Palestinian officials, each side considered that the other was responsible for the Wye River Agreement's not having been implemented and for the current deadlock in the peace process.

53. Basically, the Palestinian authorities maintain that Israel has not undertaken the redeployment stipulated under the agreement, whereas Israel claims that the Palestinians have not honoured their commitments with regard to security (outlawing of terrorist organisations, confiscation of illegal weapons, etc.). The rapporteur recognises the legitimate Israeli concern about security, but this should not be systematically used to suspend the peace process unilaterally.

54. As for positive aspects, the Israeli authorities have stressed the fact that the Wye River Agreement constitutes a turning-point, even if it has not yet been fully implemented. The signing of this agreement by the Netanyahu Government means that, for the first time, Israel's political right wing officially accepts the peace process started in Oslo.

55. Likewise, Israeli public opinion seems increasingly convinced that there is no real alternative to the peace process. Today very few people believe that the best option is isolation and a suspension of negotiations. The internal discussion revolves mostly on rhythm and practical terms of the final agreement.

56. The Palestinian question might have a significant impact on the results of the May elections. More particularly, the position of the Palestinian authorities regarding 4 May 1999, the date set for the completion of negotiations on final status, will play a crucial role.

57. The unilateral proclamation of a Palestinian state on 4 May — one possible option — would probably help improve the results of the right-wing parties and the fundamentalists. Israeli officials maintain that if such a unilateral act were to take place, the Wye River Agreement would automatically become null and void and consideration would be given to such measures as the annexation of territories still under Israel's control.

58. A unilateral proclamation hardly seems to appeal to the Palestinian authorities, but they argue that failure to meet this deadline would:

— undermine all future deadlines;

— strengthen extremist Palestinian movements, such as Hamas.

59. A way out of this deadlock might take the form of a new initiative by the international community, which might constitute an alternative for the Palestinian authorities. According to certain officials on both sides, a new agreement together with international guarantees might include recognition by Israel of the principle of the creation of a future Palestinian state and the setting of a new deadline for the completion of negotiations on final status.

60. In this connection, emphasis has been placed on the need for more active involvement by the European Union and other European states, in particular those that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

61. It therefore appears that it would be extremely difficult to resume the Israeli-Palestinian peace process before summer 1999, and until then it is important that neither side take unilateral action in defiance of the other, which might scuttle the peace process once and for all.

62. It goes without saying that progress on the Syrian and Lebanese aspects of the peace process, presently at a standstill, will also strongly depend on the results of the elections.

b. *Contribution of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly*

63. Both the Israeli and the Palestinian officials have recognised that the Council of Europe can and must play a role in the peace process in its area of competence.

64. The rapporteur points out that the current tensions in Israeli-Palestinian relations are due to a large extent to lack of confidence between the two sides. The creation of a climate of confidence is thus one of the areas on which the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly might focus its contribution.

65. Likewise, the Assembly might turn its attention to questions concerning human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of movement, in both Israel and the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The question of citizenship might also be discussed.

66. Some Israeli officials have stressed that the most important guarantee for Israel's security is the democratisation of Palestinian society and that the Parliamentary Assembly could make a contribution in this respect.

67. Consequently, the rapporteur proposes that the Assembly instruct its Political Affairs Committee to organise a meeting between a delegation of the Knesset (which, it should be remembered, has the status of observer in the Assembly) and a delegation of the Palestinian Legislative Council in order to hold an exchange of views on the above-mentioned subjects. Such an encounter could probably take place in autumn 1999.

APPENDIX

Programme of the visit of Mr Vladimir Lukin, Rapporteur, to Israel and to the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority (10-13 January 1999)

Sunday 10 January 1999

13.00	Lunch offered by the Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, responsible for Eastern European countries

Monday 11 January 1999

10.00	Meeting with Mr Ezer Weizman, President of Israel
11.30	Meeting with Mr. Natan Sharanski, Minister of Industry and Trade of Israel
13.00	Meeting with Mr. Ariel Sharon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
19.00	Participation in the Opening Ceremony of the Perez Center for Peace 2nd Annual Meeting of the International Board of Governors

Tuesday 12 January 1999

Meetings with the Palestinian authorities

10.00	Meeting with Mr Sa'ed Erikat, Minister for Local Self-Government
12.00	Meeting with Mr Ahmed Qurie, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council
13.00	Meeting with Mr Abu Amri, Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and Mr Kamel Sharafi, Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights of the Palestinian Legislative Council
17.00	Meeting with Mr Faisal Huseini, Minister for Jerusalem
19.00	Meeting with Mr Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian Executive Authority

Wednesday 13 January 1999

7.45	Meeting with Mr Yuri Shtern, member of the Knesset
9.00	Meeting with Mr. Yossi Beylin, member of the Knesset
11.30	Visit of the Knesset
12.00	Lunch with members of the Observer delegation of the Knesset with the Parliamentary Assembly

Reporting committee : Political Affairs Committee

Reference to committee : Resolution 1013 (1993), Recommendation 1221 (1993), Doc. 7363 and Reference No. 2027 of 25 September 1995

Budgetary implications for the Assembly : none

Draft resolution and opinion unanimously adopted by the committee on 11 March 1999.

Members of the Committee : *Mr Ruffy (Chairperson)*, *Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson)*, *Mr Toshev (Vice-Chairperson)*, MM Arzilli, *Atkinson, Bársony*, Behrendt, Bergqvist, Björck, Blaauw *(alternate: Mrs Gelderblom-Lankhout)*, MM Bloetzer, *Bühler,* Chornovil, Daly, *Davis*, Demetriou, *Dokle*, *Domljan*, *Fico*, Gjellerod *(alternate: Mrs Severinsen)*, MM Gligoroski, Glotov, Gül, Mrs Iotti *(alternate: Mr Evangelisti)*, *Mr Iwinski*, Mrs Kautto, MM *Kirilov*, Krzaklewski *(alternate: Mr Adamczyk)*, *Kuzmickas*, *Mrs Lentz-Cornette*, MM *Lopez Henares*, *Lupu*, van der Maelen, Maginas, Martinez *(alternate: Mr de Puig)*, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Micheloyiannis, Mota Amaral, Mutman, Nallet *(alternate: Mr Baumel, Vice-Chairman)*, Nedelciuc, Mrs Nemkova, MM *Neuwirth*, Oliynyk, Pahor, *Palmitjavila Ribo,* Prusak, Mrs Ragnarsdottir, Mrs Roudy, MM Schieder, Schloten *(alternate: Mr Neumann)*, *Schwimmer,* Selva, *Sinka,* Mrs Smith *(alternate: Mrs Fyfe)*, *Mrs Stanoiu*, Mrs Stepová, MM Surjan, Thoresen, Timmermans, Urbain, Vella, *Volcic*, Zhebrovsky *(alternate: Mr Lukin)*.

N.B. The names of the members who took part in the vote are printed in italics

Secretaries of the Committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Sich

Notre perplexité :

Nous sommes entre deux violences : celle de l'unité du Kosovo et celle de l'E.L.K. et nous essayons de lutter contre elle avec une autre violence :

Est-ce que nous cherchons : la paix. ~~Il faut~~ Le retour des réfugiés.

Nous devons protéger ~~deux~~ of our peuples : ~~Albanais~~ et Kosovars.

Nos armes ? Le droit.

Ouvrir ce pays à une alternative démocratique en l'ouvrant aussi au Kosovo.

Comment ? Avec des sanctions. Mais il faut pas aller jusqu'au fond. Bombardements sont inutiles.

Mais il faut envoyer une autre envoyé plus expérimenté du Kosovo pour les Nations Unies et l'OTAN.

Et co-habiter à faire apprendre

~~une alternative de société~~